Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/19 : CIA-RDP91B00776R000500100002-4

- --

TOANCAU		DATE				
IRANSMI	ITAL SLIP	2	2 Apr 81			
<b>то:</b> А/I	NIO/Warning	1				
ROOM NO.	BUILDING					
	5G00 Hqs.					
REMARKS:						
			1			
······						
FROM:	ichard Lehn	nan, C/NI	C			
ROOM NO.	BUILDING		EX			
7E48	Но	ļs.				

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/19 : CIA-RDP91B00776R000500100002-4

S	Ľ	٩.	Т
---	---	----	---

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/19 : CIA-RDP91B00776R000500100002-4

1 April 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: Edward W. Proctor

20

SUBJECT : The Warning Account

1. Attached is the memorandum you asked me for the other day. As compared with Bruce' ideas, mine go a little further. If the account were divided, I would divide it completely and not try to have the nonsubstantive people reporting to me. They should be an integral part of the IC Staff.

2. The "focused warning" project has the potential for becoming quite elaborate and requiring centralized management at the national level. If so, the IC Staff or my own will probably have to do it.

3. Related to this is the intractable problem of providing structured political and economic inputs to a national warning system that will be compatible with the military input. DIA badly wants this from State and CIA.

4. As to collection, I suspect this should remain closely coupled to analysis and therefore that responsibility probably should stay with our organization. This would be consistent with the concept that you outlined to me the other day for the role of the NIOs in collection.

Richard Lehman Chairman National Intelligence Council

Attachment

SECRET

25X1

25X1

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/19 : CIA-RDP91B00776R000500100002-4

SUBJECT: The Warning Account (NFAC #1868-81)

Distribution:

1 - Addressee 1 - A/NIO/Warning 1 - C/NIC Chrono 1 - NFAC Registry

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/19 : CIA-RDP91B00776R000500100002-4

## SECRET

## THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

NFAC #1850-81

1 April 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Intelligence Officer for Warning

SUBJECT : One Option for Using an Expanded NIO/W Staff

You requested yesterday that I provide you some thoughts on moving the management side of the proposed NIO/W staff to the IC Staff (reconstituted).

1. <u>Responsibilities</u>: DCID 1/5 assigns the NIO/W the following warning responsibilities:

- i. To oversee analysis of intelligence from all sources which might provide warning. In particular, he should be alert to alternate interpretations within the Community and assess these with a view to the need for issuance of warning. He should encourage consultation and substantive discussion at all levels in the Community.
- ii. To recommend to the Director or Deputy Director of Central Intelligence the issuance of warning to the President and National Security Council, and to ensure the dissemination of such warning within and by the organizations of the Intelligence Community. When time is of the essence, the National Intelligence Officer may issue such warning directly to the President and the National Security Council, with concurrent dissemination to the Director and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and senior officers of the Intelligence Community.
- iii. To advise the Deputy Director for Collection Tasking and Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment on appropriate Community response to developing warning situations.

25X1

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/19 : CIA-RDP91B00776R000500100002-4

SUBJECT:	One Option	for	Using	an	Expanded	NIO/W
	Staff		-		·	

NFAC #1850-81 1 April 1981

- iv. To develop plans and procedures for support of the Director of Central Intelligence in crisis situations.
- v. To support the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and the National Foreign Intelligence Board on warning matters.
- vi. To chair the Warning Working Group.
- vii. To oversee the warning activities of the National Intelligence Officers.
- viii. To supervise the Strategic Warning Staff.
  - ix. To arrange for intelligence research and production with respect to strategic warning.
  - x. To develop a warning consciousness and discipline throughout the Community.
  - xi. To seek improvements in methodologies and procedures for warning including communications and dissemination of information.
  - xii. To arrange with appropriate organizations of the government for provision to the National Intelligence Officer for Warning and the Strategic Warning Staff of the information they need to carry out their mission.
- xiii. To promote improved analyst training in indications and warning techniques and in other analytic techniques that might contribute to improved warning.
- xiv. To advise the Deputy for Collection Tasking and the Deputy for Resource Management, as appropriate, on warning activities that relate to their responsibilities.

