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NIC-01590-88
2 May 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, National Intelligence Council

FROM: Charles E. Allen
National Intelligence Officer for Warning

SUBJECT: Meeting with Robert Oakley, NSC

1. During a lively half hour with Bob Oakley, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director of Near East and South Asian Affairs, NSC, on 28 April 1988, Bob made the following comments and/or requests:

a. Afghanistan: Absolutely no question but that the Soviets are leaving; Kabul will fall to the Afghan resistance, but resistance leaders will eventually revert to their tribal ways and the unity of the resistance will break down. The Soviets will work hard to prop up the Najibullah regime as long as possible and to retain influence with tribes in the north so as to form a buffer against those insurgents who wished to generate unrest among Muslims inside the USSR.

Requests: First Oakley asked about the level of terrorist attacks by the Afghan resistance against the Kabul regime. He said he would appreciate knowing the number of attacks that plausibly might have been conducted by the mujihadeen. Second, he requested statistics on the current level of KGB/WAD-sponsored terrorist attacks inside Pakistan. Is the pace of attacks down from 1987? I told them that the question could more readily be answered by the new NIO/CT. I promised that someone would get back to him on this issue. (Oakley stated that he had recommended to Secretary Schulz that the KGB/KHAD bombing campaign be raised with Shevardnadze but that the Secretary had not done so. Oakley, however, stated the issue had been raised with the Soviet foreign minister by Colin Powell.)

b. Israel-Arab States: Oakley stated that he was deeply concerned by the proliferation of missile systems among Arab states. He expressed disappointment in the failure of the Intelligence Community to warn of the sale of the Chinese CSS-2 to Saudi Arabia. By the time this was known, few policy options were available at the policy level. He assessed the failure as an analytic one. Raw intelligence was available, but analysts in the Intelligence Community had not brought together all the pieces within an analytic framework. He also blamed the failure to warn on



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"analytic mindset." Oakley assessed Israel's situation in the Middle East as a dicey one where the balance of power was slowly but inexorably beginning to shift. The proliferation of missiles and the mating of chemical warheads by Syria to them pose a serious threat to Israel which the Israelis recognize.

Requests: Oakley stated that he would appreciate receiving an authoritative briefing that would address the missile proliferation question and the growing threat of use of chemical agents by Arab states in any conflict with Israel. He also requested a "definitive briefing" on the missiles, chemical weapons, delivery systems other than missiles, and chemical inventories possessed by the Arab states. When questioned, Oakley stated that he would also appreciate inclusion of the biological threat to Israel from the Arabs. The overall thrust of the briefing should be long-range in judging how the environment of the Middle East is changing. I told Oakley that I would bring his request to your attention and that Dan Webster and Dave Einsel probably would be involved in any briefing.

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c. Libya: Oakley requested a status report on the chemical plant under construction at Ruhta. He expressed deep concern over Libyan construction of this plant, which will have a significant chemical agent production capacity when it becomes operational. I told Oakley that I would have General Einsel contact him on this development.



Charles E. Allen

Attachment

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 8, 1988

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has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR COLIN L. POWELL

FROM: ROBERT B. OAKLEY ⁷⁷²⁰

SUBJECT: Thoughts for the Next Meeting
with Shevardnadze

We have begun to think about the points you and Secretary Shultz should make in your next meeting with Shevardnadze and will be sending them to you shortly. Though there will still be a need to clarify specific points or understandings on the Afghan accord signed in Geneva, we think it makes sense in your meeting to use the agreement as a vehicle for looking ahead to discuss future stability in the subcontinent, as well as a spur for more cooperation from the USSR on other regional issues. Given some of the dangerous, uncontrollable regional military trends (e.g., nuclear proliferation, wider use of chemical munitions, increased acquisition and use of longer-range missiles) and given the possibility that additional fundamentalist, less rational regimes may gain power in South Asia and the Middle East, the Soviets may see that they have a growing stake in defusing regional tensions.

To be sure, some of these very dangers will strengthen their long-standing determination to influence the political forces in Afghanistan after they depart--particularly because they know the Iranians (along with the Paks, Indians, Chinese, and Saudis) are certain to be active supporting different Afghan factions. We probably can do little to affect Soviet activism in Afghanistan after the withdrawal, but we should make the case for a cooperative approach with us and the GOP rather than a potentially confrontational one--which is the most likely outcome.

We can also point out to Shevardnadze that India-Pakistan competition in nuclear capability may soon be made more acute by the development (India) or acquisition (Pakistan) of ballistic missiles. Chinese provision of IRBMs to the Saudis cannot make

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the Soviets comfortable, given close Chinese relations with Pakistan in the nuclear and military fields. (Pakistan is in fact seeking missiles from Beijing). It is bound to have an effect on the Indians, heightening tension and reducing stability--as the Indian acquisition of nuclear subs and development of its own ballistic missiles has had an effect upon Pakistan. An accelerated competition in missilery and nuclear weapons would make South Asia look very different in the 1990's than it does today. The Middle East is already looking different, due to the spread of missiles at a time when chemical warfare capabilities are also spreading in the region, when the prohibition against their use has been eroded by the Iraq-Iran war, and when fundamentalism/radicalism are on the rise. Soviet geographic proximity as well as Soviet political interests give them cause for serious concern. (They, not we, would be in range of missiles with unconventional warheads).

We should play on these concerns, highlighting the linkage between conflicts in South Asia and the Middle East. Despite the vaunted "new thinking", Soviet behavior hasn't yet seemed to grasp the dangers inherent in these trends; they've shown little practical interest in defusing competition between India and Pakistan, bringing pressure to bear to stop the Iran-Iraq war, or being helpful with the PLO and Syria in fostering a process that could make progress toward Arab-Israeli peace. You and the Secretary might talk of our shared interest in taking account of the disturbing regional developments, perhaps starting with new cooperative efforts to:

- Stabilize the Subcontinent, including the future of Afghanistan, in order to reduce the threat of fundamentalism and uncontrollable military competition; try to bring India and Pakistani nuclear, ballistic missiles, and conventional military competition under control and to develop new confidence-building measures (CBM) to reduce the risk of war between them; we have been talking to the Soviets about joining us in nuclear controls and should now broaden and intensify it, seeking a positive response; we should also explore their joining us in proposing military CBM's to both India and Pakistan.
- Seek controls on ballistic missile and chemical warfare capabilities in the Middle East; this is a complicated, sensitive but extremely important issue; the Soviets will quickly raise Israeli developments and Israel will understandably fear that attempts would be made to control their nuclear or missile programs. Yet the dangers created by Iraqi and Syrian missile and CW capabilities, as well as the Saudi missiles, may create new possibilities and thinking in Israel--and certainly should foster some sober thinking in the Soviet Union.

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- new efforts to stop the Iran-Iraq war, including a serious attempt to get both sides to implant SC Res. 558; starting with ceasefire (overall, including but not limited to war of cities and CW), initial withdrawal phase, and appointment of investigating commission; followed by comprehensive implementation; failure to comply by a tight deadline would result in sanctions. The Soviet pretext of not moving on this issue until the U.S. moved on Afghanistan has been destroyed.

I am giving a copy of this memo to Fritz Ermarth, Peter Rodman and Bob Dean, all of whom will have useful contributions to make, as well as to Mike Armacost so State can think in parallel with us. Dennis will be working with them to further develop the basic ideas and to prepare the talking points. He will also work with State on talking points for the Middle East peace process.

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