


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


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


ARMY review(s)
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DIA review(s)
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State Dept. review
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SUMMARY

Indochina

The Military Situation: The French have begun to react to the loss of Dien Bien Phu by bolstering the Tonkin delta defenses. They are redeploying forces from Laos and are tentatively planning to send 35,000 more troops from Europe and North Africa.

The Viet Minh redeployment from Dien Bien Phu is apparently proceeding at a faster rate than the French had expected. As of 25 May, the bulk of the 304th, 308th, 312th and 351st Divisions was east of Son La. With the movement of the 316th Division, only 2,000 of the 35,000 enemy troops formerly in northwest Tonkin will remain there.

The French report they have no evidence that a Viet Minh logistical build-up is under way on the scale necessary for an all-out assault on the perimeter.

[REDACTED]

General Ely accepted in principle General O'Daniel's plan for having American advisers train the Vietnam army, but serious difficulties still stand in the way of putting the plan into operation.

The Political Situation: Security and social cohesion went from bad to worse.

In Saigon, Bao Dai's turning of police power over to the gangster Binh Xuyen organization led to the resignation of hundreds of experienced policemen and their replacement by Binh Xuyen incompetents. Law enforcement "dropped to nothing." The American chargé fears antiwhite rioting. The French are by no means confident of their ability to quell a major disturbance.

In central Vietnam, security is similarly precarious. The local militia are described as entirely uncoordinated and leaderless. A Vietnamese official says that in the event of an attack, the militia would probably shoot each other rather than the Viet Minh.

Influential Vietnamese continue to go to Paris and Geneva on official or semiofficial "missions," changing large amounts of piasters into francs "for expenses of the delegation" or, as in the case of one cabinet member, for the purchase of property in France for his "retirement."

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In talks with American officials at his resort headquarters near Geneva, Bao Dai loftily dismissed reports of disintegration in Vietnam and blamed any political ferment back home on France's failure to clarify its intentions and meet Vietnamese demands for independence.

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Geneva Conference

Communist Position: Communist tactics at Geneva appear to be aimed at stalling the negotiations while watching developments in Indochina and Paris, at gaining acceptance of Communist proposals as a basis for negotiations, and at exalting the contrived "resistance" regimes in Laos and Cambodia.

The Communist position on the relationship between a cease-fire and a political settlement in Indochina is still obscure. After beginning from the position that the two questions are inseparable, the Communists began to retreat toward the possibility of an armistice first. They are now again insisting on the inseparability of military and political issues.

The Communists seem to think they will succeed in forestalling Western intervention in Indochina and will be able to improve the position of the Viet Minh by a combination of military and political forms of action.

Observers in Geneva as well as in Washington get the impression that the Communists believe time is on their side in Indochina.

Vietnamese Position: The Vietnamese delegate reminded the conference on 25 May that Vietnam and France had recently negotiated two treaties by which Vietnam had achieved its independence. He agreed that a cease-fire in Indochina was desirable, but said his country must defend its independence against all foreign dangers.

Laotian and Cambodian Position: The Laotian and Cambodian delegates continued to maintain that, since their countries are independent, there are no political problems concerning them for the conference to discuss.

French Position: Bidault stood fast on the original French demand that an armistice agreement with international controls must be concluded prior to either a cease-fire or a political settlement. Pressure from the National Assembly limits the

foreign minister's ability to maneuver. There are reports of double-dealing within the French delegation at Geneva.

British Position: Eden told American delegates he had warned Chou En-lai that the Indochina situation might lead to unpredictable and serious results and that Peiping must not count on Britain to prevent this from happening. Eden said he had told Chou that in a showdown Britain would stand with the United States.

Soviet Bloc Propaganda

East Germany: An East German commentary contributed the most pointed observation made by Orbit propaganda. The United States is trying to create a Southeast Asian "military bloc" directed against China, the commentary said--and China, "one is well advised to remember, is closely linked to the USSR by a treaty of friendship and assistance."

The USSR, Communist China and the Viet Minh soft-pedaled their earlier demands that the Communist ghost governments of Pathet Lao and Khmer be represented at Geneva. Propagandists continued, however, to stress the "legitimacy" of these regimes and to treat the Associated States as a geographic whole, united in a "struggle for national liberation."

Free World Policies and Opinions

France: The French showed signs of a Hamlet-like indecision.

The National Assembly continued to give only grudging and unstable support to the Laniel cabinet, and to do so only on the clear understanding that the government find a way to end the Indochina conflict.

