



Directorate of  
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and NATO Country Statements  
at the Geneva Conference on  
Disarmament (CD)  
4 June – 29 August 1986  
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**CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT**

CD/PV.374  
29 July 1986

ENGLISH

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**FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-FOURTH PLENARY MEETING**

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 29 July 1986, at 10.30 a.m.

President:

U Tin Tun

(Burma)

GE.86-63717/3907E



The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 374th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with the timetable of meetings for this week, the Conference starts today its consideration of item 6 on its agenda, entitled "Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons", and item 8 on its agenda entitled, "Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament". However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference may do so.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the Netherlands, Viet Nam and Australia. I now give the floor to the representative of the Netherlands, Ambassador Van Schaik.

Mr. Van SCHAIK (Netherlands): Mr. President, since this is the first time that I speak this month I wish to begin by expressing my appreciation and the appreciation of my delegation for the guidance you have given to our work this month. Perhaps we have not made major progress on the road towards greater security, but it has at least given us, delegates here, a sense of greater security knowing that at this Conference the Presidency is in good, trustworthy hands -- in the hands of you and your colleagues in your delegation who both, as representatives of your country and personally, we know are dedicated to the cause of disarmament. We also wish to thank Ambassador Tellalov of Bulgaria who presided over the Conference last month and whose skill and experience has been appreciated by my delegation -- he has ensured a smooth resumption of the annual session.

We were encouraged by the good news that the Soviet Union and the United States have started bilateral discussions at the expert level on test ban issues last Friday here in Geneva. We hope these talks will continue and soon pave the way for removing the obstacles that for long have prevented progress in this area, so essential for nuclear disarmament. We fervently hope that these talks will lead to agreement on terms enabling the two Governments to ratify the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974 and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) of 1976. We equally hope -- and this is of course very relevant for this Conference -- that further steps will seriously be considered to bring the goal of a comprehensive test-ban treaty closer to realization. It is against this background that I intend to devote a major part of my intervention to the test ban issue.

A nuclear-test ban continues to be considered by a great many countries as urgently required. For tens of years, pressing calls have been made in a wide variety of forums by many, both at the governmental and at the non-governmental level, in favour of the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

My country has in the past joined those calls and will continue to support any effort that may lead to a comprehensive test-ban treaty. A CTB, once established, would be a helpful tool in slowing down the qualitative improvement of the nuclear arsenals. It would, furthermore, set a most

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important example to other nations that possess -- or are on the verge of acquiring -- a nuclear explosive capability. More specifically, a CTB would bring fulfilment of the expectations raised in article VI of the NPT. Thus, a CTB would considerably enhance the non-proliferation régime.

In spite of such vigorous support from all quarters, a test ban has eluded us so far. Indeed, one could argue that these last two years the goal of a test ban is almost vanishing below the horizon. The Conference even did not agree to set up an appropriate mechanism to deal with the issue. Of course, this stagnation, unsatisfactory as it is in itself, is only a reflection of deep underlying divisions, touching the heart of the subject, the test ban.

In the course of the years, objections raised against a CTB have accumulated, together constituting a colourful variety of arguments. I shall not try to be exhaustive, but I intend to deal with the most important arguments. Of late, three arguments have been advanced in particular:

First, testing must be continued, in order to test new weapon designs and improved defences against incoming missiles and warheads; in other words, testing is crucial to modernization.

Second, testing is indispensable for those who wish to be assured of the reliability of weapons, once they are used.

Third, continuation of testing is necessary if one wants to maintain a nuclear-weapon testing and design capability and in particular a staff of highly qualified nuclear scientists.

Those who think that the time is not ripe yet for a test ban have forged together these arguments in the doctrine that testing is required as long as security is based on nuclear deterrence. On that basis, the test ban, in so many declarations and treaties considered to be only a first step -- symbolic and effective at the same time -- in the complex process of nuclear disarmament, would be reduced to a measure that eventually will be taken at the back end of the process. Let me, before dealing with another argument adduced in support of deferring a CTB, turn to the three I mentioned first.

Views differ on the value of nuclear testing for the purpose of modernization of the arsenals. Some maintain that substantive modernization can be achieved through micro-explosions or even non-explosive experiments with new designs at the laboratory scale. To the extent this is true, a test ban need not be rejected for the sake of modernization. Others, however, also at the official level, argue that modernization and testing are inseparable. The proponents of a test ban, of course, hope that modernization and testing are firmly linked, as the effect of a test ban would be all the more meaningful if such a ban slowed down the qualitative arms race. We believe that, whatever the merits of a whole range of other tests and experiments may be, nuclear tests certainly have importance. So we are not dealing with a non-problem.

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Would this result in a compelling case against a test ban? We do not think so. In today's world, where discrepancies in technological capacities have been reduced and continue to diminish, modernization cannot provide a party with a lasting and decisive advantage. As in other arms-control agreements, some opportunities to modernize weapons may have to be sacrificed. Far from wishing to return to an era of technology that we have long left behind us, we think that such sacrifices would rather lead us to a shift within and a reallocation of our modernization efforts.

The second argument is reliability testing. While few would dispute the technical merits of tests to check the reliability of a standard design type of weapon, the question remains as to how decisive these advantages are for the fate of the test ban. We consider a certain modest degree of uncertainty as to the actual functioning of a nuclear device not of decisive importance for the maintenance of the nuclear deterrence. Reliability testing will at best yield an indicative assurance of the functioning of the arsenal as a whole, in other words will not give absolute certainty to the party concerned. Apart from that, the reliability of weapons can be improved by changes in design that do not require resorting to testing. Changes in design can increase the reliability of weapons, without there being a need to resort to testing. Finally on this point, we are not aware of arguments presented by the nuclear-weapon States that reliability testing has in fact played a major role in their explosion programmes, or that it should do so in the future. Perhaps, the nuclear-weapon States, including those who in principle favour a comprehensive test ban, are willing to provide us with some relevant figures.

