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The Soviet Air and Naval Presence at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam (S)

Summary

Information available as of 1 April 1984 was used to prepare this report.

The Soviets have been increasing their air and naval presence and expanding facilities at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, since 1979. In late 1983 they deployed naval Badger medium bombers, including strike models, to Cam Ranh; and they appear to be making preparations at the air-field to support long-term deployment of Badgers. The number of Soviet naval ships routinely present at Cam Ranh port has increased steadily during the last few years.

Soviet naval aircraft and ships operating from Cam Ranh Bay demonstrate visible Soviet support for the Vietnamese government and provide the Soviets the capability to:

- Monitor and interfere with international shipping between the Indian and Pacific Oceans.
- Strike US air and naval bases in the Philippines.
- Threaten the southern coastal areas of China.
- Conduct surveillance of all of the South China Sea.

The nine Badgers deployed at the airfield since late 1983 form a composite squadron of five strike-capable, two tanker, one photoreconnaissance, and one ECM aircraft—a combination that is similar to the composition of Badger regiments in the USSR. The Soviets began preparation in late February 1984 for their first flight operations from this airfield with antiship air-to-surface missiles. Both AS-2 and AS-5 missiles and support equipment are present at the airfield. There is no evidence of nuclear warhead storage.

Increases in equipment and expansion of facilities at Cam Ranh Bay Airfield suggest that up to a regiment of naval Badgers—30 to 35 aircraft—could eventually be deployed there, perhaps during 1984. Major construction at the airfield includes:

- An air-to-surface missile storage and handling facility for the AS-2 and AS-5.
- Air munitions storage buildings.

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Sa Secret	nitized Copy	Approved for Release 2010	/11/26 : CIA-RDP91	T01115R00010019	0002-3
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		• Two POL facilities with a	capacity of about 6	million liters of fue	1.
		New communications fac	ilities, barracks, and	support facilities.	
		The Soviet ship contingent rollargest concentration of Soviet or more ships—deployed to a Support for these ships is proships. In contrast to expande there has been little expansion Soviets may have refrained for shore facilities to support the access to those facilities could be Egypt and Somalia. The lack namese sensitivity to a large,	et combatants and an anaval facility outside an naval facility outside ovided mostly by depend aircraft support factors come constructing substitutions are facilities of shore facilities of foreign-controlled managements.	uxiliaries—usually I de of the Soviet United and replenishment cilities at the airfield cilities ashore. The estantial and costly because they fear the date, as occurred ay also reflect Vietnilitary base on its south providing for Soviet in the south of the south o	2 on. nt d, at in oil.
		use of Vietnamese facilities in development, and use of thes nam requires a major counter	the Cam Ranh Bay e facilities seems assi	area. Soviet access, ured as long as Viet-	
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The Soviet Air and Naval Presence at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam (S)

Bay, Vietnam (S)	
Introduction The Soviets deployed naval Badger medium bomber aircraft, including strike-capable models, to Cam Ranh, Vietnam, in November 1983. This develop-	man six SAM sites, three SA protect the approaches to the other airfield facilities built b heavily damaged and unuse
ment significantly increases Soviet military capabilities in Southeast Asia. As important as it is, however, it is just one more development in the growth of the Soviet military presence at Cam Ranh. (S	Support Facilities Soviet construction and reno support facilities at Cam Rar in mid-1982. Prior to then the communications facility, seventialized and a facility of the sevential sevent
This paper addresses the buildup of Soviet naval air and seagoing forces at Cam Ranh since 1979. It discusses the development of facilities that support those forces, the capabilities of the forces, and the potential threat they present to opposing military forces in the area. (S	buildings, and a few ground airfield—an amount sufficien Bear D and Bear F aircraft t ate out of the airfield. (S
Soviet Naval Air Force Presence Soviet air activities are centered primarily at facilities located in the northern portion of Cam Ranh Bay Airfield (figure 1). The Soviets are apparently the sole occupants of this area, which is served by the largest aircraft parking apron at the airfield. The parking apron separates the majority of their facilities from the nearest Vietnamese-controlled area. The Soviet facilities are secured by fence, and access to individual areas within the compound also appears to be controlled. The Soviets are using the badly damaged US-built POL facility at the southern end of the airfield for their aviation fuel storage site, and they have begun construction on a second POL facility (figure 2). They also recently began upgrading and securing the abandoned US-built ammunition storage area east of the airfield. (s	Air-to-Surface Missile Storage. struction began on several quarea next to the parking aproair-to-surface missile storage By mid-1983 six quonset built and two additional buildings tion. This separately fenced fover 3,000 square meters of fipleted. It will be large enoug storage and checkout for a gaircraft than the five Badger ly deployed at Cam Ranh Bacomparable to ASM storage supporting Badger regiments the USSR. (S
The Vietnamese use two areas at this airfield. A helicopter training regiment is located on the west side of the airfield, and a surface-to-air (SAM) missile support facility is located on the east side. Both areas are wall-secured. The Vietnamese also	

