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DDS&T-625-83

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	MEMORANDUM FOR:	Director, Center for the Study of Intelligence	
	FROM:	James V. Hirsh Acting Deputy Director for Science and Technology	
	SUBJECT:	Demographic Profile: CSI Research Project	
	REFERENCE:	CSI 83-0610, dated 30 June 1983	
25X1	consideration by profile research within the DDS& probably are not enormity of her	n project. Although these topics were developed I as being of interest to us, many of them t unique to this Directorate. I recognize the task, especially in light of the short time she the research data, analyze them, and write the	
25X1	given sufficien project. We ha	not be able to meet the due date, I ther she or another qualified Agency officer be t time to complete this potentially worthwhile ve tried to remain within the general bounds of perhaps have overreached them in some instances. certain amount of overlap among topics included line headings.	
25X1	mutually accept	be happy to meet withat some able time. Alsobn my staffis available should you need clarification or rmation from here or any of the individual Offices ate.	25X1 25X1 25X1
		Jámes V. Hirsh	20//1
	Attachment: As stated		25X1
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OUTLINE OF DDS&T TOPICS FOR DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE PROJECT

The following topics and questions seek data on how it was THEN and how it is NOW.

RECRUITING

- How were current employees recruited? Previously?
- What motivating factors attracted them to the Agency (e.g., money, interesting work, security, location, and the like)?
- What percentage stay in the career field for which they were recruited? What percentage switch?
- What are the expectations of new employees in terms of career development and what are the probabilities that they will achieve those objectives?
- Kinds of people recruited:
 Educational levels?
 Socio-economic mix (e.g., Ivy League or not)?
 Experience levels?
 Specialists vs generalists?
 Do we hire the expertise we need or do we develop it? If we develop it, must we? Could we contract for it?
- Numbers of applications received vs numbers brought on board. Where do greatest losses occur? Reasons?
- What geographic areas and institutions offer the most fertile recruitment opportunities for technical officers? Other substantive officers? Non-technical/substantive?
- At what point in their lives are most technical officers recruited?

STAFFING

- Initial job category vs current or final; career track, (e.g., is it related to background at EOD)?
- Scientific and technical employees as a percentage of total Directorate workforce? Substantive non-scientific/technical employees as percentage of Directorate workforce? Agency workforce?
- Substantive staff vs support staff?

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SUBJECT: OUTLINE OF DDS&T TOPICS FOR DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE PROJECT

- Women and minorities as percentages of the Agency and Directorate populations of the technical staff? Non-technical substantive staff? Support staff?

- Average age of total Agency population? Directorate population? Technical vs the substantive non-technical and the support population? What are age distributions by grades within those populations?

- Grade creep-over time?

- How valid are the Agency's pre-employment tests as predictors of job performance?

- What is the degree of cross-directorate personnel

assignments?

- Are certain scientific disciplines associated with rapid career progression in the DDS&T? The Agency? If so, which disciplines?

- What percentage of employees in the Agency and the DDS&T pursue additional education and what has been the change over time? How much is self-sponsored and how much component sponsored by Directorate?

- Are there discernible job progression/movement patterns in the Agency? In the Directorate? If so, what are they?

RETENTION

- Kinds of people who stay and kinds who leave?

Attrition rates of technical officers? What are the real reasons for their leaving (e.g., perhaps better opportunities elsewhere, length of the recruitment process, expanding bureaucracy, too little or too much challenge, organization failed to meet assignment expectations as portrayed during recruitment, pay cap disillusionment with prospect of changes in retirement benefits/rules, changing public image of the Agency, social changes including trend toward greater self interest, couples having two incomes/careers, threats to safety at overseas locations, financial burden from high cost of living in Headquarters area and overseas locations)?

- Which scientific/technical disciplines tend to have

higher retention rates? Loss rates?

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SUBJECT: OUTLINE OF DDS&T TOPICS FOR DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE PROJECT

- Comparison of retention rates of employees hired immediately upon graduation (BS or graduate degrees) with co-op/summer intern/graduate fellow and with employees hired after experience in private industry?

- Comparison of retention rates for those hired at Grades GS-13 and above with those hired at grade levels

through GS-12?

- What would have to change to reduce attrition rates?

- Impact of departures on those remaining?

- Is career progression random or planned? If planned,

by whom--supervisor/manager or individual?

- Is there a definable career point where most technical employees make the decision to stay or leave? If so, could higher retention rate be achieved if attention/ routine action were taken at or prior to that decision point?

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

- Does the organization respond rapidly enough to changing requirements?