General Ely told General O'Daniel, "The sooner you get into the war, the better we will like it," and most other French military leaders and some cabinet members urged American intervention. But most ministers and most deputies feared such action as a long step toward a general war.

Meanwhile, the government took only stopgap measures to strengthen the military position in Indochina. It put off action on last week's decision to send 30,000 troops to Indochina "in the immediate future" and agreed that for the time being only 5,000--mostly North Africans--would be sent.

French North Africa: The American consul in Rabat suggested that the recent intensification of terrorist activity there may be prompted by a nationalist desire to take advantage of France's troubles in Asia.

Great Britain: Despite a flood of rumors which followed a special cabinet meeting last week end, British policy on Indochina seemed to remain the same. Foreign Secretary Eden appeared to be as intent as before on giving the Communists every opportunity to agree to arrangements which the free world could accept. The Communists, if they spurned all these opportunities, would be accountable for a failure at Geneva.

There was widespread editorial nervousness over the state of the Anglo-American alliance, but the government's policy had overwhelming popular support.

Australia and New Zealand: Apparent differences between the United States and Britain caused concern in Canberra and Wellington.

Netherlands: Catholic and independent newspapers alike endorsed the American position that early organization of a collective Southeast Asia defense system is necessary.

Burma: There was new evidence of growing Burmese concern over the Communist threat but little reason to expect Burma to abandon its "neutral" policy soon.

Indonesia: The Indonesians are beginning to have doubts about their original view that Ho Chi Minh was the leader of a struggle for national independence essentially like their own against the Dutch. The press shows an increasing tendency to recognize Ho's dependence on Peiping. One newspaper warned Ho against jumping from "the mouth of the lion to the mouth of the crocodile." Indonesian leaders still prefer to keep their misgivings about Ho to themselves, however.

Philippines: His leadership challenged by ultra-nationalists in his own party, President Magsaysay is obliged to move cautiously. He told an American army officer this week, however, that he was planning to discuss with political leaders the conditions under which the Philippines would be prepared to enter into an Asian or Southeast Asian bloc.

Thailand: The Thai government continued to support the United States, as it has done from the outset of the Indochina crisis. The director general of the public relations office said that Thailand might send troops to Indochina without waiting to be attacked.

Japan: Japanese diplomacy took no strong, clear line on Indochina.

The ambassador to Thailand was quoted as telling the press that the fall of Dien Bien Phu was "merely an episode in a purely colonial war" and that there was therefore no reason to attribute particular importance to it by "forcing it" into the framework of the fight of the free nations against Communism.

The minister to Switzerland viewed the American proposal for a NATO-style Southeast Asian pact as necessary to guarantee any understanding which might be reached on Indochina.

Foreign Minister Okazaki told the Diet that it was "problematical" whether the Japanese constitution--which renounces war--would permit Japan to join such an alliance.

Korea: Ambassador Briggs reports that President Rhee thinks the United States cannot get along without him. Rhee's attitude toward Washington has hardened, Briggs believes. The president this week described the situation in Indochina as "almost hopeless." At the same time, he publicly renewed a previous offer to send troops to Indochina.

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INDOCHINA

Military



Following the initial reaction of dismay and consternation over the fall of Dien Bien Phu, the French have begun to take steps to bolster their military position in Indochina.

Vietnam: General Ely told the American chargé in Saigon on 22 May that the French are determined to hold the Tonkin delta and will bring in all or almost all of the 13 French Union infantry and two artillery battalions now in Laos and replace with Vietnamese troops the Union forces now in static positions in the delta. One artillery and four infantry battalions already have been redeployed from other areas of Indochina to the delta and at least one of the three battalions now en route from Europe will be sent there.


As the Viet Minh has gradually increased its striking power through training, combat experience and Chinese materiel aid, the scattered French garrisons have found it more and more difficult to protect the Tonkin delta countryside and to prevent posts from being overrun.

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


The American army attaché reported on 26 May that the redeployment of Viet Minh units from Dien Bien Phu apparently was proceeding at a faster rate than the French had expected when they recently estimated 20 June as the earliest date this battle corps could arrive at the delta. The French reported that as of 25 May the bulk of the 304th, 308th, 312th and 351st Divisions was east of Son La, with leading elements of the 351st Division approaching Tuyen Quang, north of the delta. The 316th Division, the last to re-deploy, still had two of its three regiments in the Dien Bien Phu area. With the movement of the 316th, only 2,000 of the 35,000 enemy troops formerly in northwest Tonkin will remain there.




