



**Directorate of  
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**Soviet Bloc and Neutral/Nonaligned  
Country Statements at the  
CSCE Stockholm Conference on  
Confidence- and Security-Building  
Measures and Disarmament  
in Europe (CDE)  
(CDE-XI & CDE-XII)**

**10 June – 18 July 1986**

**19 August – 19 September 1986**

**Volume II**

25X1

**A Reference Aid**

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*IR 86-10002  
November 1986*

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
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 06518  
 SUBJECT: CDE--NATO BRAINSTORMING MEETING

1. CDE XII - 006.

2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

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3. SUMMARY: NATO CDE HEADS OF DELEGATIONS MET AUGUST 16-17 IN THE HAGUE FOR CONSULTATIONS PRIOR TO THE FINAL ROUND OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUED ALLIED COHESION AND COORDINATION WAS STRESSED, AMIDST AN ALLIED PREOCCUPATION WITH AVOIDING A RESULT SIMILAR TO THAT AT THE APRIL 1986 BERN HUMAN CONTACTS MEETING, WHERE THE US WAS ALONE AMONG NATO COUNTRIES IN WITHHOLDING CONSENSUS. ALTHOUGH GENERALLY A CONGENIAL MEETING, SOME ALLIED DIVERGENCES WERE REVEALED. THESE DIFFERENCES WERE PARTICULARLY EVIDENT ON THE ISSUE OF INSPECTION, WHERE MOST ALLIES SEE THE PRIMARY VALUE OF INSPECTION IN POLITICAL TERMS. AS A CONSEQUENCE, THOSE ALLIES ARE EXTREMELY FLEXIBLE REGARDING MODALITIES. THE US EMPHASIZED THAT SOVIET AGREEMENT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF INSPECTION MUST BE SUPPORTED BY AGREEMENT TO AN OPERATIONALLY EFFECTIVE REGIME. THE CONFERENCE'S ABILITY TO REACH AGREEMENT ON AN EFFECTIVE SYSTEM OF INSPECTION MODALITIES WILL MAKE OR BREAK AN AGREEMENT FOR THE US. END SUMMARY.

4. INFORMATION. IT WAS AGREED THAT NATO'S MEASURE ON AN EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION WOULD NOT FORMALLY BE ELIMINATED FROM CONTENTION. THE MAIN THRUST OF NATO'S NEGOTIATING EFFORTS IN THIS AREA, HOWEVER, SHOULD BE DIRECTED TOWARDS OBTAINING INFORMATION IN THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION AND IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR.

5. ANNUAL CALENDAR/CONSTRAINING MEASURES. ALLIES GENERALLY AGREED THAT NATO SUPPORT FOR A "TIME" CONSTRAINT SHOULD BE USED AS A BARGAINING LEVER BOTH TO GET MORE INFORMATION IN THE CALENDAR AND TO ATTRACT NNA SUPPORT FOR NATO POSITIONS IN OTHER AREAS. THIS "TIME" CONSTRAINT WILL TAKE THE FORM OF A REQUIREMENT FOR ACTIVITIES ABOVE A CERTAIN LEVEL (E.G., 40,000) TO BE FORECAST TWO YEARS IN ADVANCE. IN ADDITION, ALLIES EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR A PROVISION WHICH WOULD PREVENT ADDITIONS TO THE ANNUAL CALENDAR FOR MILITARY ACTIVITIES ABOVE 75,000. AS ALERT ACTIVITIES WILL BE EXCLUDED FROM THE ANNUAL CALENDAR, NATO COULD, OF COURSE, STILL UNDERTAKE ACTIVITIES ABOVE A CERTAIN LEVEL (E.G., 75,000) WHICH HAD NOT BEEN FORECAST BY NOTIFYING THEM AS ALERT ACTIVITIES. BEGIN COMMENT: WE BELIEVE THAT THESE TWO POSSIBLE MODIFICATIONS TO THE ANNUAL CALENDAR WILL SATISFY NNA DEMANDS IN THE FIELD OF CONSTRAINTS AS WELL AS GARNER SOME NNA SUPPORT FOR OUR EFFORTS IN OTHER AREAS. THE EAST,

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WHILE QUITE FLEXIBLE ON THE SUBSTANCE OF WHAT WE PUT UNDER THE RUBRIC OF CONSTRAINING MEASURES, IS CURRENTLY INSISTING THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF CONSTRAINTS, I.E., LIMITATIONS, RECEIVE ATTENTION IN A FINAL DOCUMENT INDEPENDENT FROM THE ISSUE OF THE ANNUAL CALENDAR. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE DISSUADED THEM FROM HARBORING ANY ILLUSION ABOUT INCLUDING A PRINCIPLED REFERENCE TO DEALING WITH CONSTRAINTS IN THE FUTURE (AS IN A DEFERRAL FORMULA), WE BELIEVE THAT USE OF THE TITLE IN THE OCTOBER 14 GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT (CONSTRAINING MEASURES; ANNUAL FORECASTS OF CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES) WOULD PROVIDE SUFFICIENT ATTENTION TO THE ISSUE. ALLIES AGREED THAT THE OCTOBER 14 HEADINGS COULD FORM THE BASIS FOR OUR APPROACH, BUT WE AND SEVERAL OTHER ALLIES, RECALLING THAT ANOTHER OF THE HEADINGS IN THE GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT INCLUDES THE WORDS "EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION," BELIEVE THAT THESE HEADINGS GIVE US SIGNIFICANT BARGAINING LEVERAGE. END COMMENT.

6. NOTIFICATION. ALLIES CONTINUE TO SUPPORT A COMBINED STRUCTURAL/NUMERICAL THRESHOLD, ALTHOUGH THE DISCUSSION REVEALED SIGNIFICANT LACK OF UNDERSTANDING, EVEN AT THIS LATE DATE, ABOUT THE PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THE CURRENT NNA FORMULA. WE BELIEVE MOST ALLIES NOW UNDERSTAND THE RELATIONSHIP OF STRUCTURE IN THE PARAMETER, AS A PRECONDITION, TO THE MANPOWER AND EQUIPMENT TRIGGERS IN THE THRESHOLD. IT WAS GENERALLY AGREED THAT THE MANPOWER PARAMETER SHOULD BE AS LOW AS POSSIBLE, PREFERABLY NOT ABOVE 10,000. ALLIES CONTINUED TO EXPRESS PREFERENCE FOR A SINGLE NOTIFICATION/OBSERVATION THRESHOLD, BUT AGAIN THE POTENTIAL VALUE OF A SPLIT THRESHOLD--SHOULD IT BE THE ONLY MEANS TO OBTAIN A LOW NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD--WAS MENTIONED.

7. DURING DISCUSSION OF THE SUBJECT OF OUT-OF-GARRISON, SUBSTANTIAL SOVIET PRESSURE ON NATO TO DROP THE CONCEPT WAS NOTED. ALLIES AGREED, HOWEVER, THAT IT WAS FOR THE SOVIETS TO PROPOSE ANY ALTERNATIVES. SOME CONCERN WAS EXPRESSED OVER THE FACT THAT THE CURRENT SOVIET APPROACH (TO DEFINE THREE CATEGORIES OF ACTIVITIES: MANEUVERS, MOVEMENTS, TRANSFERS) COULD BE USED TO EXCLUDE POTENTIALLY THREATENING ACTIVITIES SUCH AS LARGE TROOP CONCENTRATIONS ALONG BORDERS. IT WAS AGREED THAT NATO SHOULD CONSIDER TWO TACKS FOR RESOLVING THE IMPASSE: DEVELOPING A CATEGORY OF EXCLUSIONS TO THE OOG CONCEPT (E.G., CEREMONIAL ACTIVITIES, HARVESTS, ETC.); OR USING THE SOVIET DEFINITIONAL APPROACH IN SUCH A WAY AS TO ENSURE THAT IT WOULD BE COMPREHENSIVE.

8. IN A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF THE THRESHOLD FOR

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AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES, ALLIES AGREED THAT IF WE ARE NOT SUCCESSFUL IN NEGOTIATING A THRESHOLD AT THE THREE BATTALION/3,000-TROOP LEVEL NATO WILL RECONSIDER ITS SUPPORT FOR A SEPARATE NOTIFICATION FOR AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES. SEVERAL ALLIES BELIEVE THAT NO SEPARATE NOTIFICATION FOR AMPHIBIOUS ACTIVITIES IS BETTER THAN A THRESHOLD SO HIGH THAT ONLY NATO ACTIVITIES WOULD BE CAPTURED.

9. VERIFICATION. EASTERN ENDORSEMENT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF INSPECTION AND INDICATIONS THAT THE SOVIETS ARE NOW PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE SC.1 NO RIGHT OF REFUSAL APPROACH TO INSPECTION AND BEGIN DRAFTING MODALITIES HAS CREATED SUBSTANTIAL ALLIED OPTIMISM. THE US ATTEMPTED TO TEMPER THAT OPTIMISM WITH SOBRIETY BY COMMUNICATING ITS REQUIREMENTS FOR AN EFFECTIVE INSPECTION REGIME. ALTHOUGH ALLIES UNDERSTAND OUR DEMAND FOR EFFECTIVE AND CREDIBLE MODALITIES, INDIVIDUALLY AND NATIONALLY THEY DO NOT HAVE THE SAME REQUIREMENT. IN FACT, SEVERAL ALLIES ARTICULATED THEIR BELIEF THAT THE VALUE OF AN INSPECTION REGIME IS PRIMARILY POLITICAL. THEY ARGUED THAT THE EXISTENCE OF INSPECTION WILL SERVE AS A DETERRENT TO ABUSE OF A CDE AGREEMENT AND THAT IN PRACTICE, INSPECTION--AS SOMETHING WHICH WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE ESCALATION OF TENSIONS--WOULD ONLY BE USED IN THE MOST SERIOUS OF

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CIRCUMSTANCES. THE US EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT A BAD INSPECTION REGIME IS WORSE THAN NONE AT ALL, THAT THE PRECEDENTIAL NATURE OF INSPECTION AND THE SUBSEQUENT IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER ARMS CONTROL FORA DEMAND A RIGOROUS AND COMPREHENSIVE REGIME IN THE CDE AND ARGUED THAT IT MUST HAVE MORE THAN SYMBOLIC VALUE. COMMENT: OUR VIEW IS GENERALLY ENDORSED BY THE UK, PORTUGAL, AND BELGIUM ALTHOUGH THEIR VOICES TEND TO GET OVERWHELMED BY THE CHORUS OF OPTIMISM. END COMMENT.

10. REGARDING AERIAL INSPECTION, SEVERAL ALLIES SEE IT AS A NEGOTIATING NIGHTMARE AND SOME (UK, FRG) WENT SO FAR AS TO IMPLY WE SHOULD CONSIDER ALLOWING THE SOVIETS TO FLY AIRCRAFT FOR WESTERN INSPECTIONS OF THE USSR. THE US MADE IT QUITE CLEAR THAT THE LATTER IS NOT AN OPTION. ALLIES DID NOT RESIST THIS POSITION AND GAVE GENERAL ENDORSEMENT TO US DEMANDS THAT WE MUST OBTAIN AGREEMENT TO A WORKABLE AERIAL INSPECTION REGIME.

11. ON THE ISSUE OF RESTRICTED AREAS, THE TURKS GAVE A SOBERING BUT SOMEWHAT FLEXIBLE ACCOUNT OF THEIR REQUIREMENTS AND INFORMED ALLIES THAT THEY WOULD HAVE A POSITION FROM ANKARA IN 10 DAYS. THEY DID SUGGEST THEY WERE REVIEWING THE US SUGGESTION (FOR DEFINING WHAT AREAS CAN BE INSPECTED RATHER THAN WHAT AREAS

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CANNOT) IN A FAVORABLE WAY AND HAVE REINFORCED THIS POINT TO USDEL MEMBERS PRIVATELY.

12. COMMUNICATIONS/CONSULTATIONS. ALTHOUGH SEVERAL ALLIES WOULD HAVE PREFERRED A MORE ELABORATE SYSTEM, ALL ALLIES AGREED THAT DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS ARE THE PREFERRED METHOD FOR COMMUNICATIONS REGARDING CSBMS. ALLIES ALSO SUPPORTED US SUGGESTION THAT ANY CONSIDERATION OF THE ISSUE OF CLARIFICATIONS BE INCLUDED UNDER A COMMUNICATIONS MEASURE.

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13. A SPANISH SUGGESTION FOR A CONSULTATION SYSTEM WAS STRONGLY OPPOSED BY FRANCE AND THE US. ALTHOUGH SOME ALLIES FOUND THE CONCEPT APPEALING, THEY RECOGNIZE THAT WITH THE LIMITED TIME AVAILABLE WE CANNOT NEGOTIATE CONSULTATIONS.

14. FORMAT AND IMPLEMENTATION. ON PROCEDURAL ISSUES, MOST DELEGATIONS INDICATED SIGNIFICANT FLEXIBILITY. IN DISCUSSING POSSIBLE TITLES FOR A DOCUMENT, IT WAS GENERALLY AGREED THAT: 1) IT CANNOT SUGGEST A LEGALLY-BINDING NATURE (I.E., "AGREEMENT" OR "ACCORD" ARE NOT ACCEPTABLE) AND 2) IT CANNOT INTIMATE THAT THE FIRST PHASE OF CDE WAS CONCLUDED (I.E., AVOID ADJECTIVES LIKE "FINAL" AND "CONCLUDING"). SOME ALLIES ALSO INDICATED CONCERN THAT A TITLE SHOULD NOT IMPLY THAT THE CDE HAS EQUAL STATUS TO THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT NEGOTIATIONS OR TO CSCE REVIEW MEETINGS.

15. REGARDING THE ORDER OF SUBJECTS IN A DOCUMENT, ALL AGREED THAT CSBMS MUST BE THE CENTRAL FOCUS. MOST ALLIES ALSO FELT THAT PREAMBULAR LANGUAGE SHOULD BE AVOIDED AND THAT, IN ORDER TO DE-EMPHASIZE NUF, IT SHOULD BE COMBINED WITH INTRODUCTORY LANGUAGE. ALTHOUGH THE US ARGUED TO PLACE THE SECTION ON NUF AFTER THE CSBMS, WE BELIEVE THAT COMBINING NUF WITH THE INTRODUCTION AND MAKING CSBMS THE CORE OF THE DOCUMENT IS ALSO SATISFACTORY. ON IMPLEMENTATION, MOST AGREED THAT THE FINAL STOCKHOLM PLENARY SHOULD ADOPT THE DOCUMENT AS WELL AS AGREE TO A DATE FOR IMPLEMENTATION DURING THE VIENNA REVIEW MEETING.

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END OF MESSAGE

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UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 06484

SUBJECT: US CDE PLENARY STATEMENT: AUGUST 19, 1986

1. CDE XII - 007
2. UNCLASSIFIED - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE REMARKS MADE BY AMBASSADOR ROBERT L. BARRY, HEAD OF USDEL CDE, AT THE CDE PLENARY OF AUGUST 19, 1986.

BEGIN TEXT:

MR. CHAIRMAN:

AT THE END OF THE LAST ROUND I SPOKE WITH GUARDED OPTIMISM. MY THEME TODAY IS URGENCY; ALTHOUGH THE OUTLINES OF AN AGREEMENT NOW EXIST, SERIOUS SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEMS DUE REMAIN. THE DRAFTING TASK BEFORE US IS ENORMOUS; AND THE TIME REMAINING TO COMPLETE IT IS FRIGHTENINGLY SHORT.

TIME IS IMPORTANT BECAUSE WE MUST ACHIEVE EVERYTHING BY SEPTEMBER 19 IF WE ARE TO ACHIEVE ANYTHING. OUR MANDATE REQUIRES US TO NEGOTIATE AND ADOPT "A SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES DESIGNED TO REDUCE THE RISK OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE." WE MUST COMPLETE THE REQUIRED TASK: WE CANNOT LEAVE DETAILS, LARGE OR SMALL, FOR OTHERS TO DECIDE LATER; WE CANNOT LEAVE BLANKS FOR OTHERS TO FILL IN. SO LET'S NOT BELIEVE THAT SOME MIRACLE SUCH AS AN EXTENSION OF OUR TIMETABLE OR A DEFERRAL OF ISSUES UNTIL THE VIENNA CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING WILL RESCUE US. FOR US, SEPTEMBER 19 IS NOT A TARGET DATE BUT AN ABSOLUTE REQUIREMENT. WE CAN ONLY RESCUE OURSELVES BY INTENSIFYING THE PACE OF OUR WORK AND DEALING HEAD-ON WITH THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES REMAINING.

IN KEEPING WITH THE NEED FOR COMPLETENESS, WE MUST DEMAND CLARITY OF OURSELVES: WE MUST AVOID A HASTY PATCHWORK IN WHICH LOOPHOLES OR AMBIGUITIES CREATE POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WHICH WOULD PLAGUE OUR RELATIONS IN THE FUTURE. OUR GOAL IS TO INCREASE CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY THROUGH OPERATIONALLY EFFECTIVE MEASURES WHICH CONTRIBUTE TO GREATER OPENNESS AND UNDERSTANDING; THEY MUST NOT THEMSELVES BECOME A SOURCE OF DISAGREEMENT OR TENSION BECAUSE OF AMBIGUITIES AND DIFFERING INTERPRETATIONS.

WE THINK WE CAN ACCOMPLISH THIS IN THE TIME REMAINING BECAUSE THE CONFERENCE HAS, AT LAST, GATHERED MOMENTUM. A CONSTRUCTIVE PROCESS OF GIVE-AND-TAKE IS UNDERWAY. THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED STATES AND THE COORDINATORS HAVE HELPED TO CREATE THIS MOMENTUM. FOR EXAMPLE, THE JUNE 13 NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED PROPOSAL ON THE THRESHOLD FOR NOTIFICATION OF GROUND-FORCE ACTIVITIES HAS BROUGHT US CLOSER TO THE RESOLUTION OF THAT MAJOR ISSUE. THE FIVE POINT WESTERN INITIATIVE OF JUNE 30 HAS CONTRIBUTED TO PROGRESS. AND RESOLVING THE

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ISSUE OF AIR ACTIVITIES ON A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE BASIS HAS REMOVED A DIFFICULT OBSTACLE. AS I SAID AT THE END OF THE LAST SESSION, MY DELEGATION WELCOMED THE STATEMENT OF THE DISTINGUISHED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SOVIET UNION, AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY, ON JULY 18. LET ME RETURN TO SOME OF THE ISSUES HE RAISED THEN AND, IN THAT PROCESS, SOME OF THE ISSUES HE RAISED TODAY.

-- FIRST, WE ARE PREPARED TO REACH PROMPT AGREEMENT ON THE SUB-THRESHOLD FOR PROVIDING INFORMATION ON THE AIR COMPONENT OF GROUND-FORCE EXERCISES. THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAS PROPOSED 200 SORTIES AS THE THRESHOLD; IF OTHERS AGREE, WE ARE PREPARED TO GO STILL LOWER.

-- SECONDLY, WE, TOO, ARE EAGER TO REACH AGREEMENT ON PARAMETERS FOR NOTIFYING GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES. TO BE VERIFIABLE, THE NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD MUST CONTAIN STRUCTURAL AND NUMERICAL AND EQUIPMENT ELEMENTS. WE WELCOME EASTERN WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER COMBINING THESE FACTORS. THE RESULTANT MIX MUST PRODUCE NOTIFICATIONS OF SUBSTANTIALLY MORE MILITARY ACTIVITIES THAN DID THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. WE ARE READY TO DISCUSS SPECIFIC NUMBERS OF TROOP AND TANKS, AS WELL AS THE STRUCTURAL FRAMEWORK IN WHICH THEY WOULD FIT. BUT IT IS DIFFICULT TO APPROACH THIS DISCUSSION AS LONG AS THE EAST TAKES THE POSITION THAT TEN TO TWELVE THOUSAND IS "THE STARTING POINT IN THE SEARCH FOR A COMPROMISE." LET US BE CLEAR -- THIS NOT OUR STARTING POINT NOR WILL IT BE. THE SUBJECT OF TRANSFERS CONCERNS THOSE OF US WHO HAVE TERRITORY OUTSIDE THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR THE MEASURES WE ADOPT. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT A SOLUTION CAN BE FOUND TO THIS PROBLEM WHICH WOULD PROVIDE INFORMATION ABOUT THE ARRIVAL OF TROOPS IN EUROPE TO CONDUCT ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION. A SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM MUST NOT, HOWEVER, AFFECT ACTIVITIES TAKING PLACE OUTSIDE THE ZONE. WE BELIEVE THAT AGREEMENT ON THE EXCHANGE OF ANNUAL FORECASTS OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES WILL BE ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT MEASURES WE WILL DECIDE UPON HERE. THIS WILL MAKE A QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENT ON THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES AGREED UPON IN HELSINKI. WE AGREE THAT THESE FORECASTS SHOULD BE EXCHANGED BY MID-NOVEMBER EACH YEAR. AND WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT, TO BE MEANINGFUL, THEY MUST CONTAIN DETAILED INFORMATION ON THE PLANNED ACTIVITY, AS PROPOSED BY THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED STATES AND OURSELVES. WE HAVE LONG BELIEVED THAT THERE IS A CONNECTION BETWEEN THE EXCHANGE OF ANNUAL FORECASTS AND CONSTRAINING MEASURES. AS INDICATED IN PRESIDENT REAGAN'S STATEMENT OF APRIL 15, WE HAVE BEEN EXAMINING

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WAYS OF ELABORATING THE FORECASTING MEASURE SO AS TO MAKE IT MORE CONSTRAINING. WE AND THE OTHER MEMBERS OF OUR GROUP ARE PREPARED TO WORK WITH OTHERS TO SEE HOW THIS CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED IN A MANNER ACCEPTABLE TO ALL. AS YOU KNOW, THE QUESTION OF VERIFICATION HAS ALWAYS BEEN CENTRAL TO OUR APPROACH TO THIS CONFERENCE. THIS IS WHY WE PARTICULARLY WELCOMED AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY'S REFERENCES TO INSPECTION ON JULY 18 AND TODAY. AS WE HAVE INDICATED, WE ARE READY TO MEET THE CONCERNS OF OTHERS THAT SUCH A REGIME MIGHT BE ABUSED; IT WAS TO MEET THAT CONCERN THAT, ON JUNE 30, WE INDICATED THAT WE COULD ACCEPT A QUOTA OF ONE FOR THE NUMBER OF INSPECTIONS EACH STATE COULD CARRY OUT EACH YEAR. FOR OUR PART, WE ARE PREPARED TO GO STILL FURTHER AND AGREE THAT THERE SHOULD BE A CEILING ON THE NUMBER OF INSPECTIONS WHICH ANY PARTICIPATING STATE MIGHT BE REQUIRED TO ACCEPT EACH YEAR. AND WE ARE READY TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE LEGITIMATE SECURITY CONCERNS OF ALL OF OUR NEGOTIATING PARTNERS IN OTHER AREAS AS WELL. TODAY, AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY MENTIONED THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT. WE ARE PREPARED TO LOOK FOR WAYS TO RESOLVE DIFFERENCES ON THIS ISSUE, BUT ANY SOLUTION MUST BE COMPREHENSIVE AND COVER ALL MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES.

WE MUST AGREE ON A COMPLETE AND EFFECTIVE INSPECTION REGIME; NO DETAILS CAN BE LEFT ASIDE FOR LATER ELABORATION; NO RIGHT OF REFUSAL CAN BE GRANTED OR IMPLIED. INSPECTION MODALITIES FOR BOTH AIR AND GROUND INSPECTION MUST BE SPELLED OUT. INSPECTION MUST BE DISTINGUISHED CLEARLY FROM OBSERVATION; IT MUST BE CLEAR THAT, WITHIN THE DESIGNATED AREA, INSPECTORS MAY GO WHERE THEY NEED TO GO TO EVALUATE WHAT IS HAPPENING IN THE FIELD. BECAUSE SO LITTLE HAS BEEN DRAFTED ON THIS TOPIC, WE WILL HAVE TO GIVE IT TOP PRIORITY AND WORK DAY AND NIGHT TO ACCOMPLISH OUR GOALS.

FOR US, INFORMATION REMAINS AN ESSENTIAL COMPONENT OF A CONFIDENCE-BUILDING REGIME. FOR A DECADE, THE UNITED STATES, LIKE OTHERS IN OUR GROUP, HAS BEEN PROVIDING DETAILED INFORMATION, INCLUDING THE DESIGNATION OF PARTICIPATING UNITS, IN ALL OF THE NOTIFICATIONS OF ITS ACTIVITIES PROVIDED UNDER THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. IF THIS CONFERENCE IS UNABLE TO AGREE TO DO WHAT SOME PARTICIPATING STATES HAVE BEEN DOING FOR YEARS, THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION WILL BE REDUCED, NOT INCREASED, ON THE BASIS OF RECIPROCITY; THIS WOULD BE A MAJOR SETBACK FOR CONFIDENCE-BUILDING. AT LEAST FOR COMBAT UNITS ON THE DIVISIONAL LEVEL, LET US AGREE TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION, INCLUDING DESIGNATION AND NORMAL PEACETIME LOCATIONS, ESSENTIAL TO UNDERSTANDING THE MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES IN THE ZONE.

FINALLY, AGREEMENT ON NON-USE OF FORCE WITH A PROVISION

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ON HUMAN RIGHTS SEEMS TO BE EASILY WITHIN REACH, BASED ON THE PROPOSALS ALREADY ON THE TABLE. WE SUPPORT REAFFIRMATION OF THIS PRINCIPLE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ADOPTION OF CONCRETE CSBMS.

OUR BELIEF THAT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE CAN SUCCEED COMES FROM THE VIEW THAT ALL OF OUR DELEGATIONS ARE NOW ENGAGED IN A COMMON EFFORT TO ACHIEVE A MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL RESULT. MY DELEGATION WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THIS PROCESS, ALWAYS BEARING IN MIND THAT THE OUTCOME CAN ONLY RESULT FROM THE COMMON EFFORT OF ALL THIRTY-FIVE PARTICIPANTS AND MUST BE ACCEPTABLE TO ALL THIRTY-FIVE. BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS CAN AND DO FACILITATE OUR WORK; THEY CANNOT SUBSTITUTE FOR NEGOTIATIONS IN THE WORKING GROUPS AND OTHER INFORMAL GROUPS. AS PRESIDENT WOODROW WILSON SAID NEARLY SEVENTY YEARS AGO, THE UNITED STATES SEEKS "OPEN COVENANTS, OPENLY ARRIVED AT." ALL THIRTY-FIVE STATES WILL BE BOUND POLITICALLY BY THE OBLIGATIONS WE UNDERTAKE; CLEARLY, ALL MUST PARTICIPATE IN THEIR FORMULATION.

MR. CHAIRMAN, AS WE WORK THROUGH THIS FINAL SESSION -- SHORT WEEKS WHICH PROMISE TO BE HECTIC AND INTENSE -- WE SHOULD ALSO KEEP IN MIND WHY IT IS SO IMPORTANT THAT THE SET OF CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES WE ADOPT HERE BE COMPLETE AND SUBSTANTIVE. IN A STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE WHITE HOUSE TODAY, PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS SAID, "SUCCESS IN CDE WOULD CONTRIBUTE DIRECTLY TO A CLEARER AND MORE PREDICTABLE MILITARY SITUATION IN EUROPE. MORE BROADLY, IT WOULD GIVE AN IMPORTANT IMPULSE TO THE HELSINKI PROCESS OF WHICH CDE IS AN INTEGRAL PART, AND THUS CONTRIBUTE TO THE PROMOTION OF ALL THE AIMS OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT." I WOULD ALSO RECALL PRESIDENT REAGAN'S STATEMENT MARKING THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE FINAL ACT, WHEN HE NOTED THAT "THE SIGNATORIES (OF THE FINAL ACT) UNDERTOOK TO OBSERVE IMPORTANT STANDARDS OF INTERNATIONAL CONDUCT AND TO PURSUE PRACTICAL STEPS TO REDUCE THE BARRIERS DIVIDING EUROPE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. . . . THE UNITED STATES REMAINS FIRMLY COMMITTED TO THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL ACT IN ALL ITS PROVISIONS AND TO THE INDIVISIBILITY OF ITS HUMAN, SECURITY AND ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS."

MR. CHAIRMAN, I HAVE SPOKEN TODAY TO REAFFIRM THE COMMITMENT OF MY DELEGATION AND THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME IN THIS CONFERENCE. I HOPE THAT THE NEXT TIME I HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO ADDRESS A PLENARY IT WILL BE TO EXPRESS SATISFACTION THAT THAT IMPORTANT GOAL, WHICH WE HAVE PURSUED CONSISTENTLY AND ENERGETICALLY FOR NEARLY THREE YEARS, HAS BEEN MET.  
THANK YOU. END TEXT

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END OF MESSAGE**

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UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 06506

SUBJECT: USSR CDE PLENARY STATEMENT: AUGUST 19, 1986

1. CDE XII - 008
2. UNCLASSIFIED - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE REMARKS MADE BY AMBASSADOR OLEG A. GRINEVSKY, HEAD OF USSRDEL CDE, AT THE CDE PLENARY OF AUGUST 19, 1986.

BEGIN TEXT:

MR. CHAIRMAN:

FIRST OF ALL I WOULD LIKE TO DRAW THE ATTENTION OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFERENCE TO THE STATEMENT BY GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV MADE YESTERDAY ON SOVIET TV. IT CONTAINS AN IMPORTANT ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, GIVES IN A CONCENTRATED FORM PROPOSALS DESIGNED TO SAVE MANKIND FROM SLIDING TO THE ABYSS OF NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE, TO BREAK THE DANGEROUS COURSE OF EVENTS AND PUT IT ON THE TRACK OF DETENTE.

THE PEACE INITIATIVES OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE ALLIED SOCIALIST COUNTRIES GO PRECISELY IN THIS DIRECTION. THEY INCLUDE THE PROGRAM OF ELIMINATING NUCLEAR AND OTHER TYPES OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, THE SET OF MEASURES TO REDUCE CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS, NEW PROPOSALS ON THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY REGIME OF NUCLEAR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT, COOPERATION IN PEACEFUL EXPLORATION OF SPACE, AND ON VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL OBLIGATIONS, ETC.

GUIDED BY THE AWARENESS OF THE HIGH RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DESTINY OF MANKIND THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT DECIDED TO EXTEND ITS MORATORIUM ON NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TILL JANUARY 1, 1987. THUS A POSITIVE RESPONSE WAS GIVEN TO ALL STATES, POLITICAL AND PUBLIC FORCES WORKING FOR PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION. ACCOUNT WAS ALSO TAKEN OF THE RECENT ADDRESS BY THE SIX AMONG WHICH SWEDEN IS AN ACTIVE PARTICIPANT.

THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE TOO HAS A ROLE TO PLAY IN REDUCING THE LEVEL OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE. AS THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE STATED, "AT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES BY COOPERATING CONSTRUCTIVELY WITH ITS OTHER PARTICIPANTS HAVE DONE A LOT TO FIND SOLUTIONS TO SUCH KEY ISSUES AS NON-USE OF FORCE, NOTIFICATION OF MILITARY MANEUVERS AND TRANSFERS OF FORCES. EXCHANGE OF ANNUAL PLANS OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES, INVITATION OF OBSERVERS, AND VERIFICATION". AS A RESULT, MOVEMENT FORWARD BECAME DISCERNIBLE BY THE END OF THE LAST SESSION IN STOCKHOLM. THE CLIMATE AT THE CONFERENCE BEGAN TO CHANGE FOR THE BETTER AND PROSPECTS OPENED FOR

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COMPLETING THE CONFERENCE WITH SUBSTANTIVE RESULTS. TODAY THE CONFERENCE ENTERS THE MOST SERIOUS PERIOD OF ITS WORK. IT MUST COMPLETE ITS WORK ON SEPTEMBER 19 WITH THE ADOPTION OF A SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLIMENTARY CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MADRID MANDATE. OBVIOUSLY, THIS IS NOT A SIMPLE TASK, BUT IT IS QUITE RESOLVABLE. THE TIME FACTOR CANNOT BE AN OBSTACLE TO SUCCESS PROVIDED THERE IS A FIRM DESIRE AND THE POLITICAL WILL TO ACHIEVE SUCCESS. THEREFORE TODAY IT IS NECESSARY TO EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND ALL OUR VIGOUR, TO DEMONSTRATE MAXIMAL RESPONSIBILITY, FLEXIBILITY AND A BUSINESS-LIKE APPROACH IN ORDER TO CONCLUDE THE STOCKHOLM FORUM BY THE ADOPTION OF A MEANINGFUL DOCUMENT WHICH WOULD INCLUDE BOTH MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND GIVE CONCRETE EXPRESSION AND EFFECT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-USE OF FORCE. AS THE STATE OF AFFAIRS DEMONSTRATES THE ISSUE OF VERIFICATION HAS BECOME ONE OF THE MOST SERIOUS OBSTACLES TO THE NEGOTIATION OF A FINAL DOCUMENT ACCEPTABLE TO ALL. THE SOVIET UNION AND THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ATTACH PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE TO VERIFICATION. WE WANT THAT AGREEMENTS NEGOTIATED IN STOCKHOLM WOULD BE PROVIDED WITH DEPENDABLE AND EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION SO THAT STATES COULD HAVE ASSURANCE IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE AGREED CSBMS IN EUROPE.

FROM THIS POINT OF VIEW WE ARE GIVING CAREFUL STUDY TO ALL THE PROPOSALS TABLED AT THE CONFERENCE. WE ARE IMPRESSED, IN PARTICULAR, BY THE PROPOSALS OF THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALLIGNED COUNTRIES ON OBSERVATION ON REQUEST OF THE NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES. WE SEE QUITE A LOT OF MERIT IN THIS IDEA AND ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE ELABORATION OF A CORRESPONDING AGREEMENT ON THIS BASIS, PROVIDED, OBVIOUSLY, OTHER PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE ALSO PREPARED TO DO SO. WE HAVE ALSO CONSIDERED THE VIEWS MADE AT THE CONFERENCE REGARDING A POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO THE INSPECTION ISSUE ON A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE COMPROMISE BASIS THROUGH A STRICTLY LIMITED ANNUAL QUOTA. WELL, WE ARE READY TO MOVE ALONG THIS ROAD AS WELL. WE COULD, IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE VERIFICATION CONCEPT LAID DOWN IN THE BUDAPEST APPEAL OF THE WARSAW TREATY MEMBER STATES, AGREE TO THE CONDUCT OF ON-SITE INSPECTION OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES ON THE BASIS OF A LIMITED QUOTA - 1-2 INSPECTION PER YEAR ON THE TERRITORY OF EACH STATE.

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ARE READY TO START IMMEDIATELY AND IN A BUSINESS-LIKE FASHION NEGOTIATIONS ON THESE ISSUES IN ORDER TO CONTRIBUTE TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE FIRST STAGE OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. THIS POSITION OF THE SOCIALIST

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COUNTRIES PROVIDES VIVID PROOF OF THEIR READINESS TO PURSUE A LARGE-SCALE PROGRAM OF REDUCING THE ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN EUROPE UNDER EFFECTIVE CONTROL AS SET FORTH AT THE BUDAPEST MEETING OF THE POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION.

DEMONSTRATING GOOD WILL WE, NATURALLY, EXPECT THAT OUR CONSTRUCTIVE INITIATIVES WILL BE MATCHED BY STEPS OF THE NATO STATES. IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO BELIEVE THAT THE SOLUTION OF THE VERIFICATION ISSUE AUTOMATICALLY PAVES THE WAY TO AN AGREEMENT. IN THIS AREA OF THE UNEXPLORED WE FACE HARD WORK IN THE COURSE OF WHICH IT IS NECESSARY TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE SENSITIVE SECURITY INTERESTS OF STATES.

IF WE ARE TO ACHIEVE AGREEMENT, IT IS NECESSARY, IN THE FIRST PLACE, TO IDENTIFY PRECISELY SPECIFICALLY WHAT MILITARY ACTIVITIES WILL BE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION. THE NOTIFICATION CONCEPT OF "OUT-OF-GARRISON ACTIVITIES" OR ITS MODIFICATION - "OUTSIDE PERMANENT LOCATIONS OF FORCES" - DO NOT PROVIDE A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM. THEY ARE TOO VAGUE AND OBSCURE, CONTAIN MANY LEEWAYS FOR MISUSE AND INTERFERENCE INTO THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF STATES AND THUS CANNOT SERVE AS A CRITERION FOR NOTIFICATION. WE CAN SAY ON THE SAME GROUNDS THAT THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH INSPECTION. IT MAKES INSPECTION DEVOID OF SUBSTANCE AND UNACCOMPLISHABLE.

THE TWO AND A HALF YEARS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE PROVEN THAT IT IS THIS CONCEPT THAT BLOCKS THE ELABORATION OF THE NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION SYSTEM. THIS FACT SHOULD GIVE SERIOUS GROUNDS FOR CONCERN WHEN WE ADDRESS THE VERIFICATION SYSTEM. HOWEVER THERE ARE NO INSURMOUNTABLE DIFFICULTIES HERE. BY ALL THE LOGIC, INSPECTION SHOULD COVER SUCH CONCRETE TYPES OF NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES AS MANEUVERS, MOVEMENTS AND TRANSFERS OF FORCES.

OBVIOUSLY, INFORMATION SHOULD ALSO APPLY TO THESE SAME MILITARY ACTIVITIES. IT WOULD BE SENSELESS TO RAISE AGAIN THE QUESTION OF SO CALLED "STATIC INFORMATION" AS IT HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES.

OF COURSE, WE STILL HAVE TO SOLVE QUITE A FEW IMPORTANT PROBLEMS TO SUCCESSFULLY CONCLUDE THE CONFERENCE. ONE OF THEM CONCERNS NOTIFICATION OF TRANSFERS OF FORCES INTO EUROPE FROM OTHER AREAS AND CONTINENTS. ITS RESOLVED STATUS MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO COMPLETE NEGOTIATION OF THE ENTIRE LIST OF NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES. IN OBJECTIVE TERMS, WHETHER WE LIKE IT OR NOT, IT IMPEDES THE ELABORATION OF OTHER CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES, FOR EXAMPLE ANNUAL PLANS OF NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES, THE INVITATION

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OF OBSERVERS, ETC. IT IS ALSO HIGH TIME TO AGREE ON PARAMETERS FOR NOTIFICATION OF MANEUVERS OF GROUND AND AIR FORCES, AMPHIBIOUS AND AIR-BORNE TROOPS AS WELL. ONE CAN HARDLY IMAGINE THAT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE IS NOT ABLE TO FIND MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS ON THE ISSUE OF THE LIMITATION OF THE SCALE OF MILITARY MANEUVERS AS WELL, WHICH LITERALLY KNOCKS ON THE DOOR. AGREEMENT ON THIS ISSUE WOULD MAKE OUR CONCLUDING DOCUMENT MORE SUBSTANTIVE AND ACCOMPLISHED. FINALLY, WE HAVE TO COMPLETE THE ELABORATION OF AN AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD GIVE CONCRETE EXPRESSION AND EFFECT TO THE NON-USE OF FORCE PRINCIPLE.

MR. CHAIRMAN,

AT THE END OF THE PREVIOUS SESSION WE PUT FORTH A NUMBER OF NEW PROPOSALS WHICH MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO PURSUE SOLUTIONS TO THE REMAINING OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS AT THE CONFERENCE. IN MANY RESPECTS THEY MEET THE WISHES OF THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALLIGNED COUNTRIES AND TAKE INTO ACCOUNT IDEAS OF THE NATO COUNTRIES PUT FORTH ON JUNE 30 IN THE STATEMENT BY DISTINGUISHED AMBASSADOR DELWORTH. TODAY WE HAVE PROPOSED A WAY TO A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION OF THE VERIFICATION ISSUE. THE BALL IS IN NATO'S COURT. WE HAVE DONE OUR PART TO AN AGREEMENT.

I WOULD ONLY STRESS THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE ENTERING A PHASE OF CRITICAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DESTINY OF THE BUSINESS ENTRUSTED TO US. IF SOMEONE IS GOING TO CONTINUE TO BET ON HARDENING AND LINKAGES, ON RAISING STAKES AND FUTILE RHETORICS HE SERIOUSLY PUTS THE CONFERENCE BEFORE THE THREAT OF A FAILURE. TODAY AS NEVER BEFORE WE NEED A STRICT ACCOUNT OF MUTUAL INTERESTS, ABANDONMENT OF MAXIMALIST DEMANDS, ABILITY TO MEASURE ONE'S OWN CLAIMS AGAINST REAL POSSIBILITIES, AND AN UNDERSTANDING THAT EVERY PARTNER HAS A BOTTOM LINE FOR CONCESSIONS DELINEATED BY THE SUPREME INTERESTS OF ITS SECURITY. WE NEED CANDID AND HONEST NEGOTIATIONS FOR IT IS HARDLY IMAGINABLE THAT A SIDE WILL ALLOW TO OUTSMART OR OUTWIT IT INsofar AS ITS NATIONAL SECURITY IS CONCERNED. A CLEAR STATEMENT OF POSITIONS, EXCLUSION OF AMBIGUITIES AND UNCERTAINTIES, MUTUAL READINESS TO CLARIFY QUESTIONS THAT RAISE DOUBTS WILL PERMIT TO ACCELERATE THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS. A POSITIVE CONCLUSION OF THE CONFERENCE CAN MAKE A SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTION TO CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING IN EUROPE AND TO PROMOTION OF THE MULTILATERAL PROCESS INITIATED IN HELSINKI. AGREEMENT IN STOCKHOLM WOULD CREATE FAVOURABLE PREREQUISITS FOR THE CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING TO TAKE PLACE THIS FALL IN VIENNA AND HENCE FOR THE SECOND STAGE OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE WHICH COULD PRODUCTIVELY ADDRESS DISARMAMENT QUESTIONS.

BARRY

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
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 06590  
SUBJECT: PUBLIC CHARACTERIZATIONS OF CDE: INSPECTION  
AND INFORMATION

REF: STOCKHOLM 6506

1. CDE XII - 010
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY: IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES, US SHOULD KEEP THE PRESSURE ON THE SOVIETS TO DELIVER ON THEIR PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE OF INSPECTION IN CDE. WE SHOULD ALSO STRESS INSPECTION, ALONG WITH ANNUAL FORECASTS AND AN INTENSIFIED NOTIFICATION/OBSERVATION REGIME, AS THE MAIN FEATURE OF A POSSIBLE CDE REGIME; WE SHOULD DOWNPLAY THE EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION. END SUMMARY.
4. AS CDE APPROACHES ITS SEPTEMBER 19 DEADLINE, SOVIET PROPAGANDA EFFORTS AND OTHER PRESSURES TEND TO DISTORT THE PUBLIC VIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CONFERENCE AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE POSSIBLE OUTCOME. US AND ALLIES NEED TO MAINTAIN ACTIVE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY EFFORTS TO KEEP THE RECORD STRAIGHT.
5. THE SOVIETS ARE PLAYING THEIR AUGUST 19 ACCEPTANCE OF "ON-SITE INSPECTION" AS PART OF A CDE REGIME (REF) AS A MAJOR CONCESSION WHICH PREPARES THE WAY FOR FINAL AGREEMENT IN THE CONFERENCE. THE US WELCOMES SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF INSPECTION IN CDE. AT THE SAME TIME, WE MUST REJECT THE SOVIET IMPLICATION THAT THEY HAVE NOW DONE THEIR PART AND IT IS UP TO THE WEST TO MAKE FURTHER MOVES NEEDED FOR FINAL SUCCESS. THE EAST STILL HAS TO AGREE TO PRACTICAL MODALITIES TO CREATE AN INSPECTION REGIME WHICH IS OPERATIONALLY EFFECTIVE. WE WILL NOT AGREE TO SYMBOLIC INSPECTION; IF WE ARE TO GET THE SOVIETS TO PUT SOME REAL CONTENT INTO INSPECTION WE MUST KEEP THE PUBLIC PRESSURE ON THEM.
6. ON A SECOND POINT, THE OUTSTANDING FEATURES OF ANY CDE REGIME COMING OUT OF STOCKHOLM ARE LIKELY TO BE:
  - . - ANNUAL FORECAST OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES: THIS IS NEW KIND OF MILITARY CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURE AND WOULD PROVIDE ALL PARTICIPATING STATES WITH A COMPREHENSIVE SCHEDULE OF SIGNIFICANT MILITARY ACTIVITIES FOR THE YEAR AHEAD;
  - . - A MORE COMPREHENSIVE NOTIFICATION/OBSERVATION REGIME COMPARED WITH THE CBM'S OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. THERE WOULD BE SIGNIFICANTLY MORE NOTIFICATIONS, PLUS MANDATORY OBSERVATION OF NOTIFIED ACTIVITIES;
  - . - INSPECTION TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE.THE CDE REGIME WILL PROBABLY NOT REQUIRE A SIGNIFICANT EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ABOUT STRUCTURE AND LOCATION OF MILITARY FORCES IN EUROPE, I.E., IT WILL NOT PROVIDE A MBFR-TYPE DATA BASE. IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ANNUAL FORECAST OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND THE NOTIFICATION REGIME, SOME INFORMATION ON MILITARY FORCES WILL BE

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**PROVIDED. BARRY  
END OF MESSAGE**

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STOCKHOLM 06635

REF: CURTIN/ROMANSKI TELCONS

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE SPEECH IN FRG ON CDE

1. CDE XII - 012
  2. LIMITED OFFICIAL USE - ENTIRE TEXT.
  3. USDEL APPRECIATES ASSISTANCE OF USIS BONN IN TRYING TO ARRANGE SITE FOR AMBASSADOR BARRY'S SPEECH ON CDE. OUR OBJECTIVE IS TO PRESENT THE AUTHORITATIVE US VIEW OF CDE AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE, RIGHT AFTER THE CONFERENCE ADJOURNS SEPTEMBER 19.
  4. AUDIENCE: WE SEEK A HIGH PROFILE PUBLIC FORUM, FOR EXAMPLE, THE FRG EQUIVALENT TO THE NEW YORK COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS OR LONDON'S CHATHAM HOUSE. IT NEED NOT CONCENTRATE ON GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, ALTHOUGH THEY WOULD, OF COURSE, BE WELCOME. WE WOULD LIKE A GERMAN CO-SPONSOR, IN THE THOUGHT THAT A GERMAN AFFILIATION SHOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE IMPACT OF THE SPEECH WITH EUROPEAN AUDIENCES. WE WILL SEEK TO PUBLISH THE SPEECH AFTERWARDS.
  5. PRESS/MEDIA: THE SPEECH WILL BE ON THE RECORD, AND AMBASSADOR BARRY WOULD WELCOME QUESTIONS FROM THE AUDIENCE AFTERWARDS. WE WOULD WELCOME MEDIA COVERAGE, BUT THAT IS OF SECONDARY IMPORTANCE TO US. IF USIS BONN WANTED TO ARRANGE A SEPARATE PRESS CONFERENCE, THAT WOULD BE FINE, SCHEDULE PERMITTING.
  6. TIMING: THE WEEK OF SEPTEMBER 22-26 WOULD BE BEST. AMBASSADOR BARRY WILL DO A EURONET INTERACTIVE SEPTEMBER 23. WE UNDERSTAND BONN MAY PREFER SEPTEMBER 22 FOR THE SPEECH, BUT THERE ARE NO FLIGHTS EARLY THAN THE 23RD TO ENSURE ARRIVAL IN TIME FOR EURONET AND RETURNING ON THE 22ND WOULD MEAN LEAVING BONN IN EARLY AFTERNOON. IF BONN STILL PREFERS SEPTEMBER 22 GIVEN THOSE CONSTRAINTS, THE 22ND WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO AMB. BARRY. WE WOULD ALSO BE OPEN TO PROGRAM LATER IN THE WEEK AND ALSO TO A SITE IN HAMBURG OR ELSEWHERE OTHER THAN BONN.
  7. IF A FULL PROGRAM SEPTEMBER 22 IN BONN SEEMS STRONGLY PREFERABLE TO OTHER OPTIONS, WE COULD RUN THE EURONET ON THE 23RD FROM BONN. THAT, OF COURSE, WOULD PLACE THE BURDEN ON YOU. WE HAVE UNTIL SEPTEMBER 3 TO CONFIRM ARRANGEMENTS FOR EURONET HERE. BARRY
- END OF MESSAGE  
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UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 06627

SUBJECT: CDE CHRONOLOGY

REF: STOCKHOLM 6552

1. CDE XII - 013

2. UNCLASSIFIED - ENTIRE TEXT.

3. PLEASE NOTE FOLLOWING CORRECTION TO CHRONOLOGY IN REF.

DATE FOR ITEM: "IN PARIS, CPSU GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV ... VERIFICATION PROBLEMS" IS OCTOBER 3, 1985, NOT JULY.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 06634

SUBJECT: AKHROMEYEV VISIT TO CDE 8/29/86

1. CDE XII - 014
  2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
  3. SUMMARY: SOVIET CHIEF OF STAFF AKHROMEYEV'S PLANNED SPEECH TO CDE SEPTEMBER 29 UNDERLINES INTENSIFYING SOVIET EFFORT TO SEIZE THE PUBLIC OPINION INITIATIVE AS CDE ENDS. WE CAN EXPECT A REGULAR STREAM OF EASTERN PUBLIC MOVES, LARGE AND SMALL, BETWEEN NOW AND ADJOURNMENT SEPTEMBER 19. END SUMMARY.
  4. PLANNED VISIT TO CDE 8/29/86 OF THE CHIEF OF THE SOVIET GENERAL STAFF, S. F. AKHROMEYEV, IS PART OF AN INTENSIFYING SOVIET PROPAGANDA EFFORT TO TAKE CREDIT FOR ANY POSITIVE OUTCOME IN THE CONFERENCE -- CREDIT WHICH THEY, WHO HAVE DELAYED PROGRESS THROUGH MUCH OF CDE, HARDLY DESERVE. AT THE SAME TIME, THE SOVIETS WILL BE BUILDING A RECORD IN ORDER TO BLAME THE WEST IN CASE OF FAILURE.
  5. WHICHEVER WAY CDE GOES, THE WESTERN RECORD IS STRONG. THE TRICK WILL BE TO ENSURE THAT THE RECORD GETS ACROSS ACCURATELY TO THE MEDIA AND THE PUBLIC. WE APPRECIATE EFFORTS OF DEPARTMENT, USIA AND POSTS IN HIGHLIGHTING OUR POSITIONS IN CDE DURING THE FINAL WEEKS. BARRY
- END OF MESSAGE

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**C O N F I D E N T I A L** STOCKHOLM 06703  
**SUBJECT: NOTED TEXTS FOR ALL WORKING GROUPS AS OF**  
**- AUGUST 22, 1986**

1. CDE XII - 015
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

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 3. THE FOLLOWING IS A LIST OF ALL THE LANGUAGE THAT HAS BEEN REGISTERED IN THE COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK FOR ALL WORKING GROUPS AT CDE. (REQUEST LANGUAGE SERVICES TRANSLATE THE TEXTS BELOW AND ALL SUBSEQUENT TEXTS INTO RUSSIAN ASAP.)

BEGIN TEXT:

A-1 (NON-USE OF FORCE):

THE AIM OF THE CONFERENCE IS, AS A SUBSTANTIAL AND INTEGRAL PART OF THE MULTILATERAL PROCESS INITIATED BY THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, TO UNDERTAKE, IN STAGES, NEW, EFFECTIVE AND CONCRETE ACTIONS DESIGNED TO MAKE PROGRESS IN STRENGTHENING CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY AND IN ACHIEVING DISARMAMENT, SO AS TO GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS AS WELL AS IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN GENERAL.

. . . . (3/11/86)

THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECOGNIZE THAT THE ADOPTED SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CSBM'S, WHICH ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MADRID MANDATE, BY THEIR SCOPE AND NATURE AND BY THEIR IMPLEMENTATION SERVE TO STRENGTHEN CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE AND THUS TO GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE. (5/20/86)

. . . THE PARTICIPATING STATES, RECALLING THEIR OBLIGATION TO REFRAIN, IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS AS WELL AS IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN GENERAL, FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANY STATE, OR IN ANY OTHER MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS, ACCORDINGLY REAFFIRM.. THEIR COMMITMENT TO RESPECT AND PUT INTO PRACTICE THE PRINCIPLE OF REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE, AS LAID DOWN IN THE FINAL ACT. (6/17/86)

THEY WILL ABIDE BY THEIR COMMITMENT TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH ANY STATE, REGARDLESS OF THAT STATE'S POLITICAL, SOCIAL, ECONOMIC OR CULTURAL SYSTEM AND IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER OR NOT THEY MAINTAIN WITH THAT STATE RELATIONS OF ALLIANCE. (7/8/86)

THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL FULFILL IN GOOD FAITH THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW; THEY ALSO STRESS.. THAT STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THEIR COMMITMENTS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CSCE IS ESSENTIAL FOR BUILDING CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY. (8/19/86)

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THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECONFIRM.. THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE BASIC PRINCIPLE OF THE SOVFREIGN EQUALITY OF STATES AND STRESS.. THAT ALL STATES HAVE EQUAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF INTFRNATIONAL LAW. (8/19/86)

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 A-2 (INFORMATION, VERIFICATION, COMMUNICATION):  
 THE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES TO BE AGREED UPON WILL BE PROVIDED WITH ADEQUATE FORMS OF VERIFICATION WHICH CORRESPOND TO THEIR CONTENT . . . . (2/26/86)

ANY PARTICIPATING STATE WHICH HAS DOUBTS AS TO ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE'S COMPLIANCE WITH THE AGREED CSBM'S WILL BE ALLOWED TO . . . . (4/30/86)

THE PARTICIPATING STATE WHICH REQUESTS . . . WILL STATE THE REASONS FOR SUCH A REQUEST. (4/30/86)

THE PARTICIPATING STATE WHICH HAS RECEIVED SUCH A REQUEST WILL . . . WITHIN THE AGREED PERIOD OF TIME. . . . (5/7/86)

THE REQUEST WILL BE ADDRESSED TO THE PARTICIPATING STATE(S) ON WHOSE TERRITORY IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBM'S COMPLIANCE WITH THE AGREED CSBM'S IS IN DOUBT. . . . (6/11/86)

THE PARTICIPATING STATE WHICH REQUESTS . . . WILL SPECIFY THE AREA WHERE . . . . (7/2/86)

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 A-3 (ANNUAL CALENDAR AND CONSTRAINTS):  
 EACH PARTICIPATING STATE WILL EXCHANGE, WITH ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES, AN ANNUAL CALENDAR OF ITS NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES, WITHIN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBM'S, FORFCASTED FOR THE SUBSEQUENT CALENDAR YEAR. IT WILL BE TRANSMITTED EVERY YEAR, IN WRITING, THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS, NOT LATER THAN . . . FOR THE FOLLOWING YEAR . . . . (3/6/86)

TO BE DEFINED  
 EACH PARTICIPATING STATE WILL LIST THE ABOVE-MENTIONED ACTIVITIES CHRONOLOGICALLY AND WILL PROVIDE INFORMATION ON EACH ACTIVITY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOLLOWING MODEL:  
 . . . . (5/22/86)

- TYPE OF MILITARY ACTIVITY AND ITS DESIGNATION  
 - GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS AND PURPOSE OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY  
 - NAMES OF THE STATES INVOLVED IN THE MILITARY ACTIVITY  
 . . . . (7/3/86)

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 B-1 (NOTIFICATION):  
 THE PARTICIPATING STATE WILL GIVE . . . IN WRITING THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS IN AN AGREED FORM OF CONTENT, TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES . . . DAYS OR MORE IN ADVANCE OF THE START OF NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES

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. . . .  
 . . . WILL BE GIVEN BY THE PARTICIPATING STATE ON WHOSE TERRITORY THE ACTIVITY IN QUESTION IS PLANNED TO TAKE PLACE EVEN IF THE FORCES OF THAT STATE ARE NOT ENGAGED IN THE ACTIVITY OR THEIR STRENGTH IS BELOW THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL. THIS WILL NOT RELIEVE OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES OF THEIR OBLIGATION TO GIVE . . . , IF THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN THE PLANNED MILITARY ACTIVITY REACHES THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL. (3/4/86)  
 TO BE DEFINED

UNDER THE TERMS OF THE MADRID MANDATE, THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBM'S IS AS FOLLOWS:  
 ON THE BASIS OF EQUALITY OF RIGHTS, BALANCE AND RECIPROCITY, EQUAL RESPECT FOR THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF ALL CSCE PARTICIPATING STATES, AND OF THEIR RESPECTIVE OBLIGATIONS CONCERNING CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE, THESE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES WILL COVER THE WHOLE OF EUROPE AS WELL AS THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE. THEY WILL BE OF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE AND POLITICALLY BINDING AND WILL BE PROVIDED WITH ADEQUATE FORMS OF VERIFICATION WHICH CORRESPOND TO THEIR CONTENT.  
 AS FAR AS THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE IS CONCERNED, THE MEASURES WILL BE APPLICABLE TO THE MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF ALL THE PARTICIPATING STATES TAKING PLACE THERE WHENEVER THESE ACTIVITIES AFFECT SECURITY IN EUROPE AS WELL AS CONSTITUTE A PART OF ACTIVITIES TAKING PLACE WITHIN THE WHOLE OF EUROPE AS REFERRED TO ABOVE, WHICH THEY WILL AGREE TO NOTIFY. NECESSARY SPECIFICATIONS WILL BE MADE THROUGH THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AT THE CONFERENCE.  
 NOTHING IN THE DEFINITION OF THE ZONE GIVEN ABOVE WILL DIMINISH OBLIGATIONS ALREADY UNDERTAKEN UNDER THE FINAL ACT. THE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES TO BE AGREED UPON AT THE CONFERENCE WILL ALSO BE APPLICABLE IN ALL AREAS COVERED BY ANY OF THE PROVISIONS IN THE FINAL ACT RELATING TO THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES AND CERTAIN ASPECTS OF SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT.

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 IN THIS CONTEXT, THE NOTION OF ADJOINING SEA AREA IS UNDERSTOOD TO REFER ALSO TO OCEAN AREAS ADJOINING EUROPE. HEREINAFTER THE ABOVE MENTIONED WILL BE REFERRED TO AS "THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBM'S." (3/11/86)

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 THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL GIVE . . . IN WRITING THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS IN AN AGREED FORM OF CONTENT, TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES . . . DAYS OR MORE IN ADVANCE OF THE START OF NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBM'S.

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. . . WILL BE GIVEN BY THE PARTICIPATING STATE ON WHOSE TERRITORY THE ACTIVITY IN QUESTION IS PLANNED TO TAKE PLACE EVEN IF THE FORCES OF THAT STATE ARE NOT ENGAGED IN THE ACTIVITY OR THEIR STRENGTH IS BELOW THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL. THIS WILL NOT RELIEVE OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES OF THEIR OBLIGATION TO GIVE . . . , IF THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN THE PLANNED MILITARY ACTIVITY REACHES THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL. (3/11/86)

TO BE DEFINED

MILITARY ACTIVITIES . . . CONDUCTED IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBM'S AT OR ABOVE THE LEVELS DEFINED BELOW, WILL BE NOTIFIED. (5/13/86)

. . . WILL BE GIVEN IN WRITING IN THE FOLLOWING AGREED FORM OF CONTENT:

- . . .
- THE DESIGNATION OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY
- THE GENERAL PURPOSE OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY
- THE NAMES OF THE STATES INVOLVED IN THE MILITARY ACTIVITY

- . . . OF COMMAND, ORGANIZING AND COMMANDING THE MILITARY ACTIVITY

. . . (6/13/86)

- . . .
- CHANGES, IF ANY, IN RELATION TO INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR REGARDING THE ACTIVITY
- RELATIONSHIP OF THE ACTIVITY TO OTHER NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES. (6/24/86)

THE ENGAGEMENT OF MILITARY FORCES IN AN AMPHIBIOUS . . . LANDING . . . IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBM'S.

- THIS MILITARY ACTIVITY WILL BE SUBJECT TO . . . WHENEVER THIS LANDING . . . INVOLVES AT LEAST . . . . (7/15/86)

THE ENGAGEMENT OF FORMATIONS OF LAND FORCES OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES . . . CONDUCTED UNDER A SINGLE OPERATIONAL COMMAND INDEPENDENTLY OR IN COMBINATION WITH ANY POSSIBLE AIR OR NAVAL COMPONENTS.

THIS MILITARY ACTIVITY WILL BE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION WHENEVER . . . .

THE PARTICIPATION OF AIR FORCES OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE NOTIFICATION IF IT IS FORESEEN THAT IN THE COURSE OF THE ACTIVITY . . . OR MORE SORTIES BY AIRCRAFT, EXCLUDING HELICOPTERS, WILL BE FLOWN.

-----  
 IN THIS CONTEXT, THE TERM LAND FORCES INCLUDES AMPHIBIOUS, AIRMOBILE AND AIRBORNE FORCES. (7/16/86)  
 THE ENGAGEMENT OF MILITARY FORCES IN A PARACHUTE ASSAULT BY AIRBORNE FORCES IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBM'S. THIS MILITARY ACTIVITY WILL BE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION WHENEVER THE PARACHUTE DROP INVOLVES AT LEAST . . . . (7/18/86)

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B-2 (OBSERVATION):

A PARTICIPATING STATE WILL INVITE OBSERVERS FROM ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES TO . . . . .  
THE HOST STATE WILL EXTEND THE INVITATIONS IN WRITING THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES AT THE TIME OF NOTIFICATION.  
EACH PARTICIPATING STATE MAY SEND UP TO TWO OBSERVERS TO THE MILITARY ACTIVITY TO BE OBSERVED.

-  
REPLIES TO THE INVITATION WILL BE GIVEN IN WRITING NOT LATER THAN . . . DAYS AFTER THE ISSUE OF THE INVITATION. IF THE INVITATION IS NOT ACCEPTED IN TIME IT WILL BE ASSUMED THAT NO OBSERVERS WILL BE SENT. (2/27/86)  
OBSERVERS WILL BE PROVIDED EQUAL TREATMENT AND OFFERED EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES TO CARRY OUT THEIR FUNCTIONS. (3/6/86)

THE INVITING STATE MAY DELEGATE SOME OF ITS RESPONSIBILITIES AS HOST TO ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE ENGAGED IN THE MILITARY ACTIVITY ON THE TERRITORY OF THE INVITING STATE. IN SUCH CASES, THE INVITING STATE WILL SPECIFY THE ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITIES IN ITS INVITATION TO OBSERVE THE ACTIVITY. (3/13/86)

THE PARTICIPATING STATES ACCEPTING AN INVITATION WILL PROVIDE THE NAMES AND RANKS OF THEIR OBSERVERS IN THEIR REPLY TO THE INVITATION. (3/13/86)

THE INVITED STATE MAY DECIDE WHETHER TO SEND MILITARY AND/OR CIVILIAN OBSERVERS, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF ITS PERSONNEL ACCREDITED TO THE HOST STATE. (4/17/86)

THE HOST STATE WILL PROVIDE OBSERVERS WITH TRANSPORTATION TO THE AREA OF THE NOTIFIED ACTIVITY AND BACK. THIS TRANSPORTATION WILL BE PROVIDED FROM EITHER THE CAPITAL OR ANOTHER SUITABLE LOCATION TO BE ANNOUNCED IN THE INVITATION, SO THAT OBSERVERS ARE IN A POSITION BEFORE THE START OF THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME. (4/24/86)

THE HOST STATE WILL PROVIDE OBSERVERS WITH APPROPRIATE MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION IN THE AREA OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY. (4/24/86)

THE HOST STATE WILL GUIDE THE OBSERVERS IN THE AREA OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY. (4/24/86)

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THE INVITED STATE WILL COVER THE TRAVEL EXPENSES FOR ITS OBSERVERS TO THE CAPITAL, OR ANOTHER SUITABLE LOCATION SPECIFIED IN THE INVITATION, OF THE HOST STATE, AND BACK. (5/1/86)

TOGETHER WITH THE INVITATION THE HOST STATE WILL PROVIDE A GENERAL OBSERVATION PROGRAMME, INCLUDING THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

- . . .  
- THE DATE, TIME AND PLACE OF ASSEMBLY OF OBSERVERS;

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- PLANNED DURATION OF THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME;
- LANGUAGES TO BE USED IN INTERPRETATION AND/OR TRANSLATION;
- ARRANGEMENTS FOR BOARD, LODGING AND TRANSPORTATION OF THE OBSERVERS;

- . . .  
- . . .

(6/26/86)

THE OBSERVERS WILL BE GRANTED, DURING THEIR MISSION, THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES ACCORDED TO DIPLOMATIC AGENTS IN THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

(7/3/86)

AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME GIVE A BRIEFING OF THE PURPOSE, THE BASIC SITUATION, THE PHASES OF THE ACTIVITY AND POSSIBLE CHANGES AS COMPARED WITH THE NOTIFICATION AND PROVIDE THE OBSERVERS WITH A DAILY SCHEDULE AS WELL AS A SKETCH INDICATING THE BASIC SITUATION. (7/3/86)

IN THE COURSE OF THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME GIVE THE OBSERVERS DAILY BRIEFINGS WITH THE HELP OF MAPS ON THE VARIOUS PHASES OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY AND THEIR DEVELOPMENT AND INFORM THE OBSERVERS ABOUT THEIR POSITIONS GEOGRAPHICALLY . . . .

. . . (7/3/86)

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THE HOST STATE WILL PROVIDE OBSERVERS WITH APPROPRIATE BOARD AND LODGING IN A LOCATION SUITABLE FOR CARRYING OUT THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME AND, WHEN NECESSARY, MEDICAL CARE. (7/17/86).

THE HOST STATE WILL GUIDE THE OBSERVERS IN THE AREA OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY. OBSERVERS WILL FOLLOW THE INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED BY THE HOST STATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS SET OUT IN THIS DOCUMENT. (8/21/86)

THE HOST STATE WILL EXTEND THE INVITATIONS IN WRITING THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES AT THE TIME OF NOTIFICATION. THE HOST STATE WILL BE THE PARTICIPATING STATE ON WHOSE TERRITORY THE NOTIFIED ACTIVITY WILL TAKE PLACE. (8/21/86)

END TEXT.

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END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 06636  
SUBJECT: AGREED TEXT IN WORKING GROUP B-2 (OBSERVATION)

1. CDE XII - 016
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

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3. ON AUGUST 21, WORKING GROUP B-2 AGREED TO NOTE TWO SENTENCES WHICH COMPLETE ALREADY NOTED PARAGRAPHS ON THE INVITATION OF OBSERVERS AND THE GUIDANCE OF OBSERVERS IN THE AREA OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY. IN EACH CASE THE NEWLY NOTED SENTENCE IS THE SECOND SENTENCE IN THE PARAGRAPH.

BEGIN TEXT:

THE HOST STATE WILL EXTEND THE INVITATIONS IN WRITING THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES AT THE TIME OF NOTIFICATION. THE HOST STATE WILL BE THE PARTICIPATING STATE ON WHOSE TERRITORY THE NOTIFIED ACTIVITY WILL TAKE PLACE.

END TEXT.

BEGIN TEXT:

THE HOST STATE WILL GUIDE THE OBSERVERS IN THE AREA OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY. OBSERVERS WILL FOLLOW THE INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED BY THE HOST STATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS SET OUT IN THIS DOCUMENT.

END TEXT.

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END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 06652  
 SUBJECT: WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS -  
 - AUGUST 19-22, 1986

1. CDE XII - 017
  2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
  3. BEGIN SUMMARY AND GENERAL ASSESSMENT: THERE WAS MUCH TACTICAL MOTION BUT LITTLE SUBSTANTIVE MOVEMENT DURING THE FIRST WEEK OF THE LAST SESSION OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. WHILE THE WEST AND THE NNA WORKED FEVERISHLY BEHIND THE SCENES (AS MUCH INTRA- AS INTER-GROUP) ON THE KEY QUESTIONS OF NOTIFICATION AND VERIFICATION, THE ONLY LANGUAGE NOTED WAS ON OBSERVATION AND NON-USE OF FORCE. PROGRESS ON NOTIFICATION IS HUNG UP IN THREE KEY AREAS: 1) THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT; 2) THE COMBINED STRUCTURAL/NUMERICAL EQUIPMENT PARAMETER FOR GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES, AND 3) THE DEFINITION OF NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES. THE SOVIETS HAVE TAKEN THE PUBLIC LINE THAT, WITH THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF INSPECTION, THE BALL IS NOW IN THE WESTERN COURT. WHILE OUR ALLIES, BY AND LARGE, HAVE HELD FIRMLY TO WESTERN POSITIONS, MANY ARE CLEARLY WORRIED THAT U.S. REQUIREMENTS, PARTICULARLY ON INSPECTION, ARE SO DEMANDING THAT THEY WILL BE FACED EITHER WITH TAKING OUR SIDE IN A STANDOFF OR ISOLATING US IN A BERN-LIKE OUTCOME. MEANWHILE THE NNA, AFTER CALLING ON EAST AND WEST TO RECONCILE THEIR DIFFERENCES FOR OVER TWO YEARS, ARE NOW WORRIED THAT THEY ACTUALLY WILL. THE NNA NOW FACE THE PROSPECT THAT THEIR SECURITY INTERESTS, TOO, WILL BE AFFECTED BY THE NOTIFICATION AND INSPECTION REGIMES -- AND THEY DON'T LIKE IT. END SUMMARY AND GENERAL ASSESSMENT.
  4. NOTIFICATION: THE SOVIETS THIS WEEK PLAYED A STALLING GAME WHICH SUCCEEDED IN MAKING A NUMBER OF OUR ALLIES NERVOUS. BY FILIBUSTERING IN THE COFFEE GROUP, THEY MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY ARE NOT PREPARED SERIOUSLY TO DISCUSS THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION UNTIL THE DEFINITION OF NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES IS RESOLVED. CONSEQUENTLY, SOVIET GENERAL TATARNIKOV'S MAIN PREOCCUPATION THIS WEEK BOTH IN WORKING GROUP MEETINGS AND IN PRIVATE WAS NOTIFICATION OF TRANSFERS. SOVIET AND U.S. POSITIONS ON WHEN A CSBM'S REGIME SHOULD APPLY TO TRANSFERRED TROOPS ARE VERY CLOSE IN SUBSTANCE AND U.S. MODIFICATIONS TO A SOVIET TEXT ON TRANSFERS COULD BE THE BASIS TO PUT THIS ISSUE TO REST. A DRAFTING COMBO DEALING WITH TRANSFERS AND INFORMATION TO BE EXCHANGED ON PHASES COULD ALLOW US TO RESOLVE THE TYPES OF ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED AND MOVE ON TO THE PARAMETER.
- 
- OUT-OF-GARRISON: THE SOVIETS CATEGORICALLY REJECT THE OUT-OF-GARRISON (OOG) CONCEPT AND LINK WESTERN DROPPING OF OOG WITH THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF INSPECTION. WE SUSPECT THAT THEY ARE CONCERNED THAT OOG WOULD COVER A BROAD

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RANGE OF ACTIVITIES, THEREBY MAKING THE SAME RANGE OF NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO INSPECTION. THEY INSIST THAT THEIR PROPOSAL FOR NOTIFICATION OF EXERCISES, MOVEMENTS AND TRANSFERS COVERS ALL OOG ACTIVITIES OF CONCERN. HOWEVER, WHEN WE DISCUSS PRIVATELY WHICH PHASES OF A MOVEMENT OR TRANSFER WOULD BE SUBJECT TO OBSERVATION AND VERIFICATION, THEIR POSITION IN PRACTICE AMOUNTS TO OUR OOG CONCEPT WITH STARTING POINTS/ARRIVAL POINTS AND EQUIPMENT STORAGE AREAS TREATED AS SENSITIVE POINTS, I.E., NO OBSERVATION OR VERIFICATION PERMITTED. THE LINK BETWEEN INFORMATION AND TRANSFERS CURRENTLY BEING WORKED MAY ENABLE US TO PRESERVE THE OOG CONCEPT AND AVOID DISCUSSION ON MOVEMENTS.

GROUND FORCE THRESHOLD: THERE HAS BEEN A CERTAIN DEGREE OF DISARRAY WITHIN NATO AND THROUGHOUT THE CONFERENCE ON LANGUAGE FOR A COMBINED GROUND FORCE THRESHOLD. NATO DOES NOT HAVE AGREED LANGUAGE BUT HAS ARRIVED AT A GENERAL UNDERSTANDING THAT 1) A THRESHOLD FORMULA WOULD CONSIST OF NUMERICAL AND EQUIPMENT ELEMENTS BACKED UP BY STRUCTURE; 2) STRUCTURE BY ITSELF WOULD NOT TRIGGER NOTIFICATION, AND 3) THAT EITHER NUMERICAL OR EQUIPMENT ELEMENTS WOULD REQUIRE STRUCTURE IN ORDER TO TRIGGER NOTIFICATION. THESE NATO REQUIREMENTS HAVE BEEN FURTHER COMPLICATED BY SOVIET AND SWISS PREOCCUPATIONS: TATARNIKOV EXPLAINED TO US PRIVATELY THAT THE STRUCTURAL ELEMENT OF A THRESHOLD FORMULA MUST CAPTURE NATO AND WTO FULL-STRENGTH SINGLE-DIVISION EXERCISES BUT NOT SOVIET SINGLE DIVISION EXERCISES CARRIED OUT BY INCOMPLETE DIVISIONS (5-6,000 TROOPS). THE SWISS ARE ADAMANT ABOUT EXCLUDING FROM NOTIFICATION THEIR MOUNTAIN BRIGADES, WHICH, THEY ARGUE, ARE NOT THREATENING.

5. VERIFICATION: THE WEEK OPENED WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY'S FIRST PUBLIC ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THE USSR'S WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT OBLIGATORY INSPECTION IN A CDE AGREEMENT PROVIDED THERE IS A PASSIVE QUOTA OF "ONE OR TWO." HAVING GONE THAT FAR, HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS NOW SEEM DETERMINED TO DELAY THE DRAFTING OF INSPECTION MODALITIES UNTIL AS LATE IN THE GAME AS POSSIBLE TO ENHANCE THEIR PROSPECTS OF ESCAPING WITH ONLY SOFT MODALITIES FOR GROUND INSPECTION AND TO LEAVE NO TIME FOR CONSIDERATION OF AERIAL MODALITIES. THE NNA ATTEMPTS TO KEEP OPEN THE POSSIBILITY FOR THEIR CHERISHED OBSERVATION UPON REQUEST PROPOSAL IS ONE MORE IMPEDIMENT TO DRAFTING PROGRESS. IT HAS BELATEDLY DAWNED ON THE NNA THAT THEY WILL HAVE TO ALLOW VERIFICATION (I.E., INSPECTION) TO TAKE PLACE ON THEIR TERRITORY -- OBSERVATION UPON REQUEST HAD BEEN DESIGNED TO SPARE THEM THIS THROUGH ITS REQUIREMENT FOR JUSTIFICATION OF REQUESTS AND ITS RIGHT OF REFUSAL CLAUSE; THEY (PARTICULARLY THE SWEDES) ARE FINDING THIS A BITTER AND DIFFICULT PILL TO SWALLOW. (A MORE DETAILED REPORT ON VERIFICATION DEVELOPMENTS FOLLOWS

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6. OBSERVATION: TWO ADDITIONAL TEXTS WERE NOTED THIS WEEK STIPULATING: 1) THAT THE "HOST STATE" IS THE STATE ON WHOSE TERRITORY THE NOTIFIED ACTIVITY TAKES PLACE (OF NO'E BECAUSE THE SOVIETS HAVE DROPPED THEIR EARLIER PRE-CONDITION FOR A CONFERENCE-WIDE UNDERSTANDING OF THE WORD "TERRITORY"); AND 2) THAT OBSERVERS WILL FOLLOW THE INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED BY THE HOST STATE (TEXTS PROVIDED SEPTEL). IN THE WORKING GROUP, POLISH AMBASSADOR KONARSKI, AFTER HAVING ALERTED THE PRESS TO A MAJOR DEVELOPMENT, DROPPED THE EASTERN PROPOSAL FOR A QUOTA ON MANDATORY OBSERVATIONS AND PROPOSED INSTEAD THAT A SEPARATE THRESHOLD ABOVE THE AGREED NOTIFICATION LEVEL BE ESTABLISHED FOR MANDATORY OBSERVATION. KONARSKI HAS OFFERED NO INDICATION OF THE LEVEL OF HIS NEW THRESHOLD, BUT THE SOVIET "NEGOTIATING" POSITION IS 16,000 (FOR NOTIFICATION)-20,000 (FOR OBSERVATION) AND THEIR "SERIOUS" POSITION IS 12,000-16,000. THE ALLIANCE IS CONTINUING INTERNAL CONSIDERATION OF A SIMILAR "SPLIT-LEVEL" APPROACH; MOST COULD AGREE TO 10,000-15,000. FOR ITS PART, NATO PROPOSED THAT OBSERVATION BEGIN ONCE THE NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD IS REACHED OR EXCEEDED AND END WHEN THE THRESHOLDS ARE NO LONGER MET (THIS IS VIRTUALLY IDENTICAL TO THE ALREADY TABLED EASTERN AND NNA PROPOSALS). NATO ALSO SPURNED AN EASTERN OFFER TO TRADE OFF THE USE OF PERSONAL BINOCULARS FOR AGREEMENT TO PROVIDE OBSERVERS WITH TIMELY COMMUNICATIONS. NEXT WEEK DISCUSSION WILL TURN TO THE CENTRAL ISSUE OF SCOPE OF OBSERVATION.

7. ANNUAL FORECASTS: THERE IS CONTINUING DISAGREEMENT OVER WHETHER THE "AREA OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY" IN THE ANNUAL FORECAST SHOULD BE DEFINED BY GEOGRAPHIC FEATURES (EASTERN AND NNA PREFERENCE) OR GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES (NATO PREFERENCE). THE CURRENT COORDINATOR'S TEXT WOULD ALLOW EITHER TO BE PROVIDED IN THE CALENDAR. IT IS THE VIEW OF MOST OF OUR ALLIES THAT NATO CAN BE FLEXIBLE ON THIS QUESTION IF WE CAN AGREE TO GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES IN THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION. WE EXPECT TO AGREE ON TEXTS ON BOTH THE "AREA" AND "DURATION" THE NEAR FUTURE.

8. CONSTRAINTS: THE EAST HAS SIGNIFICANTLY ELEVATED THE IMPORTANCE OF CONSTRAINTS ALTHOUGH THEY ARE CLEARLY FLEXIBLE ON SUBSTANCE. WE BELIEVE THAT, SEEING THE OUTLINES OF A DOCUMENT WHICH WILL CONTAIN LITTLE OF EASTERN ORIGIN, THE EAST HAS DECIDED THAT A SEPARATE SECTION ON CONSTRAINTS IS ESSENTIAL. NATO NOW AGREES THAT THE IRISH CONCEPT OF TIME CONSTRAINTS, I.E., ACTIVITIES ABOVE A CERTAIN SIZE WOULD HAVE TO BE FORECAST TWO YEARS IN ADVANCE, SHOULD BE USED BOTH TO DEFUSE EASTERN AND NNA PRESSURE ON OTHER CONSTRAINT MEASURES AND TO OBTAIN SOME LEVERAGE FOR EASTERN AND NNA CONCESSIONS ELSEWHERE. NATO IS ALSO CONSIDERING A LIMIT

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ON THE SIZE OF ACTIVITIES WHICH COULD BE ADDED TO THE CALENDAR, OR WHICH COULD BE PRIOR NOTIFIED WITHOUT BEING FORECAST. ACTIVITIES NOTIFIED AT THE TIME THEY COMMENCE WOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM ANY SUCH RESTRICTION.

9. NON-USE OF FORCE: THE FINAL FORM OF THE NON-USE OF FORCE SECTION IS TAKING SHAPE. THIS WEEK LANGUAGE WAS NOTED ON COMPLIANCE AND SOVEREIGN EQUALITY/ EQUAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES. ALMOST ALL THE WESTERN-ORIENTED PASSAGES NOW HAVE BEEN REGISTERED WITH THE NOTABLE EXCEPTIONS OF "TERRORISM" AND "HUMAN RIGHTS;" BUT EVEN ON THESE ISSUES THE EVOLUTION OF DRAFTING IS IN A WESTERLY DIRECTION. THUS, MOST OF THE UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS, E.G., REFERENCE TO MILITARY FORCE/ARMED FORCES, THE MEDITERRANEAN, DISARMAMENT, ARE EASTERN AND NNA ISSUES. IN OTHER WORDS, THE EAST AND THE NNA, PARTICULARLY MALTA, FIND THEMSELVES IN THE ROLE OF THE DEMANDEURS. ACCORDINGLY, EASTERN SPOKESMAN KORMENDY (HUNGARY) HAS OFFERED US A DEAL: THEY WILL ACCEPT MOST OF THE WESTERN/NNA HUMAN RIGHTS LANGUAGE IF WE WILL BUY A MODIFIED PASSAGE ON "ARMED FORCES," I.E., BASED ON THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT LANGUAGE, P.83, AND WITHOUT REFERENCES TO NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL WAR. THE NNA COORDINATOR (LOIBL - AUSTRIA) IS ALSO ANXIOUS TO CLOSE UP THE NUF SHOP. WHILE SOME OF ALLIES ARE UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THIS PRESSURE, THE ALLIANCE HAS SO FAR HELD FIRM. OVER THE NEXT WEEK WE INTEND TO SIT TIGHT AND SEE WHAT KIND OF DEALS THE EAST AND NNA HAVE TO OFFER.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 06677

SUBJECT: CDE: KEY PROBLEM AREAS

1. CDE XII-018. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. ON A WEEKLY BASIS WE PLAN TO BRIEFLY IDENTIFY AND DISCUSS KEY SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEMS IN THE CDE ENDGAME.
3. INSPECTION: DRAFTING IN THIS CRUCIAL AREA IS STILL STALLED DUE TO SOVIET FOOT-DRAGGING, NNA RESISTANCE AND ALLIED DISUNITY. THE MAIN ISSUES ARE:

- A. AIR INSPECTION: WE HAVE CONFRONTED THIS ISSUE HEAD-ON, MUCH TO OUR ALLIES' DISCOMFORT. THE SOVIETS ARE WHISPERING THAT AT THE END OF THE ROAD THEY WILL ACCEPT AIR INSPECTION AS LONG AS IT'S THEIR AIRPLANE. WE ARE LETTING IT BE KNOWN THAT THE LEAST WE COULD ACCEPT WOULD BE A NEUTRAL AIRPLANE. OUR AIM IS TO FORCE THE SOVIET "CONCESSION" ON THE USE OF THEIR OWN AIRCRAFT EARLY SO THAT THERE WILL BE TIME TO PRY OUT

- THE SECOND "CONCESSION" ON NEUTRAL AIR LATER. THIS IS HOLDING UP DRAFTING ON MODALITIES AND MAKING OUR ALLIES NERVOUS. DESPITE PRO-FORMA SUPPORT WE ARE ALONE IN THINKING NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT ESSENTIAL. WASHINGTON CAN EXPECT DEMARCHES SOON.

- B. RESTRICTED AREAS: THE SOVIET POSITION IS THAT THEY WILL NOT AGREE TO A LIMITATION ON A MAXIMUM PERCENTAGE OF CLOSED AREAS NOR WILL THEY EXCHANGE MAPS UNTIL AFTER SEPTEMBER 19. WE HAVE DISMISSED THIS POSITION AS RIDICULOUS. THE FRG AND TURKEY, THE LAST NATO HOLDOUTS, HAVE NOW COME ABOARD ON OUR POSITION THAT WE SHOULD DEFINE WHAT IS OPEN, NOT WHAT IS CLOSED AND TRY TO GET A FORMULA WHICH SAYS THAT NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES WILL NOT BE HELD IN CLOSED AREAS. WE THINK THE EAST WILL ACCEPT THIS.

- C. QUOTAS: THE SOVIET POSITION IS THAT EACH PARTICIPATING STATE SHOULD BE OBLIGED TO ACCEPT A MAXIMUM OF 2 INSPECTIONS PER YEAR (PASSIVE QUOTA). NATO ACCEPTS THE PASSIVE QUOTA CONCEPT, BUT IS SEEKING A 5 INSPECTION CEILING. WE BELIEVE THERE SHOULD ALSO BE AN ACTIVE QUOTA - A RIGHT FOR EACH COUNTRY TO ASK FOR A CERTAIN NUMBER OF INSPECTIONS. A COMBINATION OF ACTIVE AND PASSIVE QUOTAS OF EQUAL NUMBERS PRODUCES EQUAL OBLIGATIONS TO ACCEPT INSPECTION ON EACH SIDE. BUT AT LEAST ONE ALLY - TURKEY - FLATLY REFUSES TO ACCEPT ANY ACTIVE QUOTA ABOVE ONE. THE NNA DISLIKE ALL INSPECTION WITHOUT A RIGHT OF REFUSAL AND HAVE BEEN RESISTING THE PASSIVE QUOTA CONCEPT. A NUMBER OF HYBRID PROPOSALS ATTEMPTING TO PRESERVE A RIGHT OF REFUSAL HAVE EMERGED FROM THE NN AND HAVE BEEN SWATTED DOWN. MOST OPPOSE THE ACTIVE QUOTA. SOME - E.G. AUSTRIA - ARE INSISTING THAT COUNTRIES SHOULD BE FREE TO ASK FOR INSPECTIONS AFTER THE PASSIVE QUOTA IS EXHAUSTED. IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, REQUESTS WOULD HAVE TO BE JUSTIFIED

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AND THERE WOULD BE A RIGHT OF REFUSAL. THIS WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO US AND MOST OF NATO.

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- D. NNA OBSERVATION OF INSPECTION: SOME NNA ARE INSISTING THAT THIRD PARTIES MUST BE INVITED BY THE INSPECTED STATE TO OBSERVE AN INSPECTION. THEY WOULD NOT SUBMIT REPORTS, BUT WOULD BE "GUARANTORS AGAINST ABUSE" AND WOULD LEARN THE INSPECTION TRADE. THE EAST IS MAKING ENCOURAGING NOISES. WE ARE TRYING TO DISCOURAGE THE IDEA BY PLAYING UP THE RISK THAT THEY WILL LOSE THEIR NEUTRAL VIRGINITY BY BEING FORCED TO SERVE AS JUDGES. THE KEY PROMOTERS - AUSTRIA AND SWITZERLAND - ARE HINTING THAT IF THEY ARE NOT ALLOWED TO PLAY THEY WILL NOT BE READY TO PARTICIPATE IN SUPPLYING AIRCRAFT FOR INSPECTIONS.

4. NOTIFICATION.

- A. TRANSFERS: WE ARE CLOSE TO A SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM. WE WILL AGREE TO A FORMULATION THAT GIVES NOTIFICATION OF TRANSFERS BUT PROTECTS OUR POSITION AND EXTRACTS A PRICE FROM THE EAST IN TERMS OF INFORMATION ON ALL PHASES OF AN ACTIVITY. LANGUAGE WILL PROTECT U.S. POSITION THAT TRANSITS WILL NOT BE NOTIFIED OR OTHERWISE CAPTURED.

- B. "OUT-OF-GARRISON" FORMULA: SINCE THE SOVIETS FLATLY REFUSE TO DISCUSS ANY VARIATION OF THE "OUT-OF-GARRISON" CONCEPT THE CHALLENGE IS TO FIND A COMPREHENSIVE FORMULA WHICH DOES NOT GIVE THE EAST A LOOPHOLE FOR CIRCUMVENTION ON GROUNDS THAT THE ACTIVITY IN QUESTION DOES NOT FIT INTO A LIST OF TYPES OF NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES. WE ARE PURSUING VARIOUS CONCEPTS, SOME OF WHICH MIGHT FILL THE BILL.

- C. GROUND FORCE THRESHOLDS: THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO RESIST A STRUCTURAL ELEMENT, AND THE ALLIES WOULD SIDE WITH THEM WERE IT NOT FOR OUR INSISTENCE THAT THIS WOULD MEAN NO AGREEMENT. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS WE THINK THE SOVIETS WILL COME AROUND. IT IS NOT YET TIME TO NEGOTIATE ON NUMBERS, BUT WHEN WE DO WE THINK WE CAN GET 10,000 TROOPS AND 250 TANKS FOR NOTIFICATION AND A STRICTLY NUMERICAL THRESHOLD OF 15,000 TROOPS FOR OBSERVATION.

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5. CONSTRAINTS: WE ARE CURRENTLY ENGAGED IN NEGOTIATING A TIME CONSTRAINT PROPOSAL. IN ADDITION TO THIS PROPOSAL, WHICH WOULD REQUIRE NOTIFYING EXERCISES OF 40,000 TWO YEARS IN ADVANCE, NATO IS ALSO CONSIDERING A PROHIBITION ON ADDITIONS TO THE CALENDAR OF EXERCISES ABOVE 75,000 (EXCEPT ALERTS) AS WELL AS AN EXEMPTION FROM THE PASSIVE QUOTA FOR ADDITIONS BELOW 75,000.

6. OBSERVATION: THE EAST REMAINS FIRM IN REJECTING BOTH PERSONAL BINOCULARS AND MAPS ON A REASONABLE SCALE, AND, THUS, SHOW THEIR TRUE COLORS ON THE "OPENNESS"

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QUESTION. CONTROVERSIAL ASPECTS OF "SCOPE" OF OBSER-  
VATION HAVE YET TO BE DISCUSSED IN DETAIL AND ARE LIKELY  
TO PROVE DIFFICULT.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 06715  
 SUBJECT: CDE: KEEPING THE RECORD STRAIGHT  
 REF: A) STOCKHOLM 6552, B) STOCKHOLM 6627,  
 C) STATE 126401

1. CDE XII - 019

2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

3. SUMMARY: IF CDE SUCCEEDS, THE SOVIETS WILL CLAIM CREDIT; IF IT FAILS, THEY WILL BLAME THE WEST. IN FACT, CDE HAS FOLLOWED A WESTERN AGENDA, TO A VERY LARGE DEGREE IN THE FACE OF EASTERN OBSTACLES. THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES TALKING POINTS ON THE EVOLUTION OF CDE AND IDENTIFIES BACKGROUND MATERIAL SUPPORTING US VIEW. ASSISTANCE REQUEST PARA. 6. END SUMMARY.

4. AS CDE ENDS, THE SOVIETS ARE STEPPING UP PROPAGANDA EFFORTS TO TAKE CREDIT FOR SUCCESS OR, CONVERSELY, PUT THE BLAME ON THE WEST FOR FAILURE. IN FACT, AS THE CHRONOLOGY DEMONSTRATES IN OUTLINE (REFS A AND B), CDE IN ITS PRESENT FORM WAS A WESTERN INITIATIVE WHICH, IN FOCUSING ON CONCRETE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES (CSBM), NOT ON DECLARATORY OR SYMBOLIC MEASURES, HAS FOLLOWED A WESTERN CONCEPTION. THE EAST INITIALLY TRIED TO DIVERT CDE TO USE IT AS A PROPAGANDA FORUM BUT FAILED TO DO SO. THE EAST THEN ADOPTED AN OBSTRUCTIONIST APPROACH TO MINIMIZE SUBSTANTIVE CONTENT OF ANY CSBM'S AGREED IN CDE.

-- AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CONFERENCE, THE WEST TABLED SIX CSBM'S (01/24/84), CONCRETE MILITARY MEASURES WITH CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS.

-- THE SOVIET MEASURES TABLED 5/8/86 WERE LARGELY DECLARATORY, RECYCLED POLITICAL/PROPAGANDA PROPOSALS. THE ONE CONCRETE CSBM, THEIR MEASURE SIX, WAS VERY VAGUE. NEVERTHELESS, THE SOVIETS CLAIMED THEIRS WERE SWEEPING POLITICAL-MILITARY MEASURES "SUITED TO THE CURRENT TENSE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION". THEY BELITTLED WESTERN PROPOSALS AS NARROW "MILITARY-TECHNICAL" MEASURES.

-- MUCH OF THE FIRST YEAR AND A HALF OF CDE WAS SPENT DISPOSING OF SOVIET DECLARATORY MEASURES AND REAFFIRMING CDE'S MANDATE TO NEGOTIATE CONCRETE, MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT CSBM'S. PRESIDENT REAGAN'S DUBLIN INITIATIVE (6/4/84) ON NON-USE OF FORCE (NUF) WAS AN EFFORT TO MOVE THE CONFERENCE IN THAT DIRECTION.

-- REF C (PARAS. 7-8) DESCRIBES THE STRATEGY OF DELAY BY WHICH THE EAST RAISED ONE OBSTACLE AFTER ANOTHER AND THEN CLAIMED CREDIT FOR MAKING MAJOR CONCESSIONS WHEN THEY ACCEPTED SOLUTIONS FOR REMOVING THEM. THE 6/16/86 RESOLUTION OF THE AIR ISSUE IS AN EXAMPLE OF THIS EASTERN APPROACH. ON OTHER OCCASIONS, THE SOVIETS PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED MAJOR INITIATIVES/CONCESSIONS, ONLY TO QUALIFY THEM OUT OF EXISTENCE AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE (CF 10/3/85 ON CALENDARS; 1/15/86 ON NAVAL

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ACTIVITIES).

-- SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF "ON-SITE INSPECTION" FOR VERIFICATION (8/19/86) COULD BE AN IMPORTANT STEP FORWARD; THE CRUCIAL QUESTION IS WHETHER THE EAST WILL AGREE TO CONCRETE PROVISION FOR CARRYING OUT INSPECTIONS TO CREATE AN OPERATIONALLY EFFECTIVE INSPECTION REGIME.

-- IF SUCCESSFUL, CDE WILL ESTABLISH A MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT CONFIDENCE-BUILDING REGIME BASED ON GREATER OPENNESS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST ABOUT MILITARY AFFAIRS. THE WHOLE CONCEPT OF OPENNESS IS WESTERN; THE EAST STILL EXPLICITLY REJECTS IT IN CDE.

5. IN ADDITION TO THE CHRONOLOGY, WE SUGGEST THE FOLLOWING AS USEFUL SOURCES OF BACKGROUND ON CDE AND US POSITIONS IN THE CONFERENCE.

A) PRESIDENTIAL: THE WHITE HOUSE HAS ISSUED STATEMENTS ON CDE AT THE BEGINNING OF EACH ROUND, MOST RECENTLY: 8/19/86; 6/10/86; 4/15/86; 1/28/86. THE PRESIDENT ALSO ADDRESSED CDE IN HIS SPEECH BEFORE THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT IN STRASBOURG (5/8/85) AND IN HIS SPEECH BEFORE THE IRISH PARLIAMENT (6/4/84). THE US-SOVIET JOINT STATEMENT FROM THE GENEVA SUMMIT ADDRESSED CDE (11/21/85).

B) RECENT OTHER US: SPEECHES BY AMB. ROBERT L. BARRY, HEAD USDEL CDE, IN BERN, SWITZERLAND (2/27/86) AND AT CHATHAM HOUSE, LONDON (2/4/86). THE WIRELESS FILE CARRIES NUMEROUS US SPEECHES MADE IN THE CONFERENCE, MOST RECENTLY 8/19/86.

C) OTHER: THE USIA PAMPHLET ON CDE (7/85) REMAINS AN EXCELLENT BACKGROUND SOURCE ON THE FIRST HALF OF THE CONFERENCE, LAYING OUT NEGOTIATING POSITIONS AND EARLY KEY US STATEMENTS. THE CHRONOLOGY FILLS IN LATER DEVELOPMENTS. NATO REVIEW (6/84 AND 2/85) ALSO CARRIES BACKGROUND ARTICLES.

6. WE APPRECIATE ASSISTANCE OF USIS POSTS IN EXPLAINING US CDE POSITIONS TO JOURNALISTS WHO MIGHT BE WRITING ON THE CONFERENCE. MOST OF THE MATERIAL NOTED ABOVE IS AVAILABLE IN THE WIRELESS FILE. WE CAN SUPPLY COPIES OF OTHER TEXTS ON REQUEST.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 06722  
 SUBJECT: CDE: RESTRICTED AREAS: TURKISH POSITION

1. CDE XII - 20.
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY. TURKISH CDE ACTING REP BOLUKBASI INFORMED U.S. CDE DEPUTY REP, AMB. HANSEN ON AUGUST 23 OF NEW INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING TURKEY'S APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF RESTRICTED AREAS IN THE CONTEXT OF ANY CDE AGREEMENT. IN BRIEF, FOR THE PURPOSES OF CDE, TURKEY WILL DROP ITS INSISTENCE ON A PERCENTAGE OF RESTRICTED AREAS APPROACH; THUS, THE TURKISH RESTRICTED AREA PRACTICE, WHICH WILL CONTINUE TO REMAIN IN FORCE, WILL NOT BE APPLIED BY TURKEY FOR THE PURPOSES OF CDE. TURKEY SUPPORTS A "POSITIVE" APPROACH TO RAS; ONE THAT WOULD DEFINE WHERE AN INSPECTION CAN TAKE PLACE RATHER THAN WHERE IT CANNOT. TURKEY NONETHELESS WANTS A REFERENCE TO BOTH SENSITIVE POINTS (IN THE SC.1 SENSE OF THE TERM) AND "PERMANENTLY RESTRICTED AREAS" IN ANY TEXT ADDRESSING THE QUESTION OF AREAS DESIGNATED/SPECIFIED FOR INSPECTION. BOLUKBASI INDICATED THAT TURKEY HAS MADE THIS MOVE IN AN EFFORT TO SOLVE THE PROBLEMS FACING THE WEST CONCERNING THE RESTRICTED AREA/EXCEPTIONS PROBLEMS IN THE CONTEXT OF CDE. KEY ELEMENTS OF NEW TURKISH POSITION FOLLOW. END SUMMARY.
4. AS INDICATED REFTEL (STOCKHOLM 05710), U.S. CDE DEPREP AMB. HANSEN CONSULTED DURING ROUND 11 WITH TURKISH CDE DEPREP BOLUKBASI ON THE SUBJECT OF RESTRICTED AREAS WITH A VIEW TO RESOLVING THIS ISSUE IN THE CONTEXT OF AN INSPECTION MEASURE. ONE OF THE KEYS TO RESOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM, IN THE U.S. VIEW, WAS TURKISH AGREEMENT TO DROP OR AT LEAST MODIFY, IN THE CONTEXT OF ANY CDE AGREEMENT, THE TURKISH PRACTICE OF RESTRICTED AREAS WHICH, AS ARTICULATED AT NATO, REQUIRES A 5 TERRITORIAL ALLOTMENT FOR PERMANENTLY RESTRICTED AREAS AND 10 FOR TEMPORARILY RESTRICTED AREAS. ON AUGUST 22, BOLUKBASI INFORMED HANSEN OF THE RESULTS OF TURKEY'S REVIEW OF ITS POSITION.
5. BY WAY OF BACKGROUND, AND FOR U.S. INFORMATION ONLY, BOLUKBASI NOTED THAT IN THE TURKISH/USSR BORDER AREA THE GENERAL DEFENSE POSITIONS (GDPS), OR RATHER THE PEACETIME AND WARTIME POSITIONS, ARE MORE OR LESS THE SAME FOR CERTAIN UNITS. THESE UNITS EXERCISE IN THEIR GDPS OR IN THE GDP AREA. GDPS, HE NOTED, ARE NOT ALL IN THE BORDER AREA. HE ALSO RECALLED THAT ALL SENSITIVE MILITARY AREAS IN TURKEY ARE CLOSED TO THE PUBLIC AND THAT THE AREA RESTRICTED IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES IS THE WHOLE AREA, EVEN IF SUCH AN AREA IS NOT DECLARED A RESTRICTED AREA; IN PRACTICE IT IS A RESTRICTED AREA. AT A NOTIFICATION LEVEL OF 10,000, TURKEY DOES NOT BELIEVE IT WILL FACE PROBLEMS CONCERNING NOTIFICATION OR OBSERVATION OF THESE UNITS. TURKEY IS CONCERNED,

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HOWEVER, THAT THE SOVIET'S MAY REQUEST AN INSPECTION OF AN ACTIVITY BELOW THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL. IT THEREFORE IS NOT WILLING TO DO AWAY ENTIRELY WITH THE CONCEPT OF RAS IN THE CONTEXT OF CDE.

6. DRAWING ON INSTRUCTIONS, BOLUKBASI OFFERED THE FOLLOWING:

-- ALTHOUGH THERE HAS BEEN NO UNDERSTANDING FROM ALLIES REGARDING TURKEY'S SPECIAL PROBLEMS AND CONCERNS WITH CERTAIN POSITIONS, SUCH AS MEASURE 1, TURKEY HAS DECIDED NOT TO MAKE A PROBLEM OUT OF RESTRICTED AREAS IN CONNECTION WITH DESIGNATED AREAS FOR INSPECTION.

-- TURKEY THUS DROPS ITS INSISTENCE ON A PERCENTAGE RESTRICTED AREA APPROACH FOR THE PURPOSES OF CDE. TURKEY IS NOT CONVINCED THAT THIS APPROACH WILL WORK IN THE CONTEXT OF CDE AND RECOGNIZES THE POTENTIAL FOR SOVIET ABUSE WHICH WOULD WORK TO THE SOVIET ADVANTAGE AND TO THE DISADVANTAGE OF TURKEY.

-- THE TURKISH RESTRICTED AREA PRACTICE, ALREADY ESTABLISHED, WILL NOT BE APPLIED FOR THE PURPOSES OF CDE. OTHERWISE IT WILL REMAIN IN FORCE. THUS, HE REITERATED, TURKEY IS NOT INSISTING ON A BROADER CONCEPT OF RESTRICTED AREAS IN TERMS OF PERCENTAGES OF NATIONAL TERRITORY. TURKEY ALSO DOES NOT SUPPORT AN APPROACH WHEREBY THERE WOULD BE AN EXCHANGE BETWEEN PARTICIPATING STATES OF LISTS OR MAPS OF RESTRICTED AREAS. IT IS TURKEY'S VIEW THAT THERE WOULD BE NO PROVISION FOR TRAS.

-- THERE ARE CERTAIN CONDITIONS ATTACHED TO THIS NEW POSITION, NAMELY THAT THERE SHOULD BE AN ACTIVE INSPECTION QUOTA OF ONE AND THAT NOTIFICATION PARAMETERS ARE AT A LEVEL OF AT LEAST 10,000/ONE DIVISION SIZED EXERCISE. IN THIS CONTEXT, BOLUKBASI ALSO INDICATED THAT TURKEY WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT A PASSIVE INSPECTION QUOTA OF FIVE, ALTHOUGH THIS WAS NOT INFORMATION HE IS PREPARED TO SHARE WITH OTHERS AT THIS TIME.

-- THE ABOVE REPRESENTS A BIG SACRIFICE FOR TURKEY, AND TURKEY HOPES OTHERS WILL UNDERSTAND IT WAS NOT EASY FOR THEM TO DROP THE RESTRICTED AREA APPROACH IN TERMS OF PERCENTAGES OF NATIONAL TERRITORY FOR PURPOSES OF CDE.

-- ON A PERSONAL NOTE, BOLUKBASI RECALLED THAT HE HAD GIVEN HANSEN HIS WORD OF HONOR THAT HE WOULD TRY TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM, AND EXPRESSED HIS HOPES THAT THIS WOULD FACILITATE THE SOLUTION.

7. FOLLOWING PRESENTATION OF THE TURKISH POSITION, AMB. HANSEN ASKED HOW THIS POSITION COULD BE REFLECTED IN TERMS OF DRAFTING LANGUAGE, BASED ON LANGUAGE THAT HAD BEEN DISCUSSED DURING PREVIOUS CONSULTATIONS. BOLUKBASI RESPONDED AS FOLLOWS:

-- TURKEY CAN ACCEPT THE APPROACH OUTLINED BY HANSEN IN JULY WHEREBY THERE IS A REFERENCE TO WHAT THE DESIGNATED AREA FOR INSPECTION WILL INCLUDE, I.E. TRAINING AREAS AND PUBLIC TERRAIN AND WILL BE LIMITED TO PLACES WHERE

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ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION CAN BE CONDUCTED.  
-- TURKEY WANTS A REFERENCE IN DRAFTING LANGUAGE TO RESTRICTED AREAS AND THE FOLLOWING KIND OF LANGUAGE, AS DISCUSSED PREVIOUSLY WITH HANSEN, IS ACCEPTABLE: IN A DESIGNATED AREA, THE INSPECTING STATE WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INSPECTED STATE, BUT THE INSPECTING STATE WILL BE PERMITTED ACCESS, ENTRY AND UNOBSTRUCTED SURVEY EXCEPT FOR SENSITIVE POINTS AND AREAS AS WELL AS PERMANENTLY RESTRICTED AREAS, NOT INCLUDING TRAINING AREAS, TO WHICH ACCESS BY THE GENERAL PUBLIC IS NORMALLY RESTRICTED OR DENIED. HANSEN INDICATED THAT, AS A STARTING POSITION FOR NEGOTIATIONS, IT WAS THE U.S. PREFERENCE NOT TO MAKE REFERENCE TO RESTRICTED AREAS. IN RESPONSE, AND FOR U.S. INFORMATION ONLY, BOLUKBASI INDICATED THAT IF A REFERENCE TO PERMANENTLY RESTRICTED AREAS MIGHT CAUSE A PROBLEM, TURKEY WILL RE-CONSIDER SUCH A REFERENCE WHEN/IF SUCH A PROBLEM ARISES.

-- IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ABOVE-CITED LANGUAGE, BOLUKBASI INDICATED THAT IT IS TURKEY'S UNDERSTANDING THAT THE REFERENCE TO "SENSITIVE POINTS" ONLY COVERS THE EXCEPTIONS ALREADY ENUMERATED AS EXCEPTIONS IN SC.1/AMPLIFIED/MEASURE 5/PARAGRAPH 7. THE CONCEPT OF "SENSITIVE POINTS", IN TURKEY'S UNDERSTANDING, WOULD ALSO COVER THE AIRSPACE OVER TURKEY, I.E. AIRSPACE OVER "SENSITIVE POINTS".

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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AUSTRIA

Mr. Chairman,

during the past weeks the outlines of a surprising turn of events have appeared in the important field of verification, a turn which the Austrian delegation welcomes, both in principle and in the interest of a result in Stockholm. This development found confirmation in the last plenary when Ambassador Grinevsky accepted the conduct of on site-inspections of confidence building measures on the basis of a limited quota per year on the territory of each State. In the corridors this idea is referred to as passive quota and it seems to imply that inspections within the framework of such a quota may not be refused under any circumstances.

This very important step by the Soviet Union has created a new situation within the Conference and has largely improved the prospects for a positive conclusion of our work. A concrete result in Stockholm - and nobody is talking any more of only a mini-package - has always been the essential aim for Austria: we expect that the ensuing improvements of the political and in the longer run hopefully also for the military situation in Europe will indirectly also increase our own security.

In as far as vital security interests of the Republic of Austria are not endangered we have always tried to facilitate and promote results in Stockholm and will continue to do so with determination and within the framework of our possibilities.

One such vital security interest is the exemption of mobilization from notifiable activities - mobilization being the calling up of reservists from the civilian population, irrespective of whether this activity were to be called mobilization, concentration of forces or something else. Contrary to bigger countries with considerable standing forces the Austrian militia-type defence system has to depend heavily on mobilization; the employment of such mobilized forces in defence positions is essentially different from a transfer of standing forces and consequently cannot in the same way be subject to CSBMs.

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On the basis of this clear position but with an open mind to whatever ideas can advance the course of our negotiations, I would like to make some remarks relating to the system of verification on which the views of the two alliances seem to be converging. I consider this convergence as a positive, though certainly not as the only or even the decisive element required for an agreement.

My considerations and questions start from the assumption that verification should be effective and not only a theoretical, abstract principle. I also take it for granted that an agreement in Stockholm will - as all other CSCE-agreements, including the CBMs of the Helsinki Final Act - contain obligations unlimited in time which therefore are not only designed for seasons of political good weather. And only this assumption makes it understandable for example that all CSBM-proposals submitted in Stockholm foresee exceptions from the notification of notifiable activities.

The passive quotas I mentioned before seem to be based on the understanding that a certain amount of inspection requests per year may not be refused. This might create certain problems and concerns for a State like Austria which for its security does not rely on alliance membership but which - situated in the center of military power concentration in Europe - is itself surrounded by members of opposing alliances. We are aware that members of alliances sometimes have little understanding for these problems but this is precisely the reason why it is necessary to recall this aspect in order to increase comprehension for the security requirements of N+N-countries.

On the other hand Austria is also conscious of its share of responsibility for the future of the CSCE-process; we will therefore try to stretch ourselves to the limits of what is possible and reasonable in order not to complicate understandings between the alliance partners in the difficult field of verification.

But if the system of passive quotas is not to be only a coat to cover the otherwise naked principle of non-refusal it must be clear, to start with, that passive quotas will not be used up by members of the same alliance among themselves.

Moreover, the consumption of the passive quota of one State should not exclude the right at least to request inspections beyond that passive quota. (And in this context just a short additional remark: according to the existing note book-texts requests would be addressed to the States on whose territories an activity is taking place; thus the quota for example of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic would be very rapidly exhausted whereas no requests could be addressed to the United States of America and Canada).

The right for additional requests beyond the passive quota cannot be contested on logical grounds: because non-compliance with the CSBM-regime could - hopefully only in theory - arise more often than is covered by the inspections admitted under the passive quota. This aspect is all the more serious if for example some notifiable activities were in part to be exempted from observation. Inspection would then remain the only means of compliance-control. Even if criteria of "Realpolitik" can be adduced in defence of passive quotas, the limitation of requests to the passive quota would only be a political manifestation of the principle of non-refusal but not assure effective verification - in particular if the passive quotas were to be relatively low.

The introduction of an explicit limitation of the right to request an inspection, an active quota as it is called in the corridors would be even worse: this would lead to absurd consequences and undermine the whole idea of verification. Up to a certain degree and in the interest of consensus one can decide to overlook the fact that verification solutions are proposed to the CSCE-conference that satisfy the interests of the alliances.

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This cannot, however, bring a non-alliance State to total self-denial. With an active quota the members of NATO who underline their firm common position and their intensive cooperation would in reality dispose of 16 times the right to request inspections that Austria would possess. One cannot argue that this is the political reality of the existence of alliances: to the contrary, political reality requests that each and every State has so many rights of request as it itself considers necessary in order to safeguard its own security interests. This can only be judged by the concerned country itself. A restriction of the obligation to accept an inspection by introducing passive quotas would in itself be bad enough: an additional explicit limitation even of the right to put forward a request by establishing active quotas has nothing to do neither with an effective, workable verification system nor with the fundamental principles of the CSCE and would not be in line with the interests of my country.

Passive quotas with their lack of a right of refusal and thus the inherent danger of a possible abuse of inspections present in our view shortcomings in a verification system. This is particularly true for smaller non-alliance States. The seemingly intended restriction of the right to request inspections to the passive quota will be another deficiency of this system which we perhaps also will have to live with.

But the necessity to alleviate such deficiencies of the joint NATO-WP-approach gives increased importance to an element contained in SC.7, that is the presence of a third State during the conduct of an inspection.

The invitation of a third State by the requested State introduces a cooperative element of confidence-building into the verification system: in the case of misunderstandings or frictions between the requesting and the requested State during the practical conduct of the inspection a third party would through its mere presence constitute a moderating influence. The



representatives of a third State would not be inspectors themselves but follow and observe the entire inspection. The invitation would not create any administrative difficulties and would not hinder the conduct of the inspection. Austria considers this element of cooperation as particularly important for reducing the block-to-block-character of the emerging inspection system and thereby for strengthening the element of confidence-building in the interest of the longer-term CDE-development.

The participation of a third State upon invitation by the requested State also provides some reassurance for a smaller State which does not rely for its security on membership in an alliance, in case an unjustified inspection request were used for an attempt to exert pressure on such a State. The presence of a third party would have a certain counter-balancing effect. And I wish to repeat: the inspection system is not valid only for seasons of political good weather.

In addition to the purpose of verifying CSBM-compliance - an aim that passive quotas can achieve only to a limited extent - the motive of gaining experience is sometimes mentioned as an argument for the introduction of a somewhat limited verification system. Particularly for this reason the limited passive quotas should be used in the best possible way in order to permit a broad distribution of experience amongst the participating States. After all it is not only of interest to the requesting State if an inspection were to prove CSEM-non-compliance. This broader possibility to gain experience by inviting a third party so as to have both members and non-members of alliances present during an inspection would be a desirable collateral effect of the inclusion of a third State.

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In order to attain the aims mentioned above the choice of the invited third party must be left to the requested State. However, the obligation to invite a third participating State ought to be well defined: Measures agreed in Stockholm have to be politically binding and should therefore not be left to the discretion of the participating States. Otherwise we would fall back into a situation such as for example the observation system of the Final Act where some States invited more often than others, which is precisely what the Madrid Mandate wanted to exclude. Whether the invitation is accepted or not is another question: SC.7 does not want to force any State to accept an invitation if in a particular situation it does not feel like doing so.

Mr. Chairman,  
for the reasons indicated above Austria is particularly interested in the participation of a third State in inspections. We are therefore encouraged that this idea has e.g. been taken up very positively in recent declarations made by State Minister Renton and the Spanish Head of Delegation. We have also noticed with satisfaction that this concept is under active consideration in the relevant working body of the Conference.

We would therefore hope, Mr. Chairman, that this important element submitted by the N+E in their proposal SC.7 will find its place in the drafting of the principles and modalities of inspection which is now under way.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman

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S E C R E T STOCKHOLM 06717

SUBJECT: ON THE VERIFICATION FRONT: WEEK ONE OF THE FINAL ROUND

1. CDE XII - 021
2. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY. THE SOVIETS' ANNOUNCED READINESS AT THE OPENING PLENARY TO ACCEPT A PROVISION FOR OBLIGATORY ON-SITE INSPECTION WAS FOLLOWED BY A WEEK OF SOVIETS' STONEWALLING AND NNAS' COMPLICATING OF WESTERN EFFORTS TO DRAFT EFFECTIVE INSPECTION MODALITIES. THE SOVIETS CLEARLY HAVE NO INTEREST IN EFFECTIVE MODALITIES AND PROBABLY INTEND TO PRESENT THE US WITH A BERN-LIKE DILEMMA ON 19 SEPTEMBER: AN AGREEMENT WITH MUSHY INSPECTION MODALITIES OR NO AGREEMENT AT ALL. THE LACK OF DRAFTING PROGRESS AT THE END OF WEEK ONE HAS RAISED ALLIED ANXIETIES AND IS COMPLICATING OUR ABILITY TO MAINTAIN A COHERENT TACTICAL NEGOTIATING APPROACH. THE NNA ARE IN DISARRAY, DISMAYED IF NOT OUTRAGED AT THE PROSPECT OF AN INSPECTION REGIME WITH NO RIGHT OF REFUSAL. KEY ISSUES BOUND TO CONFRONT US EARLY IN WEEK TWO ARE RESTRICTED AREAS, AERIAL INSPECTION AND THIRD PARTY PARTICIPATION. END SUMMARY.
4. SOVIETS AND THEIR INSPECTION PROPOSAL. SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY MADE HEADLINES WITH HIS STATEMENT IN THE OPENING PLENARY (8/19/86) OF EASTERN READINESS TO ACCEPT ON-SITE INSPECTION. GRINEVSKY SPOKE OF INSPECTION IN THE FORM OF A PASSIVE QUOTA SYSTEM WHICH WOULD LIMIT EACH STATE'S LIABILITY TO NO MORE THAN TWO INSPECTIONS PER YEAR. PRIVATELY, THE SOVIETS HAVE INDICATED, WITHOUT MUCH ELABORATION, THAT THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO ENTERTAIN A COMBINED ACTIVE AND PASSIVE QUOTA SYSTEM. AS THE WEEK ENDED LITTLE DOUBT REMAINED THAT THE SOVIETS WILL ATTEMPT TO FRUSTRATE OUR EFFORTS TO DEVELOP MEANINGFUL MODALITIES FOR AN EFFECTIVE INSPECTION REGIME; THE ATTAINABILITY OF SUCH MODALITIES IS STILL AN OPEN QUESTION.
5. A PASSIVE QUOTA SYSTEM, AS SOVIET DELEGATES EXPLAIN IT, WOULD EQUALIZE THE EXPOSURE OF ALL PARTICIPANTS TO ON-SITE INSPECTION. TO THE SOVIETS, IT HAS THE OBVIOUS APPEAL OF A FAR LOWER POTENTIAL NUMBER OF INSPECTIONS OF THE USSR THAN THE NO-LIMIT APPROACH OF SC.7 OR THE COLLECTIVE THREAT OF 16 NATO INSPECTIONS, THE NUMBER IMPLICIT IN THE CURRENT WESTERN POSITION. THE GRINEVSKY SCHEME WOULD LIMIT THE USSR'S VULNERABILITY TO A MAXIMUM OF TWO INSPECTIONS PER YEAR. A COMBINED EQUAL ACTIVE-PASSIVE QUOTA SYSTEM, MENTIONED PRIVATELY BY ONE SOVIET DELEGATE AS A POSSIBILITY, COULD COMPENSATE FOR THE DISPARITY IN THE SIZE OF NATO AND THE WTO, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME PRESERVING A COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING OF INSPECTION ENTITLEMENTS. IN THE EXAMPLE PROVIDED BY THE SOVIETS, THE THREE ACTIVE QUOTA

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WOULD MEAN THAT NATO COULD CONDUCT 48 INSPECTIONS OF THE WTO ANNUALLY; THE SEVEN-MEMBER WTO'S ACTUAL COLLECTIVE VULNERABILITY WOULD BE LIMITED, HOWEVER, THROUGH THE PASSIVE QUOTA BRAKE, TO 21 INSPECTIONS. THE THREE ACTIVE QUOTA WOULD LIMIT WTO INSPECTIONS OF NATO TO A SIMILAR NUMBER. (COMMENT: WE HAVE NOT YET EXPLORED THESE CONCEPTS EXTENSIVELY WITH SOVIET REPS LEST THE SUBJECT OF QUOTAS DOMINATE DISCUSSIONS IN THE DRAFTING SESSIONS. BESIDES THAT, AT LEAST ONE ALLY AND SEVERAL NNA HAVE ALREADY COME OUT AGAINST ANY ACTIVE QUOTA AT ALL. END COMMENT)

6. NO RIGHT OF REFUSAL. IN A PRESS CONFERENCE FOLLOWING THE PLENARY GRINEVSKY STRESSED THAT INSPECTION UNDER THE SOVIET PASSIVE QUOTA PROPOSAL WOULD BE OBLIGATORY. STATES WOULD HAVE TO ACCEDE TO REQUESTS FOR AN INSPECTION SO LONG AS THEIR QUOTAS WERE NOT EXHAUSTED. IN BOTH HIS PLENARY AND PRESS CONFERENCE STATEMENTS, HOWEVER, GRINEVSKY ADDED A PRECONDITION. ONLY ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION WOULD BE SUBJECT TO INSPECTION; THESE HE IDENTIFIED AS MANEUVERS, MOVEMENTS AND TRANSFERS. THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT, HE EMPHASIZED, WAS INCOMPATIBLE WITH INSPECTION. TO ILLUSTRATE WHAT HE TERMED THE ABSURDITY OF THE CONCEPT, GRINEVSKY CITED THE POSSIBILITY THAT IT WOULD ALLOW FOR INSPECTION OF TROOPS ENGAGED IN FLOOD RELIEF. (COMMENT: GRINEVSKY'S PRECONDITION PRESUMES INSPECTING STATES HAVE NO DIFFICULTY DISCERNING WHETHER OR NOT AN ACTIVITY CONSTITUTES A MANEUVER, MOVEMENT OR TRANSFER, BUT MAY HAVE LEGITIMATE QUESTIONS AS TO WHETHER AGREED THRESHOLDS FOR THESE ACTIVITIES ARE MET OR EXCEEDED. THE PRECONDITION ILLUSTRATES THE ADVANTAGE OF THE OUT-OF-GARRISON APPROACH WHICH WOULD REQUIRE A DETERMINATION ONLY THAT TROOPS EQUIPPED FOR COMBAT ARE NOT IN GARRISON AND NOT THAT THEY ARE ENGAGED IN A SPECIFIC ACTIVITY WHOSE CHARACTERISTICS MAY BE DIFFICULT, FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE, TO DEFINE OR DISCERN. HOWEVER THE SOVIETS HAVE SHOWN SOME READINESS TO ACCOMMODATE THIS CONCERN THROUGH A COMPREHENSIVE DEFINITION OF NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES WHICH WOULD ADDRESS THE PROBLEM. END COMMENT)

7. IN THE DRAFTING TRENCHES. THIS WEEK'S EXERCISE PORTENDS A DOWN-TO-THE WIRE STRUGGLE IF WE ARE TO GET AN INSPECTION REGIME WHICH MEETS OUR REQUIREMENTS. IN OUR FIRST ATTEMPTS AT DRAFTING MODALITIES, WE MADE IT EXPLICIT AT THE OUTSET THAT WE WOULD INSIST ON AIR INSPECTION AND INTENDED TO ESTABLISH PROVISIONS WHICH WOULD BE SUITABLE FOR BOTH GROUND AND AERIAL INSPECTION. THE SOVIETS STONEWALLED, ACCUSING US OF LINKING ACCEPTANCE OF AERIAL INSPECTION TO MOVEMENT ON THE DRAFTING OF MODALITIES FOR GROUND INSPECTION.

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8. IN THEIR OWN "CONTRIBUTIONS" TO DRAFTING, THE SOVIETS MADE SELECTIVE USE OF SC.1. THEIR SNIPPETS WERE DESIGNED TO PRECLUDE MODALITIES FOR AN AERIAL OPTION, AND ATTEMPTS BY THE WEST TO PRESERVE THE ORIGINAL CONTEXT WERE EFFECTIVELY THWARTED. INITIAL INDICATIONS OF SOVIET READINESS TO DRAFT ON THE TIMING OF A RESPONSE TO A REQUEST FOR AN INSPECTION, ENTRY ONTO TERRITORY OF THE INSPECTED STATE, ARRIVAL AT THE SPECIFIED AREA AND DURATION OF THE INSPECTION, AS WELL AS ON THE COMPOSITION OF THE INSPECTION TEAMS, FAILED TO MATERIALIZE IN RECORDED TEXT. AT ONE POINT THE SOVIETS ALSO SEEMED READY TO AGREE THAT THE ACTUAL CONDUCT OF THE INSPECTION COULD BEGIN NO LATER THAN 24 HOURS AFTER THE INITIAL REQUEST. A DAY LATER THEY BACKTRACKED AND ATTEMPTED TO TACK ON A 12 HOUR BUFFER WHICH WOULD HAVE MEANT 36 HOURS BEFORE THE START OF AN INSPECTION.

9. NNA REACTION TO PASSIVE QUOTA PROPOSAL. THE NNA ARE IN DISARRAY, DISMAYED IF NOT OUTRAGED AT THE PROSPECT OF AN INSPECTION REGIME WHICH, FROM THEIR PERSPECTIVE, WOULD MAKE THEM MORE VULNERABLE TO INSPECTION THAN WOULD SC. 1 OR THEIR OWN PROPOSAL. THE SWEDES, WHO ARE THE AUTHORS OF THE SC.7 APPROACH TO VERIFICATION, ARE LEADING THE OUTCRY WITH THE AUSTRIANS CLOSE BEHIND. NN CRITICISMS HAVE RANGED FROM PRIVATELY MADE ALLEGATIONS OF SOVIET-US COLLUSION IN PROMOTING THE PASSIVE QUOTA CONCEPT TO A SERIES OF ARGUMENTS BASED ON SC.7 THEOLOGY. FOR INSTANCE, THEY SAY THAT QUOTAS ON THE RIGHT TO INSPECT, WHETHER ACTIVELY IMPOSED OR PASSIVELY LIMITED, ARE INCOMPATIBLE WITH EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION AND NOT RESPONSIVE TO THE MANDATE.

10. NNA ARGUMENTS, HOWEVER, BELIE THE REAL CONCERNS. THE PASSIVE QUOTA SYSTEM WITH ITS NO RIGHT OF REFUSAL, IN THE NNA VIEW, WOULD MAKE INSPECTIONS OF THEIR OWN TERRITORIES AND ACTIVITIES MORE LIKELY THAN WOULD SC.7 OR NATO'S ACTIVE QUOTA-CUM-NO-RIGHT-OF-REFUSAL APPROACH. THE SOVIET PROPOSAL WOULD NOT ONLY PROSCRIBE REFUSAL BUT ALSO ROB THE NNA OF ANOTHER SC.7 SAFEGUARD, THE REQUIREMENT TO JUSTIFY AN INSPECTION. IN THE NNA VIEW, THE SOVIETS COULD NOT CREDIBLY SUBSTANTIATE A REQUEST FOR AN INSPECTION OF AN NN STATE ON THE GROUNDS STIPULATED IN SC.7, VIZ., THREAT TO THE USSR'S NATIONAL SECURITY. THE PASSIVE QUOTA PROPOSAL WOULD OFFER NO SUCH PROVISION. THE PASSIVE APPROACH ALSO WOULD NOT PROVIDE FOR THE INCENTIVE IN SC.1 FOR WTO AND NATO STATES TO CONSERVE ONE'S LIMITED NUMBER OF CHALLENGES TO INSPECT FOR CONTINGENCIES INVOLVING THE OTHER'S ARMED FORCES. PASSIVE QUOTAS, THE NNA FEAR, WOULD INVITE INSPECTION BECAUSE THE OPPORTUNITY IS THERE. THE PASSIVE APPROACH WOULD ALSO ENHANCE MOSCOW'S

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ABILITY TO DETER THE NN FROM REQUESTING INSPECTION OF SOVIET TERRITORY THROUGH INTIMIDATION, I.E., THE PROSPECT OF RECIPROCAL INSPECTIONS. A FINAL, LEGITIMATE NNA CONCERN IS THAT STATES WITH NTMS WOULD LIKELY HAVE FIRST CRACK AT EXHAUSTING AVAILABLE INSPECTION QUOTAS BECAUSE SUCH STATES ARE BEST EQUIPPED TO DETECT ACTIVITIES WHICH MAY WARRANT INVESTIGATION.

11. THE NN SCRAMBLE TO PROTECT THEIR OWN SPECIFIC INTERESTS HAS RESULTED IN A NUMBER OF SCHEMES WHICH HAVE BEEN FLOATED DURING THE WEEK. GENERALLY THESE RUN ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES:

. -- OBSERVATION UPON REQUEST FOR USE ONLY BY THE NNA WITH THE CONCOMITANT RIGHT OF REFUSAL AND REQUIREMENT TO JUSTIFY AND A PASSIVE QUOTA SYSTEM FOR USE BY THE TWO MILITARY BLOCS BETWEEN THEMSELVES. THIS HAS NOW DIED AS A RESULT OF EASTERN AND WESTERN REFUSAL TO CONSIDER IT.

. -- A RIGHT TO REQUEST INSPECTION AFTER THE PASSIVE QUOTA HAS BEEN USED UP, BUT WITH THE NEED TO JUSTIFY AND THE RIGHT TO REFUSE. WE HAVE BEEN EQUALLY HOSTILE TO THIS, BUT SO FAR TO NO AVAIL.

12. SPECIFIC KEY ISSUES. THE FOLLOWING ISSUES WILL CONFRONT US THIS WEEK AND OUR ABILITY TO RESOLVE THEM SOON WILL DETERMINE TO A LARGE EXTENT OUR CHANCES OF DRAFTING MODALITIES ALONG THE LINES AND AT THE PACE WE DESIRE.

. -- RESTRICTED AREAS. THE ALLIANCE WHICH HAS NO FULLY DEVELOPED POSITION HAS FOUND ITSELF IN THE AWKWARD POSITION OF HAVING TO SAY THANKS BUT NO THANKS TO THE SOVIET OFFER TO DRAFT EXCEPTIONS LANGUAGE ON THE BASIS OF SC.1. A SOLUTION, HOWEVER, IS IN THE WORKS. LATE LAST WEEK THE TURKISH DELEGATE ACTING ON INSTRUCTIONS OFFERED US A FLEXIBLE FORMULA (REPORTED SEPTEL) WHICH WILL PERMIT US TO SMOKE OUT THE SOVIETS ON THIS ISSUE WELL BEFORE THE ELEVENTH HOUR. THE TURKS WILL SUPPORT A POSITIVE APPROACH, VIZ., AREAS THAT WILL NOT BE RESTRICTED.

. -- AERIAL INSPECTION. THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM IS OF THE ALLIANCE'S OWN DOING. WE WILL ATTEMPT TO SOLVE IT HERE. THE FRENCH HAVE INFORMED US OF THEIR INSTRUCTIONS TO SUPPORT US FULLY ON THIS QUESTION. UNFORTUNATELY FRENCH DILIGENCE IS LIKELY TO BE HANDICAPPED BY THE FRENCH ASSESSMENT THAT AERIAL INSPECTION IS UNATTAINABLE. THE FRENCH MIL REP'S GAMEPLAN, ACCORDINGLY, IS TO ELICIT THE ANTICIPATED SOVIET REJECTION FORMALLY SO THAT WE CAN GET ON WITH DRAFTING GROUND INSPECTION MODALITIES. FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE THE SOVIETS HAVE AVOIDED SEVERAL CONVENIENT OPPORTUNITITES TO UTTER THE REJECTION. WE SURMISE MOSCOW HAS GIVEN ITS DELEGATION THE GREENLIGHT TO DELIVER IF WEST MAKES IT AN ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENT. A

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CALCULATED OUTCOME FOR THE SOVIETS WOULD BE AN ELEVENTH HOUR OFFER BUT WITH A SOVIET AIRCRAFT OR SOVIET PILOT CLAUSE. WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR AERIAL INSPECTION IS A REQUIREMENT FOR US AND A SOVIET AIRCRAFT OR PILOT OFFER WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE.

. -- THIRD PARTY PARTICIPATION. THE AUSTRIANS, BACKED BY SOME OTHER NNA, HAVE PROPOSED THAT INSPECTED STATES SHOULD HAVE THE OBLIGATION TO INVITE A THIRD PARTY TO OBSERVE AN INSPECTION BUT NOT REPORT ON IT). WE HAVE BEEN ARGUING THAT THIS WOULD FORCE THE NNA TO TAKE SIDES IN EAST-WEST DISPUTES OVER INSPECTION. THIS ARGUMENT HAS SWAYED SOME NNAS -- ESPECIALLY INFLUENTIAL FINLAND. BUT IN ORDER TO CONTROL THIS PROBLEM WE MAY HAVE TO AGREE TO WHAT IS SELF-EVIDENT IN ANY CASE -- THAT AN INSPECTING STATE MAY IF IT WISHES VOLUNTEER TO INVITE A THIRD PARTY TO OBSERVE. MEANWHILE OUR ARGUMENT HAS BEEN THAT PROVIDING AN AIRCRAFT AND CREW WOULD GIVE THE NEUTRALS A NON-CONTROVERSIAL BUT CRUCIAL ROLE IN AN INSPECTION REGIME WITHOUT CREATING BAD PRECEDENTS FOR THE FUTURE.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 06723

SUBJECT: TRANSLATION PROBLEMS WITH A CDE CONCLUDING  
- DOCUMENTREF: A) STOCKHOLM 5861, B) STOCKHOLM 3681,  
- C) STOCKHOLM 692, D) 85 STOCKHOLM 8697.  
- E) 85 STOCKHOLM 870

1. CDE XII - 022

2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

3. BEGIN SUMMARY: IN LIGHT OF PAST EXPERIENCE IN CSCE AND OTHER FORA WITH LAST MINUTE SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO OBTAIN SUBSTANTIVE ADVANTAGE IN THE RUSSIAN TRANSLATION OF AGREED TEXTS, USDEL IS MAKING EVERY EFFORT TO ENSURE THAT OFFICIAL TRANSLATIONS ARE AVAILABLE IN ALL CSCE LANGUAGES BEFORE ANY DOCUMENT IS AGREED ON SEPTEMBER 19. WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT WE ARE NEITHER PREPARED TO EXTEND THE CDE'S WORK SCHEDULE BEYOND SEPTEMBER 19 TO ALLOW FOR TRANSLATION, NOR TO AGREE ON ANY DOCUMENT ON SEPTEMBER 19 IN THE ABSENCE OF OFFICIAL TRANSLATIONS, PARTICULARLY IN RUSSIAN. AT NATO'S URGING, THE CONFERENCE SECRETARIAT HAS AGREED TO BEGIN TRANSLATING ALREADY NOTED TEXTS FOR DELEGATIONS' REVIEW AND WE WILL PRESS THE SECRETARIAT TO ENSURE THAT THE RUSSIAN TRANSLATORS ARE NOT ALLOWED TO STALL THIS PROCESS. FOR PRACTICAL AS WELL AS SUBSTANTIVE REASONS, HOWEVER, THIS WILL NOT BE AN EASY TASK AND MAY PROVE IMPOSSIBLE IF MUCH OF THE TEXT IS AGREED ONLY IN THE FINAL HOURS. USDEL WILL REQUIRE STRONG RUSSIAN LANGUAGE SUPPORT FROM WASHINGTON IF WE ARE TO ACHIEVE OUR OBJECTIVE. END SUMMARY.

4. IT IS USDEL'S OBJECTIVE TO HAVE ANY CDE DOCUMENT AVAILABLE IN ALL SIX OFFICIAL CSCE LANGUAGES, PARTICULARLY RUSSIAN, BEFORE IT IS AGREED ON SEPTEMBER 19. AS THE DEPARTMENT IS AWARE AND AS WE HAVE OUTLINED IN A NUMBER OF PREVIOUS MESSAGES (REFTELS) THERE HAVE BEEN RECURRING PROBLEMS IN RUSSIAN INTERPRETATION AND TRANSLATION HERE IN STOCKHOLM WHICH HAVE HAD SUBSTANTIVE AS WELL AS LINGUISTIC IMPORT. AS AT PAST CSCE CONFERENCES, THE SECRETARIAT'S RUSSIAN LANGUAGE INTERPRETERS AND TRANSLATORS ARE ALL EMPLOYEES OF THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY AND, AS SUCH, OFTEN ANSWER TO MOSCOW'S WISHES RATHER THAN THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY'S. IN STOCKHOLM WE HAVE SEEN THE SOVIET TRANSLATORS DELIBERATELY PUT A SOVIET TWIST ON SUCH KEY MILITARY TERMS AS "CONSTRAINTS," "GARRISON" AND "GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES." SUCH PROBLEMS HAVE NOT BEEN CONFINED TO STOCKHOLM: AT THE MADRID CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING IN 1983, THE SOVIET INTERPRETERS DELIBERATELY DELAYED TRANSLATION OF THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT UNTIL THE LAST MINUTE, IN AN EFFORT TO TWIST A RUSHED TRANSLATION JOB TO THE USSR'S ADVANTAGE; THE PROBLEM MAY BE MORE SERIOUS WITH GERMAN, WHERE THE TWO GERMANIES TRADITIONALLY ARGUE VIGOROUSLY ABOUT THE CORRECT RENDERING OF COMPLEX TEXTS INTO ONE LANGUAGE

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DIVIDED NOT ONLY BY IDEOLOGY BUT BY WORKING FROM THE ENGLISH OR RUSSIAN VERSIONS OF THE TEXT.

5. BEYOND THE SUBSTANTIVE DIFFICULTIES, THE TRANSLATION ISSUE IS ALSO PRESENTING SOME ADMINISTRATIVE AND PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS. AT MADRID IT TOOK THREE WEEKS TO PREPARE THE TRANSLATIONS OF THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT. HERE IN STOCKHOLM, WHERE A DOCUMENT IN ITS ENTIRETY MAY NOT BE READY UNTIL THE LAST DAY OF THE CONFERENCE, THE TASK OF HAVING ALL TRANSLATIONS IN ORDER AND AGREED BY SEPTEMBER 19 WILL BE NEARLY IMPOSSIBLE IF KEY ELEMENTS ARE NOT DECIDED UNTIL THE LAST MINUTE. IN FACT, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY HAS CLAIMED THAT HE CANNOT HAVE ALL TRANSLATIONS READY BY THE SEPTEMBER 19 ADJOURNMENT DATE UNLESS THE COMPLETED TEXT IS GIVEN TO HIM BY SEPTEMBER 1. WHILE WE TAKE THIS SUPPOSED TIMETABLE WITH A GENEROUS GRAIN OF SALT, IT IS INDICATIVE OF THE NEED TO BEGIN THE TRANSLATION JOB NOW WITH THE TEXTS WHICH HAVE ALREADY BEEN NOTED, RATHER THAN WAITING FOR THE ENTIRE PACKAGE TO BE READY AS THE SECRETARIAT HAS SEEMED INCLINED TO DO.

6. WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR TO OUR INTERLOCUTORS THAT, WITH MANY OF THE DIFFICULT SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES STILL BEFORE US, WE MUST AVOID HAVING MAJOR LINGUISTIC PROBLEMS CROP UP ON SEPTEMBER 19 AS WELL. AND IN LIGHT OF THE RATHER RELAXED ATTITUDE AMONG MANY DELEGATIONS TOWARD ALLOWING TRANSLATION WORK TO GO ON BEYOND SEPTEMBER 19, WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR: 1) THAT WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO EXTEND THE WORK PROGRAM FOR SO CALLED "TOILETTAGE"; AND 2) THAT WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO AGREE TO ANY DOCUMENT ON SEPTEMBER 19 UNLESS WE HAVE AGREED TO ALL OFFICIAL TRANSLATIONS, PARTICULARLY IN RUSSIAN AND GERMAN. THIS POINT HAS BEEN ACKNOWLEDGED BY OUR SWEDISH HOSTS, WHO ARE ANXIOUS TO AVOID ANY IMPEDIMENTS TO A SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF "THEIR" CONFERENCE, AND BY OUR NATO ALLIES. IN RESPONSE TO SEVERAL ALLIED APPROACHES THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY INSTRUCTED SECRETARIAT TRANSLATORS TO BEGIN IMMEDIATELY TO TRANSLATE THE COORDINATORS' NOTEBOOK TEXTS AND PROVIDE THEM TO INTERESTED DELEGATIONS. SOME OF THE TEXTS WILL BE AVAILABLE FROM COORDINATORS THIS WEEK AND THE NATO CAUCUS HAS SET UP A NATO LANGUAGE EXPERTS GROUP TO REVIEW THE SECRETARIAT'S TRANSLATIONS AS THEY BECOME AVAILABLE.

7. TO ACHIEVE OUR TRANSLATION OBJECTIVE, WE INTEND TO KEEP THE PRESSURE ON THE SECRETARIAT TO ENSURE THAT THE TRANSLATORS MOVE PROMPTLY, AND ON OUR ALLIES TO PREVENT OPEN WAVERING ON THE SEPTEMBER 19 ADJOURNMENT DATE AND EXPEDITE WORK ON TEXTS. WE WILL ALSO REQUIRE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE SUPPORT FROM WASHINGTON, AND FOR THIS PURPOSE WE WILL CONTINUE TO TRANSMIT ENGLISH TEXTS AS THEY ARE NOTED. WE WILL ALSO PROVIDE RUSSIAN TEXTS BY POUCH TO WASHINGTON AS THEY BECOME AVAILABLE TO US (UNFORTUNATELY, WE DO NOT HAVE A CYRILLIC SCRIPT FACILITY ON EITHER THE

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DELEGATION WORD PROCESSORS OR TYPEWRITERS). UNDER THE  
BEST OF CIRCUMSTANCES, OBTAINING COMPLETED OFFICIAL  
TRANSLATIONS IN ALL CSCE LANGUAGES BY SEPTEMBER 19 WILL  
NOT BE EASY AND MAY BE IMPOSSIBLE IF MUCH OF THE TEXT IS  
AGREED IN THE FINAL HOURS.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 06721  
 SUBJECT: NOTED TEXT IN B1 (NOTIFICATION)

1. CDE XII - 023
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. FOLLOWING ARE TWO TEXTS NOTED IN WORKING GROUP B1 TODAY (8/26/86).

BEGIN TEXT ONE:

THE ENGAGEMENT OF FORMATIONS OF LAND FORCES OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES IN A TRANSFER FROM OUTSIDE THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS TO ARRIVAL POINTS IN THE ZONE, OR FROM INSIDE THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS TO POINTS OF CONCENTRATION IN THE ZONE, TO PARTICIPATE IN A NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITY OR TO BE CONCENTRATED. THE ARRIVAL OR CONCENTRATION OF THESE FORCES WILL BE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION WHENEVER IT INVOLVES . . .

FORCES WHICH HAVE BEEN TRANSFERRED INTO THE ZONE WILL BE SUBJECT TO ALL PROVISIONS OF AGREED CSBMS WHEN THEY DEPART THEIR ARRIVAL POINTS TO PARTICIPATE IN A NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITY OR CONCENTRATION WITHIN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS.

AGREEMENT ON THIS TEXT IS PROVISIONAL PENDING RESOLUTION OF OTHER ISSUES, INCLUDING NOTABLY THE QUESTION OF EXCEPTIONS. END TEXT.

NOTE: THERE IS NO FINAL AGREEMENT ON WHERE THE EXCEPTION PROVISIONS FOR FORCES NORMALLY STATIONED OUTSIDE THE ZONE WILL BE PLACED. GENERAL CONSENSUS WOULD PUT THE LANGUAGE IN AN EXCEPTIVE PARAGRAPH. THE ADDENDUM "AGREEMENT ON THIS TEXT . . . EXCEPTIONS" IS NOT PART OF THE NOTED TEXT BUT IS ADDED IN ITALICS, WITHOUT STATUS, AT THE BOTTOM OF THE PAGE. END NOTE.

BEGIN TEXT TWO:

THE START AND END DATES OF EACH PHASE (TRANSFERS, DEPLOYMENT, CONCENTRATION OF FORCES, ACTIVE EXERCISE PHASE, RECOVERY PHASE) OF ACTIVITIES IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS OF PARTICIPATING FORMATIONS, THE TACTICAL PURPOSE AND CORRESPONDING GEOGRAPHIC AREAS (DELIMITED BY GEOGRAPHICAL COORDINATES) FOR EACH PHASE. AGREEMENT ON THIS TEXT IS PROVISIONAL PENDING RESOLUTION OF OTHER ISSUES, INCLUDING NOTABLY THE QUESTION OF EXCEPTIONS. END TEXT.

NOTE: AS WITH TEXT ONE, THE ADDENDUM TO TEXT TWO HAS NO STATUS. END NOTE.

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END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 06779

SUBJECT: CDE: SPECIFIED AREAS FOR  
INSPECTIONS/RESTRICTED AREAS

REFS: (A) STOCKHOLM 5710, (B) STOCKHOLM 6722

1. CDE XII - 24.
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. AS INDICATED REF (A), US DEL HAS PURSUED THE IDEA OF A "POSITIVE" APPROACH TO THE QUESTION OF AREAS TO BE SPECIFIED FOR AN INSPECTION IN THE CONTEXT OF ANY CDE AGREEMENT. FOLLOWING INTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES, INCLUDING TURKEY (REF (B)), GENERAL SUPPORT HAS EMERGED FOR THE IDEA THAT NATO SHOULD, FOR THE PURPOSES OF CDE, TAKE A "POSITIVE APPROACH" TO THE QUESTION OF RESTRICTED AREAS, ( I.E. WHAT CAN BE COVERED IN AN INSPECTION). LANGUAGE RESULTING FROM THESE SMALL GROUP CONSULTATIONS WHICH REFLECTS THIS APPROACH WAS CIRCULATED FOR CONSIDERATION IN THE NATO CLUSTER CAUCUS TASKED WITH THE VERIFICATION ISSUES ON AUGUST 26. CDE/NATO RECOGNIZES THE URGENT NEED TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE AND HAS AGREED TO REFER LANGUAGE REFLECTING THIS APPROACH (SEE TEXT BELOW) TO CAPITALS FOR COMMENT AND SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION WITHIN THE RELEVANT NATO CLUSTER NO LATER THAN FRIDAY, OPENING OF BUSINESS, AUGUST 29. THE LANGUAGE ITSELF IS DESIGNED TO FOCUS NATO COUNTRIES ON THE "POSITIVE" APPROACH IN ORDER TO DEVELOP AN AGREED ALLIANCE POSITION THAT CAN SERVE AS THE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS. US DEL BELIEVES THAT LANGUAGE BEING CONSIDERED REFLECTS THE WESTERN APPROACH TO THE QUESTION OF "SPECIFIED AREAS" AND WHICH, IF IT PROVED ACCEPTABLE IN THE CONFERENCE, WOULD BE A GOOD OUTCOME ON THIS ISSUE. LANGUAGE IS AS FOLLOWS:  
BEGIN TEXT.

"AREA FOR INSPECTION. FOR THE PURPOSE OF VERIFYING COMPLIANCE WITH AGREED CSBMS, AN INSPECTING STATE IS PERMITTED TO DESIGNATE THE AREA IN WHICH AN INSPECTION IS TO BE CARRIED OUT ON THE TERRITORY OF A PARTICIPATING STATE WITHIN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS. SUCH AN AREA WILL BE REFERRED TO AS A "SPECIFIED AREA." THE SPECIFIED AREA WILL INCLUDE, INTER ALIA, TRAINING AREAS AND TERRAIN WHERE ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION CAN BE CONDUCTED. IN A SPECIFIED AREA THE INSPECTING STATE WILL BE PERMITTED ACCESS, ENTRY AND UNOBSTRUCTED SURVEY EXCEPT FOR SENSITIVE POINTS (E.G., DRAW FROM SC.1/AMPLIFIED/MEASURE FIVE/LANGUAGE IN PARA 7, SUB-PARAS (A) AND (B)) TO WHICH ACCESS BY THE GENERAL PUBLIC IS NORMALLY RESTRICTED OR DENIED AND PERMANENTLY RESTRICTED AREAS WHICH SHALL BE AS LIMITED IN SIZE AND NUMBER AS POSSIBLE AND SHALL NOT INCLUDE TRAINING OR OTHER AREAS WHERE NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES CAN

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TAKE PLACE."

END TEXT.

4. DELEGATION WILL CONTINUE TO WORK WITH OTHERS FIRST  
WITHIN NATO, AND THEN IN THE CONFERENCE, ON BOTH  
SECURING SUPPORT FOR THIS APPROACH AND ON SPECIFIC  
LANGUAGE REFLECTING IT IN ORDER TO MEET OUR OBJECTIVES  
(SEE REF A).

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END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 06782  
SUBJECT: FRG AND CDE ADJOURNMENT  
REFS: A) FBIS LONDON 261341Z AUG 86; B) STATE 249735;  
C) STOCKHOLM 6465  
1. CDE XII - 25  
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.  
3. REMARKS BY FRG MINISTER OF STATE STAVENHAGEN THAT  
CDE MIGHT BE EXTENDED BEYOND SEPTEMBER 19 (REF A)  
REFLECTS CONSTANT THEME OF FRG DELEGATION HERE IN  
STOCKHOLM. US POSITION REMAINS FIRM THAT SEPTEMBER 19  
IS THE DEADLINE AND CANNOT BE EXTENDED (REF B).  
REQUEST EMBASSY BONN AT EARLIEST APPROPRIATE  
OPPORTUNITY REITERATE TO FRG MFA US POSITION THAT CDE  
MUST ADJOURN AS SCHEDULED ON SEPTEMBER 19 (REF C).  
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END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 06783

SUBJECT: OUT OF GARRISON IN CDE

REF: STOCKHOLM 06721, 06677

1. CDE XII - 6.
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY: DESPITE ABSENCE OF WORDS "OUT OF GARRISON" IN THE TEXTS NOTED TO DATE, THE OUT OF GARRISON CONCEPT IS FIRMLY EMBEDDED IN THE TEXT WHICH HAS NOW BEEN NOTED. IT IS THE COMBINATION OF THE NOTED TEXTS DEALING WITH TYPES OF ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED AND THAT DEALING WITH INFORMATION TO BE SUPPLIED IN THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION WHICH OPERATIONALIZES THE CONCEPT. END SUMMARY
4. NUMEROUS U.S./SOVIET BILATERAL MEETINGS COUPLED WITH EXCELLENT SUPPORT FROM THE FRENCH AND OTHER DELEGATIONS RESULTED IN SOVIET RECOGNITION THAT THE WEST WOULD NOT SETTLE FOR LESS THAN A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES, ALTHOUGH THEY CONSISTENTLY REJECTED ANY REFERENCE TO "OUT-OF-GARRISON" OR "NORMAL PEACETIME LOCATIONS". IN THE BILATERAL AND WORKING GROUP DISCUSSIONS ON THIS ISSUE, USDEL SAW AN OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLOIT SOVIET ANXIOUSNESS TO OBTAIN AN AGREEMENT ON NOTIFYING THE ARRIVAL DATE FOR TROOPS ENTERING THE ZONE TO PARTICIPATE IN A NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITY (EXCLUDING TRANSITS FROM ANY NOTIFICATION REGIME) TO WORK A DEAL WHICH WOULD INCLUDE INFORMATIONAL ELEMENTS WHICH WOULD, IN FACT, BE AN EXPRESSION OF THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT. TO ACCOMPLISH THIS, ONE MAJOR LOOPHOLE HAD TO BE CLOSED, I.E., THE POSSIBILITY THAT TROOPS COULD BE MOVED SOMEWHERE AND REMAIN THERE WITHOUT CONDUCTING ANY EXERCISE ACTIVITY. THIS LOOPHOLE WAS CLOSED BY THE REQUIREMENT TO NOTIFY ANY CONCENTRATION OF TROOPS ABOVE THE THRESHOLD AFTER ANY MOVE FROM A GARRISON AREA IF THE CONCENTRATION ITSELF REACHED THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL. THUS, THE ACTUAL MOVE ITSELF IS NOT NOTIFIABLE, OBSERVABLE OR INSPECTABLE (EASING MONITORING PROBLEMS) BUT THE FACT THAT IF THEY STOP ANYWHERE, EITHER TO EXERCISE OR AS A HALT WHICH DE FACTO CREATES A CONCENTRATION OF FORCES, THE FACT THAT THEY WILL HAVE MOVED OUT OF THEIR GARRISONS IS NOTIFIABLE.
5. THE SOVIETS RELUCTANTLY AGREED THAT IN THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON EACH PHASE OF A NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITY (WHICH TAKES PLACE OUT OF GARRISON) WILL BE GIVEN:
  - THE START AND END DATES OF EACH PHASE (FURTHER DEFINED AS TRANSFER, DEPLOYMENT, CONCENTRATION OF FORCES, ACTIVE EXERCISE, AND RECOVERY), THEREBY COVERING THE ENTIRE PERIOD OF AN ACTIVITY WHICH TAKES PLACE AWAY FROM THE GARRISON AREA;
  - THE PURPOSE OF EACH PHASE;

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- EACH PHASE WILL BE DELIMITED VIA GEOGRAPHICAL COORDINATES.
6. THE EXACT LOCATION OF GARRISONS FROM WHICH FORCES WOULD DEPLOY TO TAKE PART IN AN ACTIVITY WOULD NOT BE GIVEN, BUT GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES WOULD DEFINE THE AREA IN WHICH THE GARRISONS ARE LOCATED.
7. THE COMPREHENSIVE NATURE OF THIS APPROACH, AGREED TO BY EAST AND WEST, HAS TROUBLED SOME NNA STATES, PARTICULARLY SWEDEN, WHICH HAD HOPED THAT DISPOSITION OF THEIR FORCES, ONCE MOBILIZED, COULD BE EXEMPTED FROM ANY NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT. THUS, FOR THE TIME BEING THEY HAVE ONLY PROVISIONALLY AGREED THAT THIS TEXT MIGHT BE NOTED PENDING A RESOLUTION OF WHAT TO DO WITH NNA FORCES ONCE THEY HAVE BEEN MOBILIZED. (COMMENT: NEITHER WE NOR ANY OF OUR ALLIES HAVE SHOWN ANY SYMPATHY TO THE SWEDISH CONCERNS. THE EAST APPEARS TO BE EQUALLY DISDAINFUL OF THE SWEDISH POSITION, WHICH, IN OUR VIEW IS UNSUSTAINABLE. END COMMENT)
8. ALLIED ACCEPTANCE OF THIS APPROACH TO ACHIEVING THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT HAS NOT COME EASILY. SOME HAVE DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING WHAT THEY PERCEIVE IS A NEW CONCEPT, OTHERS SMELL A U.S./SOVIET UNDERSTANDING FROM WHICH THEY WERE EXCLUDED. USDEL, WITH THE FIRM SUPPORT OF THE FRENCH, HAS BEEN ABLE TO GET CAUCUS CONSENSUS TO NOTE THE LANGUAGE, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE SOME LINGERING MISGIVINGS AMONG SOME, E.G., THE NETHERLANDS AND NORWAY.
9. WE SEE FURTHER POSSIBILITY OF STRENGTHENING OUR CASE ON OUT-OF-GARRISON IN A FINAL DOCUMENT BY FILLING IN THE ELIPSES IN TEXT ALREADY NOTED. USDEL WILL PURSUE THIS EFFORT WITH DILIGENCE.

BARRY  
END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 06800

SUBJECT: CDE--CONSTRAINING MEASURES

REF: STOCKHOLM 06518

1. CDE XII - 027.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY: THIS CABLE PROVIDES DETAILS OF A WESTERN "TIME" CONSTRAINT FOR USE IN THE CONFERENCE. END SUMMARY.
4. AS REPORTED REFTTEL, NATO HAS BEEN DEVELOPING AN AGREED APPROACH TO THE ISSUE OF "TIME" CONSTRAINTS. WE HAVE BEGUN DRAFTING ON THE ISSUE, ALTHOUGH AS YET WE HAVE NO AGREED LANGUAGE. THE FOLLOWING TEXT HAS BEEN AD REF AGREED BY THE US, UK, AND FRG AND IS GENERALLY SUPPORTED BY OTHER ALLIES. IT PROVIDES FOR THE FOLLOWING: 1) ACTIVITIES ABOVE 40,000 WILL BE FORECAST TWO YEARS IN ADVANCE; 2) NO ACTIVITIES ABOVE 75,000 WILL BE ALLOWED UNLESS THEY HAVE BEEN FORECAST TWO YEARS IN ADVANCE; 3) INSPECTION OF ANY ACTIVITY WHICH IS PRIOR NOTIFIED BUT NOT FORECAST SHALL NOT COUNT AGAINST ANY PARTICIPATING STATE'S PASSIVE QUOTA FOR INSPECTION; AND 4) EXCLUSION OF ALERTS FROM BOTH THE PRIOR FORECAST REQUIREMENT AND THE PASSIVE QUOTA EXEMPTION.
5. BEGIN TEXT:
  - I. EACH PARTICIPATING STATE WILL COMMUNICATE, IN WRITING, TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES, BY 15 NOV EACH YEAR, INFORMATION CONCERNING MILITARY ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION INVOLVING MORE THAN AN AGGREGATE TOTAL OF 40,000 TROOPS OR ..., WHICH IT PLANS TO CARRY OUT DURING THE SECOND SUBSEQUENT CALENDAR YEAR. SUCH COMMUNICATION WILL INCLUDE THE GENERAL PURPOSE, ENVISAGED TIMEFRAME AND DURATION, AREA, AND SIZE OF EACH ACTIVITY.
  - II. PARTICIPATING STATES WILL NOT CARRY OUT MILITARY ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION INVOLVING MORE THAN AN AGGREGATE TOTAL OF 75,000 TROOPS OR ..., UNLESS THEY HAVE BEEN THE OBJECT OF COMMUNICATION AS DEFINED IN THE PRECEDING PARAGRAPH.
  - III. IF A PARTICIPATING STATE CARRIES OUT MILITARY ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION IN ADDITION TO THOSE INCLUDED IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR OR THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN THE OBJECT OF COMMUNICATION AS DEFINED IN PARAGRAPH I ABOVE, INSPECTION OF SUCH ACTIVITIES SHALL NOT COUNT AGAINST ANY PARTICIPATING STATE'S PASSIVE QUOTA FOR INSPECTION."
 END TEXT.
6. COMMENT: WE EXPECT NO OPPOSITION TO THIS APPROACH WITHIN NATO BUT BELIEVE THE RELATIVELY LOW PARAMETERS WILL CAUSE DIFFICULTIES FOR BOTH EAST AND NNA. WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT THE PASSIVE QUOTA EXEMPTION WILL HELP SMOOTH RUFFLED NNA FEATHERS REGARDING THE

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ESTABLISHMENT OF A PASSIVE QUOTA. USDEL HAD HOPED TO INCLUDE ALERT ACTIVITIES ABOVE 75,000 IN THE EXEMPTION FROM THE PASSIVE QUOTA, BUT THIS IDEA HAS GENERATED STRONG OPPOSITION IN BONN. WE HAVE RELUCTANTLY AGREED TO GO ALONG, DESPITE THE FACT THAT SC.1 PROVIDED UNLIMITED INSPECTION FOR ALERTS AS WELL AS OTHER NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES, SUBJECT TO THE ACTIVE QUOTA. END COMMENT.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 06851  
GENEVA PLEASE PASS TO CD DEL  
SUBJECT: CDE--LANGUAGE NOTED IN WORKING GROUP A-3

1. CDE XII - 031.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

-

3. THE FOLLOWING LANGUAGE WAS NOTED IN WORKING GROUP A-3 ON 28 AUGUST. IT PROVIDES FOR INFORMATION ON THE AREA AND TIMING OF ACTIVITIES IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR. THE DATE OF 15 NOV FOR EXCHANGE OF ANNUAL CALENDARS WAS ALSO AGREED.

4. BEGIN TEXT:

"- AREA OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY, INDICATED BY APPROPRIATE GEOGRAPHIC FEATURES AND/OR DEFINED BY GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES

- PLANNED DURATION OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY AND THE 14 DAY PERIOD, INDICATED BY DATES, WITHIN WHICH IT IS ENVISAGED TO START." END TEXT.

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END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 06852

GENEVA FOR CD DELEGATION

SUBJECT: AGREED TEXT IN WORKING GROUP B-2 (OBSERVATION),  
- AUGUST 28, 1986

1. CDE XII - 032

2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

3. ON AUGUST 28 WORKING GROUP B-2 AGREED TO NOTE TWO  
ADDITIONAL SENTENCES. THE FIRST TEXT COMPLETES A  
PREVIOUSLY NOTED PARAGRAPH AND IS THE SECOND SENTENCE OF  
THAT PARAGRAPH.

BEGIN TEXT:

THE INVITED STATE MAY DECIDE WHETHER TO SEND MILITARY  
AND/OR CIVILIAN OBSERVERS, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF ITS  
PERSONNEL ACCREDITED TO THE HOST STATE. MILITARY  
OBSERVERS WILL, NORMALLY, WEAR THEIR UNIFORMS AND  
INSIGNIA WHILE PERFORMING THEIR TASKS.

END TEXT.

4. THE SECOND TEXT DEALS WITH REQUESTS AS FOLLOWS.

BEGIN TEXT:

THE OBSERVERS MAY MAKE REQUESTS WITH REGARD TO THE  
OBSERVATION PROGRAM. THE HOST STATE WILL, IF POSSIBLE,  
ACCEDE TO THEM.

END TEXT.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 06847

GENEVA FOR CD DEL

SUBJECT: STATEMENT BY MARSHAL SERGEI F. AKHROMEYEV

1. CDE XII - 033

2. UNCLASSIFIED - ENTIRE TEXT.

3. THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF STATEMENT MADE IN CDE PLENARY BY MARSHAL SERGEI F. AKHROMEYEV, CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE USSR, FIRST DEPUTY MINISTER OF DEFENSE OF THE USSR, IN STOCKHOLM AUGUST 29, 1986.

BEGIN TEXT:

DISTINGUISHED MR. CHAIRMAN,  
I WISH TO EXPRESS MY GRATITUDE FOR THE OPPORTUNITY PROVIDED TO A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES TO ADDRESS THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE, THIS IMPOSING INTERNATIONAL FORUM. I AM ACTING ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT.

TODAY YOUR WORK IS IN THE FOCUS OF ATTENTION OF THE NATIONS OF EUROPE AND NOT ONLY OF EUROPE. THE STATE OF AFFAIRS AT THE CONFERENCE HAS BEEN CONSTANTLY KEPT WITHIN THE FIELD OF VISION OF THE LEADERSHIP OF OUR STATE. WE IN THE SOVIET UNION HAVE BEEN THOROUGHLY ANALYZING THE COURSE OF THE CONFERENCE AND THE PARTICIPATION OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION IN IT, HAVE BEEN STUDYING AND TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE VIEWS AND PROPOSALS OF OTHER COUNTRIES. TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION ALL THE FACTS WE MAKE DECISIONS WITH THE AIM OF ACHIEVING MUTUALLY ACCPETABLE SOLUTIONS, THUS ENSURING A CONSTRUCTIVE CONCLUSION OF THE CONFERENCE. THIS ATTENTION ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AND THE SOVIET PUBLIC TO THE CONFERENCE IS UNDERSTANDABLE, FOR IT WAS EUROPE WHERE WORLD WARS FLARED UP TWICE IN WHICH OUR NATION SUFFERED PARTICULARLY HEAVY LOSSES. WE IN THE SOVIET UNION ALWAYS REMEMBER THOSE IRRETRIEVABLE LOSSES. IN EUROPE TWO GROUPINGS OF FORCES, EACH MILLION STRONG, OF THE BIGGEST MILITARY ALLIANCES, NATO AND THE WARSAW TREATY, FACE EACH OTHER EVEN TODAY. AT PRESENT THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT IS ONE OF THE MOST DANEROUS AREAS IN TERMS OF NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION. OTHER TYPES OF WEAPONS HAVE ALSO BEEN CONCENTRATED HERE IN A GREAT DEGREE. EUROPE TODAY IS AN AREA OF THE WORLD OVER WHICH MANY DANGERS LOOM LARGE, THEREFORE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING AMONG STATES AND PEOPLES IS OF SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE HERE.

PREREQUISITS EXIST FOR THIS. EUROPE HAS A VALUABLE EXPERIENCE IN PEACEFUL DEVELOPMENT AND COOPERATION. THE CSCE FINAL ACT ADOPTED IN HELSINKI IN 1975 LAID THE FOUNDATION FOR FURTHER REDUCING MILITARY CONFRONTATION AND PROMOTING DISARMAMENT. THE ADOPTION OF THE FINAL ACT CREATED CONDITIONS FOR THE NEGOTIATION OF NEW

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POLITICAL AND MILITARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY." THE MEASURES ON CONFIDENCE-BUILDING AND REDUCTION OF THE MILITARY THREAT RECORDED IN IT REFLECTED VIVIDLY A QUALITATIVELY NEW STAGE OF THE PRESENT DAY AND ASPIRATIONS FOR A BETTER FUTURE IN RELATIONS AMONG STATES WITH DIFFERENT SOCIAL SYSTEMS. AS GENERAL SECRETARY MIKHAIL GORBACHEV POINTS OUT, "IT IS IMPORTANT, WHILE PRESERVING THE ASSETS THAT HAVE ALREADY BEEN ACCUMULATED, TO MOVE FURTHER: FROM THE INITIAL TO A MORE LASTING PHASE OF DETENTE, TO MATURE DETENTE, AND THEN TO THE BUILDING OF DEPENDABLE SECURITY ON THE BASIS OF THE HELSINKI PROCESS AND A RADICAL REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS."  
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THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE HAS A GREAT ROLE TO PLAY IN THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THIS GOAL. THE SOVIET UNION CAME TO THIS INTERNATIONAL FORUM FIRMLY DETERMINED TO WORK FOR MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE BALANCE OF INTERESTS. IT IS OUR PROFOUND CONVICTION THAT THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE SITUATION ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT, PEACE AND TRANQUILITY IN OUR EUROPEAN HOME WOULD BE OF GREAT SIGNIFICANCE NOT ONLY FOR OUR CONTINENT BUT FOR ALL OTHER CONTINENTS AS WELL. THE SOVIET STATE HAS NEVER SET ANY OBJECTIVES IN ANY AREA, INCLUDING THE MILITARY AREA, WHICH WOULD BE AIMED AT GAINING UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES, DIMINISH OTHER STATES' SECURITY, OR RUN COUNTER TO THE INTERESTS OF OTHER NATIONS. OUR MILITARY DOCTRINE HAS A STRICTLY DEFENSIVE THRUST. THE USSR AND ITS ALLIES ARE DETERMINED OPPONENTS OF WAR IN ANY OF ITS VERSIONS. THE SOVIET UNION ASSUMED AN OBLIGATION NOT TO BE THE FIRST TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE WARSAW TREATY MEMBER STATES DECLARED TO THE ENTIRE WORLD THAT THEY WILL NEVER BEGIN MILITARY ACTIONS AGAINST ANY STATE UNLESS THEY THEMSELVES BECOME SUBJECT TO AGGRESSION. IN THE MILITARY FIELD OUR COUNTRY INTENDS TO ACT IN SUCH A WAY THAT NOONE WOULD HAVE GROUNDS FOR CONCERN ABOUT THEIR SECURITY. AT THE SAME TIME BOTH WE AND OUR ALLIES WANT, IN OUR TURN, TO ELIMINATE THE THREAT THAT IS LOOMING OVER US. THEREFORE WE PRESS FOR A RADICAL REDUCTION OF THE CURRENT HIGH LEVEL OF MILITARY EQUILIBRIUM, FOR A TOTAL EXCLUSION OF NUCLEAR AND OTHER TYPES OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION FROM ARSENALS, SEEK TO REDUCE OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES OF THE OPPOSING GROUPINGS OF ARMED FORCES SO THAT THEY WOULD BECOME A MEANS OF DEFENSE FOR ALL MILITARY ALLIANCES AND INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES. THE USSR PROVES ITS COMMITMENT TO THE LIMITATION OF ARMS AND REDUCTION OF THE MILITARY THREAT IN PRACTICE. THE RECENT EXTENTION OF OUR UNILATERAL MORATORIUM ON

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS TILL JANUARY 1, 1987 IS YET ANOTHER BIG STEP OF THE SOVIET UNION TO BREAK THE VISCIOUS CIRCLE OF THE ARMS RACE, TO MAKE A BEGINNING FOR A TOTAL ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR ARMS. THIS DECISION OF OURS MEETS THE INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLES OF ALL COUNTRIES. IT EVIDENCES THAT THE USSR HAS NO OTHER INTENTION BUT TO SEEK AN END TO NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION. THE SOVIET MORATORIUM, AS A CONCRETE ACTION AND NOT JUST AS A PROPOSAL, PROVES THE SERIOUSNESS AND HONESTNESS OF OUR PROGRAM FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, OF OUR CALLS FOR NEW POLICIES -- THE POLICES OF REALISM, PEACE AND COOPERATION.

THE EXTENTION OF THE MORATORIUM IS NOT TO THE LIKING ONLY OF THOSE WHO TRY TO DRAW THE SOVIET UNION INTO A RACE TO DEVELOP EVER NEWER WEAPONS, WHO WISHES TO PUSH US TO THE ROAD OF CONFRONTATION IN NEGOTIATIONS. THESE QUARTERS TRY TO DISLodge US FROM THE ROAD OF DETENTE WHICH WE HAVE CHOSEN. THE DESIRE OF THE SOVIET UNION TO STEER INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT TOWARDS DETENTE IS CONSISTENT WITH OUR PHILOSOPHY AND OUR MORALS.

THE SOVIET UNION AND OUR FIRENDS PURSUE ALSO HERE, AT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE, A CONSTRUCTIVE LINE TO ACHIEVE IN EUROPE A TRUE ATMOSPHERE OF SECURITY AND TO DEVELOP A BROAD SPECTRUM OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES OF A POLITICAL AND MILITARY CHARACTER. THE SOVIET DELEGATION, ALL SOCIALIST COUNTRIES IN COOPERATION WITH OTHER PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFERENCE HAVE DONE MUCH TO REACH AGREEMENT ON SUCH KEY ISSUES AS UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 07 STOCKHOLM 06847 GENEVA FOR CD DEL

NON-USE OF FORCE, NOTIFICATION OF MILITARY MANEUVERS AND MOVEMENTS OF FORCES, INVITATION OF OBSERVERS, AND VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH AGREEMENTS ACHIEVED. WE ASSESS POSITIVELY THE AGREEMENT ON TRANSFERS OF FORCES TO EUROPE THAT WAS ACHIEVED THE OTHER DAY. THIS IS SERIOUS AGREEMENT WHICH CAN BECOME AN IMPORTANT LINK IN THE SYSTEM OF ACCORDS DESIGNED TO ENSURE EUROPEAN SECURITY. THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL TERMS NOTIFICATION OF TRANSFERS OF FORCES CAN, UNDOUBTEDLY, INCREASE THE DEGREE OF CONFIDENCE, CONTRIBUTE TO THE REDUCTION OF CONCERN AND ALARM RELATED TO THE BUILD-UP OF FORCES IN EUROPE.

AT THE SAME TIME WE SHARE THE VIEW OF THE NEUTRAL AND NONALIGNED COUNTRIES TO THE EFFECT THAT AN AGREEMENT AT THE CONFERENCE SHOULD NOT COVER MOBILIZATION ACTIVITIES OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES. INDEED, MOBILIZATION ACTIVITIES CONCERN SENSITIVE ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL SECURITY OF MOST STATES AND AFFECT THEIR DEFENSE CAPABILITIES IN A DIFFERENT DEGREE.

OUR DELEGATION IS PREPARED TO CONTINUE TO SEEK MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, FOR THE SAKE OF

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COMMON INTERESTS WE ACCEPTED THE EXCHANGE OF ANNUAL PLANS OF NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES, AGREED TO REDUCE THE LEVEL FOR NOTIFICATION OF MANEUVERS OF LAND FORCES, AND, ALTHOUGH IT WAS VERY DIFFICULT FOR US, AGREED TO POSTPONE NOTIFICATION OF INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL EXERCISES TILL THE SECOND STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE. AT THE SAME TIME ALL MUST BE AWARE THAT AIR AND NAVAL FORCES IN GENERAL ARE THE TWO MAIN SERVICES OF THE ARMED FORCES WHICH REPRESENT A PARTICULARLY DANGEROUS THREAT TO SECURITY. IT IS NOT ONLY WE BUT ALSO MANY OTHER STATES THAT ARE GREATLY CONCERNED ABOUT EXCLUSION FROM THE COVERAGE BY CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES OF INDEPENDENT MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF AIR AND NAVAL FORCES WHILE LAND FORCES ARE SUBJECT TO THE MAXIMAL MEASURES OF NOTIFICATION, OBSERVATION AND VERIFICATION. THIS UNDERLINES THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CONSTRUCTIVE STEPS OFFERED BY THE WARSAW TREATY STATES WHICH AGREED TO POSTPONE THE CONSIDERATION OF NOTIFICATION OF AIR AND NAVAL MANEUVERS. HOWEVER, WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT DURING THE SECOND STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE ACTIVITIES OF THESE SERVICES OF THE ARMED FORCES WILL OCCUPY AN APPROPRIATE PLACE IN NEGOTIATION. NOTIFICATION OF THESE MANEUVERS MUST FIND ITS SOLUTION.

OUR DESIRE TO ACHIEVE AN AGREEMENT AT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE, LIKE OUR DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS IN GENERAL, IS BASED ON THE AWARENESS OF THE GREAT RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURITY OF OUR NATION AND OF ALL EUROPEAN NATIONS AS WELL. WE ARE ENTITLED TO EXPECT RECIPROCAL STEPS ON THE PART OF NATO STATES. HOWEVER, WE HAVE TO NOTE THAT ON A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT ISSUES DISCUSSED AT THE CONFERENCE MATCHING MOVEMENT ON THEIR PART IS CLEARLY INSUFFICIENT.

THE SOVIET UNION MADE A PROPOSAL TO LIMIT THE SCALE OF MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS. MANY PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFERENCE SUPPORTED US IN THIS RESPECT. WE CANNOT UNDERSTAND THE STUBBORN REFUSAL TO LIMIT THE SCALE OF MAJOR MILITARY MANEUVERS, AS IT EXEMPTS THE MOST DANGEROUS TYPE OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE FROM ANY LIMITATION. WHAT DO MODERN MAJOR MANEUVERS MEAN? THEY MEAN PUTTING THE ARMED FORCES IN COMBAT READINESS ON THE SCALE OF THE ENTIRE EUROPEAN CONTINENT, PUTTING COMMAND AND CONTROL CENTERS UP TO THE HIGHEST ECHELON INTO THE WAR-TIME REGIME, AND MOVING GROUND FORCES, UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 07 STOCKHOLM 06847  
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AVIATION AND NAVAL FORCES TO COMBAT POSITIONS. IN THE COURSE OF SUCH MANEUVERS LARGE CONTINGENTS OF TROOPS AND AIR FORCES ARE TRANSFERRED TO EUROPE FROM OVERSEAS. THEY ARE ACCOMPANIED BY A BROAD MOBILIZATION OF HUMAN AND MATERIAL RESOURCES. THUS, THE AUTUMN FORGE EXERCISE OF NATO FORCES WHICH

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WILL BE ALSO CONDUCTED THIS YEAR INVOLVES UP TO 300 THOUSAND TROOPS, APPROXIMATELY 4 THOUSAND TANKS, 2 THOUSAND AIRCRAFT AND 300 NAVAL SHIPS. THE EXERCISE COVERS THE ENTIRE TERRITORY OF WESTERN EUROPE (FROM NORTH CAPE TO THE SOUTHERN COAST OF TURKEY) AND THE ADJOINING SEA AREA. IN THE COURSE OF THIS EXERCISE WITH THE ENTIRE DURATION OF OVER TWO MONTHS THEY PRACTICE PLANS OF PREPARING AND CONDUCTING THE INITIAL PERIOD OF WAR WITH THE USE OF CONVENTIONAL, CHEMICAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS, TEST NEW WEAPONS AND HARDWARE AND VARIOUS METHODS OF WARFARE. SUPPOSE THAT A SIMILAR EXERCISE WOULD BE CONDUCTED BY THE WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION AT THE SAME TIME? THE SITUATION IN EUROPE IN SUCH PERIODS WOULD BECOME CRITICAL.

WE ARE CONVINCED THAT SUCH EXERCISES ARE NOT REQUIRED FOR NORMAL TRAINING OF TROOPS AND NAVAL FORCES. THESE EXERCISES ARE USED AS A MEANS OF MILITARY PRESSURE. WE DO NOT CONDUCT SUCH EXERCISES. GIVEN THE DANGEROUS DESTABILIZING NATURE OF SUCH EXERCISES, THE DEMAND OF MOST COUNTRIES THAT MAJOR EXERCISES MUST BE SIGNIFICANTLY LIMITED IS QUITE LEGITIMATE.

THERE IS ALSO OBVIOUSLY THE PROBLEM OF COVERING THE US TERRITORY WITH CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES. WE ARE SPEAKING OF IT IN TERMS OF THE FUTURE. IT CONCERNS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY EUROPE. MILITARY ACTIVITIES WITH RESPECT TO THE EUROPE CONTINENT OF ONE OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFERENCE WHICH POSSESS THE BIGGEST ARMED FORCES BECOME FREQUENTLY UNPREDICTABLE. THE NONCOVERAGE BY CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES OF US MILITARY ACTIVITIES ON ITS TERRITORY BECOMES DANGEROUS AND PUTS AT A DISADVANTAGE THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS IN THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. THE RECENT STATEMENT OF THE US ADMINISTRATION ON THE FINAL SESSION OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE REFERRED TO USEFULNESS OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES, TO THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO THE PREDICTABILITY OF THE MILITARY SITUATION IN EUROPE DEPENDS TO A LARGE EXTENT ON THE PREDICTABILITY OF US ACTION, THEIR READINESS TO COVER WITH CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES THEIR OWN MILITARY ACTIVITIES, IN PARTICULAR, MAJOR MANEUVERS OF THE ARMED FORCES.

IF MANEUVERS OF TROOPS NEAR THE VOLGA RIVER AND THE URALS ARE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION AND VERIFICATION LEGITIMATE THOUGHTS COME TO PEOPLE'S MINDS AS TO WHY THE SAME ACTIVITIES ARE NOT VERIFIED NEAR THE MISSOURI RIVER AND CLEVELAND.

AVOIDING THIS ISSUE UNDER VARIOUS PRETEXTS THE UNITED STATES SEEK AT THE SAME TIME TO PUT UNDER CONTROL AND DAY-TO-DAY TRAINING OF SUBUNITS AND UNITS OF LAND FORCES IN AREAS OF PERMANENT LOCATION IN THE FORM OF THE SO CALLED "OUT-OF-GARRISON ACTIVITIES." WHAT LIES

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BEHIND THE "OUT-OF-GARRISON ACTIVITIES" CONCEPT? THE SUBSTANCE OF THE US POSITION, UPON CLOSE SCRUTINY, ON THIS QUESTION MEANS CONTROL FOR THE STATE OF UNITS AND SUBUNITS WHEN THEY ARE ENGAGED IN COMBAT TRAINING IN AREAS OF PERMANENT LOCATION.

IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE AGREEMENT ON NOTIFICATION OF ANY UNCLAS SECTION 05 OF 07 STOCKHOLM 06847  
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TYPE OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES IT IS NECESSARY TO DEFINE CLEARLY WHAT SPECIFIC MILITARY ACTIVITIES WILL BE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION AND, ACCORDINGLY, VERIFICATION. THE "OUT-OF-GARRISON ACTIVITIES" CONCEPT FOR NOTIFICATION OR ITS MODIFICATION, THAT OF "OUTSIDE PERMANENT LOCATIONS", PROVIDES NO SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM. IT CONTAINS MANY LEEWAYS FOR ABUSE AND INTERFERENCE INTO THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF STATES AND THUS CANNOT SERVE AS THE CRITERION FOR NOTIFICATION. WE CAN SAY WITH EVEN GREATER JUSTIFICATION THAT THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH INSPECTIONS. INSPECTION MUST HAVE A CONCRETE ADDRESS, I.E., MANEUVERS, MOVEMENTS AND TRANSFERS OF FORCES WHICH ARE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION.

THE SOVIET UNION IS PREPARED TO AGREE TO ANY REASONABLE VERIFICATION MEASURES PROMOTING THE LIMITATION OF THE ARMS RACE AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING AMONG COUNTRIES. OBVIOUSLY, VERIFICATION IS NOT AN END IN ITSELF. ITS SCOPE AND METHODS DEPEND ON THE CHARACTER AND VOLUME OF CONCRETE AGREEMENTS REGARDING MEASURES OF DISARMAMENT AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING.

ANY ATTEMPTS TO PORTRAY THINGS IN SUCH A WAY AS IF THE USSR IS AGAINST INSPECTIONS AND HENCE IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO AGREE ON ANY REAL DISARMAMENT STEPS CONSTITUTE A DELIBERATE LIE. WE ACCEPT THE WIDEST POSSIBLE INSPECTION TO TERMINATE NUCLEAR TESTING. BY THE WAY, WHEN WE RAISED THIS QUESTION IN THIS FASHION IN NEGOTIATION IT TURNED OUT THAT OUR COUNTERPARTS WERE SIMPLY BEING CUNNING: THEY MADE OUT OF THE VERIFICATION PROBLEM AN ARTIFICIAL OBSTACLE COVERING UP FOR THEIR UNWILLINGNESS TO GIVE UP NUCLEAR TESTING. WE ARE READY TO ACCEPT INSPECTION IN SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF BANNING AND COMPLETELY ELIMINATING CHEMICAL WEAPONS. THE WARSAW TREATY MEMBER STATES ENVISAGED ON-SITE INSPECTIONS IN THEIR PROPOSALS REGARDING THE REDUCTION OF THE ARMED FORCES AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS IN EUROPE FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS. IN BRIEF, THE VERIFICATION PROBLEM DOES NOT EXIST. THE USSR IS AGREEABLE TO VARIOUS FORMS OF VERIFICATION, INCLUDING INTERNATIONAL ONES. WE CONFIRM THIS HERE, AT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE, AS WELL IN SOLVING QUESTIONS OF VERIFICATION OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES. OF COURSE, WE REGRET THAT OUR MOST ACTIVE INTERLOCUTOR

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ON THE INSPECTION ISSUE AMONG THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFERENCE WHILE SPEAKING IN FAVOUR OF "OPENNESS OF ALL MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE" PUTS ITS OWN TERRITORY OUTSIDE VERIFICATION. IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT IN THIS CASE THERE IS A DESIRE TO OPEN ("MAKE TRANSPARENT") EUROPE TO THE URALS AND CLOSE ITS OWN MILITARY ACTIVITIES.

DESPITE THIS THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT DEEMED IT POSSIBLE TO AGREE TO INSPECTIONS IN ORDER TO VERIFY CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES. THE USSR IS DOING SO GUIDED BY THE DESIRE TO MAKE PROGRESS IN THE CONSIDERATION OF THE QUESTIONS AT THE CONFERENCE AND TO CONCLUDE IT BY CONCRETE RESULTS. OBVIOUSLY, WE BELIEVE THAT INSPECTIONS MUST NOT BE TURNED INTO AN INTELLIGENCE GATHERING INSTRUMENT, I.E., THEY MUST NOT DIMINISH ANYONE'S SECURITY. SPECIFICALLY, THE USSR CONSIDERS THAT EACH STATE PARTICIPATING IN THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE COULD ALLOW THE CONDUCT OF ON-SITE INSPECTIONS ON ITS TERRITORY WITHIN THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT BASED ON THE QUOTA OF ONE TO TWO INSPECTIONS PER YEAR ON REQUESTS FROM OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES, IF SUSPICIONS ARISE REGARDING COMPLIANCE WITH CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES WHICH WILL BE NEGOTIATED. UNCLAS SECTION 06 OF 07 STOCKHOLM 06847 GENEVA FOR CD DEL

THE INSPECTION AREA SPECIFIED IN THE REQUEST OF AN INSPECTING STATE FORMS AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN THIS SCHEME. IT SHOULD BE AN AREA WHERE A NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITY TAKES PLACE -- TROOPS OR OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL EXERCISES, MOVEMENTS, TRANSFERS OF FORCES, AND EXERCISE- AND MOVEMENT-RELATED CONCENTRATIONS OF FORCES OUTSIDE AREAS OF PERMANENT LOCATION ABOVE A NOTIFIABLE LEVEL. IN ORDER NOT TO DIMINISH SECURITY OF THE INSPECTED STATE REQUESTS SHOULD NOT CLAIM THE CONDUCT OF INSPECTIONS IN CLOSED AREAS OR IN MILITARY AND DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS WITH RESTRICTED ACCESS. AT THE SAME TIME WE ACT ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT SUCH CLOSED AREAS WILL BE DEFINED AS APPLIED TO AN AGREEMENT ON VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH CSBMS. NATURALLY, THE NUMBER AND EXTENT OF THESE CLOSED AREAS SHOULD BE KEPT WITHIN REASONABLE LIMITS, I.E., THEY SHOULD BE SO AS TO ASSURE COMPLIANCE WITH AGREEMENTS REACHED AT THE CONFERENCE. THEY SHOULD NOT INCLUDE AREAS WHERE NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES TAKE PLACE.