- How do sweeping changes of upper management affect the organizational structure? Attrition rates? Production?

- Have there been changes from centralized to decentralized management? Placement of technical disciplines?

- Have changing demographic profiles resulted in organizational changes, restructuring?

MOST USEFUL SKILLS

- Skills across the spectrum of crafts as well as the scientific and technical disciplines

- Analytic skills.

- Oral and written communication skills - Management skills/training/experience

- Interpersonal skills

- Motivation, imagination, creativity, initiative, dedication
- Experience in the private sector

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Short-form of questionnaire: grouped by subject

Two major thrusts of questions: (a) to provide an over-all profile of employees to match with US general population for similarities &/or differences; and (b) to get at level of education/skills and rate of acquisition, retention, and loss.

- 1. Total number of employees?
- Average age at time of hire : 2.
- 3. Average grade at time of hire :
- Total number of employees born in: (list by region). 4.
- Total number of employees residing in (at time of hire): (list 5. by region).
- Number of employees who lived overseas prior to employment:

 - a) totalb) less than one year, one to five years, six to 10 years, over ten years
- 7. Total number of employees whose:
 - a) parents worked for the Agency
 - b) whose relatives (non-parent) worked for the Agency
 - c) whose parents worked for the Agency overseas
- Total number of employees who served in: (list by world 8. geographic area).
- Average number of years served in: (list by world area). 9.
- Average age of employee at: 10.
 - a) time of hire with a college degree
 - b) retirement
 - c) early retirement
 - d) resignation
- Total number of handicapped employees: 11.
- Average number of siblings of all employees? 12.
- 13. Total number of employees who are the eldest (or only child) in their families ?
- Total number of employees who are the youngest child 14. in their family?

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- 15. Average number of schools employees attended prior to graduation from high school:
- 16. Total number of employees who, at time of hire, were:
 - a) single
 - b) married
 - c) widowed
 - d) separated
 - e) divorced
 - f) annulled marriage
 - g) remarried
- 17. Total number of employees divorced after time of hire?
- 18. Average number of marriages, per employee, at time of hire?
- 19. Average number of marriages, per employee, contracted after time of hire?
- 20. Total number of marriages between Agency employees ?
- 21. Total number of divorces between Agency employees married to each other?
- 22. Average number of children employees have?
- 23. Total number of employees who, at time of hire, had:
 - a) no college degree
 - b) a B.A./B.S.
 - c) a degree in: (list disciplines)
 - d) a M.A. degree
 - e) a Ph.D. degree
 - f) any higher degree (M.D., lawyer, etc.)
- 24. Average grade at time of hire of employees with:
 - a) a college degree
 - b) a graduate degree
- 25. Average grade at:
 - a) time of first overseas assignment with the Agency
 - b) time first eligible to retire
 - c) retirement
 - d) early retirement
 - e) resignation
- 26. Average number of years in service of employees:
 - a) without a college degree
 - b) with a college degree
 - c) with a higher degree at time of hire
 - d) eligible to retire
 - e) who resign
 - f) at retirement

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- 27. Total number of employees with:
 - a) a higher degree
 - b) a M.A. in: (list disciplines)
 - c) a Ph.D. in: (list disciplines)
 - d) a M.D.
 - e) a law degree
 - f) other
- 28. Total number of employees:
 - a) eligible to retire
 - b) who retired
 - c) who retired early
 - d) who resigned
- 29. Average number of years in:
 - a) college for all employees
 - b) overseas service for all PCS employees (non-TDY-ers)
 - c) post-graduate school, prior to hire
 - d) college, at retirement
 - e) college of employees who retire early
 - f) college of employees who resign
- 30. Average number of Directorates served in:
 - a) at time eligible to retire
 - b) at retirement
 - c) at early retirement
 - d) by employees who resign

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The idea of having a demographic profile of the Agency arose at a meeting of the Board of Directors of the Center for the Study of - Intelligence approximately 18 months ago. Initial work was attempted in the summer of 1982 when an employee was attached to the Center for a few months, but the project failed to get underway for lack of data.

Lacking resources, nothing more was attempted until this summer when again an employee came to the Center for three months. The proposed assignment was to produce a concepts paper which would serve as a terms of reference for a full-scale demographic profile of the Agency to be undertaken some time in the future, resources and interest permitting. On this occasion, the attempt to acquire data proved to be more successful.

METHODS AND PROBLEMS

The ideal method was conceptualized as a mix of collecting and analyzing data; conducting both intensive and extensive interviews; and reading Agency histories to lend relevance to the statistics. The method which actually evolved was dictated by circumstances, as described below.