According to a senior French official, there is no indication as yet of a build-up of supplies by the Viet Minh of the proportions needed for an all-out assault on the delta. This official believes there will be no major attack by the Viet Minh before September, but that the Viet Minh will attempt during the summer to cut supply lines and strangle Hanoi. This view is concurred in by the American army attaché in Saigon, who believes that for the near future, the primary Viet Minh target in the delta will continue to be the road and railroad between Hanoi and Haiphong.






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
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Laos: The threat of another Communist drive on Luang Prabang during the current rainy season has receded with the impending movement of most of the Viet Minh forces at Dien Bien Phu to the delta. It is possible, however, that minor Viet Minh elements remaining in northwest Tonkin and northern Laos will attempt to recapture several small French outposts between Luang Prabang and the Tonkin border.

Cambodia: The French have announced the evacuation of Siem Pang in the north, which was attacked last month by two invading Viet Minh battalions. The French stated that the withdrawal was made to permit the organization of the Siem Pang troops into a mobile group. There have been no further reports of military activity by the Viet Minh battalions in Cambodia.

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


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American training: According to the American embassy in Saigon, General Ely has accepted in principle General O'Daniel's concept of having the Vietnamese army trained by American advisers. Although he emphasized that there would be no American participation in operational planning, he agreed that the advisers should be attached to Vietnamese combat units. American officials in Saigon say the Vietnamese minister of defense would like to have the entire training program administered by the US army.

Dien Bien Phu wounded: French personnel allowed in Dien Bien Phu have seen no Vietnamese prisoners there, and assume the Viet Minh is moving them elsewhere. Viet Minh spokesmen stated that the enlisted troops have volunteered to join the Viet Minh.

* * *



FRENCH UNION FORCES				VIET MINH FORCES				
FRENCH	ASSOCIATED	TOTAL	COMBAT STRENGTH	AREA	REGULARS	REGIONAL EQUIVALENT	TOTAL	COMBAT STRENGTH
39 Inf Bns 12 Arty Bns	31 Inf Bns 2 Arty Bns 18 Lt Bns	70 Inf Bns 14 Arty Bns 18 Lt Bns	86,500	I	33 Inf Bns 1 Arty Bn	35 Inf Bns	68 Inf Bns 1 Arty Bn	53,200
5 Inf Bns 2 Arty Bns	16 Inf Bns 0 Arty Bns 4 Lt Bns	21 Inf Bns 2 Arty Bns 4 Lt Bns	22,500	II	4 Inf Bns 0 Arty Bns	10 Inf Bns	11 Inf Bns 0 Arty Bns	10,100
6 Inf Bns 2 Arty Bns	7 Inf Bns 0 Arty Bns 3 Lt Bns	13 Inf Bns 2 Arty Bns 3 Lt Bns	14,800	III	4 Inf Bns 0 Arty Bns	3 Inf Bns	7 Inf Bns 0 Arty Bns	4,600
6 Inf Bns 2 Arty Bns	23 Inf Bns 0 Arty Bns 3 Lt Bns	29 Inf Bns 2 Arty Bns 3 Lt Bns	35,500	IV	15 Inf Bns 0 Arty Bns	6 Inf Bns	24 Inf Bns 0 Arty Bns	14,900
5 Inf Bns 0 Arty Bns	12 Inf Bns 0 Arty Bns 19 Lt Bns	17 Inf Bns 0 Arty Bns 19 Lt Bns	22,500	V	10 Inf Bns 0 Arty Bns	12 Inf Bns	22 Inf Bns 0 Arty Bns	15,000
0 Inf Bns 0 Arty Bns	6 Inf Bns 0 Arty Bns 3 Lt Bns	6 Inf Bns 0 Arty Bns 3 Lt Bns	7,300	VI	0 Inf Bns 0 Arty Bns	3 Inf Bns	3 Inf Bns 0 Arty Bns	2,500
10 Inf Bns 1 Arty Bn	1 Inf Bn 0 Arty Bn 1 Lt Bn	11 Inf Bns 1 Arty Bn 1 Lt Bn	11,000	VII	4 Inf Bns 1 Arty Bns	4 Inf Bns	8 Inf Bns 1 Arty Bn	6,000
8 Inf Bns 0 Arty Bns	5 Inf Bns 0 Arty Bns 3 Lt Bns	13 Inf Bns 0 Arty Bns 3 Lt Bns	13,500	VIII	4 Inf Bns 0 Arty Bns	7 Inf Bns	11 Inf Bns 0 Arty Bns	7,500
_____	_____	_____	_____	IX	37 Inf Bns 4 Arty Bns	9 Inf Bns	46 Inf Bns 4 Arty Bns	37,800

Political

Saigon: The deteriorating security situation in Saigon is marked by new indications of professional incompetence and power-grabbing on the part of the Binh Xuyen, the gangster organization to which Bao Dai gave police control some weeks ago. The French have revised their earlier estimate that Binh Xuyen control of the police, while disastrous politically, would not enhance Viet Minh capabilities. According to a senior French official, the resignation of hundreds of experienced policemen and their replacement by Binh Xuyen incompetents is playing into the hands of the Viet Minh.