THERE ARE STILL DIVERGENCIES AT THE CONFERENCE REGARDING METHODS FOR INSPECTION: NATO COUNTRIES, IN PARTICULAR, INSIST ON AIR INSPECTION.

I'LL BE FRANK, TO US, MILITARY MEN, INSPECTION FROM THE AIR HAS BEEN A TRADITIONALLY DIFFICULT QUESTION SINCE THE "OPEN SKIES" DOCTRINE PROCLAIMED BY PRESIDENT EISENHOWER. AT THAT TIME, AS IS KNOWN, NO AGREEMENT

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WAS REACHED TO THIS EFFECT. HOWEVER, TIME MOVES US TO NEW FRONTIERS, REQUIRES NEW POLITICAL AND MILITARY APPROACHES TO QUESTIONS OF ENSURING PEACE AND COOPERATION, CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY IN THE ENTIRE WORLD AND ESPECIALLY IN EUROPE.

WITH THIS UNDERSTANDING AND TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE SITUATION AT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE WE COULD THINK OF ADOPTING AN AIR/GROUND VERSION OF ON-SITE INSPECTION ON THE CLEAR UNDERSTANDING THAT INSPECTIONS WOULD BE CARRIED OUT FROM TRANSPORTATION VEHICLES AND AIRCRAFT PROVIDED BY THE INSPECTED STATE. IN OUR VIEW, DELEGATIONS COULD CONSIDER IT AT THE CONFERENCE. SUCH ARE CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSALS OF THE USSR AND OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES AIMED AT ACHIEVING AGREEMENTS ON THE MAJOR ISSUES OF THE CONFERENCE. OUR STEPS ARE DICTATED BY THE PEACEFUL POLICIES OF THE SOVIET UNION AND FOLLOW FROM THE DEFENSIVE NATURE OF OUR MILITARY DOCTRINE.

UNFORTUNATELY, THE CONFERENCE IS STILL PROCEEDING SLOWLY AND THERE REMAIN MANY UNRESOLVED ISSUES ALTHOUGH TIME IS RUNNING OUT. IT WOULD SEEM APPROPRIATE TO COME TO GRIPS WITH ALL THE QUESTIONS UNDER DISCUSSION WITHOUT PUTTING ANYTHING OFF TILL THE END OF THE CONFERENCE SO THAT IT WOULD COMPLETE ITS WORK ON SEPTEMBER 19 BY ADOPTING SUBSTANTIAL AGREEMENTS. WE COUNT ON A RECIPROCALLY CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH OF ALL THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFERENCE. IN SO DOING WE ASSUME THAT THE PROBLEM OF SECURITY TODAY IS OUR COMMON PROBLEM AND HENCE OUR COMMON CONCERN AND OUR COMMON RESPONSIBILITY. IT WOULD SEEM THAT THIS TRUTH IS EVIDENT TO ALL. HOWEVER, THE WORK FOR DETENTE, ENHANCED STABILITY AND CONFIDENCE IN THE WORLD TAKES PLACE IN DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES. ON THE ONE HAND, THE SOVIET MORATORIUM ON NUCLEAR TESTS HAS BEEN IN FORCE FOR THE SECOND YEAR, WE HAVE DECLARED AND PUT ON THE NEGOTIATING TABLE IN ALL FORA OUR CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSALS TO ACHIEVE MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENTS ON ARMS LIMITATION. FORCES WORKING FOR PEACE HAVE UNCLAS SECTION 07 OF 07 STOCKHOLM 06847 GENEVA FOR CD DEL

INTENSIFIED THEIR EFFORTS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE EXISTS A DIRECT AND OPEN REFUSAL TO TERMINATE NUCLEAR TESTING, STUBBORN COMMITMENT TO THE ARMS RACE, OPPOSITION TO PACE INITIATIVES, AND DISREGARD FOR THE PEOPLES' CONCERNS ABOUT THE DANGEROUS COURSE OF EVENTS IN THE WORLD.

IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES IT IS VERY IMPORTANT TO CONCLUDE THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE POSITIVELY. THE MAIN SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS FACE WOULD BE THAT THERE WOULD BE MADE AN IMPORTANT STEP FOR THE BETTER IN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS AND IN INTERNATIONAL LIFE IN GENERAL.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 06853

SUBJECT: CONSULTATIONS WITH SWISS MILITARY

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: AT THE REQUEST OF THE SWISS DELEGATION IN STOCKHOLM, U.S. DEPUTY, AMBASSADOR HANSEN MET WITH THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE SWISS ARMED FORCES IN BERN ON 25 AUG 86 TO DISCUSS SWISS MILITARY OBLIGATIONS UNDER A POSSIBLE CDE AGREEMENT. SWISS HAVE AGREED THAT NONE OF THEIR FORCES NEED BE EXCLUDED FROM A FUTURE NOTIFICATION REGIME, BUT THAT ACTUAL MOBILIZATION PRACTICES, THE STRUCTURE AND LOCATION OF INDEPENDENT BRIGADES, AND THE SECRECY OF DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS TO WHICH THE PUBLIC DOES NOT HAVE ACCESS MUST BE PROTECTED. SWISS REQUESTED THAT THE MERE FACT THAT SUCH CONSULTATIONS HAVE OCCURED BE REGARDED AS SECRET AND SENSITIVE. END SUMMARY
3. IN STOCKHOLM, THE SWISS DELEGATION HAS BEEN AT THE FOREFRONT OF NNA ATTEMPTS TO EXEMPT FROM NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS FORCES WHICH MUST BE MOBILIZED IN ORDER TO CARRY OUT MILITARY ACTIVITIES AT FORESEEN THRESHOLDS. FOR THE MOST PART, THESE EFFORTS HAVE FOCUSED ON THE FACT THAT SUCH FORCES ARE MOBILIZED FOR DEFENSIVE PURPOSES AND THEREFORE DO NOT POSSESS EITHER THE MOBILITY OR FIREPOWER REQUIRED TO CONDUCT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS. THE SWISS INTEREST HAD BEEN TO PROTECT ALL THEIR ALPINE FORCES (BOTH DIVISIONS AND BRIGADES) AS WELL AS ALL THE BRIGADES WHICH MOBILIZE IN THEIR PREPARED DEFENSIVE POSITIONS AND REMAIN THERE THROUGHOUT AN EXERCISE.
4. THE SWISS AGREED THAT DIVISIONS, NOT EVEN ALPINE DIVISIONS, NEED BE EXCLUDED FROM A POSSIBLE NOTIFICATION REGIME. MOREOVER, THE ACTIVITIES OF DIVISIONS COULD BE BOTH OBSERVED AND NOTIFIED. OBSERVATION AND INSPECTION OF NOTIFIED DIVISION-EXERCISES IN BRIGADE-AREAS WOULD BE EXCLUDED AS SENSITIVE POINTS/AREAS. BRIGADES, ON THE OTHER HAND, WOULD NEVER OPERATE TOGETHER IN SUFFICIENT STRENGTH TO TRIGGER A NOTIFICATION ON THEIR OWN. THEY MIGHT, HOWEVER, DURING AN EXERCISE BE SUBORDINATED TO AN EXERCISING DIVISION AND THEIR NUMBERS INCLUDED IN THE TOTAL WHICH TRIGGERS NOTIFICATION OF THE DIVISION EXERCISE. THESE BRIGADES CONDUCT THEIR ENTIRE EXERCISE ACTIVITY IN THEIR WARTIME DEFENSIVE POSITIONS AND CANNOT UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES BE EITHER OBSERVED OR INSPECTED, ACCORDING TO SWISS LAW. INFORMATION ON BRIGADES WHEN SUBORDINATED TO A DIVISION PARTICIPATING IN A NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITY COULD NOT BE GIVEN.
5. INASMUCH AS OBSERVATION IS UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE HOST COUNTRY AND DEFENSIVE FORTIFICATIONS WOULD BE CONSIDERED TO BE SENSITIVE POINTS TO WHICH NEITHER OBSERVERS NOR INSPECTORS WOULD NEED BE ADMITTED, THE DISPOSITION AND STRUCTURE OF THE SWISS BRIGADES WOULD NOT BE COMPROMISED EVEN THOUGH THEIR NUMBERS MIGHT BE

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INCLUDED IN AN ACTUAL NOTIFICATION. PARTICIPATION OF BRIGADES IN NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES COULD BE INDICATED AS A PHASE IN CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION.

6. UNDER THE LANGUAGE NOTED FOR THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION, THE SWISS WOULD BE REQUIRED TO PROVIDE THE START AND END DATES OF THE DEPLOYMENT PHASE OF A NOTIFIED ACTIVITY AND DEFINE THE AREA IN WHICH THE DEPLOYMENT TAKES PLACE USING GEOGRAPHICAL COORDINATES, BUT THEY WOULD NOT HAVE TO IDENTIFY ANY MOBILIZATION PRACTICES, ASSEMBLY AREAS OR INFRASTRUCTURE, IT BEING UNDERSTOOD THAT MOBILIZATION TERMINATES AT THE END OF THE DEPLOYMENT-PHASE OF DIVISIONS.

7. TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE POLITICAL EFFECT OF REQUIRING EXCLUSIONS FROM A NOTIFICATION REGIME OF CERTAIN SWISS FORCES AND WITH A CONDITION THAT A NOTIFICATION REGIME, INCLUDING OBSERVATION AND INSPECTION, WOULD NOT VIOLATE SWISS LAW CONCERNING THEIR MOBILIZATION PRACTICES, THE STRUCTURE AND LOCATION OF THEIR INDEPENDENT BRIGADES IN THEIR STATIC LOCATIONS, THE SWISS AGREED THAT NO SWISS FORCES NEED BE EXEMPTED FROM NOTIFICATION. THE CONCEPT OF SENSITIVE POINTS WOULD BE EMPLOYED TO PROTECT MOBILIZATION PROCEDURES AND MILITARY INSTALLATIONS TO WHICH THE PUBLIC IS NOT ALLOWED ACCESS.

8. THE GENERAL STAFF CONFIRMED SWISS WILLINGNESS TO PROVIDE AIRCRAFT AND CREWS FOR AERIAL INSPECTION.

9. SWISS CONSIDER THE FACT THAT THESE CONSULTATIONS TOOK PLACE AS SECRET AND REQUEST THIS REPORT BE TREATED AS  
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 STOCKHOLM 06853  
SENSITIVE INFORMATION.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 06868

SUBJECT: CDE: AIR INSPECTION ISSUE COMES TO A HEAD

1. SOVIET CHIEF OF STAFF, MARSHAL AKHROMEYEV MADE THE EXPECTED SOVIET MOVE ON AERIAL INSPECTION IN HIS AUGUST 29 STATEMENT OF THE CDE PLENARY; HE SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT AEOW AIR INSPECTION IF IT WAS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE INSPECTED STATE WOULD SUPPLY THE AIRCRAFT. AS ALREADY ARRANGED IN THE NATO CAUCUS, FRG AMBASSADOR CITRON TOOK THE FLOOR TO OFFER A WESTERN CONCESSION; NATO WOULD NO LONGER INSIST ON USING ITS OWN AIRCRAFT IF A COUNTRY OUTSIDE THE ALLIANCE SYSTEMS WOULD OFFER TO SUPPLY ONE.

2. THE NNA CHIMED IN SPONTANEOUSLY. THE AUSTRIAN REPRESENTATIVE LEAD OFF WITH A STRONG INDICATION THAT AUSTRIA WOULD PROBABLY BE WILLING TO MAKE SUCH AN OFFER. THE SWEDES, SWISS AND FINNS SUGGESTED THAT THEY ALSO MIGHT BE ABLE TO MAKE SUCH OFFERS. MALTA, CYPRUS AND YUGOSLAVIA MADE POSITIVE NOISES ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF NNA INVOLVEMENT.

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3. UNFORTUNATELY THE LOCAL PRESS DID NOT ASK AKHROMEYEV ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF NNA AIRCRAFT IN HIS POST-PLENARY PRESS CONFERENCE. EASTERN DIPLOMATS, CLEARLY CHAGRINED THAT NATO AND THE NNA HAD STOLEN AKHROMEYEV'S THUNDER, GENERALLY EXPRESSED DOUBT THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD EVER ACCEPT ANY FOREIGN AIRCRAFT CARRYING OUT INSPECTIONS OVER SOVIET TERRITORY.

4. ALSO THE SWISS SOUNDED RESERVED ABOUT THE IDEA BECAUSE OF AN EXCESS OF CAUTION. THEIR PLAN IS TO MAKE A PUBLIC STATEMENT FROM BERNE FOR THE ROLE. THEY ARE IN FACT THE MOST ENTHUSIASTIC. IF THE SOVIETS DON'T FLATLY REJECT THE IDEA FIRST, FOREIGN MINISTER AUBERT PLANS TO MAKE THE OFFER OFFICIALLY DURING HIS MOSCOW VISIT SEPTEMBER 3-7. WE EXPECT THE SWEDES, FINNS AND AUSTRIANS TO ALSO OFFER AIRCRAFT.

5. THE SWISS WOULD LIKE TO BE THE SOLE PROVIDERS AS REFLECTED IN CITRON'S STATEMENT THAT IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE FOR ONE NEUTRAL COUNTRY TO BE THE SUPPLIER OF AIRCRAFT AND CREW. OUR POSITION IS THAT THIS IS A QUESTION FOR THE INTERESTED NEUTRALS TO WORK OUT FOR THEMSELVES (ALTHOUGH PRIVATELY WE HAVE ENCOURAGED THE SWISS MORE THAN THE OTHERS.)

6. COMMENT: IN STAGING THE WESTERN "CONCESSION" ON NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT, WE HOPED TO STEAL AKHROMEYEV'S HEADLINES AND PREVENT A GROUND SWELL OF ALLIED SUPPORT FOR ACCEPTING THE SOVIET OFFER OF AIR INSPECTION WITH THE INSPECTED COUNTRY'S AIRCRAFT. THE SURPRISINGLY ENTHUSIASTIC NNA REACTION WAS MORE THAN WE HAD HOPED FOR. HOWEVER, WE FEAR THAT IF THE SOVIETS REJECT THE POSSIBILITY PUBLICLY, THE NNA WILL NOT PRESS THEIR OFFER.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 06882  
 GENEVA FOR CD DELEGATION

SUBJECT: WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS --  
 - AUGUST 25-29, 1986

REF: STOCKHOLM 6783

1. CDE XII - 034.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY AND GENERAL ASSESSMENT: SOVIET CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF ADDRESSED THE PLENARY AUGUST 29 TO ANNOUNCE SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF AERIAL INSPECTION -- PROVIDED THE AIRCRAFT ARE PROVIDED BY THE HOST STATE. NATO WAS EXPECTING THIS ANNOUNCEMENT AND RESPONDED WITH A COUNTEROFFER -- AERIAL INSPECTION COULD BE CONDUCTED USING NNA AIRCRAFT AND CREWS. THIS NEW NATO POSITION WAS GREETED WITH ENTHUSIASM BY NNA REPRESENTATIVES. IT IS HIGHLY DOUBTFUL THAT THE SOVIETS WILL ACCEPT NON-SOVIET MEANS OF TRANSPORT IN AN INSPECTION REGIME. IN A MAJOR STEP FORWARD THIS WEEK, THE LIST OF TYPES OF NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES WAS CLOSED WITH THE NOTING OF LANGUAGE WHICH PRESERVES THE OUT-OF-GARRISON APPROACH AND EXCLUDES TRANSITS. WHILE THE NNA WERE DISMAYED TO FIND THAT THE NEW LANGUAGE -- MAKING CONCENTRATIONS OF FORCES NOTIFIABLE -- MAKES ACTIVITIES BY MOBILIZED FORCES SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION, THEY NONETHELESS ACCEPTED THE LANGUAGE. THE FOCUS NOW WILL TURN TO THE NEXT NOTIFICATION PROBLEM AREA: THE THRESHOLD. THIS WEEK NATO ALSO OUTLINED COMPROMISE PROPOSALS ON CONSTRAINING MEASURES TIED TO THE ANNUAL CALENDAR. AS THE CONFERENCE ENTERS THE SEPTEMBER STRETCH RUN, INTENSIVE, FRUSTRATING AND PRODUCTIVE NEGOTIATIONS, PARTICULARLY BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE U.S. AND THE USSR AND FRANCE, CONTINUE BEHIND THE SCENES TO RESOLVE THE REMAINING ISSUES. END SUMMARY AND GENERAL ASSESSMENT.
4. NOTIFICATION: IN AN IMPORTANT STEP FORWARD THE CONFERENCE NOTED TWO TEXTS WHICH CLOSED THE LIST OF TYPES OF NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND OPENED THE WAY FOR DRAFTING ON THRESHOLDS AND THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION. ONE TEXT COVERS NOTIFICATION OF TRANSFERS INTO AND WITHIN THE ZONE AND CONCENTRATIONS OF FORCES; THE SECOND REQUIRES INFORMATION ON ALL PHASES OF AN ACTIVITY. ALTHOUGH THE WEST MADE AN IMPORTANT MOVE BY NOT INSISTING ON THE TERM "OUT-OF-GARRISON" IN THE LANGUAGE AGREED THIS WEEK, THE BREAKDOWN OF NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES INTO PHASES WHICH AMOUNT TO THE PERIODS WHEN UNITS ARE AWAY FROM THEIR GARRISONS PRESERVES THE SUBSTANCE OF NATO'S OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT (SEE REF A). MOREOVER, BY MAKING NOTIFICATION OF TRANSFERS FROM OUTSIDE THE ZONE CONDITIONAL UPON THE PARTICIPATION OF TRANSFERRED FORCES IN A NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITY OR IN A CONCENTRATION OF FORCES AT AGREED THRESHOLDS, THE AGREED TRANSFERS LANGUAGE EXEMPTS

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TRANSITS FROM NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS AS EFFECTIVELY AS SC.1/AMPLIFIED.

THE NNA SWALLOWED HARD BEFORE ACCEPTING THE LANGUAGE ON NOTIFICATION: BY MAKING CONCENTRATIONS OF FORCES NOTIFIABLE, THE PROVISION COULD CAPTURE NNA MOBILIZED FORCES MOVING TO THEIR FORWARD DEFENSE POSITIONS, A CONTINGENCY WHICH THE NNA WOULD EXERCISE ONLY IN A CRISIS. (THE NNA PROPOSAL (SC.7) EXCLUDES SUCH A CONTINGENCY FROM ALL REQUIREMENTS OF A NOTIFICATION REGIME.)

5. VERIFICATION: THE MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS OF THE WEEK CAME IN FRIDAY'S PLENARY AS DEPUTY MINISTER OF DEFENSE MARSHAL AKHROMEYEV UNVEILED A NEW SOVIET POSITION ACCEPTING AERIAL INSPECTION -- COMBINED WITH GROUND INSPECTION -- IF CARRIED OUT BY AIRCRAFT, HELICOPTERS AND VEHICLES OF THE INSPECTED STATE. (BEGIN COMMENT: THIS REFLECTS A BROADER SOVIET DESIRE TO ENSURE THAT THE C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 STOCKHOLM 06882 GENEVA FOR CD DELEGATION

INSPECTED STATE IS IN CONTROL OF THE INSPECTION TEAM, A DESIRE WHICH IS SLOWING DOWN DRAFTING ON INSPECTION MODALITIES. END COMMENT.)

RESPONDING IMMEDIATELY, THE FRG, ON BEHALF OF NATO, WELCOMED THIS NEW POSITION AND PROPOSED A COMPROMISE: AERIAL INSPECTIONS COULD BE CARRIED OUT WITH THE AIRCRAFT AND CREW PROVIDED BY A EUROPEAN NEUTRAL (RATHER THAN BY THE INSPECTING STATE, NATO'S PREVIOUS POSITION). (BEGIN COMMENT: SWITZERLAND, SWEDEN AND AUSTRIA HAVE EXPRESSED INTEREST TO US IN THIS IDEA. END COMMENT.) NEARLY ALL NNA MEMBERS WELCOMED THIS IDEA AS A POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION AND SAID THEY WOULD STUDY IT URGENTLY. AUSTRIA EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT VIENNA WOULD AGREE TO PARTICIPATE ACTIVELY.

THE NATO COUNTEROFFER ACHIEVED AT LEAST TWO MAJOR OBJECTIVES: 1) IT IMMEDIATELY BLUNTED, WITHIN THE CONFERENCE AT LEAST, THE IMPACT OF AKHROMEYEV'S STATEMENT; AND 2) IT MAY HELP TO MITIGATE NNA IDEAS OF REQUIRING THE INSPECTED STATE TO INVITE A THIRD STATE TO OBSERVE EACH INSPECTION. WE ARE MAKING THE PITCH TO THE NNA (WHO ARE CONCERNED THAT AN INSPECTION SYSTEM WITH A PASSIVE QUOTA WOULD EFFECTIVELY CUT THEM OUT OF THE VERIFICATION PROCESS) THAT BY PROVIDING AIRCRAFT AND CREW THE NNA WOULD BE VERY INVOLVED IN THE INSPECTION PROCESS. (BEGIN COMMENT: FOR THE NEAR FUTURE, THE NNA'S POSITIVE RESPONSE TO THE FRG PROPOSAL MAY ALSO SERVE TO QUIET NATO AGITATION AGAINST AERIAL INSPECTION. END COMMENT.) AKHROMEYEV'S OFFER, THE NATO COUNTEROFFER AND NNA RESPONSE RAISE THE POSSIBILITY THAT THIS KEY ASPECT OF THE INSPECTION ISSUE MAY BE RESOLVED SOON; THE QUESTION NOW IS WHETHER THE SOVIETS WILL FEEL PRESSURED INTO AGREEMENT.

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IN THE ACTUAL DRAFTING PROCESS, A PARTIAL TEXT WAS NOTED ON THE CONTENT OF INSPECTION (REPORTED SEPTEL). ALSO DISCUSSED THIS WEEK WERE COMMUNICATIONS, EQUIPMENT AND LOGISTICS. IN GENERAL, HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS CONTINUE THEIR EFFORT TO SLOW DRAFTING IN THE HOPE OF ESCAPING WITH MUSHY INSPECTION MODALITIES IN LAST-MINUTE NEGOTIATIONS. MEANWHILE, BEHIND THE SCENES, NATO HAS BEGUN TO GRAPPLE WITH THE PROBLEM OF AREAS TO BE SPECIFIED FOR INSPECTION/RESTRICTED AREAS. AGREEMENT TO ADOPT A "POSITIVE" APPROACH -- IDENTIFYING WHAT CAN BE INSPECTED -- SEEMS TO BE IMMINENT ALTHOUGH DETAILS STILL NEED TO BE WORKED OUT.

6. OBSERVATION: WRAPPING UP SOME MINOR QUESTIONS, TWO TEXTS (PROVIDED SEPTEL) WERE NOTED THIS WEEK, ONE DEALING WITH THE WEARING OF UNIFORMS BY MILITARY OBSERVERS, AND THE OTHER STATING THAT OBSERVERS MAY MAKE REQUESTS REGARDING THE OBSERVATION PROGRAM TO WHICH THE HOST STATE WILL, IF POSSIBLE, ACCEDE. STILL OUTSTANDING, HOWEVER, ARE THREE MAJOR ISSUES: THE SCOPE OF OBSERVATION, THE DURATION, AND THE QUESTION OF UNITARY OR SPLIT NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION THRESHOLDS. NATO HAD HOPED TO FOCUS DISCUSSION THIS WEEK ON THE SCOPE OF OBSERVATION AND HAD PREPARED A NEW DRAFT ON THE SUBJECT WHICH WAS TABLED AT THE COFFEE GROUP. HOWEVER, A REFERENCE TO DIRECT OBSERVATION OF "MOBILIZATION" IN THIS PAPER (INSERTED AT BRITISH INSISTENCE) RESULTED IN THE NNA REP (LIKO - AUSTRIA) STORMING OUT OF THE MEETING, BECAUSE HE FELT THE WEST WAS BACKTRACKING ON "SOLEMN PROMISES" TO EXCLUDE MOBILIZATION ACTIVITY FROM NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION (SEE PARA 4). SUBSEQUENT USDEL BILATERAL CONTACTS MANAGED TO EASE NNA FEARS, AND THE SCOPE OF OBSERVATION WILL BE DISCUSSED NEXT WEEK WITHOUT REFERENCE TO MOBILIZATION, ALTHOUGH IT REMAINS IN THE NATO PAPER. AS WE UNDERSTAND IT THE UK'S PRINCIPAL CONCERN IS THAT THE ACTIVITY OF MOBILIZED FORCES BE COVERED BY CSBM'S; THIS C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 STOCKHOLM 06882 GENEVA FOR CD DELEGATION

HAS ALREADY BEEN ACCOMPLISHED IN B-1. SINCE THE ACT OF MOBILIZATION HAS NOT BEEN IDENTIFIED AS A NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITY, IT IS BY DEFINITION NOT OBSERVABLE. WITH THE NOTING OF LANGUAGE IN THE NOTIFICATION WORKING GROUP ON CONCENTRATIONS OF FORCES, THE DURATION ISSUE WILL HEAT UP IN THE OBSERVATION GROUP AS WE DISCUSS OBSERVATION OF ALERT ACTIVITIES. WE CAN EXPECT THE NNA TO WORK VERY HARD TO LIMIT OBSERVATION OF ALERT ACTIVITIES.

7. ANNUAL CALENDARS: WORK ON THE CALENDAR CONTINUES TO MOVE EXCRUCIATINGLY SLOWLY. TWO TEXTS ON THE CONTENT OF THE CALENDAR -- DURATION AND AREA OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY -- WERE NOTED THIS WEEK. (HAVING OBTAINED THE PRECISE FORMULATION OF "GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES" IN THE NOTIFICATION, WE HAVE AGREED TO "GEOGRAPHIC FEATURES

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AND/OR COORDINATES" IN THE CALENDAR.) THE DATE FOR THE ANNUAL EXCHANGE OF CALENDARS -- NOVEMBER 15 -- ALSO WAS AGREED. ITEMS REMAINING FOR NEGOTIATION INCLUDE THE SIZE OF AN ACTIVITY AND INFORMATION ON PARTICIPATING UNITS AS WELL AS A PROVISION FOR CHANGES/ADDITIONS TO THE CALENDAR.

8. CONSTRAINING MEASURES: NATO THIS WEEK ANNOUNCED THAT IT WAS ABLE TO ACCEPT TWO ELEMENTS OF AN EARLIER COORDINATOR'S NON-PAPER ON A "TIME" CONSTRAINT:  
 1) ACTIVITIES ABOVE 40,000 MUST BE ANNOUNCED TWO YEARS IN ADVANCE; 2) THERE MAY BE NO ADDITIONS OF ACTIVITIES "SUBJECT TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION" (THIS EXEMPTS ALERTS WHICH ARE NOTIFIED AT THE TIME THEY OCCUR, NOT IN ADVANCE) WHICH ARE LARGER THAN 75,000 TROOPS. THIS ANNOUNCEMENT WAS TIMED TO PREEMPT AKHROMEYEV'S STATEMENT AT THE END OF THE WEEK WHICH, MANY EXPECTED, WOULD LINK SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF AERIAL INSPECTION WITH THE WEST'S ACCEPTANCE OF A "REAL" CONSTRAINT, I.E., A CEILING, NOT A TIME CONSTRAINT. IN FACT, HE DID NOT MAKE THIS LINKAGE EXPLICITLY BUT CRITICIZED NATO FOR ITS "STUBBORN REFUSAL TO LIMIT THE SCALE OF MILITARY MANEUVERS." ALTHOUGH NATO IS WILLING TO DRAFT ON ITS TWO IDEAS FOR A "TIME" CONSTRAINT, THE EAST IS RELUCTANT TO DO SO UNTIL IT SEES WHETHER IT CAN ATTACH ANY CONSTRAINING ELEMENTS TO THE "TIME" CONSTRAINT. SUCH EASTERN TACTICS SEEM TO BE RELATED TO A CHANGE IN THE EASTERN APPROACH TO CONSTRAINTS: IN THE PAST EAST EUROPEAN DELEGATES HAD LED US TO BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD BE SATISFIED SIMPLY WITH A SEPARATE CONSTRAINTS SECTION WITHOUT ANY SUBSTANCE. THIS WEEK WE GOT THE MESSAGE THAT THE SOVIETS MAY BE INCREASING THE IMPORTANCE OF CONSTRAINTS, IN PART AS A "QUID" FOR SOVIET CONCESSIONS ON INSPECTION. AKHROMEYEV DEVOTED SEVERAL PARAGRAPHS OF HIS PLENARY STATEMENT TO AN ATTACK ON NATO'S "AUTUMN FORGE" EXERCISE AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE TYPE OF EXERCISE WHICH SHOULD BE LIMITED.

YUGOSLAVIA INTRODUCED A PAPER ON "CONSTRAINING MEASURES" WHICH COMBINED ELEMENTS OF THE WEST'S "TIME" CONSTRAINT WITH SOME OF THE NNA LIMITATIONS ON FREQUENCY AND DURATION; IT ALSO INTRODUCED A REQUIREMENT TO ANNOUNCE TWO YEARS IN ADVANCE AMPHIBIOUS AND/OR AIRBORNE ACTIVITIES INVOLVING MORE THAN 10,000 TROOPS. IN PLENARY AMBASSADOR BOZOVIC, TAKING HIS CUE FROM AKHROMEYEV, INSISTED THAT CONSTRAINTS MUST FIGURE IN A STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT.

9. NON-USE OF FORCE: DRAFTING PROGRESSED SLOWLY BUT STEADILY AS THE EAST SULKED BECAUSE THE WEST DID NOT JUMP AT ITS DEAL TO EXCHANGE THE EAST'S NEW "BOTTOM LINE" TEXT ON ARMED FORCES FOR A WESTERN-BASED "HUMAN RIGHTS" TEXT. LANGUAGE ON PEACEFUL SETTLEMENTS OF DISPUTES AND TERRITORIAL OCCUPATION WAS AGREED AND THE

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NNA MOVED TOWARDS WESTERN LANGUAGE ON DISARMAMENT AND  
TERRORISM. HOWEVER, A SERIES OF NETTLESOME, YET  
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ULTIMATELY RESOLVABLE, ISSUES REMAIN. THIS SUITS US  
JUST FINE: WE ARE IN NO HURRY TO RELINQUISH THE LIMITED  
NEGOTIATING LEVERAGE WE RETAIN WITH THE NNA AND THE EAST  
BY CONTROLLING THE PACE OF THE NUF DISCUSSIONS SEE  
SEPTEL FOR A FULL UPDATE ON NUF).  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 06889  
 GENEVA FOR CD DELEGATION  
 SUBJECT: ANALYSIS OF AKHROMEYEV CDE ADDRESS  
 REF: A) STOCKHOLM 6847, B) STOCKHOLM 6868

1. CDE XII - 035
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

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3. BEGIN SUMMARY: CHIEF OF THE SOVIET GENERAL STAFF AKHROMEYEV'S SPEECH TO THE CDE PLENARY AUGUST 29 CENTERED ON VERIFICATION AND OFFERED AERIAL INSPECTION PROVIDED THAT AIRCRAFT AND CREWS ARE FROM THE INSPECTED STATE. WHILE AGREEMENT TO AERIAL INSPECTION IS A SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT, THE SOVIET POSITION ON TRANSPORT CLEARLY REFLECTS THEIR CONTINUED DESIRE TO CONTROL THE ACTIVITIES OF INSPECTION TEAMS ON THEIR TERRITORY. THE QUESTION NOW WILL BE WHETHER THE WEST AND NNA CAN PRESSURE THE SOVIETS INTO ACCEPTING NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT AS A COMPROMISE. USDEL FOUND AKHROMEYEV'S DISCUSSION OF RESTRICTED AREAS ENCOURAGING AS HE SEEMED TO MOVE TOWARD OUR "POSITIVE APPROACH" THAT SUCH AREAS CANNOT BE WHERE NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES COULD TAKE PLACE AND SHOULD BE KEPT TO A MINIMUM. THE SOVIET GENERAL STAFF'S HISTORIC DISGRUNTLEMENT WITH THE CDE ZONE OF APPLICATION, AS WELL AS WITH SOVIET DECISIONS ON AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES AND INSPECTION, WAS EVIDENT THROUGHOUT AKHROMEYEV'S STATEMENT AND PERHAPS EXPLAINS THE LACK OF EMPHASIS ON THE BUDAPEST APPEAL. ON NOTIFICATION ISSUES, DESPITE THE RECENT AGREEMENT WHICH CREATES A COMPREHENSIVE EQUIVALENT TO THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT, AKHROMEYEV ATTACKED THE CONCEPT VEHEMENTLY (A GOOD INDICATION THAT THE GENERAL STAFF WAS OVERRULED ON THIS ISSUE AS WELL). WHILE HE TOUCHED ON CONSTRAINTS, IT SEEMED MORE TO LAMENT THEIR PASSING THAN TO MAKE THEM A PRECONDITION FOR SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF AN AGREEMENT. HE RECAPITULATED THE STANDARD LITANY OF SOVIET ARMS CONTROL POSITIONS, HIGHLIGHTING THE SOVIET MORATORIUM ON NUCLEAR TESTING. AKHROMEYEV'S ADDRESS ALSO DEMONSTRATED NEW SOVIET DESIRE TO CONCLUDE CDE BY SEPTEMBER 19, MOST LIKELY IN ORDER TO FACTOR ITS RESULTS INTO THE SHULTZ-SHEVARDNADZE MEETING. END SUMMARY.

4. FIRST DEPUTY DEFENSE MINISTER AND CHIEF OF THE SOVIET GENERAL STAFF SERGEI AKHROMEYEV ADDRESSED THE CDE PLENARY ON AUGUST 29 (FULL TEXT PROVIDED REF A). THE FOCUS OF AKHROMEYEV'S ADDRESS WAS CLEARLY ON VERIFICATION AS HE UNVEILED A NEW SOVIET OFFER TO ACCEPT AERIAL INSPECTION

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PROVIDED THAT THE AIRCRAFT AND CREW ARE FROM THE INSPECTED STATE. THIS POSITION, ALONG WITH IDENTICAL PROVISIONS FOR GROUND TRANSPORT, REFLECTS A SOVIET DESIRE TO ENSURE THAT THE INSPECTION TEAM REMAINS UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE INSPECTED STATE. NATO IMMEDIATELY

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RESPONDED TO AKHROMEYEV'S OFFER BY PROPOSING THAT, AS A COMPROMISE, AIRCRAFT AND CREWS COULD BE PROVIDED FROM THE NEUTRAL COUNTRIES -- A CONCEPT THAT WAS WELL RECEIVED BY THE NNA (REF B). THESE DEVELOPMENTS MAY ACCELERATE ACTION ON THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE COMBINED NATO/NNA PRESSURE WILL FORCE THE SOVIETS TO TAKE THE FINAL STEP IN OUR DIRECTION. HOWEVER, HAVING MADE THIS POINT OF PRINCIPLE AT SUCH A HIGH LEVEL, IT IS DOUBTFUL WHETHER THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAS MUCH FLEXIBILITY ON THIS ISSUE.

5. ON THE SUBJECT OF RESTRICTED AREAS IT APPEARS, IF AKHROMEYEV PROVIDED AN ACCURATE REFLECTION OF MOSCOW'S THINKING, THAT U.S. AND SOVIET POSITIONS MAY BE CONVERGING AROUND THE SO-CALLED "POSITIVE APPROACH" THAT AREAS WHERE NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES CAN TAKE PLACE WILL NOT BE RESTRICTED AREAS. HE INDICATED THAT STATES SHOULD NOT REQUEST INSPECTIONS "IN CLOSED AREAS" OR IN MILITARY AND DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS AND INDICATED THAT SUCH CLOSED AREAS WOULD BE "DEFINED AS APPLIED TO" A CDE AGREEMENT C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 STOCKHOLM 06889 GENEVA FOR CD DELEGATION (I.E., NOT THE PRESENT SOVIET LIST OF CLOSED AREAS). HE ADDED THAT "NATURALLY THE NUMBER AND EXTENT OF THOSE CLOSED AREAS SHOULD BE KEPT WITHIN REASONABLE LIMITS, I.E., THEY SHOULD BE SO AS TO ASSURE COMPLIANCE WITH AGREEMENTS REACHED AT THE CONFERENCE" AND "SHOULD NOT INCLUDE AREAS WHERE NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES TAKE PLACE." IN SUBSEQUENT BILATERAL CONTACTS WITH THE BULGARIAN DELEGATION AND THE POLISH AMBASSADOR WE LEARNED THAT AKHROMEYEV HAD BRIEFED THE EASTERNERS ON AUGUST 28 AND HAD INDICATED THAT "CLOSED AREAS" FOR THE PURPOSE OF A CDE AGREEMENT WOULD BE BOTH DIFFERENT AND LESS EXTENSIVE THAN THOSE CURRENTLY DESIGNATED AND WOULD NOT INCLUDE TRAINING AREAS OR PLACES WHERE NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES TAKE PLACE.

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6. AKHROMEYEV HAD OPENED HIS STATEMENT WITH A RITUAL REHASHING OF IMPORTANT SOVIET STEPS FOR PEACE AND DISARMAMENT WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON THE NUCLEAR TESTING MORATORIUM, NO DOUBT TO DEMONSTRATE ONCE AGAIN THAT THE MILITARY SUPPORTS THE IDEA. OF INTEREST TO USDEL WAS THE SCANT ATTENTION DEVOTED TO THE BUDAPEST APPEAL AND THE POSSIBILITY OF A CDE PHASE II DEALING WITH CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT. THIS COULD BE INDICATIVE OF THE SOVIET GENERAL STAFF'S LACK OF ENTHUSIASM FOR GORBACHEV'S RECENT PROPOSALS AND THE PROSPECT OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS REDUCTIONS. IN FACT, AN UNDERCURRENT OF GENERAL STAFF DISGRUNTLEMENT WITH SOVIET CSCE POLICY WAS EVIDENT AT SEVERAL POINTS DURING THE SPEECH. REFLECTING HISTORIC GENERAL STAFF DISLIKE OF THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CDE WHICH WAS AGREED ON AT MADRID AND WHICH WAS FORCED DOWN THEIR

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THROATS BY BREZHNEV, AKHROMEYEV CARPED ABOUT "NONCOVERAGE BY CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES OF U.S. MILITARY ACTIVITIES ON ITS TERRITORY" WHICH HE ALLEGED "BECOMES DANGEROUS AND PUTS AT A DISADVANTAGE THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS IN THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE." AKHROMEYEV ALSO STRONGLY FOCUSED ON ANOTHER AREA WHERE THE GENERAL STAFF'S ATTEMPT TO EXTEND THE ZONE WESTWARD (THROUGH NOTIFICATION OF INDEPENDENT NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES) HAD BEEN OVERRULED BY POLITICAL AUTHORITIES. AKHROMEYEV OBSERVED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS "GREATLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE EXCLUSION FROM COVERAGE BY CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES OF INDEPENDENT MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF AIR AND NAVAL FORCES WHILE LAND FORCES ARE SUBJECT TO THE MAXIMAL MEASURES OF NOTIFICATION, OBSERVATION AND VERIFICATION." HE CONCLUDED THAT NOTIFICATION OF THESE MANEUVERS "MUST FIND ITS SOLUTION" IN THE SECOND STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE. HE ALSO NOTED THAT AGREEMENT TO GO ALONG WITH THE ANNUAL CALENDAR AND A SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED NOTIFICATION LEVEL HAD BEEN "DIFFICULT STEPS" FOR THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT (READ: GENERAL STAFF). AKHROMEYEV'S OBVIOUS MESSAGE ON THESE ISSUES ISSUE AS WELL AS ON INSPECTION WAS THAT THE

GENERAL STAFF HAD TAKEN THESE DIFFICULT DECISIONS AFTER WEIGHING THE IMPORTANT POLITICAL STAKES INVOLVED. IN OUR VIEW HIS MORE SUBLIMINAL MESSAGE WAS THAT THESE DECISIONS HAD BEEN TAKEN AT POLITICAL LEVELS AGAINST THE ADVICE OF THE GENERAL STAFF.

7. ON NOTIFICATION ISSUES, AKHROMEYEV EXPRESSED THE GENERAL STAFF'S SOMEWHAT MIXED FEELINGS ABOUT THE RECENTLY NOTED TEXT WHICH CLOSED THE LIST OF NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES. HE "ASSESSED POSITIVELY" THE AGREEMENT ON NOTIFICATION OF TRANSFERS AND CONCENTRATIONS AND CURRIED NNA FAVOR BY SUPPORTING THE EXCLUSION OF MOBILIZATION FROM NOTIFICATION. LATER, HOWEVER, HE RESUSCITATED SOVIET ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT WHICH "IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH INSPECTION" BECAUSE INSPECTION MUST RELATE TO "MANEUVERS, MOVEMENTS AND TRANSFERS OF FORCES WHICH ARE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION." DESPITE HIS OWN MILITARY REP'S (TATARNIKOV) CONCESSION AT STOCKHOLM THAT THE RECENT AGREEMENT CLOSES THE LIST OF NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES WITHOUT REFERENCE TO EITHER "MANEUVERS" OR "MOVEMENTS," AKHROMEYEV'S RETURN TO OLD POSITIONS IS A GOOD INDICATION THAT THE GENERAL STAFF WAS OVERRULED ON THIS -- AS EARLIER ON INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES. (THE AGREEMENT ALSO CREATES A COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM OF NOTIFICATION WHICH IS THE FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT OF THE OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT.) DEMONSTRATING SOVIET SKILL AT USING WESTERN ARGUMENTS

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OUT OF CONTEXT WHEN IT SUITS SOVIET PURPOSES, AKHROMEYEV FOLLOWED HIS ATTACK ON OUT-OF-GARRISON BY ADAPTING THE CONCEPT TO DESCRIBE WHAT AREAS COULD BE SPECIFIED FOR INSPECTION, I.E, "IT SHOULD BE AN AREA WHERE A NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITY TAKES PLACE . . . OUTSIDE AREAS OF PERMANENT LOCATION ABOVE A NOTIFIABLE LEVEL." HOWEVER, AKHROMEYEV'S HARPING ON THIS THEME REFLECTS A KEY SOVIET CONCERN -- THAT THE ACTIVITIES TO BE SUBJECT TO INSPECTION BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED. IN THIS CONTEXT THE WEST'S BROAD OUT-OF-GARRISON APPROACH IS UNACCEPTABLE BECAUSE IT COULD COVER A RANGE OF ACTIVITIES. THEY ARE, THUS,

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CONTINUING TO REJECT OUT-OF-GARRISON AS IT APPLIES TO INSPECTION AND ARE INSTEAD TRYING TO LIMIT INSPECTION TO THE "LIST" OF ACTIVITIES AGREED UPON FOR NOTIFICATION. IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT WHILE THE GENERAL STAFF MAY HAVE LOST SOME BATTLES, IT HAS YET TO GIVE UP THE FIGHT.

8. AKHROMEYEV TOUCHED ON CONSTRAINTS, NOTING THE SOVIET PROPOSAL TO LIMIT THE SCALE OF MAJOR MANEUVERS ("THE MOST DANGEROUS TYPE OF MILITARY ACTIVITY IN EUROPE") AND BEMOANED "THE STUBBORN REFUSAL" OF SOME TO ACCEPT THIS PROPOSAL. IN AN EFFORT TO STIR UP EUROPEAN PUBLIC FEAR AND CONCERN OVER SUCH EXERCISES HE HIGHLIGHTED NATO'S "AUTUMN FORGE" WHICH HE ALLEGED WAS A SINGLE EXERCISE INVOLVING UP TO "300,000 TROOPS, 2,000 AIRCRAFT" WHICH WILL PRACTICE PLANS FOR "CONDUCTING THE INITIAL PERIOD OF WAR WITH THE USE OF CONVENTIONAL, CHEMICAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS." HE SAID SUCH EXERCISES ARE NOT REQUIRED FOR NORMAL TRAINING AND ACCUSED THE WEST OF USING "AUTUMN FORGE" "AS A MEANS OF MILITARY PRESSURE." WHILE USING THE CONSTRAINTS ISSUE TO SCORE PROPAGANDA POINTS, HOWEVER, AKHROMEYEV'S STATEMENT SEEMED MORE OF A LAMENT THAT CONSTRAINTS WILL NOT APPEAR IN THE FINAL DOCUMENT THAN A CONDITION FOR SOVIET AGREEMENT. IN FACT, HIS BOTTOM LINE MESSAGE WAS SOLELY THAT THE "DEMAND" FOR SUCH A MEASURE WAS "QUITE LEGITIMATE."

9. IN CONCLUSION, AKHROMEYEV STRESSED THE NEED TO COMPLETE THE CONFERENCE WORK WITH SUBSTANTIAL AGREEMENTS BY SEPTEMBER 19. AS THE SOVIETS HAVE OFTEN EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS, IF NOT EAGERNESS, TO WORK BEYOND THE 19TH, WE FIND IT NOTEWORTHY THAT A SENIOR SOVIET OFFICIAL WOULD MAKE THIS POINT. WE SUSPECT THE SOVIETS MAY NOW WANT TO STICK TO THE ADJOURNMENT DATE IN ORDER TO FACTOR THE RESULTS OF STOCKHOLM INTO THE SHULTZ-SHEVARDNADZE MEETING SEPTEMBER 19-20.

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END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 06879  
 DEPARTMENT FOR A/S RIDGWAY AND HOLMES  
 JCS FOR LTG VESSER AND BG DENSON  
 ACDA FOR DIRECTOR ADELMAN  
 OSD FOR DAS FEITH  
 CIA FOR RUTHERFORD

SUBJECT: CDE: THREE WEEKS TO GO

1. CDE XII-036. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: WE PROMISED TO LET THE POLICY COMMUNITY KNOW THE PROSPECTS FOR AGREEMENT HALFWAY THROUGH THE FINAL ROUND. IN SUM, A REASONABLE AGREEMENT IS WITHIN SIGHT. THE KEY REMAINING ISSUE IS WHETHER THE EAST WILL ACCEPT THE USE OF NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT AND CREW IN AN INSPECTION REGIME. WE ARE TELLING OUR ALLIES THAT WE CANNOT ACCEPT CONSENSUS ON AN AGREEMENT USING AIRCRAFT SUPPLIED BY THE INSPECTED STATE, E.G. BY THE SOVIET UNION. OUR ALLIES ARE TELLING US THAT WE WOULD BE ISOLATED IN SUCH A SITUATION. PROBLEMS REMAIN IN ALL OTHER AREAS AS WELL, BUT THEY ARE PROBABLY MANAGEABLE. END SUMMARY.
3. VERIFICATION:
  - A. NEUTRAL AIR. NNA ENTHUSIASM FOR OUR PROPOSAL THAT THEY PROVIDE INSPECTING AIRCRAFT HAS UPSTAGED AKHROMEYEV'S OFFER OF INSPECTION IN HOST-STATE (I.E. IN THE CRUCIAL INSTANCE, SOVIET) AIRCRAFT AND HELICOPTERS HERE AT THE CONFERENCE. (SEPTELS) THE SOVIETS ARE PRIVATELY REJECTING THE NEUTRAL OFFER; THEY SAY THEY WILL BLOCK DRAFTING ON AERIAL INSPECTION UNLESS WE ACCEPT HOST-STATE AIRCRAFT. WE WILL SOON COME UNDER STRONG ALLIED PRESSURE EITHER TO ACCEPT HOST-STATE AIRCRAFT OR ACCEPT GROUND INSPECTION ONLY. OUR ALLIES TELL US THAT WE WILL BE ALONE IN TURNING DOWN AN AGREEMENT BECAUSE OF THE ISSUE OF NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT. FOR THIS WEEK, HOWEVER, THE POSSIBILITY OF NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT WILL PROBABLY BE KEPT ALIVE BY ANNOUNCEMENTS IN VARIOUS NEUTRAL CAPITALS OF WILLINGNESS TO SUPPLY AIRCRAFT IF ALL PARTICIPANTS WISH.
  - B. RESTRICTED AREAS:
    - WE BELIEVE A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION CAN BE FOUND ON THE BASIS OF DEFINING WHERE INSPECTIONS CAN TAKE PLACE AND SPECIFYING THAT CLOSED AREAS WILL NOT BE USED TO PREVENT INSPECTIONS. AKHROMEYEV ESSENTIALLY SAID THIS IN HIS SPEECH AND PRESS CONFERENCE FRIDAY.
  - C. QUOTAS:
    - THE MOST LIKELY OUTCOME IS A CEILING ON THE NUMBER OF INSPECTIONS ANY COUNTRY MUST ACCEPT DURING A YEAR (THE SOVIETS WANT A MAXIMUM OF TWO BUT MIGHT ACCEPT 3-4) WITH NO ACTIVE QUOTA BUT A PROVISION THAT NO COUNTRY CAN CARRY OUT MORE THAN ONE INSPECTION ON ANOTHER. AN ALTERNATIVE OUTCOME WOULD BE MIXED ACTIVE/PASSIVE QUOTA - SAY 3:3 OR 4:4 - WHICH WOULD RESULT IN EQUAL OBLIGATIONS

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BETWEEN THE MILITARY ALLIANCES. IT WILL BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO NEGOTIATE A FORMULATION WHICH SPECIFICALLY GUARANTEES THAT THE NNA WILL NOT USE UP THE QUOTA.

- D. NEUTRAL PARTICIPATION IN INSPECTION:  
- THIS ISSUE HAS ESSENTIALLY BEEN DEFUSED, THE NNA GOAL AT THE MOMENT IS TO PROVIDE AIRCRAFT, NOT TO OBSERVE INSPECTIONS.

4. NOTIFICATION:

- A. GROUND FORCE PARAMETER:  
- WE THINK THE SOVIETS ARE NOW READY TO AGREE TO AN ACCEPTABLE FORMULA COMBINING STRUCTURE WITH TROOPS OR C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 STOCKHOLM 06879 DEPARTMENT FOR A/S RIDGWAY AND HOLMES  
JCS FOR LTG VESSER AND BG DENSON  
ACDA FOR DIRECTOR ADELMAN  
OSD FOR DAS FEITH  
CIA FOR RUTHERFORD  
TANKS. IN ORDER TO GET THE NUMBERS LOW ENOUGH, WE WILL PROBABLY HAVE TO AGREE TO A SPLIT THRESHOLD FOR NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION. THE SOVIETS ARE SAYING THEY COULD "THINK ABOUT" 12,000-16,000. OUR "BOTTOM LINE" IS 10,000-15,000. WE THINK THAT 250 IS A NEGOTIABLE TANK FIGURE.

- B. INFORMATION:

- WE THINK WE CAN GET THE DESIGNATIONS FOR DIVISIONS PARTICIPATING IN AN EXERCISE AND, THROUGH LANGUAGE ALREADY NOTED ON INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED ABOUT PHASES OF ACTIVITIES, THE GENERAL AREA THEY COME FROM BUT NO PRECISE LOCATIONS OF DIVISION HEADQUARTERS.

5. OBSERVATION:

- WE SEE NO MAJOR PROBLEMS HERE; WE WILL HAVE TO DRAFT NEW PROVISIONS IF WE HAVE TO AGREE TO A HIGHER NUMERICAL-ONLY THRESHOLD FOR OBSERVATION. THERE WILL BE LAST MINUTE NNA PRESSURE TO LIMIT THE DURATION OF OBSERVATION TO, SAY, 72 HOURS. WE ARE CONSIDERING COUNTERING WITH AN OFFER TO LIMIT OBSERVATION TO A WEEK IN RETURN FOR NNA COOPERATION ON INSPECTION AND NOTIFICATION. WE CONTINUE TO HOLD OUT FOR THE RIGHT TO BRING OUR OWN BINOCULARS.

6. ANNUAL FORECASTS:

- AGAIN WE FACE NO MAJOR PROBLEMS. OUR OBJECTIVE IS TO GET AS MUCH DETAIL AS POSSIBLE.

7. CONSTRAINING MEASURES:

- OUR INTRODUCTION OF A TIME CONSTRAINT HAS HELPED US TACTICALLY IN FENDING OFF LAST-MINUTE DEMANDS FOR LIMITATIONS ON MILITARY EXERCISES. THE EAST IS RELUCTANT TO AGREE TO OUR PROPOSAL OF A REQUIREMENT TO NOTIFY EXERCISES ABOVE 40,000 TWO YEARS IN ADVANCE UNLESS THEY ACTUALLY HAVE A CONSTRAINING ELEMENT ATTACHED. WE EXPECT OUR OFFER OF A PROHIBITION ON ADDITIONS OF EXERCISES OVER 75,000 TO THE CALENDAR (EXCEPT AS

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ALERTS) TO FILL THIS BILL. IF AND WHEN THE CONCEPT OF EXTRA INSPECTIONS IN CASE THESE SCHEDULES ARE NOT HELD TO GETS OFF GROUND, WE EXPECT EASTERN OPPOSITION. IF NECESSARY IN THE LAST DAYS WE WILL ALLOW A SEPARATE CHAPTER FOR CONSTRAINING MEASURES (WITH ONLY THIS TIME CONSTRAINT IN IT) AS A PRICE FOR AVOIDING SUBSTANTIVE LIMITATIONS ON EXERCISES.

8. NON-USE OF FORCE:

- THE NUF SECTION WILL INCLUDE ALL POINTS OF THE WESTERN PROPOSAL, NOTABLY A PASSAGE ON HUMAN RIGHTS CLOSE TO THE WESTERN TEXT. SINCE THE EAST HAS DROPPED OFF ITS DEMAND FOR A "MILITARY FORCE" REFERENCE, WE CAN ACCEPT A REFERENCE TO "ARMED FORCES" BASED ON HELSINKI FINAL ACT LANGUAGE.

9. COMMUNICATIONS:

- THE LAST VESTIGE OF "CLARIFICATIONS" WILL PROBABLY END UP HERE, TOGETHER WITH A STRAIGHTFORWARD PROVISION THAT NORMAL DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS WILL BE USED FOR COMMUNICATIONS. THE NNA MAY, HOWEVER, SEEK SOME VAGUE LANGUAGE LEAVING OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING "RAPID MEANS" OR "DEDICATED LINKS" FOR COMMUNICATION

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OSD FOR DAS FEITH

CIA FOR RUTHERFORD

AT SOME LATER POINT. THE CONCEPT OF AD HOC MEETINGS ALONG THE LINES OF THE SWISS IDEA OF A SALON DES AMBASSADEURS IS ALSO LIKELY TO RAISE ITS HEAD AGAIN IN THE WANING MOMENTS OF THE CONFERENCE.

09. TIMING:

- A STANDOFF ON THE AIR INSPECTION ISSUE COULD LEAVE US WITH GREAT GAPS IN THE VERIFICATION TEXT BY SEPTEMBER 19. OTHERWISE WE THINK THE SUBSTANCE WILL BE WRAPPED UP. WE ARE LESS CONFIDENT ABOUT THE APPROVAL OF TRANSLATIONS AND FINAL EDITORIAL WORK, WHICH WILL PROBABLY NOT BE DONE IN TIME.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 STOCKHOLM 06879  
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - P A R A N U M B E R )  
S U B J E C T : C D E : T H R E E W E E K S T O G O  
A T S O M E L A T E R P O I N T . T H E C O N C E P T O F A D H O C M E E T I N G S A L O N G  
T H E L I N E S O F T H E S W I S S I D E A O F A S A L O N D E S A M B A S S A D E U R S  
I S A L S O L I K E L Y T O R A I S E I T S H E A D A G A I N I N T H E W A N I N G  
M O M E N T S O F T H E C O N F E R E N C E .

10. T I M I N G :

- A S T A N D O F F O N T H E A I R I N S P E C T I O N I S S U E C O U L D L E A V E  
U S W I T H G R E A T G A P S I N T H E V E R I F I C A T I O N T E X T B Y S E P T E M B E R  
19. O T H E R W I S E W E T H I N K T H E S U B S T A N C E W I L L B E W R A P P E D U P .  
W E A R E L E S S C O N F I D E N T A B O U T T H E A P P R O V A L O F T R A N S L A T I O N S  
A N D T I M E .

B A R R Y

E N D O F M E S S A G E

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UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 06880

GENEVA FOR CD DEL

SUBJECT: EXCERPTS FROM PRESS CONFERENCE GIVEN BY  
MARSHAL SERGEI F. AKHROMEYEV, STOCKHOLM 08/29/86

REF: STOCKHOLM 6847

1. CDE XII - 037
2. UNCLASSIFIED - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. THE FOLLOWING ARE EXCERPTS FROM THE PRESS CONFERENCE GIVEN BY MARSHAL SERGEI F. AKHROMEYEV, CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE USSR, FIRST DEPUTY MINISTER OF DEFENSE OF THE USSR, IN STOCKHOLM AUGUST 29, 1986. QUESTIONS WERE WRITTEN, ANSWERS ORAL. (REF PROVIDES TEXT OF HIS PLENARY ADDRESS IN CDE.)

BEGIN TEXT:

...

Q: FIRST: HOW DOES THE SOVIET UNION SEE THE PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF ON-SITE INSPECTION?

A: AS YOU ARE WELL AWARE, HERE IN THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE DELEGATES ARE NEGOTIATING ON NOTIFICATION AND VERIFICATION OF SUCH MILITARY ACTIVITIES AS MANUEVERS, MOVEMENTS AND TRANSFERS OF FORCES. WE BELIEVE THAT THESE TYPES OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES ARE THE MAIN AND DETERMINING ELEMENT AS REGARDS ANY THREATENING CHARACTER TO ANY OF THE STATES, AND THEY SHOULD BE VERIFIED, INCLUDING BY ON-SITE INSPECTION. IN OTHER WORDS, IF ANY STATE BELIEVES THAT ANOTHER STATE VIOLATES ITS ASSUMED OBLIGATIONS IN CARRYING OUT THE MILITARY ACTIVITIES I HAVE REFERRED TO, AND THEN IT CAN CLAIM OR REQUEST AN INSPECTION OF THE ACTIVITY IN THE SPECIFIED AREA. AND THE REQUESTED STATE, THAT IS THE STATE TO WHICH A REQUEST IS ADDRESSED, SHOULD PROVIDE POSSIBILITIES FOR THE CONDUCT OF AN INSPECTION. THE INSPECTED STATE, THE REQUESTED STATE, SHOULD, WITHIN THE BRIEFEST POSSIBLE TIME, TRANSPORT THE INSPECTING TEAM TO THE AREA WITH REGARDS TO WHICH DOUBTS ARISE AS TO COMPLIANCE. AND THE INSPECTED STATE SHOULD PROVIDE POSSIBILITIES TO THE INSPECTING GROUP TO SURVEY THE AREA AND ASCERTAIN WHETHER THE ACTIVITIES CORRESPOND TO THE MEASURE OF NOTIFICATION OR NOT. THIS INSPECTION COULD BE CONDUCTED FROM THE GROUND AND, PERHAPS, FROM THE AIR; THAT IS, THE QUESTION IS BEING DISCUSSED AT THIS MOMENT IN THE CONFERENCE: FROM THE AIR, INCLUDING BY AIRCRAFT AND HELICOPTER.

...

Q: UPI AND REUTERS: DOES YOUR OFFER ON ON-SITE INSPECTION FROM THE AIR MEAN THAT SOVIET PILOTS WOULD HAVE TO FLY SOVIET PLANES ON AN INSPECTION OVER SOVIET TERRITORY? AND ON CLOSED AREAS: ARE YOU PREPARED TO ALLOW ON-SITE INSPECTION IN MANY OF THE AREAS WHICH ARE REGULARLY CLOSED TO FOREIGNERS? WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF A

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COUNTRY SAID IT SUSPECTED THE SOVIET UNION HAD CONCENTRATED ITS NAVAL FORCES IN THE KOLA PENINSULA? WOULD FOREIGN INSPECTORS BE ALLOWED TO CHECK THESE ACTIVITIES IN SOVIET PORTS?

AND: WOULD NOT INSPECTION BE WATERED DOWN BECAUSE VAST AREAS OF THE WARSAW TREATY COUNTRIES ARE CLOSED ZONES DUE TO MILITARY SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS? HOW MUCH OF THE SOVIET UNION IN EUROPE WOULD BE EXEMPTED FROM ON-SITE INSPECTION?

A: IT IS DIFFICULT TO GIVE A BRIEF ANSWER TO THESE QUESTIONS. FIRST, ON ON-SITE INSPECTION FROM AIR: WE ARE SUGGESTING THAT INSPECTION OF THE AREA WHERE UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 03 STOCKHOLM 06880

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EXERCISES ARE TAKING PLACE, AND IN REGARD TO WHICH THERE ARE DOUBTS OR SUSPICIONS ON THE PART OF ANOTHER STATE, COULD BE INSPECTED BOTH FROM THE AIR AND FROM THE GROUND. BY AERIAL INSPECTION, WE MEAN THAT THE INSPECTING TEAM OF THE OTHER STATE WILL FLY IN AIRCRAFT WHICH WOULD BE PROVIDED BY THE INSPECTED STATE. AND WE DON'T SEE ANY CONTRADICTIONS HERE. YOU ARE SPEAKING OF SOVIET PILOTS AND SOVIET AIRCRAFT, BUT IT IS APPLICABLE TO FLIGHTS PLACE OVER SOVIET TERRITORY. WHEN FLIGHTS ARE TAKING OVER THE FRG, THEN AIRCRAFT AND PILOTS WILL BE GERMAN. AND INSPECTION WILL BE CARRIED OUT NOT BY PILOTS THEMSELVES BUT BY INSPECTIONS TEAMS. AND IT WILL TELL THE PILOTS WHERE TO FLY, WHERE TO SEARCH, WHERE TO TURN AND WHERE THEY COULD SEE THE AREA. SO I DON'T SEE WHAT IS IMPROPER HERE. THERE IS ANOTHER QUESTION. YOU CAN IMAGINE A CASE WHEN A FOREIGN PLANE IS FLYING OVER THE TERRITORY OF ANOTHER SOVEREIGN STATE. AND THIS PLANE COULD BE STUFFED WITH INTELLIGENCE GATHERING EQUIPMENT, INTELLIGENCE WHICH WOULD VERIFY NOT ONLY THE ACTIVITIES OF THE TROOPS TAKING PLACE BUT ALSO THE DIFFERENT INSTALLATIONS AND FACILITIES WHICH HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH VERIFICATION. THIS WOULD CONSTITUTE AN IMPERMISSABLE INTELLIGENCE GATHERING ACTIVITY AND WOULD AMOUNT TO A VIOLATION OF THE SOVEREIGNTY OF A STATE. THEREFORE, I BELIEVE OUR POSITION ON THE MATTER IS JUST.

AS TO CLOSED AREAS, TODAY IN MY STATEMENT . . . I HAVE ALREADY DEALT IN GREAT DETAIL WITH THIS ISSUE. I BELIEVE THAT THESE CLOSED AREAS SHOULD BE REASONABLE IN SIZE AND SHOULD BE SUCH AS TO ASSURE THAT INSPECTION WHICH WOULD BE AGREED ON IN STOCKHOLM. IN OTHER WORDS, AREAS WHERE EXERCISES AND MOVEMENTS ARE TAKING PLACE AND WHICH SHOULD BE VERIFIED, THAT IS, THESE EXERCISES AND MOVEMENTS SHOULD NOT TAKE PLACE IN THE AREAS WHICH SHOULD (NOT ?) BE SUBJECT TO VERIFICATION. (AS HEARD) NOW, ON THE KOLA PENINSULA: THE KOLA PENINSULA IS THE NORTHERN COAST OF THE SOVIET UNION AND, I'LL BE FRANK,

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IT IS A BASE FOR THE SOVIET NAVY. SEA-BASED STRATEGIC SYSTEMS OF THE SOVIET UNION ARE BASED ON THE KOLA PENINSULA. IF THE US ASSURES THE RIGHT TO VERIFY ITS ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC COASTS, AREAS WHERE ITS SEA-BASED STRATEGIC SYSTEMS ARE BASED, THEN AND ONLY THEN A QUESTION COULD BE RAISED ABOUT VERIFYING THE KOLA COAST LINE. SO FAR, WE HAVE NOT HEARD FROM THE US ANY PROPOSALS OF THIS KIND. HOWEVER, IF WE ARE SPEAKING ABOUT EXERCISES OF TROOPS IN THE AREA OF THE KOLA PENINSULA, THEN THESE EXERCISES WILL BE SUBJECT TO THE SAME VERIFICATION AS EXERCISES IN ANY OTHER AREA. I THINK I HAVE PROVIDED AN ANSWER TO CLOSED AREAS.

...  
Q: UPI: HOW DO YOU ASSESS THE NATO PROPOSAL REGARDING CONSTRAINT ON EXERCISES WHICH EXCEED THE LEVEL OF 75,000 TROOPS AND WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN NOTIFIED TWO YEARS IN ADVANCE?

A: WE ASSESS THIS PROPOSAL POSITIVELY BECAUSE IT MOVES SOMEWHAT THE CONFERENCE FORWARD. HOWEVER, THE MAIN THING DOES NOT LIE IN THIS FACT. THE MAIN THING IS NOT TO CONDUCT SUCH GREAT MANUEVERS OR EXERCISES IN EUROPE WHICH ARE BEING CONDUCTED BY NATO COUNTRIES. THE AUTUMN FORGE EXERCISES HAVE ACTUALLY STARTED. AND THE ARMED FORCES OF NATO COUNTRIES START MOVING THROUGHOUT EUROPE FROM NORTH CAPE TO THE SOUTHERN COAST OF TURKEY. TRANSFERS ARE EFFECTED OF GROUND FORCES AND AIR FORCES FROM THE US TO EUROPE. AND HEADQUARTERS OF NATO COUNTRIES LEAVE THEIR PERMANENT LOCATIONS AND MOVE UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 03 STOCKHOLM 06880 GENEVA FOR CD DEL

TO THE FIELD. THE EXERCISES INVOLVE MORE THAN 300,000 TROOPS, 2000 AIRCRAFT, 4000 TANKS AND 300 NAVAL SHIPS. NATO FORCES ARE MOVING CLOSER TO THE BORDERS OF THE WARSAW TREATY MEMBERS STATES. HOW SHOULD WE REACT? IT IS HARD TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THESE EXERCISES AND AN ACTUAL PREPARATION FOR WAR. THEREFORE, WE ARE IN FAVOR OF NOT CONDUCTING SUCH LARGE SCALE EXERCISES. AS WE ARE ALSO TRAINING OUR FORCES TO REPEL AGGRESSION, BUT WE DO NOT CONDUCT EXERCISES ON THIS SCALE. AND WE CALL ON THE OTHER SIDE NOT TO CONDUCT THEM EITHER. HOWEVER WE ARE FACED WITH A REFUSAL SO FAR.

...  
Q: WOULD AN AGREEMENT IN THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE NOW REPRESENT THE PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL PROCESS WHICH THE SOVIET UNION SAYS IS NECESSARY FOR A SECOND US-SOVIET SUMMIT?

A: I THINK YOU ARE RIGHT IN THE WAY YOU ARE RAISING THIS QUESTION. THAT IS IF DURING THIS STAGE OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE THERE WILL BE SUCCESS AND IF PARTICIPANTS AGREE ON CONCRETE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES AND NOTIFICATION OF THOSE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING

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MEASURES AND VERIFICATION OF THEM, THEN THERE WILL BE A  
BASE FOR FURTHER MOVEMENT. IT IS NOT AN ACCIDENT THAT  
THE CONFERENCE IS ENTITLED THE CONFERENCE ON  
CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND  
DISARMAMENT. AND IF WE AGREE ON CONFIDENCE-BUILDING  
MEASURE S NOW, THEN IT WOULD BE LOGICAL TO RAISE AT THE  
NEXT STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE OTHER MEASURES, THAT IS,  
MEASURES OF DISARMAMENT. AND MEASURES DESIGNED TO  
REDUCE THE ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE ARE PRECISELY THE  
OBJECTIVE SET BY THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER WTO  
MEMBERS. YOU KNOW OUR PROPOSALS SET FORTH IN THE  
BUDAPEST DOCUMENT. END PRESS CONFERENCE.

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END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 06887

SUBJECT: NUF UPDATE

REF: STOCKHOLM 6449

1. CDE XII - 038
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

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3. BEGIN SUMMARY: VARIOUS TEXTS AWAIT JUDGMENT DAY IN THE NON-USE OF FORCE WORKING GROUP. WE HAVE NOW NOTED ALMOST ALL WESTERN TEXTS, WITH THE NOTABLE EXCEPTIONS OF SELF-DEFENSE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND TERRORISM (AND WE HAVE MADE PROGRESS ON THESE TEXTS). HOWEVER, AS WE ENTER END GAME TRADE OFF WE MAY HAVE TO CONSIDER, FOR TACTICAL REASONS, ACCEPTING SOME NNA TEXTS, AS LONG AS THESE ARE CONSISTENT WITH CONSENSUS LANGUAGE IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT AND MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT. WE HAVE PLACED THE REMAINING TEXTS IN THREE DIFFERENT CATEGORIES BASED ON THEIR DRAFTING STATUS. INCLUDED IN THESE CATEGORIES ARE TEXTS RIPE FOR NOTATION, OTHER MORE CONTROVERSIAL TEXTS, AS WELL AS THOSE "GRAB BAG" TEXTS OF THE NNA AND EAST. END SUMMARY.

4. TEXTS RIPE FOR NOTATION CONSIST OF LANGUAGE ON PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES (PSD), TERRITORIAL OCCUPATION, DISARMAMENT, MEDITERRANEAN, SELF-DEFENSE, AND NONCOMPLIANCE. AGREEMENT ON THE PSD TEXT MAY BE POSSIBLE NOW THAT THE SWISS HAVE DROPPED THEIR INSISTENCE ON A SENTENCE THAT THE PARTICIPATING STATES' "DETERMINATION" TO "DEVELOP" PSD MECHANISMS IN A CSCE CONTEXT. THE TEXT, WHICH INCLUDES A NEW ADDITIONAL SENTENCE PROPOSED BY THE SWISS, NOW READS AS FOLLOWS.

BEGIN TEXT:

THE PARTICIPATING STATES STRESS.. THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES AS CONTAINED IN THE FINAL ACT, CONVINCED THAT IT IS AN ESSENTIAL COMPLEMENT TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE, BOTH BEING ESSENTIAL FACTORS FOR THE MAINTENANCE AND CONSOLIDATION OF PEACE AND SECURITY. THEY RECALL.. THEIR COMMITMENT TO REINFORCE AND TO IMPROVE THE METHODS AT THEIR DISPOSAL FOR THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES. (HFA, P.84.) THEY REAFFIRM.. THEIR RESOLVE TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO SETTLE EXCLUSIVELY BY PEACEFUL MEANS ANY DISPUTE BETWEEN THEM.

END TEXT.

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5. IN THE DISARMAMENT TEXT, NATO HAS SUCCEEDED IN SEPARATING THE NOTION OF DISARMAMENT FROM THREE CDE OBJECTIVES, "LESSENING MILITARY CONFRONTATION, BUILDING MUTUAL CONFIDENCE, AND ENHANCING SECURITY." THE NNA RELUCTANTLY ACCEPT THIS DEMARCATION, DESPITE THEIR DESIRE FOR A MORE PROMINENT ROLE FOR DISARMAMENT IN THE TEXT. THE EAST IS STILL HOLDING OUT FOR A LONGER TEXT.

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HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THAT THE FOLLOWING TEXT CAN FORM THE BASIS FOR A COMPROMISE.

BEGIN TEXT:

THE PARTICIPATING STATES ARE DETERMINED TO PURSUE EFFORTS TO LESSEN MILITARY CONFRONTATION, BUILD MUTUAL CONFIDENCE, AND ENHANCE SECURITY FOR ALL. THEY ARE ALSO COMMITTED TO ACHIEVING PROGRESS IN DISARMAMENT.

END TEXT.

6. WE ARE ALSO READY TO NOTE LANGUAGE ON "TERRITORIAL C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 05 STOCKHOLM 06887 OCCUPATION." THE EAST HAS DROPPED OFF ITS INSISTENCE ON LINKING THIS TEXT WITH THE FINAL ACT'S PRINCIPLE OF THE "INVIOABILITY OF FRONTIERS;" HOWEVER, WE DOUBT WE HAVE HEARD THE LAST OF THIS "FRONTIERS" MOVE (POLAND AND THE FRG ARE CURRENTLY DISCUSSING THIS ON THE MARGINS OF THE CONFERENCE). THE LANGUAGE TO BE NOTED:

BEGIN TEXT:

NO TERRITORIAL OCCUPATION OR ACQUISITION RESULTING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN CONTRAVENTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW WILL BE RECOGNIZED AS LEGAL.

END TEXT.

7. WE ARE ALSO PROGRESSING ON LANGUAGE ON THE MEDITERRANEAN. (BEGIN COMMENT: MALTESE AMBASSADOR GAUCI ASSURES US THAT THIS IS THE ONLY REFERENCE TO THE

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MEDITERRANEAN HIS AUTHORITIES WILL INSIST UPON IN THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT. END COMMENT.) THE USDEL WANTS TO KEEP THIS TEXT AS SHORT AS POSSIBLE AND HAS PROPOSED THE FOLLOWING LANGUAGE, WHICH HAS HERETOFORE BEEN THE BASIS OF THE WEST'S NEGOTIATING POSITION.

BEGIN TEXT:

THEY ARE ALSO AWARE, IN THE BROADER CONTEXT OF WORLD SECURITY, OF THE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SECURITY IN EUROPE AS A WHOLE, AND SECURITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA.

END TEXT.

HOWEVER, ALL OF OUR ALLIES BELIEVE WE NEED TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING TOWARD THE MNA, PARTICULARLY THE MALTESE, ON THIS ISSUE, AND POINT OUT THAT BOTH THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT AND THE MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT GO WELL BEYOND THE LIMITED U.S. LANGUAGE ON THE MEDITERRANEAN. THEY ALSO ARGUE THAT THIS MIGHT BUY OFF MALTA ON OTHER ISSUES, E.G., NAVAL ACTIVITIES. THEREFORE, ITALY HAS PROPOSED THAT NATO ADOPT THE FOLLOWING LANGUAGE AS A COMPROMISE PROPOSAL.

BEGIN TEXT:

THEY ARE ALSO CONVINCED THAT SECURITY IN EUROPE IS TO BE CONSIDERED IN THE BROADER CONTEXT OF WORLD SECURITY AND IT IS CLOSELY LINKED WITH SECURITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA AS A WHOLE. IN THIS CONTEXT, THEY REAFFIRM THEIR INTENTION TO CONDUCT THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE NON-

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PARTICIPATING MEDITERRANEAN STATES, WITH DUE REGARD TO RECIPROCITY, IN THE SPIRIT OF THE PRINCIPLES SET FORTH IN THE DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS BETWEEN PARTICIPATING STATES, SO AS TO GIVE EFFECT TO THE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE MEDITERRANEAN CHAPTER OF THE FINAL ACT.

END TEXT.

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8. THE TEXT ON SELF-DEFENSE IS STILL BEING HELD IN ABEYANCE WHILE WE TRY TO SQUARE THE CIRCLE BETWEEN THE SWISS AND IRISH POSITIONS. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THE FOLLOWING TEXT MAY BE ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH THE SWISS AND THE IRISH.

BEGIN TEXT:

THEY RECALL.. THE INHERENT RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL OR C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 05 STOCKHOLM 06887 COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE IF AN ARMED ATTACK OCCURS, AS SET FORTH IN THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

END TEXT.

9. THE ONLY OTHER TEXT RIPE FOR NOTATION IS NON-COMPLIANCE. WHILE FRANCE HAS EXPRESSED ITS DISAPPROVAL OF THIS TEXT IN THE DRAFTING DISCUSSION, USDEL REGARDS THE FOLLOWING NONCOMPLIANCE TEXT AS A HARMLESS IF UNNECESSARY ADDITION TO THE NUF SECTION. FURTHERMORE, THE TEXT HIGHLIGHTS THE ISSUE OF "NONCOMPLIANCE" AND MIGHT BE A BONE WE CAN THROW IN THE DIRECTION OF THE TROUBLESOME BUT INFLUENTIAL CYPRIOT AMBASSADOR WE HAVE REJECTED MOST OF HIS OTHER CONTRIBUTIONS).

BEGIN TEXT:

THEY STRESS.. THAT NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE OBLIGATION OF REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE PRINCIPLES AND PURPOSES OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONSTITUTES A VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. (TEXT PROPOSED BY CYPRUS.)

END TEXT.

10. OTHER MORE CONTENTIOUS TEXTS THE WORKING GROUP IS CONSIDERING INCLUDE "ARMED FORCES" (FORMERLY "MILITARY FORCE"), TERRORISM, AND HUMAN RIGHTS. ON "ARMED FORCES," THE EAST HAS DROPPED BACK TO WHAT IT CHARACTERIZES AS ITS "ABSOLUTE BOTTOM LINE." THE EASTERN REP HAS ALSO SAID

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IF WE CAN AGREE ON THIS TEXT, THE SOVIETS WILL BE FLEXIBLE ON ALL OTHER ISSUES, INCLUDING HUMAN RIGHTS AND DISARMAMENT. THE EASTERN TEXT IS BASED ON LANGUAGE FROM THE FINAL ACT, P.83, AND DROPS REFERENCES TO "MILITARY FORCE" IN FAVOR OF "ARMED FORCES." WHILE WE HAVE NOT EXPLICITLY SAID SO FOR TACTICAL REASONS, WE HAVE HINTED WE CAN ACCEPT A REFERENCE TO "ARMED FORCES" BASED ON THE HFA LANGUAGE. HOWEVER, WE EXPLICITLY HAVE OPPOSED THE NON-FINAL ACT LANGUAGE IN THE TEXT, WHICH INCLUDES REFERENCES TO "PREVENTING ANY KIND OF WAR." (BEGI

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COMMENT: IF WE WANT A STRONG HUMAN RIGHTS TEXT WE MAY HAVE TO CONSIDER AT THE VERY LAST MOMENT HFA "ARMED FORCES" LANGUAGE PLUS A FEW MORE WORDS, E.G., RECALLING HFA LANGUAGE ON PEACE AND SECURITY.) THE NEW EASTERN TEXT READS AS FOLLOWS.

BEGIN TEXT:

IN ORDER TO REDUCE THE DANGERS OF ARMED CONFLICT, TO PRESERVE PEACE AND TO PREVENT ANY KIND OF WAR, THEY WILL REFRAIN FROM ANY USE OF ARMED FORCES INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE PROVISIONS OF THE FINAL ACT.

END TEXT.

11. THE TERRORISM TEXT, TOO, IS STALLED BY A FEW OBSTACLES. THE YUGOSLAVS, SUPPORTED BY THE EAST, HAVE DEMANDED A REFERENCE TO "SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES DIRECTED TOWARD THE REGIME OF ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE." USDEL HAS TRIED TO ELIMINATE REFERENCE TO "VIOLENT OVERTHROW" WHILE PUTTING "SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES" IN THE CONTEXT OF ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES AIMED AT TERRORISM. SEVERAL ALLIES, HOWEVER, HAVE EXPRESSED DISCOMFORT WITH OUR OBDURATE POSITION, I.E., OPPOSING FINAL ACT LANGUAGE WHICH INCLUDES REFERENCE TO "VIOLENT OVERTHROW," AND WOULD BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE YUGOSLAV (AND NNA) LANGUAGE ON THE SUBJECT. THE TEXT ALSO CONTAINS THREE C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 05 STOCKHOLM 06887 DOTS WHERE THE EAST AND NNA WOULD PREFER TO INSERT THE

WORDS "IN ANY FORM." IRONICALLY, THE YUGOSLAVS NOW SAY THEY MAY ACCEPT THE U.S. APPROACH BUT SOME OF OUR ALLIES, E.G., ITALY, THE UK, HAVE DIFFICULTY WITH EITHER OF THE FOLLOWING ALTERNATIVES.

BEGIN TEXT:

THE PARTICIPATING STATES CONDEMN.. TERRORISM . . . , INCLUDING TERRORISM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AND EMPHASIZ.. THE NECESSITY TO TAKE RESOLUTE MEASURES TO COMBAT IT. THEY EXPRESS.. THEIR DETERMINATION TO TAKE EFFECTIVE MEASURES, BOTH AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL AND THROUGH INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, FOR THE PREVENTION AND SUPPRESSION OF ALL ACTS OF TERRORISM. THEY WILL TAKE ALL APPROPRIATE MEASURES IN PREVENTING THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIES FROM BEING USED FOR THE PREPARATION, ORGANIZATION OR COMMISSION OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. (THIS ALSO INCLUDES MEASURES TO PROHIBIT ON THEIR TERRITORIES SUBVERSIVE OR OTHER ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES OF PERSONS, GROUPS AND ORGANIZATIONS THAT INSTIGATE, ORGANIZE OR ENGAGE IN THE PERPETRATION OF ACTS OF TERRORISM, INCLUDING THOSE DIRECTED AGAINST OTHER STATES AND THEIR CITIZENS.) OR (THEY CONFIRM.. THAT THEY WILL REFRAIN FROM DIRECT OR INDIRECT ASSISTANCE ON THEIR TERRITORIES TO SUBVERSIVE OR OTHER ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES OF PERSONS, GROUPS, AND ORGANIZATIONS OF ACTS OF TERRORISM,

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INCLUDING THOSE DIRECTED AGAINST OTHER STATES AND THEIR CITIZENS.)

END TEXT.

12. THE PROSPECTS FOR AN AGREEMENT ON A NATO-ORIENTED HUMAN RIGHTS TEXT ARE VERY PROMISING, ALTHOUGH THE EAST WILL PROBABLY INTRODUCE NETTLESOME AMENDMENTS AND WITHHOLD CONSENSUS UNTIL THE LAST MOMENT FOR TACTICAL REASONS. LAST WEEK THE U.S. INTRODUCED A PROPOSAL BASED ON LANGUAGE FROM THE NNA AND WESTERN TEXTS, AS WELL AS FROM SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY'S MOST RECENT PLENARY STATEMENT. THIS TEXT, WHICH NOW FORMS THE BASIS OF DRAFTING, READS AS FOLLOWS.

BEGIN TEXT:

IN THIS CONTEXT, THEY (REAFFIRM.. / CONFIRM..) THE UNIVERSAL SIGNIFICANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS. RESPECT FOR AND THE EFFECTIVE EXERCISE OF THESE RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS ARE ESSENTIAL FACTORS FOR THE CSCE PROCESS AND FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, JUSTICE AND SECURITY, AS WELL AS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND COOPERATION AMONG THEMSELVES AS AMONG ALL STATES.

END TEXT.

THE EAST IS TRYING TO INTRODUCE LEAD-OFF LANGUAGE TYING HUMAN RIGHTS TO "TRUE AND LASTING PEACE FREE FROM THREATS TO OR ATTEMPTS AGAINST THE SECURITY" OF ALL PARTICIPATING STATES (P.77, FINAL ACT), I.E., THE SOVIET VERSION OF RIGHT TO LIFE.

13. THE FOLLOWING NNA AND EASTERN TEXTS, WHICH ESTABLISH THE NUF PRINCIPLE AS AN EFFECTIVE "NORM" OF INTERNATIONAL LIFE, REPRESENT "GRAB BAG" LANGUAGE. NATO HAS REJECTED THE EASTERN LANGUAGE ON THE PREMISE THAT THE NON-USE OF FORCE PRINCIPLE IS ALREADY A NORM OF INTERNATIONAL LIFE AND DOES NOT REQUIRE ACTIVITY OR MEASURES TO MAKE IT AN EFFECTIVE NORM BUT INACTIVITY, I.E., REFRAINING FROM THE C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 05 OF 05 STOCKHOLM 06887 THREAT OR USE OF FORCE. WE HAVE CHARACTERIZED THE NNA TEXT AS UNNECESSARY; HOWEVER, SINCE BOTH THE EASTERN AND NNA TEXT ARE CONTAINED IN THE HFA AND MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT RESPECTIVELY, WE MAY EVENTUALLY HAVE TO ACCEPT THE NNA TEXT. HERE ARE BOTH TEXTS.

BEGIN NNA TEXT:

THEY REAFFIRM THEIR DETERMINATION TO RESPECT THIS PRINCIPLE, CONTAINED IN THE FINAL ACT, SO AS TO ENSURE THAT, AS A NORM OF INTERNATIONAL LIFE, IT IS STRICTLY AND EFFECTIVELY OBSERVED. (NNA TEXT.)

END NNA TEXT.

BEGIN EASTERN TEXT:

REAFFIRMING THEIR OBLIGATION UNDER THE UN CHARTER TO REFRAIN IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS, AS WELL AS IN THEIR

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN GENERAL, FROM THE THREAT OR  
USE OF FORCE, THE PARTICIPATING STATES IN THE CONFERENCE  
CONSIDER IT NECESSARY TO MAKE THIS PRINCIPLE AN EFFECTIVE  
NORM OF INTERNATIONAL LIFE. (EASTERN TEXT)  
END EASTERN TEXT.

14. BOTH THE NNA AND EAST HAVE INTRODUCED LANGUAGE ON  
THE "COMPLEMENTARY NATURE" OF POLITICAL AND MILITARY  
ASPECTS OF SECURITY. AGAIN, THE WEST HAS OBJECTED TO  
THE INTRODUCTION OF THIS ILL-DEFINED CONCEPT INTO THE  
NUF SECTION OF THIS DOCUMENT, BUT IN THE END WE MAY AGREE  
TO APPROPRIATE LANGUAGE TAKEN FROM THE FINAL ACT, E.G.,  
P.87, UNDER "GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS."

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END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 06881

GENEVA FOR CD DEL

SUBJECT: ON THE VERIFICATION FRONT - WEEK TWO OF THE FINAL ROUND

REF: STOCKHOLM 06779

1. CDE XII - 039

2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

3. SUMMARY. HIGHLIGHT OF THE WEEK WAS SOVIET OFFER OF THE POSSIBILITY OF AERIAL INSPECTION WITH INSPECTED COUNTRY AIRCRAFT AND CREW. NATO'S COUNTERPROPOSAL OF NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT AND CREW DREW A RESOUNDING ENDORSEMENT FROM THE NNA. DRAFTING ON MODALITIES PROCEEDED AT CATERPILLAR PACE. MAIN ISSUES LOOMING INCLUDE RESTRICTED AREAS, SPECIFYING THE AREA FOR INSPECTION, QUOTAS, AERIAL MODALITIES AND WINNING NNA SUPPORT ON THE DRAFTING OF MODALITIES. END SUMMARY.

EASTERN ACTIVITIES

4. CHIEF OF THE SOVIET GENERAL STAFF, AKHROMEYEV, ADDRESSING THE END-OF-WEEK PLENARY, OFFERED THE POSSIBILITY OF AN AIR MODALITY, APPARENTLY LINKED WITH GROUND, FOR INSPECTION BUT WITH AN IMPORTANT HOOK--THE INSPECTED STATE WOULD PROVIDE THE AIRCRAFT AND CREW. NATO WELCOMED THE PROSPECT OF INSPECTION FROM THE AIR BUT REJECTED THE HOST-COUNTRY PROVISION. AS A COMPROMISE, NATO OFFERED THE USE BY THE INSPECTING STATE OF NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT AND CREWS. THE NNA, HUNGRY FOR SOME THIRD PARTY ROLE, HEARTILY ENDORSED THE NATO OFFER.

5. AKHROMEYEV ALSO REITERATED THE SOVIET POSITION ON OTHER VERIFICATION-RELATED ISSUES. THE INSPECTED STATE WOULD ALSO PROVIDE TRANSPORT FOR GROUND INSPECTORS. ON-SITE INSPECTION IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE NATO OUT-OF-GARRISON CONCEPT. INSPECTION "MUST HAVE A CONCRETE ADDRESS," THAT IS, THE AREA TO BE INSPECTED MUST BE AN AREA WHERE MILITARY ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION ARE CONDUCTED. HE DEFINED THESE ACTIVITIES AS "TROOP OR OPERATIONAL-TACTICAL EXERCISES, TROOP MOVEMENTS AND TRANSFERS, AND CONCENTRATIONS OF TROOPS ABOVE NOTIFIABLE LEVELS OUTSIDE THEIR PERMANENT LOCATIONS IN RELATIONSHIP WITH EXERCISES AND MOVEMENTS." CLOSED AREAS AND DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS, HE SAID, WOULD BE OFF LIMITS TO INSPECTORS. HE ADDED THAT THE NUMBER AND SIZE OF CLOSED AREAS MUST BE KEPT TO REASONABLE LIMITS.

NNA HIGHLIGHTS

6. NNA PREOCCUPATIONS DURING THE WEEK CENTERED ON SECURING A ROLE FOR THEMSELVES AS THE THIRD PARTY IN THE CONDUCT OF INSPECTIONS AND ON SCOTCHING ANY RIGHT OF REFUSAL. THE AUSTRIANS ARE THE PRINCIPAL CHAMPIONS OF THE CONCEPT OF THIRD PARTY PARTICIPATION; AUSTRIAN AMBASSADOR LOIBL DEVOTED A LENGTHY STATEMENT IN WORKING

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GROUP A/B TO THE DEFICIENCIES OF A PASSIVE QUOTA SYSTEM AND THE MERITS OF MANDATORY THIRD PARTY OBSERVERS AS A SAFEGUARD AGAINST THE POTENTIAL FOR ABUSE INHERENT IN SUCH A SYSTEM. EXTENSIVE LOBBYING BY USDEL AGAINST THE CONCEPT OF MANDATORY OBSERVERS, TOGETHER WITH THE PROPOSAL FOR NEUTRAL AIR, HAD BY WEEK'S END DAMPENED NNA ENTHUSIASM FOR THE AUSTRIAN IDEA. MEANWHILE, SWISS REPS HAVE BEEN WORKING BEHIND THE SCENES TO BUILD WESTERN SUPPORT FOR AN EXCLUSIVE SWISS ROLE AS THE PURVEYORS OF THE AIRCRAFT AND CREWS. THE SWISS HAVE BEEN STRONG, BUT UNTIL NOW SOMEWHAT SILENT, PROPONENTS OF AERIAL INSPECTION. THE NEUTRAL AIR PROPOSAL WILL PROBABLY ENCOURAGE THEM TO VOCALIZE THEIR SUPPORT. THE SWISS AMBASSADOR'S INITIAL ENDORSEMENT OF NATO'S PROPOSED COMPROMISE SOLUTION TO THE AIRCRAFT/CREW C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 STOCKHOLM 06881 GENEVA FOR CD DEL

PROBLEM WAS FAINT, AS HE FELT OBLIGED TO REPRESS HIS ENTHUSIASM BECAUSE OF HIS ROLE AS COORDINATOR OF THE VERIFICATION WORKING GROUP.