nan six SAM sites, three SA-2 and three SA-3, that protect the approaches to the airfield. Most of the other airfield facilities built by the US remain leavily damaged and unused. (S	25X1 25X1
Support Facilities	
Soviet construction and renovation of air-related upport facilities at Cam Ranh Bay Airfield began in mid-1982. Prior to then the Soviets had only a communications facility, several small support buildings, and a few ground service vehicles at the airfield—an amount sufficient to support only the	25 X 1
Bear D and Bear F aircraft that periodically oper- tte out of the airfield. (s	25X1
Air-to-Surface Missile Storage. In mid-1982 contruction began on several quonset buildings in an area next to the parking apron that serves as an air-to-surface missile storage and support facility. By mid-1983 six quonset buildings were completed and two additional buildings were under construction. This separately fenced facility will provide over 3,000 square meters of floorspace when completed. It will be large enough to provide missile storage and checkout for a greater number of strike aircraft than the five Badger strike aircraft presently deployed at Cam Ranh Bay Airfield. It will be comparable to ASM storage and support facilities supporting Badger regiments (30 to 35 aircraft) in the USSR. (S	25X1 25X1
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Munitions Storage. Construction of what probably will be air munitions storage buildings began in June 1983 in the old US-built ammunition storage area east of the airfield (figure 3). The design of	22 aircraft fuel trucks also increased from five to 15—about the same number normally used to support a Soviet medium bomber regiment. (S	25X1 25X1
these buildings is typically Soviet and similar to buildings at air munitions storage facilities in the USSR. As of December 1983 three buildings, each 30 meters long and 18 meters wide, were under construction. Each building is located in one of the old US-built bunkered revetments. Although construction is proceeding slowly, they could be completed in 1984. Nine additional old bunkered revetments are available in this area for munitions storage expansion. There is no construction of, or provision for, nuclear weapons storage at this facility or at the air-to-surface missile storage	Barracks and Storage Area. During the summer of 1982 the Soviets began construction of 17 one-story buildings in a separately secured area. Ten of the buildings, located at the south end of the secured area, are identical in design and appear to be barracks. By March 1984 eight were completed, one was being roofed, and the foundation was being laid for the tenth. All of these buildings are or will be partitioned into two-man, or possibly three-man, rooms with a total floorspace of over 8,600 square meters. The interior arrangement of these buildings	
facility. (S Communications. Prior to mid-1983 communications facilities at the airfield consisted of antennas	suggests they will provide living space for 400 to 600 senior technicians and officers. (S	25X1 25X1 25X1
on and near a 3,600-square-meter communications and support building, a FIX-24 direction finding (HF/DF) facility, and a Park Drive mobile satellite communications (satcom) unit. During the summer of 1983 communications were upgraded by adding a second Park Drive mobile satcom unit. The satcom units directly link the Soviet forces at Cam	The other seven buildings, located at the north end of the secured area, have no internal partitioning. All are complete, and we believe they are probably for storage. Some, however, could be open-bay barracks intended for enlisted personnel. The total floorspace of these seven buildings is 4,000 square meters; if all were used as barracks they could	
Ranh Bay Airfield with Moscow. The communications and support building probably also serves as the administration center for the Soviets at the	house about 1,000 men. (S	25X1 25X1
airfield. (S	Miscellaneous Support Facilities. Several smaller facilities at the airfield also are occupied by the	25X1
Ground Support Vehicles. Before August 1983 the Soviets had only five TZ-22 aircraft fuel trucks and about 12 miscellaneous vehicles supporting Bear D,	Soviets. An AKDS-70 mobile air separation unit near the motor pool supplies oxygen used on board aircraft. A probable electric generator facility is at	
Bear F, and occasional transient aircraft opera- tions. The motor pool area was expanded during the first half of 1983 to accommodate an influx of ground service vehicles. By September 1983 the	the south end of the Soviet area, and a supply building and a support building are near the center of the Soviet area. An aircraft operations building has been completed next to the parking apron.	
number of vehicles had reached roughly 100, including the equivalent of a medium bomber regiment's air technical battalion, in addition to numer-	(S	25X