The third argument is that the nuclear scientific community would run dry if no tests were permitted. As a result, so it is said, the lead time for development of high-technology nuclear weapons would rise to unacceptable levels, taking into account that a country must remain prepared for a possible break-out of the nuclear disarmament process of the other party. Cutting off the road to testing may indeed induce some experts, voluntarily or otherwise, to seek employment in other fields, though not necessarily outside the nuclear-weapons laboratories.

Reversing the nuclear-arms race, breaking down nuclear weapons, shifting emphasis from offensive to defensive systems, all of which are now under serious consideration, may very likely have consequences -- and more far-reaching, I may say -- for the division of labour within nuclear-weapon States. As with forgoing certain modernization options this is very much a matter of choice and of allocation. The underlying assumption of any of the arms control approaches currently considered is that parties are prepared to pay the price of constraint, if "price" is the proper word.

We all are familiar with a fourth argument against a test ban, which is not related to the merits of a ban as such, but rather to the question whether and to what extent a test ban can be verified. In our view, verification is, of course, very important, even essential, but we should always be aware that it is only a means to an end: to ensure compliance with a treaty. Verification will, for technical reasons, seldom ensure compliance 100 per cent, whatever the subject of the agreement may be. In matters of

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disarmament, adequate verification means that, to the extent feasible, a verification régime must be established which will at least greatly reduce the number and the size of the loopholes through which a malevolent country may wish to wriggle.

In case a 100-per-cent assurance cannot be achieved, adequate verification may be defined as a level of verification beyond which the military advantage of successful cheating would be disproportionate to the political risk of being caught "red-handed".

It is, to say the least, not an easy task to define at what level of technology such "adequate" verification would be ensured. But let us not forget that, even if we have determined that level of technology, it requires another major step before technology is actually deployed, and this of course at considerable expense. The Ad Hoc Group of Seismic Experts, meeting again during these weeks, is undertaking the arduous work of designing an international seismic monitoring network and it has even initiated field testing. We hope agreement can be reached on communication techniques of a higher technological level to be introduced in this network.

National technical means of verification have tremendously improved over the past few years. Once progress is being made towards a CTB and if the political decisions are then taken to go ahead with the deployment of seismic measuring devices and the establishment of a corresponding institutional network, an "adequate" verification régime can certainly be designed. We assume that the identification and verification threshold can, in fact, be reduced to levels that will prove to be "adequate", acceptable, probably well below 1 kt.

In this context, the interesting statement made by Ambassador Issraelyan a week ago is relevant. We shall study his proposals carefully. But let me now say that we would welcome Soviet participation in work on the incorporation of the exchange of Level II data in the system.

To some extent we must in these verification matters rely on the adage that the proof of the pudding will be in the eating. We trust that, once the network can be tested on an operational basis, a satisfactory basis for the solution of the verification issue will be found, even if centred only on tests in the United States and the Soviet Union.

We took note with interest of the agreement reached between groups of American and Soviet scientists to install seismic monitoring equipment near a nuclear-test site in the Soviet Union. We understand this agreement is being implemented. The use of on-site instruments may reduce the threshold at which nuclear explosions are detected and identified and may yield data necessary for better calibration of instruments measuring the strength of such explosions.

While we do not consider the objections I referred to as convincing arguments against a CTB, they should, of course, be addressed seriously. An alternative approach, seemingly bypassing all those difficulties, has been to

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halt tests unilaterally, to declare a moratorium. A moratorium can, under appropriate circumstances, constitute a confidence-building step towards the conclusion of a verifiable agreement. With a unilateral moratorium a degree of self-restraint is demonstrated. We have, therefore, in itself appreciation for the moratorium that the Soviet Union announced a year ago, and has since that time extended till the beginning of next month. But the Soviet moratorium has in our view not been effective, to the extent that it did not provide us with an answer to the questions raised by the implementation of a verifiable test-ban treaty. It did not provide us with an answer to the arguments against a test ban, to which I referred earlier.

Unfortunately, past experience with moratoria, even applied by only three parties, has been that they ended in a breakaway, leading to an explosive outburst of new series of tests, rapidly making up for tests temporarily renounced. As a matter of fact, in August it will be 25 years ago that the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom ended a moratorium on nuclear tests, respected up to then, in a spectacular way and turned it into its reverse. We must conclude that moratoria can never be a substitute for a bilateral or a multilateral agreement on a comprehensive test ban, laying down the details of scope and verification.

The question with which we are faced is how to reconcile two positions. One is: "test ban first, disposal of nuclear arms later", and the other: "disposal of nuclear arms first, test ban later".

In the past, suggestions have been made at the Conference on interim measures, in particular on a threshold treaty. I do not now wish to enter into the merits and the drawbacks of the idea of a threshold treaty, but I wish to point out the risk that, if such a treaty were a multilateral treaty, open for accession by non-nuclear-weapon States, it might provide those countries with legal, or at least moral, arguments for taking up testing under the threshold level set by the treaty. Since a multilateral CTBT ought to strengthen the non-proliferation régime, we think countries should beware of interim régimes on a multilateral basis. A CTB should be truly comprehensive, including a ban on so-called peaceful nuclear explosions.

My authorities have reached the conclusion that any interim approach towards the goal of a multilateral CTB should involve only the States that are responsible for the bulk of nuclear test explosions. Such an interim approach should furthermore aim at meeting to the extent possible all objections that have thus far come to light.

It is with these considerations in mind that the Netherlands has reached the following conclusions on this point.

First, we wish to encourage the United States and the Soviet Union -- I repeat -- to continue the discussions on verification issues that have just started. These countries should, as soon as possible, reach agreement on terms that permit the ratification of the threshold treaties (TTBT and PNET). If the Soviet Union were to allow the United States to undertake some calibration measurements in the vicinity of relevant Soviet test sites, this

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will certainly be conducive to reaching such agreements. The President of the United States made an offer to the Soviet Union last year for Soviet scientists to acquaint themselves with the measuring techniques of the Corrtex type. We still hold the view that the Soviet leaders should positively respond to this offer, thus opening the door to the ratification of these treaties.