(COMMENT. THE NATO NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT AND CREW PROPOSAL EVOKED AN ENTHUSIASTIC CHORUS OF SUPPORT FROM ALL THE NNA, INCLUDING YUGOSLAVIA, MALTA AND CYPRUS. SWISS ATTEMPTS TO CAPTURE THE CONCESSIONARY RIGHTS, IF THEY CONTINUE, MAY FURTHER CONTRIBUTE TO NNA DISARRAY, AS SWISS, SWEDES AND AUSTRIANS ARE ALL LIKELY TO BE SERIOUS CONTENDERS FOR THIS ROLE IF THE IDEA EVER GETS OFF THE GROUND. MEANWHILE, NNA ARDOR FOR THIRD PARTY PARTICIPATION WILL PROBABLY COOL NOW THAT THE NEUTRAL AIR OPTION IS ON THE TABLE. END COMMENT.)

#### NATO HIGHLIGHTS

7. EGOS, WOUNDED EARLIER IN THE WEEK AS WORD OF US AND UK INFORMAL MEETINGS WITH THE SOVIETS LEAKED OUT, NOW SEEM SALVED. THE ALLIANCE APPEARS ON VERGE OF A COMMON OPENING POSITION ON RESTRICTED AREAS (REFTEL). SOME CONFUSION REMAINS OVER THE PARTICULARS OF WHAT WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO ACHIEVE IN THE DRAFTING OF MODALITIES. MINOR DISPUTES OVER KINDS OF CAMERAS AND COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT INTENDED ORIGINALLY BY THE AUTHORS OF SC.1, FOR EXAMPLE, HAVE LENT AN AIR OF DISARRAY TO WESTERN ATTEMPTS AT DRAFTING MODALITIES. THE SOVIETS HAVE SMUGLY BEEN ABLE TO EXPLOIT THE SITUATION.

#### DRAFTING SESSIONS

8. AS THE DEMANDEUR ON INSPECTION, THE ALLIANCE FINDS ITSELF AT THE MERCY OF SOVIET OBSTINACY IN CONFEE'S ATTEMPTS TO DRAFT ON MODALITIES. ATTEMPTS TO ADVANCE DRAFTING BY FOCUSING ON THE MORE INNOCUOUS MODALITIES SUCH AS THOSE RELATING TO RATIONS AND LODGING HAVE GENERALLY BEEN STYMIED. ATTEMPTS TO DRAFT ON THE STICKIER MODALITIES, E.G., TIMING OF THE ENTRY OF

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INSPECTORS, DURATION OF THE INSPECTION, AND MODES OF TRANSPORT, WHICH RELATE TO THE ISSUE OF AERIAL, AS WELL AS GROUND, INSPECTION, HAVE NOT BEEN SUCCESSFUL. SOVIET AGREEMENT TO AERIAL INSPECTION IN PRINCIPAL IS NOT LIKELY TO FREE UP THE LOGJAM. THE SOVIETS NO DOUBT WILL INSIST UPON AGREEMENT TO HOST COUNTRY CONTROL AS A CONDITION FOR DRAFTING PROGRESS. ALL OF THE ALLIES, BUT ESPECIALLY FRANCE AND TURKEY WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR DRAFTING ON GROUND MODALITIES IN THE BELIEF THAT PURSUIT OF AIR MODALITIES COULD PREJUDICE OUR ABILITY TO GET EFFECTIVE GROUND MODALITIES.

## ISSUES

9. ISSUES LIKELY TO PREOCCUPY US IN THE COMING WEEK AND AFFECT THE PACE OF DRAFTING ARE THE FOLLOWING:

-- RESTRICTED AREAS. THE ALLIANCE HAS A MORE OR LESS UNIFIED OPENING GAMBIT WHICH WILL ENABLE US TO BROACH THE ISSUE AND MAKE THE SOVIETS DEMANDEURS ON THIS ISSUE. THE ALLIANCE WILL GO IN WITH A POSITION ASKING FOR NO RESTRICTED AREAS; AS THE TACTICAL SITUATION DEVELOPS WE WILL STRESS THE POSITIVE APPROACH, NAMELY, NO AREAS WHERE NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES CAN TAKE PLACE WILL BE OFF LIMITS TO INSPECTORS. THE SOVIETS MEANWHILE ARE PURPOSEFULLY SENDING MIXED SIGNALS ABOUT THEIR POSITION IN AN ATTEMPT TO EXPLOIT LATENT SPLITS AMONG THE ALLIES. THE UK, FOR EXAMPLE, WOULD LIKE TO EXCHANGE LISTS OF RESTRICTED AREAS IN ORDER TO PREVENT SOVIET ABUSE WHILE THE FRG IS STILL FLIRTING WITH A PERCENTAGE APPROACH. UNDER PRESSURE OF THE C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 STOCKHOLM 06881 GENEVA FOR CD DEL NEGOTIATIONS THE TENUOUS ALLIANCE UNITY ON THIS ISSUE MAY CRUMBLE. WE HAVE HEARD, PARTICULARLY AFTER AKHROMEYEV'S STATEMENT, THAT THE SOVIET POSITION IS GENERALLY SIMILAR TO THE POSITIVE APPROACH. WE ALSO CONTINUE TO ENCOUNTER SOVIET SUGGESTIONS, HOWEVER, THAT SENSITIVE POINTS AND PERCENTAGES ARE THE WAY TO GO AND THAT THESE WOULD NOT INTERFERE WITH INSPECTIONS.

-- DESIGNATING INSPECTION AREAS. THE SOVIETS HAVE A CONCERN SHARED BY OUR ALLIES -- HOW TO MINIMIZE THE POTENTIAL FOR FISHING EXPEDITIONS? INFORMALLY THE SOVIETS ARE PUSHING THE CONCEPT OF ESTABLISHING RULES-OF-THUMB FOR DELIMITING THE AREA INSPECTORS COULD SEARCH FOR SPECIFIC KINDS OF NON-COMPLIANCE. THUS, A SUSPECTED ACT OF NON-COMPLIANCE OF ONE TYPE, E.G., AN UNNOTIFIED DIVISION-LEVEL EXERCISE, WOULD LIMIT THE INSPECTION TO AN AREA OF 300 SQ KM. SUSPECTED NON-COMPLIANCE INVOLVING TRANSFERS OR CONCENTRATIONS WOULD HAVE THEIR AREA SPECIFICATIONS. WE, OF COURSE, SEE THIS AS AN IMPOSSIBLE APPROACH AND WILL ARGUE AGAINST ANY REQUIREMENT TO LINK THE SIZE OF THE SPECIFIED AREA TO A PARTICULAR ACTIVITY. (COMMENT:

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DRAFTING ON THE QUESTION OF HOW TO DESIGNATE AN AREA FOR INSPECTION WILL PROVE ESPECIALLY DIFFICULT. THE SOVIETS HAVE AN ULTERIOR MOTIVE IN THEIR APPROACH; THEY INTEND TO HAVE THE INSPECTING STATE SPECIFY WHAT KIND OF VIOLATION IT SUSPECTS IS OCCURRING AND THUS POSSIBLY CREATE THE LOOPHOLE FOR REJECTING THE REQUEST ON GROUNDS THAT THE REASONS CITED DO NOT FIT THE CIRCUMSTANCES. END COMMENT).

-- QUOTAS. BOTH EAST AND NNA SEEM TO FAVOR NO ACTIVE QUOTA. THE SOVIETS, FOR OBVIOUS REASONS, PREFER THIS APPROACH (IT WOULD ALLOW THEM TO CONDUCT ALL WTO INSPECTIONS). ALTHOUGH AKHROMEYEV REITERATED GRINEVSKY'S PASSIVE QUOTA OF 1-2, WE EXPECT, IN THE END, SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF THREE. USDEL IS CONSIDERING, IN ADDITION TO THE ACCEPTABILITY OF A PASSIVE QUOTA OF THREE, WHETHER OR NOT A NO ACTIVE QUOTA COULD BE MADE ACCEPTABLE IF IT CONTAINED A PROVISION THAT NO STATE MAY INSPECT ANY OTHER STATE MORE THAN ONCE.

-- AERIAL INSPECTION. WHILE NATO WILL BE FOCUSING ON THE RECENT IMS PAPER, USDEL WILL ATTEMPT TO DEVELOP A COMPREHENSIVE SET OF AIR MODALITIES WHICH WE HOPE TO USE WITH APPROPRIATE NNA.

-- CURRYING NNA FAVOR. AS AN ISSUE THIS MAY HAVE BEEN DEFUSED BY THE NATO AIR PROPOSAL. WE CAN PROBABLY EXPECT NNA SUPPORT IN THE DRAFTING OF AIR MODALITIES. IF, FOR REASONS OF THEIR OWN, THEY CONTINUE TO HAVE DIFFICULTY WITH THE PASSIVE QUOTA CONCEPT AND USE THIS AS A PRETEXT FOR IMPEDING DRAFTING, WE MAY HAVE TO FIND A WAY OF ASSUAGING THEM. ONE IDEA FLOATED BY THE SOVIETS IS TO BUY THE NNA OFF BY OFFERING THEM A QUOTA OF ONE NO-RIGHT-OF-REFUSAL.

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END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 06903

GENEVA FOR CD DEL

SUBJECT: CDE: RESTRICTED AREAS

REFS: (A) STOCKHOLM 6779 (B) STOCKHOLM 6722

(C) STOCKHOLM 5710

1. CDE XII - 42.

2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

3. SUMMARY. NATO/CDE HAS REACHED AGREEMENT ON A "GOING-IN" POSITION FOR CONFERENCE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE SUBJECT OF RESTRICTED AREAS/AREAS TO BE SPECIFIED FOR INSPECTION, IN THE CONTEXT OF CDE. THE GOING-IN POSITION DOES NOT/NOT MAKE REFERENCE TO PERMANENTLY RESTRICTED AREAS. SHOULD THE EAST INSIST ON A REFERENCE OF SOME KIND TO PERMANENTLY RESTRICTED AREAS, NATO AGREED TO FALL BACK TO LANGUAGE ALONG THOSE LINES, ALTHOUGH SOME DISCUSSION OF SPECIFICS WILL BE REQUIRED WITHIN NATO. IN FACT, SHOULD A FALLBACK POSITION BE REQUIRED, THE POTENTIAL FOR THE AGREED NATO POSITION COMING UNGLUED IS HIGH.

4. FOLLOWING DISCUSSIONS ON FRIDAY, AUGUST 28 AND MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 1, AGREEMENT WAS REACHED IN THE RELEVANT NATO CAUCUS CLUSTER GROUP ON LANGUAGE TO REPRESENT NATO'S "POSITIVE APPROACH" AND THE "GOING-IN" NEGOTIATING POSITION ON THE SUBJECT OF RESTRICTED AREAS/AREAS TO BE SPECIFIED FOR AN INSPECTION, IN THE CONTEXT OF THE INSPECTION MEASURE OF ANY CSBM AGREEMENT REACHED HERE IN CDE. DISCUSSION WAS BASED ON LANGUAGE FORWARDED REF (A) AND AGREEMENT WAS REACHED THAT, IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT NATO WAS NOT THE DEMANDEUR ON "PERMANENTLY RESTRICTED AREAS," THE REFERENCE TO SUCH AREAS SHOULD BE DELETED FROM THE "GOING-IN" TEXT. IT WAS UNDERSTOOD IN THE CLUSTER CAUCUS, HOWEVER, THAT IF THE EAST INSISTS ON SUCH LANGUAGE, NATO WILL BE PREPARED TO INCLUDE AN APPROPRIATE REFERENCE, ALONG THE LINES OF THAT IN THE LAST SENTENCE OF THE LANGUAGE FORWARDED REF (A). IT IS CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT SUCH A FALLBACK APPROACH AND SPECIFIC LANGUAGE WILL REQUIRE DISCUSSION WITHIN NATO SHOULD THE NEED ARISE. PROBLEMS IN IMPLEMENTING A FALLBACK POSITION ARE DISCUSSED IN PARAGRAPH 6 OF THIS CABLE. LANGUAGE REPRESENTING AGREED POSITION FOLLOWS:

BEGIN TEXT.

"AREA FOR INSPECTION. FOR THE PURPOSE OF VERIFYING COMPLIANCE WITH AGREED CSBMS, AN INSPECTING STATE IS PERMITTED TO DESIGNATE THE AREA IN WHICH AN INSPECTION IS TO BE CARRIED OUT ON THE TERRITORY OF A PARTICIPATING STATE WITHIN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS. SUCH AN AREA WILL BE REFERRED TO AS A "SPECIFIED AREA." THE SPECIFIED AREA WILL INCLUDE, INTER ALIA, TRAINING AREAS AND TERRAIN WHERE ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION CAN BE CONDUCTED. IN A SPECIFIED AREA THE INSPECTING STATE

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WILL BE PERMITTED ACCESS, ENTRY AND UNOBSTRUCTED SURVEY EXCEPT FOR SENSITIVE POINTS (E.G. DEFENCE INSTALLATIONS, FOR EXAMPLE, NAVAL BASES, DOCKYARDS, GARRISONS, MILITARY AIRFIELDS, FIRING RANGES, BUILDINGS OR DEFENCE RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT OR PRODUCTION ESTABLISHMENTS; NAVAL VESSELS, MILITARY VEHICLES OR AIRCRAFT) TO WHICH ACCESS IS NORMALLY RESTRICTED OR DENIED."

END TEXT.

NOTE: THE ADDITIONAL LANGUAGE IN THE EARIER FORMULATION (REF A), DROPPED FROM THIS ONE, BUT UPON WHICH IT WAS AGREED ANY FALLBACK SHOULD BE BASED, READS "AND PERMANENTLY RESTRICTED AREAS WHICH SHALL BE AS LIMITED IN SIZE AND NUMBER AS POSSIBLE AND SHALL NOT INCLUDE TRAINING OR OTHER AREAS WHERE NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES CAN TAKE PLACE."

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 STOCKHOLM 06903 GENEVA FOR CD DEL

5. TWO INTERPRETATIONS WERE ATTACHED TO THIS TEXT. THE FRG UNDERSTANDS THAT THE REFERENCE TO "ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION" IN THE AGREED TEXT, AND THE REFERENCE TO "WHERE NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITES CAN TAKE PLACE" IN THE SENTENCE THAT MAY BE DRAWN ON IF THE EAST INSISTS ON A REFERENCE TO PERMANENTLY RESTRICTED AREAS (SEE REF (A)), MEANS BOTH ACTIVITIES THAT HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED AND THOSE THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED. WITH FURTHER U.S. CLARIFICATION THIS INTERPRETATION WAS ACCEPTED. U.S. CLARIFICATION WAS THAT THE FRG REFERENCE TO "THOSE THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED" ALSO COVERS THOSE ACTIVITIES WHICH WERE NOT NOTIFIED BUT ABOUT WHICH WE HAVE DOUBTS WHETHER THEY SHOULD HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED OR NOT, EVEN IF AN INSPECTION SHOWS IN THE END THAT THEY DID NOT REQUIRE NOTIFICATION. NORWAY RECALLED THAT IT HAS A PRACTICE OF ESTABLISHING TEMPORARY RESTRICTED AREAS. IN THIS CONTEXT, THEY UNDERSTAND THAT THE CONCEPT OF "SENSITIVE POINTS", NOT FULLY DEFINED IN THE TEXT, COULD BE APPLIED TO ANY TRA'S ESTABLISHED BY NORWAY, IF NECESSARY. THIS UNDERSTANDING WAS ACCEPTED.

6. FALLBACK POSITION: COMMENTS. DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE CLUSTER CAUCUS AGREED THAT THE FALLBACK POSITION WOULD MAKE REFERENCE TO "PERMANENTLY RESTRICTED AREAS," IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THIS POINT SHOULD A FALLBACK BE REQUIRED. LURKING BEHIND THIS FACADE OF UNITY ARE DIVERSE NATIONAL POSITIONS; SHOULD A FALLBACK POSITION BE REQUIRED, THIS TENUOUS UNITY COULD COME UNGLUED. WE HAVE LEARNED, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THIS "GOING-IN" POSITION REPRESENTS FOR FRANCE THE ONLY POSITION; FRANCE IS NOT/NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT A REFERENCE TO RESTRICTED AREAS. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE FRG POSITION REALLY REQUIRES A REFERENCE TO PERMANENTLY RESTRICTED AREAS; FOR THEM THE "GOING-IN" POSITION IS TACTICAL AND THEY AGREED TO IT ONLY BECAUSE THEY BELIEVE

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THE EAST WILL NEVER ACCEPT IT. AND ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE NOT RAISED IT RECENTLY, THE FRG HAS NOT LEFT BEHIND THE IDEA OF IDENTIFYING IN A CDE AGREEMENT THE PERCENTAGE OF NATIONAL TERRITORY THAT COMPRISES RESTRICTED AREAS. AND, IF PERMANENTLY RESTRICTED AREAS COME BACK INTO PLAY, THE UK MAY AGAIN ASSERT ITS DESIRE FOR AN EXCHANGE OF LISTS OF SUCH AREAS, IN ORDER TO CLOSE A WHAT THEY PERCEIVE TO BE A MAJOR LOOPHOLE -- THAT THE EAST COULD, AT RANDOM, DECLARE ANYTHING THEY WANT TO BE A RESTRICTED AREA AND THUS STYMY INSPECTION. IT IS, HOWEVER, OUR BELIEF THAT THE "GOING-IN" POSITION MAY WELL PROVE ACCEPTABLE TO THE EAST; IT IS VERY CLOSE TO THE POSITION OUTLINED IN AHKROMEYEV'S PLENARY STATEMENT LAST WEEK. THIS, OF COURSE, WILL PLACE THE FRG IN A DIFFICULT SITUATION AND THEY MAY WELL BE ISOLATED IN NATO ON THIS POINT. THE FRG CLAIMS ITS REQUIREMENT FOR RESTRICTED AREAS IS TO PROTECT U.S. FORCES IN EUROPE; WE HAVE SOUGHT TO REASSURE THEM THAT WE DON'T SEE A REQUIREMENT TO PROTECT OUR FORCES THROUGH THE CONCEPT OF PERMANENTLY RESTRICTED AREAS. END COMMENT.

BARRY  
END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

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AMBASSADOR O'BROIN, IRELAND, WORKING GROUP A + B, 1.9.1986

Friday's Plenary brought good news in the speech of Ambassador Citron, who confirmed the willingness of the sponsors of SC.1 to accept a constraining measure which would prohibit the conduct of military activities involving more than 75.000 troops unless announced two years in advance. This is an important step.

The particular measure accepted by Ambassador Citron was framed in a coordinator's paper and is also close to proposals made by the Irish delegation at an earlier stage of negotiations. It is our belief that a time-constraint, while not the most immediately glamorous of constraining measures, has solid attractions. In a time-constraint, we name a figure for what is implicitly regarded as a large and exceptional activity, thereby establishing an important reference point and helping to shape the psychological climate in which military activities are planned. The attachment of special conditions to such large activities is tantamount to an acknowledgement that the state conducting them owes an explanation, as it were, to its neighbours. Announcing large activities far in advance may help to convince others that these activities are genuinely for training purposes. Other states are given the opportunity to take whatever steps they may find necessary. Finally, a measure of this kind limits the freedom of action of states and is therefore, if we are to discuss definitions, constraining in its effects. I make no apology for underlining this last point. States will have an assurance that their neighbours, who have not announced very large activities, will not carry out such activities over the coming two years.

My delegation believes that the effectiveness, both practical and psychological, of a time-constraint may prove itself over time to be comparable to the effectiveness of constraints based on absolute ceilings, especially if by basing a system on periods of preannouncement, we are able to agree on more favourable parameters than would otherwise be the case.

We believe that a time-constraint of the kind now accepted by Ambassador Citron should be welcome to all delegations who look forward to a Europe in which military exercises are conducted with respect for the perceptions of others and for training purposes only.

My delegation hopes that further progress on constraining measures can be made in the weeks remaining to us. Perhaps a formula can now be found to give expression to the general view that once a list of activities subject to regular notification is transmitted in an annual calendar, deviations from that list should be as limited as possible.

I will enter for a moment into detail:

A two year time-constraint implies a fortiori that an activity above a certain level - 75.000 troops, to use Ambassador Citron's figure - may not be added to the list of activities transmitted in the calendar. But this, as a restriction on alterations to the calendar, appears capable of improvement. Would it be possible to limit the number of activities, or of larger activities, that may be added to the list furnished in the annual calendar? Could one envisage a ceiling on the size of any additional activities lower than the level of 75.000 troops just mentioned?

Mr. Chairman,

My delegation also welcomes the contribution to our work made in Friday's Plenary by our distinguished visitor, the First Deputy Minister of Defence the USSR Marshal Akhromeyev. I am thinking in particular of that section of his speech in which he expressed the readiness of his delegation to consider an air/ground version of on-site inspection. This step, one of several important steps taken in recent months by delegations representing various points of view, brings us closer than ever before to a significant agreement at the present phase of the CDE. As we attempt to bring our efforts to a successful conclusion, we must increase our determination to



avoid the fate of Sisyphus, who pushed his boulder almost to the crest of the slope only to lose control at the last moment and see it roll away.

Marshal Akhromeyev stipulated that aircraft for inspection should be provided by the inspected State. Others have consistently taken the view that inspection teams should rely on their own equipment. It is to be hoped that these and other differences over practical arrangements will not prove too intractable in the days to come. The Irish delegation would like to add its voice to those who expressed interest, at Friday's Plenary, in a compromise solution according to which aircraft and crew for inspections could be provided by a third State not belonging to a military alliance.

At present there are no clear indications as to what type of aircraft and what other material resources will be required for purposes of inspection. Ireland would be willing, as a State outside military alliances, to examine different options with a view to discovering whether there is any practical contribution which we could make to the conduct of ground/air inspections.

A role for third States in inspection deserves to be examined not only as a possible solution to a difficult practical problem, but also for broader political reasons. Such involvement of a third State in a ground/air inspection if it is accepted by this Conference would underline our common interest in upholding a CSBM regime. If all thirty-five States could come to feel comfortable with this solution, it might point the way to a future in which the sense of community now existing within groups of States in our midst, could become a characteristic of the entire region.

Mr. Chairman,

The Irish delegation has often argued that observers under a regime of CSBM will have a serious job of reporting to do and that the modalities of observation which we adopt should ensure the observer's right to fulfil the tasks assigned to him.

In the light of this general approach to the role of observers, we have listened carefully to the argument that observation should focus on activities of a certain size or significance. We have come to the conclusion that if the agreed threshold for notification is low, for example low enough to capture activities throughout the zone, serious attention should be given to the possibility of reaching agreement on some arrangements which would ensure that the weighty instrument of mandatory observation is economically employed.

Mr. Chairman,

My delegation was moved by the exhortation of Ambassador Delworth on Friday not to forget the expectations and fears of millions of people who may not fully comprehend the details of our discussions here but who understand what is at stake. I echo Ambassador Delworth's call. Let us not discover in ourselves, on a mid-September morning, the sense of futility of Samuel Beckett's Vladimir:

' Was I sleeping while the others suffered? ... tomorrow, when I wake... what shall I say of today? That with Estragon my friend, at this place, until the fall of night, I waited for Godot?'

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 06890  
SUBJECT: CDE: INSPECTION BY NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT  
1. CDE XII-043. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.  
2. FOLLOWING SOVIET CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF,  
MARSHALL AKHROMEYEV'S AUGUST 29 CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE  
OF AERIAL INSPECTION, FRG OFFERED A COMPROMISE PROPOSAL  
TO USE NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT AND CREWS. THE NNA'S HERE  
SPOKE WITH VARYING DEGREES OF ENTHUSIASM ABOUT THE  
IDEA OF THEIR PROVIDING THE PLANE AND CREW. IRELAND,  
A LATE COMER, JOINED THE REST ON SEPTEMBER 1.  
3. ACTION ADDRESSEES ARE THE MOST LIKELY TO COME  
FORWARD WITH SPECIFIC OFFERS OF AIRCRAFT. THE SWISS,  
SWEDES AND AUSTRIANS MIGHT MAKE ANNOUNCEMENTS IN  
CAPITALS IN THE COMING WEEK.  
4. US DEL WOULD APPRECIATE BEING ADVISED IMMEDIATELY  
OF ANY SUCH DEVELOPMENT.  
5. WE ALSO THINK IT POSSIBLE THAT A SWISS OFFER MIGHT  
BE CONVEYED TO THE SOVIETS DURING THE VISIT OF FOREIGN  
MINISTER AUBERT TO MOSCOW SEPTEMBER 3-7. WOULD APPRE-  
CIATE EMBASSY MOSCOW'S TRACKING THIS ISSUE WITH THE  
SWISS EMBASSY. BARRY  
END OF MESSAGE

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S E C R E T STOCKHOLM 06901  
 SECSTATE PASS JCS AND SECDEF  
 BONN FOR A/S RIDGWAY  
 SUBJECT: CDE: LAST MINUTE PROBLEMS ON AIR INSPECTION  
 - AND RESTRICTED AREAS

REF: STOCKHOLM 6890

1. CDE XII-045. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUDDEN SHIFTS IN THE FRENCH AND GERMAN POSITIONS CREATE MAJOR COMPLICATIONS IN THE LAST DAYS OF CDE. THE FRENCH HAVE RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS NOT REPEAT NOT TO ACCEPT NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT OVER FRANCE IN INSPECTION. THE FRENCH INSIST THAT THEY CAN ACCEPT NO REFERENCE TO CLOSED AREAS IN SECTION ON EXCEPTIONS TO INSPECTION REGIME. THE GERMANS ARE INCREASINGLY NERVOUS ABOUT ANY LANGUAGE WHICH DOES NOT REFER TO CLOSED AREAS.  
 NEUTRAL AIR
3. WE WERE INFORMED BY THE FRENCH DELEGATION ON SEPTEMBER 2 THAT THEY HAD JUST RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS TELLING THEM NOT TO ACCEPT THE NATO CAUCUS POSITION THAT INSPECTIONS MUST BE CARRIED OUT IN NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT NOT THOSE OF INSPECTED STATE. THE FRENCH ARE TO CALL FOR A REGIME WHICH LEAVES IT TO THE INSPECTED STATE TO CHOOSE NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT OR THOSE OF INSPECTED OR OF INSPECTING STATE. IN EFFECT THIS MEANS INSPECTIONS BY INSPECTED STATE AIRCRAFT. WE HAVE POINTED OUT TO FRENCH DEL THAT THEY HAVE BEEN SUPPORTING THE NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT OPTION FOR MONTHS NOW AND THAT SUCH A SHIFT OF POSITION IN THE MIDDLE OF THE END GAME IS POTENTIALLY DISASTROUS. WE HAVE ALSO URGED THEM NOT TO GO PUBLIC WITH THEIR POSITION THIS WEEK PENDING CONSULTATIONS WITH WASHINGTON; OUR GUESS IS THAT THEY WILL NOT KEEP SILENT FOR LONG.
4. THE FRENCH SAY THEIR CONCERN IS SECURITY; WE SUSPECT IT IS NEGOTIABILITY. THEIR DELEGATION HERE HAS OPPOSED OUR EFFORT TO SEEK SOUND INSPECTION MODALITIES. THEY OBVIOUSLY REALIZE THAT ANY INDICATION THAT FRANCE CANNOT ACCEPT NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT WOULD FINISH THE IDEA.
5. THE SOVIETS HERE STOPPED SHORT OF PUBLIC REJECTION OF THE NN OFFER OF AIRCRAFT - GRINEVSKY HAS ARGUED PRIVATELY AGAINST THE CONCEPT ON PRAGMATIC GROUNDS, BUT HAS NOT CLOSED THE DOOR. HOWEVER, SOVIET DELEGATION IS STALLING ON DRAFTING AIR MODALITIES ACROSS THE BOARD; WE THINK THEIR TACTIC IS TO DELAY UNTIL THE LAST MINUTE AND THEN USE THE EXCUSE THAT THERE IS NO TIME TO DRAFT ON SUCH A COMPLEX IDEA.  
 RESTRICTED AREAS
6. HERE THE FRENCH AND FRG POSITIONS ARE AT OPPOSITE ENDS OF THE SCALE. THE FRENCH SAY THEY CAN ACCEPT NO REFERENCE TO RESTRICTED AREAS IN THE EXCEPTIONS SECTION OF INSPECTION. THIS HAS BEEN THE NATO "GOING IN" POSITION WHICH HAS MADE THE GERMANS VERY JUMPY. NOW

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THE SOVIETS (NO DOUBT WITH SOME PRODDING BY THE GERMANS)  
HAVE REJECTED ANY FORMULA WHICH DOES NOT REFER TO RESTRICTED  
AREAS. WE HAVE TAKEN THE POSITION THAT WE CAN ACCEPT  
SOME REFERENCE TO RESTRICTED AREAS AS LONG AS IT DOES  
NOT CREATE A TAUTOLOGY WHICH EXCLUDES NOTIFIABLE ACTI-  
VITIES IN RESTRICTED AREAS FROM NOTIFICATION. HOWEVER,  
WE MIGHT SOON BE FACED WITH A DEADLOCK IN NATO ON THIS  
SUBJECT; IF SO WE WILL ENCOURAGE SOMEONE (SUCH AS THE  
UK) TO CUT A PRIVATE DEAL WITH THE SOVIETS.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 06968  
 SUBJECT: STRUCTURE OF THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT  
 REF: A) BONN 26553, B) STOCKHOLM 6518

1. CDE XII - 046
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

-  
 3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THIS CABLE CONTAINS THE PRELIMINARY FRAMEWORK OF A STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT AS DRAWN UP BY THE COORDINATOR FOR STRUCTURE, FINNISH AMBASSADOR KAHILUOTO. USDEL BELIEVES THE PAPER PROVIDES A GOOD BASIS FOR DISCUSSION AND IS CONSISTENT WITH NATO'S APPROACH TO THE STRUCTURE OF THE DOCUMENT. SEE PARA 6 FOR OUR PRELIMINARY COMMENTS. END SUMMARY.

4. AFTER PRELIMINARY CONTACTS WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE EAST, NNA AND WEST (THE AMBASSADORS OF THE NETHERLANDS, BELGIUM, CANADA AND DENMARK) THE COORDINATOR (KAHILUOTO - FINLAND) OF THE CONTACT GROUP ON STRUCTURE HAS GIVEN NATO AND ALL OTHER CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS THE FOLLOWING FRAMEWORK OF THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT.

BEGIN TEXT:

- DOCUMENT OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE  
 - ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND  
 - DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE CONVENED IN ACCORDANCE WITH  
 - THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT  
 - OF THE MADRID MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE  
 - HL SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE  
 - THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES OF THE  
 CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE,  
 AUSTRIA, BELGIUM, BULGARIA, CANADA, CYPRUS,  
 CZECHOSLOVAKIA, DENMARK, FINLAND, FRANCE, THE GERMAN  
 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY,  
 GREECE, THE HOLY SEE, HUNGARY, ICELAND, IRELAND, ITALY,  
 LIECHTENSTEIN, LUXEMBOURG, MALTA, MONACO, THE  
 NETHERLANDS, NORWAY, POLAND, PORTUGAL, ROMANIA, SAN  
 MARINO, SPAIN, SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND, TURKEY, THE UNION OF  
 SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE  
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND YUGOSLAVIA, MET IN STOCKHOLM  
 FROM 17 JANUARY 1984 TO 19 SEPTEMBER 1986 IN ACCORDANCE  
 WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT OF THE  
 MADRID MEETING RELATING TO THE CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE-  
 AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE.

-  
 THE PARTICIPANTS WERE ADDRESSED BY THE SWEDISH PRIME  
 MINISTER, THE LATE OLOF PALME, ON 17 JANUARY 1984.  
 OPENING STATEMENTS WERE MADE BY THE MINISTERS OF FOREIGN  
 AFFAIRS AND OTHER HEADS OF DELEGATIONS. THE PRIME  
 MINISTER OF SPAIN AS WELL AS MINISTERS AND SENIOR  
 OFFICIALS OF OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES ADDRESSED THE  
 CONFERENCE LATER.

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED

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THE CONFERENCE ON 6 JULY 1984.  
 CONTRIBUTIONS WERE ALSO MADE BY THE FOLLOWING NON-  
 PARTICIPATING MEDITERRANEAN STATES: ALGERIA, EGYPT,  
 ISRAEL, LEBANON, MOROCCO, SYRIA, AND TUNISIA.  
 THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECALLED THAT THE AIM OF THE  
 CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES  
 AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE IS, AS A SUBSTANTIAL AND  
 C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 STOCKHOLM 06968  
 INTEGRAL PART OF THE MULTILATERAL PROCESS INITIATED BY  
 THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, TO  
 UNDERTAKE, IN STAGES, NEW, EFFECTIVE AND CONCRETE ACTIONS  
 DESIGNED TO MAKE PROGRESS IN STRENGTHENING CONFIDENCE AND  
 SECURITY AND IN ACHIEVING DISARMAMENT, SO AS TO GIVE  
 EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN  
 FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS  
 AS WELL AS IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN GENERAL.

- - -  
 THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECOGNIZED THAT MUTUALLY  
 COMPLEMENTARY CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES  
 IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE MADRID  
 CONCLUDING DOCUMENT, WILL BY THEIR SCOPE AND NATURE AND  
 BY THEIR IMPLEMENTATION SERVE TO STRENGTHEN CONFIDENCE  
 AND SECURITY IN EUROPE AND THUS TO GIVE EFFECT AND  
 EXPRESSION TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE  
 THREAT OR USE OF FORCE.

-  
 THE PARTICIPATING STATES  
 HAVE DECLARED THE FOLLOWING:  
 REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE  
 HAVE ADOPTED THE FOLLOWING:  
 PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES  
 OBSERVATION OF CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES  
 CONSTRAINING MEASURES: ANNUAL FORECASTS OF CERTAIN  
 MILITARY ACTIVITIES  
 COMPLIANCE AND VERIFICATION  
 COMMUNICATION  
 THE MEASURES ADOPTED IN THIS DOCUMENT WILL COME INTO  
 FORCE ON 1 JANUARY 1987.  
 HOWEVER, THE ANNUAL CALENDARS CONCERNING NOTIFIABLE  
 MILITARY ACTIVITIES FORECAST FOR 1987 WILL BE EXCHANGED  
 NOT LATER THAN 15 DECEMBER 1986.  
 THE GOVERNMENT OF SWEDEN IS REQUESTED TO TRANSMIT THE  
 PRESENT DOCUMENT TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED  
 NATIONS. THE GOVERNMENT OF SWEDEN IS ALSO REQUESTED TO  
 TRANSMIT THE PRESENT DOCUMENT TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE  
 NONPARTICIPATING MEDITERRANEAN STATES.  
 THE TEXT OF THIS DOCUMENT WILL BE PUBLISHED IN EACH  
 PARTICIPATING STATE, WHICH WILL DISSEMINATE IT AND MAKE  
 IT KNOWN AS WIDELY AS POSSIBLE.  
 THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES EXPRESS  
 THEIR PROFOUND GRATITUDE TO THE PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT OF

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SWEDEN FOR THE EXCELLENT ORGANIZATION OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE AND WARM HOSPITALITY EXTENDED TO THE DELEGATIONS WHICH PARTICIPATED IN THE CONFERENCE. STOCKHOLM, 19 SEPTEMBER 1986  
END TEXT.

5. THE WEDNESDAY P.M. NATO CAUCUS WILL TAKE UP THE KAHILUOTO PAPER. USDEL BELIEVES THE PAPER PROVIDES A C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 STOCKHOLM 06968 GOOD BASIS FOR DISCUSSION AND IS CONSISTENT WITH THE GENERAL WESTERN APPROACH AS AGREED UPON AT THE HAGUE BRAINSTORMING MEETING (REF B). OTHER GROUPS SEEM ANXIOUS TO AGREE ON THE FRAMEWORK OF THE DOCUMENT, SO THAT THEY MAY CONCENTRATE ON THE REMAINING UNRESOLVED SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES.

6. USDEL'S PRELIMINARY COMMENTS:

-- WE ARE SATISFIED WITH THE TITLE OF THE DOCUMENT; IT AVOIDS ANY MENTION OF AGREEMENT, CONCLUDING DOCUMENT OR ANYTHING THAT MIGHT GIVE US LEGAL OR LEGISLATIVE DIFFICULTIES. IN ADDITION, THERE IS SOME SENTIMENT IN THE CAUCUS FOR DROPPING THE FULL TITLE, I.E., THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE.

-- THE REST OF THE "TECHNICAL INTRODUCTION" FOLLOWS THE STANDARD FORMATS ESTABLISHED IN HELSINKI AND MADRID.

-- NATO IS CONSIDERING ADDING ONE SECTION DRAWN FROM THE FIRST PARAGRAPHS OF THE WESTERN NUF TEXT TO REPLACE THE ELLIPSES AFTER THE AIM OF THE CONFERENCE. FOR EXAMPLE:

"ACCORDINGLY, THE PARTICIPATING STATES ADOPTED A SET OF CSBM'S, WHICH ARE OF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE, POLITICALLY BINDING, PROVIDED WITH ADEQUATE FORMS OF VERIFICATION AND WHICH COVER THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBM'S, AS LAID DOWN IN THE MADRID MANDATE."

-- NATO INSISTED THAT A CLEAR DISTINCTION BE MADE BETWEEN THE NON-USE OF FORCE SECTIONS AND THE CORE OF THE DOCUMENT -- THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES. THIS IS DONE BY LEADING INTO THE NUF SECTION WITH THE "LINK" (I.E., CSBM'S, BY THEIR SCOPE AND NATURE AND BY THEIR IMPLEMENTATION SERVE TO STRENGTHEN CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE AND THUS TO GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION

TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE) AND BY NOTING THAT THE PARTICIPATING STATES "DECLARED" THEIR NUF REAFFIRMATION, WHILE THEY HAVE "ADOPTED" THE CSBM'S.

-- REGARDING THE TREATMENT OF THE "BERLIN" ISSUE IN THE CDE, THE FRG DELEGATION ARGUES THAT ALLIED RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR BERLIN HAVE BEEN RESERVED IN THE CSCE CONTEXT BY THE "SAVINGS CLAUSE" UNDER PRINCIPLE 10, I.E., THE PRESENT DECLARATION DOES NOT AFFECT THEIR



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RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS, NOR THE CORRESPONDING TREATIES AND OTHER AGREEMENTS AND ARRANGEMENTS (SEE REF A). FURTHERMORE, THE DELEGATION POINTS OUT THAT LANGUAGE TO BE NOTED ON THE COMMITMENT TO THE FINAL ACT IN THE NUF SECTION, I.E., "THEY EMPHASIZE THEIR COMMITMENT TO ALL THE PRINCIPLES" OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, SPECIFICALLY COVERS THE "SAVINGS CLAUSE" UNDER PRINCIPLE 10.

-- USDEL MADE A FORMAL RESERVATION IN THE CAUCUS TO ACCEPTING CHAPTER HEADINGS AT THIS STAGE OF THE DISCUSSION SINCE, IN PARTICULAR, THERE IS NO AGREEMENT ON CONSTRAINING MEASURES. NATO REPRESENTATIVES HAVE MADE THIS POINT IN THEIR CONTACTS WITH KAHILUOTO. (HOWEVER, EVEN THE UNOFFICIAL EXISTENCE OF CHAPTER HEADINGS DOES PREJUDICE OUR POSITION ON CONSTRAINING MEASURES.)

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07020

SUBJECT: NAC DISCUSSION OF CDE

REF: USNATO 04725

1. CDE XII-048. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. WE THINK THE ALLIES ARE ABSOLUTELY RIGHT IN OPPOSING AN INSTRUCTED SESSION OF THE COUNCIL ON CDE BEFORE SEPTEMBER 19. ALL ALLIES ARE NOW IN THE PROCESS OF RECEIVING MUTUALLY CONTRADICTORY AND MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE INSTRUCTIONS ON CDE WHICH WILL HAVE TO BE IGNORED OR OVERRULED BETWEEN NOW AND SEPTEMBER 19. FOR EXAMPLE, THE BRITISH RECEIVED TODAY INSTRUCTIONS TO ACCEPT A QUOTA OF NO LESS THAN 5 INSPECTIONS; THE FRENCH RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS THE SAME DAY TO ACCEPT NO MORE THAN 3.
3. THE LAST THING WE NEED AT THIS STAGE IS AN EXERCISE WHICH GENERATES MORE SUCH INSTRUCTIONS AND FORCES COUNCIL MEMBERS TO AIR THEM PUBLICLY.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07021

SUBJECT: CDE: NEUTRAL INSPECTING AIRCRAFT

1. CDE XII-049. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WE THINK THERE IS A GOOD CHANCE THAT THE EAST WILL ACCEPT THE CONCEPT THAT CDE INSPECTIONS CAN BE CARRIED OUT BY NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT IF THE NNA PRESS THEIR CASE. WE UNDERSTAND THAT SWITZERLAND, SWEDEN AND AUSTRIA HAVE DECIDED IN PRINCIPLE TO OFFER SUCH AIRCRAFT AND MAY MAKE THEIR DECISIONS PUBLIC AT THE CDE PLENARY SEPTEMBER 5 - WHEN SWISS FOREIGN MINISTER AUBERT IS IN MOSCOW.

3. WE SUGGEST DEMARCHES IN BERN, HELSINKI, STOCKHOLM AND VIENNA PRIMARILY BUT ALSO IN OTHER NNA CAPITALS URGING THEM TO PRESS THEIR CASE PUBLICLY. THESE DEMARCHES SHOULD BE TAILORED TO THE INDIVIDUAL CASE BUT SHOULD GO ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES:

-- CDE IS AT A CRITICAL STAGE; CREDIBLE INSPECTION MODALITIES WILL MAKE OR BREAK THE CONFERENCE.

-- US AND ITS ALLIES WERE FIRM IN THEIR BELIEF THAT THE INSPECTING STATE SHOULD SUPPLY THE AIRCRAFT FOR AIR INSPECTION. BUT IN THE CONTEXT OF SOVIET OFFER TO ACCEPT AERIAL INSPECTION WE MADE AN IMPORTANT COMPROMISE OFFER - TO ACCEPT USE OF NNA AIRCRAFT.

-- WE CANNOT ACCEPT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL THAT INSPECTING STATE AIRCRAFT BE USED. WE DO NOT THINK THIS WOULD BE SEEN BY WESTERN PUBLICS AS CREDIBLE OR EFFECTIVE INSPECTION.

-- WE APPRECIATED POSITIVE REACTION OF NNA TO OUR OFFER TO ACCEPT NNA AIRCRAFT FOR INSPECTION. SOVIET COMMENTS TO US HAVE BEEN NEGATIVE, BUT THEY HAVE NOT CLOSED THE DOOR. WE THINK THEY WILL RESPOND MORE POSITIVELY TO A NEUTRAL KNOCK.

-- TIME IS VERY SHORT. WITH ONLY TWO WEEKS REMAINING IN THE CONFERENCE THE ISSUE OF THE INSPECTING AIRCRAFT IS KEY. WE THINK THAT REPEATED UNAMBIGUOUS PRIVATE AND PUBLIC EXPRESSIONS OF READINESS TO OFFER AIRCRAFT COULD HELP ENSURE SUCCESS AT STOCKHOLM.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07052

SUBJECT: CDE: EAST TRIES TO DEFLECT NEUTRAL OFFER OF INSPECTION AIRCRAFT

1. CDE XII -050.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: AUSTRIA AND SWITZERLAND OFFICIALLY OFFERED TO PROVIDE THEIR AIRCRAFT AND CREW FOR INSPECTIONS. HUNGARY, SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF THE EAST, SAID THAT THERE WERE TOO MANY PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES TO NEGOTIATE SUCH A REGIME IN THE REMAINING TIME BUT DID NOT EXPLICITLY REJECT THE USE OF NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT. ITALY AND THE U.S. SAID THESE PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES COULD BE RESOLVED AND SAID THAT THE NEUTRAL OFFER WOULD ENHANCE THE CREDIBILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF INSPECTION. END SUMMARY.
4. ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM THEIR RESPECTIVE CAPITALS, SWITZERLAND AND AUSTRIA SEPARATELY OFFERED "IN PRINCIPLE" TO PROVIDE AIRCRAFT AND CREWS FOR INSPECTION OF A STOCKHOLM CSBM'S REGIME. THEY BOTH INDICATED THAT THIS OFFER COULD FIT INTO A COOPERATIVE EFFORT WITH OTHER NNA AND SUGGESTED THAT RESOLUTION OF THIS THORNY ISSUE WOULD BE A MAJOR STEP AT THE CONFERENCE. AT THE SAME TIME, BOTH CAREFULLY NOTED THAT SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT MUST BE ACCEPTED BY ALL PARTICIPATING STATES.
5. ON BEHALF OF THE EAST, AND ECHOING THE PROPOSAL OF SOVIET MARSHAL AKHROMEYEV, HUNGARY RESPONDED INDIRECTLY TO THE NEUTRALS. WHILE HE DID NOT EXPLICITLY REJECT THE USE OF NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT, HE SAID "THE COMPLEX FINANCIAL, LEGAL AND PRACTICAL" DIFFICULTIES, AS WELL AS THE LACK OF TIME MADE THE USE OF ANYTHING BUT THE AIRCRAFT OF THE "INSPECTED" STATE INFEASIBLE. HE EMPHASIZED THE NEED TO EXAMINE A NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT FOR "UNAUTHORIZED EQUIPMENT" AND ARGUED THAT BECAUSE OF THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF THE TERRAIN, INSPECTED STATE CREWS AND AIRCRAFT WOULD BE SAFER. THE HUNGARIAN AMBASSADOR ALSO OUTLINED THE EASTERN APPROACH: BOTH GROUND AND AIR TRANSPORTATION WOULD BE PROVIDED BY THE INSPECTED STATE "TO AVOID DELAYS." THE RECEIVING STATE COULD, HOWEVER, AT ITS DISCRETION, INVITE NNA REPRESENTATIVES TO PARTICIPATE IN THE INSPECTION. THE INSPECTED STATE WOULD BE OBLIGED TO DELIVER THE INSPECTORS TO THE AREA DESIGNATED FOR INSPECTION IN THE SHORTEST POSSIBLE TIME AND GIVE THEM THE OPPORTUNITY TO ASSESS MILITARY ACTIVITY IN PROGRESS. IN THE AREA OF THE INSPECTION THE AIRCRAFT CREW WOULD FOLLOW THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE INSPECTORS.
6. ITALY (CIARRAPICO) AND THE U.S. RESPONDED TO THE ABOVE STATEMENTS CIARRAPICO SAID THE WEST WELCOMED THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS AND RESOLVE THE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS INVOLVED WITH NEUTRAL AIR. BARRY WELCOMED THE NEUTRAL OFFER AND SAID IT WOULD MAKE A "CREDIBLE AND

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EFFECTIVE" INSPECTION REGIME POSSIBLE. HE ARGUED THAT THE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS ALLUDED TO BY THE HUNGARIAN AMBASSADOR, E.G., FLIGHT SAFETY, FINANCIAL AND LEGAL ISSUES, WERE RESOLVABLE AND SHOULD NOT DELAY AGREEMENT ON AN INSPECTION REGIME. HE ALSO DOUBTED THAT INSPECTED STATES NEED FEAR THAT THE NEUTRAL WOULD PLACE UNAUTHORIZED EQUIPMENT ON BOARD. HE STRESSED THE U.S. PREFERENCE FOR INSPECTING STATES' AIRCRAFT BUT SAID THE U.S. COULD ACCEPT NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT IN ORDER TO MOVE THE CONFERENCE AHEAD.

7. THE EAST CLEARLY WANTS TO DIVERT THE NNA BY PROPOSING THAT THEY PARTICIPATE IN THE INSPECTIONS RATHER THAN SUPPLYING THE AIRCRAFT, WHICH ECHOES EARLIER NNA PROPOSALS. IN PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS THE SOVIETS AND OTHER WTO REPRESENTATIVES CITE THE ADVANTAGES OF USING INSPECTED STATE AIRCRAFT AND THE PROBLEMS OF USING NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT, BUT THEY DO NOT REJECT THE NEUTRAL OFFER FLATLY. THEIR TACTIC IS SIMPLY TO LET TIME RUN OUT ON THE IDEA. MEANWHILE THE FRENCH CONTINUE TO SAY PRIVATELY THAT THEIR INSTRUCTIONS WOULD REQUIRE THEM TO VETO ANY REQUIREMENT FOR NEUTRAL AIR, BUT THEY HAVE NOT YET SAID SO PUBLICLY.

**BARRY****END OF MESSAGE****CONFIDENTIAL****NNNN****SECRET**

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07069

SUBJECT: CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION

1. CDE XII - 051.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. PROVIDED BELOW ARE 22 ELEMENTS CURRENTLY CONSIDERED AS ACCEPTABLE FOR THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION. THESE ELEMENTS COMBINED WITH THE SEVEN WE ALREADY HAVE WILL EVENTUALLY FORM THE FINAL NOTIFICATION ANNOUNCEMENT. THOSE IDENTIFIED WITH A PLUS ( ) HAVE, IN FACT, BEEN ACCEPTED BY ALL SIDES AND WILL PROBABLY BE NOTED ON MONDAY. ELEMENTS IDENTIFIED WITH A DOUBLE PLUS ( ) ARE GENERALLY AGREED AND WILL BE NOTED PENDING RESOLUTION OF THE QUESTION CONCERNING DESIGNATION.
4. BEGIN TEXT OF ELEMENTS:
  - THE START AND END DATES OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY
  - THE TOTAL NUMBER OF TROOPS TAKING PART IN THE MILITARY ACTIVITY, THAT IS GROUND TROOPS, AMPHIBIOUS TROOPS AND AIRBORNE TROOPS, AND THE NUMBER OF TROOPS PARTICIPATING FOR EACH STATE INVOLVED, IF APPLICABLE
  - DESIGNATION AND TYPE OF DIVISIONS PARTICIPATING AND THE LOCATION OF EACH DIVISION'S HQS (FOR DIVISIONS WITH TROOPS AND UNITS IN MORE THAN ONE LOCATION THE LOCATION OF THE DIVISION COMMANDER'S HEADQUARTERS WILL BE GIVEN)
  - NUMBER AND TYPE OF BRIGADES/REGIMENTS IN EACH DIVISION
  - THE TOTAL NUMBER OF ARTILLERY PIECES AND MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHERS (100MM OR ABOVE)
  - THE TOTAL NUMBER OF TANKS AND THE TOTAL NUMBER OF ANTI-TANK GUIDED MISSILE LAUNCHERS MOUNTED ON ARMORED CARRIERS
  - THE TOTAL NUMBER OF HELICOPTERS, BY CATEGORY
  - ENVISAGED NUMBER OF SORTIES
  - PURPOSE OF AIR MISSIONS
  - CATEGORIES OF AIRCRAFT PARTICIPATING
  - AREA, DELIMITED BY GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES, OF AIR FORCE PARTICIPATION
  - NAME OF THE LEVEL OF COMMAND, ORGANIZING AND COMMANDING THE AIR FORCE PARTICIPATION
  - INDICATION OF NAVAL GUNFIRE (SIMULATED OR LIVE FIRE)
  - NAME OF THE LEVEL OF COMMAND, ORGANIZING AND COMMANDING THE NAVAL FORCE PARTICIPATION
  - THE TOTAL NUMBER OF TROOPS LANDED IN A NOTIFIABLE AMPHIBIOUS LANDING, OR DROPPED IN A NOTIFIABLE PARACHUTE ASSAULT
  - THE NUMBER OF LANDING CRAFT TO BEACH IN AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS
  - THE NUMBER OF BATTALION SIZED UNITS LANDED IN A NOTIFIABLE AMPHIBIOUS LANDING OR DROPPED IN A

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**NOTIFIABLE PARACHUTE ASSAULT**

- THE TOTAL NUMBER OF TRANSFERRED TROOPS FOR EACH PARTICIPATING STATE
- DESIGNATION AND TYPE OF DIVISIONS PARTICIPATING IN THE TRANSFER
- THE TOTAL NUMBER OF TANKS PARTICIPATING IN A TRANSFER
- GEOGRAPHICAL COORDINATES OF POINTS OF ARRIVAL AND POINTS OF CONCENTRATION
- THE AREA OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY DELIMITED BY GEOGRAPHIC FEATURES TOGETHER WITH GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES, AS APPROPRIATE

5. THE SOVIETS ARE PREPARED TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO PROVIDING MUCH OF THE INFORMATION, AND ON THE BASIS OF RECIPROCITY USDEL AND NATO REPS HERE BELIEVE WE SHOULD ALSO. WE WILL HAVE TO NOTE AD REFERENDUM TEXT BEGINNING SEPT 8. PLEASE ADVISE BY SEPT 8 IF ANY OF THESE TEXTS ARE UNACCEPTABLE.

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END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07070  
 SUBJECT: VERIFICATION WRAPUP - WEEK THREE OF THE FINAL  
 - ROUND

REF: STOCKHOLM 07019

1. CDE XII - 052.

2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

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3. SUMMARY. SWITZERLAND AND AUSTRIA CAME THROUGH WITH ANNOUNCEMENTS OF THEIR READINESS TO PROVIDE NNA AIRCRAFT AND CREWS. THE EAST, UNABLE TO STAVE OFF THE NNA WITH CREDIBLE ARGUMENTS, SEEMS TO HAVE LINKED ACCEPTANCE OF A NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD OF 16,000 WITH ACCOMMODATION ON VERIFICATION ISSUES AND MAY PURSUE THIS LINKAGE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NNA AERIAL OPTION. TEXTS NOTED IN THE WORKING GROUP IMPLICITLY ESTABLISHED THE PRINCIPLE OF INSPECTION FROM THE AIR OR GROUND OR BOTH. BEHIND THE SCENES BILATERAL WORK BETWEEN THE UK AND USSR IS FOCUSING ON THE ISSUES OF RESTRICTED AND SPECIFIED AREAS. WE CONTINUE TO WORK PRIVATELY WITH THE NNA ON AIR MODALITIES WHILE NATO FUMBLES FOR ITS OWN AGREED APPROACH. END SUMMARY.

4. THE NEWS OF THE WEEK WAS THE ANNOUNCED READINESS OF VIENNA AND BERN TO SUPPLY THE AIRCRAFT AND CREWS FOR AERIAL INSPECTION. LATE FRIDAY EVENING A REUTER PRESS RELEASE FROM MOSCOW, WHERE SWISS FOREIGN MINISTER AUBERT IS ON OFFICIAL VISIT, INDICATED THAT SHEVARDNADZE HAD CONDITIONALLY AGREED TO THE NNA CONCEPT. THIS WAS LATER CONFIRMED BY THE SWISS DEL WHICH HAD BEEN IN CONTACT WITH BRUNNER IN BERN. EARLIER IN THE DAY IN PLENARY, HOWEVER, THE EAST HAD ATTEMPTED TO BUY OFF THE NNA BY OFFERING THEM, AS AN ALTERNATIVE, A ROLE AS THIRD PARTY PARTICIPANTS IN INSPECTIONS. AT THE SAME TIME THEY TRIED TO POUR COLD WATER ON THE NNA OPTION BY CONJURING UP LOGISTICAL, TECHNICAL AND LEGALISTIC HURDLES WHICH THEY PORTRAYED AS TOO FORMIDABLE TO RESOLVE BEFORE CONFERENCE ADJOURNMENT.

5. IF THE REPORT OF SOVIET ACCEPTANCE IS ACCURATE, THE EAST IS LIKELY TO ATTACH CONDITIONS, SUCH AS NNA AIR AS AN OPTION OF CHOICE OF THE INSPECTED STATE. AN ACCEPTABLE VARIANT FOR US WOULD BE NEUTRAL AIR OR INSPECTED STATE AIR AT THE CHOICE OF INSPECTING STATE. THE EAST MAY ALSO TRY TO LINK PROGRESS IN THE DRAFTING OF NEUTRAL AERIAL MODALITIES TO ACCEPTANCE OF THEIR PROPOSED NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD OF 16,000 TROOPS. SOVIET REP ROZANOV ALLUDED TO THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH LINKAGE EARLIER IN THE WEEK, AS DID THE HUNGARIAN AMBASSADOR, IN HIS PLENARY STATEMENT. LINKAGE OR NOT, HOWEVER, WE WILL HAVE A FORMIDABLE TASK OF COAXING THE SOVIETS TO DRAFT MODALITIES WHICH WOULD PROVIDE FOR EFFECTIVE MONITORING FROM THE AIR BY

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19 SEPTEMBER. WE EXPECT NNA HELP HERE NOW THAT THEY HAVE COMMITTED THEMSELVES. MEANWHILE, IF MOSCOW IS INDEED READY TO ACCEPT THE NNA AERIAL OPTION, THE FRENCH MAY BE THE LAST TO HOLDOUT AGAINST IT. THE FRENCH, WHO HAVE BEEN COUNTING ON THE SOVIETS DOING THEIR DIRTY WORK, ARE UNDER INSTRUCTIONS FROM PARIS TO SAFEGUARD FRENCH TERRITORY FROM AERIAL INSPECTION BY EITHER NNA OR INSPECTING STATE AIRCRAFT AND CREWS. THE FRENCH HAVE INDICATED, HOWEVER, THAT THEY WILL NOT BE THE LONE HOLDOUT; THEY PROBABLY COULD LIVE WITH A FORMULA WHICH PERMITTED A CHOICE BETWEEN THE USE OF INSPECTED STATE OR NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT.

## DRAFTING

6. EFFORTS FOCUSED MAINLY ON THE LESS CONTROVERSIAL MODALITIES. WE MANAGED, HOWEVER, TO RECORD TEXT WHICH ESTABLISHES THAT INSPECTION COULD BE FROM THE AIR OR GROUND OR BOTH. THIS LANGUAGE ESTABLISHED THE PRINCIPLE OF SIMULTANEITY BUT FELL SHORT OF OPENING THE DOOR TO THE USE OF NON-HOST COUNTRY AIRCRAFT (SEE REFTTEL). SOVIET EFFORTS WERE CLEARLY INTENDED TO PRESERVE THE INSPECTED STATE'S CONTROL OF THE GROUND AND AIR TRANSPORT USED BY THE INSPECTORS. THEY BLOCKED ATTEMPTS, FOR INSTANCE, TO RECORD LANGUAGE THAT WOULD PROVIDE IMMUNITIES AND PRIVILEGES FOR NON-HOST COUNTRY PERSONNEL ACCOMPANYING INSPECTORS.

## ISSUES

7. RESTRICTED AREAS. WE ARE CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT WORKING OUT WITH THE SOVIETS A SOLUTION BY LATE NEXT WEEK WHICH WOULD BE SUBSTANTIVELY COMPATIBLE WITH OUR POSITION. THE SOVIETS UNDERSTAND WE NEED A FORMULA WHICH WOULD NOT PRECLUDE INSPECTION IN ANY AREA CAPABLE OF ACCOMMODATING A NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITY; THEY APPEAR TO RECOGNIZE OUR REQUIREMENT. FOR THEIR PART, THE SOVIETS NEED A FORMULA CONTAINING A REFERENCE TO RESTRICTED OR SENSITIVE AREAS. THE FRENCH, HOWEVER, HAVE INDICATED THEY CANNOT ACCEPT SUCH A REFERENCE, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEIR NOTION OF "SENSITIVE POINTS" SEEMS TO INCORPORATE WHAT OTHERS MIGHT REFER TO AS RESTRICTED OR SENSITIVE AREAS. ON SPECIFIED AREAS, THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO PUSH FORMULAS WHICH WOULD LIMIT THE AREA OF INSPECTION TO THE NATURE OF THE SUSPECTED VIOLATION, E.G., AN UNNOTIFIED DIVISION-LEVEL EXERCISE, AN UNNOTIFIED OPERATIONAL-TACTICAL EXERCISE, ETC. WE CONTINUE TO SAY THIS APPROACH IS UNACCEPTABLE.

8. AIR MODALITIES. WHILE THE NATO CLUSTER GROUP CONTINUES TO MASSAGE THE IMS PAPER, THE USDEL IS WORKING QUIETLY WITH SELECT NNA EXPERTS TO DEVELOP A SET OF MODALITIES AND SPECIFICATIONS FOR AIRCRAFT WHICH WOULD MEET OUR OBJECTIVES AND WHICH THE EAST WOULD HAVE DIFFICULTY CREDIBLY REJECTING. THE SWISS

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HAVE BEEN OUR PRINCIPAL COLLABORATORS BUT WE HAVE RECENTLY BEEN APPROACHED BY AUSTRIAN, SWEDISH AND EVEN IRISH REPRESENTATIVES. WE SEE SOME POTENTIAL FOR MINOR FRICTION AMONG THE NNA BECAUSE OF DIFFERENCES OVER MODALITIES; SOME NNA PARTIES HAVE ALSO BEGUN TO DISPARAGE AS SUITABLE AIRCRAFT MODELS WHICH OTHERS ARE WILLING TO OFFER AS CANDIDATES. NEVERTHELESS, USDEL WILL ASSIST THE MORE SERIOUS NNA CONTENDERS IN DEFINING THE REQUIREMENTS AND DEVELOPING THE SOLUTIONS FOR INSPECTION FROM THE AIR. WE BELIEVE IT TACTICALLY TO OUR ADVANTAGE IF THE NNA THEMSELVES TABLED THE MODALITIES WE JOINTLY DEVELOP.

9. QUOTAS. A PREFERENCE IS EMERGING FOR PASSIVE, AS OPPOSED TO ACTIVE, QUOTAS. UNFORTUNATELY, AMONG THE ALLIES VARYING AND INCOMPATIBLE NUMBERS OF INSPECTIONS HAVE BEGUN TO SURFACE. THE SOVIETS ARE MAKING CLEAR THEY DO NOT WANT AN ACTIVE QUOTA; AN ACTIVE QUOTA WOULD DENY THEM THE ROLE OF INSPECTION EXECUTOR ON BEHALF OF THE WTO. SOVIET OPPOSITION TO AN ACTIVE QUOTA, HOWEVER, WOULD ALSO IMPLY NO SERIOUS OBJECTION TO THE POTENTIAL PROSPECT OF THE U.S. OR FRG MONOPOLIZING THE NUMBER OF INSPECTIONS WHICH COULD BE VISITED UPON THE SOVIET UNION UNDER A PASSIVE QUOTA SYSTEM. THE NNA APPEAR RESIGNED TO QUOTAS BUT ARE AS CONFUSED AS THE REST OF US ABOUT THE PROSPECT OF FINDING AN EQUITABLE FORMULA. THE NNA WOULD PREFER A HIGH NUMBER OF PERMISSIBLE INSPECTIONS. THEY ARE CONCERNED THAT A LOW NUMBER COULD READILY BE EXHAUSTED BY MEMBERS OF EITHER OF THE TWO MILITARY ALLIANCES. AS FOR THE ALLIES, THE BRITISH INFORM US THEY WILL SUPPORT A PASSIVE QUOTA OF NO LESS THAN FIVE; THE FRENCH SAY THEY CAN ACCEPT NO MORE THAN THREE. OUR TASK THIS COMING WEEK WILL BE TO DEVELOP FORMULAS WHICH WOULD DENY THE SOVIETS THE POSSIBILITY OF INSPECTING ON BEHALF OF THE WTO AND SATISFY THE NNA PERCEIVED REQUIREMENT FOR A HIGH NUMBER. AT THE SAME TIME, WE CONTINUE TO SEARCH FOR A FORMULA WHICH WOULD PRECLUDE THE NNA USE OF INSPECTION QUOTAS TO WHICH NATO AND THE WTO WOULD BE LIABLE. THIS IS PROVING PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT AND WE ARE CURRENTLY FAVORING AN APPROACH OF UNLIMITED ACTIVE, BUT WITH A CLAUSE TO PREVENT ANY ONE STATE FROM CONDUCTING MORE THAN ONE INSPECTION ON ANY OTHER STATE'S TERRITORY.

10. IN A LATE DEVELOPMENT ON SEPT 6, GRINEVSKY TOLD US THAT HIS INITIAL READOUT IS THAT MOSCOW'S POSITION IS THAT NEUTRAL AIR CAN BE USED FOR INSPECTION AT THE OPTION OF THE INSPECTED STATE. SINCE THE USSR WOULD SURELY CHOOSE ITS OWN AIRCRAFT IN SUCH SITUATIONS, THIS REPRESENTS NO REAL CHANGE IN THEIR POSITION. SUSPICIOUS MINDS WOULD NOTE THAT THIS IS ALSO THE FRENCH POSITION. AT LEAST THIS GIVES US THE CHANCE TO

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DRAFT ON MODALITIES FOR NEUTRAL AIR WHILE LEAVING  
ASIDE THE PARAGRAPH ON THE CRITICAL ISSUE OF WHO GETS  
TO MAKE THE CHOICE OF NNA AIRCRAFT.

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END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07071

SUBJECT: WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS --

- SEPTEMBER 1-5, 1986

REF: STOCKHOLM 7019

1. CDE XII - 053.

2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

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3. BEGIN SUMMARY AND GENERAL ASSESSMENT: THE HIGHLIGHT OF THE WEEK WAS THE BUILDING MOMENTUM FOR THE USE OF NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT IN THE INSPECTION REGIME. AT FRIDAY'S PLENARY AUSTRIA AND SWITZERLAND OFFICIALLY OFFERED TO PROVIDE THEIR AIRCRAFT AND CREW FOR THE PURPOSES OF INSPECTION OF A STOCKHOLM CSBM'S REGIME. HUNGARY, SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF THE EAST, SAID THAT THERE WERE TOO MANY PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES TO NEGOTIATE SUCH A REGIME IN THE REMAINING TIME BUT DID NOT EXPLICITLY REJECT THE USE OF NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT. THE U.S. ARGUED THAT THESE PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES COULD BE RESOLVED AND SAID THAT THE NEUTRAL OFFER WOULD ENHANCE THE CREDIBILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF INSPECTION.

THERE IS, UNFORTUNATELY, A PERHAPS FATAL FLAW IN THIS ROSY SCENARIO: FRANCE. PARIS HAS NOW SAID IT CAN ONLY GO ALONG WITH THE USE OF INSPECTED STATE AIRCRAFT. UNFORTUNATELY, THE FRENCH ARE NOT ALONE IN RAISING DIFFICULT, AND SOMETIMES NON-NEGOTIABLE, DEMANDS. AS THE THOUGHT BELATEDLY DAWNS ON OTHER DELEGATIONS AND THEIR CAPITALS (AND DEFENSE MINISTRIES) THAT THERE ACTUALLY MAY BE AN AGREEMENT AFFECTING THEIR SECURITY INTERESTS COMING OUT OF STOCKHOLM, THE COLONELS HAVE BEGUN TO REVOLT. VARIOUS DELEGATIONS HAVE COME UP WITH LAST-MINUTE FIXES TO PROTECT THEIR PERCEIVED SECURITY INTERESTS. THE FRENCH, OF COURSE, LEAD THE WAY. THEY HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THEY CAN ACCEPT NO MORE THAN THREE PASSIVE INSPECTIONS AND CANNOT ACCEPT NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT FOR THOSE INSPECTIONS. THE BRITISH MINISTER OF DEFENSE IS UPSET THAT THE ALLIANCE HAS EXEMPTED MOBILIZATION FROM NOTIFICATION. FINALLY, THE SOVIETS HAVE THEIR OWN AGENDA; MUCH OF IT IS NEGATIVE. THEY ARE THEREFORE DRAGGING THEIR FEET ON INFORMATION IN THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION AND INSPECTION MODALITIES IN ORDER TO EMASCULATE THOSE REGIMES. THERE ARE NOW TWO WEEKS REMAINING TO RESOLVE THESE AND OTHER PROBLEMS. END SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT.

4. NOTIFICATION: EVERYTHING WAS ON HOLD WHILE A FORMULA FOR THE NOTIFICATION PARAMETER FOR GROUND FORCE ACTIVITIES WAS BEING WORKED ON BEHIND THE SCENES. WITH NATO'S BLESSING FRENCH DEPUTY FELIX-PAGANON CONDUCTED INTENSIVE PRIVATE TALKS WITH SOVIET MAJOR GENERAL TATARNIKOV TO COME UP WITH A FORMULA FOR THE STRUCTURAL ELEMENT OF THE GROUND FORCE PARAMETER. THE SOVIETS WANT THE WORDS "ORGANIZED INTO DIVISIONS..." WHILE THE WEST

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AND NNA CAN ACCEPT "ORGANIZED INTO MULTIPLE MAJOR COMBAT ELEMENTS". THE SOVIET FORMULA IS UNACCEPTABLE BECAUSE IT WOULD EXCLUDE EXERCISES BY SINGLE FULL STRENGTH DIVISIONS. MEANWHILE, HUNGARY ANNOUNCED IN PLENARY (9/5/86) THAT THE EAST COULD ACCEPT A NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD OF 16,000 IF ITS VERIFICATION CONCERNS ARE MET.

WHILE THIS ISSUE WAS BEING WORKED OUT BILATERALLY, THE FOCUS IN WORKING GROUP MEETINGS THIS WEEK WAS ON THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION. EARLY IN THE WEEK THE SWEDISH COORDINATOR (LIDGARD) DISTRIBUTED A PAPER (BASED LARGELY ON A USDEL PAPER) ON THE SUBJECT. TATARNIKOV ARGUED THAT THE COORDINATOR'S EFFORT WAS UNACCEPTABLE BECAUSE IT CONTAINED NOTHING ON TRANSFERS. AFTER A NUMBER OF SEPARATE MEETINGS BETWEEN THE COORDINATOR AND U.S. AND SOVIET NEGOTIATORS, IT APPEARED THAT EIGHT ENTRIES COULD BE NOTED. HOWEVER, THIS EMERGING CONSENSUS WAS BLOWN OUT OF THE WATER WHEN TATARNIKOV INSISTED ON A FOOTNOTE WHICH STATED THAT THIS LANGUAGE WAS ONLY PROVISIONALLY AGREED PENDING AGREEMENT ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE THRESHOLD FOR NOTIFICATION. WE REJECTED THE SOVIET CONDITION. TATARNIKOV EVENTUALLY WITHDREW THIS REQUIREMENT, BUT THEN DEMANDED INFORMATION ON THE NUMBER AND TYPE OF DIVISIONS FOR TRANSFERRED TROOPS. WE ARE INSISTING THAT THE DESIGNATION OF SUCH DIVISIONS ALSO BE GIVEN. A STALEMATE HAS RESULTED.

IN OTHER DEVELOPMENTS, THE BRITS, REPORTEDLY ALL THE WAY UP TO THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE, WERE SMARTING OVER THE ALLIANCE'S DECISION TO DROP MOBILIZATION AS A NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITY AND WERE LOOKING AT WAYS TO MAKE THE EAST AND NNA PAY MORE FOR THIS CONCESSION. WE ALSO CAN EXPECT THE NNA TO BE DIFFICULT ON THE SUBJECT OF THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION AS THEY SEE THIS AS THE ONLY OUTSTANDING ISSUE WHERE THEY CAN HAVE ANY REAL INFLUENCE.

5. VERIFICATION: THE MAJOR DEVELOPMENT IN VERIFICATION THIS WEEK WAS THE SWISS AND AUSTRIAN ANOUNCEMENTS IN PLENARY THAT THEIR GOVERNMENTS HAVE AGREED, IN PRINCIPLE, TO MAKE AIRCRAFT AND CREW AVAILABLE FOR INSPECTION. THE EASTERN REACTION, DELIVERED BY HUNGARY, RESTATED THAT AIRCRAFT SHOULD BE PROVIDED BY THE INSPECTED STATE, BUT DID NOT REJECT THE NEUTRAL AIR CONCEPT ONLY "REGRETTING" THAT THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT TIME LEFT TO CONSIDER IT. THE EAST ALSO TRIED TO "THROW A BONE" TO THE NNA BY PROPOSING THAT THE INSPECTED STATE, AT ITS DISCRETION, COULD INVITE A THIRD PARTY WITHOUT ALLIANCE RELATION TO PARTICIPATE IN THE INSPECTION. (COMMENT: OUR EASTERN INTERLOCUTORS HAVE BEEN STUDIOUS IN AVOIDING ANY PRINCIPLED OBJECTION TO NEUTRAL AIR, BASING THEIR CASE AGAINST IT SOLELY ON THE SHORT TIME REMAINING AND LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS. AS THIS

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IS MUCH THE SAME OPENING LINE THEY TOOK ON INSPECTION IN GENERAL, WE BELIEVE THERE IS STILL A GOOD CHANCE FOR SUCCESS, IF BOTH NATO AND, PARTICULARLY, NNA PRESSURE IS KEPT ON THE EAST. END COMMENT). IN FACT, THE SOVIETS MAY HAVE LEFT THEIR HUNGARIAN COLLEAGUES OUT ON A LIMB AS A REUTERS STORY CARRIED LATER IN THE DAY SUGGESTED THAT MOSCOW HAD "CONDITIONALLY" ACCEPTED THE SWISS OFFER DURING A MEETING BETWEEN SWISS FOREIGN MINISTER AUBERT AND SHEVARDNADZE.

IN THE WORKING GROUP, FIVE TEXTS (REFTEL) WERE NOTED AS THE EAST LET UP ON THE DRAFTING BRAKES SOMEWHAT. THE MOST IMPORTANCE OF THESE CONCRETIZED SOVIET AGREEMENT THAT INSPECTION COULD BE FROM THE AIR OR GROUND OR BOTH. IN SUBSEQUENT COFFEE GROUPS, SEVERAL MORE TEXTS WERE "PRE-NOTED," LEAVING TRANSPORTATION, SPECIFIED AREAS AND INSPECTION QUOTAS AS THE BIG ISSUES REMAINING. IN BILATERAL CONTACTS ON RESTRICTED AREAS, THE SOVIETS APPEAR WILLING TO GO ALONG WITH OUR "POSITIVE APPROACH" THAT AREAS WHERE NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES TAKE PLACE CANNOT BE DECLARED CLOSED, AND HAVE REAFFIRMED THAT CLOSED AREAS IN THE CONTEXT OF CDE WOULD BE DIFFERENT AND LESS EXTENSIVE THAN THOSE EXISTING CURRENTLY. THEY ARE INSISTING, HOWEVER, ON A REFERENCE TO RESTRICTED AREAS IN THE TEXT, WHICH WILL POSE PROBLEMS FOR THE FRENCH WHO SAY PARIS CAN ONLY ACCEPT "SENSITIVE POINTS". IN COFFEE GROUP DISCUSSION THE SOVIETS HAVE TRIED TO BUILD THE CASE FOR A PASSIVE QUOTA OF 1-2, BUT HAVE RECEIVED A COOL NNA RECEPTION. NATO HAS YET TO GET ITS OWN ACT TOGETHER ON NUMBERS AS THE FRENCH INSIST ON NO MORE THAN THREE, WHILE THE UK MUST HAVE NO LESS THAN FIVE. FOR NOW, WE ARE CONTINUING TO ADVOCATE AN ACTIVE QUOTA, AND ONLY SAYING THAT A PASSIVE QUOTA OF 1-2 IS INSUFFICIENT.

6. OBSERVATION: DISCUSSION THIS WEEK FOCUSED ONCE AGAIN ON THE CORE OF THE OBSERVATION REGIME, SCOPE OF OBSERVATION BUT DUE TO EASTERN STALLING TACTICS NO PROGRESS WAS MADE. THE EAST HAS APPARENTLY DECIDED THAT THE LONGER IT CAN HOLD OFF DRAFTING ON THIS ISSUE, THE LESS IT WILL HAVE TO AGREE TO ALLOW OBSERVERS TO SEE AND DO. A VARIETY OF STALLING TACTICS HAVE BEEN EMPLOYED, RANGING FROM INSISTING ON DISCUSSION OF THE OBSERVATION OF ASSOCIATED AIR AND NAVAL COMPONENTS BEFORE FOCUSING ON THE ACTUAL GROUND ACTIVITY TO TABLING LANGUAGE WHICH WOULD NOT GUARANTEE THAT OBSERVERS COULD VISIT UNITS OF EACH DIVISION TAKING PART IN AN EXERCISE. DISCUSSION BROKE DOWN COMPLETELY LATE IN THE WEEK WHEN THE SOVIETS TABLED A PAPER REFERRING TO THE OBSERVATION OF "TRANSFERS OF FORCES," WHICH ARE, IN FACT, NOT OBSERVABLE, BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT A NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITY UNDER THE RECENT AGREEMENT IN B-1. WHILE WE EXPECT THIS "MISUNDERSTANDING" TO BE RESOLVED FAIRLY QUICKLY, IT HAS

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WASTED ANOTHER FEW DAYS. NATO (AND THE NNA) WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR SERIOUS DRAFTING ON THE SCOPE OF OBSERVATION NEXT WEEK, AS MOST OF THE OTHER MAJOR ISSUES REMAINING IN OBSERVATION (E.G, DURATION, OBSERVATION OF ALERTS, AND THE QUESTION OF SPLIT OR UNITARY NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION THRESHOLDS) CONTINUE TO AWAIT DEVELOPMENTS IN B-1.

7. ANNUAL CALENDAR: THE SOVIETS BLOCKED PROGRESS THIS WEEK ON THE CONTENT OF THE CALENDAR PENDING PROGRESS ON THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION. ONCE THE LATTER ISSUE IS RESOLVED WE MAY GET AGREEMENT ON SEVERAL ADDITIONAL ITEMS OF INFORMATION IN THE CALENDAR (E.G., ON THE SIZE, THE LEVEL OF COMMAND, NUMBER AND TYPES OF DIVISIONS), ALTHOUGH WE EXPECT THESE ITEMS WILL NOT BE EASY TO EXTRACT FROM THE EAST. WE ALSO BELIEVE THEIR WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER MORE INFORMATION IS LINKED TO WHAT THE WEST IS PREPARED TO PROVIDE ON CONSTRAINTS.

8. CONSTRAINTS: IN THE FRIDAY PLENARY (9/5/86), BULGARIA (TODOROV), IN A PREPARED STATEMENT, FURTHER DEVELOPED THE EAST'S SET OF LIMITATIONS PROPOSALS. HE PROPOSED THAT NOT JUST "LARGEST SCALE" EXERCISES, BUT MEDIUM-SIZED EXERCISES AS WELL, SHOULD BE COVERED BY CSEM'S AND, IN THIS CONTEXT, PROPOSED THAT NO MORE THAN A CERTAIN NUMBER OF EXERCISES (HE PROPOSED THE NUMBER SIX) ABOVE A CERTAIN SIZE (HE PROPOSED 40,000) SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR. HE NOTED THAT THE EAST, "IN THE SPIRIT OF COMPROMISE" COULD ACCEPT 75,000 AS THE PARAMETER FOR A LIMITATION (READ CEILING) ON "LARGEST SCALE" EXERCISES; BUT SUGGESTED THAT OCCASSIONALLY THIS CEILING MIGHT BE EXCEEDED. TODOROV ALSO SUGGESTED THAT THE SWISS COORDINATOR'S NON-PAPER BE USED AS THE BASIS FOR DRAFTING.

THE EAST'S APPETITE FOR A LIMITATION CLEARLY HAS NOT BEEN ASSUAGED BY NATO'S ENDORSEMENT OF A "TIME" CONSTRAINT. WTO REPRESENTATIVES ARE VEHEMENTLY OPPOSED TO THE CONCEPT AND WE WILL FIND IT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO NEGOTIATE PARAMETERS LOW ENOUGH TO AFFECT THE PACT AS WELL AS NATO.

THE BULGARIA STATEMENT CLEARLY INDICATED AN EASTERN PREFERENCE FOR A LIMIT ON THE NUMBER OF ACTIVITIES FORECAST. HOWEVER, NATO HAS BEEN EXAMINING A RELATED NNA IDEA: A LIMIT ON THE NUMBER OF ADDITIONS TO THE ANNUAL CALENDAR. THE ONLY APPARENT AREA OF COMMON GROUND LIES IN THE AREA OF LIMITATIONS ON THE SIZE OF ACTIVITIES WHICH MAY BE ADDED TO THE CALENDAR; THERE ARE PROBLEMS WITH THIS IDEA, HOWEVER: NATO (PRIMARILY THE FRG) CANNOT ACCEPT A NUMBER LOWER THAN 75,000 WHILE THE EAST AND NNA WANT 40-50,000. AND FINALLY, USDEL REMAINS TACTICALLY OPPOSED TO A SEPARATE MEASURE ON CONSTRAINTS, ALTHOUGH, UNFORTUNATELY, MOST ALLIES ALREADY APPEAR TO HAVE GIVEN THIS AWAY.

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9. NON-USE OF FORCE: THE EAST AND NNA ARE PUTTING ON A FULL COURT PRESS TO COMPLETE WORK ON NUF AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WHILE SOME OF OUR ALLIES ARE ALSO ANXIOUS TO COMPLETE THE NUF GAME, LAST WEEK THE U.S. HELD THE BALL ANTICIPATING BREAKS IN THE EASTERN/NNA DEFENSE. THIS STRATEGY SERVED TWO PURPOSES: TO GET BETTER (OR LESS BAD) LANGUAGE ON SUCH SUBJECTS AS "THE MEDITERRANEAN" AND "ARMED FORCES" AND TO KEEP SUCH TROUBLESOME PLAYERS AS THE EASTERN CAPTAIN (KORMENDY - HUNGARY) AND THE MALTESE AMBASSADOR (GAUCI) PREOCCUPIED WITH NUF AND OUT OF THE CRUCIAL CSBM'S GAME. THIS STRATEGY HAS LARGELY SUCCEEDED. HOWEVER, AS THE FRUSTRATION FACTOR RISES AND THE FRENCH, THE ULTIMATE NON-TEAM PLAYERS, BEGIN TO INTRODUCE THEIR OWN MISCHIEVOUS LANGUAGE, THIS STRATEGY IS RAPIDLY APPROACHING A POINT OF DIMINISHING RETURNS. ACCORDINGLY, IT IS OUR VIEW THAT IT IS NOW TIME TO CUT A DEAL. SEPTTEL SPELLS OUT THE SPECIFIC LANGUAGE AND STRUCTURE OF A POSSIBLE COMPLETE NUF SECTION, INCLUDING ARMED FORCES, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND MEDITERRANEAN TEXTS. THE DEAL WILL NOT INCLUDE LANGUAGE ON THE COMPLEMENTARY NATURE OF POLITICAL/MILITARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY, THE NUF NORM, EQUAL SECURITY, PREVENTION OF ANY KIND OF WAR, ETC. IN OTHER WORDS, THE EASTERN AGENDA. USDEL BELIEVES IF SUCH A TRADE OFF IS ATTAINABLE WE SHOULD STOP THE GAME AND DECLARE VICTORY. THIS RESULT, HOWEVER, IS NOT A FOREGONE CONCLUSION.

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END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07075  
SUBJECT: CDE: NEUTRAL INSPECTING AIRCRAFT  
REF: STATE 280986

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)
  2. DRAWING ON REFTTEL, POLCOUNS SEPT. 8 DISCUSSED QUESTION OF NNA AIRCRAFT AND CREWS BEING USED FOR AERIAL INSPECTION WITH ARNE KALLIN OF MFA CDE SECTION. KALLIN SAID THAT, ALTHOUGH THE GOS HAS NOT YET MADE AS EXPLICIT A STATEMENT AS THE AUSTRIANS AND THE SWISS, THE GOS HAS MADE CLEAR AT THE CDE ITS POSITIVE ATTITUDE TOWARDS THIS PROPOSAL. KALLIN SAID THAT SWEDISH MILITARY OFFICIALS ARE CURRENTLY EXAMINING THE DETAILS OF AIRCRAFT INSPECTION AND THAT HE UNDERSTANDS THAT A SUITABLE SWEDISH AIRCRAFT HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED.
  3. KALLIN TOOK THE USG POINT ABOUT THE UTILITY OF PUBLICIZING PRIVATELY AND PUBLICLY, NNA WILLINGNESS TO PROVIDE INSPECTION AIRCRAFT. WHILE KALLIN DID NOT PROMISE ANY IMMEDIATE GOS ACTION, HE REITERATED THAT THE GOS HAS THE MATTER UNDER ACTIVE CONSIDERATION AND THAT THERE WOULD BE OPPORTUNITIES IN THE NEAR FUTURE FOR A POSSIBLE GOS STATEMENT TO BE MADE. NEWELL
- END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07090

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE FINAL NON-USE OF FORCE TEXT OF THE  
- STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT

1. CDE XII - 054
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THIS CABLE CONTAINS THE POSSIBLE FINAL STRUCTURE AND LANGUAGE OF THE NON-USE OF FORCE SECTION OF THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT. IN USDEL'S VIEW, IT CONTAINS ALL KEY WESTERN LANGUAGE AND ELIMINATES OR EMASCULATES THE MOST OBNOXIOUS EASTERN AND NNA TEXTS. TACTICALLY WE ARE IN A GOOD POSITION AND BELIEVE IT IS TIME TO STRIKE A DEAL WITH THE NNA AND EAST ON THE NUF SECTION. WE PLAN TO DO SO THIS WEEK. (SEE PARA 6 FOR ACTION REQUESTED AND PARA 7 FOR POSSIBLE FINAL NUF TEXT.) END SUMMARY.

4. THIS CABLE CONTAINS THE POSSIBLE FINAL STRUCTURE AND LANGUAGE OF THE NON-USE OF FORCE SECTION OF THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT. IT INCLUDES ALL KEY WESTERN LANGUAGE, E.G., ON HUMAN RIGHTS, TERRORISM, COMPLIANCE, ETC., AND DOES NOT INCLUDE SOME EASTERN PASSAGES, E.G., ON EQUAL SECURITY, THE NUF NORM, AND POLITICAL ASPECTS OF SECURITY, ETC. THE SECTION WILL ALSO INCLUDE PER FORCE LANGUAGE ON "ARMED FORCES" AND THE MEDITERRANEAN. MOREOVER, TO ENSURE THAT THERE CAN BE NO UNDUE FOCUS ON THESE TEXTS, WE PROPOSE USING EXISTING HELSINKI FINAL ACT AND MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT LANGUAGE. OTHER LANGUAGE PREVIOUSLY NOTED IN THE NUF WORKING GROUP SUCH AS ON THE AIM OF THE CONFERENCE AND THE CSBM'S NUF LINK WILL PROBABLY APPEAR IN THE INTRODUCTION OF THE DOCUMENT. FRENCH-INSPIRED LANGUAGE SPELLING OUT THE MANDATE OF THE CONFERENCE AND THE GOAL OF DISARMAMENT IS EITHER REDUNDANT OR MISCHIEVOUS; WE, THEREFORE, PROPOSE DROPPING THESE TEXTS FROM THE NUF SECTION. (IN ANY CASE, WE WILL HAVE TO ACCEPT SOME ANODYNE LANGUAGE ON DISARMAMENT PROBABLY IN THE INTRODUCTION OF THE DOCUMENT.) FINALLY, THE POLES ARE STILL PUSHING FOR LANGUAGE ON INVIOABILITY OF FRONTIERS TAKEN FROM THE FINAL ACT. WHILE WE WOULD NOT BLOCK FINAL ACT LANGUAGE ON THE SUBJECT IF A STRONG CONSENSUS DEVELOPS, WE HAVE HERETOFORE OPPOSED THIS LANGUAGE AS UNNECESSARY AND AS COMING TOO LATE IN THE GAME. WE HOPE IT WILL DISAPPEAR IN THE FINAL DEAL.

5. SUBSTANTIVELY, IN USDEL'S VIEW, WE HAVE EVERYTHING WE CAN REASONABLY EXPECT IN A NUF SECTION AND HAVE ELIMINATED OR EMASCULATED THE MOST OBNOXIOUS EASTERN AND NNA TEXTS. TACTICALLY, THEN, IT IS NOW TIME TO STRIKE THE FINAL DEAL WITH THE EAST AND NNA. MOREOVER, OVER THE PAST WEEK, THE FRENCH HAVE INTRODUCED SEVERAL MISCHIEVOUS AMENDMENTS TO THE WESTERN POSITION, THEREBY HOLDING UP AGREEMENT ON SEVERAL WESTERN-ORIENTED PASSAGES, E.G.,

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PEACEFUL SETTLEMENTS OF DISPUTES, NONCOMPLIANCE. THE NNA, PARTICULARLY THE AUSTRIAN COORDINATOR, ARE BECOMING FRUSTRATED AT ALLEGED AND REAL WESTERN FOOT DRAGGING. THEREFORE, USDEL PROPOSES CONCLUDING WORK ON THE NUF SECTION BY THE END OF THIS WEEK WITH THE GOAL OF NOTING THE FINAL TEXT BY TUESDAY (SEPTEMBER 16) AT THE LATEST. WE WILL PROPOSE THE LANGUAGE COMBINED IN PARA 7 AS OUR "BOTTOM LINE." IT IS FAR FROM A FOREGONE CONCLUSION THAT THE WORKING GROUP WILL ACCEPT THIS PACKAGE. THE FRENCH MAY NOT ACCEPT THIS AS A WESTERN POSITION, THE SOVIETS PROBABLY WILL NOT ACCEPT THE "ARMED FORCES" AND "HUMAN RIGHTS" LANGUAGE AND THE NNA WILL PUT FORWARD MINOR FIXES. HOWEVER, WE INTEND TO USE EASTERN AND NNA ANXIETY TO CONCLUDE WORK ON NUF TO OUR ADVANTAGE IN ARGUING OUR CASE AND TO CONCENTRATE ON THE CSBM'S END GAME.

6. ACTION REQUEST: UNLESS OTHERWISE INSTRUCTED BY COB SEPTEMBER 9, WE WILL OFFER THE FOLLOWING NUF PACKAGE TO THE EAST AND NNA BY MID-WEEK.

7. THE FINAL NUF SECTION WITH THE LEAD-IN PARAGRAPH LINKING THE NON-USE OF FORCE REAFFIRMATION TO THE ADOPTION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF CSBMS, I.E., THE LINK, FOLLOWS (THE HEADING FOR EACH PARAGRAPH, E.G., THE REAFFIRMATION, SELF-DEFENSE, WILL NOT APPEAR IN THE FINAL DOCUMENT, BUT IS INCLUDED FOR CLARITY'S SAKE. LANGUAGE WITHIN THE PARENTHESES WILL NOT BE PART OF THE WESTERN FINAL DEAL OFFER.)

BEGIN TEXT:

- THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECOGNISE THAT THE ADOPTED SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES, BY THEIR SCOPE AND NATURE AND BY THEIR IMPLEMENTATION SERVE TO STRENGTHEN CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE AND THUS TO GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE.

- THE PARTICIPATING STATES HAVE DECLARED THE FOLLOWING:  
- REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE  
- HE REAFFIRMATION

- THE PARTICIPATING STATES, RECALLING THEIR OBLIGATION TO REFRAIN, IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS AS WELL AS IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN GENERAL, FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANY STATE, OR IN ANY OTHER MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS, ACCORDINGLY REAFFIRM THEIR COMMITMENT TO RESPECT AND PUT INTO PRACTICE THE PRINCIPLE OF REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE, AS LAID DOWN IN THE FINAL ACT. (NOTED 6/17/86)

NO CONSIDERATION

- NO CONSIDERATION MAY BE INVOKED TO SERVE TO SERVE TO WARRANT RESORT TO THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN CONTRA-

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VENTION OF THIS PRINCIPLE. (NOTED 9/2/86)

- SELF-DEFENSE  
 - THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECALL THE INHERENT RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL OR COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE IF AN ARMED ATTACK OCCURS, AS SET FORTH IN THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS. (NOTED 9/2/86)

- MANIFESTATION OF FORCE  
 - THEY WILL REFRAIN FROM ANY MANIFESTATION OF FORCE FOR THE PURPOSES OF INDUCING ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE TO RENOUNCE THE FULL EXERCISE OF ITS SOVEREIGN RIGHTS. (EAST AND NNA WANT TO ADD "IN ANY FORM" OR "INDIRECT OR DIRECT" AFTER "ANY MANIFESTATION OF FORCE.")

