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# SURVEY OF AFRICA

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## SURVEY OF AFRICA

## FOREWORD

This survey is divided into four sections. The introduction, which treats the entire continent south of the Sahara and north of the Union, emphasizes the overall problems affecting Africa. These include race relations, political development, economic progress and communist influence.

The second section describes the current political and economic situation in individual countries, with the exception of French North Africa and the Union of South Africa, which are extensively treated in recent NIE publications. The continent has been divided into geographical areas: West, Equatorial, East, Central and Southern Africa.

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#### SURVEY OF AFRICA

#### I. Introduction

Africa, a continent of wide geographic diversity, is currently experiencing the strains and frictions produced by the introduction of Western culture, with its techniques of political and economic organization, into a primitive, largely non-literate society. The problems arising from this development are aggravated by the racial differences between Europeans, who direct or enforce these changes, and the Africans.

The pace of change and the seriousness of the resulting frictions is strongly affected, however, by the peculiarities of the individual African territories and the varying European colonial policies. Four main problems have continentwide importance: race relations, political evolution, economic development and Communist influence.

## A. Race Relations

The most explosive area in African race relations is the belt of territory from the Cape of Good Hope to Ethiopia which includes the Union of South Africa, and the British areas of the Rhodesias, Nyasaland, Tanganyika and Kenya. Here Europeans have settled in greater numbers than elsewhere and have laid claims to a permanently predominating influence over Africans.

In East Africa their claim is contested by both indigenous Africans and the Indian immigrants. But attempts to unite these latter groups are hindered by the Africans' resentment against the Indian traders who dominate small business and money lending.

Europeans have also settled in Portuguese Angola and Mozambique and in the Belgian Congo, but Portuguese and Belgian policy and practice, combined with the limited political influence of the settlers, have generally avoided all save minor irritations between the races.

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In Uganda, British West Africa and French Black Africa, Europeans are only temporary residents -- officials, businessmen and missionaries. Dissident movements in these areas are protests against colonial political status

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rather than against the pressure of European settlement. But here also racial issues are often injected into purely political and economic disputes. Africans are sensitive to the universal self-segregation of whites, and publicity given the racial problems of South Africa and Kenya has a pernicious effect on race relations throughout the continent.

Similarly, the rapid development of the Gold Coast toward the status of a native independent state has important racial overtones and generally inspires other Africans with the hope of self-government. To the Europeans, it is a forecast of possible future development in the settler communities of the Union, British Central Africa and Kenya. This fear of an independent African state, in which the European settler communities would be a minority, influences many whites to judge less harshly the South African Government, although individually they deplore many aspects of its racial policy.

#### B. Political Development

The political development of African territories is largely conditioned by the traditions and policies of the European governments.

The British are committed to granting colonial peoples eventual independence within the Commonwealth. The partnership of all races is regarded as an essential element in the achievement of this goal. But white settlers, where they live in significant numbers, believe that Colonial Office concern for native rights inhibits economic development. retards the growth of independent local political institutions and threatens their own ascendancy. This feeling lies behind the Kenya Europeans' reiterated demand for early self-government, schemes for a Central African Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland and a vision of Capricorn Africa which would indlude all British Central and East Africa.

To date only Southern Rhodesia, under complete control of a white minority, has come close to full dominion status, a stage attained 30 years ago. The Colonial Office retains control in the other British settler territories--Northern Rhodesia, Kenya and Tanganyika. European settlers have gained varying degrees of influence in the legislative bodies of these colonies, and Africans have been accorded very limited representation. Approved For Release 2006/02/27 (CJA RDP91T01172R000300090001-0

Since World War II, evolution toward African selfgovernment has been rapid in the Gold Coast and Nigeria, where there is no European settler population capable of fighting British Colonial Office decisions. The Gold Coast now has an African prime minister, a legislature which is practically all-African and African ministers in all save justice, defense and external affairs and finance departments, with the promise of complete African control in the near future. A relatively well-organized native political party covers the whole country, and an indigenous nationalism is supplanting tribal loyalties.

Nigeria is less advanced, although there is a majority of African ministers in both the regional and central governments. Self-government has been retarded by serious tribal antagonisms and because the northern region, Moslem and semi-feudal in culture, fears domination by the Europeanized elite of the coast. During the 1951 elections, an increase of nationalistic sentiment was reported, though the results again underlined the regional basis of Nigeria's political parties. Sierra Leone, lagging behind the larger territories, is still troubled by the contrasts between a coastal urban elite and the mass of interior "bush" natives. The Gambia is a political and economic backwater.

The direction taken by British West Africa is anathema to the Malan government of South Africa and privately alarms French, Portuguese and Belgian authorities.