We are encouraged by the admission to the Soviet Union of a group of American seismologists, to which I referred earlier. We understand they have installed measuring devices near Semipalatinsk. Although these devices are far away (150 km) from the actual test site and it is not clear whether they will continue to function once the Soviet Union will resume its nuclear tests, we do hope this new event can be considered as signalling an encouraging change in the Soviet position on on-site inspection in general.

Second, we submit that, if the two major nuclear Powers were to agree progressively to reduce their nuclear arsenals, they should simultaneously and in relation to these reductions agree to reduce nuclear tests, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Such a formula dealing with nuclear tests would be a natural corollary of the bilateral arms control negotiations taking place elsewhere in this town. Our proposal links fewer nuclear weapons to fewer nuclear tests and, depending on the scope of the arms agreements, to no tests for new types of nuclear weapons.

I hasten to stress that an arrangement of this kind would in no way obviate the necessity of the speediest conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT). It would in no way affect the multilateral process either in the Conference or in the General Assembly or elsewhere.

The two major nuclear Powers could at any time make the qualitative jump to a CTBT. But, we think that the Conference should not wait for such a jump to be made. It is in fact high time that we agreed on the procedure to be pursued in order to start the necessary work. My delegation believes that the Western proposal (CD/521) provides an excellent basis for work to be resumed in this complex area and we hope that consultations on the basis of that text will in fact soon prove to be successful.

The Netherlands will continue its efforts for an early conclusion of a CTBT prohibiting all nuclear explosions for all times. Our proposals, our suggestions, today should be seen in that context.

Permit me now to make a few remarks on chemical weapons. Recently various speakers have observed that negotiations on chemical weapons have received a fresh impulse, but that the tempo at which the negotiations are conducted is still too low. We believe that, in fact, there is every reason to step up our efforts in order to achieve tangible results.

It may partly be a question of how quickly Governments react to new positions adopted by other delegations at this Conference. It would be of great importance if Governments not only showed more flexibility, but also showed that flexibility at the appropriate time. I may take as an example the

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very interesting statement made on 15 July by the British Minister of State, Mr. Renton, who indicated a new approach for the procedures to be followed in face of a request for challenge inspections. My Government, after careful study of this proposal, has reached the conclusion that this new proposal offers an appropriate basis for dealing with this thorny issue. Whereas the proposed provisions ensure stringent rules that do not permit a country to get away with a simple negative reaction to a request for challenge inspection, it at the same time also prevents challenge inspections becoming the rule. An inappropriate use of the challenge inspection clause, should be avoided, so as to ensure a balanced implementation of the treaty.

But whatever the final outcome of negotiations on this crucial issue in the negotiations may be, it is important that delegations, in particular those who have been most critical of positions previously taken, will offer their comments, adopt their own position within a reasonably brief time-frame.

In general, we think that both governments and delegations here in Geneva should become more time-conscious. Time is in this case perhaps our greatest enemy, because if we wait too long this can only lead to more proliferation of CW to more countries, to the production of more weapons and to a more widespread use of CW, such as we have been witness of in the Iraq-Iran war.

Since time is becoming such a precious, even essential, factor in our negotiations, we also think that we should deal more effectively with the time available between the end of the summer session and the beginning of the spring session in 1987. Ambassador Cromartie's efforts to find a generally acceptable formula for the inter-sessional consultations have our full support.

We also think it worth while to reconsider the structure of the CW negotiations in the future. In the first place, we believe that, if we really wish to do business, our time schedule should no longer be dependent on timing of conferences and meetings taking place elsewhere. I recognize that for some delegations it is difficult to cover at the same time the sessions of the First Committee and those of the Conference on Disarmament. However, a solution must be found for this dilemma, by permitting negotiators on CW to work the whole year around on CW only.

In the second place, I think that it is worth while to consider whether it is not appropriate to follow another rhythm in the negotiations, so as to be able to alternate negotiating rounds with periods of homework, in order to prepare instructions for the next round.

Mr. Renton suggested that we aim to present a complete chemical weapons convention to the United Nations General Assembly in 1987. I think 1987 is indeed a crucial year. If in 1987 we do not break the back of the problems, we run the risk that negotiations will be slipping. We would therefore be interested in a discussion now on the way we wish to organize our work next year.

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Recent contributions to the work of the Ad Hoc Committee from various delegations are a promising signal of the interest delegations take in the work on chemical weapons. I mention the very useful document CD/713, presented by Ambassador Imai of Japan, about quantitative aspects of a chemical weapons convention. The basic conclusion in this Paper, namely that in various chemical facilities verification can be assured by taking a surprisingly small number of random samples, is encouraging. It would mean that, according to this method, intrusiveness can be kept at a modest level.

The Working Papers from Norway submitted to the plenary as CD/702, CD/703 and CD/704 on the verification of alleged use of chemical weapons, are again proof of the long-standing high quality of the research conducted by Norway in this field.

The problem of chemical weapons production facilities was addressed in the statement of Ambassador Issraelyan on 22 April last. We consider this contribution as a modest but constructive step forward. We hope that other important aspects of this problem will receive also due attention.

We welcome the document presented by the United States on the chemical stockpile disposal problem (circulated under CD/711). This paper provides us with a great amount of interesting and hitherto unknown details about location and composition of chemical stockpiles in the United States. It would, indeed, be important if other countries will follow suit by providing us with information on the stocks located in their country.

Having said all this, allow me to take the opportunity to thank both the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee and the three Chairmen of the Working Groups for their untiring efforts to produce more substantive results at this year's sessions, possibly in treaty language. We certainly owe it to them that work is well under way for a rolling text of the draft convention, which will reflect the progress so far achieved.

My final words today are for my colleagues here around this table and others who have expressed their appreciation for the Chemical Weapons Workshop held in the Netherlands in June. With the commitment and enthusiasm that dominated this two-day seminar, the CW convention could be realized in a week's time. The Netherlands Government is very grateful for the kind words addressed to it in the aftermath of the Workshop. Let us hope that the spirit of commitment and goodwill that inspired the participants of the Workshop will find its expression at this Conference by early agreement on the relevant issues.