From the beginning of the project, at the end of June 1983, the primary concern was to collect sufficient data to give meaning to the concepts paper. Accordingly, a questionnaire was designed to collect general demographic data as well as data of particular concern to Agency managers (skills bank, retirement rates, etc.).

Very shortly thereafter, a series of interviews with the

Director of Personnel, the Executive Director, the DDA, ADDI, and ascertain

DDS&T--as well as other interested individuals--were conducted to A

Approved For Release 2005/07/28: CIA-RDP92 00455R000100140003-7 their specific interests and concerns (what, in particular, might they want to know about the Agency population?) (to further focus the project's direction.) Early on these individuals own perceptions about Agency demographics (" the majority of people used to come from the East and from Ivy League schools") came to be referred to as popular Agency "myths" which would be interesting to the test against whatever data fould be cellected. The most common responses, however, were of an intense but generalized interest: people simply wanted to know what the Agency population looked like now and how--if at all--it had changed over time and in what respects. The dominant concern was that trends be identified so

The notable exception to this generalized response came from the man color DDS&T which provided a detailed and comprehensive outline of issues which could, in itself, serve as the "concepts paper" (see Appendix A). It was a useful contribution which helped to important delineating maximal areas of inquiry but, in the event, proved somewhat disheartening as the inability to address several of the issues became more apparent.

that projections of future needs could more accurately be made.

The initial enthusiasm which characterized the construction of the questionnaire for the Information and Analysis Branch (IAB) of the Office of Personnel was considerably dampened by the realities. The first hard fact was that 1976 was the furthest back that all data had been coded so as to be electronically retrievable. Some kinds of data were available back to 1966, and even smaller amounts (categories of information) were available as far back as 1947.

The second discouraging factor was that some kinds of

Approved For Release 2005/07/28: CIA-RDP92-00455R000100140003-7 information requested (where did employees come from?) had never In the case of geographic location the information been acquired. was not kept because the Agency never had to fill a geographically defined quota--hence there was no perceived need to collect the Neither was all information that employees provide on the Personal History forms of the Agency application package fall encoded. Furthermore, many of the questions sought to distinguish between characteristics/qualifications that an employee had at time of hire (as opposed to developing or acquiring as a consequence of being an Agency employee). The regular IAB programs could not make this distinction. (HAB could answer how many employees have a higher degree, but not how many had a higher degree at time of hire Other questions aimed at tracking employee careers could not be answered (for example, the numbers who had served in more than one Directorate).

Perhaps most discouraging of all, the data were given in aggregates (all current employees) and could not be broken out annually in order to make statements about trends, rates, and other comparisons possible. The data represented everyone on board, whatever their time of entering on duty. (See Appendix B-a copy of the original questionnaire showing which questions could be answered, and what changes were necessary to make it possible.) With all of these qualifications plainly stated, the IAB analysts began to work on those questions which could be electronically answered—often after being reworded. For example, the question "Average number of years in service of employees with a higher degree at time of hire" could be answered only by dropping the "at time of hire" qualifier, as noted above:

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While waiting for the IAB analysts to provide the first round of data, more interviewing resulted in the serendipitous acquisition of the first set of hard data. These came from

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acquiring data for the last three years and who generously shared these: total Agency population numbers from 1952-1982 broken down by Directorates and showing totals in the foreign field, as well. These data resulted in the first of the graphics produced for the demographic project.

Working with the CMS data first exposed another problem which was to plague the remainder of the project: Directorate totals did not equal Agency totals (which were invariably higher) after 1957. It was difficult to identify the "hidden" category of people, and it is still not conclusively resolved--tentatively, it is assumed they belong to the Interim Assignment Staff.

The dimensions of the problem of consistency in the numbers became clearest when the first data from IAB (acquired the first week of August) was closely followed by data given the author by another office--although IAB was the original source of both sets.

Many of the totals were different, even for the same month and year.

Two important facts emerged from the initial confusion. One was that the figures fluctuate from month to month so that it is necessary to collect numbers from exactly the same day and month (30 June, e.g.) for every issue or comparability becomes impossible. Second, it became obvious that defining the population was no easy task, and that different reports (shelf reports) used different parameters. The most common dichotomies which account for differing totals are:

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- --Full-time permanent personnel (FTP) only or FTP plus part-time personnel (PTP).
- --GS grade personnel only or GS plus other civilian personnel.
- --FTP regular staff only or FTP regular staff plus staff contractors. (In 1975 a combined ceiling was instituted, and it becomes impossible to distinguish between regular staff and staff contractors. Prior to 1975, staff contractors were never included unless there was a specific request that they be.)
- -- Civilians only or civilians plus military personnel.