French policy emphasizes African assimilation of French language and social habits, and the retention of African territories as nominally autonomous units within the French Union. Each French territory in West and Equatorial Africa has been endowed by the 1946 French constitution with advisory territorial assemblies and elaborate electoral procedures.

In addition, French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa have elected Federation councils which advise the government. "Citizenship" in the French Union has been granted to all Africans, and each territory elects representatives to the French National Assembly, the Council of the Republic, and to the Assembly of the French Union. In the most important, the French National Assembly, 80 percent of the representatives from French territories south of the Sahara are native Africans.

Senegal and the Ivory Coast of French West Africa are the most politically sophisticated of the French territories,

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but the formal rights granted to French Africans have been largely vitiated in practice by native inexperience and incomprehension of political affairs, government pressure for French-minded candidates, gerrymandering and manipulation of elections. Suffrage is limited and the territorial assemblies have no effective power.

The Portuguese territories of Guinea, Angola and Mozambique are constitutionally provinces of Portugal itself. Colonials and a few qualified natives participate in Portuguese presidential elections; but the administration of the territories is in the hands of the governors general and all policy originates in Lisbon. As in Portugal, the National Union is the only overt political party.

Belgian policy is materialistic paternalism with heavy emphasis on balanced economic and social development. Native political advance has been nil, but in both 1951 and 1952 official pronouncements have expressed a belief that Africans should be more closely associated with the administration. Conservative Belgians in the colony objected strongly, and the only concrete expression of the new outlook has been the appointment of some African notables to a council which advises the governor general. There are no political parties and no elections.

There are three independent countries in the general area under discussion. The Union of South Africa, as a member of the Commonwealth, is fully self-governing and posesses all the attributes of an independent nation. Ethiopia, recently united in a federation with Eritrea, has a long historical record of independent status, but Western governmental practice and organization have not penetrated deeply, and the benevolent despotism of the emperor recalls European states of the 18th century. In Liberia, an oligarchy descended from freed American slaves rules the primitive native tribes. The government party has never been defeated at the polls.

## C. Economic Progress

African economic development is based on production of raw materials for export. Among these are asbestos, chrome, cobalt, copper, industrial diamonds, manganese, tantalite, tin, uranium, vegetable fats and oils, cotton, cocoa and sisal. Many African products are of strategic importance to the United States and Western Europe.

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The economies of the continent have been relatively vulnerable; their prosperity has depended on favorable conditions in Europe and the United States, and a fall in the world prices of a single commodity often spelled economic disaster for European investors and brought unrest among the Africans of the territory affected. Since 1945 the growing use of commodity marketing boards in many of the territories, a desire for international action to soften the effect of price fluctuations, and heavy world demand have decreased this vulnerability. Nevertheless, several African countries rely on a single product for more than 50 percent of their exports: Liberia, rubber; Gold Coast, cocoa; Northern Rhodesia, copper; and Uganda, cotton.

In many territories -- especially in Northern and Southern Rhodesia, and the Belgian Congo -- the exploitation of mineral deposits has attracted heavy capital investment and brought together a large African labor force in an alien environment. In earlier periods, the African could fall back in times of depression on his traditional subsistence economy, but the progress of specialization of labor and the increase in the number of Africans who have severed their rural ties and adopted permanent urban residence is making this increasingly difficult. The Ten-Year Plan of the Belgian Congo seeks to balance the economy by developing secondary industry and an internal market; other territories have not tackled this problem as systematically.

Two major factors hamper economic development in all Africa. The first is a shortage of native labor caused largely by the uneconomic use of labor in native agriculture, poor health of the natives, and lack of skills and education. The mines of South Africa and to a lesser extent those of the Rhodesias, needing far more labor than can be obtained from local sources, have been supplied from Nyasaland and Portuguese Mozambique. Officials of the two latter territories are concerned about the social consequences of male emigration, however, and there is also a developing industrial need for labor in these areas which threatens to reduce this supply.

In many regions not served by rails and roads, the transportation problem limits exports to articles of small bulk and high value. Even in areas with railroads, narrow guages, light roadbeds, shortages of rolling stock, and limited port facilities necessitate tonnage restrictions

on strategically important mineral exports. In general, the railroad systems of Africa are designed to link producing areas in the hinterland with a port and do not connect with each other. Most of the road systems, particularly in the Equatorial regions, are passable only in the dry season.

While the majority of Africans are engaged in agriculture, the organization of agricultural production varies widely. Kenya's exports of wheat, pyrethrum, sisal and coffee come largely from European-run plantation farms, as do the sisal exports of Tanganyika. Uganda's cotton is native grown. In West Africa, the Gold Coast's cocoa is grown and gathered by African farmers, but graded and sold by a government board. In Nigeria, the peanut crop in the north and both palm products and cocoa in the south, are produced by natives, who also sit on local marketing boards.