- ARMED FORCES  
 - THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECOGNIZE THEIR COMMITMENT TO PEACE AND SECURITY. ACCORDINGLY THEY REAFFIRM THAT THEY WILL REFRAIN FROM ANY USE OF ARMED FORCES INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE PROVISIONS OF THE DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS BETWEEN PARTICIPATING STATES AGAINST ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE, IN PARTICULAR FROM INVASION OF OR ATTACK ON ITS TERRITORY.  
 - (EAST "BOTTOM LINE" LANGUAGE: "IN ORDER TO REDUCE THE DANGERS OF ARMED CONFLICT, TO PRESERVE PEACE AND TO PREVENT ANY KIND OF WAR, THEY WILL REFRAIN FROM ANY USE OF ARMED FORCES INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE PROVISIONS OF THE FINAL ACT.)

- TERRITORIAL OCCUPATION  
 - NO TERRITORIAL OCCUPATION OR ACQUISITION RESULTING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN CONTRAVENTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW WILL BE RECOGNIZED AS LEGAL.  
 - (THE FRENCH HAVE PROPOSED SIGNIFICANT DRAFTING CHANGES: "THEY MOREOVER RECALL THEIR COMMITMENT TO RESPECT THE PRINCIPLE OF TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF STATES AS SET FORTH IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, IN PARTICULAR THEY STRESS THAT NO MILITARY OCCUPATION OR ACQUISITION OF TERRITORIES BY THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN CONTRAVENTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW WILL BE RECOGNIZED AS LEGAL.")

- ERGA OMNES  
 - THEY WILL ABIDE BY THEIR COMMITMENT TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH ANY STATE, REGARDLESS OF THAT STATE'S POLITICAL, SOCIAL, ECONOMIC OR CULTURAL SYSTEM AND IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER OR NOT THEY MAINTAIN WITH THAT STATE RELATIONS OF ALLIANCE. (NOTED 7/8/86)

- NON-COMPLIANCE WITH NUF  
 - THEY STRESS THAT NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE OBLIGATION OF REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE UNITED

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NATIONS CONSTITUTES A VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. (NOT NOTED -- FRENCH OBJECTIONS; THIS PASSAGE IS ADMITTEDLY REDUNDANT, BUT IT IS CAREFULLY WORDED AND MAY ALLOW US TO TRADE OFF THIS HARMLESS TEXT FOR THE NNA DROPPING OFF THEIR POSITION ON OTHER ISSUES, E.G., MANIFESTATION OF FORCE.)

- PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

- THE PARTICIPATING STATES STRESS THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES AS CONTAINED IN THE FINAL ACT, CONVINCED THAT IT IS AN ESSENTIAL COMPLEMENT TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE, BOTH BEING ESSENTIAL FACTORS FOR THE MAINTENANCE AND CONSOLIDATION OF PEACE AND SECURITY. THEY RECALL THEIR COMMITMENT TO REINFORCE AND TO IMPROVE THE METHODS AT THEIR DISPOSAL FOR THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES. THEY REAFFIRM THEIR RESOLVE TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO SETTLE EXCLUSIVELY BY PEACEFUL MEANS ANY DISPUTE BETWEEN THEM. THE FRENCH OBJECTED TO THIS TEXT AT THE LAST MOMENT.)

- COMMITMENT TO THE FINAL ACT

- THE PARTICIPATING STATES STRESS THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE FINAL ACT OF THE CSCE AND THE NEED FOR FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL ITS PROVISIONS, AND THUS TO FURTHER THE PROCESS OF INCREASING SECURITY AND DEVELOPING COOPERATION IN EUROPE, THEREBY CONTRIBUTING TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE WORLD AS A WHOLE. (NOT AGREED, ALTHOUGH CONSENSUS IS NEAR.)

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- COMMITMENT TO ALL PRINCIPLES

- THEY EMPHASIZE THEIR COMMITMENT TO ALL THE PRINCIPLES OF THE DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTICIPATING STATES AND DECLARE THEIR DETERMINATION TO RESPECT AND PUT THEM INTO PRACTICE IRRESPECTIVE OF THEIR POLITICAL, ECONOMIC OR SOCIAL SYSTEMS AS WELL AS OF THEIR SIZE, GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION OR LEVEL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

- ALL THESE PRINCIPLES ARE OF PRIMARY SIGNIFICANCE AND, ACCORDINGLY, THEY WILL BE EQUALLY AND UNRESERVEDLY APPLIED, EACH OF THEM BEING INTERPRETED TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE OTHERS. (THE EAST WANTS TO INSERT THE LIST OF ALL TEN PRINCIPLES AT THIS POINT IN THE TEXT.)

- RESPECT FOR AND THE APPLICATION OF THESE PRINCIPLES WILL ENHANCE THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND COOPERATION AMONG THE PARTICIPATING STATES IN ALL FIELDS COVERED BY THE PROVISIONS OF THE FINAL ACT.

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HUMAN RIGHTS

- IN THIS CONTEXT, THEY CONFIRMED THE UNIVERSAL SIGNIFICANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS. RESPECT FOR AND THE EFFECTIVE EXERCISE OF THESE RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS ARE ESSENTIAL FACTORS FOR THE CSCE PROCESS FOR KNRNATKONAL PEACE, JUSTICE AND SECURITY, AS

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WELL AS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND COOPERATION AMONG THEMSELVES AS AMONG ALL STATES.

THE MEDITERRANEAN

- THEY REAFFIRM THAT, IN THE BROADER CONTEXT OF WORLD SECURITY, SECURITY IN EUROPE IS CLOSELY LINKED WITH SECURITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA AS A WHOLE; IN THIS CONTEXT, THEY CONFIRM THEIR INTENTION TO DEVELOP GOOD NEIGHBORLY RELATIONS WITH ALL STATES IN THE REGION, WITH DUE REGARD TO RECIPROCITY (IN THE SPIRIT OF THE

PRINCIPLES SET FORTH IN THE DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS BETWEEN PARTICIPATING STATES) OR (TO PROMOTE CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY AND MAKE PEACE PREVAIL IN THE REGION) AND TO GIVE EFFECT TO THE PROVISIONS ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN ADOPTED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CSCE. (POSSIBLE COMPROMISE TEXT NOT YET ACCEPTED BY THE NNA.)

TERRORISM

- THE PARTICIPATING STATES EMPHASIZE THE NECESSITY TO TAKE RESOLUTE MEASURES TO PREVENT AND TO COMBAT TERRORISM, INCLUDING TERRORISM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. THEY EXPRESS THEIR DETERMINATION TO TAKE EFFECTIVE MEASURES, BOTH AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL AND THROUGH INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, FOR THE PREVENTION AND SUPPRESSION OF ALL ACTS OF TERRORISM. THEY WILL TAKE ALL APPROPRIATE MEASURES IN PREVENTING THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIES FROM BEING USED FOR THE PREPARATION, ORGANIZATION OR COMMISSION OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. THIS ALSO INCLUDES MEASURES TO PROHIBIT ON THEIR TERRITORIES ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES, OF PERSONS, GROUPS AND ORGANIZATIONS THAT INSTIGATE, ORGANIZE OR ENGAGE IN THE PERPETRATION OF ACTS OF TERRORISM, INCLUDING THOSE DIRECTED AGAINST OTHER STATES AND THEIR CITIZENS.

SOVEREIGN EQUALITY/EQUAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES - THE PARTICIPATING STATES

STSS G CONFIRM THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE BASIC PRINCIPLE OF THE SOVEREIGN EQUALITY OF STATES AND STRESS THAT ALL STATES HAVE EQUAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. (NOTED 8/19/86)

COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS

- THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL FULFILL IN GOOD FAITH THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW; THEY ALSO STRESS THAT STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THEIR COMMITMENTS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CSCE IS ESSENTIAL FOR BUILDING CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY. (NOTED 8/19/86)

ARTICLE 103

- THE PARTICIPATING STATES CONFIRM THAT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 103 OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS,

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IN THE EVENT OF A CONFLICT BETWEEN THE OBLIGATIONS OF  
THE MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS UNDER THE CHARTER OF  
THE UNITED NATIONS AND THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER ANY TREATY  
OR OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT, THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER  
THE CHARTER WILL PREVAIL. (NOTED 9/2/86)  
END TEXT.  
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END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07121

SUBJECT: CDE: KEY ISSUES AS OF SEPTEMBER 8

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: AS WE MOVE INTO THE HOME STRETCH, ALLIED POSITIONS ARE BEGINNING TO COME TOGETHER. THE SOVIETS ARE CLEARLY FRUSTRATED BY WESTERN AND NNA PRESSURE FOR USE OF NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT IN INSPECTIONS AND MAY BE PREPARING EITHER TO YIELD ON THE ISSUE OR TO THREATEN THE BREAKUP OF THE CONFERENCE. THE NNA ARE PREPARING TO INSIST ON EXEMPTION OF THE MOBILIZED FORCES. WE HOPE TO ACCELERATE DRAFTING THIS WEEK AND WIND UP AS MANY ISSUES AS POSSIBLE. END SUMMARY.
3. GRINEVSKY AND TATARNIKOV RETURNED TO MOSCOW ON SEPTEMBER 7, PRESUMABLY FOR LAST-MINUTE CONSULTATIONS ON NEUTRAL AIR AND OTHER CDE ISSUES. GRINEVSKY IN PARTICULAR HAS EXPRESSED ANGRY FRUSTRATION WITH WESTERN PRESSURE ON INSPECTION ISSUES AND WITH GENERAL INABILITY TO PIN DOWN AGREEMENT ON KEY NOTIFICATION ISSUES. HE MAY RETURN FROM MOSCOW WITH INSTRUCTIONS EITHER TO GIVE IN ON NEUTRAL AIR OR TO THREATEN NO AGREEMENT.  
NEUTRAL AIR
4. SWISS FOREIGN MINISTER AUBERT REPORTEDLY PRESSED SHEVARDNADZE HARD ON THE NEUTRAL AIR QUESTION ON SEPTEMBER 5. SHEVARDNADZE'S INITIAL REACTION WAS TO SAY THAT AKHROMEYEV HAD OFFERED THE LAST WORD IN ACCEPTING AERIAL INSPECTION WITH THE INSPECTED STATE'S AIRCRAFT. IN THE FACE OF SWISS PERSISTENCE, SHEVARDNADZE SAID THE SOVIETS COULD ACCEPT NNA AIRCRAFT IF ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL FOR VERIFICATION. OTHER SOVIET MFA OFFICIALS TOOK THE LINE THAT THERE WAS NO TIME TO DRAFT MODALITIES COVERING NNA AIRCRAFT. THE SWISS SAID THAT DETAILS COULD BE WORKED OUT AFTER SEPTEMBER 19.
5. GRINEVSKY'S SEPTEMBER 6 VERSION OF THE MOSCOW LINE WAS THAT THE INSPECTED STATE COULD CHOOSE EITHER NNA AIRCRAFT OR INSPECTED STATE'S AIRCRAFT, BUT HE EMPHASIZED THAT HE HAD ONLY A GENERAL READOUT FROM MOSCOW. THIS, OF COURSE, IS THE SAME AS THE FRENCH POSITION AND WOULD RESULT IN THE INVARIABLE WTO CHOICE OF INSPECTED STATE'S AIRCRAFT. OUR POSITION IS THAT THE CHOICE MUST BE THE INSPECTING STATE'S.
6. IN PRACTICAL TERMS, THIS NEW SOVIET POSITION OPENS THE WAY FOR DRAFTING ON MODALITIES FOR THE USE OF NNA AIRCRAFT AS WELL AS INSPECTED STATE'S AIRCRAFT; WE WILL MAKE CLEAR THAT THERE IS NO CHOICE -- IT IS UP TO THE INSPECTING STATE. THE ALLIES HAVE GENERALLY AGREED TO PROCEED THIS WAY. THIS ROUTE DOES, HOWEVER, LEAVE THE QUESTION OF WHO MAKES THE CHOICE UNTIL THE VERY END WHEN PRESSURES FOR COMPROMISE WILL BE AT THEIR HEIGHT.
7. WE BELIEVE THAT RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF QUOTAS WILL MAKE THE QUESTION OF NNA AIR EASIER TO SOLVE. THE UK IS THE MOST CAUTIOUS OF ALL ALLIED DELEGATIONS ON

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THIS POINT. WE ARE URGING THE ALLIES TO COME TOGETHER ON A POSITION OF NO ACTIVE QUOTA, 5 PASSIVE AND A PROVISION THAT NO COUNTRY HAS TO ACCEPT MORE THAN ONE INSPECTION FROM ANY OTHER.

8. NEGOTIATIONS ON RESTRICTED AREAS AND AREAS WHERE INSPECTION CAN BE CARRIED OUT ARE MOVING AHEAD; WE BELIEVE THAT THE FRENCH AND GERMANS CAN LIVE WITH THE TEXT THE BRITISH ARE NEGOTIATING, WHICH INCLUDES MENTION OF RESTRICTED AREAS.

#### NOTIFICATION

9. THE KEY REMAINING ISSUE HERE IS THRESHOLDS. THE DISCUSSION OF THE STRUCTURAL FORMULA HAS COME ABOUT AS FAR AS IT CAN FOR THE MOMENT, AND WE STILL LACK AN ACCEPTABLE FORMULA. WE PLAN TO SHIFT THE FOCUS TO NUMBERS OF TROOPS AND TANKS HOPING THAT A SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION WILL HELP US WITH THE STRUCTURAL FORMULA. THIS WILL BE A VERY TOUGH NEGOTIATION, WHICH IS PRIMARILY IN THE HANDS OF THE UK, NORWAY AND FRG.

10. WE RESIGNED TO THE FACT THAT THE DESIGNATION OF DIVISIONS AND THEIR HEADQUARTERS LOCATIONS WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE TO GET, ALTHOUGH WE CONTINUE TO PRESS. THE REMAINDER OF THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION WILL INCLUDE MUCH, BUT NOT ALL, OF THE INFORMATION WHICH INTERESTS US.

11. THE MAIN "SLEEPER" ISSUE HERE IS POSSIBLE INSISTENCE BY SOME NNA THAT THEIR MOBILIZED FORCES BE EXPLICITLY EXEMPTED IN SOME FASHION FROM CSBMS. WE SAY THIS IS UNREALISTIC, BUT THE SOVIETS ARE SIGNALING THAT THEY CAN AGREE WITH THIS.

#### OBSERVATION

12. WE ALSO BELIEVE OBSERVATION CAN BE CLOSED OFF THIS WEEK EXCEPT FOR THE POTENTIAL PROBLEMS OF SEPARATE NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION THRESHOLDS. WE HAVE PROPOSED A COMPROMISE SOLUTION WHICH WOULD RESOLVE THE ISSUE OF OBSERVERS' BINOCULARS.

#### CALENDARS/CONSTRAINTS

14. OUR PROPOSAL OF TWO YEARS' ADVANCE NOTICE FOR EXERCISES ABOVE 40,000 HAS THE SOVIETS ON THE DEFENSIVE. WE MAY END UP WITH NO TIME CONSTRAINTS AT ALL. IN THE MEANTIME, WE WILL TRY TO SECURE A CLOSING-OFF OF CALENDAR DRAFTING WITH WHATEVER LEVEL OF DETAILED INFORMATION WE CAN GET.

#### NON-USE OF FORCE

15. COMPLETION OF DRAFTING CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED THIS WEEK ON TERMS SATISFACTORY TO NATO AND INCLUDING LANGUAGE ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND TERRORISM.

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END OF MESSAGE

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UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 07160

SUBJECT: NOTED TEXTS FOR ALL WORKING GROUPS AS OF  
SEPTEMBER 5, 1986

1. CDE XII - 055
2. UNCLASSIFIED - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. THE FOLLOWING IS A LIST OF ALL THE LANGUAGE THAT HAS BEEN REGISTERED IN THE COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK FOR ALL WORKING GROUPS AT CDE AS OF 9/5/86. THE TEXTS HAVE BEEN ARRANGED IN LOGICAL SEQUENCE, RATHER THAN CHRONOLOGICALLY AS IN PREVIOUS MESSAGES.

BEGIN TEXT:

(POSSIBLE INTRODUCTORY LANGUAGE)

... THE AIM OF THE CONFERENCE IS, AS A SUBSTANTIAL AND INTEGRAL PART OF THE MULTILATERAL PROCESS INITIATED BY THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, TO UNDERTAKE, IN STAGES, NEW, EFFECTIVE AND CONCRETE ACTIONS DESIGNED TO MAKE PROGRESS IN STRENGTHENING CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY AND IN ACHIEVING DISARMAMENT, SO AS TO GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS AS WELL AS IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN GENERAL ...

THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECOGNIZE.. THAT THE ADOPTED SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CSBMS, WHICH ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MADRID MANDATE, BY THEIR SCOPE AND NATURE AND BY THEIR IMPLEMENTATION SERVE TO STRENGTHEN CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE AND THUS TO GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE.

A-1 (NON-USE OF FORCE)

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... THE PARTICIPATING STATES, RECALLING THEIR OBLIGATION TO REFRAIN, IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS AS WELL AS IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN GENERAL, FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANY STATE, OR IN ANY OTHER MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS, ACCORDINGLY REAFFIRM.. THEIR COMMITMENT TO RESPECT AND PUT INTO PRACTICE THE PRINCIPLE OF REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE, AS LAID DOWN IN THE FINAL ACT.

NO CONSIDERATION MAY BE INVOKED TO SERVE TO WARRANT RESORT TO THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN CONTRAVENTION OF THIS PRINCIPLE.

THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECALL THE INHERENT RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE IF AN ARMED ATTACK OCCURS, AS SET FORTH IN THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

THEY WILL ABIDE BY THEIR COMMITMENT TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH ANY STATE, REGARDLESS OF THAT STATE'S POLITICAL, SOCIAL,

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ECONOMIC OR CULTURAL SYSTEM AND IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER OR NOT THEY MAINTAIN WITH THE STATE RELATIONS OF ALLIANCE.

THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL FULFILL IN GOOD FAITH THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW; THEY ALSO STRESS.. THAT STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THEIR COMMITMENTS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CSCE IS ESSENTIAL FOR BUILDING CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY.

THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECONFIRM.. THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE BASIC PRINCIPLE OF THE SOVEREIGN EQUALITY OF STATES AND STRESS.. THAT ALL STATES HAVE EQUAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. THE PARTICIPATING STATES CONFIRM, THAT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 103 OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, IN THE EVENT OF A CONFLICT BETWEEN THE OBLIGATIONS OF MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS UNDER THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER ANY TREATY OR OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT, THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CHARTER WILL PREVAIL.

A-2 (INFORMATION, VERIFICATION, COMMUNICATION)

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THE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES TO BE AGREED UPON WILL BE PROVIDED WITH ADEQUATE FORMS OF VERIFICATION WHICH CORRESPOND TO THEIR CONTENT ... . ANY PARTICIPATING STATE WHICH HAS DOUBTS AS TO ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE'S COMPLIANCE WITH THE AGREED CSBMS WILL BE ALLOWED TO ... .

THE PARTICIPATING STATE WHICH REQUESTS ... WILL STATE THE REASONS FOR SUCH A REQUEST.

THE REQUEST WILL BE ADDRESSED TO THE PARTICIPATING STATE(S) ON WHOSE TERRITORY IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS COMPLIANCE WITH THE AGREED CSBMS IS IN DOUBT.

...  
IN ITS REQUEST, THE INSPECTING STATE WILL NOTIFY THE RECEIVING STATE OF:

(A) THE REASONS FOR THE REQUEST ...;  
(B) THE LOCATION OF THE SPECIFIED AREA ... DEFINED BY GEOGRAPHICAL COORDINATES;

...  
( ) WHETHER THE INSPECTION WILL BE CONDUCTED FROM THE GROUND, FROM THE AIR OR BOTH;  
INFORMATION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF DIPLOMATIC VISAS TO INSPECTORS ENTERING THE RECEIVING STATE.

THE PARTICIPATING STATE WHICH REQUESTS ... WILL SPECIFY THE AREA WHERE ... .

THE PARTICIPATING STATE WHICH HAS RECEIVED SUCH A REQUEST WILL ... WITHIN THE AGREED PERIOD OF TIME. ... WITHIN 48 HOURS AFTER THE ARRIVAL OF THE INSPECTION TEAM AT THE SPECIFIED AREA, THE INSPECTION WILL BE TERMINATED.

THE ... WILL BE GRANTED, DURING THEIR MISSION, THE

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PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES ACCORDED TO DIPLOMATIC AGENTS IN THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE RECEIVING STATE WILL ACCOMPANY THE INSPECTION TEAM, INCLUDING WHEN IT IS IN LAND VEHICLES AND AN AIRCRAFT FROM THE TIME OF THEIR FIRST EMPLOYMENT IN THE INSPECTION UNTIL THE TIME THEY ARE NO LONGER IN USE FOR THE PURPOSES OF INSPECTION. THE INSPECTION TEAM WILL HAVE THE USE OF ITS OWN MAPS, OWN ..., OWN ... AND OWN DICTAPHONES.

A-3 (ANNUAL CALENDAR AND CONSTRAINING MEASURES)

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EACH PARTICIPATING STATE WILL EXCHANGE, WITH ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES, AN ANNUAL CALENDAR OF ITS NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES, WITHIN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS, FORECASTED FOR THE SUBSEQUENT CALENDAR YEAR. IT WILL BE TRANSMITTED EVERY YEAR, IN WRITING, THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS, NOT LATER THAN 15 NOVEMBER FOR THE FOLLOWING YEAR.

EACH PARTICIPATING STATE WILL LIST THE ABOVE-MENTIONED ACTIVITIES CHRONOLOGICALLY AND WILL PROVIDE INFORMATION ON EACH ACTIVITY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOLLOWING MODEL: ...

-----

TO BE DEFINED

- TYPE OF MILITARY ACTIVITY AND ITS DESIGNATION
- GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS AND PURPOSE OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY
- NAMES OF THE STATES INVOLVED IN THE MILITARY ACTIVITY
- ...
- AREA OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY, INDICATED BY APPROPRIATE GEOGRAPHIC FEATURES AND/OR DEFINED BY GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES
- PLANNED DURATION OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY AND THE 14 DAY PERIOD, INDICATED BY DATES, WITHIN WHICH IT IS ENVISAGED TO START.

B-1 NOTIFICATION

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1.0 PRIOR NOTIFICATION

1.1 THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL GIVE ... IN WRITING THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS IN AN AGREED FORM OF CONTENT, TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES ... DAYS OR MORE IN ADVANCE OF THE START OF NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS.

1.2 ... WILL BE GIVEN BY THE PARTICIPATING STATE ON WHOSE TERRITORY THE ACTIVITY IN QUESTION IS PLANNED TO TAKE PLACE EVEN IF THE FORCES OF THAT STATE ARE NOT ENGAGED IN THE ACTIVITY OR THEIR STRENGTH IS BELOW THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL. THIS WILL NOT RELIEVE OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES OF THEIR OBLIGATION TO GIVE ..., IF THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN THE PLANNED

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- MILITARY ACTIVITY REACHES THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL.
- 2.0 ... MILITARY ACTIVITIES ... THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS AT OR ABOVE THE LEVELS DEFINED BELOW, WILL BE NOTIFIED.
- 2.1 THE ENGAGEMENT OF FORMATIONS OF LAND FORCES OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES ... CONDUCTED ... INDEPENDENTLY OR IN COMBINATION WITH ANY POSSIBLE AIR OR NAVAL COMPONENTS.

- 
- IN THIS CONTEXT, TERM LAND FORCES INCLUDES AMPHIBIOUS, AIRMOBILE AND AIRBORNE FORCES.
- 2.2 THIS MILITARY ACTIVITY WILL BE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION WHENEVER IT INVOLVES
- 2.3 ...
- 2.4 THE PARTICIPATION OF AIR FORCES OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE NOTIFICATION IF IT IS FORESEEN THAT IN THE COURSE OF THE ACTIVITY ... OR MORE SORTIES BY AIRCRAFT, EXCLUDING HELICOPTERS, WILL BE FLOWN.
- 2.5 THE ENGAGEMENT OF MILITARY FORCES ... IN AN AMPHIBIOUS ... LANDING ... IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS.
- 2.6 THESE MILITARY ACTIVITIES WILL BE SUBJECT TO ... WHENEVER THE ... LANDING INVOLVES AT LEAST ...
- 2.8 THE ENGAGEMENT OF FORMATIONS OF LAND FORCES OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES IN A TRANSFER FROM OUTSIDE THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS TO ARRIVAL POINTS IN THE ZONE, OR FROM INSIDE THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS TO POINTS OF CONCENTRATION IN THE ZONE, TO PARTICIPATE IN A NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITY ... . THE ARRIVAL OR CONCENTRATION OF THESE FORCES WILL BE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION WHENEVER IT INVOLVES
- 2.9 ...
- 2.10 FORCES WHICH HAVE BEEN TRANSFERRED INTO THE ZONE WILL BE SUBJECT TO ALL PROVISIONS OF AGREED CSBMS WHEN THEY DEPART THEIR ARRIVAL POINTS TO PARTICIPATE IN A NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITY OR CONCENTRATION WITHIN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS. NOTIFICATION WILL BE GIVEN IN WRITING OF EACH NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITY IN THE FOLLOWING AGREED FORM OF CONTENT.
- 3.1.1- THE NAME OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY
- 3.1.2- THE GENERAL PURPOSE OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY
- 3.1.3- THE NAMES OF THE STATES INVOLVED IN THE MILITARY ACTIVITY
- 3.1.4- NAME OF THE LEVEL OF COMMAND, ORGANIZING AND COMMANDING THE MILITARY ACTIVITY
- 3.5.2- THE START AND END DATES OF EACH PHASE (TRANSFERS, DEPLOYMENT, CONCENTRATION OF FORCES, ACTIVE EXERCISE PHASE, RECOVERY PHASE) OF ACTIVITIES IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS OF PARTICIPATING

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FORMATIONS, THE TACTICAL PURPOSE AND CORRESPONDING GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS (DELIMITED BY GEOGRAPHICAL COORDINATES) FOR EACH PHASE

3.6.1- CHANGES, IF ANY, IN RELATION TO INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR REGARDING THE ACTIVITY  
3.6.2- RELATIONSHIP OF THE ACTIVITY TO OTHER NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES

B-2 OBSERVATION  
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1. A PARTICIPATING STATE WILL INVITE OBSERVERS FROM ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES TO ....
2. THE HOST STATE WILL EXTEND THE INVITATIONS IN WRITING THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES AT THE TIME OF NOTIFICATION. THE HOST STATE WILL BE THE PARTICIPATING STATE ON WHOSE TERRITORY THE NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITY WILL TAKE PLACE.
3. THE HOST STATE MAY DELEGATE SOME OF ITS RESPONSIBILITIES AS HOST TO ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE ENGAGED IN THE MILITARY ACTIVITY ON THE TERRITORY OF THE HOST STATE. IN SUCH CASES, THE HOST STATE WILL SPECIFY THE ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITIES IN ITS INVITATION TO OBSERVE THE ACTIVITY.
4. EACH PARTICIPATING STATE MAY SEND UP TO TWO OBSERVERS TO THE MILITARY ACTIVITY TO BE OBSERVED.
5. THE INVITED STATE MAY DECIDE WHETHER TO SEND MILITARY AND/OR CIVILIAN OBSERVERS, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF ITS PERSONNEL ACCREDITED TO THE HOST STATE. MILITARY OBSERVERS WILL, NORMALLY, WEAR THEIR UNIFORMS AND INSIGNIA WHILE PERFORMING THEIR TASKS.
6. REPLIES TO THE INVITATION WILL BE GIVEN IN WRITING NOT LATER THAN ... DAYS AFTER THE ISSUE OF THE INVITATION.
7. THE PARTICIPATING STATES ACCEPTING AN INVITATION WILL PROVIDE THE NAMES AND RANKS OF THEIR OBSERVERS IN THEIR REPLY TO THE INVITATION. IF THE INVITATION IS NOT ACCEPTED IN TIME IT WILL BE ASSUMED THAT NO OBSERVERS WILL BE SENT.
8. TOGETHER WITH THE INVITATION THE HOST STATE WILL PROVIDE A GENERAL OBSERVATION PROGRAMME, INCLUDING THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:
  - . 8.1 - ...
  - . 8.2 - THE DATE, TIME AND PLACE OF ASSEMBLY OF  
. . . OBSERVERS;
  - . 8.3 - PLANNED DURATION OF THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME;
  - . 8.4 - LANGUAGES TO BE USED IN INTERPRETATION AND/OR  
. . . TRANSLATION;
  - . 8.5 - ARRANGEMENTS FOR BOARD, LODGING AND  
. . . TRANSPORTATION OF THE OBSERVERS;

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- . 8.6 - ...
- . 8.7 - ...
- 9. THE OBSERVERS MAY MAKE REQUESTS WITH REGARD TO THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME. THE HOST STATE WILL, IF POSSIBLE, ACCEDE TO THEM.
- 10. ...
- 11. THE HOST STATE WILL PROVIDE OBSERVERS WITH TRANSPORTATION TO THE AREA OF THE NOTIFIED ACTIVITY AND BACK. THIS TRANSPORTATION WILL BE PROVIDED FROM EITHER THE CAPITAL OR ANOTHER SUITABLE LOCATION TO BE ANNOUNCED IN THE INVITATION, SO THAT OBSERVERS ARE IN A POSITION BEFORE THE START OF THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME.
- 12. THE INVITED STATE WILL COVER THE TRAVEL EXPENSES FOR ITS OBSERVERS TO THE CAPITAL, OR ANOTHER SUITABLE LOCATION SPECIFIED IN THE INVITATION, OF THE HOST STATE, AND BACK.
- 13. OBSERVERS WILL BE PROVIDED EQUAL TREATMENT AND OFFERED EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES TO CARRY OUT THEIR FUNCTIONS.
- 14. THE OBSERVERS WILL BE GRANTED, DURING THEIR MISSION, THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES ACCORDED TO DIPLOMATIC AGENTS IN THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.
- 15.
- 16.
  - . 16.1 -- AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME GIVE A BRIEFING OF THE PURPOSE, THE BASIC SITUATION, THE PHASES OF THE ACTIVITY AND POSSIBLE CHANGES AS COMPARED WITH THE NOTIFICATION AND PROVIDE THE OBSERVERS WITH A MAP OF THE AREA OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY ... AND AN OBSERVATION PROGRAMME WITH A DAILY SCHEDULE AS WELL AS A SKETCH INDICATING THE BASIC SITUATION.
  - . 16.2
  - . 16.3 -- IN THE COURSE OF THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME GIVE THE OBSERVERS DAILY BRIEFINGS WITH THE HELP OF MAPS ON THE VARIOUS PHASES OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY AND THEIR DEVELOPMENT AND INFORM THE OBSERVERS ABOUT THEIR POSITIONS GEOGRAPHICALLY ....
  - . 16.4
  - . 16.5
  - . 16.6 -- GUIDE THE OBSERVERS IN THE AREA OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY. OBSERVERS WILL FOLLOW THE INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED BY THE HOST STATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS SET OUT IN THIS DOCUMENT.
  - . 16.7 -- PROVIDE THE OBSERVERS WITH APPROPRIATE MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION IN THE AREA OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY.
  - . 16.8
  - . 16.9 -- PROVIDE THE OBSERVERS WITH APPROPRIATE

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BOARD AND LODGING IN A LOCATION SUITABLE FOR CARRYING  
OUT THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME AND, WHEN NECESSARY,  
MEDICAL CARE.

16.10 --

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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S E C R E T STOCKHOLM 07170

SUBJECT: CDE: MOSCOW REJECTS NNA AIRCRAFT: HOPES TO  
- AVOID NEW "CONCESSIONS"

1. SUMMARY: BACK FROM A LIGHTNING TRIP TO MOSCOW FOR INSTRUCTIONS ON THE USE OF NNA AIRCRAFT FOR INSPECTION, SOVIET HEAD OF DELEGATION GRINEVSKY AND GENERAL TATARNIKOV TOLD US FOR THE FIRST TIME ON SEPTEMBER 9 THAT THEIR AUTHORITIES COULD NOT ACCEPT NNA AIRCRAFT. WE SAID THIS COULD PREVENT AGREEMENT. ON OTHER INSPECTION ISSUES, IN PARTICULAR, ON CLOSED AREAS AND THE INSPECTION AREA, U.S. AND SOVIET POSITIONS ARE CLOSE AND THE FOCUS IS ON FINDING ACCEPTABLE LANGUAGE. THE OTHER MAIN ISSUE IDENTIFIED AS OF MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE WAS THAT OF STRUCTURAL AND NUMERICAL ELEMENTS OF THE NOTIFICATION/OBSERVATION THRESHOLD. END SUMMARY

-  
NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT:

2. BACK FROM A LIGHTNING TRIP TO MOSCOW FOR INSTRUCTIONS ON THE USE OF NNA AIRCRAFT FOR INSPECTION, SOVIET HEAD OF DELEGATION GRINEVSKY AND GENERAL TATARNIKOV TOLD US IN SEPARATE MEETINGS ON SEPTEMBER 9 WITH BARRY AND HANSEN THAT THEIR AUTHORITIES COULD NOT ACCEPT NNA AIRCRAFT. GRINEVSKY DENIED THE ACCURACY OF PRESS REPORTS OF SHEVARDNADZE'S COMMENT TO SWISS FM AUBERT THAT THE USSR WOULD CONSIDER NNA AIR INSPECTION IF ESSENTIAL TO VERIFICATION. "AT NO LEVEL OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT," HE SAID, "WAS SUCH A POSITION STATED." WHEN PRESSED, GRINEVSKY ADMITTED THAT THE SOVIET POSITION ALSO WAS THAT GROUND VEHICLES WOULD BE PROVIDED BY THE INSPECTED STATE; HE ARGUED THAT THE IMPORTANT PRINCIPLE OF CHOICE WAS NOT AFFECTED BY INSPECTED STATE TRANSPORT, BECAUSE IT IS THE INSPECTORS, NOT THE AIRCRAFT OR GROUND VEHICLES, WHICH INSPECT AND THEY WOULD GIVE THE ORDERS TO THE PILOTS REGARDING WHERE IN THE INSPECTION AREA TO GO.

3. BARRY POINTED OUT THAT WASHINGTON WOULD NOT AGREE WITH THAT INTERPRETATION AND POINTED OUT THAT THE ORIGINAL WESTERN POSITION HAD BEEN INSPECTING STATE AIRCRAFT; WE HAD MADE A SIGNIFICANT COMPROMISE IN ACCEPTING NNA AIRCRAFT. BARRY STRESSED THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF CHOICE WAS VERY IMPORTANT TO THE U.S. HE INDICATED THAT THE U.S. WOULD HAVE TO MAKE A DECISION AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL AS TO WHETHER IT COULD ACCEPT AN AGREEMENT WITH THE INSPECTORS' TRANSPORTATION IN THE HANDS OF THE INSPECTED COUNTRY. HANSEN MADE THE SAME POINT WITH TATARNIKOV. IN FACT, AGREEMENT COULD BREAK DOWN ON THIS POINT.

4. GRINEVSKY DOUBTED THAT THE U.S. WOULD WALK AWAY FROM AGREEMENT WITHOUT NNA AIR. FIRST, HE SAID, SOME OF OUR ALLIES CANNOT ACCEPT THE USE OF NNA AIRCRAFT (THE FRENCH BACK CHANNEL AT WORK?) SECOND, MANY OF THE

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NNAS DON'T LIKE THE IDEA AND ALL HAVE MADE THEIR OFFER CONDITIONAL ON ACCEPTANCE BY ALL PARTICIPANTS - A CONDITION WHICH HAD NOT BEEN MET.

-

5. BOTH GRINEVSKY AND TATARNIKOV NOTED THAT INSPECTORS WOULD BE ALLOWED TO CHOOSE WHETHER AIR INSPECTION WOULD BE CARRIED OUT BY PLANE OR HELICOPTER, STRESSING THAT HELICOPTERS WERE BETTER SUITED FOR INSPECTION. REITERATING PREVIOUS PRAGMATIC ARGUMENTS, TATARNIKOV INDICATED THAT HE HAD SPOKEN WITH SOVIET "AIR SPECIALISTS, NAVIGATORS AND OTHER SPECIALISTS" ABOUT AIR INSPECTION AND ALL HAD CONCLUDED THAT FOR REASONS BOTH FOR SAFETY FOR THE CREW AND INSPECTORS AND OF THE SECURITY OF THE INSPECTED STATE, INSPECTED STATE AIRCRAFT WERE SUPERIOR. GRINEVSKY SAID THAT U.S. MILITARY SPECIALISTS WOULD RECOGNIZE THIS POINT AND ACCEPT THAT THEIR VERSION OF AERIAL INSPECTION WAS MORE EFFECTIVE THAN OURS. BARRY REPLIED THAT IT WAS LESS CREDIBLE, AND THIS WOULD BE A CRUCIAL CONSIDERATION IN THE ALLIANCE.

CLOSED AREAS:

6. REFERRING TO HIS MOSCOW CONSULTATIONS, TATARNIKOV SAID THAT ALL MILITARY ACTIVITY SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION WOULD BE INSPECTED AND THAT SUCH ACTIVITIES WOULD NOT AND COULD NOT BE CARRIED OUT IN CLOSED AREAS. HE INDICATED THAT EVEN IN AREAS CLOSED TO FOREIGN DIPLOMATS, E.G., THE KOLA PENINSULA AND GORKY, ACTIVITIES WHICH EXCEEDED THE NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD WOULD BE OBSERVABLE, VERIFIABLE, INSPECTABLE. HE DIFFERENTIATED SUCH "MILITARY" CLOSED AREAS FROM "MISSILE" CLOSED AREAS, SAYING THAT THE LATTER ARE WELL KNOWN AND ARE FEW IN NUMBER; MOREOVER MILITARY ACTIVITIES WOULD NOT TAKE PLACE THERE.

INSPECTION AREAS:

7. GRINEVSKY DID NOT PROVIDE ANY SPECIFIC NEW IDEAS ON HOW TO DEFINE INSPECTION AREAS. BARRY NOTED THAT THE PURELY SOVIET APPROACH OF APPLYING THE AREA COVERED BY DIVISIONAL AND OPERATIONAL-TACTICAL EXERCISES TO THE AREA OF INSPECTION WOULD NOT WORK BECAUSE THE CONCEPT WAS PURELY SOVIET AND IMPLIED STRICT GEOGRAPHIC LIMITATIONS WHICH THE WEST WOULD NOT AGREE TO. HE INSISTED THAT THE AREA FOR INSPECTION MUST BE TIED TO THE CONCEPT OF NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES.

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THRESHOLDS:

8. ASKED TO IDENTIFY ANOTHER AREA IN WHICH U.S.-SOVIET POSITIONS REMAINED FAR APART, BARRY MENTIONED THRESHOLDS. BOTH THE STRUCTURAL FORMULA AND THE NUMERICAL VALUES WERE NOT AGREED, AND ON NUMERICAL VALUES WE WERE VERY DISTANT. BARRY SAID U.S. - AND THE ALLIANCE - STRONGLY PREFERRED A SINGLE THRESHOLD; CONCRETE NEGOTIATIONS

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WOULD HAVE TO TAKE PLACE WITH NATO TROIKA, NORWAY, FRG,  
UK. GRINEVSKY SAID SINGLE THRESHOLD COULD BE 20,000.  
BARRY SAID HE PREFERRED CAUCESCU'S PROPOSAL (12,000).  
CONCLUSIONS:

9. OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE IS  
OBJECTING STRONGLY TO SUGGESTIONS THAT IT MIGHT BE  
"ROLLED" ON THE QUESTION OF NEUTRAL AIR. THEY HAD  
INTENDED THAT AKHROMEYEV WOULD HAVE THE LAST WORD ON  
INSPECTION, AND RESENTED BEING SANDBAGGED BY THE  
NEUTRALS. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THEY WILL SHOW ANY FLEXI-  
BILITY IN THE REMAINING 9 DAYS. THERE IS A POSSIBILITY  
THAT SHEVARDNADZE MIGHT BE PREPARED TO GIVE GROUND ON  
THIS IN WASHINGTON (IF SUCH A MEETING TAKES PLACE).  
BUT IF SO HE WOULD PROBABLY WANT TO TRADE THIS OFF  
AGAINST ANOTHER ISSUE - PROBABLY A HIGH GROUND-FORCE  
THRESHOLD. THIS WOULD CAUSE CONSIDERABLE ALLIED  
RESENTMENT SINCE THEY WANT LOW THRESHOLDS MUCH MORE  
THAN NNA AIRCRAFT.

BARRY  
END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07180  
 SUBJECT: FUNCTIONAL NAVAL AND THE CONTENT OF  
 NOTIFICATION

1. CDE XII - 057
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: WHILE MANY WOULD LIKE TO THINK OTHERWISE, THE IDEA OF FUNCTIONAL NAVAL ACTIVITIES IS NOT DEAD IN STOCKHOLM. THE EAST HAS CONSISTENTLY MADE A LINK TO ACTIVITIES IN THE ADJOINING SEA, AND THE NEUTRAL HAVE ALWAYS SOUGHT DETAILED INFORMATION ON FUNCTIONAL NAVAL ACTIVITIES. OUR WORK HAS BEEN TO LIMIT THE AMOUNT OF FUNCTIONAL NAVAL INFORMATION TO BE INCLUDED IN THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION, AND WE HAVE SUCCESSFULLY DONE THAT. HOWEVER, IF WE RETURN TO OUR GOING IN POSITION OF INDICATING ONLY WHEN WE WILL HAVE NAVAL GUNFIRE WE OPEN THE POSSIBILITY THAT ALL OF OUR WORK ON THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION WILL COME UNRAVELED. END SUMMARY.
4. AT THE BEIGNNING OF THIS ROUND WORK BEGAN IN EARNEST ON THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION. OUR WORK WAS COMPOUNDED BY TATARNIKOV'S AGREEMENT TO PROVIDE ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION THAT WE HAD ORIGINALLY BELIEVED HE WOULD NOT PROVIDE. GEN. TATARNIKOV INDICATED THAT HE WAS WILLING TO PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON FUNCTIONAL NAVAL ACTIVITIES:
  - . A) THE COMPOSITION OF THE NAVAL COMPONENT.
  - . B) LEVEL OF NAVAL COMMAND.
  - . C) NUMBER OF LANDING CRAFT PARTICIPATING.
  - . D) NUMBER OF COMBAT SHIPS AND AMPHIBIOUS VESSELS PARTICIPATING IN AN ACTIVITY.
  - . E) NUMBER OF NAVAL PERSONNEL INVOLVED.
5. THE NEUTRAL COUNTRIES WERE EVEN MORE AMBITIOUS IN THEIR DEMANDS FOR INFORMATION ON FUNCTIONAL NAVAL ACTIVITIES. THEY WANTED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:
  - . A) NUMBER OF COMBAT SHIPS.
  - . B) NUMBER OF AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS.
  - . C) NUMBER OF AUXILIARY SHIPS.
  - . D) DESIGNATION OF THE NAVAL COMMANDER.
  - . E) TROOP CARRYING CAPACITY FOR AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS.
  - . F) NUMBER OF LANDING CRAFT PARTICIPATING.
  - . G) TOTAL NUMBER OF PARTICIPATING FORCES IN THE ACTIVITY AS A WHOLE.
6. WITHIN THE ALLIANCE WE WERE RECEIVING A GREAT DEAL OF PRESSURE TO SHOW FLEXIBILITY CONCERNING NAVAL INFORMATION. WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CONFERENCE DELIBERATIONS WE DEVELOPED A POSITION THAT WAS TOTALLY FUNCTIONAL, AND PROTECTED US SECURITY INTERESTS. WE WERE ABLE TO NARROW DOWN THE INFORMATION WISH LIST OF CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS TO A LEVEL THAT WAS REALISTIC AND MANAGEABLE. IN THE END WE WERE ABLE TO GET GENERAL CONSENSUS AMONG THE 35 TO NOTE 22 ELEMENTS IN THE

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CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION. IN THIS REGARD THERE WERE 3 ELEMENTS THAT DEALT WITH NAVAL RELATED ACTIVITIES; HOWEVER, ONE OF THESE WOULD ONLY BE REQUIRED WHEN THERE WAS A NOTIFIABLE AMPHIBIOUS LANDING. THE THREE DATA ELEMENTS AGREED TO WERE AS FOLLOWS:

. A) NAME OF THE LEVEL OF COMMAND ORGANIZING AND COMMANDING THE NAVAL FORCE PARTICIPATION. (FYI: THIS PARALLELS THE LAND FORCE COMMANDER AND IS NOT INTENDED TO CAPTURE THE COMMANDER AFLOAT, BUT THE MAJOR COMMANDER RESPONSIBLE FOR ORGANIZING THE ACTIVITY. THIS INFORMATION WOULD ONLY BE PROVIDED WHEN THE NAVAL ACTIVITY SUPPORTED A NOTIFIABLE LAND FORCE MILITARY EXERCISE ACTIVITY. WHILE UNDER OUR FORMULATION THIS WOULD CALL FOR 6TH FLEET, OR CINCLANTFLT, IF THE SOVIETS ARE SUCCESSFUL IN AVOIDING DESIGNATION, IT WOULD SIMPLY SAY "LEVEL OF COMMAND IS FLEET." END FYI)

. B) INDICATION OF NAVAL GUNFIRE (SIMULATED OR LIVE).

. C) NUMBER OF LANDING CRAFT TO BEACH IN A NOTIFIABLE AMPHIBIOUS LANDING. (FYI: THIS WORDING WAS BASED ON THE JCS DEFINITION OF LANDING CRAFT AND REPRESENTS THE PURE FUNCTIONAL RELATIONSHIP THAT EXISTS WHEN THE LANDING CRAFT COMES UP ON THE BEACH IN FULL VIEW OF THE OBSERVERS. THIS INFORMATION IS PROVIDED ONLY WHEN THERE IS A NOTIFIABLE AMPHIBIOUS LANDING AND REQUIRES NO SPECIFICATION OF TYPE, BUT ONLY THE NUMBER LANDING. THIS INFORMATION IS TOTALLY DESCRIPTIVE, AND IS NOT A VERIFICATION ELEMENT. END FYI)

7. WE HAD CLOSED THE LIST OF ELEMENTS TO APPEAR IN THE CONTENT OF NOTIFICATION AS OF LAST FRIDAY. BACKING AWAY FROM THIS LIST NOW POTENTIALLY THROWS OPEN THE ENTIRE LIST. IF WE GO IN TO REMOVE OUR TWO, WE CAN EXPECT THE SOVIETS TO COME IN AND ASK FOR THEIR TWO. WHAT IMPACT THIS WILL HAVE ON THE NEUTRALS IS UNCERTAIN. WITHIN THE ALLIANCE WE CAN EXPECT TROUBLE. ALLIES ALREADY BELIEVE THAT WE HAVE BEEN INFLEXIBLE ON THIS ISSUE, AND FURTHERMORE THEY BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD PROVIDE THE INFORMATION ANY TIME THERE IS FUNCTIONAL ACTIVITY, WHEREAS WE HAVE LIMITED THE TIMES THAT THIS INFORMATION WOULD BE PROVIDED.

8. OUR POSITION ON THE NAVAL ISSUE BECOMES EVEN MORE DIFFICULT TO MANAGE WHEN WE LOOK AT WHAT WE HAVE DONE ON FUNCTIONAL AIR. THE CURRENT POSITION OF JCS THAT WE ARE PUTTING AT RISK OPSEC REQUIREMENTS AND FUTURE CONTINGENCIES OF AIR CUSHIONED LANDING CRAFT AND ARE OPENING THE DOOR FOR THE EAST TO DEMAND MORE INFORMATION IS UNFOUNDED. WE HAD THE LIST CLOSED ON FRIDAY. AMB. HANSEN AND MAJ. TYO HAD THIS ISSUE RESOLVED, WHAT THE DELAY HAS DONE IS UNCERTAIN, BUT WE THINK WE CAN GET BACK TO WHERE WE WERE.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07203

SUBJECT: FULL AD REFERENDUM NON-USE OF FORCE TEXT OF  
- THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT

REF: A) STOCKHOLM 7071, B) STOCKHOLM 7090

1. CDE XII - 058

2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

3. BEGIN SUMMARY: THE NON-USE OF FORCE WORKING GROUP HAS PROVISIONALLY AGREED TO THE FULL TEXT OF THE NUF SECTION OF THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT. IN USDEL'S VIEW, THE TEXT IS FULLY CONSISTENT WITH THE WESTERN APPROACH TO NON-USE OF FORCE. THEREFORE, UNLESS OTHERWISE INSTRUCTED BY COB SEPTEMBER 11, WE INTEND TO AGREE TO NOTING THIS FULL TEXT ON FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 12. SEE PARA 8 FOR FULL TEXT. END SUMMARY.

4. THE NON-USE OF FORCE WORKING GROUP HAS PROVISIONALLY AGREED ON THE FULL TEXT OF THE NON-USE OF FORCE SECTION OF THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT. AS NOTED REFTELS, IN USDEL'S VIEW THE TIME WAS PROPITIOUS FOR CONCLUDING THE WORK OF THE REAFFIRMATION OF THE NUF PRINCIPLE: WE HAD NOTED OUR MOST IMPORTANT TEXTS (E.G., ANTI-BREZHNEV DOCTRINE, COMPLIANCE) WITH THE NOTABLE EXCEPTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS; WE HAD DILUTED OBJECTIONABLE LANGUAGE ON THE MEDITERRANEAN AND TERRORISM; AND WE RISKED THE DANGER OF UNRAVELING THE DELICATE CONSENSUS ON THESE AND OTHER TEXTS IF WE WERE TO DELAY ANY LONGER. THEREFORE, IN A SEVEN-HOUR LATE-NIGHT SESSION ON SEPTEMBER 9, THE WEST PRESSED FOR FINALIZING THE TEXTS ON ALL REMAINING SUBJECTS WHICH STOOD A CHANCE OF GAINING CONSENSUS, THEREBY ELIMINATING OBJECTIONABLE EASTERN AND NNA LANGUAGE STILL ON THE TABLE, E.G., ON THE NUF NORM, EQUAL SECURITY, AND POLITICAL ASPECTS OF SECURITY.

5. THE FOLLOWING TEXT IS THE RESULT OF THIS EFFORT. WITH A FEW MINOR EXCEPTIONS, IT FOLLOWS VERBATIM THE TEXT SENT IN REF B. IT PROTECTS ALL OUR MAIN INTERESTS AND ELIMINATES ALL OUR MAJOR CONCERNS. THEREFORE, USDEL STRONGLY RECOMMENDS THAT THIS FULL TEXT BE NOTED AS STATED IN PARA 8. ALL OTHER WESTERN CDE DELEGATIONS CONCUR WITH THIS JUDGMENT. (ALTHOUGH IT IS DIFFICULT TO PREDICT REACTION IN CAPITALS, PARTICULARLY IN PARIS.) ACCORDINGLY, UNLESS OTHERWISE INSTRUCTED, USDEL WILL AGREE TO THE NOTING OF THIS FULL TEXT AT THE SEPTEMBER 12 - A.M. WORKING GROUP.

6. THE TEXT FOLLOWS VERBATIM THE TEXT PROVIDED IN REF B WITH THE FOLLOWING EXCEPTIONS:

-- ON TERRITORIAL OCCUPATION, THE LANGUAGE "AS SET FORTH IN THE FINAL ACT" WAS ADDED AT FRENCH INSISTENCE.

-- ON ARMED FORCES, AFTER PERFUNCTORY ATTEMPTS TO GO BACK TO THE ORIGINAL EASTERN TEXT, THE EAST ACCEPTED VERBATIM THE WESTERN "BOTTOM LINE" ARMED FORCES COUNTERPROPOSAL.

-- ON NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THE NUF OBLIGATION, THE FRENCH

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OBJECTED TO THE LANGUAGE "IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS" BECAUSE THIS REFERENCE DID NOT COVER THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE, IN THEIR VIEW. THE SWISS COULD NOT ACCEPT THE LANGUAGE "IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE UN CHARTER" BECAUSE, THEY ARGUED, IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THEM TO AGREE THAT NONCOMPLIANCE WITH A TREATY (UN CHARTER) TO WHICH THEY WERE NOT A PARTY WAS IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. RATHER THAN DROP THE WHOLE REFERENCE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, AS SUGGESTED BY THE COORDINATOR, THE U.S. PROPOSED THAT THE WORDS "AS RECALLED ABOVE" BE ADDED TO RECALL THE NUF OBLIGATION OF THE UN CHARTER AND THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE (AS SET FORTH IN THE UN CHARTER) WHICH HAD BEEN DESCRIBED PREVIOUSLY. THAT IS ADMITTEDLY NOT A HAPPY OR IDEAL COMPROMISE BUT IT DOES, IN USDEL'S VIEW, PROTECT THE U.S. POSITION.

-- ON PEACEFUL SETTLEMENTS, "DETERMINATION AND THE NECESSITY" WAS SUBSTITUTED FOR "COMMITMENT" TO WEAKEN SOMEWHAT THE COMMITMENT TO REINFORCING AND IMPROVING PSD MECHANISMS. ADMITTEDLY, THIS LANGUAGE IS NOT ELEGANT BUT, BY MERELY REPEATING FINAL ACT LANGUAGE, IN USDEL'S VIEW IT ACCOMPLISHES THE PURPOSE OF NOT PREJUDICING THE WORK OF ANY FUTURE PSD MEETINGS

-- ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE ONLY SUBSTANTIVE CHANGE IS IN THE DELETION OF THE WORDS "FOR THE CSCE PROCESS" AND THE ADDITION OF THE LANGUAGE "AS SET FORTH IN THE DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS BETWEEN PARTICIPATING STATES." THIS CHANGE DOES WEAKEN SOMEWHAT THE HUMAN RIGHTS-CSCE LINK IN THE NUF CONTEXT. HOWEVER, THE EAST ARGUED THAT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE COULD NOT SAY THAT ONE PRINCIPLE, HUMAN RIGHTS, WAS AN ESSENTIAL FACTOR FOR THE CSCE PROCESS AND NOT THE OTHERS. FURTHERMORE, THE NNA, WHICH ORIGINALLY HAD PROPOSED THE LINKAGE, QUICKLY RETREATED FROM ITS POSITION. THEREFORE, THE WEST PROPOSED TO SUBSTITUTE THE LANGUAGE ON THE DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES FROM THE FINAL ACT, WHICH WAS EVENTUALLY ACCEPTED BY THE EAST.

-- ON TERRORISM, THE GROUP EVENTUALLY ACCEPTED THE LANGUAGE CONTAINED IN REF B. IN INTERPRETIVE STATEMENTS, VARIOUS WESTERN DELEGATIONS MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE "SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES" REFERRED TO IN THE TEXT WERE CLEARLY ILLEGAL AND WERE AIMED AT "THE PERPETRATION OF ACTS OF TERRORISM."

7. IN THIS NUF MEETING, LANGUAGE WAS ALSO AGREED TO ON "THE LINK" AND "DISARMAMENT" WHICH WILL PROBABLY BE PLACED IN THE INTRODUCTION OF THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT (SEE SEPTTEL). FINALLY, THE EAST HAS FREQUENTLY AND PUBLICLY MADE THE POINT THE WESTERN AGREEMENT ON A NUF TEXT WOULD BE SEEN AS "AN IMPORTANT POLITICAL SIGNAL" AND WOULD FACILITATE PROGRESS IN THE OTHER WORKING GROUPS. ACCORDINGLY, ONCE FINAL AGREEMENT IS REACHED ON

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THE NUF TEXT (PERHAPS ON FRIDAY) WE INTEND TO USE WHATEVER LEVERAGE WE CAN GET FROM WESTERN AGREEMENT ON NUF TO SPEED WORK IN THE CSBM'S WORKING GROUPS.

8. THE FOLLOWING TEXT FOLLOWS THE MOST LIKELY ORDER OF THE NON-USE OF FORCE SECTION OF THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT. BEGIN TEXT:

- THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECOGNISE THAT THE ADOPTED SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES, BY THEIR SCOPE AND NATURE AND BY THEIR IMPLEMENTATION SERVE TO STRENGTHEN CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE AND THUS TO GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE.
- THE PARTICIPATING STATES HAVE DECLARED THE FOLLOWING: REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE
- THE PARTICIPATING STATES, RECALLING THEIR OBLIGATION TO REFRAIN, IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS AS WELL AS IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN GENERAL, FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANY STATE, OR IN ANY OTHER MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS, ACCORDINGLY REAFFIRM THEIR COMMITMENT TO RESPECT AND PUT INTO PRACTICE THE PRINCIPLE OF REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE, AS LAID DOWN IN THE FINAL ACT.
- NO CONSIDERATION MAY BE INVOKED TO SERVE TO WARRANT RESORT TO THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN CONTRAVENTION OF THIS PRINCIPLE.
- THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECALL THE INHERENT RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL OR COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE IF AN ARMED ATTACK OCCURS, AS SET FORTH IN THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS.
- THEY WILL REFRAIN FROM ANY MANIFESTATION OF FORCE FOR THE PURPOSES OF INDUCING ANY OTHER STATE TO RENOUNCE THE FULL EXERCISE OF ITS SOVEREIGN RIGHTS.
- AS SET FORTH IN THE FINAL ACT NO OCCUPATION OR ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY RESULTING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN CONTRAVENTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW WILL BE RECOGNIZED AS LEGAL.
- THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECOGNIZE THEIR COMMITMENT TO PEACE AND SECURITY. ACCORDINGLY THEY REAFFIRM THAT THEY WILL REFRAIN FROM ANY USE OF ARMED FORCES INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE PROVISIONS OF THE DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS BETWEEN PARTICIPATING STATES AGAINST ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE, IN PARTICULAR FROM INVASION OF OR ATTACK ON ITS TERRITORY.
- THEY WILL ABIDE BY THEIR COMMITMENT TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH ANY STATE, REGARDLESS OF THAT STATE'S POLITICAL, SOCIAL,

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ECONOMIC OR CULTURAL SYSTEM AND IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER OR NOT THEY MAINTAIN WITH THAT STATE RELATIONS OF ALLIANCE.

- THE PARTICIPATING STATES STRESS THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES AS CONTAINED IN THE FINAL ACT, CONVINCED THAT IT IS AN ESSENTIAL COMPLEMENT TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE, BOTH BEING ESSENTIAL FACTORS FOR THE MAINTENANCE AND CONSOLIDATION OF PEACE AND SECURITY. THEY RECALL THEIR DETERMINATION AND THE NECESSITY TO REINFORCE AND TO IMPROVE THE METHODS AT THEIR DISPOSAL FOR THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES. THEY REAFFIRM THEIR RESOLVE TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO SETTLE EXCLUSIVELY BY PEACEFUL MEANS ANY DISPUTE BETWEEN THEM.

- THEY STRESS THAT NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE OBLIGATION OF REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE AS RECALLED ABOVE CONSTITUTES A VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

- THE PARTICIPATING STATES STRESS THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE FINAL ACT OF THE CSCE AND THE NEED FOR FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL ITS PROVISIONS, AND THUS TO FURTHER THE PROCESS OF INCREASING SECURITY AND DEVELOPING COOPERATION IN EUROPE, THEREBY CONTRIBUTING TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE WORLD AS A WHOLE.

- THEY EMPHASIZE THEIR COMMITMENT TO ALL THE PRINCIPLES OF THE DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTICIPATING STATES AND DECLARE THEIR DETERMINATION TO RESPECT AND PUT THEM INTO PRACTICE IRRESPECTIVE OF THEIR POLITICAL, ECONOMIC OR SOCIAL SYSTEMS AS WELL AS OF THEIR SIZE, GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION OR LEVEL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

- ALL THESE PRINCIPLES ARE OF PRIMARY SIGNIFICANCE AND, ACCORDINGLY, THEY WILL BE EQUALLY AND UNRESERVEDLY APPLIED, EACH OF THEM BEING INTERPRETED TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE OTHERS.

- RESPECT FOR AND THE APPLICATION OF THESE PRINCIPLES WILL ENHANCE THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND COOPERATION AMONG THE PARTICIPATING STATES IN ALL FIELDS COVERED BY THE PROVISIONS OF THE FINAL ACT.

- THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECONFIRM THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE BASIC PRINCIPLE OF THE SOVEREIGN EQUALITY OF STATES AND STRESS THAT ALL STATES HAVE EQUAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

- THEY REAFFIRMED THE UNIVERSAL SIGNIFICANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS. RESPECT FOR AND THE EFFECTIVE EXERCISE OF THESE RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS ARE ESSENTIAL FACTORS FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, JUSTICE AND SECURITY, AS WELL AS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND COOPERATION AMONG THEMSELVES AS AMONG ALL

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STATES, AS SET FORTH IN THE DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS BETWEEN PARTICIPATING STATES.

- THEY REAFFIRM THAT, IN THE BROADER CONTEXT OF WORLD SECURITY, SECURITY IN EUROPE IS CLOSELY LINKED WITH SECURITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA AS A WHOLE; IN THIS CONTEXT, THEY CONFIRM THEIR INTENTION TO DEVELOP GOOD NEIGHBORLY RELATIONS WITH ALL STATES IN THE REGION, WITH DUE REGARD TO RECIPROCITY IN THE SPIRIT OF THE PRINCIPLES SET FORTH IN THE DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS BETWEEN PARTICIPATING STATES SO AS TO PROMOTE CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY AND MAKE PEACE PREVAIL IN THE REGION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN ADOPTED IN THE FINAL ACT.
- THE PARTICIPATING STATES EMPHASIZE THE NECESSITY TO TAKE RESOLUTE MEASURES TO PREVENT AND TO COMBAT TERRORISM, INCLUDING TERRORISM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. THEY EXPRESS THEIR DETERMINATION TO TAKE EFFECTIVE MEASURES, BOTH AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL AND THROUGH INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, FOR THE PREVENTION AND SUPPRESSION OF ALL ACTS OF TERRORISM. THEY WILL TAKE ALL APPROPRIATE MEASURES IN PREVENTING THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIES FROM BEING USED FOR THE PREPARATION, ORGANIZATION OR COMMISSION OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. THIS ALSO INCLUDES MEASURES TO PROHIBIT ON THEIR TERRITORIES ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES, OF PERSONS, GROUPS AND ORGANIZATIONS THAT INSTIGATE, ORGANIZE OR ENGAGE IN THE PERPETRATION OF ACTS OF TERRORISM, INCLUDING THOSE DIRECTED AGAINST OTHER STATES AND THEIR CITIZENS.
- THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL FULFILL IN GOOD FAITH THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW; THEY ALSO STRESS THAT STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THEIR COMMITMENTS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CSCE IS ESSENTIAL FOR BUILDING CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY.
- THE PARTICIPATING STATES CONFIRM THAT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 103 OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, IN THE EVENT OF A CONFLICT BETWEEN THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS UNDER THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER ANY TREATY OR OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT, THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CHARTER WILL PREVAIL.

END TEXT.  
BARRY  
END OF MESSAGE  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07231  
 SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION THRESHOLDS: THE END GAME.  
 REF: STOCKHOLM 07160

1. CDE XII - 059.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

-  
 3. SUMMARY. AS THE CONFERENCE ADJOURNMENT DATE DRAWS NEAR, THE ALLIES ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY ANXIOUS TO DEVELOP COMPROMISE NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD LANGUAGE THAT IS ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH WEST AND EAST. THE U.S. IS QUICKLY BECOMING ISOLATED BY ALLIES WHO HAVE EXPRESSED THEIR READINESS TO ACCEPT A NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD BASED ON AN UNDEFINED DIVISIONAL STRUCTURE, THAT WAS WORKED OUT DURING SOVIET/FRENCH BILATERALS. THE U.S. HAS INFORMED THE USSR AND THE ALLIES THAT THIS FORMULATION IS UNACCEPTABLE, BUT THERE IS A DANGER THAT AT THE END OF THE DAY, SOME ALLIES - ESPECIALLY THE FRG - WILL URGE US EITHER TO ACCEPT THE FRENCH-SOVIET FORMULA, OR GIVE UP STRUCTURE ENTIRELY.  
 END SUMMARY

4. AFTER MONTHS OF TRYING TO DEVELOP A NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD ACCEPTABLE TO ALL CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS, PRESSURE IS MOUNTING WITHIN NATO TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE. THE FRENCH, ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE NATO CAUCUS, HAVE BEEN PURSUING THIS ISSUE IN BILATERALS WITH THE SOVIETS SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THIS SESSION. THE FOLLOWING TEXT IS THE RESULT OF THESE DISCUSSIONS. (NOTE: TEXT IS LINE 2.3 IN REFTEL.)

BEGIN TEXT:

NOTIFICATION

2. 3 AT LEAST . . . TROOPS, INCLUDING SUPPORT TROOPS, OR

AT LEAST . . . BATTLE TANKS,  
 IF ORGANIZED INTO A DIVISIONAL STRUCTURE OR INTO BRIGADES AND REGIMENTS, NOT NECESSARILY SUBORDINATE TO THE SAME DIVISION.

END TEXT:

-  
 5. FOLLOWING LENGTHY DISCUSSIONS IN THE NOTIFICATION TEAM, CLUSTER, AND AMONG NATO HEADS OF DELEGATIONS, ALL ALLIES, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE U.S. AND NORWAY, HAVE EXPRESSED THEIR READINESS TO ACCEPT THIS FORMULATION. NORWAY ALONE AGREES WITH THE U.S. THAT EMPHASIS ON "DIVISIONAL STRUCTURE" IN THIS FORMULA WILL SERVE TO STRENGTHEN THE SOVIET NEGOTIATING POSITION FOR A HIGH PERSONNEL THRESHOLD, I.E., 16,000. HOWEVER THIS IS NORWAY'S ONLY PROBLEM; IF WE ARE SUCCESSFUL IN GETTING A LOW NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD THEY WILL ACCEPT THE FORMULA.

6. THE U.S. (BARRY) INFORMED THE ALLIES THAT THIS PROPOSAL WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO THE U.S. BECAUSE A

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THRESHOLD BASED ON AN UNDEFINED DIVISIONAL STRUCTURE WOULD NOT ONLY PREJUDICE THE PERSONNEL THRESHOLD, BUT WOULD CREATE SERIOUS PROBLEMS FOR COMPLIANCE MONITORING. MANY - ESPECIALLY THE FRG - HAVE SUGGESTED TO US THAT IF WE CANNOT ACCEPT THE "DIVISIONAL STRUCTURE" FORMULA, THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE MIGHT BE TO ABANDON THE STRUCTURAL ELEMENT ENTIRELY. 7. WE HAVE TOLD GRINEVSKY THAT THE "DIVISIONAL STRUCTURE" FORMULA IS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO THE U.S. AND THAT THEY OUGHT TO ACCEPT THE "MAJOR COMBAT ELEMENTS" CONCEPT. FOR THE MOMENT, NEGOTIATIONS ON THE STRUCTURAL FORMULA ARE ON HOLD WHILE WE WORK ON THE NUMERICAL VALUES FOR TROOPS AND TANKS; MEANWHILE WE ARE LOOKING FOR ACCEPTABLE WAYS TO MODIFY THE FRENCH-SOVIET FORMULA.  
BARRY  
END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07251  
 SUBJECT: CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT FOR FINAL CDE PLENARY  
 REF: A) STOCKHOLM 6968, B) STOCKHOLM 3458,  
 - C) STATE 146054  
 1. CDE XII - 060  
 2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.  
 -  
 3. BEGIN SUMMARY: NATO REPS TO THE CONTACT GROUP ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT REPORTED TO THE CAUCUS SEPTEMBER 10 THAT THE GROUP IS CONSIDERING A CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT FOR THE FINAL PLENARY WHICH WOULD DEAL WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SPECIFIC CSBM'S (E.G., ANNUAL CALENDARS) AND THE QUESTION OF RAISING UNRESOLVED ISSUES AT POSSIBLE FUTURE CDE MEETINGS (THE EAST'S "PRICE" FOR DROPPING AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES). ON THE LATTER POINT NATO REPS HAVE OBTAINED AD REF AGREEMENT ON A TEXT WHICH WE BELIEVE DOES NOT PREJUDICE THE RIGHT OF THE VIENNA FOLLOW-UP MEETING TO DECIDE ON THE MANDATE OR THE NATURE OF ANY FUTURE CDE MEETINGS. END SUMMARY.  
 4. FOLLOWING THEIR LATEST CONTACTS WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE EAST AND NNA, NATO'S REPRESENTATIVES TO THE CONTACT GROUP ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT (BELGIUM, NETHERLANDS, CANADA AND DENMARK) REPORTED TO THE CAUCUS SEPTEMBER 10 ON THE GROUP'S DISCUSSION OF THE CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT FOR THE CLOSING PLENARY. THE GROUP DISCUSSED A CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT CONTAINING TWO PARTS WHICH WOULD BE ANNEXED TO THE DOCUMENT ITSELF. THE FIRST PART WOULD DEAL WITH THE DATES OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CSBM'S AGREED AND WILL BUILD ON THE PROVISION IN THE DOCUMENT ITSELF WHICH STATES THAT "THE MEASURES ADOPTED IN THIS DOCUMENT WILL COME INTO FORCE ON 1 JANUARY 1987" (COMMENT: THIS TEXT IS ACCEPTABLE TO THE CAUCUS AS IT IS DRAWN DIRECTLY FROM MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT LANGUAGE THAT "THE PROVISIONS ESTABLISHED BY THE NEGOTIATORS WILL COME INTO FORCE IN THE FORMS AND ACCORDING TO THE PROCEDURE TO BE AGREED UPON BY THE CONFERENCE." (P.38 ENGLISH TEXT). END COMMENT). THE CONTACT GROUP EXPLORED FOUR ITEMS WHICH MIGHT BE INCLUDED IN THE STATEMENT:  
 -- 1) ANNUAL CALENDARS OF NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES FOR 1987 WILL BE EXCHANGED NO LATER THAN DECEMBER 15, 1986.  
 -- 2) NOTIFICATION OF ACTIVITIES TO TAKE PLACE WITHIN THE FIRST 42 DAYS OF 1987 WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CBM'S OF THE FINAL ACT, ALTHOUGH PARTICIPATING STATES WILL, IN THE NOTIFICATON, FOLLOW THE PROVISIONS OF THE STOCKHO.M DOCUMENT AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE.  
 -  
 -- 3) FOR SUCH NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES, STATES WOULD ENDEAVOR TO INVITE OBSERVERS (BUT WOULD NOT BE REQUIRED TO).  
 (COMMENT: THE REASONING BEHIND ITEMS 2 AND 3 IN THE

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CONTACT GROUP WAS THAT SINCE THE AGREEMENT DOES NOT COME INTO FORCE UNTIL 1 JANUARY PARTICIPATING STATES COULD NOT MEET THE ADVANCE NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT FOR THE FIRST SIX WEEKS OF NEXT YEAR. IN THE NATO CAUCUS, HOWEVER, ALTHOUGH NO STRONG VIEWS WERE EXPRESSED, THERE WAS A GENERAL FEELING THAT ITEMS 2 AND 3 WOULD COMPLICATE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DOCUMENT AND WERE BEST AVOIDED. AN EXCEPTION TO THE 1 JANUARY DATE COULD THEREFORE BE PROVIDED, BRINGING THE NOTIFICATION PROVISIONS INTO FORCE AS OF NOVEMBER 15 SO THAT ALL 1987 ACTIVITIES ARE COMPLETELY COVERED BY CSBM'S. NATO REPS. WILL TRY TO SECURE THIS POSITION IN THEIR NEXT CONTACT GROUP MEETING. END COMMENT.)

-- 4) IF IT IS AGREED THAT NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES ABOVE A CERTAIN SIZE WILL BE FORECAST IN ADVANCE, ACTIVITIES FOR 1988 MUST BE FORECAST BY JANUARY 1, 1987 (OR ANOTHER DATE TO BE DETERMINED).

5. THE SECOND PART OF THE CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT WOULD ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF THE PARTICIPATING STATE'S RIGHT TO RAISE ISSUES IN ANY FUTURE CDE MEETING WHICH ARE NOT RESOLVED IN STOCKHOLM. SUCH A STATEMENT IS THE MINIMUM PRICE THE EAST HAS INSISTED NATO PAY FOR ITS "DEFERMENT" OF NOTIFICATION OF INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES. AT THE CAUCUS' INSTRUCTIONS, THE NATO REPS SOUGHT CHANGES TO A DRAFT PROPOSED BY AMBASSADOR KONARSKI (POLAND). KONARSKI HAD PROPOSED " . . . THAT EACH PARTICIPATING STATE CAN RAISE ANY QUESTION CONSISTENT WITH THE EXISTING MANDATE OF THE CONFERENCE . . . AT THE NEXT STAGE." IN OUR VIEW THIS LANGUAGE WOULD HAVE PREJUDICED THE RIGHT OF THE VIENNA FOLLOW-UP MEETING TO SUPPLEMENT THE MANDATE AND DETERMINE THE NATURE OF ANY CONTINUATION (I.E., NO CONTINUATION, PHASE 1B, PHASE 2). NATO REPS WERE ABLE TO RESOLVE THESE PROBLEMS AND THE CONTACT GROUP AGREED TO THE FOLLOWING TEXT ON AN AD REF BASIS:

BEGIN TEXT:

THERE IS AN UNDERSTANDING THAT EACH PARTICIPATING STATE CAN RAISE ANY QUESTION CONSISTENT WITH THE MANDATE OF THE CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE IN ANY CONTINUATION OF THE CONFERENCE.

END TEXT.

(COMMENT: IN USDEL'S VIEW THIS TEXT IS CONSISTENT WITH THE TEXT PREVIOUSLY APPROVED BY WASHINGTON (REFS B AND C) AND SECURES OUR OBJECTIVE OF NOT PREJUDICING ANY DECISION THE VIENNA MEETING MAY WISH TO TAKE ON EITHER THE MANDATE OF THE CONFERENCE OR THE NATURE OF ANY FURTHER CDE MEETINGS. END COMMENT.) THE TEXT WAS SUPPORTED BY THE CAUCUS WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE FRENCH DELEGATION WHICH IS SEEKING INSTRUCTIONS FROM PARIS.  
BARRY

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07252

SUBJECT: CDE: INSPECTION MODALITIES

1. AT A SEPTEMBER 11 MEETING WITH FRENCH, GERMAN, BRITISH, ITALIAN, SOVIET, GDR AND POLISH AMBASSADORS AMBASSADOR BARRY SAID THAT, ON INSTRUCTIONS, HE REQUESTED THAT THE EAST RECONSIDER ITS POSITION ON THE USE OF NNA IN AN INSPECTION REGIME. HE SAID THAT USG CONSIDERED THE USE OF NNA AIRCRAFT ESSENTIAL FOR A CREDIBLE INSPECTION REGIME. HE SAID THAT ALTHOUGH HE HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO INFORM HIS GROUP IN ADVANCE OF THIS PARTICULAR DEMARCHE, IT WAS CONSISTENT WITH THE VIEWS OF ALL 16. UK AND FRG AMBASSADORS CONFIRMED THIS. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR WAS SILENT (BUT IN PRIVATE THEY HAVE BEEN HELPFUL).

2. SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY SAID THAT AKHROMEYEV HAD MADE THE FINAL MOVE ON INSPECTION BY ACCEPTING AIR INSPECTION USING INSPECTED STATES' AIRCRAFT. HIS INSTRUCTIONS WOULD NOT PERMIT DISCUSSION OF NNA AIR. BARRY SAID THAT WHAT HE WAS ASKING WAS THAT SOVIETS REVIEW THEIR POSITION AND REVISE INSTRUCTIONS ACCORDINGLY.

3. POLISH AND GDR AMBASSADORS RAISED THE VARIOUS TECHNICAL DIFFICULTIES OF USING NNA AIRCRAFT. BARRY SAID THIS WAS A POLITICAL ISSUE AND REQUIRED A POLITICAL RESPONSE. GRINEVSKY AGREED, AND SAID WE HAD RECEIVED IT. HOWEVER HE AGREED TO REPORT BARRY'S STATEMENT.

4. COMMENT: IN THE MEETINGS OF THE VERIFICATION WORKING GROUP, SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES HAVE NOT CATEGORICALLY RULED OUT THE USE OF NNA AIRCRAFT, BUT THEY REFUSE TO DRAFT ON IT. IN OUR VIEW, THEIR TACTIC IS TO RUN OUT THE CLOCK AND FINALLY INTRODUCE THEIR OWN DETAILED MODALITIES FOR AIR/GROUND INSPECTION USING INSPECTED STATE TRANSPORT, INCLUDING HELICOPTERS AND THE REQUIREMENT THAT INSPECTORS BE TAKEN WHERE THEY WANT TO GO IN THE INSPECTION AREA.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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S E C R E T STOCKHOLM 07276

SUBJECT: CDE: REQUEST FOR INSTRUCTIONS ON AIR INSPECTION

1. I WILL NEED INSTRUCTIONS ON THE CDE ENDGAME BY SEPTEMBER 17 IF WE ARE TO MANAGE THE ALLIANCE AND EXERT MAXIMUM PRESSURE ON THE SOVIETS. THE INSTRUCTIONS SHOULD COVER TWO SEPARATE ISSUES:

- - WHEN TO PLAY OUR FINAL CARDS ON INSPECTION.
- - WHEN THE FINAL CARDS WILL BE.

2. WHEN. THE QUESTION HERE IS WHETHER WE SHOULD HOLD OUT FOR NNA AIR UNTIL SEPTEMBER 19 WHEN SHEVARDNADZE IS IN WASHINGTON. THE ALTERNATIVE IS TO GO FOR AN ACCEPTABLE FALLBACK ON SEPTEMBER 18. THE ADVANTAGE OF WAITING UNTIL THE LAST MINUTE IS THAT IT WILL FORCE A NEW DECISION AT THE POLITBURO LEVEL. THE DISADVANTAGE IS THAT ALLIED PRESSURE WILL PROBABLY FOCUS ON US AT THE END, NOT THE SOVIETS AND THERE IS THE DANGER OF BEING ISOLATED AS IN BERN. THE OTHER PROBLEM IS THAT THE OTHER "BIG" ISSUE WILL BE LEFT OPEN ALSO - GROUND FORCE THRESHOLDS: THE ALLIES CARE MORE ABOUT LOW THRESHOLDS THAN ABOUT NNA AIR: THEY WOULD BE VERY RESENTFUL IF WE TRADED SOMETHING WE WANT FOR SOMETHING THEY WANT.

3. WHAT: THE FOLLOWING ARE THE SUBSTANTIVE OPTIONS AS I SEE THEM; ASSUMING THAT THE SOVIETS WON'T COME AROUND ON NNA AIR INSPECTION.

- A. REFUSE TO JOIN CONSENSUS ON AN AGREEMENT. WE WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE ALONE IN DOING SO.
- B. ACCEPT AN AGREEMENT WITHOUT ANY INSPECTION PROVISIONS, LEAVING THE ISSUE FOR A POST-VIENNA CDE.
- C. ACCEPT AN AGREEMENT WITH ONLY GROUND INSPECTION BEING IMPLEMENTED NOW GIVING THE INSPECTING STATE THE RIGHT TO USE ITS OWN VEHICLES WHERE FEASIBLE (BY IMPLICATION INSPECTED STATE'S VEHICLES WOULD BE USED IN REMOTE AREAS). AIR INSPECTION WOULD BE AGREED IN PRINCIPLE, BUT WORK ON CONCRETE MODALITIES WOULD BE DEFERRED.
- D. ACCEPT AN AGREEMENT WITH GROUND AND AIR INSPECTION, BUT WITH THE INSPECTED STATE'S AIRCRAFT AND HELICOPTER AND INSPECTING STATE'S VEHICLES (WHERE FEASIBLE).
- E. ACCEPT AN AGREEMENT WITH GROUND AND AIR INSPECTION BUT INSPECTED STATE'S TRANSPORTATION.
- F. ACCEPT AN AGREEMENT WITH INSPECTING STATE'S CHOICE OF NNA OR HOST COUNTRY AIR INSPECTION, BUT WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT FOR THE FIRST YEAR OR SO HOST COUNTRY AIRCRAFT WILL BE CHOSEN. THERE WOULD ALSO BE INSPECTED STATE'S HELICOPTERS AND GROUND TRANSPORT THROWN IN. THIS IS A CONCEPT THE YUGOSLAVS ARE PUSHING, AND IT HAS WON SOME SUPPORT AMONG THOSE WHO ARGUE THAT NNA AIR INSPECTION WOULD NOT BE IMMEDIATELY FEASIBLE IN ANY CASE FOR TECHNICAL REASONS.

4. US DEL POSITION ON THESE OPTIONS ARE DIVIDED ALONG THE SAME LINE AS THEIR PARENT AGENCIES. HANSEN PREFERS

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OPTION C. MY OWN PREFERENCE IS FOR D OR E; F HAS SOME  
ATTRACTIVE FEATURES IF COMBINED WITH EITHER OF THEM -  
I.E. A HYBRID POSITION THAT INSPECTING STATES' RIGHT  
TO CHOOSE NNA AIRCRAFT WOULD BE CONTAINED IN THE AGREE-  
MENT BUT WOULD ONLY BE OPERATIONALIZED WHEN THE SPECIFIC  
MODALITIES WOULD BE AGREED IN A POST-VIENNA CDE.  
BARRY  
END OF MESSAGE

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S E C R E T STATE 290917

SUBJECT: CDE - AERIAL INSPECTION

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. OUR STRONG PREFERENCE REMAINS FOR USE OF INSPECTING NATION'S AIRCRAFT OR NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT FOR AERIAL INSPECTION. WE ALSO BELIEVE SOVIET DESIRE FOR A SUCCESSFUL STOCKHOLM CONCLUSION MAY LEAD THEM IN THE END TO ACCEPT NNA PLANES AND PILOTS IF ALL NATO ALLIES REMAIN STRONGLY UNITED BEHIND THAT DEMAND AS A BOTTOM LINE. WE HAVE THUS MADE A STRONG AND HIGH LEVEL DEMARCHE TO THE FRENCH TO THAT END.
3. WE BELIEVE WE MUST PROTECT THE PRINCIPLE THAT THE INSPECTING STATE CONTROLS THE MEANS OF INSPECTION. TO THIS END, YOU SHOULD ENSURE NOW, BEFORE THE CONFERENCE ENDS, THAT THE INSPECTING STATE HAS THE CHOICE AMONG SEVERAL OPTIONS, FOR EXAMPLE, THE CHOICE BETWEEN GROUND OR AIR OR BOTH, THE CHOICE OF USING HELICOPTERS OR FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT, THE RIGHT TO ITS OWN COMMUNICATION AND NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT (E.G., NAVSTAR GPS), AND THE RIGHT FOR INSPECTING STATE PERSONNEL TO BE PRESENT ON THE FLIGHT DECK. YOU SHOULD ALSO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO OBTAIN THE CHOICE OF THE INSPECTING STATE USING ITS OWN GROUND VEHICLES WHERE FEASIBLE.
4. WE DO NOT WANT THE CONFERENCE TO FAIL ON THE ISSUE OF WHO PILOTS THE AIRCRAFT, PARTICULARLY SINCE NEUTRAL PILOTS OVER THE USSR WOULD FOLLOW THE "ADVICE" OF SOVIET OBSERVERS. NOR DO WE WANT TO RISK LOSING THE POSSIBILITY OF AERIAL INSPECTION OVER THE SOVIET UNION. OBTAINING AERIAL INSPECTION IN CDE IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN WHETHER NEUTRAL OR INSPECTED STATES PROVIDE THE AIRCRAFT AND AIRCREWS. INDEED, FROM A STRICTLY MILITARY VIEWPOINT, WE WOULD PREFER THE LATTER, BOTH OVER OUR FORCES AND PACT FORCES, FOR REASONS OF AVAILABILITY OF AIRCRAFT AND CREWS, TIMELY RESPONSE, SECURITY, LOGISTICAL SUPPORT, AND SAFETY.
5. WE WOULD PREFER THAT YOU DELAY MAKING THIS DECISION AS LONG AS POSSIBLE, BUT BELIEVE THAT YOU SHOULD PLAY THIS CARD, SHOULD YOU BELIEVE IT NECESSARY, WHILE WE CAN STILL USE THE NNA AIR ISSUE AS LEVERAGE TO GET CONCESSIONS ON MODALITIES AND OTHER ISSUES (E.G. THRESHOLDS). IN MAKING YOUR DECISION AS TO WHEN TO ACCEPT USE OF INSPECTED STATE'S AIRCRAFT, YOU SHOULD NOT DELAY SO LONG AS TO RISK ALLOWING THE CONFERENCE TO RUN BEYOND ITS SEPTEMBER 19 ADJOURNMENT DATE. IF YOU DO IN THE END ACCEPT HOST NATION PLANES AND PILOTS, YOU SHOULD DO SO HAVING ENSURED AGREEMENT ON DETAILS OF MODALITIES LISTED IN PARAGRAPH THREE ABOVE, AND YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT WE CONSIDER THIS ACCEPTABLE ONLY BECAUSE (UNLIKE, E.G., MBFR) NO REDUCTIONS OR LIMITATIONS OF FORCES ARE INVOLVED, AND ONLY ON AN EXPERIMENTAL BASIS TO GAIN EXPERIENCE IN CONDUCTING CHALLENGE INSPECTION. IT MUST BE VERY CLEAR TO ALL THAT THIS IS NOT A PRECEDENT FOR THE KIND OF OSI WE WOULD

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**REQUIRE TO VERIFY A REDUCTIONS OR LIMITATIONS AGREEMENT. SHULTZ**  
**END OF MESSAGE** **SECRET**  
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**SECRET**

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S E C R E T STATE 294016

SUBJECT: CDE - AERIAL INSPECTION

REF: STATE 290917

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PARAGRAPH FOUR, SENTENCE FOUR OF REFTEL SHOULD READ AS  
FOLLOWS:

"INDEED, FROM A STRICTLY MILITARY VIEWPOINT, WE SEE SOME  
ADVANTAGES TO THE LATTER, BOTH OVER OUR FORCES AND PACT  
FORCES, FOR REASONS OF AVAILABILITY OF AIRCRAFT AND CREWS,  
TIMELY RESPONSE, SECURITY, LOGISTICAL SUPPORT, AND SAFETY..

SHULTZ

END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07277

SUBJECT: CSBM'S DISARMAMENT TEXTS

REF: STOCKHOLM 6968

1. CDE XII - 061
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. ON SEPTEMBER 10 THE NON-USE OF FORCE WORKING GROUP AGREED ON AND FORWARDED THE FOLLOWING TEXTS ON CSBM'S AND DISARMAMENT TO THE GROUP WORKING ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT. THE STRUCTURE GROUP WILL DETERMINE WHERE THESE TEXTS WILL BE PLACED IN THE DOCUMENT, MOST LIKELY RIGHT AFTER THE CSBM'S SECTION (ONLY THE FRENCH OBJECT TO THIS PLACEMENT).

BEGIN TEXT:

THEY STRESS.. THAT THESE CSBM'S ARE DESIGNED TO REDUCE THE DANGERS OF ARMED CONFLICT AND OF MISUNDERSTANDING OR MISCALCULATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND EMPHASIZE THAT THEIR IMPLEMENTATION WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THESE OBJECTIVES. REAFFIRMING THE RELEVANT OBJECTIVES OF THE FINAL ACT, THE PARTICIPATING STATES ARE DETERMINED TO CONTINUE BUILDING CONFIDENCE, TO LESSEN MILITARY CONFRONTATION AND TO ENHANCE SECURITY FOR ALL. THEY ARE ALSO DETERMINED TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS IN DISARMAMENT.

END TEXT.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07254  
 SUBJECT: CDE: US-SOVIET AD REF AGREEMENT ON  
 NOTIFICATION TEXT

1. CDE XII -062.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. DURING THREE HOURS MEETING TODAY BETWEEN AMB HANSEN AND GENERAL TATARNIKOV AD REF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO DELEGATIONS WAS REACHED AS INDICATED IN THE FOLLOWING TEXT. BRACKETED TEXT INDICATED WHERE NO AGREEMENT WAS POSSIBLE. SPECIFICALLY, THERE IS NO AGREEMENT ON NUMERICAL PARAMETERS, DESIGNATION AND LOCATION OF DIVISIONS OR ON EXCEPTIONS. THE FOLLOWING TEXT WILL NOW BE ADDRESSED BY NATO AND WTO GROUPS AND THEN, IF MUTUALLY AGREED, GIVEN TO THE MNA FOR THEIR CONSIDERATION OVER THE WEEKEND. UNLESS THERE ARE SPECIFIC DIFFICULTIES, THIS TEXT COULD BE NOTED IN THE NEXT MEETING OF THE NOTIFICATION WORKING GROUP, EITHER MONDAY OR TUESDAY.

BEGIN TEXT:

PRIOR NOTIFICATION

THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL GIVE NOTIFICATION IN WRITING THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS IN AN AGREED FORM OF CONTENT, TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES 42 DAYS OR MORE IN ADVANCE OF THE START OF NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS.

NOTIFICATION WILL BE GIVEN BY THE PARTICIPATING STATE ON WHOSE TERRITORY THE ACTIVITY IN QUESTION IS PLANNED TO TAKE PLACE EVEN IF THE FORCES OF THAT STATE ARE NOT ENGAGED IN THE ACTIVITY OR THEIR STRENGTH IS BELOW THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL. THIS WILL NOT RELIEVE OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES OF THEIR OBLIGATION TO GIVE NOTIFICATION, IF THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN THE PLANNED MILITARY ACTIVITY REACHES THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL.

EACH OF THE FOLLOWING MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE FIELD CONDUCTED AS A SINGLE ACTIVITY IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS AT OR ABOVE THE LEVELS DEFINED BELOW, WILL BE NOTIFIED:

THE ENGAGEMENT OF FORMATIONS OF LAND FORCES (ASTERISK) OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES IN THE SAME EXERCISE ACTIVITY CONDUCTED UNDER A SINGLE OPERATIONAL COMMAND INDEPENDENTLY OR IN COMBINATION WITH ANY POSSIBLE AIR OR NAVAL COMPONENTS.

THIS MILITARY ACTIVITY WILL BE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION WHENEVER IT INVOLVES AT THE SAME TIME :

- - AT LEAST ... TROOPS, INCLUDING SUPPORT TROOPS, OR
- - AT LEAST ... BATTLE TANKS
- IF ORGANIZED INTO A DIVISIONAL STRUCTURE OR AT LEAST TWO BRIGADES/REGIMENTS, NOT NECESSARILY SUBORDINATE TO THE SAME DIVISION.

THE PARTICIPATION OF AIR FORCES OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE NOTIFICATION IF IT IS

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FORESEEN THAT IN THE COURSE OF THE ACTIVITY 200 OR MORE SORTIES BY AIRCRAFT, EXCLUDING HELICOPTERS, WILL BE FLOWN.

THE ENGAGEMENT OF MILITARY FORCES EITHER IN AN AMPHIBIOUS LANDING OR IN A PARACHUTE ASSAULT BY AIRBORNE FORCES IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS.