In addition to these choices, all of which can result in differing totals on the same issue for the identical time period, there was the problem of extraneous service groups which have appeared and disappeared over the course of Agency history: The X, Y, and Z service groups; the Undetermined (U) group; the ICS group; the NIESO group; and the 5 (still unidentified) group. Finally, totals are affected by the inclusion or exclusion of the Wage Board. Any total which includes every possible category of employee is colloquially referred to as a "kitchen sink" total, but it is rarely used. There is reason to believe that the figures provided by are "kitchen sink" totals, however, since they are consistently

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With the cooperation of IAB, OMS, and EEO, by the end of August the Center had a fairly complete set of shelf reports which spanned the entire history of the Agency. But one last problem remained.

One set of reports (1966 to 1983) gave Agency strength by career service, sex, race, occupation and grade--but did not show gradex educational level or language capabilities. The reports spanning

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& 1983 only) show sex, age, length of service, career service,

higher than totals on other reports.

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occupation, educational level and language capability--but not

grade or race. Interpretations and conclusions would clearly require interpolation, extrapolation, and plain leaps of faith.

By the middle of August it was apparent that the battle to gather comparable and consistent numbers on any issue was the primary focus of attention for the project. It was also clear that while one standard demographic question could not be answered (geographic origin of employees), there was a rich mine of information to be tapped on other subjects. On the other hand, several of the more pressing questions about career tracks, background of employees, motives for either joining or leaving the Agency, still could not be addressed. In effect, the nature of the available data ultimately dictated the course of the project.

This is not to imply that every issue for which there is information has been addressed. Undoubtedly some data, although available, were never acquired. However, it became clear that the project had to rely on the shelf reports, predneral reports provide annual provide annual reconstruction on "all current employees" (regardless of year) which is what an ad hoc one gets in response to A query to the IAB data bases. Nonetheless, it is felt that the information provided in this pilot study will provide both an interesting and a useful baseline for future efforts of the same nature.

Sources and The 1952 Baseline

There are three bodies of data, each different in the categories and amount of information provided, as noted earlier. The data provided by IAB was retrieved both electronically and manually. An IAB analyst had to go to Archives and manually inspect

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and count data for the years prior to 1966. Thus this body of data-whose totals are consistently higher than the shelf report totals,
which begin in 1966--provides the only source of figures by Directorate
prior to 1966. This corpus (called the OMS data for clarity) begins in
1952 and goes through 1982, which accounts for the 1952 baseline of
the present study. The OMS data are also the source of the bulk
of the graphics, and which are easily identifiable by the 1952-1982
identifier in their titles.

The drawback, which requires one of those leaps of faith, is that attempts to provide information for years which span pre- and post-1966 involves using number sets which are not identical. There is reason to believe, however, that the rates and proportions are the same on the OMS and shelf report data. Looking at patterns of growth and decline, for example, the OMS data and shelf report data yield identical patterns although the numbers (and resulting percentages) are quite different. In the point made at the beginning of the next section, it was necessary to compute growth and decline patterns, by over Directorate, \wedge the last 30 years. The contrast between the OMS and shelf report numbers can be seen below, although the patterns are identical:

	1974-1983: OMS	1974-1983: shelf report	STAT
DDA			
DDO			
DDI			
DDS&T			
	l		

Clearly, anyone wanting to use these figures to make a budget argument will have obvious preferences for one set of numbers over the other. The numbers cannot be used for specific purposes of a

Approved For Release 2005/07/28: CIA-RDP92-00455R000100140003-7 budget allocation nature, but one set and the other, in combination, of growth indexing, can be used to make points which refer to patterns. (In the point made in the following section, the OMS numbers are used throughout, for consistency, and [semper veritas] to make the point more dramatically.)

To provide maximum utility to the present study, and to prevent frustration and confusion, it is necessary to indicate the precise source, parameters of the population, and method of computation used for every table, graphic, and even theoretical or interpretive point made. This will tax the reader's patience but it is the only means of making this rich body of data usable by others and/not perpetuating the problems experienced by the author and other users of personnel data.

