SOVIET STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN ANGOLA

The USSR has been deeply involved with supporting the Marxist/Leninist regime in Angola since the regime came to power in 1975. Moscow has:

- Provided Luanda with more than $4 billion in military aid and about $6 million in economic aid.

- Stationed some 1000 military advisers there to assist in the fight against UNITA and defend against South African incursions.

In return the Soviets have:

- Gained a position in southern Africa giving them the opportunity to influence events in the region and to claim a voice in decisions regarding political arrangements there.

- Gained support from another Third World nation on matters in international fora.

- Gained access to air and naval facilities.

  - TU-95 Bear D reconnaissance aircraft periodically deploy to Angola and fly missions over the South Atlantic.

  - The Soviet West Africa patrol—some five to seven warships—uses Luanda for crew rest, logistic support, and minor ship repairs.

The USSR's key objectives in Angola are:

- Ensure the survival of the MPLA government and continued influence with Luanda.

- Preserve its access to Angolan military facilities.

- Prevent a Namibian settlement linked to a Cuban withdrawal from Angola, particularly one that does not provide for a Namibia dominated by the South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO).

- Undermine South African- and US-sponsored regional initiatives with the aim of isolating the United States and South Africa from black Africa.

- Encourage black African suspicions of South Africa and the US.

The Soviets are also building an enormous mausoleum in memory of late Angolan President Agostinho Neto.
SOVIET MILITARY AID TO ANGOLA

The USSR has provided Angola with more than $4 billion of military aid including:

- Nearly 300 aircraft--MIG-23 and MIG-21 fighters, SU-22 fighter bombers, MI-25 attack helicopters, and numerous transport aircraft and helicopters.

- Seven different types of SAMs--medium-to-high altitude SA-2s, low-to-medium altitude SA-3s, and mobile SA-6,7,8,9 and 13 SAMs.

- About 400 light and medium tanks--T-62, T-55, T-54, T-34 and PT-76s.

- About 45 naval vessels--amphibious landing ships, missile attack patrol boats, and torpedo patrol boats.

- About 300 artillery pieces and rocket launchers--122 and 152 MM howitzers, BM-21 rocket launchers.
Government offensive against UNITA appears over.
-- Pretoria has said Angolans have pulled back from Mavinga; two failed attempts to take the town were blunted by South African air strikes.

Angola's improved performance reflects more extensive Soviet involvement in planning and directing combat operations.
-- Setback was first reverse for UNITA since 1982.
-- Better trained and organized Angolan forces made more effective use of large quantities of Soviet weapons, especially aircraft, delivered in late 1983 and throughout 1984.

UNITA knocked off stride but far from beaten.
-- Shows UNITA's lightly armed insurgents cannot stand and fight well-equipped conventional army; must revert to guerrilla tactics or suffer reverses in next offensive.
-- Activity continues in central and northern Angola; will step up urban bombings and try to hit Cabinda oil facilities.
-- Would like to disrupt Luanda's December Party Congress, despite past failures to take war into capital city.

South Africa intervened during offensive with repeated air strikes, limited troop reinforcements, substantial materiel aid.
-- Pretoria probably will increase materiel and logistic assistance to Savimbi; also continue covert sabotage operations in Angola to inflict economic damage and enhance UNITA's reputation.

Soviets and Luanda likely perceive offensive as a "victory" despite failure to take Mavinga.
-- At December Party Congress, those favoring military solution against UNITA should find their hand strengthened.
-- Doubt Luanda will pursue seriously US-sponsored regional negotiations (could jeopardize Soviet interests), but probably will continue contacts of some sort.

Expect another Angolan offensive after rainy season ends next April.
-- Soviets probably will replace lost equipment and beef up air defenses to deter South African air strikes.

Angola pays for most military aid in hard currency.
-- Uses more than half of annual $2 billion hard currency earnings (90% from oil production) to pay Soviet Bloc.
-- Moscow and Havana probably would continue assistance even if Angola could not pay.
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