We have heard that some of our colleagues will soon leave this Conference. I shall not mention all their names because I hope there will still be an opportunity to say a few words to express our gratitude to some of them for their contribution and our co-operation with them. At this stage I only wish to mention the names of two of them.



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Ambassador Wegener will leave us. We shall, I am sure, all miss Ambassador Wegener's very interesting, thorough, often thought-provoking and inspiring contributions. On many occasions he has shown his deep insight in disarmament matters. I may, on this occasion also remind delegates of the role he played as President of the Disarmament Commission. In short, he has been one of the most prominent Ambassadors here at the Conference as well as a very good and dear colleague. We wish him very well in the very important new function he will assume in September.

Ambassador Gonsalves of India will also soon leave us because he has been called back to Delhi to assume an important responsibility in his own administration. Ambassador Gonsalves has, during the short time he has been here, shown a deep interest and insight in matters of disarmament. His sojourn here was too short for us, but we hope he will, in his future important function, remember us as we will remember him.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Netherlands for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

In accordance with the decision taken by the Conference at its 338th plenary meeting, I now give the floor to the representative of Viet Nam, Ambassador Nguyen Thuong.

Mr. NGUYEN THUONG (Viet Nam) (translated from French): Mr. President, may I first of all express my satisfaction at seeing the Conference presided over, in this month of July, by yourself, the esteemed representative of a friendly country, which supported Viet Nam throughout its long struggle for national liberation and with which my country is pleased to have excellent relations of good neighbourliness and co-operation. May I also express my profound esteem for your predecessor, Ambassador Tellalov of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, who so effectively presided over the Conference in the month of June, and whose talent and tact enabled us to settle very difficult issues for the best. In paying tribute to your Presidency in this month of July, I should like to also express the hope that the Presidency of the Ambassador of Canada in the month of August will consolidate the painstaking results achieved in the course of the 1986 session.

I am prompted to take the floor, under your guidance, on agenda item 8, the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, in particular by these words in your own statement of 22 April 1986: "The Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament is making some progress under the competent chairmanship of Ambassador García Robles of Mexico". In 1985, as noted in General Assembly resolution 40/152 D, despite intensive efforts, progress was very limited indeed. This is an indication of the complexity of the subject, and it will be no easy task to meet the deadline set by that resolution for the submission of the complete draft at the forty-first session, this year. To contribute to this important and urgent task, my delegation would like to share with the Conference on Disarmament some modest ideas and concerns which coincide with the thinking of many of its members, in particular the non-aligned countries.

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While it is a source of satisfaction that ultimately an incomplete draft (document CD/634) has been produced and that the questions which remain pending do not seem to be too many, we must also realize that they are among the most important and among the most urgent. With respect to objectives and priorities, two of the first chapters of the draft, agreement has been reached. However, many sets of brackets and reservations remain and still riddle the subsequent chapters of document CD/634, in particular, those entitled "Measures and Stages of Implementation" and "Other Measures".

Essentially we are appreciative of the text which is given in a footnote for eventual inclusion in the chapter on Machinery and Procedures. My delegation shares the view that the time set for attaining the objective of general and complete disarmament may reasonably be established as "by the year 2000", with a mid-term review and, if need be, readjustment of measures and deadlines. Within this time-frame, I think it is reasonable, in order to have an overview as regards both time and the interrelationship of the various weapons, not to stop at the first phase, which would overlap with the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament of 1978, but further to elaborate the two subsequent stages, the intermediate and final stages. Such a presentation, which would be in keeping with the global nature of the Programme and the objective of general and complete disarmament, will have the great advantage of ensuring that at each phase and stage the principles of parity and equal security are maintained and respected, thus inspiring more mutual confidence and, if need be, allowing for constructive criticism by the international community and public opinion of any attempt to achieve superiority in the balance of forces and hegemony. In this spirit my delegation welcomes all working papers contributing realistic ideas within the scope of such an approach. We welcome Working Paper CD/223, submitted at the start of the 1980s, by the Group of 21, which also contemplated and outlined a second phase following upon the first phase. We strongly hope that the Group, in particular drawing inspiration from the forthcoming non-aligned summit, will flesh out and update its outline of the successive phases so as to achieve fully the objective of general and complete disarmament.

In the same spirit, my delegation welcomes Working Paper CD/WP.83 submitted by the Group of socialist countries in order to incorporate in the various phases the disarmament measures contained in the comprehensive programme put forward by the General Secretary of the CPSU, Mikhail Gorbachev, on 15 January. Viet Nam's leaders warmly welcomed and unreservedly supported that programme in statements circulated at this Conference in document CD/672 of 21 February. The Vietnamese leaders view it as a source of strong impetus for all peoples in their struggle for international peace and security and they were "appreciative of this historic initiative": the Programme of 15 January "is of fundamental importance, constructive and realistic". Moreover, my delegation finds most encouraging the many clearly positive responses that the Programme advanced by Mr. Gorbachev prompted throughout the world and at this Conference. Thus, taken at random from among many others, this assessment of the Indian Minister in his statement before the Conference

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on 22 April 1986: he warmly welcomed this Programme as "concrete and time-bound", and "proposals for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons from the face of the Earth" stemming from a great nuclear Power "for the first time since the beginning of the 1960s".

In the past, various efforts have been made towards this same end. It is to be hoped that other groups of countries, in particular the major nuclear Powers, will propose their own global approach for an overall disarmament programme in all its phases and covering all priorities in their interrelationship. The Conference would thereby stand to gain much in the negotiation and drawing up of its comprehensive programme for disarmament.