As a rule, the level of skills which an African may acquire and use is higher in areas where there are fewer white settlers. Practice in Kenya and Northern Rhodesia and legislation in the Union and Southern Rhodesia prevents the African from taking skilled jobs. But an African railroad engineer takes over from a white man when trains from Rhodesia enter Belgian territory, for the Congo has a relatively large number of skilled Africans and is training more. Many West Africans in French and British territories are developing industrial skills, but the majority of those who seek education aim at becoming white-collar "clerks" and professionals. There is no color bar in Angola and Mozambique, but the scarcity of educational facilities retards individual development.

Although their prosperity is directly related to world economic conditions, few educated Africans have a firm grasp of the relations between the two, and the average African is easily led to believe that a fall in his income is caused by European employers or buyers who are increasing their profits at his expense.

#### D. Communist Influence

Of the 170,000,000 Africans, relatively few have attained even a modest degree of education by Western standards. Among those who have, however, many have had some contact with Communist ideas or activity.

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Communism enters Africa overtly by means of (1) propaganda mailed from Europe or issued by orbit diplomatic posts, (2) Africans, usually students, returning from Europe or the United States with pro-Communist sympathies they acquired there, and (3) through contact with European government officials and labor leaders who are Communists or through contact with members of UN committees.

Outside of the Union of South Africa, few Africans are known to have become Communists while living in Africa. Such anti-American sentiment as is found among Africans is largely the product of African visitors' experience with racial discrimination in the United States.

The Communists adapt their methods and programs to the special conditions of Africa -- its lack of a large industrial proletariat, lower educational standards and political immaturity, inability of many Africans to comprehend political ideologies, and the tribal outlook of the average native. Communism seizes on and exploits local problems, racial differences, social inequalities, fears of economic exploitation by the whites, and normal resentments of conquered against conqueror. The Communist leader's cry is Africa for Africans, coincident with promises of the spoils resultant from the expulsion of the white man.

The number of persons influenced by specifically Communist ideology is believed to be greatest in British West Africa, where Europeanized intellectuals are most numerous and influential. But even here, only one crypto-Communist organization, the Peoples Committee for Independence in Nigeria, is known to exist. The British party is believed now to give only advice to West African Communists, since funds given earlier were probably embezzled.

The Rassemblement Democratique Africaine party of French West Africa, centering in the Ivory Coast and with affiliates in French Equatorial Africa and the Cameroons, was a vehicle for Communist penetration from 1946 until it broke away in October 1950. Communist influence in French territories seems to fluctuate more with the changing prestige of the party in France, reflected by Communist influence among French officials, than with local agitation.

The Belgian Communist Party has a colonial "commission," but the extent of its activity in the Congo is unknown. Propaganda has been distributed by the Czech Consulate in Leopoldville. Approved For Release 2006/02 CRAFT DP91T01172R000300090001-0

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	There is conflicting information about the operations of the Soviet Legation and Hospital in Ethiopia and their alleged conspiracies to incite Communist agitation in eastern Africa. There are no Communist parties or overt activity in the East African area.	 2!
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	Communism is not overtly active in the Rhodesias, although there have been reports of Communist influence in the mining unions of the copperbelt area.	
	In summary, the danger of Communist activity in Africa is more potential than actual, and lies in the opportunities presented by the dislocation of African society, racial conflict and nationalist activity.	

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#### SURVEY OF AFRICA

#### II. Current Situation

A. North Africa

French North Africa is not included in this section because it is treated in the recently issued NIE 69.

B. West Africa

1. <u>British West Africa</u> (Gold Coast, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Gambia)

Extensive constitutional changes leading toward selfgovernment were instituted in the Gold Coast in 1950 and Nigeria in 1951. These events are a source of inspiration to native leaders throughout Africa south of the Sahara, and the success or failure of this experiment will probably influence political development elsewhere on the continent.

The road to West African self-government is beset with several dangers: (1) the small number of Africans capable of effectively running an administrative machine; (2) reliance of the economy on basic agricultural or mineral production and consequent inability to adjust quickly to world price changes; and (3) the revivalistic and emotional character of the present electorate, political parties and their leaders.