One last caveat to the reader: most of the statistics (all of the percentages, but many others besides) were the work of the author, and IAB is not responsible for either errors or misuse of the raw data which might inadvertently have occurred. Percentages, averages, and most other statistics have consistently been rounded off to the next highest number when the fraction was .50 or higher. On a few occasions this led to a minor distortion of the numbers, as when a set of three numbers (percentages, for example) should add up to 100 but the fraction were almost evenly distributed in thirds. In such cases, the highest fraction was always chosen to round off to the next highest whole number. For example, faced with .33, .31, and .36, the latter number was chosen to round upward so that all the percentages would add to 100 than rather A99. This happened very seldom, but it did occur.

Finally, although most data/were collected only for GS personnel on A from the shelf reports the IAB statistics provided on average age, length of service, etc., are always computed for the larger population (which might include part-timers in some cases or non-GS civilian personnel, in others). The author was necessarily constrained to use

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Approved For Release 2005/07/28: CIA-RDP92-00455R000100140003-7 these figures as the raw data for computing other statistics, although the IAB statistics are calculated on a slightly larger population than the one the author was describing.

Approved For Release 2005/07/28: CIA-RDP92-00455R000100140003-7 DAILY BANK BALANCES AND MONTHLY BANK STATEMENTS

An Analogy To Explain The Differences Between "All Current Employee" Reports and Quarterly, Biannual, Or Annual Shelf Reports

When you go into your bank and ask what your (current) balance is, the figure the bank gives you probably will not match any figure in your checkbook. There are outstanding checks, deposits not credited, etc., in the bank's figure. If you ask again the next day, you may get a different figure from the bank—more checks have been presented against your account, deposits credited, and so on.

The only way you can be <u>certain</u> what your balance is, is to wait for your monthly bank statement. This has all the information you need: what checks are outstanding, your balance at a precise check number; all deposits and withdrawals; and the dates of those transactions.

Note that you know your exact balance only for a date already past. Your latest bank statement ends with check #500 but you have already written 20 more, and now want to know your balance after writing check #520. You have to wait until next month! (Unless you are a meticulous bookkeeper and don't rely on an accountant. If you rely on an accountant...)

Paul - I whole this for you and Nate. On he pleation, I think it should be included in the Preface (suitably edited) as the very last section, perhaps. Jameshere in the "Methods and PARATORETORRETOR 2005/07/28 CIA-RDP92-00455R000100140003-7

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Preface

- -- Introduction
- -- Methods and Problems

Theoretical Overview: Long-Term Trends

- -- Competition Breeds Politicization (Consequences of IC Competition)
- -- Sensitivity to Changes in Administration
- -- The Creation of Four Cultures
- -- Recruitment and Retention
- -- Ideals and Realities: Values, Symbols, and Change

1983 Snapshot: The Agency and Directorates

- -- 10 topics to be covered
- -- trends, problems, issues
 - 1) age
 - 2) sex
 - 2) sex 3) race
 - 4) education
 - 5) language capability
- 6) marital status
- 7) occupation (P-T-C)8) percent on probation
- 9) grade level
- 10) retirement rate

The Agency Over Time

--information, where available, on 10 topics in comparative snapshots: 1952, 1962, 1972, & 1982

The DDA Over Time

- --information, where available, on 10 topics
- -- trends, problems, issues

The DDO Over Time

- --information, where available, on 10 topics
- --trends, problems, issues

The DDI Over Time

- --information, where available, on 10 topics
- --trends, problems, issues

The DDS&T Over Time

- --information, where available, on 10 topics
- --trends, problems, issues

The DCI's Office Over Time

- --information, where available, on 10 topics
- -- trends, problems, issues

Myths Re-Visted

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THEORETICAL OVERVIEW

Introduction

Sensitive to Changes in Administration

A first step in the demographic project was to develop an annual chronology which set the Agency in the context of U.S. and world history. The tenure of each of the Directors (DCI) was used to integrate Agency and national/world history, and the OMS totals by Directorate (U.S. and foreign field populations) were incorporated. The result indicated that the CIA and each of the Directorates appear sensitive to fluctuations in the country's political and

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economic environment. This can be understood as an inevitable consequence of the circumstances which gave rise to the Agency in 1947 and those which accounted for its survival.

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history (1976) documents that the Central The Intelligence Group (CIG--the 1947 forerunner to the CIA) came into existence in a ferment of competition among other Federal Departments. Problems of "turf" characterize Agency history within the larger Intelligence Community (IC) and, inevitably, internally as well. The Agency's struggle to survive, in spite of the Departments' (State, War, etc.) efforts to dominate and control it, had a number of immediate and long-term consequences. One of these is that the personal stature and proclivities of individual Directors had an enormous impact on the over-all direction the Agency took at any given period. Only one of the first four Directors was not a credits General Walter Bedell military careerist, and Smith's reputation in the Community, his assertiveness, and his administrative abilities for shaping the Agency as it is today (1976: 12)

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Another critical factor in the Agency's history has been the nature of the relationship between the DCI and the President of the United States, and the effect of the President's personal work style and his interests on Agency priorities. It was Truman's interest in and desire for the Agency's <u>Daily</u> summary that made current intelligence the career track to quick advancement, and resulted in the <u>Daily</u> taking precedence over production of the National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) [1976: 15].