THESE MILITARY ACTIVITIES WILL BE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION WHENEVER THE AMPHIBIOUS LANDING INVOLVES AT LEAST ... OR WHENEVER THE PARACHUTE DROP INVOLVES AT LEAST ...

THE ENGAGEMENT OF FORMATIONS OF LAND FORCES OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES IN A TRANSFER FROM OUTSIDE THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS TO ARRIVAL POINTS IN THE ZONE, OR FROM INSIDE THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS TO POINTS OF CONCENTRATION IN THE ZONE, TO PARTICIPATE IN A NOTIFIABLE EXERCISE ACTIVITY OR TO BE CONCENTRATED.

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(ASTERISK) IN THIS CONTEXT, TERM LAND FORCES INCLUDES AMPHIBIOUS, AIRMOBILE AND AIRBORNE FORCES.

THE ARRIVAL OR CONCENTRATION OF THESE FORCES WILL BE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION WHENEVER IT INVOLVES AT THE SAME TIME :

- - AT LEAST ... TROOPS, INCLUDING SUPPORT TROOPS, OR
- - AT LEAST ... BATTLE TANKS
- IF ORGANIZED INTO A DIVISIONAL STRUCTURE OR AT
- LEAST TWO BRIGADES/REGIMENTS, NOT NECESSARILY
- SUBORDINATE TO THE SAME DIVISION.

FORCES WHICH HAVE BEEN TRANSFERRED INTO THE ZONE WILL BE SUBJECT TO ALL PROVISIONS OF AGREED CSBMS WHEN THEY DEPART THEIR ARRIVAL POINTS TO PARTICIPATE IN A NOTIFIABLE EXERCISE ACTIVITY OR CONCENTRATION WITHIN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS.

NOTIFICATION WILL BE GIVEN IN WRITING OF EACH NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITY IN THE FOLLOWING AGREED FORM OF CONTENT

A - GENERAL INFORMATION

- THE DESIGNATION OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY
- THE GENERAL PURPOSE OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY
- THE NAMES OF THE STATES INVOLVED IN THE
- MILITARY ACTIVITY
- LEVEL OF COMMAND, ORGANIZING AND COMMANDING
- THE MILITARY ACTIVITY
- THE START AND END DATES OF THE MILITARY
- ACTIVITY

B - INFORMATION ON PARTICIPATING FORCES, FOR EACH STATE

- ENGAGEMENT OF LAND FORCES INDEPENDENTLY OR IN
- COMBINATION WITH ANY POSSIBLE AIR OR NAVAL
- COMPONENTS
- - THE TOTAL NUMBER OF TROOPS TAKING PART IN THE
- MILITARY ACTIVITY (I.E., GROUND TROOPS,
- AMPHIBIOUS TROOPS, AIRMOBILE AND AIRBORNE
- TROOPS) AND THE NUMBER OF TROOPS PARTICIPATING

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- FOR EACH STATE INVOLVED, IF APPLICABLE
- DESIGNATION NUMBER AND TYPE OF DIVISIONS PARTICIPATING AND THE LOCATION OF EACH DIVISION'S HEADQUARTERS (FOR DIVISIONS WITH TROOPS AND UNITS IN MORE THAN ONE LOCATION, THE LOCATION OF THE DIVISION COMMANDER'S HEADQUARTERS WILL BE GIVEN)
- THE TOTAL NUMBER OF ARTILLERY PIECES AND MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHERS (100 MM OR ABOVE)
- THE TOTAL NUMBER OF BATTLE TANKS AND THE TOTAL NUMBER OF ANTI-TANK GUIDED MISSILE LAUNCHERS MOUNTED ON ARMORED VEHICLES
- THE TOTAL NUMBER OF HELICOPTERS, BY CATEGORY
- ENVISAGED NUMBER OF SORTIES BY AIRCRAFT, EXCLUDING HELICOPTERS
- PURPOSE OF AIR MISSIONS
- CATEGORIES OF AIRCRAFT INVOLVED
- AREA OF AIR FORCE PARTICIPATION
- LEVEL OF COMMAND, ORGANIZING AND COMMANDING THE AIR FORCE PARTICIPATION
- INDICATION OF NAVAL SHIP-TO-SHORE GUNFIRE (SIMULATED OR LIVE FIRE)
- LEVEL OF COMMAND, ORGANIZING AND COMMANDING THE NAVAL FORCE PARTICIPATION
- AMPHIBIOUS AND AIRBORNE TROOPS
- THE TOTAL NUMBER OF AMPHIBIOUS TROOPS INVOLVED IN NOTIFIABLE AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS AND/OR THE TOTAL NUMBER OF AIRBORNE TROOPS INVOLVED IN NOTIFIABLE PARACHUTE ASSAULTS.
- THE NUMBER OF BATTALION SIZED UNITS LANDED IN A NOTIFIABLE AMPHIBIOUS LANDING OR DROPPED IN A NOTIFIABLE PARACHUTE ASSAULT
- IN THE CASE OF A NOTIFIABLE AMPHIBIOUS LANDING, THE POINT OR POINTS OF EMBARKATION IF IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS.
- NOTIFIABLE TRANSFER OF LAND FORCES
- THE TOTAL NUMBER OF TROOPS TRANSFERRED
- DESIGNATION NUMBER AND TYPE OF DIVISIONS PARTICIPATING IN THE TRANSFER
- THE TOTAL NUMBER OF BATTLE TANKS PARTICIPATING IN A NOTIFIABLE ARRIVAL OR CONCENTRATION.
- GEOGRAPHICAL COORDINATES FOR POINTS OF ARRIVAL AND FOR THE POINTS OF CONCENTRATION.
- C - THE AREA AND TIMEFRAME OF THE ACTIVITY
- THE AREA OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY DELIMITED BY GEOGRAPHIC FEATURES TOGETHER WITH GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES, AS APPROPRIATE
- THE START AND END DATES OF EACH PHASE (TRANSFERS, DEPLOYMENT, CONCENTRATION OF FORCES, ACTIVE EXERCISE PHASE, RECOVERY PHASE) OF ACTIVITIES IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS OF PARTICIPATING

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- FORMATIONS, THE TACTICAL PURPOSE AND CORRESPONDING
- GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS (DELIMITED BY GEOGRAPHICAL
- COORDINATES) FOR EACH PHASE
- BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EACH PHASE
- D - OTHER INFORMATION
- CHANGES, IF ANY, IN RELATION TO INFORMATION
- PROVIDED IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR REGARDING THE
- ACTIVITY
- RELATIONSHIP OF THE ACTIVITY TO OTHER NOTIFIABLE
- ACTIVITIES
- EXCEPTIONS
- ALERTS ACTIVITIES, THAT IS THOSE ACTIVITIES CARRIED
- OUT WITHOUT ADVANCE WARNING TO THE TROOPS INVOLVED,
- ARE EXCEPTIONS TO THE REQUIREMENT FOR PRIOR
- NOTIFICATION TO BE MADE 42 DAYS IN ADVANCE.
- NOTIFICATION OF ALERT ACTIVITIES, ABOVE THE AGREED
- THRESHOLDS, WILL BE GIVEN AT THE TIME THE TROOPS
- INVOLVED COMMENCE SUCH ACTIVITIES.

END TEXT.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07278

SUBJECT: AGREED TEXTS IN WORKING GROUP B-2 (OBSERVATION)

1. CDE XII - 063

2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

3. WORKING GROUP B (OBSERVATION) AGREED TO NOTE THE FOLLOWING THREE TEXTS ON SEPTEMBER 11.

(1) BEGIN TEXT:

IN ORDER TO ALLOW THE OBSERVERS TO CONFIRM THAT THE NOTIFIED ACTIVITY IS NONTHREATENING IN CHARACTER AND THAT IT IS CARRIED OUT IN CONFORMITY WITH THE APPROPRIATE PROVISIONS OF THE NOTIFICATION, THE HOST STATE WILL:

END TEXT.

(2) (NOTE: THE NEW SENTENCE NOTED TODAY APPEARS AFTER THE ELLIPSES IN THE FOLLOWING PARA.)

BEGIN TEXT:

THE HOST STATE WILL IN THE COURSE OF THE OBSERVATION PROGRAM GIVE THE OBSERVERS DAILY BRIEFINGS WITH THE HELP OF MAPS ON THE VARIOUS PHASES OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY AND THEIR DEVELOPMENT AND INFORM THE OBSERVERS ABOUT THEIR POSITIONS GEOGRAPHICALLY . . . . IN THE CASE OF A .AND FORCE ACTIVITY CONDUCTED IN COMBINATION WITH AIR OR NAVAL COMPONENTS, BRIEFINGS WILL BE GIVEN BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THESE FORCES.

END TEXT.

(3) BEGIN TEXT:

A PARTICIPATING STATE WILL INVITE OBSERVERS FROM ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES TO THE FOLLOWING NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES:

-- THE ENGAGEMENT OF FORMATIONS OF LAND FORCES OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES . . . CONDUCTED UNDER A SINGLE OPERATIONAL COMMAND INDEPENDENTLY OR IN COMBINATION WITH ANY POSSIBLE AIR OR NAVAL COMPONENTS.

-- THE ENGAGEMENT OF MILITARY FORCES IN AN AMPHIBIOUS . . . LANDING . . . IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBM'S.

-- THE ENGAGEMENT OF MILITARY FORCES IN A PARACHUTE ASSAULT BY AIRBORNE FORCES IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBM'S.

-- IN THE CASE OF THE ENGAGEMENT OF FORMATIONS OF LAND FORCES OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES IN A TRANSFER FROM OUTSIDE THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBM'S TO ARRIVAL POINTS IN THE ZONE, OR FROM INSIDE THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBM'S TO POINTS OF CONCENTRATION IN THE ZONE, TO PARTICIPATE IN A NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITY OR TO BE CONCENTRATED, THE CONCENTRATION OF THESE FORCES WHICH HAVE BEEN TRANSFERRED INTO THE ZONE WILL BE SUBJECT TO ALL PROVISIONS OF AGREED CSBM'S WHEN THEY DEPART THEIR ARRIVAL POINTS TO PARTICIPATE IN A NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITY OR CONCENTRATION WITHIN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBM'S.

-- THE ABOVE MENTIONED ACTIVITIES WILL BE SUBJECT TO

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OBSERVATION WHENEVER . . . .

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IN THIS CONTEXT, THE TERM LAND FORCES INCLUDES  
AMPHIBIOUS, AIRMOBILE AND AIRBORNE FORCES.  
END TEXT.

(COMMENT: THIS TEXT WILL BE THE LEAD PARAGRAPH OF THE  
OBSERVATION MEASURE. WHILE IT IS NOT NATO'S FIRST  
CHOICE -- WE WOULD HAVE PREFERRED A SIMPLE REFERENCE TO  
"NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES" -- THE EAST AND MNA INSISTED ON  
A FULL RECITATION FROM THE B-1 TEXT OF THE LIST OF  
ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED (FOLLOWED BY A SEPARATE LISTING  
OF THE OBSERVATION THRESHOLDS, WHICH WOULD BE DISTINCT  
FROM NOTIFICATION IF THE CONFERENCE ADOPTS A SPLIT  
APPROACH. ALTHOUGH THE INITIAL EASTERN PROPOSAL ON THIS  
SUBJECT HAD ATTEMPTED TO CAPTURE UNDER OBSERVATION THE  
MOVEMENT OF FORCES TRANSFERRED INTO THE ZONE FROM A  
POINT OF ARRIVAL TO A POINT OF CONCENTRATION, THE NATO  
CLUSTER WAS SATISFIED THAT THE LANGUAGE AS AGREED FULLY  
RETAINS THE EXEMPTION OF THOSE FORCES FROM OBSERVATION.  
END COMMENT.)

BARRY  
END OF MESSAGE

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S E C R E T STOCKHOLM 07306

SUBJECT: ALLIES DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT U.S. MAY BREAK  
- CONSENSUS

1. CDE XII - 064

2. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

3. I BRIEFED THE UK, FRENCH, AND FRG AMBASSADORS TODAY ON THE RANGE OF OPTIONS UNDER CONSIDERATION IN WASHINGTON IF THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT AGREE TO NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT FOR INSPECTIONS. ALTHOUGH I HAD EARLIER MENTIONED THE POSSIBILITY, THEY REACTED EMOTIONALLY TO THE IDEA THAT WE MIGHT DECIDE TO BREAK CONSENSUS ON AN AGREEMENT WHICH DID NOT PROVIDE FOR INSPECTION BY NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT. THEY ALSO REGISTERED STRONG OBJECTION TO THE IDEA OF GOING FOR AN AGREEMENT WITH NO INSPECTION OR AN AGREEMENT WITH GROUND INSPECTION ONLY.

4. ALL INSISTED THAT THEIR GOVERNMENTS WOULD WANT TO BE CONSULTED, NOT INFORMED, OF THE U.S. DECISION, AND THEY SAID THAT IT WOULD BE DEEPLY RESENTED IN THEIR CAPITALS IF THEIR CONSULTATION TOOK PLACE ONLY ON SEPTEMBER 17 OR 18. UK AMBASSADOR IN PARTICULAR STRESSED THAT HMG WOULD BE VERY ANGRY TO BE "BOUNCED" BY WASHINGTON AT THE LAST MOMENT.

5. ALL THREE STRESSED THAT THEY HAD SUPPORTED US ON NNA AIR EVEN THOUGH THEIR CAPITALS WERE NOT ENTHUSIASTIC; THE FRENCH WERE ACTIVELY OPPOSED BUT HAD REMAINED SILENT. CDE HAS, UP UNTIL NOW, BEEN AN EXCELLENT EXAMPLE OF ALLIED UNITY. IF WE BREAK RANKS AT THE LAST MINUTE, THIS WILL HAVE A FAR-REACHING EFFECT EXTENDING WELL BEYOND CDE.

6. UK AMBASSADOR SAID U.S. SHOULD REALIZE THE EUROPEAN ALLIES WERE SENSITIVE THAT U.S. TERRITORY WAS NOT INCLUDED IN INSPECTION (THOUGH U.S. FORCES WERE) AND THUS THEY RESENTED U.S. PRESSURE ON THE INSPECTION ISSUE. HE ALSO UNDERLINED THAT GROUND FORCE THRESHOLDS WERE MUCH THE MORE IMPORTANT ISSUE TO THEM THAN INSPECTION AND THAT THEY ALL CONSIDERED AERIAL INSPECTION WITH HOST COUNTRY AIRCRAFT TO BE ACCEPTABLE.

7. THE THREE INDICATED THAT THEY DID NOT CONSIDER THE OPTION TO USE THEIR OWN VEHICLES WHERE FEASIBLE IN A GROUND INSPECTION ESSENTIAL BUT THAT THEY COULD SUPPORT IT. THE FRENCH HAVE SERIOUS MISGIVINGS FOR SECURITY AND SAFETY REASONS BUT WILL ACCEPT IT IF WASHINGTON THINKS IT NECESSARY.

7. COMMENT: AS A SUBSTANTIAL CDE AGREEMENT GETS CLOSER, ALLIED APPETITE FOR IT GROWS. I AM SURE THE REMAINDER OF THE 16 WILL REACT JUST AS STRONGLY TO THE PROSPECT THAT WE MIGHT WALK AWAY. THEY WILL ALSO SHARE MISGIVINGS ABOUT TURNING DOWN INSPECTION OR GOING FOR GROUND INSPECTION ONLY. I URGE THAT OUR DECISION BE MADE BEFORE SEPTEMBER 17 AND BE CONVEYED TO NATO CAPITALS IN A CONSULTATIVE, NOT INFORMATIVE, MODE. END

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**COMMENT.  
BARRY  
END OF MESSAGE  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07318  
 SUBJECT: WEEKLY WRAP-UP AND ANALYSIS -  
 - - SEPTEMBER 8-12, 1986  
 REF: STOCKHOLM 7203

1. CDE XII - 065
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

3. BEGIN SUMMARY AND GENERAL ASSESSMENT: WE ARE GETTING CLOSER TO A COMPLETE AGREEMENT. VIRTUALLY THE ENTIRE NOTIFICATION SECTION, ONE OF THE TWIN PILLARS OF THE DOCUMENT'S CSBM'S REGIME, WAS COMPLETED DURING INTENSIVE U.S.-SOVIET BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS LAST WEEK, WITH THE NOTABLE EXCEPTION OF NUMERICAL PARAMETERS. IF THIS SECTION CAN SURVIVE ALLIED AND NNA SCRUTINY, WE WILL HAVE CLEARED ONE OF THE LAST SUBSTANTIVE HURDLES. ANOTHER MAJOR -- AND THE MOST DIFFICULT -- HURDLE REMAINS: VERIFICATION. WHILE PROGRESS WAS MADE ON THE IMPORTANT QUESTIONS OF RESTRICTED AREAS AND INSPECTION QUOTAS, EAST AND WEST ARE AT LOGGERHEADS OVER THE USE OF NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT FOR INSPECTION, WHILE THE NNA PRESS OFTEN CONFLICTING NATIONAL POSITIONS. SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY RETURNED FROM A LIGHTNING TRIP TO MOSCOW WITH A BIG "NYET" ON THIS ISSUE BUT THE EAST HAS NOT, IN FACT, REJECTED NEUTRAL AIR DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS. WE SUSPECT THAT THE EAST MAY HAVE SOME FLEXIBILITY ON THE QUESTION BUT THEY MAY LINK IT TO UNACCEPTABLY HIGH NOTIFICATION THRESHOLDS.

THE ENTIRE NON-USE OF FORCE SECTION WAS REGISTERED; IT REFLECTS THE WESTERN APPROACH TO SECURITY, INCLUDING LANGUAGE ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND TERRORISM. ALTHOUGH A NUMBER OF OBSERVATION ISSUES REMAIN TO BE RESOLVED, INCLUDING THE SCOPE OF OBSERVATION AND THE POTENTIAL PROBLEM OF A SEPARATE NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION THRESHOLD, WE DO NOT ANTICIPATE ANY DIFFICULTIES IN WRAPPING UP THIS SECTION EARLY IN THE WEEK. THE ANNUAL CALENDAR MEASURE WILL ALSO BE COMPLETED, ALBEIT WITHOUT DETAILED INFORMATION ON DESIGNATION AND LOCATION OF DIVISIONS. ON CONSTRAINTS, THE EAST AND NNA SEEM RESIGNED TO ACCEPTING A TIME CONSTRAINT BASED ON THE ANNUAL CALENDAR. END SUMMARY AND GENERAL ASSESSMENT.

4. NOTIFICATION: INTENSIVE U.S.-FRENCH-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS BORE FRUIT FINALLY THIS WEEK IN A LANDMARK BILATERAL AGREEMENT ON VIRTUALLY THE ENTIRE NOTIFICATION SECTION OF THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT. FOR THE MOST PART, OUR ALLIES ARE SATISFIED WITH THE BREAKTHROUGH, ALTHOUGH A FEW, NOTABLY THE DANES AND THE NORWEGIANS, ARE UPSET THAT THEIR PET INTEREST (INFORMATION RELATED TO LANDING CRAFT IN AN AMPHIBIOUS LANDING) WAS DROPPED. THERE REMAIN A NUMBER OF ESSENTIAL OUTSTANDING ISSUES: NUMERICAL PARAMETERS; AMPHIBIOUS/AIRBORNE STRUCTURE; THE

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DESIGNATION OF PARTICIPATING DIVISIONS AND THE LOCATIONS OF THEIR HEADQUARTERS (WHICH WE WILL NOT GET); AND EXCEPTIONS, I.E., THE PROVISION FOR ALERTS, ALTHOUGH U.S.-SOVIET AGREEMENT ON THIS LAST ISSUE EXISTS. (THIS UNDERSTANDING IS ON THE FOLLOWING LANGUAGE: NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT WITHOUT ADVANCE WARNING TO THE TROOPS INVOLVED ARE EXCEPTIONS TO THE REQUIREMENT FOR PRIOR NOTIFICATION TO BE MADE 42 DAYS IN ADVANCE. NOTIFICATION OF SUCH ACTIVITIES, ABOVE THE AGREED THRESHOLDS, WILL BE GIVEN AT THE TIME THE TROOPS INVOLVED COMMENCE THE ACTIVITY.) IN ADDITION, THE SWISS CONTINUE TO STRUGGLE WITH THE POSSIBILITY THAT MOBILIZED FORCES WHICH HAVE BEEN CONCENTRATED IN DEFENSIVE POSITIONS MIGHT BE SUBJECT TO INSPECTION. DESPITE THESE PROBLEM AREAS, IF THE U.S.-SOVIET AGREEMENT CAN SURVIVE ALLIED AND THEN CONFERENCE SCRUTINY, WE WILL HAVE MADE A MAJOR STEP TOWARD AGREEMENT AT STOCKHOLM.

5. VERIFICATION: THREE CRITICAL ISSUES REMAIN ON INSPECTION: NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT, RESTRICTED/SPECIFIED AREAS AND QUOTAS. ON NEUTRAL AIR, SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY RETURNED FROM A LIGHTNING TRIP TO MOSCOW WITH A HARD LINE THAT THE USSR WOULD NEVER ACCEPT NEUTRAL AIR. IN COFFEE GROUP MEETINGS HOWEVER, THE SOVIET REP HAS STUDIOUSLY AVOIDED CATEGORICAL REJECTION OF THE USE OF NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT, AND WE CONTINUE TO SUSPECT THAT THE EAST MAY HAVE SOME FLEXIBILITY ON THIS QUESTION WHICH COULD BE LINKED TO WESTERN ACCEPTANCE OF AN UNACCEPTABLY HIGH NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD (E.G., 16,000). THE PRINCIPAL

NEUTRALS BEHIND THE IDEA (AUSTRIA, SWITZERLAND, AND SWEDEN) REMAIN COMMITTED BUT ARE NOT PUSHING THE ISSUE IN PUBLIC. THE PROBLEM IS THAT WHILE THEY ARE WORKING THE ISSUE INTERNALLY THEY ARE NOT PRESSURING THE SOVIETS IN THE CONFERENCE ITSELF. ONLY THE FINNS AND THE IRISH HAVE ADDRESSED THE ISSUE THIS WEEK, EACH WITH RATHER LUKEWARM STATEMENTS THAT THEY WILL CONSIDER WHETHER THEY CAN MAKE A CONTRIBUTION IF IT IS NECESSARY FOR AN AGREEMENT AND ACCEPTABLE TO ALL. RUMORS ARE CIRCULATING THAT MANY OF THE ALLIES WILL NOT INSIST ON NN AIR AT THE END OF THE WEEK.

INTENSIVE BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIET REP (ROZANOV) AND THE NATO TEAM LEADER (FREEMAN - UK) HAVE ADVANCED DISCUSSION ON BOTH RESTRICTED/SPECIFIED AREAS AND QUOTAS. THE SOVIETS NOW APPEAR READY TO ACCEPT A TEXT ALONG THE LINES OF OUR "POSITIVE APPROACH" TO RESTRICTED AREAS, I.E., THAT THEY CANNOT BE USED TO PREVENT AN INSPECTION. THE REAL PROBLEM, HOWEVER, MAY LIE IN BONN, NOT MOSCOW, AS THE FRG MINISTRY OF DEFENSE IS INSISTING THAT IT NEEDS RESTRICTED AREAS WHERE IT CAN CONDUCT ACTIVITIES ABOVE THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL WHICH ARE EXEMPT FROM CSBM'S. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THEY WILL BLOCK

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AGREEMENT ON THE ISSUE, HOWEVER. ON QUOTAS, THE COORDINATOR INTRODUCED A TEXT (THE RESULT OF UK-SOVIET BILATERALS) IN THE COFFEE GROUP WITH SOVIET AGREEMENT THAT WOULD ESTABLISH A PASSIVE QUOTA BUT NO ACTIVE QUOTA. INSTEAD IT CONTAINS A "REVERSE ACTIVE QUOTA" STIPULATING THAT STATES NEED NOT ACCEPT MORE THAN ONE INSPECTION FROM ANY OTHER STATE AND THAT MEMBERS OF AN ALLIANCE COULD NOT CONSUME EACH OTHERS' PASSIVE QUOTAS. A PASSIVE QUOTA NUMBER REMAINS TO BE ADDRESSED AND THERE REMAIN DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE ALLIANCE ON THESE NUMBERS. THE WORKING GROUP ITSELF NOTED SIX TEXTS THIS WEEK (SEPTEL) RANGING FROM ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES TO THE PRINCIPLE THAT INSPECTIONS CAN BE FROM THE GROUND OR THE AIR. AT U.S. URGING, DRAFTING WILL BEGIN THIS WEEKEND ON AERIAL MODALITIES. THE PROBLEM HERE IS THAT THERE IS NO AGREEMENT IN NATO OR AMONG THE NNA ON TEXTS.

6. OBSERVATION: THE MAJOR DEVELOPMENT THIS WEEK WAS AGREEMENT ON A TEXT IDENTIFYING THE TYPES OF ACTIVITIES TO BE OBSERVED WHICH, AT EASTERN AND NNA INSISTENCE, IS LARGELY A REPETITION OF THE LIST OF NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES FROM B-1. THIS LANGUAGE WAS AGREED AFTER THE WEST REJECTED AN INITIAL SOVIET PROPOSAL WHICH WOULD HAVE MADE THE MOVEMENT OF FORCES TRANSFERRED INTO THE ZONE FROM THEIR ARRIVAL BASES TO A CONCENTRATION SUBJECT TO OBSERVATION (REFLECTING A CONSCIOUS "MISINTERPETATION" BY THE SOVIET MILREP TATARNIKOV OF WHAT WAS AGREED IN B-1.) THE NOTED TEXT PROTECTS OUR INTERPRETATION THAT SUCH MOVEMENTS ARE EXCLUDED FROM OBSERVATION; SUBSEQUENT BILATERAL CONTACTS WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY INDICATED THAT THE SOVIETS ARE NO LONGER SEEKING SUCH OBSERVATION. THE TEXT WILL ALSO INCLUDE THE THRESHOLDS FOR OBSERVATION, WHICH WILL BE DEPENDENT ON WHETHER THE CONFERENCE DECIDES IN FAVOR OF SPLIT OR UNITARY OBSERVATION/NOTIFICATION THRESHOLDS. TEXTS WERE ALSO NOTED ON THE PURPOSE OF OBSERVATION, AND ON BRIEFINGS TO BE GIVEN ON THE AIR AND NAVAL COMPONENTS OF ACTIVITIES. A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT ISSUES REMAIN TO BE RESOLVED IN THE FINAL WEEK, INCLUDING SCOPE OF OBSERVATION (THE EAST STILL SEEKS TO LIMIT SCOPE AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE), THRESHOLDS AND DURATION OF OBSERVATION (WHICH ARE TIED TO DEVELOPMENTS IN B-1), AND THE OBSERVATION OF ALERTS. ON PERSONAL BINOCULARS, THE EAST HAS ACCEPTED OUR PROPOSAL THAT THEY BE PERMITTED PROVIDED THAT THE HOST STATE CAN EXAMINE THEM. ALTHOUGH THERE IS STILL WORK TO BE DONE, WE DO NOT ANTICIPATE MAJOR DIFFICULTIES IN WRAPPING UP THE OBSERVATION MEASURE.

7. ANNUAL CALENDAR: ALTHOUGH THE COFFEE GROUP MANAGED TO NOTE THREE MORE TEXTS IN THE CONTENT OF THE CALENDAR (SIZE OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY, ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND CHANGES TO THE CALENDAR), THE EAST STONEWALLED ANY

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PROGRESS ON IMPORTANT UNRESOLVED ITEMS IN THE CONTENT OF THE CALENDAR (E.G., THE NUMBER, TYPE, DESIGNATION AND LOCATION OF DIVISIONS).

8. CONSTRAINTS: THE COFFEE GROUP CAME CLOSE TO AGREEMENT THIS WEEK ON LANGUAGE ON 1) THE TWO-YEAR TIME CONSTRAINT; 2) A LIMITATION ON THE SIZE OF ACTIVITIES WHICH COULD BE PRIOR NOTIFIED IF THEY HAVE NOT BEEN INCLUDED IN THE TWO-YEAR ADVANCE CALENDAR; AND 3) A LIMITATION ON THE SIZE OF ACTIVITIES WHICH COULD BE PRIOR NOTIFIED IF THEY HAVE NOT BEEN INCLUDED IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR. THERE HAS BEEN, HOWEVER, LITTLE ACTIVITY ON THE PARAMETERS FOR THESE PROVISIONS: EAST, WEST AND NNA HAVE ONLY AGREED THAT THE LIMITATION ON THE SIZE OF ACTIVITIES YOU CAN ADD THAT WERE NOT FORECAST TWO YEARS IN ADVANCE WILL BE 75,000 (ALERTS, AS ALWAYS, WILL BE EXEMPT).

9. NON-USE OF FORCE: THE NON-USE OF FORCE SECTION OF THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT IS COMPLETE. THIS SECTION, IN OUR VIEW, FULFILLS ALL THE PRIMARY WESTERN OBJECTIVES: IT JUSTIFIES THE NUF REAFFIRMATION BY THE ADOPTION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF CONCRETE CSBM'S; IT REFLECTS THE BROADER WESTERN CONCEPT OF SECURITY, INCLUDING RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS; AND IT ELIMINATES ALMOST ALL EASTERN DECLARATORY LANGUAGE (SEE REFTEL FOR FULL TEXT). IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, THE NATO STRATEGY TO REGISTER THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE WESTERN NUF PAPER EARLY PUT PRESSURE ON EASTERN AND NNA DELEGATIONS TO PLEA FOR THEIR RESPECTIVE CAUSES DURING THE LAST-MINUTE RUSH TO JUDGMENT. THE POLES PUSHED FOR INCLUSION OF A PARAGRAPH ON THE INVIOABILITY OF FRONTIERS, THE CYPRIOTS ARGUED FOR ENLARGING THE MANIFESTATION OF FORCE CONCEPT, THE EAST PRESSED FOR THE ADDITION OF DECLARATORY LANGUAGE TO THE FINAL ACT'S REFERENCES TO ARMED FORCES, AND THE FRENCH INSISTED ON ITS OWN GALLIC NUANCES ABOUT EVERYTHING ELSE (OFTEN UNINTELLIGIBLE TO THE ANGLO-SAXON OR ANY OTHER MIND). REMINISCENT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL TAX REFORM DEBATE, INDIVIDUAL DELEGATIONS FEVERISHLY LOBBIED TO PROTECT THEIR PET PROJECTS. HOWEVER, IT SOON BECAME CLEAR THAT ACQUIESCENCE TO ANY AMENDMENTS WOULD RESULT IN PRESSURE TO ACCEPT ALL OF THEM. THUS, THE COORDINATOR WAS ABLE TO REJECT ALL SUBSTANTIVE AMENDMENTS DURING AN EIGHT-HOUR SESSION ON SEPTEMBER 9. ON FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, THE FULL TEXT WAS NOTED.

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END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07320

SUBJECT: CDE: VERIFICATION LANGUAGE NOTED IN WORKING  
- GROUP

1. CDE XII -066.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. DRAFTING IS PROGRESSING ON VERIFICATION, WITH SIX MORE TEXTS PROVISIONALLY NOTED IN THE RELEVANT WORKING GROUP ON WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 10. MAJOR ISSUES STILL OUTSTANDING ARE SPECIFIED AREAS/RESTRICTED AREAS, INSPECTION QUOTAS, TRANSPORTATION (WHO HAS THE KEYS TO THE CAR), AND MODALITIES FOR AERIAL INSPECTION. LURKING IN THE WINGS ARE COMMUNICATIONS AND CONSULTATIONS ISSUES, BUT NO ONE SEEMS TO BE PRESSING PET IDEAS IN THIS REGARD AT THE MOMENT, AS ALL WORK HAS FOCUSED ON DRAFTING INSPECTION MODALITIES. ON SPECIFIED AREAS/RESTRICTED AREAS AND INSPECTION QUOTAS, BILATERAL CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE CHIEF NATO SPOKESPERSON (UK-FREEMAN) AND THE USSR (ROZANOV) ARE PROGRESSING WELL FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE. WITH A WEEK TO GO, THE PACE OF MEETINGS IS ACCELERATING -- COFFEE GROUP MEETINGS ARE SCHEDULED FOR BOTH SATURDAY AND SUNDAY. TEXTS NOTED ON WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 10 ARE AS FOLLOWS.
4. PASSAGE OF INSPECTION TEAM: A TEXT, BASED ON THE LAST SENTENCE OF PARA 12 OF SC.1/MEASURE 5, WAS NOTED AS FOLLOWS:  
"ALL PARTICIPATING STATES WILL FACILITATE THE PASSAGE OF INSPECTION TEAMS THROUGH THEIR TERRITORY."
5. INSPECTION REPORT: A TEXT, BASED ON SC.1/MEASURE 5/PARA 11, WAS NOTED. ELLIPSES ARE UNDERSTOOD BY WEST TO DEAL WITH A TIME ELEMENT, I.E. A REPORT SHOULD BE PREPARED IN AS SHORT A PERIOD OF TIME AS POSSIBLE; NNA WOULD LIKE TO SPECIFY A PERIOD OF TIME, SUCH AS 48 HOURS. NNA AND EAST MAY TRY TO PROVIDE FOR THE PROVISION OF A REPORT FROM THE INSPECTED STATE.  
"THE INSPECTING STATE WILL PREPARE A REPORT OF ITS INSPECTION AND WILL PROVIDE A COPY OF THAT REPORT TO ALL PARTICIPATING STATES . . . . (FULL STOP)"
6. COMPOSITION OF INSPECTION TEAM. A TEXT, BASED ON SC.1/MEASURE 5/PARA 13 WAS NOTED. ELLIPSES IN OUR VIEW ARE TO PROVIDE FOR AIRCRAFT CREW AND DRIVERS, AS WELL AS TO ALLOW FOR PERSONNEL OF THE INSPECTION TEAM TO BE DRAWN FROM THE DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR FACILITIES OF THE INSPECTING STATE IN THE RECEIVING STATE.  
"THERE WILL BE NO MORE THAN FOUR INSPECTORS IN AN INSPECTION TEAM . . . ."
7. LOGISTIC SUPPORT. LANGUAGE, BASED ON SC.1/MEASURE 5/PARA 15, AND DRAWN PARTIALLY FROM A TEXT PROVISIONALLY NOTED IN THE OBSERVATION WORKING GROUP, WAS NOTED AS FOLLOWS:  
"THE RECEIVING STATE WILL PROVIDE THE INSPECTION TEAM WITH APPROPRIATE BOARD AND LODGING IN A LOCATION

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SUITABLE FOR CARRYING OUT THE INSPECTION, AND, WHEN NECESSARY, MEDICAL CARE; HOWEVER THIS DOES NOT EXCLUDE THE USE BY THE INSPECTION TEAM OF ITS OWN TENTS AND RATIONS."

8. COMMUNICATIONS CHANNELS. BASED ON SC.1/MEASURE 5/PARA 8, THE FOLLOWING WAS NOTED:

"THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL USE DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS FOR COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING INSPECTIONS."

9. METHOD--PRINCIPLE. BASED ON SC.1/MEASURE 5/PARA 5, THE FOLLOWING LANGUAGE CONTAINING THE PRINCIPLE OF THE INSPECTION METHODS WAS NOTED. FIRST SET OF ELLIPSES ARE TO PROVIDE FOR THE WORDS "OR BOTH," IN ORDER TO ALLOW FOR BOTH AIR AND GROUND INSPECTION, AND TO ALLOW FOR THEM TO BE CONDUCTED SIMULTANEOUSLY. THE SECOND SET OF ELLIPSES REFLECTS A USSR DESIRE TO SPECIFY WHO PROVIDES THE TRANSPORT/VEHICLES -- FROM THEIR PERSPECTIVE, THE INSPECTED STATE.

"INSPECTION WILL BE PERMITTED ON THE GROUND, FROM THE AIR . . . .(FULL STOP) INSPECTION WILL BE CONDUCTED FROM LAND VEHICLES AND FROM AIRCRAFT . . . ."

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END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07319  
 SUBJECT: VERIFICATION WRAPUP - WEEK FIVE OF FINAL ROUND

1. CDE XII - 067
2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY: DESPITE THE RECENT "NO DEAL" MESSAGE FROM MOSCOW THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAS YET FORMALLY TO REJECT CATEGORICALLY THE POSSIBILITY OF NEUTRAL AIR FOR INSPECTION. THE NNA CONTINUE TO EXPRESS THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE CONCEPT AND TO ELICIT OUR HELP IN FORMULATING APPROPRIATE MODALITIES. THE SOVIETS MEANWHILE RESIST DRAFTING ANY MODALITIES WHICH WOULD NOT BE CONSISTENT WITH INSPECTED STATE CONTROL. ON QUOTAS, THERE IS GENERAL ACCEPTANCE OF A PASSIVE SYSTEM. SOVIET SUPPORT FOR A RESTRICTED AREA CONCEPT CLOSE TO OURS SHOULD FACILITATE EARLY DRAFTING ON THE QUESTION. SUPPORT FOR THIRD PARTY PARTICIPATION AS OBSERVERS IN THE INSPECTION PROCESS IS WANING. THE CHALLENGE OF THE FINAL WEEK WILL BE TO DRAFT MODALITIES WHICH WILL ESTABLISH AND PROVIDE FOR INSPECTION WITH NNA AIRCRAFT AND CREWS. END SUMMARY.
4. AERIAL INSPECTION. MOSCOW'S RECENT "NO DEAL" TO NEUTRAL AIR, WHICH GRINEVSKY HAS COMMUNICATED TO VARIOUS DELEGATIONS PRIVATELY, HAS NOT BEEN EXPLICITLY ECHOED IN THE WORKING GROUPS. FINLAND AND IRELAND HAVE FORMALLY EXPRESSED THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE CONCEPT, AND IN THE WORKING GROUP THE NNA MOST INTERESTED (SWITZERLAND AND SWEDEN) CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR MODALITIES WHICH WOULD ENABLE THE NNA TO CARRY OUT SUCH A ROLE. THE SWISS STILL HANKER FOR RUNNING THE WHOLE NEUTRAL AIR SHOW, IF WE SUCCEED IN GETTING IT. THEY ARE CONCERNED, HOWEVER, ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS OF CHOICE BETWEEN NEUTRAL AND INSPECTED STATE AIR. THEY BELIEVE THE WEST WILL ALWAYS OPT FOR NNA AIR AND THE EAST FOR INSPECTING STATE, THUS MAKING THE NEUTRALS (READ: SWISS) THE AGENTS FOR WESTERN INSPECTIONS. THE AUSTRIANS ARE LAYING BACK. IN PRIVATE, THEY SAY WE WILL HAVE TO FIGHT FOR NEUTRAL AIR IF WE WANT TO BRING THE SOVIETS AROUND. "IT WAS YOUR IDEA," THE AUSTRIANS SAY. THE SOVIET PRICE FOR NEUTRAL AIR, IF IT IS TO BE HAD, COULD WELL BE UNACCEPTABLY HIGH TROOP THRESHOLDS FOR NOTIFICATION. THE USDEL IN THESE FINAL DAYS WILL CONTINUE TO PUSH FOR DRAFTING ON MODALITIES THAT WOULD CLEARLY BE APPLICABLE TO THE NEUTRAL OPTION; WE EXPECT THE SOVIETS TO RESIST DRAFTING ON THESE PARTICULAR MODALITIES. TO MAKE INSPECTED STATE AIR LESS OBJECTIONABLE, THE SOVIETS ARE SUPPORTING THE PRINCIPLE THAT INSPECTED STATE AIRCREWS WOULD BE RESPONSIVE TO DIRECTION FROM THE INSPECTORS. THE SOVIETS ARE ALSO PUSHING HELICOPTERS AS THE MOST SUITABLE PLATFORM FOR BOTH INSPECTION AND TRANSPORT WITHIN THE SPECIFIED INSPECTION AREA. THEY ARGUE THAT HELICOPTERS COULD BE

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USED TO GET AN OVERVIEW OF THE INSPECTED AREA AND THAT GROUND TRANSPORT COULD BE USED FOR FOLLOWUP INVESTIGATION OF SUSPICIOUS AREAS. FIXED WING AIRCRAFT, THEY SAY, WOULD BE UNSAFE WHERE LOW-LEVEL AIR MISSIONS ARE BEING FLOWN AS PART OF EXERCISES.

5. QUOTAS. THE SOVIETS PRIVATELY HAVE INDICATED THEY COULD ACCEPT A STIPULATION THAT WOULD ALLOW ANY ONE STATE TO INSPECT ANOTHER ONLY ONCE PER YEAR. SOME NNA (AUSTRIA) SEE NO NEED FOR SUCH A LIMITATION SINCE IT SMACKS OF ACTIVE QUOTA. THE AUSTRIANS ARGUE THAT NO ONE STATE WOULD RISK TARNISHING ITS CREDIBILITY BY REPEATEDLY SEEKING TO INSPECT A PARTICULAR GIVEN STATE. WE DO BELIEVE WE CAN GET AGREEMENT TO SUCH A PROVISION. IN ADDITION, THE NNA SEEM RECONCILED TO ACCEPTING PASSIVE QUOTAS. WE PROBABLY WILL MANAGE TO ADOPT FRAMEWORK LANGUAGE ON QUOTAS BY THE MIDDLE OF THE COMING WEEK BUT NOT BE ABLE TO AGREE ON THE NUMBERS THEMSELVES UNTIL THE FINAL DAY.

6. RESTRICTED AREAS. THE UK-USSR FIX SEEMS TO BE IN. SOVIET REP ROZANOV HAS INDICATED ACCEPTANCE OF AN APPROACH CLOSE TO OURS. THE FRG MAY CONTINUE TO HAVE SOME PROBLEMS BUT BY THE END OF THE WEEK WILL PROBABLY COME AROUND. ON SPECIFIED AREAS THE SOVIETS SEEM READY TO DROP THEIR COOKIE-CUTTER APPROACH, VIZ., THE SIZE OF THE AREA SHOULD CONFORM TO THE NATURE OF THE SUSPECTED INSTANCE OF NON-COMPLIANCE. THEY WILL, HOWEVER, REQUIRE SOME REFERENCE TO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SPECIFIED AREA AND THE SIZE AND SCOPE OF THE SUSPECTED NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITY.

7. THIRD PARTY PARTICIPATION. MUCH OF THE ATTRACTION TO THIS NOTION HAS SHIFTED TO THE CONCEPT OF NNA AIR. THE AUSTRIANS ARE ALONE AMONG THE NNA STRONGLY ADVOCATING THIRD PARTY PRESENCE AS OBSERVERS DURING INSPECTION. THE EAST, WHICH LAST WEEK HELD OUT THIRD PARTY PARTICIPATION AS A WAY OF SATISFYING NNA ROLE-PLAYING ASPIRATIONS, HAS NOT PRESSED ITS CASE.

8. DRAFTING. MORE NON-CONTROVERSIAL TEXT HAS BEEN NOTED IN THE COORDINATOR'S NOTEBOOK. ATTEMPTS TO DRAFT ON INSPECTION MODALITIES MET WITH SOVIET EFFORTS TO PRESERVE INSPECTED STATE CONTROL OF TRANSPORT FROM POINT OF ENTRY AND THROUGHOUT THE INSPECTION TOUR. THE NNA ATTEMPTED TO MOVE DRAFTING ON MODALITIES IN THEIR DIRECTION BY ADDRESSING LOGISTICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR AERIAL INSPECTIONS, BUT THUS MADE IT EASY FOR THE EAST TO ARGUE THAT THE HOST STATE IS BEST EQUIPPED TO ENSURE THE RELIABILITY OF AERIAL TRANSPORT AND INSPECTION PLATFORMS. WE NOW EXPECT DRAFTING TO MOVE REASONABLY WELL ON SOME DIFFICULT ISSUES: RESTRICTED AREAS, SPECIFIED AREAS, AND QUOTAS. REGARDING AERIAL MODALITIES, HOWEVER, WE ARE CONCERNED BY THE FACT THAT THE NNA WILL NOT JOINTLY BE ABLE TO PRESENT A

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COMPREHENSIVE SET FOR DRAFTING PURPOSES. CONTINUED  
DELAY WILL ONLY CAUSE THE CONCEPT OF NEUTRAL AIR TO  
ATROPHY; THIS IS CLEARLY THE SOVIET INTENTION.  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07344  
 SUBJECT: CDE - STATUS OF CONSTRAINING MEASURES

1. CDE XII - 068.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

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3. SUMMARY: ALTHOUGH THERE IS AS YET NO LANGUAGE NOTED, DELEGATION BELIEVES THAT A "TIME CONSTRAINT" WILL, DURING THE FINAL WEEK, BE AGREED BY THE CONFERENCE. THIS MEASURE, WHILE CLEARLY RELATED TO THE ANNUAL CALENDAR, HAS, IN MOST PARTICIPANT'S EYES, A LIFE OF ITS OWN. AT THIS POINT, THEREFORE, IT APPEARS LIKELY THAT IT WILL FIND A SOMEWHAT INDEPENDENT PLACE IN THE FINAL DOCUMENT: EITHER UNDER THE TITLE "CONSTRAINING MEASURES" OR WITHIN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR BUT WITH A SEPARATE INTRODUCTION AS A "CONSTRAINING PROVISION." END SUMMARY.

4. BASED ON DISCUSSIONS WITH WASHINGTON AGENCIES BETWEEN ROUNDS XI AND XII, INCLUDING THE 9 AUGUST IG, USDEL HAS PURSUED DEVELOPMENT OF A "TIME CONSTRAINT" BOTH WITHIN NATO AND THE CONFERENCE. AS ORIGINALLY FORMULATED BY THE IRISH DELEGATION, THIS WAS A TWO TIER SYSTEM OF ADVANCE FORECASTING (I.E., ACTIVITIES ABOVE A CERTAIN SIZE WOULD BE FORECAST TWO YEARS IN ADVANCE AND EVEN LARGER ACTIVITIES WOULD BE FORECAST THREE YEARS IN ADVANCE). WE PURSUED A SINGLE TIER SYSTEM WHICH HAD THREE PARTS: 1) A REQUIREMENT TO FORECAST ACTIVITIES ABOVE A CERTAIN SIZE (E.G., 40,000) TWO YEARS IN ADVANCE; 2) A LIMITATION ON THE SIZE OF ACTIVITIES (E.G., 75,000) WHICH COULD EITHER BE INCLUDED IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR OR PRIOR NOTIFIED IF THEY HAD NOT BEEN INCLUDED IN THE TWO YEAR FORECAST; AND 3) A SANCTION OF EXEMPTION FROM THE PASSIVE QUOTA FOR INSPECTION FOR ACTIVITIES (BETWEEN THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL AND 75,000) WHICH WOULD BE PRIOR NOTIFIED BUT HAD NOT BEEN INCLUDED IN THE TWO YEAR FORECAST OR ANNUAL CALENDAR. THIS THIRD ELEMENT NEVER RECEIVED THE APPROVAL OF THE NATO CAUCUS FOR TWO REASONS: 1) CONCERN OVER ESTABLISHING THE CONCEPT OF A "PENALTY," AND 2) CONCERN THAT THE SANCTION WOULD, IN CASES WHERE A COUNTRY HAD NOT INCLUDED THE ACTIVITY IN THE CALENDAR OR TWO YEAR FORECAST, HAVE CREATED A DISINCENTIVE TO PRIOR NOTIFY.

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5. AS IT STANDS NOW, THE "TIME CONSTRAINT" IS BASED ON THE FIRST TWO PARTS OF OUR ORIGINAL CONCEPT AND A THIRD ELEMENT WHICH DERIVES FROM THE SECOND: A LIMIT ON THE SIZE OF ACTIVITIES (E.G., 40,000) WHICH CAN BE PRIOR NOTIFIED IF THEY HAVE NOT BEEN INCLUDED IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR. THE PRECISE LANGUAGE, AS IT CURRENTLY STANDS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, OF THESE THREE ELEMENTS FOLLOWS:

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## BEGIN TEXT:

PARTICIPATING STATES WILL COMMUNICATE, IN WRITING, TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES, BY 15 NOVEMBER EACH YEAR, INFORMATION CONCERNING MILITARY ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION INVOLVING MORE THAN 40,000 TROOPS ..., WHICH IT PLANS TO CARRY OUT IN THE SECOND SUBSEQUENT CALENDAR YEAR. SUCH COMMUNICATION WILL INCLUDE PRELIMINARY INFORMATION ON EACH ACTIVITY, AS TO ITS GENERAL PURPOSE, TIMEFRAME AND DURATION, AREA, SIZE AND STATES INVOLVED.

PARTICIPATING STATES WILL NOT CARRY OUT MILITARY ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION INVOLVING MORE THAN 75,000 TROOPS ..., UNLESS THEY HAVE BEEN THE OBJECT OF COMMUNICATION AS DEFINED ABOVE.

PARTICIPATING STATES WILL NOT CARRY OUT MILITARY ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION INVOLVING MORE THAN 40,000 TROOPS ... UNLESS THEY HAVE BEEN INCLUDED IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR NOT LATER THAN 15 NOVEMBER EACH YEAR.

(EXCEPTIONS CONCERNING ALERTS/ACTIVITIES ON SHORT NOTICE ARE PRESUMED.)

END TEXT.

6. TO THIS POINT, NATO HAS NOT ENDORSED A FOURTH ELEMENT WHICH THE EAST AND NNA STRONGLY SUPPORT: A LIMIT ON THE NUMBER OF ADDITIONS (I.E., TWO PER YEAR) TO THE ANNUAL CALENDAR. LIKE THE OTHER IDEAS, IT IS CLOSELY RELATED TO THE ANNUAL CALENDAR. IN FACT, IT IS INTELLECTUALLY DIFFICULT TO OPPOSE A LIMITATION ON ADDITIONS TO THE CALENDAR PER SE WHEN OUR OWN INTENT IN THE CALENDAR IS THAT ADDITIONS WOULD BE USED RARELY, IF EVER. USDEL BELIEVES, HOWEVER, ANY FLEXIBILITY WE MIGHT SHOW IN THIS AREA WOULD HAVE TO BE LINKED TO EASTERN CONCESSIONS ON ISSUES OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO US (I.E., INSPECTION AND/OR NOTIFICATION PARAMETERS).

7. THERE ARE SEVERAL POINTS WORTH NOTING REGARDING THIS CONCEPT: ALERT ACTIVITIES ARE EXEMPTED FROM THE ENTIRE REGIME, THUS PRESERVING OUR OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY; ALTHOUGH THE DOTS IN THIS TEXT ARE CURRENTLY ACTING AS A PLACEHOLDER FOR A STRUCTURAL EQUIVALENT OF THE NUMERICAL TROOP LEVEL, IT IS USDEL'S AND NATO'S VIEW THAT THE NEGOTIATION OF A STRUCTURAL EQUIVALENT WOULD PROVE THOROUGHLY IMPRACTICAL -- WE, THEREFORE, PLAN TO USE A NUMERICAL TROOP PARAMETER ONLY; THIRDLY, THE NUMERICAL TROOP PARAMETER IS THE CUMULATIVE NUMBER OF TROOPS PARTICIPATING IN AN ACTIVITY (AS IN THE NOTIFICATION PROVISION OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT) RATHER THAN THE SNAPSHOT FIGURE ("AT THE SAME TIME") IN THE CDE NOTIFICATION MEASURE.

8. IT IS USDEL'S AND NATO'S VIEW THAT ESTABLISHING

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AGREEMENT ON THIS TYPE OF CONCEPT WOULD SERVE OUR INTERESTS REGARDING THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING PROCESS. IT WILL ALSO, IN A WAY WHICH SUPPORTS THE WESTERN APPROACH TO THE CDE, SERVE TO SATISFY NNA AND EASTERN REQUIREMENTS FOR A CONSTRAINING MEASURE IN THE FINAL DOCUMENT. AS IT IS RELATED TO THE ANNUAL CALENDAR, OUR APPROACH TO THE CDE BASED ON OPENNESS AND PREDICTABILITY WOULD BE REINFORCED. FURTHERMORE, WE BELIEVE IT COMPLICATES, ALBEIT IN A MINOR WAY BECAUSE OF THE ALERT EXEMPTION, EASTERN MILITARY OPTIONS FOR CONDUCTING LARGE ACTIVITIES FOR THE PURPOSES OF INTIMIDATION.

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9. REGARDING THE ISSUE OF PLACEMENT OF THIS CONCEPT IN A FINAL DOCUMENT, WE BELIEVE THERE ARE BASICALLY TWO OPTIONS. FIRST, IT COULD BE PLACED AS A SEPARATE MEASURE UNDER THE TITLE, "CONSTRAINING MEASURES." SECOND, IT COULD FALL WITHIN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR, INTRODUCED BY A PHRASE SUCH AS, "THE FOLLOWING CONSTRAINING PROVISIONS RELATED TO THE ANNUAL CALENDAR WERE ALSO AGREED:". WE HAVE WITHHELD ENDORSEMENT OF EITHER OPTION BOTH BECAUSE OF OUR CONCERN OVER THE ATTENTION AND STATUS IT GIVES TO CONSTRAINING MEASURES AND BECAUSE OF ITS VALUE AS NEGOTIATING CAPITAL. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT EITHER OPTION IS ULTIMATELY ACCEPTABLE AND THAT INCLUSION OF THE WORDS "CONSTRAINING MEASURES" IN A CDE DOCUMENT DOES NOT IN ANY WAY PREJUDICE OUR POSITION REGARDING CONSTRAINTS IN THE FUTURE. WHILE WE WILL CONTINUE TO HOLD THIS LEVERAGE FOR THE FINAL DAYS, WE BELIEVE THAT, IN THE END, CONSTRAINING MEASURES WILL STAND IN ONE OF THE TWO WAYS OUTLINED ABOVE.

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END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07334  
 E.O.12356: DECL:OADR  
 SUBJECT: CDE: STATE OF PLAY ON RESTRICTED/SPECIFIED  
 AREAS: GERMAN CONCERNS.

1. CDE XII -069.
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. SUMMARY. USSR SEEMS TO HAVE GENERALLY ACCEPTED NATO'S "POSITIVE APPROACH" TO RESTRICTED AREAS/AREAS TO BE SPECIFIED FOR INSPECTION, ALTHOUGH IT IS STILL SEARCHING BOTH FOR WAYS TO LIMIT THE SPECIFIED AREA AND FOR LOOPHOLES REGARDING NON-NOTIFIED SUSPECT ACTIVITIES. NONETHELESS, LANGUAGE DISCUSSED BETWEEN THE EAST AND WEST IS NOW IN PLAY IN THE WORKING/COFFEE GROUP. WITHIN THE ALLIANCE WE HAVE WORKED CLOSELY TO ACCOMMODATE NORWEGIAN, TURKISH AND GERMAN CONCERNS. GERMANS, HOWEVER, STILL HAVE PROBLEMS. END SUMMARY.
4. LANGUAGE ON RESTRICTED AREAS/SPECIFIED AREAS FOR INSPECTION WORKED EXTENSIVELY BETWEEN EAST AND WEST (UK-USSR), HAS NOW SURFACED FOR DISCUSSION IN THE RELEVANT WORKING/COFFEE GROUP. WE HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN SELLING OUR "POSITIVE" APPROACH TO THE USSR. THE WORKING TEXT, CONTAINING ELLIPSES TO COVER UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS, HAS TWO PARAGRAPHS: THE FIRST ADDRESSES WHAT A SPECIFIED AREA IS AND THE RIGHTS OF STATES TO DESIGNATE SUCH AN AREA FOR INSPECTION; THE SECOND ADDRESSES RESTRICTED AREAS AND SENSITIVE POINTS AND THE RELATIONSHIP OF THESE AREAS AND POINTS TO THE SPECIFIED AREA AND THE CONDUCT OF INSPECTION. UNRESOLVED ISSUES RELATE TO THE USSR'S DESIRES TO LIMIT THE AREA OF INSPECTION IN WAYS UNACCEPTABLE TO MOST OF NATO, I.E. TO ENSURE THAT LARGE AREAS OF THE SOVIET UNION CANNOT BE DECLARED A SPECIFIED AREA FOR INSPECTION. THE SECOND SOVIET INTEREST IS TO OBTAIN TWO SENTENCES CONTAINING LANGUAGE STATING ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION WILL NOT BE CONDUCTED IN AREAS AND SENSITIVE POINTS TO WHICH ACCESS IS NORMALLY DENIED OR RESTRICTED OR THAT PLACES WHERE SUCH ACTIVITIES ARE CONDUCTED WILL NOT BE DECLARED RESTRICTED. TWO SENTENCES ARE OVERKILL AND, IN ANY EVENT, WE ARE CONCERNED THAT THE EFFECT OF SUCH LANGUAGE COULD BE TO ALLOW THE USSR TO PREVENT THE CONDUCT OF AN INSPECTION IN A RESTRICTED AREA OF A NON-NOTIFIED, BUT SUSPECT, MILITARY ACTIVITY BECAUSE A NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITY COULD NOT BE CONDUCTED IN SUCH AN AREA. ON THE OTHER HAND THIS LANGUAGE COULD ALSO HAVE THE EFFECT OF PREVENTING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF TEMPORARILY RESTRICTED AREAS AS A MEANS OF PREVENTING AN INSPECTION. NATO IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT SOMETHING ALONG THESE LINES FOR THIS REASON.
5. ALL, HOWEVER, IS NOT QUIET ON THE WESTERN FRONT. WHILE THE FRG CDE AMBASSADOR (CITRON) HAS GIVEN THE NATO SPOKESPERSON (UK-FREEMAN) AND THE NATO

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VERIFICATION TEAM ROOM TO "EXPLORE" THIS LANGUAGE, THE FRG DEL HAS NOT YET RECEIVED A FINAL GREEN LIGHT FROM BONN. AMB. CITRON IS TRYING TO MANAGE HERE IN STOCKHOLM WHAT WE UNDERSTAND IS A SPLIT BETWEEN THE POLITICAL AND DEFENSE SIDES OF THE HOUSE IN BONN. THE DEFENSE MINISTRY AND MILITARY STILL APPEAR TO HAVE CONSIDERABLE PROBLEMS WITH OUR APPROACH WHICH DOES NOT EXPLICITLY SANCTION RESTRICTED AREAS IN A CDE CONTEXT AND WHICH WOULD, IN EFFECT, PREVENT THE EXISTENCE OF RESTRICTED AREAS OR SENSITIVE POINTS FROM IMPEDING THE CONDUCT OF AN INSPECTION OF EITHER A NOTIFIED ACTIVITY, OR, PARTICULARLY, OF AN ACTIVITY NOT NOTIFIED BUT WHICH IS PRESUMED SHOULD HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED. WE UNDERSTAND THAT BEHIND THIS CONCERN LIES A DESIRE TO MAINTAIN OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY TO CONDUCT CERTAIN ACTIVITIES ABOVE OR CLOSE TO THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL AND NOT HAVE SUCH ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO INSPECTION; ONE FRG CDE MILITARY REP HAS TOLD US PRIVATELY THAT IT INTEND TO RE-ORGANIZE ITS FORCES OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS AND WISH TO MAINTAIN THEIR OPTION TO EXERCISE THEM IN THIS NEW MODE AT A NOTIFIABLE LEVEL, BUT TO ENSURE THAT THEY WILL NOT BE OBSERVED, WHICH MEANS THEY MIGHT NOT CHOOSE TO NOTIFY THEM. IN EITHER CASE, THEY WOULD LIKE THE OPTION OF EMPLOYING RESTRICTED AREAS TO AVOID INSPECTION OF SUCH ACTIVITIES. THUS, THE MOD GERMANS HAVE FREQUENTLY SOUGHT OUT U.S. REPS TO ELICIT BEHIND THE SCENES SUPPORT FOR A VARIETY OF PROPOSALS, ALL OF WHICH WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF EXPLICITLY SANCTIONING RESTRICTED AREAS AND SENSITIVE POINTS IN A CDE REGIME AND COULD REQUIRE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AN UNWIELDY, NON-NEGOTIABLE, AND NON-IMPLEMENTABLE SET OF MECHANISMS RELATED TO RESTRICTED AREAS AND THE AREA TO BE SPECIFIED FOR INSPECTION. A RELATED MOD CONCERN IS TO LIMIT THE SIZE OF THE AREA THAT COULD BE DESIGNATED AS SPECIFIED SO AS TO ENSURE THAT A HUGE AREA OF THE FRB UNRELATED TO THE MILITARY ACTIVITY IN QUESTION IS NOT DESIGNATED AS AN AREA FOR INSPECTION.

6. RELATED TO THESE CONCERNS, FRG MILITARY REPS HAVE FLOATED, BEHIND THE SCENES, VARIOUS IDEAS. AMONG SUCH IDEAS ARE THE FOLLOWING:

-- IN THE CASE OF ACTIVITIES TO BE NOTIFIED, RESTRICTED AREAS SHOULD BE SPELLED OUT IN ADVANCE IN THE PRIOR NOTIFICATION;

-- IN THE CASE OF NON-NOTIFIED ACTIVITIES, IN THE RESPONSE TO A REQUEST FOR AN INSPECTION, THE INSPECTED STATE SHOULD INDICATE THE RESTRICTED AREAS IN THE AREA SPECIFIED FOR INSPECTION;

-- RESTRICTED AREAS WITHIN ANY SPECIFIED AREA SHOULD BE LIMITED, EITHER BY NUMBER OR PERCENTAGE;

-- A SPECIFIED AREA SHOULD BE AGREED IN ADVANCE TO BE OF A LIMITED SIZE, I.E. IN THE CASE OF A NOTIFIED

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ACTIVITY PERHAPS NO LARGER THAN TWICE THE SIZE OF THE AREA WHERE THE NOTIFIED ACTIVITY IS TAKING PLACE;  
 -- EXCHANGE IN ADVANCE OF ALL RESTRICTED AREAS IN CDE COUNTRIES, EITHER BY LIST OR MAPS;

7. IN RESPONSE TO SUCH SUGGESTIONS, U.S. REPS HAVE EXPRESSED THE FOLLOWING GENERAL CONCERNS:

-- WE ARE PURSUING AN APPROACH CONSISTENT WITH OUR APPROACH TAKEN IN NATO OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS -- WE DO NOT FAVOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF RESTRICTED AREAS, EITHER ON A PERMANENT OR TEMPORARY BASIS. WE CAN ACCEPT THE CONCEPT OF "SENSITIVE POINTS" INASMUCH AS SUCH A CONCEPT IS CONSISTENT WITH THE AGREED NATO LIST OF "EXCEPTIONS" TO AN INSPECTION (E.G. GARRISONS , ETC.).

-- WE DO NOT FAVOR AN EXCHANGE OF LISTS, MAPS, OR ANY ADVANCE INDICATION OF RESTRICTED AREAS OR SENSITIVE POINTS INASMUCH AS THAT WOULD AMOUNT TO A SANCTIONING OF THE CONCEPT OF RA'S IN A CDE CONTEXT; IT HAS BEEN OUR JUDGEMENT THAT ANY ATTEMPT TO REGISTER RA'S WOULD DRIVE THE SIZE AND NUMBER OF RA'S UP TO AN UNACCEPTABLY HIGH LEVEL. WE DO NOT WISH TO CONDONE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF LARGE CLOSED AREAS IN THE EAST; WE ALSO WISH TO AVOID A SITUATION WHEREBY COUNTRIES NOT EMPLOYING THIS CONCEPT WOULD FEEL COMPELLED BY A CDE AGREEMENT TO DO SO - THIS WOULD NOT BE CONDUCIVE TO OPENNESS OR CONFIDENCE-BUILDING IN OUR VIEW. THE FRENCH, IN ANY EVENT, WILL NOT EXCHANGE LISTS OR INDICATE IN ADVANCE OF AN INSPECTION, WHERE OR WHAT THEIR "SENSITIVE POINTS" ARE. THE SOVIETS WILL NOT AGREE TO A PERCENTAGE LIMITATION AND WILL NOT EXCHANGE LISTS OF RESTRICTED AREAS UNTIL AFTER SEPTEMBER 19.

-- WE WILL NOT STAND IN THE WAY OF OUR NATO PARTNERS WHO HAVE ALREADY ESTABLISHED PRACTICES OF RESTRICTED AREAS AND WE HAVE TRIED, IN DEVELOPING DRAFTING LANGUAGE, TO ALLOW FOR THIS PRACTICE. AT THE SAME TIME, WE HAVE SOUGHT LANGUAGE THAT WOULD ENSURE THAT SUCH A PRACTICE DOES NOT IMPACT DETRIMENTALLY ON AN EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION REGIME FOR ANY CDE AGREEMENT. A SYSTEM WHICH ALLOWED THE EXISTENCE OF RESTRICTED AREAS AND SENSITIVE POINTS TO PREVENT THE CONDUCT OF INSPECTIONS WOULD, IN OUR VIEW, BE TANTAMOUNT TO NO VERIFICATION AT ALL.

-- IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO LIMIT IN ADVANCE THE NUMBER OR PERCENTAGE OF RESTRICTED AREAS ALLOWED TO BE INCLUDED IN A SPECIFIED AREA, BECAUSE WHERE AND HOW LARGE THE SPECIFIED AREA WILL BE WILL DEPEND ENTIRELY ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE ACTIVITY ABOUT WHICH THERE ARE DOUBTS. IT MAY BE CONDUCTED IN AN AREA WHERE THERE WILL BE A NUMBER OF AREAS OR SENSITIVE POINTS TO WHICH ACCESS IS NORMALLY RESTRICTED OR DENIED; ON THE OTHER HAND, IT MAY NOT.

-- WHILE WE ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THAT A SPECIFIED

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AREA DESIGNATED FOR INSPECTION SHOULD BEAR A RELATIONSHIP TO THE "SCOPE AND SCALE" OF THE AGREED CSBMS AND BE DEFINED LOOSELY IN THAT WAY, WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT SPECIFIC LIMITATIONS ON THE SIZE THAT ONE CAN DECLARE FOR A SPECIFIED AREA. IT MAY BE DIFFICULT TO KNOW IN ADVANCE WHAT THE LEVEL OF THE ACTIVITY IS; THUS IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO AGREE TO LIMIT AN INSPECTION TO AN AREA SAY, FOR EXAMPLE, OF A SPECIFIC SIZE FOR A STRICTLY DIVISIONAL SIZE ACTIVITY.

8. LANGUAGE PROVIDED BY THE COORDINATOR AS "FOOD FOR THOUGHT" ON RESTRICTED AREAS/SPECIFIED AREAS, WHICH IS NOW UNDER DISCUSSION IN THE COFFEE GROUP, IS AS FOLLOWS: "THE PARTICIPATING STATE WHICH REQUESTS AN INSPECTION WILL STATE THE REASONS FOR SUCH A REQUEST. IT IS PERMITTED TO DESIGNATE A SPECIFIED AREA FOR INSPECTION ON THE TERRITORY OF ANOTHER STATE WITHIN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS. SUCH AN AREA WILL BE REFERRED TO AS THE "SPECIFIED AREA". THE SPECIFIED AREA WILL COMPRISE TERRAIN (INCLUDING TRAINING AREAS) WHERE NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES ARE CONDUCTED OR WHERE ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE BELIEVES A MILITARY ACTIVITY SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION IS TAKING PLACE. THE SPECIFIED AREA WILL BE DEFINED AND LIMITED BY THE SCOPE AND SCALE OF THE NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES . . .

(1)

"IN THE SPECIFIED AREA THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INSPECTING STATE ACCOMPANIED BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE RECEIVING STATE WILL BE PERMITTED ACCESS, ENTRY AND UNOBSTRUCTED SURVEY, EXCEPT FOR AREAS OR SENSITIVE POINTS TO WHICH ACCESS IS NORMALLY DENIED OR RESTRICTED, IN PARTICULAR, MILITARY AND DEFENCE INSTALLATIONS, AS WELL AS NAVAL VESSELS, MILITARY VEHICLES AND AIRCRAFT. THE NUMBER AND EXTENT OF THE AREAS WILL BE AS LIMITED AS POSSIBLE. . . . (2)

RESTRICTED AREAS WILL NOT BE USED TO PREVENT THE CONDUCT OF INSPECTIONS. . . (3)

(1) USSR HAS PROPOSED ADDING "I.E. DIVISION, CORPS, ARMY EXERCISES (TRANSFERS, CONCENTRATION OF FORCES)"; WEST AND NNA HAVE COUNTERED WITH LANGUAGE ALONG FOLLOWING LINES "OR ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE PRESUMED (OR SUSPECTED) TO BE NOTIFIABLE."

(2) USSR HAS PROPOSED TWO ADDITIONAL SENTENCES: "MILITARY ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AGREED CSBMS WILL NOT BE CONDUCTED IN RESTRICTED AREAS. AREAS WHERE NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES TAKE PLACE WILL NOT BE DECLARED RESTRICTED." WEST HAS INDICATED THAT IT DOES NOT BELIEVE SUCH LANGUAGE IS NECESSARY IN LIGHT OF LAST SENTENCE IN THIS PARAGRAPH.

(3) USSR HAS SUGGESTED ADDITION OF FOLLOWING LANGUAGE "OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION."

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WEST HAS INDICATED THAT SUCH LANGUAGE IS NOT NECESSARY,  
BUT IF THE USSR INSISTS IT WOULD WISH TO SUPPLEMENT IT  
WITH LANGUAGE SUCH AS "OR BELIEVED TO BE SUBJECT TO  
NOTIFICATION."  
BARRY  
END OF MESSAGE

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CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY

Statement by ambassador Curt Lidgard, Head of the Swedish Delegation, September 15, 1986, in Working Group A+B

Mr Chairman,

As I stated in the plenary meeting on Aug 29, my Government had then declared itself willing to study urgently and in a positive spirit the proposal that neutral and non-aligned States make an aircraft and crews available for air inspection, subject to consensus among the participating States. As I also stated, this presupposed that thereby a difficult problem could be overcome in our negotiations and an agreement satisfactory to all participating States could be reached.

The issue of a possible third-state aircraft is, as we know, still subject to negotiation. We are well aware that important political questions are involved, which I am not going to dwell upon directly in this intervention. As ambassador Szigeti rightly pointed out in his intervention on September 5, there are also many practical problems which have to be solved in this context.

The latter questions have been discussed among the neutral and non-aligned States and on the behalf of the delegations of Austria, Finland and Switzerland, as well as my own, which have expressed their readiness in principle to provide such an aircraft and crews, I now want to indicate the most important elements which, in our view, would need to be reflected in our document.

Provided there is consensus among the participating States to use such an aircraft, the States on whose behalf I speak, would consult with other participating States, in particular those not being party to a treaty of alliance, in order to find ways and means to ensure permanent availability, on a rotation basis, of an inspection aircraft with its crews.

When a request for inspection from the air is addressed to a participating State, the requesting State would simultaneously inform the participating State whose aircraft is on duty according to the rotation scheme as well as participating en-route States.

The participating States concerned would be obliged immediately to accept the flight plan and facilitate the passage of the aircraft through their territory.

Before the aircraft enters the specified area the receiving State would be permitted to inspect the aircraft in the presence of inspectors or other representatives of the requesting State. This inspection of the aircraft must not delay the timely arrival in the specified area.

At a suitable opportunity, which does not delay the timely arrival in the specified area, representatives of the receiving State would board the aircraft and stay aboard for the duration of the inspection.

As long as the inspection aircraft moves outside the specified area and in controlled airspace it would be treated, mutatis mutandis, as a civil aircraft according to ICAO-procedures and -regulations.

The receiving State would provide logistic support, if needed, for the inspection aircraft and its crews.

During inspection flights in the specified area the obligations of the crew must be unambiguous. We would envisage the the following basic modalities:

- Inspectors would direct the course of the inspection flight, such as flight path, speed and altitude. The directions given by inspectors are communicated to an on-board representative of the receiving State. That representative of the receiving State would follow the directions given by inspectors except if the given course crosses a sensitive point/restricted area or if mandatory safety reasons necessitate a temporary deviation. He then relays the directions in the form of an order to the pilot. The pilot would follow these orders, provided flight safety is not jeopardized or Rules of the Air violated.



- Any deviation from the directions given by inspectors should at once be explained by the on-board representative of the receiving State.
- The crew would record all directions given by inspectors and the subsequent orders given by the on-board representative of the receiving State as well as the time when directions and orders were given, together with any possible explanation.

These may be the modalities to be included in the document which will be adopted by our conference. Other problems of a practical nature, would be worked out by the States, which would undertake to provide the inspection aircraft and crews.

The practical arrangements would be agreed among these States and communicated to all other participating States before 1 January 1987.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07349

SUBJECT: GRINEVSKY POURS COLD WATER ON NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT  
- FOR CDE INSPECTION.

1. CDE XII - 070
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: EVEN AS THE NNA MOVED TO MAKE INSPECTION BY NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT ACCEPTABLE AND WORKABLE, THE SOVIETS CAME EVEN CLOSER TO SAYING CATEGORICALLY NO. IN THE FACE OF CONTINUING SOVIET INTRANSIGIENCE, THE NNA ARE NOW LIKELY TO BACK AWAY FROM THE NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT IDEA AND TRY TO FIND ALTERNATIVES WHICH COULD BE NEGOTIATED BEFORE FRIDAY. END SUMMARY
4. WORKING GROUP AB OPENED SEPTEMBER 15 WITH A SWEDISH STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF SWEDEN, AUSTRIA, SWITZERLAND AND FINLAND, REINFORCING THEIR COMMITMENT TO PROVIDE NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT AND CREWS FOR THE PURPOSES OF CDE INSPECTION, IF THERE IS A CONSENSUS TO DO SO. LIDGARD (SWEDEN) SAID THAT NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT COULD BE PROVIDED ON A ROTATIONAL BASIS AMONG INTERESTED STATES WHICH DO NOT HAVE TREATIES OF MILITARY ALLIANCE. HE WENT ON TO PROPOSE BASIC CONCEPTS FOR AIR MODALITIES WHICH COULD FORM THE BASIS FOR DRAFTING IN THE DAYS REMAINING. IN HIS VIEW, ONLY THE BASIC PRINCIPLES FOR NEUTRAL AIR WOULD HAVE TO BE DRAFTED BEFORE SEPTEMBER 19; TECHNICAL DETAILS COULD BE RESOLVED IN CONSULTATIONS PRIOR TO JANUARY 1. THE IRISH DELEGATION WELCOMED LIDGARD'S REMARKS AND STATED THAT IT WAS PREPARED TO WORK WITH OTHER STATES WITH TREATIES OF MILITARY ALLIANCE TO PROVIDE AIRCRAFT AND CREW. THE IRISH DELEGATION SUGGESTED THAT FURTHER CONSULTATIONS ON MODALITIES COULD TAKE PLACE ON THE MARGINS OF THE VIENNA CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING. BARRY (U.S.) WELCOMED THE LIDGARD CONTRIBUTION AS A WAY TO "ADVANCE DISCUSSION OF HOW PRACTICAL, CREDIBLE AND EFFECTIVE MEANS OF VERIFICATION CAN BE DEVELOPED." HE CONCURRED WITH THE VIEW THAT ONLY THE PRINCIPAL MODALITIES NEED TO BE AGREED BY SEPTEMBER 19, WHILE MORE TECHNICAL ASPECTS CAN BE FINALIZED LATER.
5. GRINEVSKY (USSR) RESPONDED WITH HIS MOST CATEGORICAL STATEMENT AGAINST NEUTRAL AIR TO DATE: PICKING UP ON THE NNA'S LINE THAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO OFFER NEUTRAL AIR ONLY IF THERE IS A CONSENSUS TO DO SO, HE EMPHATICALLY STATED THAT "THERE IS NO CONSENSUS NOW AND NONE IS FORESEEN IN THE FUTURE." READING FROM A PREPARED TEXT, GRINEVSKY BRANDED THE NEUTRAL AIR IDEA AS AN FRG (AND NATO) PROPAGANDA PROPOSAL MADE TOO LATE IN THE CONFERENCE TO BE SERIOUS. HE IMPLIED THAT THE SO-CALLED COMPROMISE HAD ALSO BEEN AN INSULT TO SOVIET MARSHAL AKHROMEYEV, WHO HAD COME TO STOCKHOLM TO MAKE A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO A SUCCESSFUL CDE OUTCOME WITH HIS OFFER OF INSPECTED STATE AIR ON AUGUST 28. HE AGAIN ARGUED THAT INSPECTED STATE AIR, WITH CREWS WHICH WOULD BE SUBJECT TO THE

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INSTRUCTIONS OF THE INSPECTORS, WAS THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY TO ORGANIZE AERIAL INSPECTION. HE CONCLUDED BY CALLING FOR DRAFTING ON CONCRETE MODALITIES FOR INSPECTED STATE AIR AND AGREEING WITH MALTA, WHICH HAD SPOKEN EARLIER, THAT THERE WERE FAR MORE PRESSING ISSUES THAN NEUTRAL AIR TO BE RESOLVED NOW THAT, IN FACT, WE "HAVE NO TIME LEFT."

6. COMMENT: IN SPITE OF CLEAR AND PRACTICAL SUPPORT BY KEY NNA FOR THE NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT POSITION, IT IS LIKELY THAT GRINEVSKY'S STRONG NEGATIVE RESPONSE WILL CAUSE THE NEUTRALS TO LOSE THEIR ENTHUSIASM FOR THE IDEA AND BEGIN TO SEEK ALTERNATIVES ACCEPTABLE TO THE EAST AS WELL AS TO THE WEST. THE IMPACT OF THE NNA EFFORT WAS FURTHER DILUTED AS BOZOVIC (YUGOSLAVIA) CHOSE TO AIR PUBLICLY HIS COMPLAINT THAT BELGRADE, WHICH IS ALSO INTERESTED IN PROVIDING AIRCRAFT AND CREWS FOR INSPECTION, WAS NOT CONSULATED BY THE FOUR NEUTRALS IN THE PREPARATION OF LIDGARD'S MODALITIES. END COMMENT.)

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07368  
SUBJECT: PROPOSED BERLIN DECLARATION  
REF: BONN 29793  
1. CDE XII - 071  
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.  
3. USDEL CDE CONCURS WITH COURSE OF ACTION PROPOSED IN  
REFTEL, I.E., FOLLOWING ADOPTION OF STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT  
FRENCH CDE DELEGATE MAKE DECLARATION AT CDE CONCERNING  
ALLIED RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR BERLIN AND  
GERMANY BASED ON TEXT PROPOSED IN PARA 3 REFTEL.  
PENDING DEPARTMENT APPROVAL, U.S., FRENCH, AND UK REPS  
IN STOCKHOLM WILL COORDINATE SUGGESTED DECLARATION.  
BARRY  
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07439

SUBJECT: CDE: LEAKS

1. CDE XII - 072

2. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

3. THOSE WHO LEAKED OUR INSTRUCTIONS TO THE PRESS SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT THEY HAVE COMPLETELY UNDERMINED OUR BARGAINING POSITION HERE. THE SOVIETS WERE MOVING IN OUR DIRECTION ON SEVERAL KEY ISSUES, SUCH AS THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE AIRCRAFT AND GROUND VEHICLES; BUT WHEN THEY TOOK A BREAK AND RETURNED HAVING READ OUR BOTTOM LINE IN THE PRESS, THEY BACKED AWAY. GRINEVSKY CAME TO MEET ME WAVING WIRE SERVICE REPORTS AND SAYING THAT I WAS TRYING TO GET MORE THAN MY INSTRUCTIONS CALLED FOR. I WAS, AND AM, BUT THE LEAKERS HAVE PROBABLY DOOMED THE EFFORT TO FAILURE.

4. USDEL WOULD LIKE TO GO ON RECORD AS SAYING THAT, ONCE AGAIN, THE LEAKERS HAVE DONE THEIR BEST TO DESTROY OUR ABILITY TO NEGOTIATE AGREEMENTS WHICH SERVE US INTERESTS. WHY?

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07431

SUBJECT: CURRENT STATE OF PLAY ON NEUTRAL AIR FOR CDE  
- INSPECTION

1. CDE XII - 073
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

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3. IN LIGHT OF RECENT PRESS REPORTS CONCERNING THE U.S. POSITION ON THE USE OF NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT AND CREWS FOR THE CONDUCT OF INSPECTION IN A CDE VERIFICATION REGIME, ACTION ADDRESSEES MAY BE APPROACHED BY HOST GOVERNMENTS FOR CLARIFICATION ON THIS ISSUE. THE FOLLOWING POINTS ON THE CURRENT STATE OF PLAY ON NEUTRAL AIR IN STOCKHOLM MAY BE DRAWN UPON BY ACTION ADDRESSEES IN CONTACTS WITH HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS:

-- OUR PROPOSAL FOR THE USE OF NEUTRAL AIRCRAFT AND CREWS FOR THE CONDUCT OF INSPECTION IN A CDE VERIFICATION REGIME REMAINS ON THE TABLE IN STOCKHOLM.

-- NEUTRAL AIR CONTINUES TO BE OUR STRONG PREFERENCE BECAUSE WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS THE MOST SUITABLE ALTERNATIVE TO AIRCRAFT PROVIDED BY THE INSPECTING STATE, AND BECAUSE IT CAN SERVE AS THE BASIS FOR A CREDIBLE AND EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION REGIME IN THE CONTEXT OF A CDE AGREEMENT.

-- WE WILL CONTINUE TO INSIST ON A CREDIBLE AND EFFECTIVE CDE VERIFICATION REGIME AND TO PRESS FOR THE NEUTRAL AIR OPTION FOR INSPECTION.

-- WE ARE NOT PREPARED, HOWEVER, TO ALLOW THE CONFERENCE TO FAIL SOLELY ON THE NEUTRAL AIR ISSUE, ALTHOUGH IF THE CONFERENCE SHOULD RUN AGROUND ON A NUMBER OF CENTRAL ISSUES, NEUTRAL AIR WILL BE AMONG THEM.

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END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07454

SUBJECT: SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR SEPTEMBER 19 PLENARY

1. CDE XII - 074

2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

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3. PENDING AGREEMENT ON THE FULL TEXT OF THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT, NATO REPS, BASED ON CONSULTATIONS WITH EAST AND NNA REPRESENTATIVES, HAVE PROPOSED THE FOLLOWING SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR THE CLOSING PLENARY SESSION OF SEPTEMBER 19. WHILE WE HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED FORMAL APPROVAL FROM THE OTHER GROUPS, WE EXPECT THIS SCENARIO TO BE ENDORSED BY THEM AND TO BE FOLLOWED IN FRIDAY'S PLENARY.

4. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:

- 1) CHAIRMAN ASKS CONSENSUS ON THE DOCUMENT OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE.

- 2) CHAIRMAN READS CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENTS TO BE ANNEXED TO THE DOCUMENT.

- 3) DELEGATIONS MAKE FORMAL RESERVATIONS OR INTERPRETATIVE STATEMENTS REGARDING THE DOCUMENT OR THE CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENTS (RULE 79 OF THE BLUE BOOK).

- 4) CHAIRMAN PROPOSES TO GO INTO OPEN MEETING (RULE 80 OF THE BLUE BOOK).

- 5) STATEMENTS BY VARIOUS COUNTRIES OR IN THE NAME OF GROUPS OF COUNTRIES.

- 6) STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER OR FOREIGN MINISTER OF SWEDEN.

- 7) CHAIRMAN THANKS THE GOVERNMENT OF SWEDEN.

- 8) CHAIRMAN STATES THAT:

"WE HAVE NOW DEALT WITH AGENDA ITEM 3 AND PROCEED TO AGENDA ITEM 4:

"ARRANGEMENTS FOR CONCLUDING THE FIRST STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE.' DEALING WITH THIS ITEM IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT AT THE CLOSING OF THIS MEETING, THE

-

FIRST STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE WILL CONTINUE PENDING THE CONSIDERATION BY THE VIENNA OR A FUTURE CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING OF WAYS AND APPROPRIATE MEANS FOR THE PARTICIPATING STATES TO CONTINUE THEIR EFFORTS FOR SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE, INCLUDING THE QUESTION OF SUPPLEMENTING THE MADRID MANDATE FOR THE NEXT STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE. IF THERE ARE NO MORE SPEAKERS I INTEND TO CLOSE THE MEETING. THE 178TH PLENARY IS CLOSED."

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07453  
 SUBJECT: STRUCTURE OF THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT  
 REF: A) STOCKHOLM 6968, B) STOCKHOLM 7203,  
 - C) STOCKHOLM 7251

1. CDE XII - 075
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

3. BEGIN SUMMARY: PENDING CONFERENCE AGREEMENT ON THE FULL TEXT, REPRESENTATIVES OF NATO, THE WARSAW PACT AND THE NNA TO THE CONTACT GROUP ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT HAVE REACHED AGREEMENT ON A TEXT WHICH IS EXPECTED TO BE PROVISIONALLY REGISTERED AT WORKING GROUP AB THIS EVENING (SEPTEMBER 18). THE TEXT (PROVIDED IN PARA 4 BELOW) CONTAINS THE OPENING AND CLOSING SECTIONS OF THE DOCUMENT PLUS THE ALREADY FINALIZED NON-USE OF FORCE REAFFIRMATION. AT PRESENT IT CONTAINS ONLY THE TITLES FOR CSBM'S AS THESE SECTIONS ARE STILL UNDER NEGOTIATION (NOTE: THERE IS NO AGREEMENT AT THIS TIME ON A TITLE FOR THE SECTION DEALING WITH ANNUAL FORECASTS AND CONTRAINING PROVISIONS). TEXTS FROM AT LEAST SOME OTHER WORKING GROUPS, HOWEVER, ARE ALSO LIKELY TO BE PROVISIONALLY REGISTERED THIS EVENING. PARA 5 BELOW CONTAINS THE TEXT OF TWO CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENTS ON UNRESOLVED ISSUES AND THE IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE FOR PROVISIONS LINKED TO THE ANNUAL CALENDAR. IF AGREED, THESE STATEMENTS WOULD BE ANNEXED TO THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT. END SUMMARY.

4. THE FOLLOWING TEXT PROVIDES THE AGREED STRUCTURE OF THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT. WE ANTICIPATE IT WILL BE PROVISIONALLY REGISTERED IN WORKING GROUP AB THIS EVENING (SEPTEMBER 18):  
 BEGIN TEXT:

- DOCUMENT OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE  
 - )N CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND  
 - DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE CONVENED IN ACCORDANCE WITH  
 - THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT  
 - OF THE MADRID MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE  
 - ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE  
 - THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES OF THE  
 CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE,  
 AUSTRIA, BELGIUM, BULGARIA, CANADA, CYPRUS,  
 CZECHOSLOVAKIA, DENMARK, FINLAND, FRANCE, THE GERMAN  
 -  
 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY,  
 GREECE, THE HOLY SEE, HUNGARY, ICELAND, IRELAND, ITALY,  
 LIECHTENSTEIN, LUXEMBOURG, MALTA, MONACO, THE  
 NETHERLANDS, NORWAY, POLAND, PORTUGAL, ROMANIA, SAN  
 MARINO, SPAIN, SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND, TURKEY, THE UNION OF  
 SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE  
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND YUGOSLAVIA, MET IN  
 STOCKHOLM FROM 17 JANUARY 1984 TO 19 SEPTEMBER 1986 IN

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ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT OF THE MADRID MEETING RELATING TO THE CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE.

THE PARTICIPANTS WERE ADDRESSED BY THE SWEDISH PRIME MINISTER, THE LATE O.OF PALME, ON 17 JANUARY 1984. OPENING STATEMENTS WERE MADE BY THE MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND OTHER HEADS OF DELEGATIONS. THE PRIME MINISTER OF SPAIN AS WELL AS MINISTERS AND SENIOR OFFICIALS OF SEVERAL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES ADDRESSED THE CONFERENCE LATER.

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED THE CONFERENCE ON 6 JULY 1984.

CONTRIBUTIONS WERE MADE BY THE FOLLOWING NON-PARTICIPATING MEDITERRANEAN STATES: ALGERIA, EGYPT, ISRAEL, LEBANON, LIBYA, MOROCCO, SYRIA, AND TUNISIA. THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECALLED THAT THE AIM OF THE CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE IS, AS A SUBSTANTIAL AND INTEGRAL PART OF THE MULTILATERAL PROCESS INITIATED BY THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, TO UNDERTAKE, IN STAGES, NEW, EFFECTIVE AND CONCRETE ACTIONS DESIGNED TO MAKE PROGRESS IN STRENGTHENING CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY AND IN ACHIEVING DISARMAMENT, SO AS TO GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS AS WELL AS IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN GENERAL.

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THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECOGNIZE THAT THE SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES WHICH ARE ADOPTED IN THE PRESENT DOCUMENT AND WHICH, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT, WILL BY THEIR SCOPE AND NATURE AND BY THEIR IMPLEMENTATION SERVE TO STRENGTHEN CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE AND THUS TO GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE.

CONSEQUENTLY, THE PARTICIPATING STATES HAVE DECLARED THE FOLLOWING:

- REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE
- THE PARTICIPATING STATES, RECALLING THEIR OBLIGATION TO REFRAIN, IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS AS WELL AS IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN GENERAL, FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANY STATE, OR IN ANY OTHER MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS, ACCORDINGLY REAFFIRM THEIR COMMITMENT TO RESPECT AND PUT INTO PRACTICE THE PRINCIPLE OF REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE, AS LAID DOWN IN THE FINAL ACT.

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- NO CONSIDERATION MAY BE INVOKED TO SERVE TO WARRANT RESORT TO THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN CONTRAVENTION OF THIS PRINCIPLE.
- THEY RECALL THE INHERENT RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL OR COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENCE IF AN ARMED ATTACK OCCURS, AS SET FORTH IN THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS.
- THEY WILL REFRAIN FROM ANY MANIFESTATION OF FORCE FOR THE PURPOSE OF INDUCING ANY OTHER STATE TO RENOUNCE THE FULL EXERCISE OF ITS SOVEREIGN RIGHTS.
- 
- AS SET FORTH IN THE FINAL ACT NO OCCUPATION OR ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY RESULTING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN CONTRAVENTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW WILL BE RECOGNIZED AS LEGAL.
- THEY RECOGNIZE THEIR COMMITMENT TO PEACE AND SECURITY. ACCORDINGLY THEY REAFFIRM THAT THEY WILL REFRAIN FROM ANY USE OF ARMED FORCES INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE PROVISIONS OF THE DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS BETWEEN PARTICIPATING STATES, AGAINST ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE, IN PARTICULAR FROM INVASION OF OR ATTACK ON ITS TERRITORY.
- THEY WILL ABIDE BY THEIR COMMITMENT TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH ANY STATE, REGARDLESS OF THAT STATE'S POLITICAL, SOCIAL, ECONOMIC OR CULTURAL SYSTEM AND IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER OR NOT THEY MAINTAIN WITH THAT STATE RELATIONS OF ALLIANCE.
- THEY STRESS THAT NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE OBLIGATION OF REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE, AS RECALLED ABOVE, CONSTITUTES A VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.
- THEY STRESS THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES AS CONTAINED IN THE FINAL ACT, CONVINCED THAT IT IS AN ESSENTIAL COMPLEMENT TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE, BOTH BEING ESSENTIAL FACTORS FOR THE MAINTENANCE AND CONSOLIDATION OF PEACE AND SECURITY. THEY RECALL THEIR DETERMINATION AND THE NECESSITY TO REINFORCE AND TO IMPROVE THE METHODS AT THEIR DISPOSAL FOR THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES. THEY REAFFIRM THEIR RESOLVE TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO SETTLE EXCLUSIVELY BY PEACEFUL MEANS ANY DISPUTE BETWEEN THEM.
- 
- THE PARTICIPATING STATES STRESS THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE FINAL ACT OF THE CSCE AND THE NEED FOR FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL ITS PROVISIONS WHICH WILL FURTHER THE PROCESS OF INCREASING SECURITY AND DEVELOPING COOPERATION IN EUROPE, THEREBY CONTRIBUTING TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE WORLD AS A WHOLE.
- THEY EMPHASIZE THEIR COMMITMENT TO ALL THE

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PRINCIPLES OF THE DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS BETWEEN PARTICIPATING STATES AND DECLARE THEIR DETERMINATION TO RESPECT AND PUT THEM INTO PRACTICE IRRESPECTIVE OF THEIR POLITICAL, ECONOMIC OR SOCIAL SYSTEMS AS WELL AS OF THEIR SIZE, GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION OR LEVEL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

- ALL THESE TEN PRINCIPLES ARE OF PRIMARY SIGNIFICANCE AND, ACCORDINGLY, THEY WILL BE EQUALLY AND UNRESERVEDLY APPLIED, EACH OF THEM BEING INTERPRETED TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE OTHERS.