There is no immediate prospect of any unusual disturbance in British West Africa, certainly none that threatens any conceivable US interests. British West Africans' adherence to the free world, however, is not based on strong democratic convictions. Local individuals or groups may look to Communist example and accept Communist advice or money if these serve their purposes. This attitude is not likely, however, to exercise any extensive influence unless there is a swing toward the Soviet bloc in the world power balance.

a. Gold Coast

There are no indications that the political course of the Gold Coast will be altered in the immediate future. The proposals on further steps toward full self-government presented by Prime Minister Nkrumah last October were moderate, and Nkrumah does not now

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seem to wish to proceed hastily. While there is always the danger that some new messiah, taking advantage of the economic problems and strife within the government, may attempt to outbid Nkrumah, such a leader has not yet appeared.

Plans are under way to dam the Vota River and provide hydroelectric power for smelting the Gold Coast's bauxite deposits. Although actual production is several years away, a new port which will handle the processed aluminum is now being constructed at Tema near the western frontier.

There is little organized Communist activity in the Gold Coast, although the flow of propaganda into the country is alleged to be considerable. The government recently banned the import of WFTU publications; this step was taken with reluctance by the African ministers in the Gold Coast cabinet, whose neutralist tendencies are a product both of their preoccupation with local issues and of earlier leftwing contacts of sympathies.

b. Nigeria

Nigerian nationalism is in its adolescence. The two principal parties, Azikiwe's National Council of Nigeria and Cameroons (NCNC) and Awolowo's Action Group, draw support almost exclusively from the two politically awakened southern tribes to which their leaders belong. They are currently campaigning for the support of the peoples of the Moslem emirates in Northern Nigeria, where traditional native authorities are stronger than in the coast provinces.

The effort to bring the north into the political life of the whole of Nigeria has just begun and is likely to move slowly. But its further progress will make obsolete the present constitutional arrangements, which divide Nigeria into three regions and safeguard the Northern position, and may usher in a new period of ferment.

Nigeria is the seat of Communist organization and propaganda in British West Africa. If, as has been reported, the Communists have begun in the past year to send hard core agents into Nigeria, it is probably with an eye to potential unrest both in Nigeria and in West Africa generally. Approved For Release 2006/02 20 CR RDP91T01172R000300090001-0

In 1951 some Communist labor leaders in Nigeria were discredited as a result of financial scandals, but a new crypto-Communist group, the Peoples Committee for Independence, was organized last spring.

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## 2. Liberia

The 20,000 descendants of freed American Negro slaves who compose Liberia's ruling caste are practically as alien as Europeans to the native Africans of the country. The government payroll has long been the principal means of support for Americo-Liberian families.

While President W. V. S. Tubman, de facto dictator of the republic, appears to be in earnest in his attempts to raise the level of public morality and efficiency, he still has a long way to go.

The government's only real opposition has come from the aboriginal tribes, especially the relatively alert Kroo people. Tubman is establishing an increasing personal ascendancy over many of the tribes and that relations have improved under his regime.

Liberian finances are tied to the export of rubber, the bulk of which is grown on the Firestone plantations. Important deposits of high-grade iron ore are being developed by the American owned Liberia Mining Company, and shipments to the United States have begun. The Liberians can be expected to press for an ever larger share of the income from these operations.

New riots, such as those of 1950 which endangered the rubber plantations, might temporarily interrupt the production of Liberian rubber and iron ore. There are at present, however, no indications of large-scale labor trouble.

Isolated Communist agitators have appeared in Liberia from time to time, but the present government has acted vigorously in these cases and has generally cooperated with the United States in adopting anti-Soviet trade control measures. 25X6

3. French West Africa

The political climate of the large, sprawling federation of French West Africa, eight times the size of continental France, has cleared since the principal cause of political disturbance, the Rassemblement Democratique Africaine (RDA), broke with communism in October 1950. After four years of systematic opposition to the government and adherence to the party line, the RDA shifted to a general policy of cooperation with the French administration. This was brought about by a combination of pressure from the administration and dissension in the leadership over the value of association with communism.

The RDA had been the largest native political party with an estimated peak strength of 1,000,000 in 1947-48, but the dissentions and disaffections due to party tactics, fluctuating enthusiasms of the native members, counterfires set by other parties, and pressure from the administration reduced the RDA strength to a probable 250,000 in 1951. Though it is still the majority party in the territory of the Ivory Coast and has some support in the French Sudan, the RDA has now dropped its agitation on international issues and concerns itself with purely domestic problems.

Communism's loss of the RDA has so weakened the Communist movement in French West Africa that for the present it constitutes little danger, though Communists are known to be in the area. The potential, however, is there, and the RDA's earlier success is an example of the ferment which may be produced by unscrupulous native leaders with promises of Africa for the Africans, no taxes, and the seizure of the white man's houses and automobiles.