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Perhaps the most important and long-term consequence of the IC's fear of losing its own intelligence collection and analysis functions to the CIG/CIA was that the CIA's dominant role evolved in a different area than the one originally intended. Rather than devoting most of its efforts to coordinating functions and the production of NIEs--which theoretically would reduce duplication of effort by the IC--the post-war concern with Soviet intentions and aggression (the Cold War) resulted in the early pre-eminence of the Directorate of Plans (DDP--now the Directorate of Operations or DDO).

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While it was the intended analytic and coordinating functions of the Directorate of Intelligence (DDI) which gave birth to the CIA (1976: 8-9), it was the covert action capability of the DDO which accounted for the Agency's growth and, perhaps, its very For a succession of U.S. Presidents, the CIA provided an option that lay between diplomacy and overt war, thanks to the overseas stations still in STAT OSS expertise, technology, and place after World War II (1976: 45). "The Departments (essentially the NSC) defined U.S. policy objectives; covert action represented one means of obtaining those objectives, and the CIA executed the operations" (1976: 30). Certainly the decades of the Cold War (see Figure 1) are the period of the Agency's initial and greatest The period of deptente sees the sharpest decline in Agency strength since its inception.

Arguably, other factors could account for the sharp decline in Agency strength since the beginning of detente. states STAT

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that there was a wave of retirements in the early 1970s--is this coincidence, or was there also a political cause? The Viet Nam war was winding down. There were government ordered personnel cuts in the late 1960s--concern with the national budget deficit or a reflection of the political climate?

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These factors are all

undoubtedly part of the explanation of the decline in Agency size, but alternative hypotheses invite discussion as well. Specifically, what were the political motives--if any--which themselves created the set of factors which reduced the Agency's strength?

The pleasure and wrath of United States Presidents were visited on the CIA--most often in the person of its Director--according to the Agency's ability to further a President's foreign policy objectives. The paramilitary efforts demanded by various Presidents could not be concealed from the world or the U.S. public as other covert actions could. Equally obvious, it is covert action failures which become publicized and have an impact on public and Congressional opinion. The Bay of Pigs fiasco and the Watergate disclosures demonstrate the Agency's vulnerability to Presidential pressures.

A depressing indication of the extent to which the CIA's public image has been linked to a President's activities is provided by the 1982 World Almanac. The <u>first</u> mention of the Central Intelligence Agency, in the section on United States history, comes on page 713 under the 1974 entries: "Charges that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) abused its powers by massive domestic operations were published Dec. 21".

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Approved For Release 2005/07/28: CIA-RDP92-00455R000100140003-7 The Four Cultures

The Agency's sensitivity to Presidential and Directors' styles and concerns has had different impacts on each of the Directorates. This may account for both the emergence of the four Directorate "cultures" and the enormous resistance to creating one culture. Problems of "turf" characterize internal relations, both within and between Directorates, as employees respond to obvious opportunities for advancement.

Using 1961 (Bay of Pigs) and 1973 (Watergate) as historical boundaries to test this idea, Agency history can be divided into three periods: 1953 to 1961; 1962 to 1973; and 1974 to the present. The following table shows the results. (OMS numbers)

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One of the patterns revealed by this table is that while a Directorate might experience some growth during a span of years, - nevertheless its over-all share of Agency resources may decline (notably the case with the DDI). This suggests that Presidential have pressures and Directors' particular interests/hax had a noticeable impact on the differential development of the Directorates. It is no secret that Dulles was passionately interested in the DDO and virtually ignored the rest of the Agency, for example.

The table shows that over the 30 year period	i, the DDI's policio	17
of over-all Agency size declined from being	to	25X1
being approximately of the whole.	1	25X1
The DDO has gone from being	of the Agency to	
less than although part of the DDA st	rength (particular)	У
the Office of Communications) properly relates t	o DDO functions.	
Nevertheless, the DDA has the most stable histor	y over the 30 years	3
of any of the Directorates, remaining consistent	ly near one-third	
of Agency strength since 1953. Because of the s	upport and the	
services it provides the other Directorates, the	DDA bridges the	
large gulf which separates the DDI and the DDO,	for example, as	
no other Directorate can. This fact by itself of	contributes to the	
particular "culture" of the DDA, as does the div	versity of the peop	1e
that make up its population.		