2. <u>The Strategic Warning Staff</u>: The Warning Working Group has approved a plan to disestablish the Strategic Warning Staff and transfer 25X1 of the slots to the NIO/W to form a staff supporting him directly. We will be submitting their recommendation to the DDCI in the next week or so.

3. The NIO/W Staff: Aside from the NIO/W and his assistant, we envision \_\_\_\_\_\_professionals. \_\_\_\_\_of these would be devoted to \_\_\_\_\_25X1 substantive warning matters (i, ii, iii, v, vii, & ix in paragraph 1.)

-2-

## SECRET

## SECRET

SUBJECT.	One Option	for	lleing	an	Evnandod	NTO/W	1 April 1981
JUDULUI.	one option	101	05 mg	an	cxpanueu	N10/W	і Аргіі ізоі
	Staff		-				·

A would be devoted to the care and feeding of the warning "system" 25X1 (iv, x, xi, xii, xiii and part of xiv in paragraph 1). The last would concentrate on optimizing collection operations in developing crisis situations.

NFAC #1850\_81

25X1

4. <u>The</u> <u>Slot</u>: Following are examples of the things for which this person would be responsible. The list is illustrative, not exhaustive.

- -- The National Operations and Intelligence Watch <u>Officers' Net (NOIWON)</u>. The A/NIO/W is responsible for this secure conferencing telephone net, our primary means to link the Washington area watch centers together for the rapid exchange of time sensitive information.
- -- <u>Alert Memoranda procedures</u>. We have a highly structured Community procedure for producing coordinated Alert Memoranda in 24-36 hours. It needs tender loving care.
- -- DOD's "Focused Warning". DIA, as executive agent for the DCI, is managing a Community project to improve our warning capabilities against a Warsaw Pact attack on NATO. It has subsumed two other Community projects, "WISP" and "Force Packages". This effort will require increasing involvement of the NIO/W.
- -- <u>A national warning "system"</u>. DOD already has an elaborate worldwide warning system consisting of twenty odd 24 hour watch centers. Eventually, we can expect NSA, CIA, and INR (and perhaps the WHSR) to be tied into that network, thus forming a true national "system". Work on this has yet to begin, although some discussions have taken place.
- -- <u>The Washington Area Operations Centers' Conference</u>. The NIO/W sponsors semiannual meetings attended by the directors of the Washington Area Watch Centers (WHSR, CIA, NSA/NSOC, State, DIA/NMIC, JCS/NMCC, and the four military services). This is a valuable forum for discussing mutual problems and exchanging ideas.
- -- <u>Budget</u>. Although we have had some success in monitoring warning related budget issues, there is

-3-

SECRET

SECRET

SUBJECT: One Option for Using an Expanded NIO/W Staff

1 April 1981

NFAC #1850-81

plenty of room for improvement. This is an enormous task and probably could employ someone full time.

5. The \$lot: The NIO/W should monitor and, when appropriate, 25X1 influence collection operations during times of impending crisis. For example, if things are heating up in country X and we're becoming a little worried, the NIO/W should find out specifically what collection is taking place and what can be done to improve it. Analysts now levy ad hoc requirements with little or no supervision, NSA and 25X1 the DDO operate independently the 25X1 attaches proceed in blissful ignorance or our concern, etc. We need someone to find out what extraordinary tasking has been levied, why the analysts are asking for specific information (and are they really asking the right questions), and what can be done to tweak the various collectors-including 0ne 25X1 could argue that the NCPO/Warning should be doing this, but that has not been the case.

6. An Option: If the NIO/W Staff is expanded as described above, and if two people are assigned tasks as described in paragraphs 4 and 5, and depending on the role assumed by the reconstituted IC Staff, it might be attractive to locate those two people with the IC Staff. They would be members of the NIO/W staff and would report to him, but they might be in a better position to carry out their duties if colocated with their resource planning/management and collection management colleagues.



25X1

25X1

-4-

SECRET