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TALKING POINTS FOR THE ADDI

THE SINO-INeDBorder DISPUTE

1. India and China are probably headed for a limited conflict this spring or summer over their border. During the past year each side has taken political and military steps the other considers provocative.

--- Beijing established a forward base in disputed territory on Wangdung Ridge last summer in response to the building of new Indian Army installations along the disputed border in the Eastern sector.

--- New Delhi in December voted statehood for Arunachal Pradesh, territory still under negotiation and claimed by Beijing.

2. The dispute in the east centers on the area overrun by China in 1962 and now the newly created Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh.

--- The Chinese recognize a line of control that lies south of the Wangdung Ridge and well to the south of the British-drawn McMahon line. In 1962 the Chinese unilaterally withdrew to positions 20 kilometers north of the line of control and warned New Delhi not to enter the buffer zone.

--- The Indians insist that the McMahon line defines their border and refuse to accept the Chinese claims stemming from the 1962 conflict.

3. The Chinese have turned aside Indian requests for new negotiations this spring and have told US officials that they have few options but to resume patrolling the disputed area.

--- Beijing's reference to new patrolling—and a lack of interest in immediate negotiations—suggests Beijing may choose to begin aggressively patrolling Indian-controlled areas near the Chinese outpost on Wangdung Ridge to draw Indian troops into a provocation that China could use to portray India as the aggressor.

--- The departure of the Chinese Ambassador from New Delhi last week sends another signal of rising tensions, but Beijing's plan to name a border expert as the next Ambassador indicates China eventually hopes for a negotiated settlement with New Delhi.

--- Indian Prime Minister Gandhi almost certainly would order an Indian military response to possible Chinese provocations before he agrees to talks. Gandhi cannot afford to preside over a repetition of India's loss to China in 1962 or even be seen as capitulating to Chinese pressure.
5. India has the upper hand militarily in the region, but ultimately would lose its advantage if a conflict grew to general war.

-- Should a conflict escalate, however, Beijing's large military force of over 4 million men and 5,000 fighter and bomber aircraft would allow China to prosecute a several front war along the entire Sino-Indian border--severely straining the resources of New Delhi's 1.5 million man Army.
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