The 1973 transfer of NPIC from the DDI to the relatively young DDS&T had the net effect of equalizing the two Directorates' share of Agency strength. However, the DDI remained at the same strength while the DDS&T's portion of the Agency increased by 5% over the following decade.

The DDO's acquisition of DCD in 1973 off-set what otherwise Approved For Release 2005/07/28: CIA-RDP92-00455R000100140003-7

25X1

25X1

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would have been a much greater reduction in size as a result of the Schlesinger cuts. It is not known whether this was one of the motives for the transfer, but other data also suggest that "leveling differences" among Directorates, components, and occupations may for example, be a trend in Agency history. In 1982 Athe Office of Personnel upgraded eight Clerical positions to Technical, and two Clerical positions to Professional. The result was to equalize the proportions of Clerical and Technical employees in the Agency. In 1981, Professionals made up 63% of the Agency; Technicals were 10% and Clericals were 27%. Following the re-definition of the positions in 1982, the percentage of Professional employees remained at 63%. Technicals now made up 18% and Clericals were 18% of the Agency's force.

None of this explains why the DDO has not regained lost ground, however, and leads to the discussion of another long-term consequence of the initial forces which shaped the Agency's development.

Recruitment and Retention

The beginning of the separate cultures in the Agency has to be attributed to the interaction of complex factors dating back to the late 1940s and early 1950s. The lack of cooperation by other Federal Departments, in those early days, restricted the DDI's access to their information and impeded their coordination function (1976). The DDO's fear of their operations being compromised (security concerns) led to extraordinary comparmentation within the Agency (1976: 22). The special frustrations or advantages experienced differed in each of the Directorates from the beginning.

Perhaps one cultural theme was common to the entire organization:

career advancement was linked to producing quickly and being

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Long-term researchers and asset developers (in the DDO) may have the slowest advancement and career success in the Agency. (This is one of several issues that the available data cannot address). But each Directorate has its special history and mission, and the personality characteristics and talents of its employees necessarily differ.

The significance of this latter fact lies in the impact which United States and world historical events have on the ease with which specific types of employees can be recruited and retained. For example, the present economy which puts academics at a disadvantage in the market place affords the DDI the best opportunity to recruit with relative ease. The same economy favors a scientific/technological career in private industry over one in the DDS&T. Over time, these differences in the career attraction the Agency offers to civilians with different specialties leads to over-all disparities in Directorate size. It may also contribute to the maintenance of careful boundaries (cultures) among the Directorates so that the history of one cannot affect the development of another.

The political consequences of Presidential demands on the CIA--and the resulting impact on public and Congressional opinion when the consequences are negative--certainly affects the morale of Agency employees. People evidence surprise when they learn that more employees ______ left under Helms than under any other DCI. One person's quick response was that the rate was lower under Helms than under Schlesinger _____ for example. The accuracy of this observation is not as telling as the rapidity with which it was made. Helms was one of our own and furthermore the cuts were ordered by

25X1

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the government, ostensibly as part of the national concern with the	
budget deficit. The cuts made by Turner during the Carter 25	X1
presidency were also more demoralizing to employees than those made	
during Helms' tenure. Again there is a noticeable difference in	
rate, but it seems apparent that the political motive for the cuts affect recruitment of new peop is the critical factor in employee morale. The same factors could)1e.

The post-Watergate decade shows a 16% reduction in the DDO's strength (difference between 1974 and 1983 strength). Two hypotheses suggest themselves to explain the DDO's failure to recoup from the 1973 cuts. First, the change in U.S. values which followed the Viet Nam war and Watergate scandal could also affect the motivation of young people to choose a career in the clandestine services.

states that Dulles' stand against Senator Joseph McCarthy in 1953 contributed to the Agency's reputation as a liberal institution (1976:44) making it an attractive place to work. The negative impact of the Watergate publicity could represent the opposite effect of discouraging people from seeking a career with the

A positive aspect of the same phenomenon can be seen in Figure 1. The State Department has reported that following international crises, their application rate soars. The Iranian revolution and the taking of American hostages in Iran coincided with the second-lowest point in Agency strength. A marked increase in Agency strength followed the hostage crisis, suggesting that the event stirred a wave of patriotic fervor in American citizens, as well as inclining the Federal government not to be caught short again.

Agency.