'Air technical battalions provide fuel, armament, and oxygen for aircraft as well as base security; supply; communications and administrative services; and air traffic control, transportation, and airfield maintenance. (S)

ous general purpose vehicles.1 The number of TZ-



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POL Storage. About March 1980 the Soviets began	Bear aircraft assigned there. Based on a maximum	
constructing a new POL storage facility at the site of the destroyed US-built POL facility just south of	loading of about 42,000 liters of fuel for a Badger	
the airfield (figure 4). As of December 1983 some	and a radius mission flown to near fuel exhaustion, 'a single sortie from Cam Ranh by the nine Badgers	
200 POL tanks, most of which are below ground,	assigned there would consume about 5 percent of	
had been emplaced for a total storage capacity of	the airfield's POL supply. A single sortie by a	
almost 5 million liters of fuel. In addition, vehicle	regiment of Badgers (20 strike and 10 supporting	
tracks around a large, US-built vertical POL tank	aircraft) staging from Cam Ranh with the same	
suggest that repair work is under way on the tank.	mission profile would consume about 20 percent of	
The earthen cofferdam surrounding the spill pond	the airfield's POL supply. (S	25 X 1
for this tank has been breached, apparently to provide access for repair vehicles. If the Soviets		25X1
repair this tank, the capacity of the POL facility	Fuel supplies could limit extended air operations	
would be increased by about 3 million liters.	from Cam Ranh by the Soviets. In the USSR	
(S	airfields are supported by an extensive logistics	25 X 1
	infrastructure. In Vietnam the Soviets probably	
In March 1984 the Soviets began constructing a	must rely on sea-delivered fuel supplies and, to a	
second POL facility next to the parking apron.	lesser extent, air deliveries. We have no evidence of	
Twenty POL tanks with a total capacity of about 1 million liters have been delivered to the site.	an agreement with the Vietnamese to provide So-	
(S	viet forces at Cam Ranh with aviation fuel. Soviet reliance on such an agreement would be counter to	25X1
(0	past practices they have followed in establishing	20/(1
The Soviets have made no provisions for hydrant	their overseas bases. (S	25X1
fueling of their aircraft. TZ-22 aircraft fuel trucks		
normally are loaded at the main POL facility and	Aircraft Deployments	
serve aircraft parked on the large apron 2.5 kilome-	The Soviet Union has routinely deployed pairs of	
ters away. The new POL facility under construction will provide improved fueling services for quick-	Bear D maritime reconnaissance aircraft and Bear F antisubmarine warfare aircraft to Cam Ranh Bay	
response missions that otherwise might be delayed	Airfield since 1980. In 1983 the Soviets deployed	
due to the time required to transport fuel from the	naval Badger aircraft, including strike-capable mod-	
main POL facility. (S	els, to the airfield. With the exception of military	25 X 1
	exercises, this is the first out-of-area deployment of	
There is no evidence of an operational pipeline	Badgers in more than a decade. The last such	
connecting either POL facility with the port facili-	deployment took place from 1968 to mid-1972,	
ties 11 kilometers south of the airfield. Sections of a US-built pipeline are missing and no repair	when a naval air unit of as many as 36 air- craft—two-thirds of which were Badgers—operated	
activity has been evident. Apparently POL facilities	from three airfields in Egypt. (S	25 X 1
at the airfield are replenished by fuel trucks. The	8,7,4,4	25 X 1
fuel probably is delivered to the port by a Soviet		
merchant tanker or naval oiler routinely seen	According to special intelligence, the first deploy-	
moored at the piers or anchored offshore. Although	ment of naval Badgers to Cam Ranh Bay Airfield	05)//
these ships primarily support naval operations, they could also carry aviation fuel. (s	occurred Japanese Air Self	25X1 25X1
could also carry aviation ruci. (s	Defense Forces (JASDF) aircraft, which observed the Badgers on their way to Vietnam. and imagery	25X1
	of Cam Ranh Bay Airfield	25 X 1
The capacity of the POL facilities at the airfield is	indicated that this deployment consisted of four	
consistent with that normally found at airfields in	aircraft—two Badger A tankers, one Badger E	
the USSR supporting medium-range bomber regi-	photoreconnaissance aircraft, and one Badger J	
ments, and it is more than adequate to support the missions currently flown by both the Badger and	special intelligence	25 X 1
missions currently nown by both the bauger and	detected a second deployment of three Badger	