The Binh Xuyen's political ambitions have been greatly excited by its acquisition of the police arsenal, and there is a strong possibility of armed clashes between its forces and those of the Vietnam National Army. A Reuters correspondent told an embassy official that the Binh Xuyen had been ordered to take the side of local cab drivers in any dispute with a white passenger. The American chargé fears antiwhite rioting.

The French are by no means confident they have enough troops in Saigon to quell a major disturbance. Law enforcement has reportedly "dropped to nothing," thereby giving the Viet Minh and its sympathizers an unparalleled opportunity to push anti-Western propaganda. In the past week there have been unprecedented references in the Saigon press to American "imperialism" and Soviet "benevolence."

Central Vietnam: The security situation in central Vietnam is similarly precarious. The local militia are reported to be entirely un-co-ordinated and leaderless. A Vietnamese official has said that in the event of an attack they would probably shoot each other rather than the Viet Minh. It is believed that a considerable number of the many refugees entering Hué from the provinces are Viet Minh agents.

The increasing tendency of Vietnamese to take matters into their own hands, both as individuals and as groups, is evident in a constructive but probably belated program launched by the Vietnamese labor minister which aims at the inauguration of a grass-roots democratic movement through the formation of a network of popularly elected local administrative committees.



The problems which will be encountered in any attempt to renovate the government have been aggravated by the continuing movement of influential Vietnamese to Paris and Geneva on official or semiofficial "missions." A recent sharp rise in requests by Vietnamese for francs in exchange for piasters suggests growing despair in some circles that Vietnam can be held. The requests are camouflaged as being for the expenses of the delegation or, on the part of one cabinet minister, for the purchase of property in France for his "retirement."

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Laos: An unprecedented popular demonstration was organized against the Communist powers' build-up of the so-called "Pathet Lao" regime. Although the demonstration was undoubtedly organized by the government, it may promote the development of widespread nationalist, anti-Communist feeling.


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Cambodia: Premier Penn Nouth threatened to dissociate Cambodia's currency from the franc unless certain customs duties collected in Vietnam were remitted to Cambodia in accordance with earlier agreements with France. Whether or not this specific threat is carried out, it is evident Cambodia is pressing hard to give maximum reality to its economic as well as political independence.



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


Bao Dai: In talks with American officials at his resort headquarters near Geneva, Bao Dai loftily dismissed reports of Vietnamese political disintegration and attributed any political ferment to France's failure to clarify its intentions and meet Vietnamese demands for independence.



Bao Dai gave no indication he would return to Vietnam or act decisively in any way beyond indicating through one of his aides that he might remove Premier Buu Loc and replace him by the overrated Catholic lay leader, Ngo Dinh Diem. Such a move would be useless or worse, and would merely postpone the regeneration of Vietnam which would be possible under either one of two outstanding men as premiers--Governor Tri of Tonkin or Defense Minister Phan Huy Quat.

The American chargé at Saigon warns that if Bao Dai returns to Vietnam "his evil genius," Nguyen De, must be left behind.



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GENEVA CONFERENCE

Communist Position

The discussions during the first week of restricted sessions on Indochina were devoted entirely to procedural matters. The pattern of Communist tactics suggested that the bloc delegates are seeking (1) to stall serious negotiations while watching the course of military and political developments in Indochina and Paris; (2) to maneuver the conference into accepting the Communist proposals for an Indochina settlement as a basis for negotiations; and (3) to gain acceptance of the principle that all three Indochinese states should be given simultaneous consideration and equal treatment. The last step would achieve a measure of international recognition for the "resistance governments" of Laos and Cambodia and help to consolidate the "liberated areas" under the control of the Communist-sponsored regimes.

17 May: The Communists opened the first restricted session, on 17 May, with a maneuver aimed at creating the impression, particularly within the French government, that they were willing to negotiate a cease-fire without prior agreement on terms of a political settlement. Molotov stated that the Soviet delegation attached great importance to both the military and political aspects of the Indochina question and believed that they were closely linked, but that, since the military aspect was covered by both proposals, it might be taken up first.

