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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

NIC #05136-87  
22 December 1987

National Intelligence Council

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM: Walter L. Barrows  
National Intelligence Officer for Africa

SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report: Sub-Saharan Africa [REDACTED]

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1. Intelligence community representatives discussed the following topics at the monthly warning meeting on 15 December.

2. Warning Notes

- President Habre of Chad probably will delay any attack on Libyan forces in the Aozou Strip until after the OAU Summit meeting scheduled for January 1987. Nonetheless, Chadian forces are capable of attacking without further warning. Libya is likely to strike first if Habre delays several more months.
- More than just rotating troops as it normally does at this time of year, Cuba may be increasing its forces in Angola. South Africa is not yet withdrawing all its forces from Angola. UNITA--with or without South African help--may try to cut off approximately eight demoralized Angolan brigades now concentrated at Cuito Cuanavale.
- More ANC attacks in South Africa are likely, but not a spectacular escalation. South Africa may strike perceived ANC targets--particularly in Botswana--but probably with a small-scale covert operation rather than a large, undeniable raid.
- Zimbabwe is reducing its forces in Mozambique in order to protect its eastern border against RENAMO guerrilla raids. Harare will not give up protecting the road, rail, and pipeline to Beira port, and the road to Malawi through Mozambique's Tete Province, but it probably will send only a few hundred troops and some militia to help guard the Limpopo rail line to Maputo.

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
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-- CIA cautioned that the government of Mauritania could fall at any time, although other analysts give it a slightly better chance of weathering more Toucouleur demonstrations, avoiding involvement in Polisario's War, and coping with intractable economic problems.

-- Sudan has lost two eastern border garrisons to SPLA insurgents with artillery support from Ethiopia, and new Libyan military aid to Khartoum may increase Qadhafi's leverage there.

 a Sudanese coup is increasingly likely by military officers who are dissatisfied with Prime Minister Sadiq's Libyan ties and his inability to end the insurgency in southern Sudan.

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DISCUSSION



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-- In Zaire, [redacted] Mobutu's rumored poor health and well-known dissatisfaction with falling US aid levels. Copper prices probably won't hold, and infrastructure is in poor shape.

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-- Cameroon's economy is probably in worse shape than most [redacted] realize. It has been hurt by the falling dollar and oil prices [redacted]

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[redacted] President Biya's wish to devolve more authority to the cabinet is still only a wish.

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[redacted] Chad's economic potential, however, seems slight. In particular, its poor roads raise transportation costs exorbitantly.

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5. Chad/Libya. The NIO asked DIA to lead the discussion on Chad.

-- Indications of Chadian readiness to attack have been visible for several months, yet Habre has allowed the momentum to be lost. He probably is using the delay to establish a logistic base at Miski, mass more forces in the north, and continually revise his tactical plans as Libya improves defenses at Aozou airbase. If the OAU meeting slips to February or March and Habre continues to delay, his military capabilities may erode.

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-- INR suggested that the Chadians will attack before April. Otherwise, Habre probably anticipates, the Libyans will attack then during the election period in Paris when French officials would be reluctant to get involved in more fighting on Habre's behalf. A Libyan attack most likely would come in the east along the Kufra-Ounianga Kebir axis. Libyan commanders are nervous and might be spooked into launching such an operation.

-- INR also suggested that there is a chance of Chadian-Sudanese conflict. Although Habre is unlikely to supply the Sudanese SPLA insurgents with arms, he probably will let them use Chadian territory. The NIO [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] agreed that they probably would not arm the SPLA.

6. South Africa/Angola. CIA led the discussion.

-- Major fighting probably has ended for the rainy season. Angolan government forces in the southeast have retreated to positions in and around Cuito Cuanavale [REDACTED]

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-- UNITA's guerrilla operations and limited South African operations against the SWAPO insurgents in southern Angola probably will continue. South Africa's 61st Mechanized Battalion is still in the field. Moreover, General Geldenhuys' public statement only guarantees South African conscripts to be home for Christmas, not necessarily the Buffalo Battalion or territorial units. [REDACTED]

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-- We [REDACTED] believe that Cuba may be increasing its forces in Angola. Several Cuban generals have arrived in Angola, perhaps to command the augmented contingent or simply to carry out a fact-finding mission. Claims that Cuban units in Angola are moving south to engage the South Africans have originated in Luanda and may be untrue.

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-- CIA suggested that UNITA is likely to end its siege of Cuito Cuanavale and that perhaps half of the seven or eight government brigades there will withdraw, leaving only the usual three or so during the rainy season. DIA, on the other hand, said it expects UNITA, with or without South African artillery support, to keep shelling the airfield and Angolan units, perhaps forcing an evacuation of the town. Resupply, always difficult during the rains, would constrain the attackers as well as the defenders.