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aircraft flying to Vietnam, and on 2 December two	² Soviet Naval Aviation (SNA) has three Badger models	
more Badger aircraft arrived, bringing the total number of Badgers at Cam Ranh Bay Airfield to	equipped for strike operations—Badger Cs, modified Badger Cs, and Badger Gs. Badger Cs are deployed only with naval	
nine (figure 5).	aviation. They entered service about 1960, primarily for use in maritime strike missions. This aircraft carries a single AS-2 an-	25 X 1
vealed that these five Badgers are strike-capable,	tiship, air-to-surface missile (ASM) on its centerline. Modified	
modified Badger Cs. ² This combination of strike- capable and strike-support aircraft is consistent	Badger Cs carry either two AS-5 or two AS-6 antiship ASMs mounted on pylons under their wings, or an AS-2 on its center-	
with a composite squadron of medium bombers	line. Badger Gs also carry two AS-5s or two AS-6s mounted on pylons under the wings. (S)	
found in a typical Soviet naval Badger strike regiment. (S	pyrons under the wings. (5)	0EV4
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Capability for Air-to-Surface Missile Operations. The airfield facility improvements and the presence of AS-2 and AS-5 missiles and missile-support equipment indicate that Soviet planning for Badger deployments to Vietnam included the capability for strike aircraft to conduct air-to-surface missile operations. (S The Soviets made a concerted effort to keep missiles and missile-support equipment in covered storage until they were ready for use. In addition, two of the five modified Badger Cs at Cam Ranh Bay Airfield were photographed while enroute to Vietnam by US Navy aircraft operating from the carrier USS Midway. These Badgers were not fitted with missile pylons under their wings, but discoloration on the aircraft indicated that pylons previously had been attached. It is possible that all five modified Badger Cs were flown to Cam Ranh Bay	Airfield without attached pylons in order their intended role. (S	25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1
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Missile pylon installation and the first loading of air-to-surface missiles on the modified Badger C aircraft took place during February and March 1984 (figure 7). Soviet ground support personnel moved missile pylon crates onto the parking apron in early February 1984 in preparation for their installation on the five strike aircraft. Pylon installation was completed by early March 1984. A missile handling dolly for the AS-5 also was positioned near the aircraft when the pylons were being installed, suggesting practice ASM loadings for ground crew training may have occurred (figure 8). (S Loading of air-to-surface missiles on the modified Badger C aircraft was observed	and apparently involved both AS-5 and AS-2 missiles. Although the only missiles seen at the time were AS-2s, missile handling dollies for both the AS-2 and the AS-5 were on the apron. An AS-5 missile was seen in front of one of the missile storage quonset buildings two days earlier (figure 9). (S The quonset buildings in the missile storage area can easily accommodate the 10 to 15 ASMs that can be carried on the five modified Badger Cs. When the two additional buildings are completed, the facility will be capable of meeting the missile storage and handling requirement of a Badger regiment—probably as many as 60 air-to-surface missiles. (S	25X1 25X1 25X1