- RESPECT FOR AND THE APPLICATION OF THESE PRINCIPLES WILL ENHANCE THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND COOPERATION AMONG THE PARTICIPATING STATES IN ALL FIELDS COVERED BY THE PROVISIONS OF THE FINAL ACT.

- THEY RECONFIRM THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE BASIC PRINCIPLE OF THE SOVEREIGN EQUALITY OF STATES AND STRESS THAT ALL STATES HAVE EQUAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

- THEY REAFFIRM THE UNIVERSAL SIGNIFICANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS. RESPECT FOR AND THE EFFECTIVE EXERCISE OF THESE RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS ARE ESSENTIAL FACTORS FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, JUSTICE AND SECURITY, AS WELL AS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND COOPERATION AMONG THEMSELVES AS AMONG ALL STATES, AS SET FORTH IN THE DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS BETWEEN PARTICIPATING STATES.

- THEY REAFFIRM THAT, IN THE BROADER CONTEXT OF WORLD SECURITY, SECURITY IN EUROPE IS CLOSELY LINKED WITH SECURITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA AS A WHOLE; IN THIS CONTEXT, THEY CONFIRM THEIR INTENTION TO DEVELOP GOOD NEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS WITH ALL STATES IN THE REGION, WITH DUE REGARD TO RECIPROCITY, AND IN THE SPIRIT OF THE PRINCIPLES CONTAINED IN THE DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS BETWEEN PARTICIPATING STATES, SO AS TO PROMOTE CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY AND MAKE PEACE PREVAIL IN THE REGION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE MEDITERRANEAN CHAPTER OF THE FINAL ACT.

- THEY EMPHASIZE THE NECESSITY TO TAKE RESOLUTE MEASURES TO PREVENT AND TO COMBAT TERRORISM, INCLUDING TERRORISM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. THEY EXPRESS THEIR DETERMINATION TO TAKE EFFECTIVE MEASURES, BOTH AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL AND THROUGH INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, FOR THE PREVENTION AND SUPPRESSION OF ALL ACTS OF TERRORISM. THEY WILL TAKE ALL APPROPRIATE MEASURES IN PREVENTING THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIES FROM BEING USED FOR THE PREPARATION, ORGANIZATION OR COMMISSION OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. THIS ALSO INCLUDES MEASURES TO PROHIBIT ON THEIR TERRITORIES ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES, OF PERSONS, GROUPS AND ORGANIZATIONS THAT INSTIGATE, ORGANIZE OR ENGAGE IN THE

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PERPETRATION OF ACTS OF TERRORISM, INCLUDING THOSE DIRECTED AGAINST OTHER STATES AND THEIR CITIZENS.

- THEY WILL FULFILL IN GOOD FAITH THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW; THEY ALSO STRESS THAT STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THEIR COMMITMENTS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CSCE IS ESSENTIAL FOR BUILDING CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY.

- THE PARTICIPATING STATES CONFIRM THAT IN THE EVENT OF A CONFLICT BETWEEN THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS UNDER THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER ANY TREATY OR OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT, THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CHARTER WILL PREVAIL, IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 103 OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

-  
THE PARTICIPATING STATES HAVE ADOPTED THE FOLLOWING MEASURES:

THEY STRESS THAT THESE CSBM'S ARE DESIGNED TO REDUCE THE DANGERS OF ARMED CONFLICT AND OF MISUNDERSTANDING OR MISCALCULATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND EMPHASIZE THAT THEIR IMPLEMENTATION WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THESE OBJECTIVES. REAFFIRMING THE RELEVANT OBJECTIVES OF THE FINAL ACT, THE PARTICIPATING STATES ARE DETERMINED TO CONTINUE BUILDING CONFIDENCE, TO LESSEN MILITARY CONFRONTATION AND TO ENHANCE SECURITY FOR ALL. THEY ARE ALSO DETERMINED TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS IN DISARMAMENT.

PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES  
OBSERVATION OF CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES

ANNUAL CALENDARS; CONSTRAINING PROVISIONS (OR MEASURES)  
(NOTE: THIS TITLE HAS NOT BEEN AGREED PENDING FURTHER NEGOTIATION IN THE A-3 WORKING GROUP.)

COMPLIANCE AND VERIFICATION  
COMMUNICATION

THE MEASURES ADOPTED IN THIS DOCUMENT ARE POLITICALLY BINDING AND WILL COME INTO FORCE ON 1 JANUARY 1987.

THE GOVERNMENT OF SWEDEN IS REQUESTED TO TRANSMIT THE PRESENT DOCUMENT TO THE FOLLOW-UP MEETING OF THE CSCE IN VIENNA AND TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS. THE GOVERNMENT OF SWEDEN IS ALSO REQUESTED TO TRANSMIT THE PRESENT DOCUMENT TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE NONPARTICIPATING MEDITERRANEAN STATES.

THE TEXT OF THIS DOCUMENT WILL BE PUBLISHED IN EACH PARTICIPATING STATE, WHICH WILL DISSEMINATE IT AND MAKE IT KNOWN AS WIDELY AS POSSIBLE.

-  
THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES EXPRESS THEIR PROFOUND GRATITUDE TO THE PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT OF SWEDEN FOR THE EXCELLENT ORGANIZATION OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE AND WARM HOSPITALITY EXTENDED TO THE DELEGATIONS WHICH PARTICIPATED IN THE CONFERENCE.  
STOCKHOLM, 19 SEPTEMBER 1986

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END TEXT.

5. THE CONTACT GROUP HAS ALSO CONSIDERED TWO CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENTS DEALING RESPECTIVELY WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SPECIFIC CSBM'S (E.G., ANNUAL CALENDARS) AND THE QUESTION OF RAISING UNRESOLVED ISSUE AT POSSIBLE FUTURE CDE MEETINGS (REF C), WHICH WOULD BE READ OUT AT THE CLOSING PLENARY AND ANNEXED TO THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT. THE TEXTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

1) (NOTE: THIS TEXT IS STILL UNDER CONSIDERATION, BUT HAS BEEN ACCEPTED IN SUBSTANCE BY THE NATO CAUCUS.)

BEGIN TEXT:

IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE AGREED DATE OF ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE AGREED CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND THE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THEM CONCERNING THE TIMEFRAMES OF CERTAIN ADVANCE NOTIFICATIONS, AND EXPRESSING THEIR INTEREST IN AN EARLY TRANSITION TO THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THIS DOCUMENT, THE PARTICIPATING STATES AGREE TO THE FOLLOWING:

THE ANNUAL CALENDARS CONCERNING NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES FORECAST FOR 1987 WILL BE EXCHANGED NOT LATER THAN 15 DECEMBER 1986.

COMMUNICATIONS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGREED PROVISIONS, CONCERNING MILITARY ACTIVITIES INVOLVING MORE THAN 40,000 TROOPS PLANNED FOR THE CALENDAR YEAR 1988 WILL BE EXCHANGED BY 15 DECEMBER 1986.

PARTICIPATING STATES MAY UNDERTAKE ACTIVITIES INVOLVING MORE THAN 75,000 TROOPS DURING THE CALENDAR YEAR 1987 AS LONG AS THESE ARE INCLUDED IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR EXCHANGED BY 15 DECEMBER 1986.

ACTIVITIES TO BEGIN DURING THE FIRST 42 DAYS AFTER 1 JANUARY 1987 WILL BE SUBJECT TO THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE FINAL ACT OF THE CSCE. HOWEVER, THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO APPLY TO THEM THE PROVISIONS OF THIS DOCUMENT TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE.

END TEXT.

2) (NOTE: THIS TEXT HAS BEEN ACCEPTED AD REF BY WEST, EAST AND NNA.)

BEGIN TEXT:

IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT EACH PARTICIPATING STATE CAN RAISE ANY QUESTION CONSISTENT WITH THE MANDATE OF THE CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE AT ANY STAGE SUBSEQUENT TO THE VIENNA CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING.

END TEXT.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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S E C R E T STOCKHOLM 07455

SUBJECT: OPTIONS FOR FUTURE HANDLING OF CONVENTIONAL  
- ARMS CONTROL

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. I'M AFRAID MY OWN VIEWS OF THE FUTURE HANDLING OF  
CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL DO NOT FIT IN ANY OF THE  
INSTITUTIONAL PIGEON-HOLES.- A. AS TO THE FORUM, I BELIEVE THAT THE ONLY WAY TO  
GO IS THE TWO-CHAMBER CDE ROUTE. THE SEPARATE FORUM  
HAS MANY FLAWS; ALTHOUGH I TOO SUFFER THE WEIGHT OF THE  
CROSS OF LORRAINE YOU CAN'T DO THIS WITHOUT THE FRENCH.  
WE CAN MANAGE ARMS REDUCTIONS EFFECTIVELY IN THE CDE  
CONTEXT AS WE HAVE PROVEN WITH CSBMS.- B. AS TO TIMING, I BELIEVE THE MANDATE OUGHT TO  
BE NEGOTIATED BY THE POST-VIENNA CSCE REVCON. IN MY  
VIEW WE HAVE MISREAD THE EUROPEANS' SENSE OF URGENCY  
ABOUT CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTIONS. BOTH THE FRENCH  
AND THE GERMANS HERE SAY THEY ARE AGAINST JUMPING RIGHT  
INTO A CDE DISARMAMENT PHASE AND THEY CAN'T UNDERSTAND  
WHY THE US IS IN A HURRY. TRYING TO NEGOTIATE A CDE II  
MANDATE AT THE VIENNA REVCON WOULD MAKE IT VERY DIFFICULT-  
TO OBTAIN A BALANCE IN THE DISCUSSIONS AND WOULD BE  
PREMATURE SINCE WE WILL NEED EXPERIENCE IN THE IMPLEMEN-  
TATION OF CSBMS. I AM ALSO OPPOSED TO ANY EFFORT TO  
NEGOTIATE A CDE II MANDATE IN MBFR; EVEN IF IT COULD  
BE DONE, IT WOULD NEVER BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE NNA IN THE  
CSCE CONTEXT.- C. I THINK CDE I B OUGHT TO CONTINUE TO DO CSBMS.  
SOVIET STONEMALLING ON INFORMATION IN STOCKHOLM BODES  
ILL FOR ANY REDUCTION PROPOSALS, A POINT WHICH WE COULD  
MAKE VERY EFFECTIVELY IN A RENEWED STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE.  
I GUESS WE'LL HAVE LOTS OF VERIFICATION HOLES TO PLUG ALSO.  
MEANWHILE WE COULD WORK ON THE ALLIED REDUCTION POSITION,  
WHICH I IMAGINE COULD USE A COUPLE OF YEARS TO MATURE.  
WE PROFITED GREATLY BY HAVING A FULL SET OF PROPOSALS  
WHEN CDE BEGAN, WE COULD BENEFIT FROM THE SAME TACTIC  
IN REDUCTIONS. THAT SAME TIME COULD BE USED TO PUSH  
OUR ISSUES, PARTICULARLY VERIFICATION, IN MBFR.- D. AS YOU KNOW, I AGREE WITH THE ACDA OPTION ON  
MASSIVE US AND SOVIET BILATERAL FORCE CUTS AS A FIRST  
STAGE MOVE. IT'S AN OFFER THEY CAN'T ACCEPT, SO WHY  
NOT SEIZE THE HIGH GROUND BY MAKING IT?3. I TRUST THESE VIEWS WILL MAKE ALL BUREAUCRATIC PARTI-  
CIPANTS EQUALLY UNHAPPY.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07456  
SUBJECT: FRENCH DIFFICULTIES WITH REFERENCES TO ALLIANCE  
REF: GUNDERSEN-WEEKS TE.CON, 9/18/86

1. CDE XII - 076
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
3. BEGIN SUMMARY: USDEL CDE, WITH DEPARTMENT APPROVAL, SUGGESTS THAT EMBASSY PARIS DELIVER THE FOLLOWING DEMARCHE TO QUAI D'ORSAY AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE, A.M., SEPTEMBER 19 (SEE PARA 6 FOR DEMARCHE). END SUMMARY.
4. PARIS IS AGAIN CREATING DIFFICULTIES FOR THE ALLIANCE. THIS TIME IT IS ON THE QUESTION OF DELEGATIONS SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF THE 16 AT THE CLOSING PLENARY AND EXPLICIT REFERENCES TO ALLIANCES IN THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT. REGARDING SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF THE 16, ALL NATO DELEGATIONS EXCEPT FRANCE FEEL STRONGLY THAT AFTER OVER TWO AND A HALF YEARS OF NEGOTIATING UNITY, E.G., INTRODUCING SC.1/AMPLIFIED, VARIOUS PLENARY STATEMENTS, ETC., THE ALLIANCE MUST NOW MORE THAN EVER SPEAK WITH ONE VOICE. ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM PARIS, HOWEVER, FRENCH DELEGATION NOW SAYS IT CANNOT ALLOW A STATEMENT TO BE MADE ON BEHALF OF THE 16 IN THE FINAL PLENARY SESSION. ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY CAN GO ALONG WITH A STATEMENT BY THE EC-12. THIS PROPOSAL, OF COURSE, IS TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO US. IT WOULD BE IRONIC, IF NOT DOWNRIGHT HARMFUL, IF THE ONLY STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF THE WEST AT THE CLOSE OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE WOULD BE MADE BY A LIMITED POLITICAL GROUPING (EC-12) AND NOT BY THE SECURITY ALLIANCE REPRESENTING ALL 16 ALLIED STATES, ESPECIALLY AT A CONFERENCE DEALING EXCLUSIVELY WITH SECURITY MATTERS. THIS POINT WAS REGISTERED EMPHATICALLY TO THE FRENCH BY US AS WELL AS BY OTHERS AT THE SEPTEMBER 18 P.M. CAUCUS. HOWEVER, ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM PARIS, FRENCH DELEGATION STILL STICKS BY ITS POSITION.
5. THE FRENCH ARE ALSO BLOCKING ALL REFERENCES TO ANY ALLIANCE IN THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT, E.G., IN THE VERIFICATION SECTION, OUTLINING THE PROPOSITION THAT ALLIANCE MEMBERS CANNOT USE UP THE INSPECTION QUOTA OF ANOTHER ALLIANCE MEMBER. FRENCH DELEGATION CAN ACCEPT, FOR EXAMPLE, REFERENCE TO STATES WHICH CONDUCT "MULTINATIONAL MILITARY ACTIVITIES" TOGETHER. USDEL HAS TRIED TO FIND SUCH FORMULATION WHICH ALL 16 CAN ACCEPT BUT OTHER ALLIANCE MEMBERS, E.G., UK, BELGIUM, CANNOT GO ALONG WITH THE ABOVE FORMULATIONS. THEREFORE, THE CAUCUS IS DEADLOCKED ON THE ISSUE WITH ONLY THE FRENCH OBJECTING TO EXPLICIT REFERENCE TO "ALLIANCES." THE UK, FRG, AND PERHAPS OTHERS, ARE PLANNING DEMARCHES IN PARIS ON THE ISSUE.
6. SUGGESTED DEMARCHE: DEPARTMENT HAS APPROVED THE FOLLOWING DEMARCHE, WHICH SHOULD BE MADE AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE A.M. SEPTEMBER 19 IN PARIS.

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-- THE 16 SPONSORS OF SC.1/AMPLIFIED HAVE ACTED TOGETHER IN STOCKHOLM FOR OVER TWO AND A HALF YEARS WITH ADMIRABLE UNITY. FOR EXAMPLE, INTRODUCING SC.1 DURING FIRST WEEK OF CONFERENCE.

-- WE MUST CONTINUE TO DO SO.

-- IT IS THEREFORE IMPERATIVE THAT THE 16 MAKE A UNIFIED STATEMENT AT THE CLOSE OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE, PARTICULARLY SINCE AT LEAST REPS OF THE EC-12, EAST AND NNA, WILL MAKE STATEMENTS ON BEHALF OF THEIR RESPECTIVE GROUPS.

-- WE CAN ACCEPT SUCH A STATEMENT BEING MADE ON BEHALF OF THE CO-SPONSORS OF SC.1/AMPLIFIED, FOR EXAMPLE.

-- REGARDING REFERENCES TO "ALLIANCES" IN THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT, USDEL HAS TRIED TO FIND A FORMULATION WHICH AVOIDS SPECIFIC REFERENCES TO "ALLIANCES" IN ORDER TO ACCOMMODATE THE FRENCH POSITION. THIS HAS PROVEN TO BE IMPOSSIBLE SINCE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE 16 COULD NOT GO ALONG WITH THE VARIOUS FORMULATIONS PROPOSED. ONLY THE FRENCH DELEGATION EXPLICITLY HAS SAID IT COULD NOT ACCEPT EXPLICIT REFERENCES TO ALLIANCES.

-- HOWEVER, FRANCE HAS ALREADY ACCEPTED AN EXPLICIT REFERENCE TO ALLIANCES IN THE NON-USE OF FORCE SECTION, I.E., ERGA OMNES PRINCIPLE.

-- SINCE FRENCH HAVE ALREADY ACKNOWLEDGED THE VALIDITY OF REFERENCES TO ALLIANCES IN THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT, WE URGE PARIS TO GO ALONG WITH CONSENSUS LANGUAGE ON THE SUBJECT EVEN IF IT ENTAILS SPECIFIC REFERENCES TO ALLIANCES.

BARRY

END OF MESSAGE

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S E C R E T STATE 295100

SUBJECT: CDE - URGENT DEMARCHE TO THE FRENCH

REF: STOCKHOLM 7456

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOR PARIS: EMBASSY IS REQUESTED TO APPROACH FOREIGN MINISTRY ON URGENT BASIS AT HIGHEST APPROPRIATE LEVEL TO DELIVER POINTS IN PARAGRAPH FIVE. CDE IS SCHEDULED TO CONCLUDE ON SEPTEMBER 19. THE TALKING POINTS IN THIS MESSAGE SUPERSEDE THOSE IN REFTEL.

3. FOR LONDON AND BONN: EMBASSIES ARE REQUESTED TO INFORM HOST GOVERNMENTS OF OUR APPROACH TO THE GOF AND REQUEST THEIR SUPPORT.

4. EUR DAS THOMAS MADE A DEMARCHE IN LATE AFTERNOON OF SEPTEMBER 18 TO FRENCH DCM. THOMAS NOTED THAT THE FRENCH POSITION WAS A BLOW NOT ONLY TO ALLIED UNITY AT STOCKHOLM, BUT ALSO TO THE POSSIBILITY OF FUTURE EUROPEAN SECURITY NEGOTIATIONS. THE NATO ROLE IN SECURITY DISCUSSIONS WAS A SINE QUA NON FOR THE U.S' IN ADDITION TO PROMISING TO REPORT THOMAS'S DEMARCHE, DCM COMMENTED THAT FRENCH REFUSAL TO COUNTESSANCE A CONCLUDING PLENARY STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF NATO SHOULD COME AS NO SURPRISE; FRANCE HAD TRADITIONALLY IN CSCE OPPOSED ANY ALLIANCE ROLE'

5. TALKING POINTS

-- THE UNITED STATES IS DEEPLY DISTURBED BY THE FRENCH REFUSAL TO AGREE TO THE MENTION OF ALLIANCES IN THE DRAFT CDE DOCUMENT AND THE FRENCH DECISION TO BLOCK A FINAL PLENARY STATEMENT BY ONE NATO MEMBER ON BEHALF OF THE SIXTEEN.

- THE SIXTEEN SPONSORS OF SC.1 AMPLIFIED HAVE WORKED TOGETHER AT THE CDE FOR OVER TWO AND ONE-HALF YEARS ON ISSUES FUNDAMENTALLY RELATED TO THE COLLECTIVE SECURITY OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE' IN LIGHT OF THE CREATIVE ROLE PLAYED BY NATO THROUGHOUT THE CONFERENCE, IT WOULD BE INCONGRUOUS FOR THE STOCKHOLM MEETING TO CLOSE WITHOUT A STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF THE ENTIRE GROUP THE FACT THAT STATEMENTS WILL BE MADE ON BEHALF OF OTHER GROUPS, SUCH AS EC-12, THE EAST, AND THE NNA, WILL ONLY MAKE NATO'S EXCLUSION MORE DAMAGING TO OUR COMMON LONG-TERM SECURITY INTERESTS AND TO FUTURE POSSIBILITIES FOR NEGOTIATING INCREASED SECURITY AT LOWER LEVELS OF FORCES THROUGHOUT EUROPE.

-- A STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF NATO WOULD NOT BE A BREAK WITH CDE PRACTICE. ON JUNE 30, FOR EXAMPLE, CANADIAN AMBASSADOR DELWORTH SPOKE ON BEHALF OF THE SIXTEEN SPONSORS OF SC.1/AMPLIFIED WHEN HE ADVANCED MODIFICATIONS TO OUR PACKAGE OF PROPOSALS.

-- IT IS THEREFORE IMPERATIVE THAT THE 16 MAKE A UNIFIED STATEMENT AT THE CLOSE OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. WE CAN ACCEPT SUCH A STATEMENT BEING MADE ON BEHALF OF THE CO-SPONSORS OF SC' 1/AMPLIFIED, FOR EXAMPLE.

-- WE ARE ALSO DISTURBED AT THE POSITION THE GOVERNMENT OF

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FRANCE HAS TAKEN ON THE MENTION OF ALLIANCES IN THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT'S SECTION ON QUOTAS FOR INSPECTIONS. -- WE HAVE ATTEMPTED TO FIND A FORMULATION THAT MEETS EVERYONE'S NEEDS, BUT OTHER ALLIES CANNOT ACCEPT THE ALTERNATIVES SUGGESTED. SINCE THE SECTION ON NON-USE OF FORCE CONTAINS A CLAUSE MENTIONING "RELATIONS OF ALLIANCE," THERE IS NO REASON OF PRECEDENCE TO AVOID USE OF THE WORD "ALLIANCES" IN THE VERIFICATION SECTION OF THE DOCUMENT. -- WE URGE FRANCE TO JOIN THE CONSENSUS ON THIS POINT OF LANGUAGE. SHULTZ  
END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07472

SUBJECT: CDE: FORMULA ON CHOICE OF AIRCRAFT

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WASHINGTON AGENCIES SHOULD BE AWARE THAT WE ARE TRYING TO GET THE FOLLOWING FORMULA APPROVED IN ORDER TO KEEP THE POSSIBILITY OF NNA AIRCRAFT OPEN FOR THE FUTURE:

- AIRCRAFT FOR INSPECTION WILL BE CHOSEN BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE INSPECTING AND INSPECTED STATE FROM AMONG AIRCRAFT OF THE INSPECTING STATE, THE INSPECTED STATE OR A THIRD CSCE PARTICIPATING STATE.

3. SOVIETS ARE CONSIDERING THIS FORMULA AND MAY WELL ACCEPT IT. NATO CAUCUS HAS APPROVED IT. IT CONFLICTS WITH SWISS INSTRUCTIONS, BUT DAS THOMAS/BRUNNER TELCON OF LAST NIGHT MAY HAVE RESOLVED THIS PROBLEM.

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END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07481

SUBJECT: STOPPING THE CLOCK

REF: STOCKHOLM 7545

1. CDE XII - 077
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

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3. IT NOW APPEARS LIKELY THAT THE CONFERENCE WILL NOT RPT NOT BE ABLE TO RESOLVE ALL SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCES BEFORE COB TODAY, SEPTEMBER 19 -- THE FORMAL CLOSING DATE OF THE CONFERENCE. OLD CSCE HANDS WILL REMEMBER THAT STOPPING THE CLOCK DOES NOT REQUIRE A POSITIVE ACT SUCH AS A CONSENSUS CONFERENCE DECISION; WE WOULD NOT WANT TO JOIN A CONSENSUS TO EXTEND BECAUSE IT COULD SET UNDESIRABLE PRECEDENTS. IN FACT, THE CONFERENCE CAN ONLY BE ADJOURNED BY CONSENSUS -- AND THIS IS CLEARLY LACKING. IT IS OUR VIEW, AND THE CONSIDERED OPINION OF NATO CAUCUS' PROCEDURAL EXPERTS, THAT THE FINAL PLENARY WILL MERELY CONTINUE, INTERRUPTED BY EXTENDED NEGOTIATING BREAKS, UNTIL THERE IS A CONSENSUS TO ADJOURN, I.E., WHEN THE FULL TEXT IS COMPLETED, TRANSLATED INTO ALL SIX CSCE WORKING LANGUAGES AND ADOPTED BY THE PLENARY. WE DOUBT THIS WILL BE BEFORE SUNDAY.

4. THEREFORE, WE FORESEE THE FOLLOWING SCENARIO FOR TODAY (SEPTEMBER 19):

1030 - PLENARY CONVENES (WITH PORTUGUESE CHAIRMAN); SINCE FULL TEXT OF DOCUMENT NOT COMPLETED THE MEETING WILL BE SUSPENDED SHORTLY THEREAFTER.

1700 - AB WORKING GROUPS TO REGISTER PROVISIONALLY COMPLETED TEXTS, IF ANY ARE READY.

2200 - PLENARY RESUMED.

- EITHER: IF CONSENSUS HAS BEEN REACHED BUT A DOCUMENT IS NOT AVAILABLE IN FINAL FORM FOR ADOPTION, I.E., IN ALL SIX OFFICIAL LANGUAGES, PLENARY ONCE AGAIN SUSPENDED UNTIL TRANSLATIONS COMPLETED.

- OR: IF CONSENSUS NOT REACHED AND IT IS CLEAR THAT DOCUMENT WILL NOT BE COMPLETED BEFORE 12:00 MIDNIGHT, SEPTEMBER 19, CHAIR ASKS CONFERENCE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO ADJUST THE CLOCK TO GIVE CONFERENCE NECESSARY TIME TO COMPLETE THE DOCUMENT. (MOST LIKELY SCENARIO.)

5. UPON RESUMING THE MEETING WHEN FINAL DOCUMENT IS AVAILABLE (SEE REFTTEL FOR FULL SEQUENCE OF EVENTS):

-- STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT ADOPTED IN ALL SIX OFFICIAL LANGUAGES.

-- INTERPRETIVE STATEMENTS.

-- PLENARY OPEN TO MEDIA.

-- PRIME MINISTER OF SWEDEN ADDRESSES PLENARY.

-- PLENARY CLOSED.

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END OF MESSAGE

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UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 07518

SUBJECT: CDE FACT SHEET

1. CDE XII - -78

2. UNCLASSIFIED - ENTIRE TEXT

3. FOLLOWING IS A FACT SHEET ON THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT WHICH CDE ADOPTED SEPTEMBER 19, 1986. IT IS MEANT FOR GENERAL BACKGROUND AND NOT AS A COMPREHENSIVE DESCRIPTION OF ALL DETAILS OF THE DOCUMENT. (NOTE: ACTUALLY, ADOPTION WAS SEPTEMBER 22, BUT "CLOCK-STOPPING" TECHNICALITIES KEPT THE FORMAL DATE SEPTEMBER 19.)

CDE FACT SHEET

THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE (CDE) COMPLETED ITS WORK SEPTEMBER 19, 1986, BY ADOPTING A SET OF FIVE MEASURES DESIGNED TO REDUCE THE RISK OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE. THE MEASURES MEET THE FOUR BASIC CRITERIA LAID DOWN BY THE MANDATE FOR THE CONFERENCE: THEY APPLY TO THE WHOLE OF EUROPE FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS, AND THEY ARE MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT, POLITICALLY BUILDING AND VERIFIABLE. THE MEASURES GO INTO EFFECT ON JANUARY 1, 1987.

THE MAIN PROVISIONS OF THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT:

ANNUAL CALENDAR:

. -- A REQUIREMENT TO EXCHANGE, ON NOVEMBER 15 OF EACH YEAR, A LIST OF ALL SIGNIFICANT MILITARY ACTIVITIES TO BE CARRIED OUT DURING THE COMING YEAR; CONSTRAINING PROVISIONS

. -- ACTIVITIES INVOLVING 75,000 TROOPS OR MORE MUST BE ANNOUNCED TWO YEARS IN ADVANCE; IF THEY ARE NOT, THEY CANNOT BE HELD;

. -- ACTIVITIES INVOLVING 40,000 TROOPS OR MORE SHOULD BE ANNOUNCED TWO YEARS IN ADVANCE BUT MUST BE ANNOUNCED ONE YEAR IN ADVANCE; IF THEY ARE NOT ANNOUNCED ONE YEAR IN ADVANCE, THEY CANNOT BE HELD.

NOTIFICATION:

. -- A REQUIREMENT TO ANNOUNCE 42 DAYS IN ADVANCE ALL SIGNIFICANT MILITARY ACTIVITIES, GIVING DETAILED INFORMATION ABOUT THEIR SCOPE, PURPOSE AND LOCATION AND ABOUT THE FORCES INVOLVED IN THEM.

IN THE CDE CONTEXT A SIGNIFICANT MILITARY ACTIVITY IS ONE WHICH INVOLVED 13,000 TROOPS OR 300 TANKS ORGANIZED INTO A DIVISION OR AT LEAST TWO REGIMENT OR BRIGADES. A DIVISION, WHICH IS MADE UP OF REGIMENTS OR BRIGADES, IS THE BASIC COMBAT UNIT OF EUROPEAN ARMIES.

SPECIAL PROVISIONS ARE MADE FOR AMPHIBIOUS AND AIRBORNE OPERATION, TRANSFERS AND CONCENTRATIONS OF FORCES AND ALERT ACTIVITIES.

OBSERVATION:

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. -- A REQUIREMENT TO INVITE OBSERVERS FROM ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES TO ATTEND THOSE ACTIVITIES WHICH INVOLVE 17,000 TROOPS AND WHICH OTHERWISE MEET THE CRITERIA FOR NOTIFICATION;

. -- THE OBSERVERS WILL BE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO WATCH THE VARIOUS PHASES OF THE ACTIVITY, MEET WITH COMMANDERS, AND OTHERWISE GAIN A SENSE OF THE NATURE OF THE ACTIVITY.

VERIFICATION: INSPECTION:

. -- THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT PROVIDES FOR GROUND AND AERIAL INSPECTION TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE WITH COMMITMENTS UNDERTAKEN IN CDE;

. -- IF ANY STATE BELIEVES THAT A MILITARY ACTIVITY GOING ON IN ANOTHER STATE FAILS TO MEET THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE CDE OBLIGATIONS, THE DOUBTING STATE HAS THE RIGHT TO ENTER THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER STATE AND DETERMINE FOR ITSELF THE FACTS OF THE CASE;

. -- NO STATE NEEDS TO ALLOW MORE THAN 3 INSPECTIONS OF ITS TERRITORY IN A YEAR; NO STATE NEEDS TO ACCEPT MORE THAN ONE INSPECTION FROM ANY OTHER SINGLE STATE; MEMBERS OF ALLIANCES ARE NOT TO CARRY OUT INSPECTIONS ON THE TERRITORY OF STATES BELONGING TO THE SAME ALLIANCE;

. -- THE INSPECTION MEASURE CONTAINS SPECIFIC AND CONCRETE PROVISIONS TO ENSURE THAT THE INSPECTORS CAN CARRY OUT THE INSPECTION EFFECTIVELY.

OTHER ELEMENTS:

IN ADDITION TO THE CONCRETE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES WHICH MAKE UP THE OPERATIONAL PART OF THE CDE REGIME, THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT CONTAINS STATEMENTS REAFFIRMING THE PRINCIPLE IN THE UN CHARTER AND THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT THAT STATES WILL NOT USE OR THREATEN TO USE FORCE AGAINST OTHER STATES. THIS PRINCIPLE IS EXPLICITLY RELATED IN THE DOCUMENT TO COMMITMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS, TO THE COMMITMENTS TO FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM AND TO OTHER RELATED ISSUES.


THE CDE INVOLVED THIRTY-FIVE PARTICIPATING STATES: ALL THE EUROPEAN STATES, EXCEPT ALBANIA, PLUS THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA.

THE CDE IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE HELSINKI CSCE PROCESS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY AND COOPERATION WHICH DEALS WITH SECURITY IN ITS BROADEST SENSE, ENCOMPASSING POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, CULTURAL AND HUMANITARIAN RIGHTS AS WELL AS MILITARY -- SECURITY AFFAIRS.

THE RESULTS OF CDE WILL BE EVALUATED AT THE VIENNA CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING WHICH BEGINS NOVEMBER 4, 1986, AND WILL REVIEW PROGRESS IN ALL ASPECTS OF THE CSCE PROCESS.

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UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 07506

SUBJECT: PROVISIONALLY NOTED CDE TEXT

1. CDE XII - 081.

2. FOLLOWING IS THE COMPLETE TEXT PROVISIONALLY NOTED IN WORKING GROUP AB IN CDE TODAY, 19 SEPT.

BEGIN TEXT:

DOCUMENT OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE  
ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND  
DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE CONVENED IN ACCORDANCE WITH  
THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT  
OF THE MADRID MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE  
ON SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE

(1) THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES  
OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN  
EUROPE (CSCE), AUSTRIA, BELGIUM, BULGARIA, CANADA,  
CYPRUS, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, DENMARK, FINLAND, FRANCE, THE  
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF  
GERMANY, GREECE, THE HOLY SEE, HUNGARY, ICELAND,  
IRELAND, ITALY, LIECHTENSTEIN, LUXEMBOURG, MALTA,  
MONACO, THE NETHERLANDS, NORWAY, POLAND, PORTUGAL,  
ROMANIA, SAN MARINO, SPAIN, SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND,  
TURKEY, THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, THE  
UNITED KINGDOM, THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND  
YUGOSLAVIA, MET IN STOCKHOLM FROM 17 JANUARY 1984 TO  
19 SEPTEMBER 1986 IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS  
RELATING TO THE CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND  
SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE  
CONTAINED IN THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT OF THE MADRID  
FOLLOW-UP MEETING OF THE CSCE.

(2) THE PARTICIPANTS WERE ADDRESSED BY THE PRIME  
MINISTER OF SWEDEN, THE LATE OLOF PALME, ON 17 JANUARY  
1984.

(3) OPENING STATEMENTS WERE MADE BY THE MINISTERS OF  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND OTHER HEADS OF DELEGATIONS. THE  
PRIME MINISTER OF SPAIN AS WELL AS MINISTERS AND  
SENIOR OFFICIALS OF SEVERAL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES  
ADDRESSED THE CONFERENCE LATER. THE MINISTER FOR  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF SWEDEN ADDRESSED THE CONFERENCE ON  
19 SEPTEMBER 1986.

(4) THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS  
ADDRESSED THE CONFERENCE ON 6 JULY 1984.

(5) CONTRIBUTIONS WERE MADE BY THE FOLLOWING NON-  
PARTICIPATING MEDITERRANEAN STATES: ALGERIA, EGYPT,  
ISRAEL, LEBANON, LIBYA, MOROCCO, SYRIA, AND TUNISIA.

(6) THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECALLED THAT THE AIM OF  
THE CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING  
MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE IS, AS A  
SUBSTANTIAL AND INTEGRAL PART OF THE MULTILATERAL  
PROCESS INITIATED BY THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND  
CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE, TO UNDERTAKE, IN STAGES, NEW,  
EFFECTIVE AND CONCRETE ACTIONS DESIGNED TO MAKE

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PROGRESS IN STRENGTHENING CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY AND IN ACHIEVING DISARMAMENT, SO AS TO GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS AS WELL AS IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN GENERAL.

(7) THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECOGNIZE THAT THE SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES WHICH ARE ADOPTED IN THE PRESENT DOCUMENT AND WHICH ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MADRID MANDATE SERVE BY THEIR SCOPE AND NATURE AND BY THEIR IMPLEMENTATION TO STRENGTHEN CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE AND THUS TO GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE.

(8) CONSEQUENTLY, THE PARTICIPATING STATES HAVE DECLARED THE FOLLOWING:

REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE

(9) THE PARTICIPATING STATES, RECALLING THEIR OBLIGATION TO REFRAIN, IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS AS WELL AS IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN GENERAL, FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANY STATE, OR IN ANY OTHER MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS, ACCORDINGLY REAFFIRM THEIR COMMITMENT TO RESPECT AND PUT INTO PRACTICE THE PRINCIPLE OF REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE, AS LAID DOWN IN THE FINAL ACT.

(10) NO CONSIDERATION MAY BE INVOKED TO SERVE TO WARRANT RESORT TO THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN CONTRAVENTION OF THIS PRINCIPLE.

(11) THEY RECALL THE INHERENT RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL OR COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENCE IF AN ARMED ATTACK OCCURS, AS SET FORTH IN THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

(12) THEY WILL REFRAIN FROM ANY MANIFESTATION OF FORCE FOR THE PURPOSE OF INDUCING ANY OTHER STATE TO RENOUNCE THE FULL EXERCISE OF ITS SOVEREIGN RIGHTS.

(13) AS SET FORTH IN THE FINAL ACT, NO OCCUPATION OR ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY RESULTING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN CONTRAVENTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, WILL BE RECOGNIZED AS LEGAL.

(14) THEY RECOGNIZE THEIR COMMITMENT TO PEACE AND SECURITY. ACCORDINGLY THEY REAFFIRM THAT THEY WILL REFRAIN FROM ANY USE OF ARMED FORCES INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE PROVISIONS OF THE DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS BETWEEN PARTICIPATING STATES, AGAINST ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE, IN PARTICULAR FROM INVASION OF OR ATTACK ON ITS TERRITORY.

(15) THEY WILL ABIDE BY THEIR COMMITMENT TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH ANY STATE, REGARDLESS OF THAT STATE'S POLITICAL,

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SOCIAL, ECONOMIC OR CULTURAL SYSTEM AND IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER OR NOT THEY MAINTAIN WITH THAT STATE RELATIONS OF ALLIANCE.

(16) THEY STRESS THAT NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE OBLIGATION OF REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE, AS RECALLED ABOVE, CONSTITUTES A VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

(17) THEY STRESS THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES AS CONTAINED IN THE FINAL ACT, CONVINCED THAT IT IS AN ESSENTIAL COMPLEMENT TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE, BOTH BEING ESSENTIAL FACTORS FOR THE MAINTENANCE AND CONSOLIDATION OF PEACE AND SECURITY. THEY RECALL THEIR DETERMINATION AND THE NECESSITY TO REINFORCE AND TO IMPROVE THE METHODS AT THEIR DISPOSAL FOR THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES. THEY REAFFIRM THEIR RESOLVE TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO SETTLE EXCLUSIVELY BY PEACEFUL MEANS ANY DISPUTE BETWEEN THEM.

(18) THE PARTICIPATING STATES STRESS THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE FINAL ACT AND THE NEED FOR FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL ITS PROVISIONS, WHICH WILL FURTHER THE PROCESS OF INCREASING SECURITY AND DEVELOPING CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE, THEREBY CONTRIBUTING TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE WORLD AS A WHOLE.

(19) THEY EMPHASIZE THEIR COMMITMENT TO ALL THE PRINCIPLES OF THE DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS BETWEEN PARTICIPATING STATES AND DECLARE THEIR DETERMINATION TO RESPECT AND PUT THEM INTO PRACTICE IRRESPECTIVE OF THEIR POLITICAL, ECONOMIC OR SOCIAL SYSTEMS AS WELL AS OF THEIR SIZE, GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION OR LEVEL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

(20) ALL THESE TEN PRINCIPLES ARE OF PRIMARY SIGNIFICANCE AND, ACCORDINGLY, THEY WILL BE EQUALLY AND UNRESERVEDLY APPLIED, EACH OF THEM BEING INTERPRETED TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE OTHERS.

(21) RESPECT FOR AND THE APPLICATION OF THESE PRINCIPLES WILL ENHANCE THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND COOPERATION AMONG THE PARTICIPATING STATES IN ALL FIELDS COVERED BY THE PROVISIONS OF THE FINAL ACT.

(22) THEY RECONFIRM THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE BASIC PRINCIPLE OF THE SOVEREIGN EQUALITY OF STATES AND STRESS THAT ALL STATES HAVE EQUAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

(23) THEY REAFFIRM THE UNIVERSAL SIGNIFICANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS. RESPECT FOR AND THE EFFECTIVE EXERCISE OF THESE RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS ARE ESSENTIAL FACTORS FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, JUSTICE AND SECURITY, AS WELL AS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND COOPERATION

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AMONG THEMSELVES AS AMONG ALL STATES, AS SET FORTH IN THE DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS BETWEEN PARTICIPATING STATES.

(24) THEY REAFFIRM THAT, IN THE BROADER CONTEXT OF WORLD SECURITY, SECURITY IN EUROPE IS CLOSELY LINKED WITH SECURITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA AS A WHOLE; IN THIS CONTEXT, THEY CONFIRM THEIR INTENTION TO DEVELOP GOOD NEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS WITH ALL STATES IN THE REGION, WITH DUE REGARD TO RECIPROCITY, AND IN THE SPIRIT OF THE PRINCIPLES CONTAINED IN THE DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES

GUIDING RELATIONS BETWEEN PARTICIPATING STATES, SO AS TO PROMOTE CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY AND MAKE PEACE PREVAIL IN THE REGION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS CONTAINED

IN THE MEDITERRANEAN CHAPTER OF THE FINAL ACT.

(25) THEY EMPHASIZE THE NECESSITY TO TAKE RESOLUTE MEASURES TO PREVENT AND TO COMBAT TERRORISM, INCLUDING TERRORISM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. THEY EXPRESS THEIR DETERMINATION TO TAKE EFFECTIVE MEASURES, BOTH AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL AND THROUGH INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION, FOR THE PREVENTION AND SUPPRESSION OF ALL ACTS OF TERRORISM. THEY WILL TAKE ALL APPROPRIATE MEASURES IN PREVENTING THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIES FROM BEING USED FOR THE PREPARATION, ORGANIZATION OR COMMISSION OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. THIS ALSO INCLUDES MEASURES TO PROHIBIT ON THEIR TERRITORIES ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES, OF PERSONS, GROUPS AND ORGANIZATIONS THAT INSTIGATE, ORGANIZE OR ENGAGE IN THE PERPETRATION OF ACTS OF TERRORISM, INCLUDING THOSE DIRECTED AGAINST OTHER STATES AND THEIR CITIZENS.

(26) THEY WILL FULFILL IN GOOD FAITH THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW; THEY ALSO STRESS THAT STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THEIR COMMITMENTS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CSCE IS ESSENTIAL FOR BUILDING CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY.

(27) THE PARTICIPATING STATES CONFIRM THAT IN THE EVENT OF A CONFLICT BETWEEN THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS UNDER THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER ANY TREATY OR OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT, THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CHARTER WILL PREVAIL, IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 103 OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

(28) THE PARTICIPATING STATES HAVE ADOPTED THE FOLLOWING MEASURES:

PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES

(29) THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL GIVE NOTIFICATION IN WRITING THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS IN AN AGREED FORM OF CONTENT, TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES 42 DAYS OR MORE IN ADVANCE OF THE START OF NOTIFIABLE

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MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES.

(30) NOTIFICATION WILL GIVEN BY THE PARTICIPATING STATE ON WHOSE TERRITORY THE ACTIVITY IN QUESTION IS PLANNED TO TAKE PLACE EVEN IF THE FORCES OF THAT STATE ARE NOT ENGAGED IN THE ACTIVITY OR THEIR STRENGTH IS BELOW THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL. THIS WILL NOT RELIEVE OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES OF THEIR OBLIGATION TO GIVE NOTIFICATION, IF THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN THE PLANNED MILITARY ACTIVITY REACHES THE NOTIFIABLE LEVEL.

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IN THIS DOCUMENT, THE TERM NOTIFIABLE MEANS SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION.

SEE ANNEX I.

(31) EACH OF THE FOLLOWING MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE FIELD CONDUCTED AS A SINGLE ACTIVITY IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS AT OR ABOVE THE LEVELS DEFINED BELOW, WILL BE NOTIFIED:

(31.1) THE ENGAGEMENT OF FORMATIONS OF LAND FORCES OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES IN THE SAME EXERCISE ACTIVITY CONDUCTED UNDER A SINGLE OPERATIONAL COMMAND INDEPENDENTLY OR IN COMBINATION WITH ANY POSSIBLE AIR OR NAVAL COMPONENTS.

(31.1.1) THIS MILITARY ACTIVITY WILL BE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION WHENEVER IT INVOLVES AT ANY TIME DURING THE ACTIVITY:

- AT LEAST 13,000 TROOPS, INCLUDING SUPPORT TROOPS, OR

- AT LEAST 300 BATTLE TANKS  
IF ORGANISED INTO A DIVISIONAL STRUCTURE OR AT LEAST TWO BRIGADES/REGIMENTS, NOT NECESSARILY SUBORDINATE TO THE SAME DIVISION.

(31.1.2) THE PARTICIPATION OF AIR FORCES OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE NOTIFICATION IF IT IS FORESEEN THAT IN THE COURSE OF THE ACTIVITY 200 OR MORE SORTIES BY AIRCRAFT, EXCLUDING HELICOPTERS, WILL BE FLOWN.

(31.2) THE ENGAGEMENT OF MILITARY FORCES EITHER IN AN AMPHIBIOUS LANDING OR IN A PARACHUTE ASSAULT BY AIRBORNE FORCES IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS.

(31.2.1) THESE MILITARY ACTIVITIES WILL BE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION WHENEVER THE AMPHIBIOUS LANDING INVOLVES AT LEAST 3000 TROOPS OR WHENEVER THE PARACHUTE DROP INVOLVES AT LEAST 3000 TROOPS.

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IN THIS CONTEXT, THE TERM LAND FORCES INCLUDES AMPHIBIOUS, AIRMOBILE AND AIRBORNE FORCES.

(31.3) THE ENGAGEMENT OF FORMATIONS OF LAND FORCES OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES IN A TRANSFER FROM OUTSIDE THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS TO ARRIVAL POINTS IN THE ZONE, OR FROM INSIDE THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR

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CSBMS TO POINTS OF CONCENTRATION IN THE ZONE, TO PARTICIPATE IN A NOTIFIABLE EXERCISE ACTIVITY OR TO BE CONCENTRATED.

(31.3.1) THE ARRIVAL OR CONCENTRATION OF THESE FORCES WILL BE SUBJECT TO NOTIFICATION WHENEVER IT INVOLVES, AT ANY TIME DURING THE ACTIVITY:

- AT LEAST 13,000 TROOPS, INCLUDING SUPPORT TROOPS, OR
  - AT LEAST 300 BATTLE TANKS
- IF ORGANISED INTO A DIVISIONAL STRUCTURE OR AT LEAST TWO BRIGADES/REGIMENTS, NOT NECESSARILY SUBORDINATE TO THE SAME DIVISION.

(31.3.2) FORCES WHICH HAVE BEEN TRANSFERRED INTO THE ZONE WILL BE SUBJECT TO ALL PROVISIONS OF AGREED CSBMS WHEN THEY DEPART THEIR ARRIVAL POINTS TO PARTICIPATE IN A NOTIFIABLE EXERCISE ACTIVITY OR TO BE CONCENTRATED WITHIN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS.

(32) NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT WITHOUT ADVANCE NOTICE TO THE TROOPS INVOLVED, ARE EXCEPTIONS TO THE REQUIREMENT FOR PRIOR NOTIFICATION TO BE MADE 42 DAYS IN ADVANCE.

(32.1) NOTIFICATION OF SUCH ACTIVITIES, ABOVE THE AGREED THRESHOLDS, WILL BE GIVEN AT THE TIME THE TROOPS INVOLVED COMMENCE SUCH ACTIVITIES.

(33) NOTIFICATION WILL BE GIVEN IN WRITING OF EACH NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITY IN THE FOLLOWING AGREED FORM:

(34) A - GENERAL INFORMATION

- (34.1) THE DESIGNATION OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY;
- (34.2) THE GENERAL PURPOSE OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY;
- (34.3) THE NAMES OF THE STATES INVOLVED IN THE MILITARY ACTIVITY;
- (34.4) THE LEVEL OF COMMAND, ORGANISING AND COMMANDING THE MILITARY ACTIVITY;
- (34.5) THE START AND END DATES OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY.

(35) B - INFORMATION ON DIFFERENT TYPES OF NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES

(35.1) THE ENGAGEMENT OF LAND FORCES OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES IN THE SAME EXERCISE ACTIVITY CONDUCTED UNDER A SINGLE OPERATIONAL COMMAND INDEPENDENTLY OR IN COMBINATION WITH ANY POSSIBLE AIR OR NAVAL COMPONENTS:

(35.1.1) THE TOTAL NUMBER OF TROOPS TAKING PART IN THE MILITARY ACTIVITY (I.E., GROUND TROOPS, AMPHIBIOUS TROOPS, AIRMOBILE AND AIRBORNE TROOPS) AND THE NUMBER OF TROOPS PARTICIPATING FOR EACH STATE INVOLVED, IF APPLICABLE;

(35.1.2) NUMBER AND TYPE OF DIVISIONS PARTICIPATING FOR EACH STATE;

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(35.1.3) THE TOTAL NUMBER OF BATTLE TANKS FOR EACH STATE AND THE TOTAL NUMBER OF ANTI-TANK GUIDED MISSILE LAUNCHERS MOUNTED ON ARMoured VEHICLES;

(35.1.4) THE TOTAL NUMBER OF ARTILLERY PIECES AND MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHERS (100 MM CALIBRE OR ABOVE);

(35.1.5) THE TOTAL NUMBER OF HELICOPTERS, BY CATEGORY;

(35.1.6) ENVISAGED NUMBER OF SORTIES BY AIRCRAFT, EXCLUDING HELICOPTERS;

(35.1.7) PURPOSE OF AIR MISSIONS;

(35.1.8) CATEGORIES OF AIRCRAFT INVOLVED;

(35.1.9) THE LEVEL OF COMMAND, ORGANISING AND COMMANDING THE AIR FORCE PARTICIPATION;

(35.1.10) NAVAL SHIP-TO-SHORE GUNFIRE;

(35.1.11) INDICATION OF OTHER NAVAL SHIP-TO-SHORE SUPPORT;

(35.1.12) THE LEVEL OF COMMAND, ORGANISING AND COMMANDING THE NAVAL FORCE PARTICIPATION.

(35.2) THE ENGAGEMENT OF MILITARY FORCES EITHER IN AN AMPHIBIOUS LANDING OR IN A PARACHUTE ASSAULT BY AIRBORNE FORCES IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS:

(35.2.1) THE TOTAL NUMBER OF AMPHIBIOUS TROOPS INVOLVED IN NOTIFIABLE AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS, AND/OR THE TOTAL NUMBER OF AIRBORNE TROOPS INVOLVED IN NOTIFIABLE PARACHUTE ASSULTS;

(35.2.2) IN THE CASE OF A NOTIFIABLE AMPHIBIOUS LANDING, THE POINT OR POINTS OF EMBARKATION, IF IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS.

(35.3) THE ENGAGEMENT OF FORMATIONS OF LAND FORCES OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES IN A TRANSFER FROM OUTSIDE THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS TO ARRIVAL POINTS IN THE ZONE, OR FROM INSIDE THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS TO POINTS OF CONCENTRATION IN THE ZONE, TO PARTICIPATE IN A NOTIFIABLE EXERCISE ACTIVITY OR TO BE CONCENTRATED:

(35.3.1) THE TOTAL NUMBER OF TROOPS TRANSFERRED;

(35.3.2) NUMBER AND TYPE OF DIVISIONS PARTICIPATING IN THE TRANSFER;

(35.3.3) THE TOTAL NUMBER OF BATTLE TANKS PARTICIPATING IN A NOTIFIABLE ARRIVAL OR CONCENTRATION;

(35.3.4) GEOGRAPHICAL COORDINATES FOR THE POINTS OF ARRIVAL AND FOR THE POINTS OF CONCENTRATION.

(36) C - THE ENVISAGED AREA AND TIMEFRAME OF THE ACTIVITY

(36.1) THE AREA OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY DELIMITED BY GEOGRAPHIC FEATURES TOGETHER WITH GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES, AS APPROPRIATE;

(36.2) THE START AND END DATES OF EACH PHASE (TRANSFERS, DEPLOYMENT, CONCENTRATION OF FORCES, ACTIVE EXERCISE PHASE, RECOVERY PHASE) OF ACTIVITIES IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS OF PARTICIPATING

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FORMATIONS, THE TACTICAL PURPOSE AND CORRESPONDING GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS (DELIMITED BY GEOGRAPHICAL COORDINATES) FOR EACH PHASE;

(36.3) BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EACH PHASE.

(37) D - OTHER INFORMATION

(37.1) CHANGES, IF ANY, IN RELATION TO INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR REGARDING THE ACTIVITY;

(37.2) RELATIONSHIP OF THE ACTIVITY TO OTHER NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES.

OBSERVATION OF CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES

(38) THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL INVITE OBSERVERS FROM ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES TO THE FOLLOWING NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES:

(38.1) - THE ENGAGEMENT OF FORMATIONS OF LAND FORCES OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES IN THE SAME EXERCISE ACTIVITY CONDUCTED UNDER A SINGLE OPERATIONAL COMMAND INDEPENDENTLY OR IN COMBINATION WITH ANY POSSIBLE AIR OR NAVAL COMPONENTS.

(38.2) - THE ENGAGEMENT OF MILITARY FORCES EITHER IN AN AMPHIBIOUS LANDING OR IN A PARACHUTE ASSAULT BY AIRBORNE FORCES IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS.

(38.3) - IN THE CASE OF THE ENGAGEMENT OF FORMATIONS OF LAND FORCES OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES IN A TRANSFER FROM OUTSIDE THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS TO ARRIVAL POINTS IN THE ZONE, OR FROM INSIDE THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS TO POINTS OF CONCENTRATION IN THE ZONE, TO PARTICIPATE IN A NOTIFIABLE EXERCISE ACTIVITY OR TO BE CONCENTRATED, THE CONCENTRATION OF THESE FORCES. FORCES WHICH HAVE BEEN TRANSFERRED INTO THE ZONE WILL BE SUBJECT TO ALL PROVISIONS OF AGREED CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES WHEN THEY DEPART THEIR ARRIVAL POINTS TO PARTICIPATE IN A NOTIFIABLE EXERCISE ACTIVITY OR TO BE CONCENTRATED WITHIN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS.

(38.4) THE ABOVE-MENTIONED ACTIVITIES WILL BE SUBJECT TO OBSERVATION WHENEVER THE NUMBER OF TROOPS ENGAGED MEETS OR EXCEEDS 17,000 TROOPS, EXCEPT IN THE CASE OF EITHER AN AMPHIBIOUS LANDING OR A PARACHUTE ASSAULT BY AIRBORNE FORCES, WHICH WILL BE SUBJECT TO OBSERVATION WHENEVER THE NUMBER OF TROOPS ENGAGED MEETS OR EXCEEDS 5,000 TROOPS.

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IN THIS CONTEXT, THE TERM LAND FORCES INCLUDES AMPHIBIOUS, AIRMOBILE AND AIRBORNE FORCES.

(39) THE HOST STATE WILL EXTEND THE INVITATIONS IN WRITING THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES AT THE TIME OF NOTIFICATION. THE HOST STATE WILL BE THE PARTICIPATING STATE ON WHOSE TERRITORY THE NOTIFIED ACTIVITY WILL TAKE PLACE.

(40) THE HOST STATE MAY DELEGATE SOME OF ITS RESPONSIBILITIES AS HOST TO ANOTHER PARTICIPATING

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- STATE ENGAGED IN THE MILITARY ACTIVITY ON THE TERRITORY OF THE HOST STATE. IN SUCH CASES, THE HOST STATE WILL SPECIFY THE ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITIES IN ITS INVITATION TO OBSERVE THE ACTIVITY.
- (41) EACH PARTICIPATING STATE MAY SEND UP TO TWO OBSERVERS TO THE MILITARY ACTIVITY TO BE OBSERVED.
- (42) THE INVITED STATE MAY DECIDE WHETHER TO SEND MILITARY AND/OR CIVILIAN OBSERVERS, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF ITS PERSONNEL ACCREDITED TO THE HOST STATE. MILITARY OBSERVERS WILL, NORMALLY, WEAR THEIR UNIFORMS AND INSIGNIA WHILE PERFORMING THEIR TASKS.
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- (43) REPLIES TO THE INVITATION WILL BE GIVEN IN WRITING NOT LATER THAN 21 DAYS AFTER THE ISSUE OF THE INVITATION.
- (44) THE PARTICIPATING STATES ACCEPTING AN INVITATION WILL PROVIDE THE NAMES AND RANKS OF THEIR OBSERVERS IN THEIR REPLY TO THE INVITATION. IF THE INVITATION IS NOT ACCEPTED IN TIME, IT WILL BE ASSUMED THAT NO OBSERVERS WILL BE SENT.
- (45) TOGETHER WITH THE INVITATION THE HOST STATE WILL PROVIDE A GENERAL OBSERVATION PROGRAMME, INCLUDING THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:
- (45.1) - THE DATE, TIME AND PLACE OF ASSEMBLY OF OBSERVERS;
- (45.2) - PLANNED DURATION OF THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME;
- (45.3) - LANGUAGES TO BE USED IN INTERPRETATION AND/OR TRANSLATION;
- (45.4) - ARRANGEMENTS FOR BOARD, LODGING AND TRANSPORTATION OF THE OBSERVERS;
- (45.5) - ARRANGEMENTS FOR OBSERVATION EQUIPMENT WHICH WILL BE ISSUED TO THE OBSERVERS BY THE HOST STATE;
- (45.6) - POSSIBLE AUTHORIZATION BY THE HOST STATE OF THE USE OF SPECIAL EQUIPMENT THAT THE OBSERVERS MAY BRING WITH THEM;
- (45.7) - ARRANGEMENTS FOR SPECIAL CLOTHING TO BE ISSUED TO THE OBSERVERS BECAUSE OF WEATHER OR ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS.
- (46) THE OBSERVERS MAY MAKE REQUESTS WITH REGARD TO THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME. THE HOST STATE WILL, IF POSSIBLE, ACCEDE TO THEM.
- (47) THE HOST STATE WILL DETERMINE A DURATION OF OBSERVATION WHICH PERMITS THE OBSERVERS TO OBSERVE A NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITY FROM THE TIME THAT AGREED THRESHOLDS FOR OBSERVATION ARE MET OR EXCEEDED UNTIL, FOR THE LAST TIME DURING THE ACTIVITY, THE THRESHOLDS FOR OBSERVATION ARE NO LONGER MET.
- (48) THE HOST STATE WILL PROVIDE THE OBSERVERS WITH

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TRANSPORTATION TO THE AREA OF THE NOTIFIED ACTIVITY AND BACK. THIS TRANSPORTATION WILL BE PROVIDED FROM EITHER THE CAPITAL OR ANOTHER SUITABLE LOCATION TO BE ANNOUNCED IN THE INVITATION, SO THAT THE OBSERVERS ARE IN POSITION BEFORE THE START OF THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME.

(49) THE INVITED STATE WILL COVER THE TRAVEL EXPENSES FOR ITS OBSERVERS TO THE CAPITAL, OR ANOTHER SUITABLE LOCATION SPECIFIED IN THE INVITATION, OF THE HOST STATE, AND BACK.

(50) THE OBSERVERS WILL BE PROVIDED EQUAL TREATMENT AND OFFERED EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES TO CARRY OUT THEIR FUNCTIONS.

(51) THE OBSERVERS WILL BE GRANTED, DURING THEIR MISSION, THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES ACCORDED TO DIPLOMATIC AGENTS IN THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

(52) THE HOST STATE WILL NOT BE REQUIRED TO PERMIT UNCLAS SECTION 09 OF 16 STOCKHOLM 07506 USUN FOR ASST SEC RIDGWAY OBSERVATION OF RESTRICTED LOCATIONS, INSTALLATIONS OR DEFENCE SITES.

(53) IN ORDER TO ALLOW THE OBSERVERS TO CONFIRM THAT THE NOTIFIED ACTIVITY IS NON-THREATENING IN CHARACTER AND THAT IT IS CARRIED OUT IN CONFORMITY WITH THE APPROPRIATE PROVISIONS OF THE NOTIFICATION, THE HOST STATE WILL:

(53.1) - AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME GIVE A BRIEFING ON THE PURPOSE, THE BASIC SITUATION, THE PHASES OF THE ACTIVITY AND POSSIBLE CHANGES AS COMPARED WITH THE NOTIFICATION AND PROVIDE THE OBSERVERS WITH A MAP OF THE AREA OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY WITH A SCALE OF 1 TO NOT MORE THAN 500,000 AND AN OBSERVATION PROGRAMME WITH A DAILY SCHEDULE AS WELL AS A SKETCH INDICATING THE BASIC SITUATION;

(53.2) - PROVIDE THE OBSERVERS WITH APPROPRIATE OBSERVATION EQUIPMENT; HOWEVER, THE OBSERVERS WILL BE ALLOWED TO USE THEIR PERSONAL BINOCULARS, WHICH WILL BE SUBJECT TO EXAMINATION AND APPROVAL BY THE HOST STATE;

(53.3) - IN THE COURSE OF THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME GIVE THE OBSERVERS DAILY BRIEFINGS WITH THE HELP OF MAPS ON THE VARIOUS PHASES OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY AND THEIR DEVELOPMENT AND INFORM THE OBSERVERS ABOUT THEIR POSITIONS GEOGRAPHICALLY; IN THE CASE OF A LAND FORCE ACTIVITY CONDUCTED IN COMBINATION WITH AIR OR NAVAL COMPONENTS, BRIEFINGS WILL BE GIVEN BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THESE FORCES;

(53.4) - PROVIDE OPPORTUNITIES TO OBSERVE DIRECTLY FORCES OF THE STATE/STATES ENGAGED IN THE MILITARY ACTIVITY SO THAT THE OBSERVERS GET AN IMPRESSION OF

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- THE FLOW OF THE ACTIVITY; TO THIS END, THE OBSERVERS WILL BE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO OBSERVE MAJOR COMBAT UNITS OF THE PARTICIPATING FORMATIONS OF A DIVISIONAL OR EQUIVALENT LEVEL AND, WHENEVER POSSIBLE, TO VISIT SOME UNITS AND COMMUNICATE WITH COMMANDERS AND TROOPS; COMMANDERS OR OTHER SENIOR PERSONNEL OF PARTICIPATING FORMATIONS AS WELL AS OF THE VISITED UNITS WILL INFORM THE OBSERVERS OF THE MISSION OF THEIR RESPECTIVE UNITS;
- (53.5) - GUIDE THE OBSERVERS IN THE AREA OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY; THE OBSERVERS WILL FOLLOW THE INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED BY THE HOST STATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS SET OUT IN THIS DOCUMENT;
- (53.6) - PROVIDE THE OBSERVERS WITH APPROPRIATE MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION IN THE AREA OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY.
- (53.7) - PROVIDE THE OBSERVERS WITH OPPORTUNITIES FOR TIMELY COMMUNICATION WITH THEIR EMBASSIES OR OTHER OFFICIAL MISSIONS AND CONSULAR POSTS; THE HOST STATE IS NOT OBLIGATED TO COVER THE COMMUNICATION EXPENSES OF THE OBSERVERS;
- (53.8) - PROVIDE THE OBSERVERS WITH APPROPRIATE BOARD AND LODGING IN A LOCATION SUITABLE FOR CARRYING OUT THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME AND, WHEN NECESSARY, MEDICAL CARE.
- (54) THE PARTICIPATING STATES NEED NOT INVITE OBSERVERS TO NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE CARRIED OUT WITHOUT ADVANCE WARNING TO THE TROOPS INVOLVED UNLESS THESE NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES HAVE A DURATION OF MORE THAN 72 HOURS. THE CONTINUATION OF THESE ACTIVITIES BEYOND THIS TIME WILL BE SUBJECT TO OBSERVATION WHILE THE AGREED THRESHOLDS ARE MET OR EXCEEDED. THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME WILL FOLLOW AS CLOSELY AS PRACTICALLY POSSIBLE ALL THE PROVISIONS FOR OBSERVATION SET OUT IN THIS DOCUMENT.
- ANNUAL CALENDARS
- (55) EACH PARTICIPATING STATE WILL EXCHANGE, WITH ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES, AN ANNUAL CALENDAR OF ITS MILITARY ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION, WITHIN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS, FORECAST FOR THE SUBSEQUENT CALENDAR YEAR. IT WILL BE TRANSMITTED EVERY YEAR, IN WRITING, THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS, NOT LATER THAN 15 NOVEMBER FOR THE FOLLOWING YEAR.
- (56) EACH PARTICIPATING STATE WILL LIST THE ABOVE-MENTIONED ACTIVITIES CHRONOLOGICALLY AND WILL PROVIDE INFORMATION ON EACH ACTIVITY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOLLOWING MODEL:
- (56.1) - TYPE OF MILITARY ACTIVITY AND ITS DESIGNATION;
- (56.2) - GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS AND PURPOSE OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY;
- (56.3) - STATES INVOLVED IN THE MILITARY ACTIVITY;

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- (56.4) - AREA OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY, INDICATED BY APPROPRIATE GEOGRAPHIC FEATURES AND/OR DEFINED BY GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES;
- (56.5) - PLANNED DURATION OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY AND THE 14-DAY PERIOD, INDICATED BY DATES, WITHIN WHICH IT IS ENVISAGED TO START;
- (56.6) - THE ENVISAGED TOTAL NUMBER OF TROOPS ENGAGED IN THE MILITARY ACTIVITY;
- (56.7) - THE TYPES OF ARMED FORCES INVOLVED IN THE MILITARY ACTIVITY;
- (56.8) - THE ENVISAGED LEVEL OF COMMAND, UNDER WHICH THE MILITARY ACTIVITY WILL TAKE PLACE;

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AS DEFINED IN THE PROVISION ON PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES

- (56.9) - THE NUMBER AND TYPE OF DIVISIONS WHOSE PARTICIPATION IN THE MILITARY ACTIVITY IS ENVISAGED;
- (56.10) - ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING, INTER ALIA, COMPONENTS OF ARMED FORCES, WHICH THE PARTICIPATING STATE PLANNING THE MILITARY ACTIVITY CONSIDERS RELEVANT.
- (57) SHOULD CHANGES REGARDING THE MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR PROVE NECESSARY, THEY WILL BE COMMUNICATED TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES NO LATER THAN IN THE APPROPRIATE NOTIFICATION.
- (58) INFORMATION ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION NOT INCLUDED IN AN ANNUAL CALENDAR WILL BE COMMUNICATED TO ALL PARTICIPATING STATES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MODEL PROVIDED IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR.

CONSTRAINING PROVISIONS

- (59) EACH PARTICIPATING STATE WILL COMMUNICATE, IN WRITING TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES, BY 15 NOVEMBER EACH YEAR, INFORMATION CONCERNING MILITARY ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION INVOLVING MORE THAN 40,000 TROOPS, WHICH IT PLANS TO CARRY OUT IN THE SECOND SUBSEQUENT CALENDAR YEAR. SUCH COMMUNICATION WILL INCLUDE PRELIMINARY INFORMATION ON EACH ACTIVITY, AS TO ITS GENERAL PURPOSE, TIMEFRAME AND DURATION, AREA, SIZE AND STATES INVOLVED.
- (60) PARTICIPATING STATES WILL NOT CARRY OUT MILITARY ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION INVOLVING MORE THAN 75,000 TROOPS, UNLESS THEY HAVE BEEN THE OBJECT OF COMMUNICATION AS DEFINED ABOVE.

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AS DEFINED IN THE PROVISIONS ON PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES

- (61) PARTICIPATING STATES WILL NOT CARRY OUT MILITARY ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION INVOLVING MORE THAN 40,000 TROOPS UNLESS THEY HAVE BEEN INCLUDED IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR, NOT LATER THAN 15 NOVEMBER

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EACH YEAR.

(62) IF MILITARY ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION ARE CARRIED OUT IN ADDITION TO THOSE CONTAINED IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR, THEY SHOULD BE AS FEW AS POSSIBLE.

COMPLIANCE AND VERIFICATION

(63) ACCORDING TO THE MADRID MANDATE, THE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES TO BE AGREED UPON "WILL BE PROVIDED WITH ADEQUATE FORMS OF VERIFICATION WHICH CORRESPOND TO THEIR CONTENT."

(64) THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECOGNIZE THAT NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS CAN PLAY A ROLE IN MONITORING COMPLIANCE WITH AGREED CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES.

(65) IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THIS DOCUMENT EACH PARTICIPATING STATE HAS THE RIGHT TO CONDUCT INSPECTIONS ON THE TERRITORY OF ANY OTHER PARTICIPATING STATE WITHIN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS.

(66) ANY PARTICIPATING STATE WILL BE ALLOWED TO ADDRESS A REQUEST FOR INSPECTION TO ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE ON WHOSE TERRITORY, WITHIN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS, COMPLIANCE WITH THE AGREED CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES IS IN DOUBT.

(67) NO PARTICIPATING STATE WILL BE OBLIGED TO ACCEPT ON ITS TERRITORY WITHIN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS, MORE THAN THREE INSPECTIONS PER CALENDAR YEAR.

(68) NO PARTICIPATING STATE WILL BE OBLIGED TO ACCEPT MORE THAN ONE INSPECTION PER CALENDAR YEAR FROM THE SAME PARTICIPATING STATE.

(69) AN INSPECTION WILL NOT BE COUNTED IF, DUE TO FORCE MAJEURE, IT CANNOT BE CARRIED OUT.

(70) THE PARTICIPATING STATE WHICH REQUESTS AN INSPECTION WILL STATE THE REASONS FOR SUCH A REQUEST.

(71) THE PARTICIPATING STATE WHICH HAS RECEIVED SUCH A REQUEST WILL REPLY IN THE AFFIRMATIVE TO THE REQUEST WITHIN THE AGREED PERIOD OF TIME, SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPHS (67) AND (68).

(72) ANY POSSIBLE DISPUTE AS TO THE VALIDITY OF THE REASONS FOR A REQUEST WILL NOT PREVENT OR DELAY THE CONDUCT OF AN INSPECTION.

(73) THE PARTICIPATING STATE WHICH REQUESTS AN INSPECTION WILL BE PERMITTED TO DESIGNATE FOR INSPECTION ON THE TERRITORY OF ANOTHER STATE WITHIN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS, A SPECIFIC AREA. SUCH AN AREA WILL BE REFERRED TO AS THE "SPECIFIED AREA". THE SPECIFIED AREA WILL COMPRISE TERRAIN WHERE NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES ARE CONDUCTED OR WHERE ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE BELIEVES A NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITY IS TAKING PLACE. THE SPECIFIED AREA

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WILL BE DEFINED AND LIMITED BY THE SCOPE AND SCALE OF NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES BUT WILL NOT EXCEED THAT REQUIRED FOR AN ARMY LEVEL MILITARY ACTIVITY.

(74) IN THE SPECIFIED AREA THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INSPECTING STATE ACCOMPANIED BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE RECEIVING STATE WILL BE PERMITTED ACCESS, ENTRY AND UNOBSTRUCTED SURVEY, EXCEPT FOR AREAS OR SENSITIVE POINTS TO WHICH ACCESS IS NORMALLY DENIED OR RESTRICTED, MILITARY AND OTHER DEFENCE INSTALLATIONS, AS WELL AS NAVAL VESSELS, MILITARY VEHICLES AND AIRCRAFT. THE NUMBER AND EXTENT OF THE RESTRICTED AREAS SHOULD BE AS LIMITED AS POSSIBLE. AREAS WHERE NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES CAN TAKE PLACE WILL NOT BE DECLARED RESTRICTED AREAS, EXCEPT FOR CERTAIN PERMANENT OR TEMPORARY MILITARY INSTALLATIONS WHICH, IN TERRITORIAL TERMS, SHOULD BE AS SMALL AS POSSIBLE, AND CONSEQUENTLY THOSE AREAS WILL NOT BE USED TO PREVENT INSPECTION OF NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES. RESTRICTED AREAS WILL NOT BE EMPLOYED IN A WAY INCONSISTENT WITH THE AGREED PROVISIONS ON INSPECTION.

(75) WITHIN THE SPECIFIED AREA, THE FORCES OF PARTICIPATING STATES OTHER THAN THE RECEIVING STATE WILL ALSO BE SUBJECT TO THE INSPECTION CONDUCTED BY THE INSPECTING STATE.

(76) INSPECTION WILL BE PERMITTED ON THE GROUND, FROM THE AIR, OR BOTH.

(77) THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE RECEIVING STATE WILL ACCOMPANY THE INSPECTION TEAM, INCLUDING WHEN IT IS IN LAND VEHICLES AND AN AIRCRAFT FROM THE TIME OF THEIR FIRST EMPLOYMENT UNTIL THE TIME THEY ARE NO LONGER IN USE FOR THE PURPOSES OF INSPECTION.

(78) IN ITS REQUEST, THE INSPECTING STATE WILL NOTIFY THE RECEIVING STATE OF:

- (78.1) (A) THE REASONS FOR THE REQUEST;
- (78.2) (B) THE LOCATION OF THE SPECIFIED AREA DEFINED BY GEOGRAPHICAL COORDINATES;
- (78.3) (C) THE PREFERRED POINT(S) OF ENTRY FOR THE INSPECTION TEAM;
- (78.4) (D) MODE OF TRANSPORT TO AND FROM THE POINT(S) OF ENTRY AND, IF APPLICABLE, TO AND FROM THE SPECIFIED AREA;
- (78.5) (E) WHERE IN THE SPECIFIED AREA THE INSPECTION WILL BEGIN;
- (78.6) (F) WHETHER THE INSPECTION WILL BE CONDUCTED FROM THE GROUND, FROM THE AIR, OR BOTH SIMULTANEOUSLY;
- (78.7) (G) WHETHER AERIAL INSPECTION WILL BE CONDUCTED USING AN AIRPLANE, A HELICOPTER, OR BOTH;
- (78.8) (H) WHETHER THE INSPECTION TEAM WILL USE LAND VEHICLES PROVIDED BY THE RECEIVING STATE OR, IF MUTUALLY AGREED, ITS OWN VEHICLES;
- (78.9) (I) INFORMATION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF DIPLOMATIC

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- VISAS TO INSPECTORS ENTERING THE RECEIVING STATE.
- (79) THE REPLY TO THE REQUEST WILL BE GIVEN IN THE SHORTEST POSSIBLE PERIOD OF TIME, BUT WITHIN NOT MORE THAN TWENTY-FOUR HOURS. WITHIN THIRTY-SIX HOURS AFTER THE ISSUANCE OF THE REQUEST, THE INSPECTION TEAM WILL BE PERMITTED TO ENTER THE TERRITORY OF THE RECEIVING STATE.
- (80) ANY REQUEST FOR INSPECTION AS WELL AS THE REPLY THERETO WILL BE COMMUNICATED TO ALL PARTICIPATING STATES WITHOUT DELAY.
- (81) THE RECEIVING STATE SHOULD DESIGNATE THE POINTS OF ENTRY AS CLOSE AS POSSIBLE TO THE SPECIFIED AREA. THE RECEIVING STATE WILL ENSURE THAT THE INSPECTION TEAM WILL BE ABLE TO REACH THE SPECIFIED AREA WITHOUT DELAY FROM THE POINT(S) OF ENTRY.
- (82) ALL PARTICIPATING STATES WILL FACILITATE THE PASSAGE OF THE INSPECTION TEAMS THROUGH THEIR TERRITORY.
- (83) WITHIN FORTY-EIGHT HOURS AFTER THE ARRIVAL OF THE INSPECTION TEAM AT THE SPECIFIED AREA, THE INSPECTION WILL BE TERMINATED.
- (84) THERE WILL BE NO MORE THAN FOUR INSPECTORS IN AN INSPECTION TEAM. WHILE CONDUCTING THE INSPECTION THE INSPECTION TEAM MAY DIVIDE INTO TWO PARTS.
- (85) THE INSPECTORS AND, IF APPLICABLE, AUXILIARY PERSONNEL, WILL BE GRANTED DURING THEIR MISSION THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.
- (86) THE RECEIVING STATE WILL PROVIDE THE INSPECTION TEAM WITH APPROPRIATE BOARD AND LODGING IN A LOCATION SUITABLE FOR CARRYING OUT THE INSPECTION, AND, WHEN NECESSARY, MEDICAL CARE; HOWEVER THIS DOES NOT EXCLUDE THE USE BY THE INSPECTION TEAM OF ITS OWN TENTS AND RATIONS.
- (87) THE INSPECTION TEAM WILL HAVE USE OF ITS OWN MAPS, OWN PHOTO CAMERAS, OWN BINOCULARS AND OWN DICTAPHONES, AS WELL AS OWN AERONAUTICAL CHARTS.
- (88) THE INSPECTION TEAM WILL HAVE ACCESS TO APPROPRIATE TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT OF THE RECEIVING STATE, INCLUDING THE OPPORTUNITY FOR CONTINUOUS COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE MEMBERS OF AN INSPECTION TEAM IN AN AIRCRAFT AND THOSE IN A LAND VEHICLE EMPLOYED IN THE INSPECTION.
- (89) THE INSPECTING STATE WILL SPECIFY WHETHER AERIAL INSPECTION WILL BE CONDUCTED USING AN AIRPLANE, A HELICOPTER OR BOTH. AIRCRAFT FOR INSPECTION WILL BE CHOSEN BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE INSPECTING AND RECEIVING STATES. AIRCRAFT WILL BE CHOSEN WHICH PROVIDE THE INSPECTION TEAM A CONTINUOUS VIEW OF THE GROUND DURING THE INSPECTION.
- (90) AFTER THE FLIGHT PLAN, SPECIFYING, INTER ALIA,

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THE INSPECTION TEAM'S CHOICE OF FLIGHT PATH, SPEED AND ALTITUDE IN THE SPECIFIED AREA, HAS BEEN FILED WITH THE COMPETENT AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL AUTHORITY THE INSPECTION AIRCRAFT WILL BE PERMITTED TO ENTER THE SPECIFIED AREA WITHOUT DELAY. WITHIN THE SPECIFIED AREA, THE INSPECTION TEAM WILL, AT ITS REQUEST, BE PERMITTED TO DEVIATE FROM THE APPROVED FLIGHT PLAN TO MAKE SPECIFIC OBSERVATIONS PROVIDED SUCH DEVIATION IS CONSISTENT WITH PARAGRAPH (74) AS WELL AS FLIGHT SAFETY AND AIR TRAFFIC REQUIREMENTS. DIRECTIONS TO THE CREW WILL BE GIVEN THROUGH A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RECEIVING STATE ON BOARD THE AIRCRAFT INVOLVED IN THE INSPECTION.

(91) ONE MEMBER OF THE INSPECTION TEAM WILL BE PERMITTED, IF SUCH A REQUEST IS MADE, AT ANY TIME TO OBSERVE DATA ON NAVIGATIONAL EQUIPMENT OF THE AIRCRAFT AND TO HAVE ACCESS TO MAPS AND CHARTS USED BY THE FLIGHT CREW FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING THE EXACT LOCATION OF THE AIRCRAFT DURING THE INSPECTION FLIGHT.

(92) AERIAL AND GROUND INSPECTORS MAY RETURN TO THE SPECIFIED AREA AS OFTEN AS DESIRED WITHIN THE FORTY-EIGHT HOUR INSPECTION PERIOD.

(93) THE RECEIVING STATE WILL PROVIDE FOR INSPECTION PURPOSES LAND VEHICLES WITH CROSS COUNTRY CAPABILITY. WHENEVER MUTUALLY AGREED TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE SPECIFIC GEOGRAPHY RELATING TO THE AREA TO BE INSPECTED, THE INSPECTING STATE WILL BE PERMITTED TO USE ITS OWN VEHICLES.

(94) IF LAND VEHICLES OR AIRCRAFT ARE PROVIDED BY THE INSPECTING STATE, THERE WILL BE ONE ACCOMPANYING DRIVER FOR EACH LAND VEHICLE, OR ACCOMPANYING AIRCRAFT CREW.

(95) THE INSPECTING STATE WILL PREPARE A REPORT OF ITS INSPECTION AND WILL PROVIDE A COPY OF THAT REPORT TO ALL PARTICIPATING STATES WITHOUT DELAY.

(96) THE INSPECTION EXPENSES WILL BE INCURRED BY THE RECEIVING STATE EXCEPT WHEN THE INSPECTING STATE USES ITS OWN AIRCRAFT AND/OR LAND VEHICLES. THE TRAVEL EXPENSES TO AND FROM POINT(S) OF ENTRY WILL BE BORNE BY THE INSPECTING STATE.

(97) DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS WILL BE USED FOR COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING COMPLIANCE AND VERIFICATION.

(98) EACH PARTICIPATING STATE WILL BE ENTITLED TO OBTAIN TIMELY CLARIFICATION FROM ANY OTHER PARTICIPATING STATE CONCERNING THE APPLICATION OF AGREED CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES. COMMUNICATIONS IN THIS CONTEXT WILL, IF APPROPRIATE, BE TRANSMITTED TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES.

(99) THE PARTICIPATING STATES STRESS THAT THESE CSBMS ARE DESIGNED TO REDUCE THE DANGERS OF ARMED CONFLICT AND OF MISUNDERSTANDING OR MISCALCULATION OF MILITARY

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ACTIVITIES AND EMPHASIZE THAT THEIR IMPLEMENTATION WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THESE OBJECTIVES.

(100) REAFFIRMING THE RELEVANT OBJECTIVES OF THE FINAL ACT, THE PARTICIPATING STATES ARE DETERMINED TO CONTINUE BUILDING CONFIDENCE, TO LESSEN MILITARY CONFRONTATION AND TO ENHANCE SECURITY FOR ALL. THEY ARE ALSO DETERMINED TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS IN DISARMAMENT.

(101) THE MEASURES ADOPTED IN THIS DOCUMENT ARE POLITICALLY BINDING AND WILL COME INTO FORCE ON 1 JANUARY 1987.

(102) THE GOVERNMENT OF SWEDEN IS REQUESTED TO TRANSMIT THE PRESENT DOCUMENT TO THE FOLLOW-UP MEETING OF THE CSCE IN VIENNA AND TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS. THE GOVERNMENT OF SWEDEN IS ALSO REQUESTED TO TRANSMIT THE PRESENT DOCUMENT TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE NON-PARTICIPATING MEDITERRANEAN STATES.

(103) THE TEXT OF THIS DOCUMENT WILL BE PUBLISHED IN EACH PARTICIPATING STATE, WHICH WILL DISSEMINATE IT AND MAKE IT KNOWN AS WIDELY AS POSSIBLE.

(104) THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES EXPRESS THEIR PROFOUND GRATITUDE TO THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF SWEDEN FOR THE EXCELLENT ARRANGEMENTS MADE FOR THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE AND THE WARM HOSPITALITY EXTENDED TO THE DELEGATIONS WHICH PARTICIPATED IN THE CONFERENCE.

STOCKHOLM, 19 SEPTEMBER 1986

ANNEX I

UNDER THE TERMS OF THE MADRID MANDATE, THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS IS DEFINED AS FOLLOWS:  
"ON THE BASIS OF EQUALITY OF RIGHTS, BALANCE AND RECIPROCITY, EQUAL RESPECT FOR THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF ALL CSCE PARTICIPATING STATES, AND OF THEIR RESPECTIVE OBLIGATIONS CONCERNING CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE, THESE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES WILL COVER THE WHOLE OF EUROPE AS WELL AS THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE. THEY WILL BE OF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE AND POLITICALLY BINDING AND WILL BE PROVIDED WITH ADEQUATE FORMS OF VERIFICATION WHICH CORRESPOND TO THEIR CONTENT.

AS FAR AS THE ADJOINING SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE IS CONCERNED, THE MEASURES WILL BE APPLICABLE TO THE MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF ALL THE PARTICIPATING STATES TAKING PLACE THERE WHENEVER THESE ACTIVITIES AFFECT SECURITY IN EUROPE AS WELL AS CONSTITUTE A PART OF ACTIVITIES TAKING PLACE WITHIN THE WHOLE OF EUROPE AS REFERRED TO ABOVE, WHICH THEY WILL AGREE TO NOTIFY. NECESSARY SPECIFICATIONS WILL BE (SIC) MADE THROUGH THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AT THE CONFERENCE.

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NOTHING IN THE DEFINITION OF THE ZONE GIVEN ABOVE WILL DIMINISH OBLIGATIONS ALREADY UNDERTAKEN UNDER THE FINAL ACT. THE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES TO BE AGREED UPON AT THE CONFERENCE WILL ALSO BE APPLICABLE IN ALL AREAS COVERED BY ANY OF THE PROVISIONS IN THE FINAL ACT RELATING TO CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES AND CERTAIN ASPECTS OF SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT.

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 IN THIS CONTEXT, THE NOTION OF ADJOINING SEA AREA IS UNDERSTOOD TO REFER ALSO TO OCEAN AREAS ADJOINING EUROPE."  
 WHENEVER THE TERM "THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS" IS USED IN THIS DOCUMENT, THE ABOVE DEFINITION WILL APPLY.

## ANNEX II

## CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT

IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE AGREED DATE OF ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE AGREED CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES AND THE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THEM CONCERNING THE TIMEFRAMES OF CERTAIN ADVANCE NOTIFICATIONS, AND EXPRESSING THEIR INTEREST IN AN EARLY TRANSITION TO THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THIS DOCUMENT, THE PARTICIPATING STATES AGREE TO THE FOLLOWING:

THE ANNUAL CALENDARS CONCERNING MILITARY ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION AND FORECAST FOR 1987 WILL BE EXCHANGED NOT LATER THAN 15 DECEMBER 1986. COMMUNICATIONS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGREED PROVISIONS, CONCERNING MILITARY ACTIVITIES INVOLVING MORE THAN 40,000 TROOPS PLANNED FOR THE CALENDAR YEAR 1988 WILL BE EXCHANGED BY 15 DECEMBER 1986. PARTICIPATING STATES MAY UNDERTAKE ACTIVITIES INVOLVING MORE THAN 75,000 TROOPS DURING THE CALENDAR YEAR 1987 PROVIDED THAT THEY ARE INCLUDED IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR EXCHANGED BY 15 DECEMBER 1986.

ACTIVITIES TO BEGIN DURING THE FIRST 42 DAYS AFTER 1 JANUARY 1987 WILL BE SUBJECT TO THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS

OF THE FINAL ACT OF THE CSCE. HOWEVER, THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO APPLY TO THEM THE PROVISIONS OF THIS DOCUMENT TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE.

THIS STATEMENT WILL BE AN ANNEX TO THE DOCUMENT OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE AND WILL BE PUBLISHED WITH IT. STOCKHOLM, 19 SEPTEMBER 1986

## ANNEX III

## CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT

IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT EACH PARTICIPATING STATE CAN RAISE ANY QUESTION CONSISTENT WITH THE MANDATE OF THE

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CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES  
AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE AT ANY STAGE SUBSEQUENT TO THE  
VIENNA CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING.

THIS STATEMENT WILL BE AN ANNEX TO THE DOCUMENT OF THE  
STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE AND WILL BE PUBLISHED WITH IT.  
STOCKHOLM, 19 SEPTEMBER 1986.

ANNEX IV

CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT

IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECALL  
THAT THEY HAVE THE RIGHT TO BELONG OR NOT TO BELONG TO  
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, TO BE OR NOT TO BE A PARTY  
TO BILATERAL OR MULTILATERAL TREATIES INCLUDING THE  
RIGHT TO BE OR NOT TO BE A PARTY TO TREATIES OF  
ALLIANCE; THEY ALSO HAVE THE RIGHT OF NEUTRALITY. IN  
THIS CONTEXT, THEY WILL NOT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THESE  
RIGHTS TO CIRCUMVENT THE PURPOSES OF THE SYSTEM OF  
INSPECTION, AND IN PARTICULAR THE PROVISION THAT NO  
PARTICIPATING STATE WILL BE OBLIGED TO ACCEPT ON ITS  
TERRITORY WITHIN THE ZONE OF APPLIATION FOR CSBMS, MORE  
THAN THREE INSPECTIONS PER CALENDAR YEAR.

APPROPRIATE UNDERSTANDINGS BETWEEN PARTICIPATING STATES  
ON THIS SUBJECT WILL BE EXPRESSED IN INTERPRETATIVE  
STATEMENTS TO BE INCLUDED IN THE JOURNAL OF THE DAY.  
THIS STATEMENT WILL BE AN ANNEX TO THE DOCUMENT OF THE  
STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE AND WILL BE PUBLISHED WITH IT.  
STOCKHOLM, 19 SEPTEMBER 1986

END TEXT.

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END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07553

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS ON NUF SECTION OF STOCKHOLM  
- DOCUMENT

1. CDE XII - 082
2. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

## 3. NON-USE OF FORCE TALKING POINTS:

-- THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT REFLECTS THE WESTERN APPROACH TO THE REAFFIRMATION OF THE NON-USE OF FORCE PRINCIPLE.

-- THE DOCUMENT IMPLICITLY REJECTS THE EASTERN DECLARATORY APPROACH; IT RECOGNIZES THAT ONLY THE ADOPTION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF CONCRETE CSBMS GIVES EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE. IN OTHER WORDS, AGREEMENT ON A VERIFIABLE AND MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CSBMS JUSTIFIES THE NUF REAFFIRMATION IN STOCKHOLM.

-- THE ACTUAL NUF REAFFIRMATION IS PUT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

-- THE DOCUMENT STRESSES THAT THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE OR THREAT TO USE FORCE IS UNIVERSAL, EXCEPT FOR THE INHERENT RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE AS SET FORTH IN THE UN CHARTER; IN OTHER WORDS, IT PROHIBITS THE USE OF FORCE IN THE MUTUAL AS WELL AS THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES (I.E., AFGHANISTAN) AND INCLUDES AN EXPLICIT PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF FORCE WITHIN ALLIANCES (ANTI-BREZHNEV DOCTRINE).

-- THE NUF SECTION ALSO REFLECTS THE BROADER WESTERN APPROACH TO SECURITY MATTERS, WHICH INCLUDES HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS.

-- IN THIS CONTEXT, THE DOCUMENT REAFFIRMS THE UNIVERSAL SIGNIFICANCES OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS AND EMPHASIZES THAT THE RESPECT FOR AND THE EFFECTIVE EXERCISE OF THESE RIGHTS ARE ESSENTIAL FACTORS FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, JUSTICE, AND SECURITY.