Delving further into the details of these measures, particularly at the current stage covering from the present to about 1990, it seems to me that the consensus acquired on the chapters of objectives and priorities should not be upset but rather we should try to remove the brackets and arrive at an agreement on the key measures in the following chapter. To this end my delegation shares the feeling of many non-nuclear States as expressed, in particular, in the declaration of Heads of State and Government of six countries of 28 January 1985. After stressing the danger of the nuclear winter and the extreme and growing urgency of measures to prevent a nuclear war, the six-nation declaration expressly states: "Two specific steps today require special attention: the prevention of the arms race in outer space, and a comprehensive test-ban treaty". The declaration of the Minister of India, the country currently chairing the non-aligned movement, so recalled this in the plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament on 22 April last. We note with satisfaction that the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty member States, at its meeting in Budapest, also cites as a first priority the cessation of tests and specific agreements at the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons. With respect to the nuclear test-ban, which is considered the most important step for stopping the continuing updating of nuclear armaments, and the key issue for ceasing all horizontal as well as vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, the many documents of the non-aligned countries and the successive statements of the six leaders stress the highest priority attached to this measure. The proposals of the Soviet Union have therefore been welcomed and the six have focused their latest efforts on this subject calling, inter alia, for the United States of America to join the moratorium unilaterally decided by the Soviet Union as an interim measure and offering their services for the effective verification of any agreement. My delegation supports this view of the non-aligned countries as indeed it supports the initiatives of the Soviet Union designed to achieve the total and immediate cessation of all tests. In this spirit we welcome Working Paper CD/701 of the Group of socialist countries proposing a draft treaty to this end.

With respect to the problem of space weapons, the non-aligned countries, and among them Viet Nam, have always held that outer space is part of the common heritage of mankind which is to be exclusively reserved for peaceful uses, for the well-being of all nations. The development of research on space weapons based on lasers or particle-beams, inter alia, arouses great concern among the non-aligned countries. The above mentioned declarations of the

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six leaders call for "the prohibition of the development, testing, production and use of all space weapons", and state that "an arms race in outer space would be enormously costly, and have grave destabilizing effects. It would also endanger a number of arms limitation and disarmament agreements". The Minister of India, in his statement of 22 April, quite rightly stressed that the SALT II and ABM treaties should be strictly observed and complied with and that the immunity of satellites should be guaranteed for their normal and peaceful functioning in space. On the basis of these very well-known views of the non-aligned countries, my delegation believes that this question of the prevention of the arms race in outer space, a problem which is of the highest importance and priority, should not be dealt with in just one paragraph of a sub-chapter entitled "Related measures"; it should be given broader treatment and have its due place among the main disarmament measures.

Viet Nam being a country which does not possess any nuclear weapons, my delegation has had occasion to express our views with respect to what are called negative security assurances. Viet Nam actively participated in the Third Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. With respect to paragraph 11, section A, chapter V of the draft comprehensive programme for disarmament, Viet Nam welcomes the creation of nuclear-free zones throughout the world and invites nuclear Powers to respect their status. My delegation considers that in the comprehensive programme for disarmament there should be a mention of the wish of the countries of South-East Asia to turn that region into a nuclear-free zone. At the NPT Review Conference in September 1985 the delegation of Indonesia explicitly expressed this idea and my delegation clearly endorsed it. It would also be advisable to include, for instance in subparagraph (e) of this paragraph, a reference to the nuclear-weapon free zone in the South Pacific, whose creation, through the express agreement of the States of the region, seems to us to be more advanced than in other regions mentioned in this paragraph.

Turning to the "related the measures" of section E of chapter V, first stage, my delegation would like to express its satisfaction at the adoption in the draft comprehensive programme of disarmament of the language relating to zones of peace in South-East Asia proposed jointly by the Indonesian and Vietnamese delegations after due consultations with all partners in the region. We hope that very soon the only final reservation will be lifted. Reservations stemming from a Power whose interest and responsibilities my country realistically understand, and hence we understand the role devolving upon it with respect to the establishment of peace, stability and co-operation in the region.

From a broader standpoint, my delegation welcomes the inclusion, under "Other Measures" of confidence-building measures and measures designed to prevent the use of force in international relations. Such measures do exist in Europe, where they have been included in international treaties and are subject to periodic review. However, in Asia, where in the course of the last four decades many so-called limited wars have taken place, having involved very Great Powers indeed, such sets of measures do not seem to have been sufficiently worked out and agreed among all countries of the region, among which there are nuclear powers or countries with very strong military

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traditions sometimes pursuing strategic and other interests which are not always favourable to international peace and security. Viet Nam, in view of its very recent past, welcomes the statement of the Soviet Union of 23 April on the situation in the Asian and Pacific region, in which it set out the main guidelines for the consolidation of peace, security and development by promoting equal and mutually advantageous co-operation between the countries of the region. In a statement of 27 April the Government of Viet Nam considered that these Soviet proposals are in total harmony with the heart and the mind, and are designed to work towards an Asian and Pacific region which is peaceful, denuclearized and free from confrontation. Viet Nam unreservedly supports this declaration which is in total conformity with the foreign policy of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, which desires to establish friendly relations with all peoples, to settle disputes through negotiations in a constructive spirit and in a spirit of mutual understanding, on the basis of respect for the independence, sovereignty and legitimate interests of all countries. As a country belonging to the Asian and Pacific region, Viet Nam has both a direct interest and a responsibility to work for the building of security in its region. International security and disarmament are organically linked and inextricably interactive. Likewise, global security and regional security have a mutual impact on each other, particularly in the case of the security of Asia and the Pacific, a region whose already sizeable weight is growing in the overall strategy of the greatest Powers in this world.

Mr. President, in the statement you made on behalf of the Union of Burma at the beginning of the year, you called upon the Conference to redouble its efforts in order to meet the deadline and submit a complete draft of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament to the forthcoming General Assembly this year, 1986, the International Year of Peace.

It is in this spirit and with this hope that my delegation has shared these thoughts with the Conference by way of a modest contribution to joint action. We are encouraged to do this by the recent General Assembly resolution 40/152 J which called upon the Conference on Disarmament to facilitate the participation of non-member States in its work.

Our sole ambition is to contribute to the great enterprise of disarmament, which is the right and responsibility of all States, large or small, developed or developing, without any ostracism or discrimination. We shall continue to participate as a non-member, and also to put forward our candidacy to become a full member of the Conference. Viet Nam is persevering in its efforts to this end supported by the Group of socialist countries and many non-aligned countries, and encouraged by the reasonable attitude taken by almost all the members of this Conference, whom we thank. It is to be hoped that "the objection of a single country" to a more active participation by Viet Nam will be lifted of itself, by the force of circumstances, and that reason and fairness will ultimately prevail.