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rospect for Additional Deployments. According to becial intelligence acquired since December 1983,	in regimental strength. The apron where the Soviet aircraft are parked is large enough to accommodate	
e Badger aircraft based at Cam Ranh Bay Air-	a regiment of Badgers and the four Bear aircraft	
eld have been flown for pilot familiarization ithin the local airfield area and for navigation,	that routinely deploy there, as well as other transient aircraft. Except for the absence of revetments	
econnaissance, and probably airborne refueling	to protect parked aircraft and provisions for nucle-	
aining. This training pattern is typical of Soviet	ar weapons storage, the facilities are comparable to	
rcraft units newly established within and outside f the USSR, and it probably will expand to	those supporting medium-range bomber regiments in the USSR. The only apparent constraint at this	
clude strike training later this summer. When the	time is missile storage and handling facilities for	
sisting squadron reaches operational readiness, the oviets may deploy additional Badgers to Cam	additional strike aircraft; however, such facilities are under construction and could be ready to	
anh Bay Airfield, probably during 1984. (s	support a regiment-sized force as early as the fall of	2
	1984. The typical naval Badger strike regiment consists of 30-35 aircraft, at least twenty of which	2
he nature and size of Soviet facilities now in place	are ASM-capable. The remaining aircraft models	
r under construction at the airfield strongly sug- est that the Soviets are developing the capability	are tankers, ECM support aircraft, and training	25
est that the soviets are developing the capability	aircraft. (S	∠⊃.

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Naval Air Capabilities and Force Options

The composite Badger squadron and the Bear aircraft at Cam Ranh provide the Soviets the capability to monitor and interfere with international shipping between the Indian and Pacific Oceans (figure 10). The aircraft can conduct surveillance of all of the South China Sea, as well as strike US air and naval bases in the Philippines. Soviet use of the airfield at Cam Ranh also poses a threat to the southern coastal areas of China, thereby demonstrating visible Soviet support for the Vietnamese government. (S


Soviet Naval Presence

Soviet Navy ships were first seen at Cam Ranh Bay in early 1979. The Soviet naval ship contingent at Cam Ranh Bay has increased steadily since then and, by March 1984, averaged about 12 ships—the largest concentration of Soviet auxiliaries and combatants routinely deployed at any non-Soviet base. This concentration of ships is larger than the number maintained by the Soviets in Alexandria during the early 1970s, when the Soviet Navy had ready access to that Egyptian port, and is larger than present ship concentrations at other facilities used by the Soviets. At Dehalak Island, Ethiopia—the major Soviet base supporting operations in the Indian Ocean—the Soviet Navy maintains a depot ship, a floating dock, a stores barge, and a few miscellaneous small craft. Two or three transient combatants usually are seen there. In Tartus, Syria—the major port used in the Mediterranean only a depot ship, a stores barge, a few miscellaneous small craft, and one submarine are seen in port. (S

Support Facilities

Depot and Support Ships. The Soviet Navy generally relies on a group of depot and support ships to provide replenishment and minor maintenance and upkeep for its ships at overseas bases. In 1980 the Soviet Navy stationed an Amur-class depot ship at Cam Ranh Bay, establishing an identifiable naval presence there. Since then the number of supporting ships and craft has grown and now includes naval oilers, naval-subordinated merchant tankers, a deperming ship, ocean-going tugs, a covered

Figure 10 Potential Surveillance and Target Areas of Badger Aircraft Staging From Cam Ranh, Vietnam



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stores barge, yard oilers and fuel barges, oil spill cleanup craft, possible picket boats, and small tugs or line-handling ships. Recently, a submarine tender routinely has been seen at the port and may now be assigned to the support forces there. Merchant ships, which are occasionally seen in port, may be delivering supplies and stores for use by Soviet forces. (8