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7. South Africa. CIA again led the discussion.
- Pretoria is taking the ANC threat seriously, but it still has not retaliated for the bombing in Johannesburg this summer. The South Africans believe that the ANC is infiltrating mainly through Botswana, so retaliation there could come at any time. The five recent grenade attacks in Gaborone could have been carried out by the South Africans, although it is unclear if all the targets were ANC-related. The war of words between Pretoria and Gaborone continues.
  - Little came of the recent ANC meeting in Arusha, Tanzania. Few prominent figures attended, and there was little news in reports of what was discussed. Only the press has claimed that the ANC decided to press for international recognition as the "sole legitimate representative" of the South African people.
8. Zimbabwe. DIA took the lead.
- RENAMO's strategy of attacking into Zimbabwe to force Harare to recall forces from Mozambique appears to be working. There are only about two Zimbabwean battalions--less than 1,000 combat troops--in the Beira corridor now, and only one mechanized battalion of nearly 500 combat troops along the Tete road. Other forces sometimes reported as being in Mozambique actually are guarding Zimbabwe's border. Harare also is not coping well with the armed dissidence in Matabeleland, and--other than a few militia--there is no indication yet of increased military recruiting.
9. Mauritania. DIA led the discussion.
- In sentencing 49 Toucouleur military officers recently for coup plotting, the regime steered a middle course between being so lenient that it would not deter new plots or being so harsh as to provoke more Toucouleur opposition to the Maur-dominated government. Only three low-ranking, non-prominent officers were executed. The opposition Front for the Liberation of Africans in Mauritania had threatened violence if there were any executions, but it has not responded so far. We expect some demonstrations, possibly even assassinations, and anti-Maur tracts are likely to be printed in neighboring Senegal.
  - Analysts differed on the extent of their pessimism about prospects for President Taya's regime. The regime continues to be squeezed by the war in the north and economic pressures.

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Polisario's crossing of Mauritanian territory to carry out attacks in Western Sahara threatens to drag Mauritania into that conflict, although Taya's neutrality policy seems to be working better than his predecessors' pro-Moroccan or pro-Polisario positions. And inflation continues to erode consumers' purchasing power.

10. Sudan. At DIA's request, Sudan was added to the agenda. DIA led the discussion.
- Sudanese SPLA insurgents are showing surprising military strength during the dry season when they normally do not, and they have recently seized two garrisons--Kurmuk and Qaysan--above the traditional north-south line where they historically have not operated. Sudanese government forces attempting to retake Kurmuk believe that they are out-gunned by Ethiopian artillery support for the insurgents. They are delaying their advance until more Sudanese guns arrive.
  - As a result of these SPLA gains since November, Sudanese-Ethiopian tensions, and foreign involvement in Sudan, have increased. Ethiopia began escalating its support to the SPLA when the insurgents overran Jokau in May 1987, and Addis Ababa currently provides the SPLA with artillery, logistic assistance, and possibly air support. Libya has provided Sudan recently with some artillery and ammunition, and it has modified Sudan's Libyan-provided MIG-23s so that they can be used to bomb the insurgents. Egypt is reluctant to jeopardize its effort to broker peace talks between Sadiq and Mengistu by antagonizing Ethiopia, but it reportedly sent an air defense unit to protect Roseires dam in Sudan.
  - Mengistu's goals are to topple Sadiq and force Sudan to cease aiding insurgents in Ethiopia. Ethiopia is unlikely to send its artillery units into Sudan to support SPLA operations, but it will continue to fire across the border and may provide artillery pieces to the insurgents. Analysts doubt that Mengistu would suspend Ethiopian involvement in the Sudanese insurgency even if the West threatened to cease its famine relief in Ethiopia.
  - Analysts do not credit recent reports of Cuban support to the SPLA attacks.
  - The discussion also seemed to dispel initial skepticism about the unconfirmed Egyptian deployment in Sudan. Analysts questioned why Egypt would be concerned because a dam is a particularly difficult target to destroy from the air. Nonetheless, there was consensus that Cairo's paramount interest is the Nile River flow.

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-- DIA



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 said that Sudan's SPLA and border problems are increasing Libyan leverage in Sudan, and warned that Qadhafi probably seeks military base rights in Sudan in return for his military aid. Egyptian-brokered negotiations are unlikely to end the Sudanese insurgency, and some officials in Khartoum view Egyptian support as inadequate. This strengthens the hand of pro-Libyan Sudanese officials. One analyst who saw nothing new in this argued that Sadiq is simply playing the Libyans--and others--for more military aid without giving them anything in return.

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SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report: Sub-Saharan Africa

The following components were represented at the Sub-Saharan Africa warning meeting:

EXTERNAL:

- Office of the Vice President
- DIA/DIO
- DIA/JSI-5B
- DIA/DB-8D
- Army
- Air Force
- State/INR
- NSA
- National Warning Staff

INTERNAL:

- DDI/ALA/AF
- DDI/ALA/MCD
- DDI/OIR
- DDI/LDA
- DDI/NESA
- FBIS
- NPIC
- DDO/AF



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