In conclusion, Mr. President and distinguished delegates, I should like to assure you once again that Viet Nam does not and will not stint any effort at this Conference and elsewhere to work with all countries and all peoples for the lofty cause of disarmament, for a lasting peace and for healthy

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(Mr. Nguyen Thuong, Viet Nam)

co-operation among nations. May I also wish the Conference, and in particular the Ad Hoc Committee under the distinguished and enlightened guidance of Ambassador García Robles, every success in the early finalization of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Viet Nam for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the representative of Australia, Ambassador Butler.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): In the statement that I made in the plenary on 10 July, I made some reference to my Government's policies towards the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We do not have many meetings of our Ad hoc Committee on that subject left this year, and it is our hope that Australian representatives in that Committee will make some further remarks shortly. But my subject today in the plenary is the prevention of an arms race in outer space and we have chosen to make these remarks in the plenary because of our wish to have them recorded.

Space has been used and indeed, predominantly used, for military purposes since the dawn of the space age and its twin, the age of the intercontinental ballistic missile. The initial reaction to the appearance in space of satellites and at least potentially, ballistic missile warheads, was to set about countering those objects.

The history of what happened subsequently is complicated and somewhat messy. But it is fair to say that partly by design and formal agreements and partly through tacit understandings, the major military Powers, essentially the two super Powers, elected to preserve space as a relative sanctuary from the use of force. Put another way, had the super Powers judged it desirable, on balance, to try to deny the use of space for military purposes, space would now be a far less hospitable environment than it is at present.

In recent years the pressures on this régime of restraint have grown steadily and can now be described as acute. The possibility of an arms race in space, that is the competitive development and deployment of weapons systems specifically intended for use against objects in space both missiles and satellites, has become very real.

Thus the prevention of such a competition has jumped to the top of the arms control agenda in both the bilateral super Power negotiations and in multilateral forums. Clearly, there has been a marked shift in the balance of considerations. The earlier tolerance of the use of space for military purposes, even though in the case of satellites these uses supported and even enhanced terrestrial military capabilities, is giving way to intolerance.

The Ad hoc Committee of our Conference is tasked to examine and to identify issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In executing this task Australia believes that we should begin at the beginning and try to clarify, in our own minds, why this shift in the balance of considerations has occurred. In our view, preventing an arms race in outer space is crucially dependent on addressing the incentives to develop and deploy space weaponry.

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(Mr. Butler, Australia)

With respect to ballistic missile defences, which both super Powers are actively researching, it is clear that one strand of motivation is the same Powers' failure, to date, to conclude agreements that would reduce offensive nuclear forces and yield a more stable balance in the residual forces. This is a central issue in the super Power negotiations on nuclear and space arms.

With respect to anti-satellite weapons, the issues would seem to fall more squarely within the purview and competence of this forum. Over the past quarter of a century, satellites have flourished in number and variety. The majority of them perform military or military-related functions and have done so, without being challenged, under a legal régime that specified that space is to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. It would seem to follow, then, that there has been a strong consensus that these satellites perform functions that are in the common interest, and are consistent with both international law and the Charter of the United Nations. Under these circumstances, a first order of business is to establish, as clearly as possible, what these common interests are and how satellites contribute to them.

Further, if, as is clearly the case, the consensus to leave satellites in peace is breaking down we should endeavour to find out why this is occurring. Technological advances are clearly a factor but surely a basic goal of arms control is to make technology the slave of security not the reverse -- to make security the hostage of technology.

Another possibility, clearly, is that the functions performed by satellites have crossed or are in danger of crossing some invisible threshold of tolerability. We should look into this.

An enquiry into the motivations for the existing Soviet ASAT system and the United States system now in development, would be instructive and relevant.

In Australia's view, establishing: why it is in our collective interests to protect space from the use of force; what space assets should, on these grounds, be protected; and what should be done about those which do not warrant such protection, will constitute a valuable guide to consideration of how this can most effectively be accomplished.

An investigation of this kind would complement the other preparatory tasks or "building blocks" on which our Ad hoc Committee is already engaged. For example, the analysis of the existing legal régime relating to arms control in space, and also to ensure that we have a common terminology: these are two building blocks.

We would then be armed to assess the relative urgency and efficacy of the many sound and imaginative ideas that have been put forward to accomplish our objective, ranging from confidence-building measures to specific suggestions for the further development of international law as it applies to outer space.

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(Mr. Butler, Australia)

At this stage in our proceedings for this year I do not propose to comment on these proposals individually. But I will take this opportunity to recall the suggestion put to this Conference in August 1984 by Australia's Foreign Minister, Mr. Hayden, that this Conference consider measures to protect from attack all satellites (and their associated ground stations) that contribute to strategic stability and to the verification of arms control agreements. We continue to believe that this proposal goes to the heart of the task assigned to our Ad hoc Committee. We would wish to see it fully discussed.

Finally, there is one proposal which a number of delegations have made and which Australia regards as a basic requirement for the prevention of an arms race in space. I refer to improving and strengthening the régime for the registration of space objects. In outer space, no less than in every other field of arms control, the degree of success will be strongly dependent upon the degree of transparency that States give to their activities.

Australia attached the greatest importance to the Schultz-Gromyko agreement of January 1985 that underpins the present negotiations in Geneva between the United States and the Soviet Union. That agreement specified that the objective of the negotiations would be to "work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms and at strengthening strategic stability". These negotiations are crucial, but in Australia's view, the Conference on Disarmament can and should play an important complementary role in this vital task.

As the bilateral agreement states, an arms race in space is still preventable. But it is folly to believe that a wall of words erected around space will be sufficient. We must deal instead with the incentives, with the pressures that are generating the interest in looking to space for solutions to security problems that have eluded us on the ground.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Australia for his statement. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor?