Outside the few urban centers, the great mass of the 16,500,000 natives are illiterate, and firmly rooted in the old tribal customs and traditions. Interests are largely centered on the immediate tribal area and there is no feeling of nationalism. Anti-French sentiment exists, but long-time tribal rivalry and mutual distrusts prevent united action. Racial strife is not important, despite RDA propaganda, due partly to French attitudes, but principally because French West Africa is not a settlement colony. The relatively small white population of about 52,000 consists of short-tour government officials, traders, planters, and a few technical and professional men.

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Politically and economically, the area is in a period of slow transition. Native political parties have only been formed since World War II, and though some 3,300,000 are eligible to vote on the local and territorial level, only about half of this figure do so. Most of them are more concerned with the problem of obtaining food and clothing.

Natives participate in district councils and territorial assemblies, as well as in the Grand Council of the Federation at Dakar, the French National Assembly, the Council of the Republic and the Assembly of the French Union. With the exception of the National Assembly, in which French West Africa has 20 deputies of whom 75 percent are Africans, these bodies are largely advisory. Firm control remains in the hands of the French.

French West Africa has an agricultural economy based on peanuts, palm products, rice, cocoa, coffee, cotton and timber, which account for more than 80 percent of exports by value. Mineral deposits, aside from diamonds, bauxite and iron ore, are relatively unexploited; however, their production will be greatly expanded in the next few years. Canneries, sawmills, and plywood factories are located near the ports of Dakar, Abijan and Conakry. But there is no heavy industry; development is hindered by a shortage of trained labor, poor transportation, absence of large mineral deposits and lack of capital.

4. Togolands

The long-standing demand of the 700,000 Ewe-speaking peoples in British and French Togoland and the Gold Coast to unite is the outstanding issue in Togoland. The Ewes have not been satisfied by the administrative gestures made by French and British trust authorities in this direction.

In French Togoland the Ewes, some 175,000 of a total population of about 1,000,000, initially asked only unity for their own ethnic group. They are now demanding unification of the two Togolands and independence in five years.

In the northern sections of the French territory, this proposal has aroused strong opposition among the non-Ewe inhabitants. Abetted by the French administration, the northerners regard "independence" as a blind

for annexation to the Gold Coast. They have formed their own political parties which propagandize locally and petition the UN in support of either the status quo or a unified Togoland under French control. In the northern sections of British Togoland the natives prefer amalgamation with the northern territories of the Gold Coast.

Available evidence indicates that the principle of unification attracts almost all groups in Togoland, but that wide disagreements over its form will not be resolved easily, especially since they are encouraged by the administering authorities.

#### C. Equatorial Africa

#### 1. Belgian Congo

The Belgian grip on the Congo remains tight and paternalistic. Outstanding features of Belgian administration are its attempts at social engineering and planned economy. Historical accident gave the Congo government a direct and controlling interest in the major mining enterprises; it has utilized this control and its profits to provide extensive health and medical services, to develop a permanent skilled labor force, to stabilize rural and urban populations, and to direct investment according to a definite but flexible program.

Until very recently the government relegated native political development to an indefinite future, but it is now cautiously considering greater African participation in political affairs. Even the limited gestures so far announced, however, have provoked strong opposition from Belgian colonists.

The government is reportedly concerned that there may be reverberations of the Kenya uprisings among the natives in eastern Congo. Dissident movements have in the past sprung up with little warning. While none so far have seriously menaced Belgian control, natives' contact with European communication and transportation techniques may increase their capabilities of disrupting the flow of strategic materials. There is also a danger that the Congo's booming economic development, based on heavy demand for its mineral and agricultural products and rapid growth of the European population, may outstrip the ability of the government to meet the

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accompanying social problems, especially native detribalization.

The authorities are particularly alert to the possibility of subversive infiltration across Congo frontiers. Strict security measures are reported to have been taken in the Katanga mineral area, and the new Kamina air base will provide a center from which troops may be rapidly despatched to any scene of trouble, but the Congo Surete does not now have effective control of many native border crossings. Contact with French Equatorial territory to the northwest remains easy, and the Czech Consulate in Leopoldville has issued propaganda whose effect and breadth of distribution are unknown.

#### 2. French Equatorial Africa

There is little present evidence of instability, social unrest, or of extensive Communist agitation in French Equatorial Africa. Many political parties exist, but no single party is generally supported throughout the area. The Communist Party is small, has little influence, and there is no present indication of Communist agitation. The Rassemblement Democratique Africaine (RDA), formerly the vehicle of Communists, is relatively inactive in this area.

The great mass of the 4,000,000 natives of Equatorial Africa are uneducated, socially undeveloped, and politically immature. They vote for personalities rather than programs, and loyalties do not extend beyond their immediate tribal areas.