Molotov's next move was aimed at blocking Western efforts to have Laos and Cambodia dealt with separately from Vietnam. He suggested that if the conference accepted his proposal to adopt both the Viet Minh and French draft proposals as a basis for negotiations, substantive talks would begin with the question as to whether Laos and Cambodia should be dealt with separately.

18 May: The conference accepted Molotov's proposal on 18 May--only to hear the Viet Minh delegate in the second restricted session flatly reject the principle of separation. He argued that war and peace are indivisible in Indochina, that the same military and political problems obtain throughout Indochina, and that the only solution would be a simultaneous cease-fire throughout the peninsula, followed by a political settlement which would provide unification in each of the three states. Molotov and Chou En-lai also rejected the separate approach to Laos and Cambodia.

19 May: Molotov concluded the third restricted session by stating he was not asking for a decision on the principle of separation and he desired to conduct a point-by-point discussion of the military aspects of the French and Viet Minh proposals at the next restricted meeting.

20 May: In separate conversations with Eden, Molotov and Chou appeared to be interested in breaking the stalemate. Chou agreed that military and political aspects must be dealt with separately, with a priority for a cease-fire, which should take effect in all three states on the same date. Molotov also told Eden the conference could get ahead by examining the French and Viet Minh proposals for a cease-fire, which would inevitably apply to all three states. Over and above the cease-fire question, Molotov said the political issues could be dealt with separately in each country, and Chou stated that political settlements might be different for the three states.

21 May: The conciliatory approach evident in these private conversations was conspicuously absent from the Viet Minh delegate's statement in the restricted session on the following day. He rejected the idea of separate

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treatment of Cambodia and Laos, arguing that the differences among the three states were of degree but not of kind.

Molotov introduced additional points regarding cease-fire negotiations clearly designed to prolong such talks. He proposed that the Viet Minh and French proposals be discussed with a view to finding what general principles would be applicable to all three states, to be followed by a discussion of the application of these principles to each of the states separately.

In addition, Molotov in the 21 May session suggested four other questions for discussion: (1) establishment of zones for regrouping forces in each of the three states; (2) nonintroduction of foreign troops or arms; (3) supervision of the cease-fire agreement; and (4) guarantees. He emphasized that these points referred only to military aspects and that the political problems could be discussed later.

25 May: The Soviet foreign minister took up his last point during the fifth restricted session. He found "no great difference" between his five points and the French list of questions to be discussed, but noted the inseparability of the political and military solutions and concluded that the conference should proceed to the discussion of the political problem after a brief consideration of the military question.

Backed by Chou En-lai and the Viet Minh delegates, Molotov urged that alternate conference sessions be held on military and political problems. Molotov and Chou both recommended direct French-Viet Minh contacts in the field or at Geneva.

The American delegation at Geneva commented after the 25 May session that the Communists seemed concerned at the trend toward discussion of military before political matters and were attempting to recover lost ground. The delegation believed that Communist tactics in this meeting discouraged the hope that the Communists might, while reserving their position, permit substantive discussion on military matters to proceed without simultaneously injecting political issues.

The delegation concluded that the bloc delegates are still playing for time on the premise that time is on their side in Indochina.

Chinese Communist spokesmen at Geneva have continued to show sensitivity to any suggestion that Peiping automatically follows the Soviet lead, and Soviet sources have continued to hint that the Chinese Communists are more aggressive in Indochina policy than is Moscow.

These developments almost certainly represent a joint Sino-Soviet maneuver. Both Moscow and Peiping are interested in portraying Communist China as a fifth great power with an "independent" foreign policy, and both may feel that the West can be enticed into asking Moscow to intervene with "those hotheads in Peiping," thus bringing closer the kind of Indochina settlement that both Moscow and Peiping want.

Vietnamese Position

The Vietnamese delegate, while agreeing to the desirability of a cease-fire in Indochina, reminded the conference on 25 May that Vietnam and France had recently negotiated two treaties by which Vietnam had achieved independence. He said his country must defend this independence against all foreign dangers.

Laotian and Cambodian Position

The Laotian and Cambodian delegates continued to maintain that there are no political problems to be discussed once the invading Viet Minh troops have been withdrawn from their states.

French Position

During the past week, Bidault continued to hold the line on the original French demands for an armistice agreement with international controls prior to either a cease-fire or a political settlement. National Assembly pressure limits his ability to maneuver; however, he has expressed concern to American officials that

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the French public may take a dim view of his inflexibility, and even his own party is reported critical of his stand.