I should now like to make the following announcements. First, the Contact Group on Scope and Definitions of the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons will meet today at 3.30 p.m. in the Conference Room located on the 6th floor in the secretariat area. Second, the Draft Report of the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons is now available in all languages in the delegations' boxes.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 31 July, at 10.30 a.m. The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.05 p.m.



**CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT**

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31 July 1986

ENGLISH

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FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-FIFTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 31 July 1986, at 10.30 a.m.

President:

U Tin Tun

(Burma)

GE.86-63750/3971E

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 375th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the outset, I wish to extend a warm welcome to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, His Excellency Sahabzada Yaqub-Khan, who is addressing the Conference today as first speaker. In doing so, I should also like to express our appreciation to him for taking his valuable time to visit our Conference to convey to us the views of his Government on the vital issue of disarmament. I should also like to wish him a successful stay in Geneva.

In accordance with the programme of work, the Conference continues today its consideration of items 6, entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" and 8, entitled "The Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament". However, in conformity with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

May I also recall that the Conference will hold today its last informal meeting during the 1986 session on the substance of item 2, entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". As usual, we shall hold that informal meeting immediately after the adjournment of this plenary meeting.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Pakistan, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.

I now give the floor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, His Excellency Sahabzada Yaqub-Khan.

Mr. YAQUB-KHAN (Pakistan): Mr. President, I consider it a privilege and a pleasure to participate in this Conference under your wise leadership. The great country that you represent belongs to the same region as Pakistan and the philosophy that has inspired the Burmese people through the ages was for a time nurtured in Pakistan.

My presence here today is a testimony of Pakistan's deep commitment to the mandate of this forum: namely to halt the irrational arms race and to preserve mankind's right to survival. With 50,000 nuclear warheads arrayed for battle, when neither man nor machine is infallible, the world is as vulnerable to destruction by adventurism as it is to such destruction by accident. Yet, it is on nuclear deterrence that the Great Powers choose to rely, which means that they rely on the threat of mutual and perhaps global destruction -- to preserve their own national security. This is surely a doctrine of despair, a rejection of Man's rationality. It is not possible to contend that the threat of mutual destruction can be replaced by the confidence of mutual defence against nuclear weapons. Human civilization has arrived at a juncture where we have no sane option except to place our faith in the power of Reason, not in the reason of Power.

(Mr. Yaqub-Khan, Pakistan)

The consensus achieved in 1978 on a broad spectrum of disarmament measures aroused as we are all aware a great deal of expectations regarding genuine disarmament. Pakistan shares the disappointment that the specific goals that were set and accepted by the General Assembly's first special session on disarmament are nowhere near achievement.

These past years have been a period of world-wide fear and a period of trepidation. Violation of national territories and acts of aggression have abounded and multiplied; military arsenals and budgets have burgeoned; the nuclear arms race has escalated; disarmament negotiations have been desultory; political rhetoric, propaganda and posturing have indeed been the order of the day. And yet it is the persistent protestations by the super-Powers of their desire for peace -- in spite of the renewed arms race -- that offer the only ray of hope in an otherwise dark and ominous setting.

Widespread expectations were aroused when these two super-Powers agreed in January 1985 to commence the negotiations on space, on strategic nuclear arms and on intermediate nuclear weapons, with the declared objective of preventing an arms race in space, terminating it on Earth and ultimately eliminating nuclear arms altogether. We were equally heartened by the spirit which animated the Soviet-American Summit in this city last November and by the joint declaration that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought".

Opportunities for disarmament must not be missed. Progress in the Soviet-American negotiations would contribute to the improvement of the international political climate. These salutary developments should be accompanied by a more uniform adherence to the accepted norms of inter-State relations and should encourage measures to resolve the disputes and conflicts that lie at the root of super-Power confrontations.

Like other non-aligned countries, Pakistan has a legitimate interest in such a positive evolution towards peace and disarmament. The threat posed by nuclear war will be different only in degree for belligerent and bystander. The development of space weapons and anti-ballistic missile defences, if successful, may provide total security for the super-Powers, but it may imply total insecurity for the non-aligned and neutral States. Moreover, the arms race is now escalating, not only in qualitative and quantitative terms, but also, literally, in horizontal and vertical directions. The massive nuclear and conventional forces of the super-Powers have spread to almost every corner of the world. Soon, deadly new weapons may be deployed over our skies. Furthermore, the turmoil caused by East-West tensions is felt, not so much in Europe, where the ideological lines are frozen by mutual fear, but among the emergent nations of the Third World, which have witnessed over 150 conflicts in the past four decades.

The non-aligned and developing countries seek genuine and global disarmament and a durable structure of international security. On the other hand, the super-Powers, for all their fine words, basically desire "equal security" against each other. In their calculus of power, the legitimate security concerns of other nations are relegated to a marginal status. Their

(Mr. Yaqub-Khan, Pakistan)

primary concern is that other States should not be allowed to disturb the precarious equation of nuclear deterrence. In this approach, there is a fundamental and unacceptable presumption of perpetual inequality in the levels of security enjoyed by the super-Powers and their alliances, on the one hand, and the non-aligned countries, on the other.

The egocentric notion of global security espoused by the super-Powers poses a fundamental dilemma for the non-aligned and neutral States. What is the best means to assure their security? Obviously these nations must oppose expansionist and neo-colonial policies and combat foreign occupation and alien domination. For this they must have the means for legitimate self-defence.

However, in the nuclear age, the dictum of Vegetius, "Qui desiderat pacem, praeparet bellum", is a dangerous and a self-defeating premise for national security. The accumulation of armaments by the non-aligned countries will neither enhance their security, nor will it end the economic deprivation of their peoples. When non-aligned States secure vast arsenals for potential use against each other, they are surely pursuing an erroneous and regrettable policy. It would be worse still if such arsenals are designed to dominate or to overawe their neighbours.

A collective endeavour by the non-aligned countries to restrain the arms race and to promote their own security at the lowest possible level of armaments is an indispensable corollary to their principled advocacy of global disarmament. Such an endeavour is in their best interest. It would enable them to allocate optimum resources for the well-being of their peoples; it will ease mutual conflicts and mutual tensions and it will contribute to world peace and security.