#### 3. French Cameroons

Here, as in French Equatorial Africa, there is little evidence of political instability, social unrest or of extensive Communist agitation. There are several political parties, but most of them are primarily local in interest. The voters, as elsewhere in Black Africa, tend to follow personalities rather than platforms and vote for their fellow tribesmen. There is no political party which has a country-wide appeal. The Communist element is limited in influence, and agitation comes principally from the Union du Peuple Camerounais (UPC), an affiliate of the former Communistline RDA.

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The main problem at present, and a possible threat to future stability because of its nationalistic appeal, is the agitation for the unification of the two Trust Territories of the British and French Cameroons. The UPC from the French Cameroons met with interested groups from the British Cameroons in August 1951 and formed the Kamerun United National Congress to establish a movement for eventual unification. The congress has petitioned the UN to take action; the movement is new and its strength unknown. It may become an important factor in the future.

## D. East Africa

1. British East Africa

This area is composed of four separate administrations in various stages of political and economic development. They are loosely federated in an East African High Commission with an East African Legislative Assembly empowered to act on subjects of common concern including railroads, income tax, customs, communications, aviation and research services.

Kenya, a crown colony and protectorate, is the most advanced of the group. It is currently beset by a native terrorist movement based on sharp racial cleavages.

Tanganyika is a trust territory where the native political and economic development is less restricted than in Kenya. Here the presence of a smaller number of European settlers has not yet aggravated the underlying racial tensions to an inflammatory degree.

The protectorate of Uganda, possessing a wellestablished native political and economic system and a very small European settlement, is stable and free from much of the racial strife of East Africa. The protectorate of Zanzibar is governed by its hereditary sultan and is not plagued with political or racial instability.

#### a. Kenya

Racial cleavages are at the root of the current disturbances in Kenya. A white minority of about 30,000, less than one percent of the total population, controls the life of the colony, despite the presence of almost 100,000 Indian immigrants and over 5,000,000 native Africans. In the Legislative Council of 54 members, there are six nominated

African representatives and six elected Indian members. The Arab community has two representatives, while 40 remaining seats are mostly held by Europeans.

The European electorate vehemently opposes Indian demands for a common electoral role because it fears that the Indian voters would swamp the white settlers at the polls. The settlers demand that their unofficial representatives of the Legislative Council will continue to equal the total number of members of all other races.

The terrorist Mau Mau movement has arisen as a result of the contact between a changing but still primitive African society and the more advanced Europeans and Indians. The contact with Western civilization has brought about cultural and economic conflict and has produced African leaders with a smattering of Western education. They, however, have no opportunity to achieve economic, political or social equality. The land laws reserve the choice agricultural areas for the whites, and the franchise is largely limited to Europeans and Indians. Some of the frustrated native intellectuals have taken advantage of the vacuum created by decaying tribal leadership and traditions to gain influence among Africans by means of secret ritualistic organizations.

These organizations, such as Mau Mau or Dini Ya Msambwa, are pledged to alleviate native land hunger by seeking to expel the European settlers from their estates. Despite the presence of British troops, the current Mau Mau disturbances have already resulted in over 100 deaths; about 20 were Europeans and the remainder natives who would not cooperate with the terrorists. Some of the leaders were in contact with leftist circles when they studied abroad. They may make use of Communist tenent and techniques without actually desiring to further Soviet aims.

There appear to be increasing indications of Communist interest in the Mau Mau. Left-wing lawyers have volunteered to defend Jomo Kenyatta, alleged leader of the Mau Mau. The evidence still suggests, however, that this society is fundamentally not under direct Communist influence but that the

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Communists are using it to embarrass the British Government. Some of the measures taken against the Mau Mau are believed to be aggravating instead of alleviating tensions.

Underlying economic, political and social friction makes it quite probable that if Britain suppresses the Mau Mau, a similar secret society will arise within a few years. Eventually, a common African front overcoming tribal differences may endanger the European position in East Africa.

The Mau Mau disturbance has reinforced the settlers' skepticism toward the British policy of gradually advancing the Africans' political development toward partnership. The inability of the settlers to control the situation has dimmed their hopes of making East Africa a "white man's country" free from Colonial Office control. The immediate prospect is an uneasy stalemate with the initiative in the hands of the London authorities, who have recently appointed a Royal Commission to study the situation in Kenya.

### b. Tanganyika

This trust territory is relatively stable politically, but recent reports of Mau Mau threats point up the possibility that the racial situation might erupt with little warning. The white settler minority of 16,000 is small in comparison to an Indian group of over 70,000 and an African majority of nearly 8,000,000.