Moreover, there are indications in his seven-point proposal of 24 May that he may have retreated from his earlier insistence on the withdrawal of Viet Minh forces from Laos and Cambodia.

Bidault's job has been further complicated by reports of double-dealing within the French delegation at Geneva. According to these reports, Secretary for the Associated States Jacquet has appointed two representatives to deal directly with the Viet Minh and is spreading the story that Bidault is not doing enough to reach an agreement. Jacquet has been one of the strongest proponents of negotiations in the French cabinet and got into trouble with Laniel over his premature response to the Ho offer to negotiate on 29 November.

British Position

Britain still has not advanced any proposals of its own in the Indochina negotiations, and is continuing to serve as spokesman for the West, both in the conference sessions and in informal approaches to the Communists.

In a conversation on 20 May, Eden warned Chou En-lai that the Indochina situation might lead to unpredictable and serious results, and that Peiping must not count on Britain to prevent this from happening. Eden said that in a showdown Britain would stand with the United States. At a dinner with Molotov the same day, Eden took the opportunity to emphasize that press rumors of Anglo-American differences were unfounded.

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SOVIET BLOC PROPAGANDAUSSR

Soviet propaganda has shown sensitivity to reports-- which it declares are false--that Moscow and Peiping have agreed to consider the settlements for Laos and Cambodia separately from that for Vietnam. While soft-pedaling its earlier call for the "resistance governments" of Pathet Lao and Khmer to be represented at Geneva, Moscow radio still treats the Associated States as a geographic whole, united in a "struggle for national liberation."

The Soviet press and radio have also continued to denounce the United States for plotting to create a Southeast Asian "military bloc," and for making charges of Chinese Communist intervention as a screen for American intervention and as a means of coercing the allies in supporting American policy.

East Germany

An East German commentary of 11 May suggested that the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950 might apply to the Indochina conflict--the only such suggestion noted. The commentary accused the United States of working toward a Southeast Asian military bloc directed against China-- which, it said, "one is well advised to remember, is closely linked to the USSR by a treaty of friendship and assistance."

Communist China

Peiping's propaganda has followed Moscow in emphasizing the "legitimacy" of the contrived regimes which share the "liberation" struggle with the Viet Minh, while ceasing to insist that they be individually represented at Geneva.

The Soviet New Times of 15 May reprinted a map from a Chinese Communist magazine of March 1954 which shows larger portions of the three Associated States as being under Viet Minh control than has any map previously published in the Soviet press.

In apparent response to a statement by the Thai chief of staff that Thailand would not object to the free world's establishing military bases there, Peiping has charged Thailand with co-operating in American plans to turn that country into a base for intervening in Indochina.

Viet Minh

Viet Minh propaganda has echoed Moscow and Peiping in portraying the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia as united in a struggle for "liberation." In contrast to its earlier stress on a cease-fire and negotiations outside the Geneva conference, this propaganda now emphasizes the need for a settlement at Geneva.

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FREE WORLD POLICIES AND OPINIONS

France

Premier Laniel continues to be under unrelenting pressure from the National Assembly to explore every possibility for a settlement at Geneva. Meanwhile he is trying to build up French forces in Indochina to prevent a military disaster.

The High Council of National Defense, which decided initially to send 30,000 reinforcements to Indochina "in the immediate future," subsequently suspended action on this plan until it hears from Generals Ely, Salan and Pelissier, whom it sent to make an on-the-spot survey of the Indochinese situation. There are rumors in Indochina that the generals will ask that at least two more divisions be sent and that General Navarre be relieved of his command. The American chargé in Saigon, however, reports that Ely will recommend that only one division be transferred.

Pending the report of the generals, smaller forces are being sent. According to the American embassy in Paris, these total 5,000 men and consist of the following units: three battalions of Tabors (North Africans similar to Goums), three Algerian rifle battalions, two artillery units with a total of 32 cannon, one "flight" of naval aircraft totaling 20 airplanes, and miscellaneous lesser units.

The government is also considering the possibility of calling up next month the conscripts originally scheduled for duty in October.

The government hopes to convince the National Assembly that military reinforcements are needed to protect the expeditionary force by strengthening the defenses of the Tonkin delta. The cabinet is also anxious to remove the impression that the fall of Dien Bien Phu broke the back of the French military effort.

The increased effort now planned is only a stopgap measure, however, and not an alternative to foreign intervention or a cessation of hostilities.

General Ely told General O'Daniel in Saigon on 18 May, "The sooner you get into the war, the better we will like it." While most French military leaders and some cabinet members continue to urge American intervention, a majority of the cabinet and of assembly deputies profess to see such a move as the first step toward general war. The assembly made it clear in the two votes of confidence it grudgingly accorded Laniel in the past three weeks that it expects the government to bring the war to an end through negotiations at Geneva.