The second hypothesis to explain the DDO's difficulty in recruiting suitable candidates is that those who do apply now have different characteristics and motivations than candidates in the past. The

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rejection rate of CTs is higher now than formerly, but

(Psychological Services Division) insists that the Agency's standards have not changed in the last 25 years. The higher rejection rate reflects changes in the type of applicants. Perhaps the negative publicity the Agency has suffered also works to attract unsuitable candidates.

If the Agency's standards for recruitment have not changed in 25 years, but the values of the general population have changed, the use of the older standards may result in the recruitment of people who are marginal—in motivation and characteristics—to the rest of the country. Put differently, the rigid application of the old standards may no longer identify the <u>same kind</u> of people as those standards once did. Changes in values and symbols will mask characteristics in civilians which the Agency may want in its employees, while use of the old standards may select for people with characteristics which are not as desireable.

It would be useful to know in what way the CTs who wash out today differ from those who are accepted. This might permit identification of the specific values, symbols and lifestyles of civilians which are at odds with the old standards but which are held, nonetheless, by the type of employee the Agency desires to attract.

Reliable information confirms that many applicants are rejected in the field by "old-hand" recruiters who "know" that the applicants do not possess characteristics the Agency wants. The problem of recruitment and retention of personnel, in the DDO and other Directorates, may require learning how to identify the same kind of people under different symbolic guises. The current,

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long-term employees in the Agency have changed with the rest of the country. Concern with the environment and its resources; interest in self-help programs and groups; non-political involvement in civil rights issues, and a host of other current interests (representing changes in values) characterize Agency employees just as much as they do the general population. But the recruitment standards may not be as up-to-date. The <u>overt</u> values, symbols, and lifestyles of the healthy, well-adjusted person of the 1980s will not be the same as those of the 1950s. The healthy, well-adjusted solid American citizen of 1880 might strike us neurotic, bigoted, and inflexible today.

It may also be that economic changes are responsible for problems in recruitment and retention of personnel, if the Agency cannot compete with the private sector. If an individual is extrinsically motivated (by a high salary, for example), it could be that—in the past—such a person sought an Agency career and remained satisfied during a long, productive career. However, if extrinsic motivation is a dominant characteristic in an individual, then he/she probably will not stay when economic changes favor the private sector. In the the present: The words of M.F. Herz, with reference to a career in the Foreign Service, apply to Agency service as well:

"Those who believe that every effort made 'for the government' must be compensated, who look upon every assignment with a calculus of advantages vs. disadvantages, who need to 'do their own thing' on their own terms, will miss an entire dimension of the diplomatic life that is different in kind from every other career, except perhaps the military services, because of the discipline that it requires. A career in diplomacy is simply too demanding and dangerous to be approached in any other spirit. Therefore, unless one can derive

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some pride from the fact that one is also serving one's country-yes, serving one's country--the inevitable sacrifices and disabilities
that are involved will never seem adequately compensated" (in Kearney
1981: 15)*

Herz recommends that this attitude be stressed in the earliest recruiting stages (1981: 15) and the same approach might also benefit the Central Intelligence Agency.

* I am indebted to Dr. Helen Kearney for making available a copy of her paper, "Organizational Constraints on Lifestyles," presented at the Groves Conference on Marriage and the Family, Mount Pocono, Pennsylvania, May 1981. The Herz quote is taken from that paper.

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	ROUTIN	G AND	RECOR	D SHEET Scope
SUBJECT: (Optional)		/ / BOY A 1888 BA CANAGE - / 1888 BA		
Policy Agenda: Per	rsonnel 1	Manageme	ent in t	he 1980's
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Chief, Policy Staff	 E/∩DDDDM			
1006 Ames	L/OFFEM			DATE 7 8 NOV 1980 ST
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and	T			
building)		ATE	OFFICER'S	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from when to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		is more providing the decision of the control of th
1. DD/P&E				
1006 Ames				In September you saw the first
2.				draft of the attached policy
•				agenda. Since that time we have
				met with two groups of personnel careerists to gather further inpu
3. EA/D/PPPM			:	in refining the policy agenda.
5E58 Hqs.				The attached is the result of
4.				this refinement.
				In initially discussing the
5				concept of a policy agenda, you
DD/PPPM				mentioned the possibility of
				further review either by your
6.				senior OPPPM managers, the PMAB,
				EXCOM, or the DDCI. Do you wish to pursue any of these avenues?
7.				parade any or diese avenues.
D/PPPM				If you agree with the Agenda,
				we will order it into priority
8.				action items. is non- working on IA (applicant of the
				80's) and I plan to have other
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