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In late 1980 an old Soviet ship repair dock was delivered to the port. This dock normally is stationed in the outer bay and may have been turned over to the Vietnamese Navy. It is capable of providing minor repairs to conventionally powered submarines and surface combatants up to the size of light frigates. In the future a larger, more capable dock, such as one of the two 8,500-ton capacity docks delivered to Ho Chi Minh City, may also be sent to Cam Ranh. This would permit the repair of ships up to the size of light cruisers of the Kara-class. (8)

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The Soviet hospital ship Ob makes periodic deploy-	outdoor chessboards. An infantry-style obstacle	
ments to Cam Ranh Bay. This ship probably	course also has been constructed. Building con-	
provides medical services to Soviets stationed in	struction has been limited to a few shed-type struc-	
Cam Ranh Bay and possibly to Soviets located	tures in the area of the piers. (S	25 X 1
elsewhere in the country. (S		25 X 1
		25 X 1
D. J. E. W. William C. Landing and Cont.	In addition to these facilities, the Soviets are using	
Berthing Facilities. When Soviet ships were first	a former South Vietnamese Navy compound lo-	
seen at Cam Ranh in 1979, berthing f. cilities	cated adjacent to the Soviet pier area. Although we	
consisted of two former US-built piers. The Soviets have refurbished both of these piers and have	cannot determine the extent of its use, we assume	
installed three floating piers. Four of the five piers	the Soviets are occupying the administration, hous-	,
are used exclusively by Soviet ships (figure 11). The	ing, and general support facilities. The buildings in this compound have 7,000 square meters of floor-	
fifth and northernmost pier is used only by the	space and could provide housing for several hun-	
Vietnamese Navy. Work progressed slowly during	dred persons. Additional warehouse-type facilities	•
1983 and early 1984 on an earth-and-rubble ap-	are in the vicinity of the port area, but we have no	
proach for a sixth pier at the southern end of the	evidence that they are being used by the Soviets.	
port. When the pier approach is completed, the pier	(S	25 X 1
will be assembled from three pier sections now at	(-	20/(1
the port. (S	Additional Security. In addition to the security	25 X 1
•	checkpoints at the approaches to the piers used by	20/(1
The five existing piers appear to be equipped to	the Soviet ships, four BTR-60 armored personnel	
provide water and electricity to ships moored to	carriers (APCs) routinely have been seen in the port	
them. A 4-kilometer-long pipeline from a reservoir	area. These vehicles may be used by a Soviet naval	
provides fresh water to the port area. Electricity	security group assigned to Cam Ranh Bay. It	
probably is provided by a generator located in a	probably is quartered aboard the Amur-class depot	
building on a quay between the two northernmost	ship. The vehicles routinely are parked in the port	
piers. Security checkpoints were built at the ap-	area near the berth used by the Amur; not at the	
proaches to the four Soviet piers in 1983. A check-	former South Vietnamese naval compound. A simi-	
point also was built at the incomplete pier ap-	lar naval security force is believed to be assigned to	
proach, indicating impending use by the Soviets. No checkpoint, however, has been built at the	the Soviet base on Dehalak Island, Ethiopia.	25 X 1
approach to the Vietnamese pier. (S	(S	
approach to the victnamese pier. (s	Naval Combatant Deployments	25X1 25X1
	A variety of combatants has been seen at Cam	25/1
Ashore Support Facilities. The Soviets so far have	Ranh Bay since 1979. Surface combatants have	
not constructed extensive shore facilities to support	ranged in size from minesweepers and Petya-II-class	
their ships at Cam Ranh Bay. The reason for this	light frigates to Kara-class guided cruisers. The	
lack of construction may be that the Navy does not	aircraft carrier Minsk, the largest surface warship in	
want to construct substantial and costly facilities	the Soviet Pacific Fleet, also has anchored in Cam	
with the risk of losing access to them at a future	Ranh Bay during its deployments in the South	
date—as occurred in Egypt and Somalia. Also, the	China Sea. Amphibious ships such as Rogov-class	
Navy may feel that it does not need substantial	amphibious assault transport docks, Ropucha-class	
shore facilities to support its ships, since it can	tank landing ships, and Polnocny-class medium	
replenish and maintain them from depot and sup-	landing ships have been identified in port and may	
port ships. Only a few facilities for training and	occasionally transport supplies from the Soviet	
crew rest and recreation have been built, including	Union. Submarines calling at Cam Ranh Bay in-	
an athletic and recreation area consisting of a	clude F-class conventionally powered attack subma-	