Laniel was unable to forestall a new Indochina debate following the return of the three generals, although, thanks to the Ascension Day recess, the cabinet is safe until 1 June. Laniel will face severe questioning, however, when he requests the additional funds now needed for Indochina. In particular, government efforts to enter into a Southeast Asia alliance with the United States, but without Britain, will evoke sharp attack.

Until it is absolutely clear that Geneva has failed, there is little chance that the assembly will accept a policy hostile to the climate of negotiation.

Laniel may hope that reinforcements will serve to strengthen France's position at Geneva and encourage early American participation in the war, but even if the assembly accepts the program as a means to save the delta, or to facilitate possible evacuation, it is unlikely to be diverted from its increasing determination to rid France of the war burden.

French North Africa

The American consul in Rabat, French Morocco, suggests that the recent intensification of terrorist activity there may be prompted by a nationalist desire to take advantage of France's troubles in Asia. If the French position in Indochina deteriorates, the long-drawn-out conflict between the North African nationalists and the French is expected to worsen. The nationalists will probably press harder for autonomy, while the French, who value North Africa even more than Indochina, will be more determined than ever to maintain their hold. The recent change of resident generals in French Morocco underscores the seriousness of the problem there and France's realization that something must be done now to ameliorate the situation.

Great Britain

Britain's approach to the Indochina problem has apparently remained the same this week, despite a flood of rumors about the special cabinet meeting last week end. Foreign Secretary Eden reportedly indicated after this meeting that he expects the next week or two to be decisive at Geneva. This suggests he will persist in the policy of offering the Communists every opportunity to reduce tension until their responsibility for the failure of Geneva is clearly apparent.

The British government evidently enjoys unanimous support, cutting across party lines, for its attempt to serve as an honest broker in East-West negotiations. Eden especially has won great favor for his intensive effort to bring Asian nations around to supporting a collective security plan for Southeast Asia. Should Eden be forced to report the failure of the Geneva talks, he could probably count on wide support for a "stronger government policy" toward Asian questions.

Resentment in the press against American criticism of Britain's position seems best summarized in a statement of the Washington correspondent of The Times of London that "Britain has no Indochina policy and is keeping quiet about it. The United States has no

Indochina policy and is talking about it at the top of its voice." This attitude is, nevertheless, frequently tempered by a widespread editorial nervousness over the state of the Anglo-American alliance.

Australia and New Zealand

Differences between the United States and Britain on methods of promoting collective security in Southeast Asia have caused considerable concern in both countries.

New Zealand's Minister of External Affairs Webb said in Washington he could not conceive of a satisfactory alliance being formed in Southeast Asia without the British. He made it clear, however, that New Zealand was not renegeing on its previous commitments.

The Australian minister of external affairs, Casey, commented that the question of membership in any area defense arrangement was hypothetical, since no official steps have yet been taken toward its establishment. He further said it was "quite clear" that Britain, the United States, Australia and New Zealand are agreed on the advisability of examining, together with other governments concerned, the possibility of setting up a mutual defense arrangement.

Netherlands

The Dutch press reflects concern over Geneva natural in a country which still retains important Southeast Asian interests. Both Catholic and independent papers, despite a belief that Britain is doing an effective diplomatic job at Geneva, have approved the American position that early organization of a collective defense system in the area is necessary. The papers reveal some doubt, however, that the United States is in a position to undertake a decisive policy in Southeast Asia.

Burma

There have been new indications of growing Burmese concern over the Communist threat.

Malcolm MacDonald, British commissioner general in Southeast Asia, told Ambassador Sebald in Rangoon on 19 May he believed the Burmese government during the past two months had developed a "surprisingly realistic" appraisal of the Communist danger. He referred to a conversation he had had with Kyaw Nyein, the Burmese acting foreign minister, in which the latter expressed fear of Communist encirclement of Burma and showed deep concern over the possibility of a Communist takeover in Indochina.

After his election on 24 May to the chairmanship of the Asian Socialist Conference, which is now meeting in Burma, Kyaw Nyein delivered a scathing denunciation of Russian imperialism. He stated that Soviet-style imperialism "is more dangerous than the old 19th century colonialism,...is more degrading,...is more ruthless, more systematic."

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Despite these indications of increasing realism among important Burmese leaders, there is little reason to believe that Burma is on the verge of abandoning its "neutral" foreign policy.