-- THE NUF SECTION ALSO COMMITS THE PARTICIPATING STATES TO TAKE RESOLUTE AND EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO PREVENT AND TO COMBAT TERRORISM.

-- THE TEXT STRESSES THAT ALL STATES HAVE EQUAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

-- IT ALSO STRESSES THAT STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH COMMITMENTS WITHIN THE CSCE IS ESSENTIAL FOR BUILDING CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY.

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END OF MESSAGE

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UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 07554

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR BARRY'S FINAL PLENARY SPEECH

1. CDE XII - 083

2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF AMBASSADOR BARRY'S FINAL SPEECH IN CDE, DELIVERED SEPTEMBER 22, 1986, ALTHOUGH THE OFFICIAL DATE IS SEPTEMBER 19, 1986 BECAUSE THE CLOCK WAS STOPPED.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

THE UNITED STATES WISHES TODAY TO JOIN OTHERS IN WELCOMING THE DOCUMENT WHICH THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE HAS JUST ADOPTED. WE BELIEVE THE CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES ADOPTED HERE CAN MAKE AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO A MORE STABLE AND SECURE EUROPE AND TO AN IMPROVED EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP. AS YOU KNOW, MY DELEGATION HAS BEEN AMONG THOSE WHICH HAVE DEMANDED THAT WE PRODUCE SUBSTANCE HERE AND NOT GENERALITIES. WE HAVE TRIED HARD TO MEET THE STRINGENT STANDARDS OF THE MADRID MANDATE. WE ARE SATISFIED THAT WE HAVE MET THESE STANDARDS AND PRODUCED A MANDATORY REGIME WHICH COULD SERVE AS A FIRST STEP IN A MORE DEMANDING ARMS CONTROL AND SECURITY PROCESS. BECAUSE OF OUR GENERAL CONCERNS ABOUT COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS, MY GOVERNMENT WILL FOLLOW THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STOCKHOLM REGIME WITH PARTICULAR ATTENTION. WE HAVE ALL MUCH TO LEARN ABOUT CONFIDENCE-BUILDING, AND THE MEASURES ADOPTED HERE WILL PROVIDE A TEST CASE AS WE CONSIDER HOW BEST TO PROCEED IN THE FUTURE. FAR FROM EXHAUSTING THE POTENTIAL OF CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY- BUILDING MEASURES, STOCKHOLM IS, WE THINK, A BEGINNING. WE SHOULD EXPAND UPON WHAT WE HAVE DONE HERE. I THINK PARTICULARLY OF MEASURES IN THE AREA OF INFORMATION EXCHANGE. THE CONFERENCE HAS NOT ACHIEVED NEARLY AS MUCH HERE IN THIS AREA AS WE THOUGHT DESIRABLE AND POSSIBLE. IT SEEMS TO US SELF-EVIDENT, THAT AN AGREED UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT FORCES ARE ROUTINELY STATIONED IN EUROPE, WITH WHAT COMBAT CAPABILITY, IS A FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENT OF TRUE STABILITY. EQUALLY, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INFORMATION BASE IS A REQUIREMENT OF ANY SERIOUS EFFORT TO REDUCE THE STRENGTH OF THESE SAME FORCES. WE HAVE NOT EVEN BEGUN TO ESTABLISH SUCH AN INFORMATION BASE HERE IN STOCKHOLM.

WE HAVE, ON THE OTHER HAND, TAKEN WHAT WE REGARD AS AN IMPORTANT, EVEN HISTORIC STEP IN THE AREA OF VERIFICATION. WITH ACCEPTANCE OF INSPECTION, WE HAVE ESTABLISHED THE PRINCIPLE THAT ANY STATE WITH DOUBTS ABOUT WHETHER THE MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF ANOTHER ARE IN COMPLIANCE WITH COMMITMENTS HAS THE RIGHT AND IS ASSURED THE MEANS OF GOING INTO THE TERRITORY OF THAT OTHER STATE TO SEE FOR ITSELF WHAT IS GOING ON. THERE IS NO RIGHT OF REFUSAL OF THE INSPECTION ADOPTED HERE, WHETHER

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EXPLICIT OR IMPLICIT. WE WILL FOLLOW IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INSPECTION PROVISION WITH PARTICULAR CARE. BECAUSE WE ARE EXPERIMENTING WITH CHALLENGE INSPECTION FOR THE FIRST TIME, WE WILL NO DOUBT HAVE TO PERFECT THE INSTRUMENT WE HAVE BUILT HERE. WE MUST ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT ANY INSPECTION REGIME INTENDED TO VERIFY ACTUAL REDUCTIONS IN FORCES WOULD HAVE TO BE MORE RIGOROUS AND MORE DEMANDING.

IN THIS REGARD, I WOULD NOTE THAT MY GOVERNMENT REMAINS CONVINCED THAT THE USE OF AIRCRAFT FROM NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED STATES WOULD PRODUCE A MORE CREDIBLE AND EFFECTIVE FORM OF AERIAL INSPECTION THAN THE USE OF AIRCRAFT FROM THE STATE BEING INSPECTED. UNFORTUNATELY, THE EAST REJECTED THIS IDEA AND THE OFFERS OF THOSE STATES WHICH SAID THEY WERE PREPARED TO HELP BRING THIS VALUABLE IDEA TO FRUITION. THIS PROPOSAL REMAINS ON THE TABLE FOR THE FUTURE.

THE UNITED STATES ALSO BELIEVES THAT THE SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME TO THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE SHOULD PROVIDE A POSITIVE POLITICAL IMPULSE TO OTHER ARMS CONTROL AND SECURITY NEGOTIATIONS AND TO THE EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP AS A WHOLE. IN A FEW DAYS, THE VIENNA FOLLOW-UP MEETING WILL BEGIN WEIGHING THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND FAILURES OF THE CSCE PROCESS SINCE MADRID. OUR WORK IN STOCKHOLM WILL WEIGH ON THE POSITIVE SIDE OF THAT BALANCE, BUT THERE WILL BE MUCH ON THE NEGATIVE SIDE AS WELL. IT WILL BE THE TASK OF THE VIENNA MEETING TO DRAW CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE FUTURE, BUT THE UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE TO BE AMONG THOSE WHICH REQUIRE BALANCED PROGRESS IN ALL AREAS.

THROUGHOUT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE, PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS TAKEN A PERSONAL INTEREST IN DEVELOPMENTS HERE. THE FIRST FOREIGN POLICY DECISION HE TOOK IN JANUARY, 1981, WAS FOR THE UNITED STATES TO PARTICIPATE IN THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. HE HAS SPOKEN FREQUENTLY ABOUT THE CONFERENCE AND IMPORTANCE HE ATTACHES TO ITS SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION BOTH IN PUBLIC AND IN PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS WITH ME. MR. CHAIRMAN, LET ME RECALL

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PRESIDENT REAGAN'S STATEMENT OF JANUARY 21, 1986, THAT "THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ... CAN CONTRIBUTE TO SECURITY IN THE LARGER SENSE, THAT WHICH ENCOMPASSES POLITICAL ECONOMIC, CULTURAL AND HUMANITARIAN MATTERS -- THAT IS HUMAN RIGHTS -- AS WELL AS STRICTLY MILITARY MATTERS. THE ATTAINMENT OF THIS BROADER CONCEPT OF SECURITY IS THE FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVE OF THE UNITED STATES." WE BELIEVE, MR. CHAIRMAN, THAT OUR WORK HERE IN STOCKHOLM WILL ADVANCE THAT OVERALL OBJECTIVE.  
THANK YOU MR. CHAIRMAN.  
END TEXT.  
BARRY

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UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 07500

SUBJECT: PROVISIONALLY NOTED CDE TEXT

1. CDE XII - 079.

2. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT PROVISIONALLY NOTED IN WORKING GROUP AB IN CDE TODAY, 19 SEPT. TEXT IN THE NOTIFICATION, VERIFICATION, AND COMMUNICATION SECTIONS REMAINS TO BE NOTED.

BEGIN TEXT:

DOCUMENT OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE

ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE CONVENED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT OF THE MADRID MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, AUSTRIA, BELGIUM, BULGARIA, CANADA, CYPRUS, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, DENMARK, FINLAND, FRANCE, THE GERMAN

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, GREECE, THE HOLY SEE, HUNGARY, ICELAND, IRELAND, ITALY, LIECHTENSTEIN, LUXEMBOURG, MALTA, MONACO, THE NETHERLANDS, NORWAY, POLAND, PORTUGAL, ROMANIA, SAN MARINO, SPAIN, SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND, TURKEY, THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND YUGOSLAVIA, MET IN STOCKHOLM FROM 17 JANUARY 1984 TO 19 SEPTEMBER 1986 IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONCLUDING DOCUMENT OF THE MADRID MEETING RELATING TO THE CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE.

THE PARTICIPANTS WERE ADDRESSED BY THE SWEDISH PRIME MINISTER, THE LATE OLOF PALME, ON 17 JANUARY 1984. OPENING STATEMENTS WERE MADE BY THE MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND OTHER HEADS OF DELEGATIONS. THE PRIME MINISTER OF SPAIN AS WELL AS MINISTERS AND SENIOR OFFICIALS OF SEVERAL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES ADDRESSED THE CONFERENCE LATER.

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED THE CONFERENCE ON 6 JULY 1984.

CONTRIBUTIONS WERE MADE BY THE FOLLOWING NON-PARTICIPATING MEDITERRANEAN STATES: ALGERIA, EGYPT, ISRAEL, LEBANON, LIBYA, MOROCCO, SYRIA, AND TUNISIA. THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECALLED THAT THE AIM OF THE CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE IS, AS A SUBSTANTIAL AND INTEGRAL PART OF THE MULTILATERAL PROCESS INITIATED BY THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, TO UNDERTAKE, IN STAGES, NEW, EFFECTIVE AND CONCRETE ACTIONS DESIGNED TO MAKE PROGRESS IN STRENGTHENING CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY AND IN ACHIEVING DISARMAMENT, SO

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AS TO GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS AS WELL AS IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN GENERAL.

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THE PARTICIPATING STATES RECOGNIZE THAT THE SET OF MUTUALLY COMPLEMENTARY CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES WHICH ARE ADOPTED IN THE PRESENT DOCUMENT AND WHICH, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT, WILL BY THEIR SCOPE AND NATURE AND BY THEIR IMPLEMENTATION SERVE TO STRENGTHEN CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE AND THUS TO GIVE EFFECT AND EXPRESSION TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE.  
CONSEQUENTLY, THE PARTICIPATING STATES HAVE DECLARED THE FOLLOWING:

REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE  
THE PARTICIPATING STATES, RECALLING THEIR OBLIGATION TO REFRAIN, IN THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS AS WELL AS IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN GENERAL, FROM THE THREAT OR UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 08 STOCKHOLM 07500  
USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANY STATE, OR IN ANY OTHER MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS, ACCORDINGLY REAFFIRM THEIR COMMITMENT TO RESPECT AND PUT INTO PRACTICE THE PRINCIPLE OF REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE, AS LAID DOWN IN THE FINAL ACT.

NO CONSIDERATION MAY BE INVOKED TO SERVE TO WARRANT RESORT TO THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN CONTRAVENTION OF THIS PRINCIPLE.

THEY RECALL THE INHERENT RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL OR COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENCE IF AN ARMED ATTACK OCCURS, AS SET FORTH IN THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS.  
THEY WILL REFRAIN FROM ANY MANIFESTATION OF FORCE FOR THE PURPOSE OF INDUCING ANY OTHER STATE TO RENOUNCE THE FULL EXERCISE OF ITS SOVEREIGN RIGHTS.

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AS SET FORTH IN THE FINAL ACT NO OCCUPATION OR ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY RESULTING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN CONTRAVENTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW WILL BE RECOGNIZED AS LEGAL.

THEY RECOGNIZE THEIR COMMITMENT TO PEACE AND SECURITY. ACCORDINGLY THEY REAFFIRM THAT THEY WILL REFRAIN FROM ANY USE OF ARMED FORCES INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE PROVISIONS OF THE DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS BETWEEN PARTICIPATING STATES, AGAINST ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE, IN PARTICULAR FROM INVASION OF OR ATTACK ON ITS TERRITORY.

THEY WILL ABIDE BY THEIR COMMITMENT TO REFRAIN FROM THE

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TREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH ANY STATE, REGARDLESS OF THAT STATE'S POLITICAL, SOCIAL, ECONOMIC OR CULTURAL SYSTEM AND IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER OR NOT THEY MAINTAIN WITH THAT STATE RELATIONS OF ALLIANCE.

THEY STRESS THAT NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE OBLIGATION OF REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE, AS RECALLED ABOVE, CONSTITUTES A VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. THEY STRESS THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES AS CONTAINED IN THE FINAL ACT, CONVINCED THAT IT IS AN ESSENTIAL COMPLEMENT TO THE DUTY OF STATES TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE, BOTH BEING ESSENTIAL FACTORS FOR THE MAINTENANCE AND CONSOLIDATION OF PEACE AND SECURITY. THEY RECALL THEIR DETERMINATION AND THE NECESSITY TO REINFORCE AND TO IMPROVE THE METHODS AT THEIR DISPOSAL FOR THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES. THEY REAFFIRM THEIR RESOLVE TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO SETTLE EXCLUSIVELY BY PEACEFUL MEANS ANY DISPUTE BETWEEN THEM.

THE PARTICIPATING STATES STRESS THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE FINAL ACT OF THE CSCE AND THE NEED FOR FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL ITS PROVISIONS WHICH WILL FURTHER THE PROCESS OF INCREASING SECURITY AND DEVELOPING COOPERATION IN EUROPE, THEREBY CONTRIBUTING TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE WORLD AS A WHOLE. THEY EMPHASIZE THEIR COMMITMENT TO ALL THE PRINCIPLES OF THE DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS BETWEEN PARTICIPATING STATES AND DECLARE THEIR DETERMINATION TO RESPECT AND PUT THEM INTO PRACTICE IRRESPECTIVE OF THEIR POLITICAL, ECONOMIC OR SOCIAL SYSTEMS AS WELL AS OF THEIR SIZE, GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION OR LEVEL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

ALL THESE TEN PRINCIPLES ARE OF PRIMARY SIGNIFICANCE AND, ACCORDINGLY, THEY WILL BE EQUALLY AND UNRESERVEDLY APPLIED, EACH OF THEM BEING INTERPRETED TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE OTHERS.

RESPECT FOR AND THE APPLICATION OF THESE PRINCIPLES WILL ENHANCE THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND COOPERATION AMONG THE PARTICIPATING STATES IN ALL FIELDS COVERED BY THE PROVISIONS OF THE FINAL ACT.

THEY RECONFIRM THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE BASIC PRINCIPLE OF THE SOVEREIGN EQUALITY OF STATES AND STRESS THAT ALL STATES HAVE EQUAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

THEY REAFFIRM THE UNIVERSAL SIGNIFICANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS. RESPECT FOR AND THE EFFECTIVE EXERCISE OF THESE RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS ARE ESSENTIAL FACTORS FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, JUSTICE AND SECURITY, AS WELL AS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND COOPERATION AMONG THEMSELVES AS AMONG ALL STATES, AS SET

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FORTH IN THE DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS BETWEEN PARTICIPATING STATES.

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THEY REAFFIRM THAT, IN THE BROADER CONTEXT OF WORLD SECURITY, SECURITY IN EUROPE IS CLOSELY LINKED WITH SECURITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA AS A WHOLE; IN THIS CONTEXT, THEY CONFIRM THEIR INTENTION TO DEVELOP GOOD NEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS WITH ALL STATES IN THE REGION, WITH DUE REGARD TO RECIPROCITY, AND IN THE SPIRIT OF THE PRINCIPLES CONTAINED IN THE DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS BETWEEN PARTICIPATING STATES, SO AS TO PROMOTE CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY AND MAKE PEACE PREVAIL IN THE REGION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE MEDITERRANEAN CHAPTER OF THE FINAL ACT. THEY EMPHASIZE THE NECESSITY TO TAKE RESOLUTE MEASURES TO PREVENT AND TO COMBAT TERRORISM, INCLUDING TERRORISM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. THEY EXPRESS THEIR DETERMINATION TO TAKE EFFECTIVE MEASURES, BOTH AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL AND THROUGH INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, FOR THE PREVENTION AND SUPPRESSION OF ALL ACTS OF TERRORISM. THEY WILL TAKE ALL APPROPRIATE MEASURES IN PREVENTING THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIES FROM BEING USED FOR THE PREPARATION, ORGANIZATION OR COMMISSION OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. THIS ALSO INCLUDES MEASURES TO PROHIBIT ON THEIR TERRITORIES ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES, OF PERSONS, GROUPS AND ORGANIZATIONS THAT INSTIGATE, ORGANIZE OR ENGAGE IN THE PERPETRATION OF ACTS OF TERRORISM, INCLUDING THOSE DIRECTED AGAINST OTHER STATES AND THEIR CITIZENS. THEY WILL FULFILL IN GOOD FAITH THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW; THEY ALSO STRESS THAT STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THEIR COMMITMENTS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CSCE IS ESSENTIAL FOR BUILDING CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY.

THE PARTICIPATING STATES CONFIRM THAT IN THE EVENT OF A CONFLICT BETWEEN THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS UNDER THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER ANY TREATY OR OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT, THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CHARTER WILL PREVAIL, IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 103 OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

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THE PARTICIPATING STATES HAVE ADOPTED THE FOLLOWING MEASURES:

PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES  
(COMMENT: NONE OF THIS SECTION HAS BEEN PROVISIONALLY NOTED, ALTHOUGH SOME COORDINATOR'S TEXT HAS BEEN AGREED. END COMMENT.)

OBSERVATION OF CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES  
A PARTICIPATING STATE WILL INVITE OBSERVERS FROM ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES TO THE FOLLOWING NOTIFIABLE

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**MILITARY ACTIVITIES:**

- THE ENGAGEMENT OF FORMATIONS OF LAND FORCES OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES ... CONDUCTED UNDER A SINGLE OPERATIONAL COMMAND INDEPENDENTLY OR IN COMBINATION WITH ANY POSSIBLE AIR OR NAVAL COMPONENTS.
  - THE ENGAGEMENT OF MILITARY FORCES EITHER IN AN AMPHIBIOUS LANDING OR IN A PARACHUTE ASSAULT BY AIRBORNE FORCES IN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBM'S.
  - IN THE CASE OF THE ENGAGEMENT OF FORMATIONS OF LAND FORCES OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES IN A TRANSFER FROM OUTSIDE THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS TO ARRIVAL POINTS IN THE ZONE, OR FROM INSIDE THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS TO POINTS OF CONCENTRATION IN THE ZONE, TO PARTICIPATE IN A NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITY OR TO BE CONCENTRATED, THE CONCENTRATION OF THESE FORCES. FORCES WHICH HAVE BEEN TRANSFERRED INTO THE ZONE WILL BE SUBJECT TO ALL PROVISIONS OF AGREED CSBMS WHEN THEY DEPART THEIR ARRIVAL POINTS TO PARTICIPATE IN A NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITY OR CONCENTRATION WITHIN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS.
- THE ABOVE-MENTIONED ACTIVITIES WILL BE SUBJECT TO OBSERVATION WHENEVER ...

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 IN THIS CONTEXT, THE TERM LAND FORCES INCLUDES AMPHIBIOUS, AIRMOBILE AND AIRBORNE FORCES.

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 THE HOST STATE WILL EXTEND THE INVITATIONS IN WRITING THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES AT THE TIME OF NOTIFICATION. THE HOST STATE WILL BE THE PARTICIPATING STATE ON WHOSE TERRITORY THE NOTIFIED ACTIVITY WILL TAKE PLACE.  
 THE HOST STATE MAY DELEGATE SOME OF ITS RESPONSIBILITIES AS HOST TO ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE ENGAGED IN THE MILITARY ACTIVITY ON THE TERRITORY OF THE HOST STATE. IN SUCH CASES, THE HOST STATE WILL SPECIFY THE ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITIES IN ITS INVITATION TO OBSERVE THE ACTIVITY.  
 EACH PARTICIPATING STATE MAY SEND UP TO TWO OBSERVERS TO THE MILITARY ACTIVITY TO BE OBSERVED.  
 THE INVITED STATE MAY DECIDE WHETHER TO SEND MILITARY AND/OR CIVILIAN OBSERVERS, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF ITS PERSONNEL ACCREDITED TO THE HOST STATE. MILITARY OBSERVERS WILL, NORMALLY, WEAR THEIR UNIFORMS AND INSIGNIA WHILE PERFORMING THEIR TASKS.  
 REPLIES TO THE INVITATION WILL BE GIVEN IN WRITING NOT LATER THAN 21 DAYS AFTER THE ISSUE OF THE INVITATION. THE PARTICIPATING STATES ACCEPTING AN INVITATION WILL PROVIDE THE NAMES AND RANKS OF THEIR OBSERVERS IN THEIR REPLY TO THE INVITATION. IF THE INVITATION IS NOT ACCEPTED IN TIME, IT WILL BE ASSUMED THAT NO OBSERVERS WILL BE SENT.

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TOGETHER WITH THE INVITATION THE HOST STATE WILL PROVIDE A GENERAL OBSERVATION PROGRAMME, INCLUDING THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

- THE DATE, TIME AND PLACE OF ASSEMBLY OF OBSERVERS;
- PLANNED DURATION OF THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME;
- LANGUAGE TO BE USED IN INTERPRETATION AND/OR TRANSLATION;
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- ARRANGEMENTS FOR BOARD, LODGING AND TRANSPORTATION OF THE OBSERVERS;
- ARRANGEMENTS FOR OBSERVATION EQUIPMENT WHICH WILL BE ISSUED TO THE OBSERVERS BY THE HOST STATE;
- POSSIBLE AUTHORIZATION BY THE HOST STATE OF THE USE OF SPECIAL EQUIPMENT THAT THE OBSERVERS MAY BRING WITH THEM;
- ARRANGEMENTS FOR SPECIAL CLOTHING TO BE ISSUED TO THE OBSERVERS BECAUSE OF WEATHER OR ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS. THE OBSERVERS MAY MAKE REQUESTS WITH REGARD TO THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME. THE HOST STATE WILL, IF POSSIBLE, ACCEDE TO THEM.

THE HOST STATE WILL DETERMINE A DURATION OF OBSERVATION WHICH PERMITS THE OBSERVERS TO OBSERVE A NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITY FROM THE TIME THAT AGREED ... THRESHOLDS ARE MET OR EXCEEDED UNTIL, FOR THE LAST TIME DURING THE ACTIVITY, THE ... THRESHOLDS ARE NO LONGER MET.

THE HOST STATE WILL PROVIDE THE OBSERVERS WITH TRANSPORTATION TO THE AREA OF THE NOTIFIED ACTIVITY AND BACK. THIS TRANSPORTATION WILL BE PROVIDED FROM EITHER THE CAPITAL OR ANOTHER SUITABLE LOCATION TO BE ANNOUNCED IN THE INVITATION, SO THAT THE OBSERVERS ARE IN POSITION BEFORE THE START OF THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME. THE INVITED STATE WILL COVER THE TRAVEL EXPENSES FOR ITS OBSERVERS TO THE CAPITAL, OR ANOTHER SUITABLE LOCATION SPECIFIED IN THE INVITATION, OF THE HOST STATE, AND BACK. THE OBSERVERS WILL BE PROVIDED EQUAL TREATMENT AND OFFERED EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES TO CARRY OUT THEIR FUNCTIONS. THE OBSERVERS WILL BE GRANTED, DURING THEIR MISSION, THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES ACCORDED TO DIPLOMATIC AGENTS IN THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

THE HOST STATE WILL NOT BE REQUIRED TO PERMIT OBSERVATION OF RESTRICTED LOCATIONS, INSTALLATIONS OR DEFENCE SITES.

IN ORDER TO ALLOW THE OBSERVERS TO CONFIRM THAT THE NOTIFIED ACTIVITY IS NON-THREATENING IN CHARACTER AND THAT IT IS CARRIED OUT IN CONFORMITY WITH THE APPROPRIATE PROVISIONS OF THE NOTIFICATION, THE HOST STATE WILL:

- AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME GIVE A BRIEFING ON THE PURPOSE, THE BASIC SITUATION, THE

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PHASES OF THE ACTIVITY AND POSSIBLE CHANGES AS COMPARED WITH THE NOTIFICATION AND PROVIDE THE OBSERVERS WITH A MAP OF THE AREA OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY WITH A SCALE OF 1 TO NOT MORE THAN 500,000 AND AN OBSERVATION PROGRAMME WITH A DAILY SCHEDULE AS WELL AS A SKETCH INDICATING THE BASIC SITUATION.

- PROVIDE THE OBSERVERS WITH APPROPRIATE OBSERVATION EQUIPMENT. HOWEVER, THE OBSERVERS WILL BE ALLOWED TO USE THEIR PERSONAL BINOCULARS, WHICH WILL BE SUBJECT TO EXAMINATION AND APPROVAL BY THE HOST STATE.

- IN THE COURSE OF THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME GIVE THE OBSERVERS DAILY BRIEFINGS WITH THE HELP OF MAPS ON THE VARIOUS PHASES OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY AND THEIR DEVELOPMENT AND INFORM THE OBSERVERS ABOUT THEIR POSITIONS GEOGRAPHICALLY. IN THE CASE OF A LAND FORCE ACTIVITY CONDUCTED IN COMBINATION WITH AIR OR NAVAL COMPONENTS, BRIEFINGS WILL BE GIVEN BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THESE FORCES.

- PROVIDE OPPORTUNITIES TO OBSERVE DIRECTLY FORCES OF THE STATE/STATES ENGAGED IN THE MILITARY ACTIVITY SO THAT THE OBSERVERS GET AN IMPRESSION OF THE FLOW OF THE ACTIVITY. TO THIS END, THE OBSERVERS WILL BE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO OBSERVE MAJOR COMBAT UNITS OF THE PARTICIPATING FORMATIONS OF A DIVISIONAL OR EQUIVALENT LEVEL AND, WHENEVER POSSIBLE, TO VISIT SOME UNITS AND COMMUNICATE WITH COMMANDERS AND TROOPS. COMMANDERS OR OTHER SENIOR PERSONNEL OF PARTICIPATING FORMATIONS AS WELL AS OF THE VISITED UNITS WILL INFORM THE OBSERVERS OF THE MISSION OF THEIR RESPECTIVE UNITS.

- GUIDE THE OBSERVERS IN THE AREA OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY. THE OBSERVERS WILL FOLLOW THE INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED BY THE HOST STATE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS SET OUT IN THIS DOCUMENT.

- PROVIDE THE OBSERVERS WITH APPROPRIATE MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION IN THE AREA OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY.

- PROVIDE THE OBSERVERS WITH OPPORTUNITIES FOR TIMELY COMMUNICATION WITH THEIR EMBASSIES OR OTHER OFFICIAL MISSIONS AND CONSULAR POSTS. THE HOST STATE IS NOT OBLIGATED TO COVER THE COMMUNICATION EXPENSES OF THE OBSERVERS.

- PROVIDE THE OBSERVERS WITH APPROPRIATE BOARD AND LODGING IN A LOCATION SUITABLE FOR CARRYING OUT THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME AND, WHEN NECESSARY, MEDICAL CARE.

THE PARTICIPATING STATES NEED NOT INVITE OBSERVERS TO NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE CARRIED OUT WITHOUT ADVANCE WARNING TO THE TROOPS INVOLVED UNLESS THESE NOTIFIABLE ACTIVITIES HAVE A DURATION OF MORE THAN 72 HOURS. THE CONTINUATION OF THESE ACTIVITIES BEYOND THIS TIME WILL BE SUBJECT TO OBSERVATION WHILE THE

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AGREED THRESHOLDS ARE MET OR EXCEEDED. THE OBSERVATION PROGRAMME WILL FOLLOW AS CLOSELY AS PRACTICALLY POSSIBLE ALL THE PROVISIONS FOR OBSERVATION SET OUT IN THIS DOCUMENT.

#### ANNUAL CALENDARS

EACH PARTICIPATING STATE WILL EXCHANGE, WITH ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES, AN ANNUAL CALENDAR OF ITS MILITARY ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION, WITHIN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS, FORECAST FOR THE SUBSEQUENT CALENDAR YEAR. IT WILL BE TRANSMITTED EVERY YEAR, IN WRITING, THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS, NOT LATER THAN 15 NOVEMBER FOR THE FOLLOWING YEAR.

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AS DEFINED ...

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EACH PARTICIPATING STATE WILL LIST THE ABOVE-MENTIONED ACTIVITIES CHRONOLOGICALLY AND WILL PROVIDE INFORMATION ON EACH ACTIVITY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOLLOWING MODEL:

- TYPE OF MILITARY ACTIVITY AND ITS DESIGNATION
- GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS AND PURPOSE OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY
- STATES INVOLVED IN THE MILITARY ACTIVITY
- AREA OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY, INDICATED BY APPROPRIATE GEOGRAPHIC FEATURES AND/OR DEFINED BY GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES
- PLANNED DURATION OF THE MILITARY ACTIVITY AND THE 14-DAY PERIOD, INDICATED BY DATES, WITHIN WHICH IT IS ENVISAGED TO START
- THE ENVISAGED TOTAL NUMBER OF TROOPS ENGAGED IN THE MILITARY ACTIVITY
- THE TYPES OF ARMED FORCES INVOLVED IN THE MILITARY ACTIVITY
- THE ENVISAGED LEVEL OF COMMAND, UNDER WHICH THE MILITARY ACTIVITY WILL TAKE PLACE
- THE NUMBER AND TYPE OF DIVISIONS WHOSE PARTICIPATION IN THE MILITARY ACTIVITY IS ENVISAGED
- ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING, INTER ALIA, COMPONENTS OF FORCES WHICH THE PARTICIPATING STATE PLANNING THE MILITARY ACTIVITY CONSIDERS RELEVANT SHOULD CHANGES REGARDING THE MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR PROVE NECESSARY, THEY WILL BE COMMUNICATED TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES NO LATER THAN IN THE APPROPRIATE NOTIFICATION.

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INFORMATION ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION NOT INCLUDED IN AN ANNUAL CALENDAR WILL BE COMMUNICATED TO ALL PARTICIPATING STATES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MODEL PROVIDED IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR.

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**CONSTRAINING PROVISIONS**

EACH PARTICIPATING STATE WILL COMMUNICATE, IN WRITING TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES, BY 15 NOVEMBER EACH YEAR, INFORMATION CONCERNING MILITARY ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION INVOLVING MORE THAN 40,000 TROOPS, WHICH IT PLANS TO CARRY OUT IN THE SECOND SUBSEQUENT CALENDAR YEAR. SUCH COMMUNICATION WILL INCLUDE PRELIMINARY INFORMATION ON EACH ACTIVITY, AS TO ITS GENERAL PURPOSE, TIMEFRAME AND DURATION, AREA, SIZE AND STATES INVOLVED.

PARTICIPATING STATES WILL NOT CARRY OUT MILITARY ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION INVOLVING MORE THAN 75,000 TROOPS, UNLESS THEY HAVE BEEN THE OBJECT OF COMMUNICATION AS DEFINED ABOVE.

PARTICIPATING STATES WILL NOT CARRY OUT MILITARY ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION INVOLVING MORE THAN 40,000 TROOPS UNLESS THEY HAVE BEEN INCLUDED IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR, NOT LATER THAN 15 NOVEMBER EACH YEAR. IF MILITARY ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION ARE CARRIED OUT IN ADDITION TO THOSE CONTAINED IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR, THEY SHOULD BE AS FEW AS POSSIBLE.

**COMPLIANCE AND VERIFICATION**

(COMMENT: NONE OF THIS SECTION HAS BEEN PROVISIONALLY NOTED, ALTHOUGH SOME COORDINATOR'S TEXT HAS BEEN AGREED. END COMMENT)

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AS DEFINED ...

**COMMUNICATION**

(COMMENT: NONE OF THIS SECTION HAS BEEN PROVISIONALLY NOTED, ALTHOUGH SOME COORDINATOR'S TEXT HAS BEEN AGREED. END COMMENT)

THE PARTICIPATING STATES STRESS THAT THESE CSBMS ARE DESIGNED TO REDUCE THE DANGERS OF ARMED CONFLICT AND OF MISUNDERSTANDING OR MISCALCULATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND EMPHASIZE THAT THEIR IMPLEMENTATION WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THESE OBJECTIVES.

REAFFIRMING THE RELEVANT OBJECTIVES OF THE FINAL ACT, THE PARTICIPATING STATES ARE DETERMINED TO CONTINUE BUILDING CONFIDENCE, TO LESSEN MILITARY CONFRONTATION AND TO ENHANCE SECURITY FOR ALL. THEY ARE ALSO DETERMINED TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS IN DISARMAMENT.

THE MEASURES ADOPTED IN THIS DOCUMENT ARE POLITICALLY BINDING AND WILL COME INTO FORCE ON 1 JANUARY 1987. THE GOVERNMENT OF SWEDEN IS REQUESTED TO TRANSMIT THE PRESENT DOCUMENT TO THE FOLLOW-UP MEETING OF THE CSCE IN VIENNA AND TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS. THE GOVERNMENT OF SWEDEN IS ALSO REQUESTED TO TRANSMIT THE PRESENT DOCUMENT TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE NON-PARTICIPATING MEDITERRANEAN STATES.

THE TEXT OF THIS DOCUMENT WILL BE PUBLISHED IN EACH

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PARTICIPATING STATE, WHICH WILL DISSEMINATE IT AND MAKE IT KNOWN AS WIDELY AS POSSIBLE.  
THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES EXPRESS THEIR PROFOUND GRATITUDE TO THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF SWEDEN FOR THE EXCELLENT ARRANGEMENTS MADE FOR THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE AND THE WARM HOSPITALITY EXTENDED TO THE DELEGATIONS WHICH PARTICIPATED IN THE CONFERENCE.  
STOCKHOLM, 19 SEPTEMBER 1986

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ANNEX I

## CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT

IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE AGREED DATE OF ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE AGREED CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES AND THE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THEM CONCERNING THE TIMEFRAMES OF CERTAIN ADVANCE NOTIFICATIONS, AND EXPRESSING THEIR INTEREST IN AN EARLY TRANSITION TO THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THIS DOCUMENT, THE PARTICIPATING STATES AGREE TO THE FOLLOWING:

THE ANNUAL CALENDARS CONCERNING MILITARY ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO PRIOR NOTIFICATION AND FORECAST FOR 1987 WILL BE EXCHANGED NOT LATER THAN 15 DECEMBER 1986.  
COMMUNICATIONS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGREED PROVISIONS, CONCERNING MILITARY ACTIVITIES INVOLVING MORE THAN 40,000 TROOPS PLANNED FOR THE CALENDAR YEAR 1988 WILL BE EXCHANGED BY 15 DECEMBER 1986. PARTICIPATING STATES MAY UNDERTAKE ACTIVITIES INVOLVING MORE THAN 75,000 TROOPS DURING THE CALENDAR YEAR 1987 PROVIDED THAT THEY ARE INCLUDED IN THE ANNUAL CALENDAR EXCHANGED BY 15 DECEMBER 1986.

ACTIVITIES TO BEGIN DURING THE FIRST 42 DAYS AFTER 1 JANUARY 1987 WILL BE SUBJECT TO THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE FINAL ACT OF THE CSCE. HOWEVER, THE PARTICIPATING STATES WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO APPLY TO THEM THE PROVISIONS OF THIS DOCUMENT TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE.

THIS STATEMENT WILL BE AN ANNEX TO THE DOCUMENT OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE AND WILL BE PUBLISHED WITH IT.  
STOCKHOLM, 19 SEPTEMBER 1986

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ANNEX II

## CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT

IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT EACH PARTICIPATING STATE CAN RAISE ANY QUESTION CONSISTENT WITH THE MANDATE OF THE CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE AT ANY STAGE SUBSEQUENT TO THE VIENNA CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING.

THIS STATEMENT WILL BE AN ANNEX TO THE DOCUMENT OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE AND WILL BE PUBLISHED WITH IT.  
STOCKHOLM, 19 SEPTEMBER 1986.  
END TEXT.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07503

SUBJECT: CDE: COMPLIANCE AND VERIFICATION MEASURE

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. ROUND-THE-CLOCK NOEGOTIATIONS -- WELL INTO THE 48TH HOUR OF SEPTEMBER 19 -- HAVE BROUGHT THE CONFERENCE CLOSE TO AGREEMENT ON A "COMPLIANCE AND VERIFICATION" MEASURE. THE TEXT WHICH FOLLOWS, WITH ACCOMPANYING COMMENTS, REFLECTS THE AGREEMENTS REACHED AS WELL AS OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS AS OF ADJOURNMENT AT 1:00 A.M. SEPTEMBER 21. NEGOTIATIONS RESUME AT 10 A.M. END SUMMARY.

3. STRUCTURE. WE HAVE AGREED NOT TO HAVE SUB-TITLES IN THIS SECTION, LARGELY BECAUSE NATO WANTED TO AVOID GIVING THE IMPRESSION THAT A VARIETY OF FORMS OF VERIFICATION HAD BEEN AGREED, WHEN THE ONLY FORM IS INSPECTION. THIS SECTION WILL BE ORGANIZED, HOWEVER, INTO FIVE DISTINCT SECTIONS, DIVIDED BY EXTRA SPACES, AS FOLLOWS:

MANDATE LANGUAGE ON VERIFICATION; NTMS; INSPECTION; COMMUNICATION; CLARIFICATIONS.

4. TEXT OF SECTION ON "COMPLIANCE AND VERIFICATION" FOLLOWS.

BEGIN TEXT.

COMPLIANCE AND VERIFICATION

ACCORDING TO THE MADRID MANDATE THE CONFIDENCE-AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES TO BE AGREED UPON "WILL BE PROVIDED WITH ADEQUATE FORMS OF VERIFICATION WHICH CORRESPOND TO THEIR CONTENT."

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PARTICIPATING STATES RECOGNIZE THAT NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS CAN PLAY A ROLE IN MONITORING COMPLIANCE WITH AGREED CSBMS.

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IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THIS DOCUMENT EACH PARTICIPATING STATE HAS THE RIGHT TO CONDUCT INSPECTIONS ON THE TERRITORY OF ANY OTHER PARTICIPATING STATE WITHIN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS.

ANY PARTICIPATING STATE WILL BE ALLOWED TO ADDRESS A REQUEST FOR INSPECTION TO ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE ON WHOSE TERRITORY, WITHIN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS, COMPLIANCE WITH THE AGREED CSBMS IS IN DOUBT. NO PARTICIPATING STATE WILL BE OBLIGED TO ACCEPT ON ITS TERRITORY WITHIN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS, MORE THAN ... INSPECTIONS PER CALENDAR YEAR. (1)

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NO PARTICIPATING STATE WILL BE OBLIGED TO ACCEPT MORE THAN ONE INSPECTION PER CALENDAR YEAR FROM THE SAME PARTICIPATING STATE.

PARTICIPATING STATES WHICH ENGAGE IN MULTINATIONAL MILITARY EXERCISE ACTIVITIES WILL NOT USE THEIR RIGHT TO INSPECT THE STATES, TOGETHER WITH WHICH, THEY PARTICIPATE IN SUCH ACTIVITIES. (2)

AN INSPECTION WILL NOT BE COUNTED IF, DUE TO FORCE MAJEURE, IT CANNOT BE CARRIED OUT.

THE PARTICIPATING STATE WHICH REQUESTS AN INSPECTION WILL STATE THE REASONS FOR SUCH A REQUEST.

THE PARTICIPATING STATE WHICH HAS RECEIVED SUCH A REQUEST WILL REPLY IN THE AFFIRMATIVE TO THE REQUEST WITHIN THE AGREED PERIOD OF TIME, SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPHS ... (3)

ANY POSSIBLE DISPUTE AS TO THE VALIDITY OF THE REASONS FOR A REQUEST WILL NOT PREVENT OR DELAY THE CONDUCT OF AN INSPECTION ... (4)

THE PARTICIPATING STATE WHICH REQUESTS AN INSPECTION WILL BE PERMITTED TO DESIGNATE FOR INSPECTION ON THE TERRITORY OF ANOTHER STATE WITHIN THE ZONE OF APPLICATION FOR CSBMS, A SPECIFIC AREA. SUCH AN AREA WILL BE REFERRED TO AS THE "SPECIFIED AREA". THE SPECIFIED AREA WILL COMPRISE TERRAIN WHERE NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES ARE CONDUCTED OR WHERE ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE BELIEVES A NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITY IS TAKING PLACE. THE SPECIFIED AREA WILL BE DEFINED AND LIMITED BY THE SCOPE AND SCALE OF NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES BUT WILL NOT EXCEED THAT REQUIRED FOR AN ARMY LEVEL MILITARY ACTIVITY.

IN THE SPECIFIED AREA THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INSPECTING STATE ACCOMPANIED BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE RECEIVING STATE WILL BE PERMITTED ACCESS, ENTRY AND UNOBSTRUCTED SURVEY, EXCEPT FOR AREAS OR SENSITIVE POINTS TO WHICH ACCESS IS NORMALLY DENIED OR RESTRICTED, MILITARY AND OTHER DEFENCE INSTALLATIONS, AS WELL AS NAVAL VESSELS, AND AIRCRAFT. THE NUMBER AND EXTENT OF THE RESTRICTED AREAS SHOULD BE AS LIMITED AS POSSIBLE. AREAS WHERE NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES CAN TAKE PLACE WILL NOT BE DECLARED RESTRICTED AREAS, EXCEPT FOR CERTAIN PERMANENT OR TEMPORARY MILITARY INSTALLATIONS WHICH, IN TERRITORIAL TERMS, SHOULD BE AS SMALL AS POSSIBLE, AND CONSEQUENTLY THOSE AREAS WILL NOT BE USED TO PREVENT INSPECTION OF NOTIFIABLE MILITARY ACTIVITIES. RESTRICTED AREAS WILL NOT BE EMPLOYED IN A WAY INCONSISTENT WITH THE AGREED PROVISIONS ON INSPECTION.

WITHIN THE SPECIFIED AREA, THE FORCES OF PARTICIPATING STATES OTHER THAN THE RECEIVING STATE WILL ALSO BE SUBJECT TO THE INSPECTION CONDUCTED BY THE INSPECTING STATE.

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INSPECTION WILL BE PERMITTED ON THE GROUND, FROM THE AIR, OR BOTH.

THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE RECEIVING STATE WILL ACCOMPANY THE INSPECTION TEAM, INCLUDING WHEN IT IS IN LAND VEHICLES AND AN AIRCRAFT FROM THE TIME OF THEIR FIRST EMPLOYMENT UNTIL THE TIME THEY ARE NO LONGER IN USE FOR THE PURPOSES OF INSPECTION.

IN ITS REQUEST, THE INSPECTING STATE WILL NOTIFY THE RECEIVING STATE OF:

- (A) THE REASONS FOR THE REQUEST;
- (B) THE LOCATION OF THE SPECIFIED AREA DEFINED BY GEOGRAPHICAL COORDINATES;
- (C) THE PREFERRED POINT(S) OF ENTRY FOR THE INSPECTION TEAM;
- (D) MODE OF TRANSPORT TO AND FROM THE POINT(S) OF ENTRY AND, IF APPLICABLE, TO AND FROM THE SPECIFIED AREA;
- (E) WHERE IN THE SPECIFIED AREA THE INSPECTION WILL BEGIN;
- (F) WHETHER THE INSPECTION WILL BE CONDUCTED FROM THE GROUND, FROM THE AIR, OR BOTH SIMULTANEOUSLY;
- (G) WHETHER AERIAL INSPECTION WILL BE CONDUCTED USING AN AIRPLANE, A HELICOPTER, OR BOTH;
- (H) WHETHER THE INSPECTION TEAM WILL USE LAND VEHICLES PROVIDED BY THE RECEIVING STATE OR, IF MUTUALLY AGREED, ITS OWN VEHICLES;
- (I) INFORMATION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF DIPLOMATIC VISAS TO INSPECTORS ENTERING THE RECEIVING STATE.

THE REPLY TO THE REQUEST WILL BE GIVEN IN THE SHORTEST POSSIBLE PERIOD OF TIME, BUT WITHIN NOT MORE THAN ... HOURS. WITHIN ... HOURS AFTER THE ISSUANCE OF THE REQUEST, THE INSPECTION TEAM WILL BE PERMITTED TO ENTER THE TERRITORY OF THE RECEIVING STATE. (5) ANY REQUEST FOR INSPECTION AS WELL AS THE REPLY THERETO WILL BE COMMUNICATED TO ALL PARTICIPATING STATES WITHOUT DELAY.

THE RECEIVING STATE SHOULD DESIGNATE THE POINT(S) OF ENTRY AS CLOSE AS POSSIBLE TO THE SPECIFIED AREA. THE RECEIVING STATE WILL ENSURE THAT THE INSPECTION TEAM WILL BE ABLE TO REACH THE SPECIFIED AREA WITHOUT DELAY FROM THE POINT(S) OF ENTRY.

ALL PARTICIPATING STATES WILL FACILITATE THE PASSAGE OF THE INSPECTION TEAMS THROUGH THEIR TERRITORY. WITHIN 48 HOURS AFTER THE ARRIVAL OF THE INSPECTION TEAM AT THE SPECIFIED AREA, THE INSPECTION WILL BE TERMINATED. THERE WILL BE NO MORE THAN FOUR INSPECTORS IN AN INSPECTION TEAM. WHILE CONDUCTING THE INSPECTION THE INSPECTION TEAM MAY DIVIDE INTO PARTS. IF LAND VEHICLES OR AIRCRAFT ARE PROVIDED BY THE INSPECTING STATE, THERE WILL BE ONE ACCOMPANYING DRIVER FOR EACH LAND VEHICLE, OR AIRCRAFT CREW.

THE ... WILL BE GRANTED, DURING THEIR MISSION, THE

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PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES ACCORDED TO DIPLOMATIC AGENTS IN THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ... (6) THE RECEIVING STATE WILL PROVIDE THE INSPECTION TEAM WITH APPROPRIATE BOARD AND LODGING IN A LOCATION SUITABLE FOR CARRYING OUT THE INSPECTION, AND, WHEN NECESSARY, MEDICAL CARE; HOWEVER THIS DOES NOT EXCLUDE THE USE BY THE INSPECTION TEAM OF ITS OWN TENTS AND RATIONS.

THE INSPECTION TEAM WILL HAVE USE OF ITS OWN MAPS, OWN CAMERAS, OWN BINOCULARS AND OWN DICTAPHONES, AS WELL AS OWN AIRCRAFT NAVIGATIONAL CHARTS AND WRITING MATERIAL. (7)

THE INSPECTION TEAM WILL HAVE ACCESS TO APPROPRIATE TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT OF THE RECEIVING STATE, INCLUDING THE OPPORTUNITY FOR CONTINUOUS COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE MEMBERS OF AN INSPECTION TEAM IN AN AIRCRAFT AND THOSE IN A LAND VEHICLE EMPLOYED IN THE INSPECTION. THE INSPECTING STATE WILL SPECIFY WHETHER AERIAL INSPECTION WILL BE CONDUCTED USING AN AIRPLANE, A HELICOPTER OR BOTH. AIRCRAFT FOR INSPECTION WILL BE CHOSEN BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE INSPECTING AND RECEIVING STATES. AIRCRAFT WILL BE CHOSEN WHICH PROVIDE THE INSPECTION TEAM A CONTINUOUS VIEW OF THE GROUND DURING THE INSPECTION.

AFTER THE FLIGHT PLAN, SPECIFYING, INTER ALIA, THE INSPECTION TEAM'S CHOICE OF FLIGHT PATH, SPEED AND ALTITUDE IN THE SPECIFIED AREA, HAS BEEN FILED WITH THE COMPETENT AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL AUTHORITY THE INSPECTION AIRCRAFT WILL BE PERMITTED TO ENTER THE SPECIFIED AREA WITHOUT DELAY. WITHIN THE SPECIFIED AREA, THE INSPECTION TEAM WILL, AT ITS REQUEST, BE PERMITTED TO DEVIATE FROM THE APPROVED FLIGHT PLAN TO MAKE SPECIFIC OBSERVATIONS PROVIDED SUCH DEVIATION IS CONSISTENT WITH PARA ( ) AS WELL AS FLIGHT SAFETY AND AIR TRAFFIC REQUIREMENTS. DIRECTIONS TO THE CREW WILL BE GIVEN THROUGH A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RECEIVING STATE ON BOARD THE AIRCRAFT INVOLVED IN THE INSPECTION. 8)

ONE MEMBER OF THE INSPECTION TEAM WILL BE PERMITTED, IF SUCH A REQUEST IS MADE, AT ANY TIME TO OBSERVE DATA ON NAVIGATIONAL EQUIPMENT OF THE AIRCRAFT AND TO HAVE ACCESS TO MAPS AND CHARTS USED BY THE FLIGHT CREW FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING THE EXACT LOCATION OF THE AIRCRAFT DURING THE INSPECTION FLIGHT. AERIAL AND GROUND INSPECTORS MAY RETURN TO THE SPECIFIED AREA AS OFTEN AS DESIRED WITHIN THE 48-HOUR INSPECTION PERIOD.

THE RECEIVING STATE WILL PROVIDE FOR INSPECTION PURPOSES LAND VEHICLES WITH CROSS COUNTRY CAPABILITY. WHENEVER MUTUALLY AGREED, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE SPECIFIC GEOGRAPHY RELATING TO THE AREA TO BE INSPECTED, THE INSPECTING STATE WILL BE PERMITTED TO USE ITS OWN

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## VEHICLES.

THE INSPECTING STATE WILL PREPARE A REPORT OF ITS INSPECTION AND WILL PROVIDE A COPY OF THAT REPORT TO ALL PARTICIPATING STATES WITHOUT DELAY.

THE INSPECTION EXPENSES, EXCEPT FOR TRAVEL EXPENSES TO AND FROM POINT(S) OF ENTRY . . . , WILL BE INCURRED BY THE RECEIVING STATE. (9)

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DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS WILL BE USED FOR COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING COMPLIANCE AND VERIFICATION.

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EACH PARTICIPATING STATE WILL BE ENTITLED TO OBTAIN TIMELY CLARIFICATION FROM ANY OTHER PARTICIPATING STATE CONCERNING THE APPLICATION OF AGREED CSBMS. . . . COMMUNICATIONS IN THIS CONTEXT WILL, IF APPROPRIATE, BE TRANSMITTED TO ALL OTHER PARTICIPATING STATES. (10)  
END TEXT.

## 6. EXPLANATION OF FOOTNOTES.

(1) RELATES TO PASSIVE QUOTA, WHICH IS NOT AGREED. SOVIETS ARE WITHHOLDING AGREEMENT ON ANY FIGURES NOT PREVIOUSLY AGREED UNTIL ALL FIGURES, AND PRIMARILY THRESHOLD FIGURES, ARE RESOLVED. THREE OR PERHAPS FOUR IS OUR GUESS FOR WHAT WOULD PROVE ACCEPTABLE, IN THE END, TO THE EAST.

(2) THIS IS ESSENTIALLY A PLACEHOLDER FOR LANGUAGE TO GO INTO A CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT ACCOMPANIED BY A STATEMENT IN THE JOURNAL OF THE DAY ENSURING THAT MEMBERS OF THE SAME ALLIANCE CAN'T EXHAUST EACH OTHERS' PASSIVE QUOTAS. LANGUAGE BASED ON THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT WILL BE EMPLOYED, NOT THE LANGUAGE CURRENTLY IN THIS PARAGRAPH, AND IT IS STILL UNDER NEGOTIATION. THE FRENCH HAVE BEEN PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT CONCERNING A REFERENCE TO "ALLIANCES" IN THIS CONTEXT, BUT THIS PROBLEM HAS BEEN RESOLVED.

(3) THE PARAGRAPHS REFERRED TO ARE THOSE WHICH RELATE TO THE QUOTA, INASMUCH AS ONCE THE QUOTAS HAVE BEEN EXHAUSTED, A REQUEST WILL NOT REQUIRE AFFIRMATIVE RESPONSE.

(4) THE SOVIETS WANT TO INCLUDE A SPECIFIC EXCEPTION IN THIS PARAGRAPH FOR RESTRICTED AREAS, EITHER WITH LANGUAGE ADDED SUCH AS "IN AREAS OPEN FOR INSPECTION," OR "EXCEPT FOR AREAS AS INDICATED IN PARAS ( )." WEST HAS REFUSED ANY LANGUAGE IN THIS PARAGRAPH WHICH CONTAINS THE NOTION OF EXCEPTION, BUT COULD ACCEPT SOME APPROPRIATE REFERENCE TO THE UNDERSTANDINGS REACHED ON SPECIFIED/RESTRICTED AREAS, SUCH AS ". . . WILL NOT

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PREVENT OR DELAY THE CONDUCT OF AN INSPECTION IN A SPECIFIED AREA AS DEFINED IN PARA ( )." THE SOVIETS HAVE, SO FAR, REFUSED TO BUDGE ON THIS ISSUE, BUT WE ANTICIPATE THAT AT THE END OF THE DAY THEY WILL ACCEPT SOME LANGUAGE ALONG THE LINES OF THAT PROPOSED BY THE WEST, WHICH DOES NOT CONTAIN THE SPECIFIC NOTION OF EXCEPTION.

(5) AGAIN, SOVIETS ARE NOT FILLING IN FIGURES. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT 24 HOURS FOR A REPLY TO A REQUEST, AND 36 HOURS FOR ENTERING THE TERRITORY OF THE RECEIVING STATE.

(6) THERE ARE TWO OUTSTANDING ISSUES IN THIS PARAGRAPH. FOR THE FIRST SET OF ELLIPSES, THE SOVIETS WANT SIMPLY THE WORD "INSPECTORS;" WEST WANTS TO ENSURE THAT IF DRIVERS AND CREW ENTER WITH THE INSPECTORS THEY ARE ALSO PROVIDED NECESSARY PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES AND HAS THUS PROPOSED INSERTING IN THESE ELLIPSES: "INSPECTORS (AND, IF APPLICABLE, AUXILLIARY PERSONNEL)." IN THE SECOND SET OF ELLIPSES THE EAST WANTS TO MAKE SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO WHAT WILL BE COVERED BY IMMUNITIES, I.E. INSPECTORS, EQUIPMENT, PERSONNEL OF THE INSPECTION TEAM, AND TO COVER THE NOTION OF WHAT IS INCLUDED IN AN INSPECTION TEAM. IN THEIR VIEW, THE TEAM IS INSPECTORS. OTHER ARE AUXILLIARY AND NOT INSPECTORS. WE ARE SEEKING A SOLUTION WHICH MAKES IT CLEAR THAT AUXILLIARY PERSONNEL ARE NOT INSPECTORS, BUT WILL BE PROVIDED WITH APPROPRIATE IMMUNITIES IF THEY ACCOMPANY THE INSPECTORS.

(7) "CAMERAS" IS BRACKETED BECAUSE BOTH THE NNA AND EAST WANT TO INDICATE WHAT KIND OF CAMERAS; WEST HAS RESISTED SUCH ATTEMPTS TO DEFINE CAMERAS BUT, IN ORDER TO GET CAMERAS AT ALL, MAY HAVE TO ACCEPT THE TERM "PHOTO CAMERAS" AT THE END OF THE DAY. THE SOVIETS HAVE INDICATED THAT THE LAST PHRASE IS ACCEPTABLE, BUT THEY HAVE LINKED ACCEPTANCE OF IT TO SATISFACTION ON CAMERAS.

(8) THE PARAGRAPH REFERENCE IS TO LANGUAGE ON SPECIFIED/RESTRICTED AREAS, TO ENSURE NO OVERFLIGHT OF RESTRICTED AREAS/SENSITIVE POINTS.

(9) THE EAST IS INSISTING ON LANGUAGE TO COVER THE INSPECTION EXPENSES. SWEDEN HAS PROPOSED INSERTING LANGUAGE IN THE ELLIPSES AS FOLLOWS: "AND COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE USE OF EQUIPMENT PROVIDED BY THE INSPECTING STATE," IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT THE INSPECTED STATE DOES NOT HAVE TO PAY FOR THINGS BROUGHT IN (OR PERHAPS LEASED) BY THE INSPECTING STATE. SOMETHING CONTAINING THE NOTION COVERED BY THE SWEDISH FIX WILL PROBABLY PROVE ACCEPTABLE TO THE WEST.

(10) ELLIPSES REFLECT AN EASTERN DESIRE TO INCLUDE A REFERENCE TO "CONSULTATIONS." EAST HAS CLEARLY LOST THE BATTLE TO INCLUDE ANYTHING MEANINGFUL ON CONSULTATIONS AND THE LANGUAGE PROPOSED IS CLEARLY A FACE-SAVING

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DEVICE ON THEIR PART AS IT SIMPLY STATES THE OBVIOUS, REFERRING ONLY TO BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS, NOT MULTILATERAL. LANGUAGE PROPOSED IS:  
"THE PARTICIPATING STATES ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT THEY MAY, IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXISTING DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE, CONSULT WITH EACH OTHER ON THE APPLICATION OF AGREED CSBMS." WEST HAS HELD FIRM AGAINST ANY SUCH LANGUAGE AND HAS INDICATED THAT IT DOES NOT BELIEVE ANYTHING SHOULD BE INSERTED INTO THE ELLIPSES. AS LONG AS THEY HAVE LANGUAGE ON CLARIFICATIONS, THE NNA HAVE ALSO GIVEN UP ON CONSULTATIONS AND ARE NO LONGER PUSHING FOR ANY CONSULTATION LANGUAGE; THEY HAVE INDICATED, HOWEVER, THEY COULD ACCEPT THIS PROPOSAL. WE BELIEVE THE FRENCH, AMONG THE MOST ARDENT OPPONENTS OF CONSULTATIONS, COULD ACCEPT THIS LANGUAGE. THE NORWEGIANS, ON THE OTHER HAND, WANT TO AVOID ANY LANGUAGE THAT SMACKS OF BILATERALISM IN A MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE EAST WILL CONTINUE TO INSIST ON SUCH LANGUAGE BUT DO NOT INTEND TO WITHHOLD CONSENSUS ON THIS LANGUAGE IF IT IS THE PRICE FOR AN AGREEMENT ON THIS SECTION.

7. COMMUNICATIONS. THE NNA (AND THE ROMANIANS) HAVE GIVEN UP ON A SPECIAL PROVISION FOR "RAPID" OR "DIRECT" MEANS OF COMMUNICATIONS. AND, IN OUR JUDGEMENT, AS INDICATED IN SC.1/MEASURE 6, THE DOCUMENT, DESPITE ITS SIGNIFICANCE, WILL NOT WARRANT A SPECIAL COMMUNICATIONS MEASURE. THUS, COMMUNICATIONS LANGUAGE HAS BEEN REFLECTED WITHIN THE COMPLIANCE AND VERIFICATION AND ALL HAVE AGREED TO DISPENSE WITH A SPECIAL COMMUNICATIONS SECTION.

BARRY  
END OF MESSAGE

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S E C R E T STOCKHOLM 07505

SUBJECT: OPTIONS FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTIONS

REF: STOCKHOLM 7455

1. I WOULD LIKE TO REITERATE THAT I DO NOT, REPEAT NOT, FAVOR THE IMMEDIATE TRANSITION TO CDE II FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTIONS. I SEE NO REASON WHY WE SHOULD BE MORE EAGER THAN THE EUROPEANS TO JUMP INTO THIS PARTICULAR FIRE. LET'S DIGEST AND IMPROVE WHAT WE HAVE DONE HERE IN CDE I B AND NEGOTIATE THE MANDATE FOR CDE II AT THE POST-VIENNA REVCON.

2. LAST MINUTE PROBLEMS WITH THE FRENCH (AND THE NNA) OVER ISSUES OF ALLIANCE MEMBERSHIP, ETC. CAST SOME DOUBT ON THE SUITABILITY OF CDE AS AN ARMS REDUCTION FORUM. IN PARTICULAR I NOW WONDER WHETHER A TWO-CHAMBER ARRANGEMENT IS POSSIBLE. BUT HOWEVER TROUBLESOME THE FRENCH HAVE BEEN ON PROCEDURAL ISSUES, THEY HAVE STUCK WITH US ON SUBSTANCE - EVEN WHEN OUR VIEWS CONTRADICTED THEIR NATIONAL POSITION.

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END OF MESSAGE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STOCKHOLM 07587  
SUBJECT: SWEDISH REACTION TO CDE AGREEMENT  
REF: STOCKHOLM 6838 (NOTAL)

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1. (C) SUMMARY: THE CDE AGREEMENT REACHED IN STOCKHOLM HAS DRAWN MIXED REVIEWS FROM SWEDISH POLITICAL FIGURES. FOREIGN MINISTRY AND DEFENSE STAFF OFFICIALS HAVE ENDORSED THE AGREEMENT. BUT OPPOSITION POLITICAL SPOKESMEN HAVE INDICATED RESERVATIONS AND CALLED FOR A CAREFUL ANALYSIS OF THE MILITARY CONSEQUENCES FOR SWEDEN. CONCERNS OVER THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE NOTIFICATION AND INSPECTION PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT HAD SURFACED PREVIOUSLY (REFTEL). IN THE END, HOWEVER, FURTHER DISCUSSIONS IN THE CDE AND SWEDISH UNWILLINGNESS TO BECOME AN OBSTACLE TO REACHING AGREEMENT ON AN ARMS CONTROL ISSUE OVERCAME ANY LINGERING DOUBTS ABOUT NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF THE AGREEMENT. END SUMMARY.
  2. (U) THE CDE AGREEMENT REACHED IN STOCKHOLM HAS DRAWN MIXED PUBLIC RESPONSES FROM SWEDISH POLITICAL LEADERS. FOREIGN MINISTER STEN ANDERSSON IN A SPEECH TO THE CONCLUDING SESSION OF THE CDE SAID THAT THE GOS WAS "VERY SATISFIED" WITH THE SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME OF THE CONFERENCE. ACCORDING TO PRESS ACCOUNTS, SOURCES IN THE SWEDISH DELEGATION ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE HAD BEEN DOUBTS OVER THE AGREEMENT'S INSPECTION PROVISIONS, BUT THESE SOURCES SAID THAT THE GOS HAD DETERMINED THAT THE AGREEMENT WOULD NOT CAUSE PROBLEMS, EITHER POLITICAL OR MILITARY, FOR SWEDEN. MFA UNDERSECRETARY PIERRE SCHORI EMPHASIZED HIS FIRM CONVICTION THAT THE AGREEMENT WAS A GOOD AND DESIRABLE ONE.
  3. (U) A SPOKESMAN FOR THE DEFENSE STAFF, COL. BERTIL JOHANSSON, ALSO ENDORSED THE CDE AGREEMENT, NOTING THAT IT WAS AN ADVANCE OVER PROVISIONS OF THE HELSINKI AGREEMENT. HE SAID THAT THE MILITARY HAVE LONG HELD THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF INSPECTIONS IS NECESSARY, EVEN IF UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS, THIS MIGHT CREATE DIFFICULTIES FOR SWEDEN.
  4. (U) SWEDISH OPPOSITION SPOKESMEN WERE MORE AMBIGUOUS. MODERATE PARTY LEADER CARL BILDT WELCOMED THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE CDE CONFERENCE AND STATED THAT IT WAS PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT THAT THE SOVIETS HAD AGREED TO PERMIT ONSITE CHALLENGE INSPECTION. HOWEVER, HE NOTED THAT UNDER THE AGREEMENT THE SOVIETS COULD DEMAND TO CONDUCT AN INSPECTION ON SWEDISH TERRITORY, WHILE, AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, SWEDEN WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO CONDUCT INSPECTIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION, SINCE NATO WOULD NO DOUBT USE UP THE LIMITED NUMBER THE SOVIETS ARE OBLIGATED TO ACCEPT. BILDT SAID THAT THE SWEDISH AUTHORITIES WOULD NEED TO CAREFULLY CONSIDER THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE AGREEMENT FOR SWEDEN. BILDT'S CALL FOR A CAREFUL REVIEW OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE CDE AGREEMENT WAS ECHOED BY

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LIBERAL PARTY MP INGEMAR ELIASSON AND CENTER PARTY DEFENSE EXPERT GUNNAR BJORK.

5. (C) AS NOTED REFTTEL, AMBASSADOR EARLIER RAISED SWEDISH CONCERNS WITH MFA UNDERSECRETARY ELIASSON. IN A LATER CONVERSATION, AMBASSADOR HAD ALSO DISCUSSED THIS ISSUE WITH MODERATE LEADER CARL BILDT EMPHASIZING U.S. INTEREST IN REACHING AN AGREEMENT THAT WOULD SERVE BROAD WESTERN INTERESTS AND NOT UNDULY ADVERSELY AFFECT ANY FRIENDLY COUNTRY. WE KNOW THAT BILDT LATER DISCUSSED THE MATTER WITH SUPREME COMMANDER GENERAL LJUNG AND BILDT DID NOT MAKE ANY PUBLIC OBJECTIONS TO THE AGREEMENT AS THE CDE STRUGGLED TO REACH A FINAL COMPROMISE.

6. (C) COMMENT: WE WOULD HAVE BEEN VERY SURPRISED IF THE GOS HAD STUCK TO A HARD LINE POSITION THAT MIGHT HAVE JEOPARDIZED REACHING A CDE AGREEMENT. IN VIEW OF SWEDEN'S PUBLIC IMAGE (AND ITS SELF-PERCEPTION) AS A STRONG ADVOCATE FOR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN POLITICALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR SWEDEN TO STAND IN THE WAY OF AN AGREEMENT. NEVERTHELESS, SWEDEN'S SERIOUS HARD LOOK AT HOW THE CDE AGREEMENT WOULD AFFECT ITS NATIONAL INTERESTS REFLECTS A SERIOUS CONCERN FOR SECURITY ISSUES THAT IS SOMETIMES LACKING IN SWEDISH POLITICAL PRONOUNCEMENTS OR ARMS CONTROL ISSUES. END COMMENT. NEWELL  
END OF MESSAGE

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UNCLAS STOCKHOLM 07640

SUBJ: AMB. BARRY SPEECH TO CHATHAM HOUSE (09/25/86)  
 1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE SPEECH AMBASSADOR ROBERT L. BARRY, HEAD OF US DELEGATION TO THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT (CDE) WILL GIVE TO THE ROYAL INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AT CHATHAM HOUSE (LONDON) THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 25.  
 2. FOR LONDON, IF AMB. BARRY MAKES LAST MINUTE CHANGES, PLEASE ADVISE P/PFE, MARIE KOENIG (202) 485-2112 IN TIME TO MAKE CORRECTIONS IN WIRELESS FILE COPY. EUR/P SHOULD ALSO BE INFORMED.  
 FOR P/PFE: REQUEST TEXT BE CARRIED IN THURSDAY FILE, TO APPEAR FRIDAY.  
 FOR EUR/P: REQUEST THIS SPEECH BE GIVEN WIDEST DISTRIBUTION THROUGH DEPARTMENT PUBLICATION OR OTHERWISE.

3. BEGIN TEXT: TITLE: THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE.  
 THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE-AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE, CDE, HAS JUST COMPLETED ITS WORK SUCCESSFULLY. I CAN THINK OF NO MORE APPROPRIATE PLACE TO DISCUSS THE CONFERENCE, ITS OUTCOME AND IMPLICATIONS THAN HERE IN LONDON. THE HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT PLAYED A LEADING ROLE IN FORMULATING AND MAINTAINING THE WESTERN POSITION, AND, UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF AMBASSADOR MICHAEL EDES, THE BRITISH DELEGATION AT THE CONFERENCE WAS A STRONG FORCE IN ACHIEVING THE POSITIVE RESULT.  
 THE UNITED STATES IS SATISFIED WITH THAT RESULT; THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT IS A GOOD ACCORD WHICH SHOULD CONTRIBUTE TO STABILITY AND HELP TO REDUCE THE RISK OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE. THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING REGIME ESTABLISHED EXTENDS THE CONCEPT OF OPENNESS IN MILITARY AFFAIRS AND ADVANCES THE BROADER PRINCIPLE, EMBODIED IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, THAT RELATIONS AMONG STATES -- BETWEEN EAST AND WEST -- SHOULD BE BASED UPON COOPERATION AND DIALOGUE AND NOT ON CONFRONTATION.

THE STOCKHOLM REGIME IS NOT PERFECT, AND MUCH MORE CAN USEFULLY BE DONE IN THE AREA OF CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES. BUT STOCKHOLM IS AN IMPORTANT STEP TOWARD A MORE PREDICTABLE AND SECURE EUROPEAN MILITARY SITUATION AND TOWARD CREATION OF THE ATMOSPHERE OF GREATER CONFIDENCE NECESSARY FOR CONSIDERATION OF MORE FAR-REACHING MEASURES OF ARMS CONTROL.

WHAT STOCKHOLM ACHIEVED  
 WHEN THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE BEGAN IN JANUARY, 1984, THE WEST HAD A CLEAR IDEA OF WHAT IT WANTED TO

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ACHIEVE: SPECIFICALLY, WE SOUGHT CONCRETE MEASURES WHICH WOULD INCREASE COMMON UNDERSTANDING ABOUT THE PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF ALL SIGNIFICANT MILITARY ACTIVITIES TAKING PLACE IN EUROPE; THUS, WE SOUGHT TO REDUCE THE RISK THAT A MISCALCULATION OR MISINTERPRETATION ABOUT THE NATURE OF THOSE ACTIVITIES COULD SET OFF THE ESCALATING CHAIN OF EVENTS WHICH, UNCHECKED, MIGHT LEAD TO WAR. TO MEET THAT GOAL, WE PROPOSED SPECIFIC MEASURES CALLING FOR AN EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION, THE FORECAST, NOTIFICATION AND OBSERVATION OF MILITARY EXERCISES, AND INSPECTION FOR VERIFICATION. TO A LARGE DEGREE, THE STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT REFLECTS EXACTLY THESE MEASURES, WHICH ALSO REPRESENT THE APPROACH SUPPORTED BY THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED STATES IN THE CONFERENCE. THE EASTERN STATES IN STOCKHOLM, ON THE OTHER HAND, INITIALLY SOUGHT TO FOCUS DISCUSSION ON PURELY DECLARATORY PROPOSALS WHICH HAD MADE UP THE POLITICAL AGENDA THEY HAD BEEN AIMING AT WESTERN EUROPE, IN SOME CASES FOR YEARS. THEIR TACTICS SEEMED INTENDED MORE TO DIVIDE THE WESTERN ALLIANCE, FOR EXAMPLE, ON THE ISSUE OF INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES, THAN TO ADVANCE SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS. ALTHOUGH THE EAST'S APPROACH FOUND NO SUPPORT IN THE CONFERENCE AND THEIR PROPOSALS EVENTUALLY WITHERED AWAY, THIS OPENING DIVERSIONARY TACTIC COST THE NEGOTIATION MANY MONTHS. ONE RESULT IS THAT WE REACHED FINAL AGREEMENT ONLY LAST FRIDAY, RATHER THAN A YEAR AGO AS THE WEST HAD HOPED TO DO AT ONE TIME. WE HAVE NOT ACTUALLY IMPLEMENTED THE MEASURES ADOPTED; WE STILL HAVE NO PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE WITH THEM TO GUIDE US ON THE NEXT STEPS.

NEVERTHELESS, THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE IS CONSIDERABLE. THIRTY-FIVE NATIONS HAVE MADE THE POLITICALLY BINDING COMMITMENT TO ANNOUNCE, FAR IN ADVANCE, SCHEDULES AND OTHER INFORMATION ABOUT THE PURPOSE, SCOPE AND LOCATION OF THEIR MILITARY ACTIVITIES. THIS FIRMLY ESTABLISHES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THE PRINCIPLE THAT STATES SHOULD KNOW WHAT OTHER STATES ARE DOING AND PLANNING TO DO IN THE MILITARY FIELD. IN PRACTICE, IT SHOULD ALSO ESTABLISH A NORM, AN ACCEPTED STANDARD OF ROUTINE TRAINING AND EXERCISES, WHICH SHOULD HAVE A STABILIZING EFFECT ON RELATIONS AMONG POTENTIAL ADVERSARIES. WITH A COMMON CALENDAR OF EVENTS, IN SOME CASES PROJECTED TWO YEARS AHEAD, MILITARY COMMANDERS WILL HAVE A BETTER IDEA OF WHAT TO EXPECT OF OTHERS; IT WILL BE EASY TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN LARGE, PRE-PLANNED EXERCISES, TO WHICH NO SPECIAL RESPONSE IS REQUIRED, AND UNANNOUNCED ACTIVITIES, WHICH COULD REQUIRE COUNTER-MEASURES. FOR EXAMPLE, IF A STATE CONCENTRATED ITS FORCES ON THE

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BORDER OF ANOTHER STATE FOR PURPOSES OF POLITICAL INTIMIDATION, IT WOULD BE IN CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE STOCKHOLM AGREEMENT AND WOULD PAY A HEAVY POLITICAL PRICE.

THE STOCKHOLM CONFIDENCE-BUILDING REGIME WILL NOT PREVENT DETERMINED AGGRESSION OR RULE OUT THE USE OF FORCE FOR POLITICAL INTIMIDATION. BUT IT WILL GREATLY REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF THE "UNWANTED" OR ACCIDENTAL WAR, AND IT WILL GREATLY RAISE THE POLITICAL COST FOR A STATE TRYING TO INTIMIDATE ANOTHER THROUGH MILITARY MEANS.

STOCKHOLM ADVANCES HELSINKI

IN EVALUATING THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFIDENCE-BUILDING REGIME, A GOOD PERSPECTIVE IS GAINED BY COMPARING IT WITH THE MODEST CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT OF 1975. THE MEASURES ADOPTED IN STOCKHOLM ARE, IN FACT, QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS OVER THE HELSINKI MEASURES.

- FIRST THEY ARE MANDATORY, POLITICALLY BINDING, WHEREAS HELSINKI WAS VOLUNTARY; THUS, THE STOCKHOLM MEASURES ARE CONCRETE COMMITMENTS TO ACTIONS, NOT SYMBOLIC GESTURES.

- SECOND, THE STOCKHOLM MEASURES COVER THE WHOLE OF EUROPE, FOR THE FIRST TIME TREATING THE ENTIRE REGION AS ONE ENTITY WITH INTERRELATED SECURITY CONCERNS; HELSINKI EXEMPTED MOST OF THE SOVIET TERRITORY IN EUROPE.

- THIRD, THE STOCKHOLM MEASURES ARE VERIFIABLE, A PREREQUISITE OF REAL CONFIDENCE-BUILDING; IN KEEPING WITH ITS VOLUNTARY CHARACTER, THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT CONTAINED NO PROVISIONS FOR VERIFICATION.

- AND FOURTH, THE STOCKHOLM MEASURES COVER ALL SIGNIFICANT MILITARY ACTIVITIES GOING ON IN EUROPE; HELSINKI COVERED ONLY "MAJOR MANEUVERS." THE LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING ACTIVITY UNDER STOCKHOLM WILL BE MUCH GREATER AND, PRESUMABLY, THE LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE WILL BE AS WELL.

IN SHORT, THE STOCKHOLM MEASURES HAVE TURNED THE CONCEPT OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES CONTAINED IN THE FINAL ACT INTO A PRACTICAL SYSTEM TO OPERATE IN THE REAL WORLD OF MILITARY AFFAIRS.

IMPLICATIONS

THE NEXT STEP, OF COURSE, WILL BE IMPLEMENTATION. WE ARE HOPEFUL THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STOCKHOLM REGIME WILL LIVE UP TO ITS POTENTIAL FOR REDUCING SUSPICIONS AND BUILDING CONFIDENCE; IT IS NOW UP TO ALL PARTIES TO CARRY OUT THEIR NEW COMMITMENTS FULLY. THAT IS NOT TO QUESTION THE GOOD FAITH OF ANY PARTICIPATING STATE IN UNDERTAKING THESE OBLIGATIONS; BUT WE ARE BREAKING NEW GROUND, AND, NATURALLY, WE ALL

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-- THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED STATES AND THE EAST, AS WELL AS THE WEST -- WILL BE WATCHING CAREFULLY TO SEE HOW THE MEASURES ADOPTED WORK OUT IN PRACTICE. IF IMPLEMENTATION GOES SMOOTHLY, WE SHOULD EXPLORE WAYS TO DEVELOP CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-MEASURES FURTHER TO INCREASE THEIR STABILIZING EFFECT. FROM STOCKHOLM, WE ALREADY SEE SEVERAL KEY AREAS WHERE IMPROVEMENT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE. FIRST AND FOREMOST, WE SHOULD WORK TO EXPAND THE COMMITMENT TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION ABOUT MILITARY FORCE STRUCTURES AND LOCATIONS IN EUROPE. STOCKHOLM WAS DISAPPOINTING IN THIS REGARD; THE EAST REFUSED TO MAKE THE COMMITMENT TO PROVIDE EVEN THE KIND OF INFORMATION THE WEST HAS ROUTINELY INCLUDED IN ITS NOTIFICATIONS UNDER THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT SINCE 1975 -- THE DESIGNATION OF UNITS PARTICIPATING IN EXERCISES. QUESTIONS OF WHAT FORCES ARE ACTUALLY IN EUROPE AND WHERE THEY ARE -- THE INFAMOUS "DATA ISSUE" -- HAVE TIED UP THE CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTION TALKS IN VIENNA FOR THIRTEEN YEARS. PROGRESS ON THIS ISSUE IN ANY CONTINUATION OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE SEEMS TO US ESSENTIAL IF THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING PROCESS IS TO ADVANCE AND, CERTAINLY, IF WE ARE TO CONSIDER NEW EFFORTS OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTIONS. THE ANNUAL CALENDAR, FORECASTING MILITARY ACTIVITIES A YEAR OR MORE AHEAD, COULD BE THE MOST IMPORTANT OF ALL THE MEASURES ADOPTED IN STOCKHOLM. WE SHOULD ESPECIALLY TRY TO DEVELOP THE CALENDAR'S STABILIZING EFFECT BY MAKING IT NOT JUST DESCRIPTIVE IN ANNOUNCING WHAT IS PLANNED TO HAPPEN BUT PROSCRIPTIVE IN LIMITING WHAT IS ALLOWED TO HAPPEN. I BELIEVE THAT THE VALUE OF PROHIBITING MILITARY ACTIVITIES WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN ANNOUNCED TWO YEARS IN ADVANCE, A LOGICAL ELABORATION OF A WESTERN PROPOSAL IN STOCKHOLM, IS SELF-EVIDENT. THE ALLIANCE CONTINUES TO EXPLORE THE WHOLE RELATED AREA OF CONSTRAINTS, CEILINGS AND LIMITATIONS ON THE SIZE AND SCOPE OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES. WE HAVE NOT FOUND A CONSTRAINT WHICH WOULD AFFECT ALL PARTIES EQUALLY AND WOULD NOT PENALIZE A DEFENDER MORE THAN AN AGGRESSOR. BUT WE RECOGNIZE THE POTENTIAL VALUE OF SUCH MEASURES AND CONTINUE OUR STUDY. THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE, THUS, HAS TAKEN AN IMPORTANT FIRST STEP TOWARD ESTABLISHING THE VIABILITY OF CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AS ARMS CONTROL INSTRUMENTS; IT HAS OPENED UP A PROCESS POTENTIALLY AS IMPORTANT AS ARMS REDUCTION EFFORTS IT IS DESIGNED TO COMPLEMENT AND SUPPORT. BUT STOCKHOLM ALSO PROVIDES CAUTIONARY LESSONS. CONTINUED EASTERN RESISTANCE TO EXCHANGING MILITARY INFORMATION AND ESTABLISHING A DATA BASE ABOUT FORCES IS AN OBVIOUS AND SERIOUS OBSTACLE TO MORE AMBITIOUS

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EFFORTS. SECONDLY, AND RELATED TO THE CONCEPT OF OPENNESS, IS THE WHOLE ISSUE OF VERIFICATION. STOCKHOLM MADE AN HISTORIC BREAKTHROUGH IN ACCEPTING INSPECTION AND THE PRINCIPLE THAT A STATE WITH DOUBTS ABOUT THE INTENTION BEHIND MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF ANOTHER STATE CAN GO INTO THAT OTHER STATE AND SEE FOR ITSELF WHAT IS GOING ON. WE HAVE A CHANCE TO TEST THE REAL EFFECTIVENESS OF INSPECTION IN PRACTICE. BUT THE INSPECTION REGIME FROM STOCKHOLM IS RELATIVELY MODEST AND UNINTRUSIVE. INSPECTION MEASURES ADEQUATE FOR VERIFYING AN ARMS REDUCTION AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE MUCH MORE DEMANDING. THEY WOULD REQUIRE ACCESS FOR INSPECTORS TO SENSITIVE INSTALLATIONS, SUCH AS DEFENSE PLANTS, GARRISONS AND WEAPONS DEPOTS, NOT JUST TO ACTIVITIES TAKING PLACE IN THE FIELD. THE NEGOTIATIONS ON INSPECTION IN STOCKHOLM WERE VERY, VERY DIFFICULT, BUT THEY WERE A BREEZE COMPARED WITH NEGOTIATIONS OF MEASURES NEEDED FOR VERIFICATION OF ARMS REDUCTION.

A FURTHER CAUTION FROM STOCKHOLM IS FOUND IN WHAT I MIGHT CALL THE "NEUTRAL DILEMMA." THE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS OF NEUTRAL STATES WHICH DEPEND UPON MOBILIZATION OF CIVILIANS ARE VERY DIFFERENT FROM THOSE OF ALLIANCES WITH STANDING ARMIES. NEGOTIATING AGREEMENTS WHICH AFFECT STATES WITH SUCH DIFFERENT SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS, NEEDS AND COMMITMENTS IS AN EXTREMELY COMPLEX TASK. ONE REASON STOCKHOLM SUCCEEDED IN MEETING THOSE DIVERSE NEEDS OF THIRTY-FIVE STATES IS THAT THE MANDATE FOR THE CONFERENCE WAS LIMITED AND PRECISE. ANY FUTURE EFFORTS ON A EUROPEAN-WIDE BASIS MUST TAKE CARE TO START WITH INSTRUCTIONS WHICH ARE EQUALLY CLEAR, CONCRETE AND ACHIEVABLE AND WHICH TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE PECULIAR SECURITY NEEDS OF THOSE NOT AFFILIATED WITH ALLIANCES.

EVEN AS WE IMPLEMENT THE STOCKHOLM MEASURES AND SEEK WAYS TO STRENGTHEN AND EXPAND THEM, WE WILL SEEK WAYS TO APPLY THE LESSONS OF STOCKHOLM TO THE QUESTIONS OF REDUCTIONS OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE. AS YOU KNOW, THE HIGH-LEVEL TASK FORCE IN NATO IS STUDYING THE WHOLE ISSUE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTIONS. THE UNITED STATES STRONGLY SUPPORTS THE OBJECTIVE OF REDUCING CONVENTIONAL FORCES, AS WE HAVE DEMONSTRATED THROUGH OUR PARTICIPATION WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM AND OTHERS IN THE VIENNA MBFR TALKS. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, ALL THESE SECURITY ISSUES ARE INTERCONNECTED; PROGRESS IN ONE AREA CAN HELP OPEN THE WAY TO PROGRESS IN ANOTHER. BECAUSE ARMS REDUCTION TALKS NEED A STABLE ENVIRONMENT IN ORDER TO PROCEED, CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES WHICH LEAD GREATER OPENNESS AND UNDERSTANDING AMONG STATES INVOLVED, AND THUS TO GREATER STABILITY, SHOULD HAVE A

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KEY ROLE TO PLAY. THE LESSONS FROM STOCKHOLM SHOULD BE INVALUABLE AS WE DECIDE WHERE TO GO NEXT.

BEYOND MILITARY SECURITY

SUCCESS IN STOCKHOLM COMES AT A TIME WHEN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP, IN PARTICULAR GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV, IS ADVOCATING GREATER OPENNESS IN SOVIET AFFAIRS, AS WELL AS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. IF STOCKHOLM REPRESENTS THE BEGINNING OF A REAL CHANGE IN SOVIET THINKING -- A "STRATEGIC SHIFT," AS ONE COLLEAGUE RECENTLY TERMED IT -- WE COULD HAVE BEFORE US AN OPPORTUNITY, UNPRECEDENTED FOR MANY DECADES, TO IMPROVE THE EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP, EVENTUALLY PERHAPS REESTABLISH IT ON A NEW, MORE CONSTRUCTIVE BASIS. THIS GREATER OBJECTIVE HAS, ULTIMATELY, PROVIDED THE FUNDAMENTAL BASIS FOR PARTICIPATION OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE AND IN THE HELSINKI CSCE PROCESS TO WHICH IT BELONGS. AS SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ SAID IN HIS ADDRESS TO THE OPENING OF THE CONFERENCE, "THE HELSINKI PROCESS IS AN HISTORIC, PEACEFUL EFFORT TO EASE, AND IN TIME TO END, THE DIVISION OF EUROPE. CONFIDENCE-BUILDING IN THE LARGER SENSE MEANS PURSUING THE WORK OF HELSINKI -- THROUGH PRACTICAL STEPS TO BREAK DOWN BARRIERS, EXPAND HUMAN CONTACT AND INTELLECTUAL INTERCHANGE, INCREASE OPENNESS AND STRETCH THE BOUNDARIES OF THE HUMAN SPIRIT." IF THE SOVIET UNION INTENDS TO ADOPT A NEW POLICY OF GLASNOST -- OPENNESS -- STOCKHOLM COULD GIVE AN IMPORTANT IMPULSE TO THE WHOLE HELSINKI PROCESS. THAT IS CERTAINLY THE HOPE OF THE UNITED STATES; WHEN THE RESULTS OF STOCKHOLM BECAME KNOWN, PRESIDENT REAGAN ISSUED A STATEMENT IN WHICH HE SAID: "I WELCOME THIS POSITIVE OUTCOME AT THE CDE CONFERENCE. IT WILL CONTRIBUTE TO GREATER SECURITY IN EUROPE AND TO IMPROVED EAST-WEST RELATIONS. THIS ALSO SENDS MESSAGES THAT SHOULD BE WELCOMED BY PEOPLE THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. IT DEMONSTRATES THAT EAST AND WEST, WITH SERIOUSNESS OF PURPOSE AND HARD WORK, CAN ESTABLISH COMMON GROUND ON WHICH TO BUILD A MORE SECURE FUTURE." IN HIS STATEMENT, THE PRESIDENT AGAIN UNDERLINED THE NECESSARY CONNECTION BETWEEN THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE AND ITS PARENT, THE HELSINKI CSCE PROCESS. "THIS CDE ACCORD CAN ALSO CONTRIBUTE TO PROGRESS IN THE BROADER HELSINKI CSCE PROCESS," HE SAID. "THE ACCORD ACHIEVED AT STOCKHOLM ON SECURITY ISSUES MAKES ALL THE MORE IMPERATIVE BALANCED PROGRESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS. AT THE VIENNA CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING, WHICH BEGINS IN NOVEMBER, THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION WILL PRESS FOR FULFILLMENT OF ALL CSCE COMMITMENTS AND FOR BALANCED PROGRESS ACROSS THE FULL CSCE AGENDA."

THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE HAS MOVED THE SECURITY AREA

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OF THE HELSINKI PROCESS A SIGNIFICANT STEP FORWARD. THE STOCKHOLM MEASURES ARE VALUABLE IN THEMSELVES, AND THEY WILL BE IMPLEMENTED. OTHER AREAS OF THE HELSINKI PROCESS, HAVE NOT PROGRESSED; SOME, NOTABLY HUMAN RIGHTS, HAVE MOVED BACKWARDS. IN THE VIENNA CSCE REVIEW MEETING, THE UNITED STATES WILL EVALUATE THE ACHIEVEMENT OF STOCKHOLM IN THE CONTEXT OF THE EASTERN FAILURE TO LIVE UP TO ALL THE COMMITMENTS UNDERTAKEN IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, INCLUDING HUMAN RIGHTS. THE QUESTION OF BALANCE AMONG ALL TEN PRINCIPLES OF THE FINAL ACT WILL WEIGH HEAVILY IN OUR JUDGMENT AS WE DECIDE HOW THE CSCE PROCESS SHOULD PROCEED AFTER VIENNA. THAT IS NOT A QUESTION OF ARRANGING MORE MEETINGS SPREAD EVENLY AMONG VARIOUS SUBJECTS OF CONCERN TO VARIOUS PARTICIPANTS. IT IS A QUESTION OF MAINTAINING THE CREDIBILITY OF CSCE AS AN ORGANIC WHOLE. THE STOCKHOLM REGIME MAY FUNCTION, BUT THE VIABILITY OF A SECURITY ARRANGEMENT WHICH DEPENDS ON OPENNESS -- ON MUTUAL CONFIDENCE -- REMAINS TENTATIVE IF PARTICIPANTS CONTINUE TO OPPOSE OPENNESS, HUMAN CONTACTS, TRAVEL AND COMMUNICATION AMONG THE CITIZENS OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES.

I WOULD EMPHASIZE, IN THIS REGARD, THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH THE UNITED STATES VIEWS THE ARREST IN MOSCOW OF THE AMERICAN JOURNALIST NICHOLAS DANILOFF ON TRUMPED UP CHARGES. THIS ONE ACT, WHICH FLIES IN THE FACE OF EVERYTHING THE HELSINKI PROCESS STANDS FOR, MUST RAISE DOUBTS IN ALL OUR MINDS ABOUT SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO TAKE THE OBLIGATIONS OF HELSINKI -- INDEED, THE OBLIGATIONS OF STOCKHOLM -- SERIOUSLY. THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTED THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE FROM ITS INCEPTION TO ITS END. WE WORKED WITH OUR ALLIES FOR A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION, AND WE TAKE SATISFACTION IN THE RESULT, NOT LEAST BECAUSE IT WAS AN ACHIEVEMENT OF THE ALLIANCE NOT JUST OF INDIVIDUAL STATES. NATO HAD SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES, FULLY DEVELOPED AND CLEARLY ARTICULATED, AT THE VERY BEGINNING OF THE CONFERENCE, AND WE STUCK TOGETHER IN WORKING CONSISTENTLY TO SEE THAT WE ACCOMPLISHED THEM. IN THIS WAY, TOO, STOCKHOLM HOLDS LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE: A COHERENT, UNIFIED ALLIANCE POSITION ESTABLISHED AT THE VERY BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATIONS AND MAINTAINED CAN LEAD TO SUCCESS EVEN ON HIGHLY COMPLEX, MULTILATERAL SECURITY ISSUES. QUITE SIMPLY, I BELIEVE STOCKHOLM WOULD NEVER HAVE REACHED THE POSITIVE OUTCOME IT DID IF THE ALLIANCE HAD NOT WORKED SO WELL TOGETHER. THE ADJOURNMENT OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE IS NOT AN END. IT IS AN ADVANCE, AND IT OFFERS NEW POSSIBILITIES FOR EAST-WEST AFFAIRS. ALL THIRTY-FIVE STATES HAVE UNDERTAKEN FURTHER COMMITMENTS; WE MUST ALL LIVE UP TO THEM. WE HAVE ALSO CREATED NEW

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**OPPORTUNITIES; WE MUST ALL STRIVE NOW TO TAKE  
ADVANTAGE OF THEM. END TEXT.  
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END OF MESSAGE**

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