The European minority has more political and economic control than its numbers indicate, but less than the whites in Kenya. In the Legislative Council of 29 members, only four persons not connected with the administration are named to represent the Africans and three the Indian community, while seven Europeans are selected to represent the settler and commercial communities. In addition, there are 15 nominated European officials. The European setlers are currently disturbed over the government's plans to provide parity for all three communities in the Legislative Council and, as in Kenya, are skeptical of British policy to advance African political development.

Because there are fewer European settlers in Tanganyika and they hold less land, the problem there is not so serious as in Kenya. African pressure on the land has not yet caused native unrest. A minor land problem, however, was created by the resettlement of a few thousand Wa Meru natives who were evicted from lands taken for white settlers. This case was brought up before the UN.

## c. Uganda and Zanzibar

A stable political situation exists in Uganda and Zanzibar because of a relatively high degree of African political development prior to the advent of European control, the use of native institutions for British indirect rule, and the small size of the European minority '-- only 8,000 out of a total population of 5,000,000.

Both areas face economic problems. Uganda has relatively fertile agricultural areas and specializes in cotton and coffee, but the contemplated exploitation of important mineral resources may change the basis of the economy. Zanzibar faces a declining revenue caused by a clove blight which threatens to destroy the mainstay of the island's economy.

## 2. Ethiopia and Eritrea

The 61-year old Emperor Haile Selassie is likely to retain control of the internal politics of Ethiopia for his lifetime. The Imperial Bodyguard, the country's only effectively orgainzed military force, is fanatically loyal to him, and he is able to pursue a policy of judiciously balancing modernists against feudal conservatives. A plot against the Emperor's life was uncovered in 1951, and the possibility of assassination remains. Should a coup succeed, it would probably be followed by a period of instability, possibly of a serious nature, in which various cliques contend for power and even the throne itself.

The principal current problem is the integration of Eritrea into the federation with Ethiopia proclaimed in September 1952. The performance of the Eritrean Assembly has been better than expected, while the Emperor has taken a conciliatory tone toward the Moslem majority and the Italian colonists. But whether the Emperor and his

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appointees can exercise their new authority without alienating the Eritreans remains to be seen.

The Russians maintain a legation, an information center and a hospital in Addis Ababa,

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Ethiopia has sent a battalion to Korea and returning veterans are reportedly enthusiastic about their treatment there and about the United States -- so much so that their reassimilation into the Ethiopian home forces has posed some problems.

3. British Somaliland and Somalia

It may be assumed that increasing nationalist activity in the Arab world will find an echo here, for the country has changed little since its earlier history of Moslem fanaticism.

The Italian Trust Administration of Somalia is busy creating a host of pro-administration splinter parties to counter the influence of the nationalistic Somali Youth League. The present state of the League, the principal vehicle for anti-Italian agitation, is difficult to estimate.

The League has been blamed by the Italians for the death of several officials in a riot at Chisimaio last August, and, regardless of who was responsible, such incidents are likely to recur. They will probably not have any effect on the character or tenure of the Italian administration, whose existence depends on factors outside Somalia.

E. Central Africa

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1. British Central Africa

Three territories in differing stages of political and economic evolution comprise British Central Africa. Rapid economic strides nave usarranged the normal

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political development of the area and aggravated labor and racial tensions, particularly in Northern Rhodesia.

Southern Rhodesia, politically the most advanced of the region because of its relatively large European settler population of 150,000, is a self-governing colony. It has its own prime minister and legislature but is subject to the control of the British Parliament in matters affecting defense, foreign relations and native policy.

The protectorate of Northern Rhodesia is under Colonial Office supervision. The vocal settler and mining minority of about 40,000 is critical of the London policy of advancing African political development, which has already resulted in having two Africans elected to the legislature.

Nyasaland Protectorate, with only a small European settler population, has two nominated Africans serving in the legislature.

The rapid economic growth of the Rhodesian area since World War II is based primarily on increased mineral revenues, especially from copper, chrome and asbestos; increased tobacco production; and from important development in the metal processing and consumer goods industries.

This economic development of Central Africa, with its problems of labor supply, transportation, capital requirements and limited markets, has led local residents, as well as the present British Government, to seek closer regional coordination. The settler groups who fear eventual African domination or even expulsion of the whites from Africa have also demanded a strong Central African state.

Prime Minister Huggins of Southern Rhodesia considers that federation is the middle ground between the complete elimination of European leadership, as in the Gold Coast, and the repressive racial policies of South Africa.

The proposed federation plan calls for a Federal Assembly of 35 members, in which Southern Rhodesia will have 17 members. Nine members will represent African interests; six of them will be natives. An African Affairs Board with seven members, of whom three will be

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Africans, is intended to prevent discriminatory legislation by requiring any bill considered against African interests to be referred to the British Government. Any amendments to the constitution would likewise be reserved for British approval. The two northern territories will remain protectorates subject to Colonial Office control in their internal affairs.