Burmese defense minister Ba Swe, the outgoing chairman of the Asian Socialist Conference, is quoted as saying that the time appeared ripe for an Asian Locarno pact, which presumably would include Communist China.

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Finally, the American embassy in

Rangoon reports there have been some editorial departures from neutrality, but most of the press and public opinion solidly supports the government's officially neutral position.

Indonesia

Ambassador Cumming in Djakarta reports there have been a number of indications in the past year that the general Indonesian view that Ho Chi Minh is the leader of a struggle essentially like their own against the Dutch has run up against nagging doubts about Ho's independence of Communist China. The Indonesian press did not hail the fall of Dien Bien Phu as a victory in the fight against colonialism, and has shown an increasing tendency to recognize Ho's dependence on Peiping. One paper warned him against going from the "mouth of the lion to the mouth of the crocodile."

Cumming believes, however, that Indonesian leaders are not prepared to acknowledge their concern publicly, fearing that to do so might look like siding with the West. He also feels that Indonesians believe their geographical location, coupled with whatever moves the West may make in Southeast Asia, will provide "an umbrella which will give them time to formulate their own position."

Meanwhile, an official of the Foreign Ministry has denied reports that the government was considering some sort of regional defense arrangement--possibly including Communist China--as an alternative to the American plan. He qualified his statement, however, by stating that Indonesia favored exploring any possibility of reducing tensions in Southeast Asia.

Philippines

Scattered press comment condemned the Soviet proposal at Geneva for the creation of a neutral commission, citing the example set in Korea. Speaking in Chicago, Carlos Romulo, the personal representative of President Magsaysay in the United States, said the Philippines would join a Southeast Asian defense pact only if it were "for freedom, as well as against Communism."

In Manila Magsaysay confidentially informed an American army officer he was planning to discuss with political leaders the conditions under which the Philippine government would enter into an Asian or Southeast Asian bloc. With his party split by the ultranationalistic Senator Recto's bid for leadership, the president must move carefully.

Thailand

Premier Nu informed Ambassador Donovan on 23 May he would immediately authorize Foreign Minister Wan to submit Thailand's complaint against Communist aggression in Laos and Cambodia to the Security Council. The day before, Wan had told Under Secretary Smith in Geneva he was in agreement with the planned procedure and would send Thailand's resident representative to the United Nations back to New York in the "very near future" to handle the matter.

Other Thai officials also gave strong support to the Western position on Indochina.

The director general of the Public Relations Office affirmed a statement by the army deputy chief of staff that Thailand would permit the establishment of foreign military bases if they were under the auspices of the UN. He went on to say that Thailand might have to send troops to Indochina without waiting to be attacked.

The Thai ambassador to Washington, who is now in Bangkok, told the press Thailand favors a cease-fire in Indochina before negotiating a political settlement, as well as a Viet Minh withdrawal from Laos and Cambodia. In this connection, Foreign Minister Wan cabled from Geneva he had told a British Broadcasting Corporation representative Thailand was prepared to join in supervising any elections in Indochina that may be agreed on at the conference.

The American embassy in Bangkok reports that local press reaction to these developments has been divided. Government-controlled papers strongly support the united action policy, while others have expressed reservations if not outright opposition.

Japan

Japanese diplomacy took no strong clear line on the Indochina situation.

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Japanese editorial writers were divided this week in their opinions on the Indochina situation. Some newspapers criticized the American proposal for a Southeast Asian pact as indicating a lack of interest in the Geneva peace talks, while others praised the action as the "only practical guarantee of peace."

Editorial comment described French policy since 1945 as "narrow in concept and timid in execution," and called it the element principally responsible for the loss of Dien Bien Phu. One editorial praised the diplomacy of Britain as superior to America's "idealistic and tactless" diplomacy because it takes the anticolonial psychology of Asian neutralist nations into account. Another editorial in the same paper attacked British diplomacy as "appeasement" of the Communists which is unlikely to bring about a settlement and only serves to weaken the United States' position at Geneva.

South Korea

On 20 May President Rhee publicly renewed his offer to send troops to Indochina. He described the situation as "almost hopeless," and called for immediate action on the part of the free world to supply arms, train native troops and increase air power there. He also said it is impossible to win a war without attacking the sources of military supplies, and that it was senseless to fear that an attack on Chinese supply routes would bring China into the war, since China was already taking part.

Ambassador Briggs reports that Rhee's attitude toward the United States has hardened perceptibly since the fall of Dien Bien Phu and since Britain's attitude toward the Southeast Asian pact has become known. He thinks that Rhee is convinced the United States now cannot get along without him.

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