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soccer field, basketball and tennis courts, and four

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rines and N- and V-class nuclear-powered attack



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submarines. E-II- and C-class nuclear-powered submarines equipped with cruise missiles routinely use the port. One W-class conventionally powered submarine also has been based at Cam Ranh. This submarine may be used as a training target for joint antisubmarine exercises with the Vietnamese Navy or as a battery-charging station for other conventionally powered submarines using the port. (S

Naval Ship Capabilities and Force Options

Access to Cam Ranh Bay port facilities provides major benefits for the Soviet Navy. By using the port as a logistics support base, the deployment times for ships operating in the South China Sea can be significantly extended. The Soviet Navy can reprovision, refuel, and provide minor upkeep and maintenance to its ships, eliminating the need for them to return to distant bases in the Soviet Pacific area or to rely on open ocean anchorages. In addition, Cam Ranh Bay is used as an interim stop to replenish Soviet naval ships transiting between the Indian Ocean and the Soviet Pacific Fleet area. The majority of Soviet naval ships operating in the Indian Ocean are home-based in the Soviet Pacific Fleet. (8

Soviet ships operating from Cam Ranh Bay can monitor and, in times of conflict, interfere with international shipping between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific. Transit lanes between the US naval base at Subic Bay in the Philippines and the Indian Ocean also could be threatened. In addition, Soviet ships based at Cam Ranh can conduct patrols off the Vietnamese coast, demonstrating support for the Vietnamese government, as well as presenting a threat to southern China. (S

Vietnam's View of the Soviet Presence

We have no evidence that the Soviets and Vietnamese have concluded a formal basing agreement for Soviet use of Cam Ranh or other Vietnamese facilities. Hanoi has consistently denied that any such agreement exists but has held open the possibility in the event of an extreme threat to Vietnam's national security. Recognizing that their present close congruence of interests may not last indefinitely, Moscow seems likely to continue following a conservative approach—as it has in other countries—toward investing in long-term, large-scale improvements at Vietnamese facilities. The absence of a massive building program also reflects Vietnamese sensitivities toward any unconstrained growth in foreign influence in Vietnam. (S)

Soviet-Vietnamese relations, though not especially warm, are solid enough to allow for a continuing gradual increase in Soviet use of Vietnamese facilities. As long as Vietnam requires a major counterweight to Chinese pressure, Soviet entree to Vietnamese facilities seems assured. (S)

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Appendix

Capabilities of Soviet Aircraft Based at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam

Aircraft	Primary Mission	Payload (km)	Range (km) a	Radius (km) ^a	Refueled Radius (km) ^a
Bear D	Maritime Reconnaissance and Targeting	Guns	17,000	7,400-8,500	9,400-10,600
Bear F	Antisubmarine Warfare	Guns, torpedoes, depth bombs, sonobuoys, marine markers	15,600	6,100-8,000	8,300-10,200
Badger A	Tankerb	Guns, fuel	2,200-5,700	1,800-3,000	3,100- 4,100
Modified Badger C	Antiship Strike	Guns, bombs, one AS-2 centerline or two AS-5 wings or two AS-6 wings	2,000-3,700	1,350-2,200	2,700- 3,300
Badger E	Photorecon- naissance	Guns, cameras	2,200-5,700	1,800-3,000	3,100- 4,100
Badger J	ECM/Strike Support	Guns, click jammer, other active ECM systems	2,200-5,700	1,800-3,000	3,100- 4,100

^a Range, radius, and refueled radius figures vary based on payload and mission profile and have been rounded.

This appendix is Secret.

bMany Badger As are configured as freefall bombers. Range and radius figures are based on the bomber variant.

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