The representatives of the Central African and the British Governments met in London in early January to discuss modification of the plan. In April, a referendum on federation is planned in Southern Rhodesia. At this time, its result is in doubt.

It is generally conceded that most articulate Africans in Central Africa oppose federation because they fear that it would replace friendly Colonial Office racial policy. Most Europeans in Northern Rhodesia favor federation as a way to escape Colonial office policy.

In Southern Rhodesia, however, settler opinion is sharply split. Those who fear South African political and economic influence want a strong central African state as a bulwark to oppose its spread northward. Many feel, however, that Southern Rhodesia may be outvoted in the Assembly by a "black" north, and that Africans in the Assembly may lead to their flooding the electoral rolls, where there are now fewer than 100 registered African voters. Principal attention is directed to the African Affairs Board, which the settlers believe will perpetuate Colonial Office control over native policy; without significant changes in the board's jurisdiction, a favorable vote in the referendum cannot be assured.

A potential for Communist action exists in the copperbelt area of Northern Rhodesia which is adjacent to the uranium and copper-rich Katanga area of the Belgian Congo. In the copperbelt, Communist control of the mining unions, or sabotage of the new power network serving the Katanga, could seriously cripple strategic mineral production.

2. Portuguese Africa (Angola and Mozambique)

So far as is known, there are no threats to the stability of the Portuguese administration of these territories, which contain the termini of the strategic rail

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routes from Central Africa. The authorities are quick to react against any indication of anti-government activity. They are suspicious of outside interest, and Portugal frequently prefers to finance development projects itself rather than accept foreign capital, even at the cost of slowing the pace of development.

There is some sentiment among the local Portuguese population for more self-administration, if not selfgovernment, and this sentiment is likely to increase as the colonies develop economically. In the last few months the Portuguese Government has taken steps to cement relations by sending important missions to the colonies, announcing a development program -- although a large share of the program was already on the books -- and promulgating a new Organic Law to revise the administration of its Overseas Territories.

#### 3. Madagascar

On the surface Madagascar is peaceful though nationalistist and Communist propaganda continues. The extremist nationalist party, the Mouvement Democratique de Renovation Malgache (MDRM), which agitated the plateau tribes into revolt in 1947 for an independent native Madagascar, has been largely eliminated by imprisonment and death. The remaining nationalist parties are intimidated, demoralized, and reduced in strength. Before the 1947 rebellion some 23 nationalists held seats in the five provincial assemblies; in 1952 only three nationalists were elected to one of the five.

Nationalists currently see independence as something to be obtained in the distant future. They are limiting themselves to the lesser targets of enlarging the importance of Madagascar within the French Union, increasing native participation in the administration, and obtaining more education and health facilities.

Though there is some conflicting evidence, the Madagascar Communist Party appears to be small and limited in influence. Communists' agitation, however, for immediate and total independence, and their playing on the residue of resentment among the natives remaining from French repression of the rebellion, combined with continued French opposition to giving the nationalists even their present lesser targets, may in the long run gain them a substantial audience.

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# F. Southern Africa

## 1. <u>High</u> <u>Commission</u> <u>Territories</u>: (Basutoland, Bechuanaland, Swaziland)

These three territories, important to South Africa as reservoirs of native labor, are relatively undeveloped agricultural areas. When the Union of South Africa was founded in 1909, they were left under the control of Britain with the general understanding that at the discretion of the British Parliament they might be transferred to the Union. Since that time, in view of South African racial policies, Britain has stated that transfer can only occur after consultation with the natives of the three territories.

Although economically dependent on the Union, the territories are nearly unanimous in their opposition to South African policy. The Union has long agitated for their annexation, and leading nationalists have said that transfer from Britain's control will become an issue in the South African election scheduled for April. If so, the areas may be the subject of a formal South African request for a transfer; Britain will probably not agree to it under present conditions.

In both Basutoland and Swaziland the political and economic situations are static and, aside from development projects instituted by the Colonial Development Corporation, no appreciable change is expected.

Traditional government in Bechuanaland has been dislocated because tribal chief Seretse Khama married a white woman and was subsequently exiled from the territory. Tribal factions have not yet agreed on his successor, while the South African Government vehemently opposes the return of a chief whose marriage defies the Union's racial doctrines.

North Bechuanaland is being turned into a gigantic beef cattle ranch by the Colonial Development Corporation in an effort to satisfy much of Britain's meat requirements.

# 2. Union of South Africa

The Union of South Africa is not included in the Current Situation because NIE 72, Probable Development in the Union of South Africa, has been recently completed.

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