A non-aligned endeavour for mutual arms restraint and enhanced security can best be promoted within a regional context. Unlike the major Powers, non-aligned nations acquire armaments in response to threats emanating from neighbouring countries. In a regional approach, the diverse problems and perspectives of States in different regions could be given appropriate consideration. Such an approach could facilitate the evolution of remedial measures which are suitable for specific regional situations. It could take into account the interaction among the regional countries, as well as between them and external Powers, so that solutions could be found for the legitimate security concerns of all.

There is concern that nuclear weapons may spread to various regions of the world. So far, the global approach to non-proliferation, reflected in the NPT, has incorrectly assumed, quite apart from its inequitable features, that there is uniformity in the motivations of those States which have not adhered to this Treaty. A closer examination would reveal the diverse compulsions that require differentiated responses. There can be at least four scenarios which may induce States to acquire nuclear weapons: first, nuclear capabilities and intentions of other regional States; second, overwhelming superiority of neighbouring countries in the field of conventional weapons; third, nuclear threat posed to the regional States by one or more nuclear-weapon Powers; and fourth, the desire for regional domination or hegemony, or for nuclear parity with the Great Powers.

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(Mr. Yagub-Khan, Pakistan)

Each of these scenarios will require a different response to stem proliferation. The first two instances can be addressed in a regional context through the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones or other similar arrangements. Negative security assurances and the withdrawal of nuclear forces from the vicinity of a region, perhaps in conjunction with arrangements for nuclear-weapon-free zones, can contain the external nuclear threat to a region. On the other hand, the desire for regional nuclear domination, for example in the specific case of South Africa, will require unequivocal assurances by the nuclear-weapon States to come to the assistance of the threatened countries. Happily, so far no non-nuclear-weapon State has attempted to achieve parity with the nuclear Powers.

Resolute efforts are also necessary to stem the escalation in conventional armaments and military forces in various parts of the world. The growing destructive potential of sophisticated conventional armaments is bound to blur the distinction between a conventional and a nuclear conflict. Attacks on dams and nuclear power plants for instance could well result in consequences comparable to the devastation unleashed by a limited nuclear exchange. The nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America must not delay the pursuit of mutual arms restraint until their situation becomes as complex and dangerous as that of Europe. In each region, a conscious and phased process can be evolved, tailored to its specific requirements, to promote security for all the regional States at the lowest possible level of armaments.

Such a process could envisage:

Firstly, steps that can be taken to build mutual trust and confidence. The understanding reached between Pakistan and India not to attack each others' nuclear facilities and installations is a good example of a confidence-building measure. Broader commitments of non-aggression and non-use of force would be equally helpful in fostering mutual confidence. It would also be useful for the regional States to clarify their respective security objectives and doctrines and exchange information on arms procurements and on force levels.

Secondly, efforts to resolve outstanding disputes or clear misunderstandings are an essential component of a regional arms control process.

Thirdly, once a degree of mutual confidence has been created, the regional States could evolve a joint and co-ordinated position regarding external threats to the region, including the presence of foreign forces in their vicinity.

Fourthly, the regional parties could endeavour to establish a mutually acceptable military equilibrium among themselves. Disproportion in the level and sophistication of armaments is likely to encourage policies of domination and intervention and to increase the danger of regional conflict. The measures to create regional balance could include: renunciation of certain types of advanced weapons, agreed ceilings on armed forces and the creation of fully or partially demilitarized zones on land, sea and air space.

(Mr. Yaqub-Khan, Pakistan)

Finally, institutions and mechanisms could be created at the regional level which would facilitate disarmament and security initiatives to develop, new approaches to be discussed and concrete steps to be taken.

The prospects for success in promoting regional security and arms control can be greatly enhanced by the simultaneous pursuit of regional co-operation in the economic, social and other fields, which can promote a better political climate and create a common stake in the preservation of regional peace and prosperity. It is in this perspective that Pakistan attaches singular importance to the establishment of the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation.

The regional approach to nuclear and conventional arms control deserves the whole-hearted support of both the non-aligned nations as well as the nuclear Powers. I hope that more detailed analyses of the possibilities for arms control in specific regions could be prepared by experts in the relevant forums. Meanwhile, Pakistan would urge States to take initiatives, or respond to existing initiatives, to promote arms control and to promote security in their respective regions.

We are convinced that the regional approach can substantially strengthen the security of the non-aligned and developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America and contribute to international peace and security. It could help to restrain the involvement of those States in the global nuclear and conventional arms race and thus reduce the extent to which they are vulnerable to external influence and interference. It would also prevent the diversion of scarce resources from economic and social development and thus help to meet the fundamental needs and to fulfil the aspirations of their people for an improved quality of life -- at a time when survival itself is a hostage to man's own machinations and impulses for self-destruction.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, His Excellency Sahabzada Yaqub-Khan, for his important statement and for the kind words addressed to the President and to my country. I now give the floor to the representative of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Cima.

Mr. CIMA (Czechoslovakia): Let me first welcome the presence among us today of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, Mr. Yaqub-Khan. We listened to what he had to say about the Pakistani approach to the problems of disarmament.

The Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament is one of the items inscribed on our agenda for this week. Our delegation is now going to address that item briefly.

The comprehensive approach towards disarmament, aimed at the achievement of the general and complete disarmament, is as old as disarmament negotiations themselves. More or less specific proposals in this regard were advanced in the distant as well as in the recent past. And since the beginning of the 1980s serious efforts to negotiate multilaterally the comprehensive programme of disarmament (CPD) were undertaken by this negotiating body. Responding to the call by the first special session of the General Assembly

(Mr. Cima, Czechoslovakia)

devoted to disarmament the then Committee of the Conference on Disarmament established a working organ which was to negotiate such a programme for adoption by the second special session devoted to disarmament. As we all know, it was not possible to finalize the draft programme then, neither could we do it later, for the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly. After that, the General Assembly requested us once more, already for the third time, to prepare an agreed draft CPD and to submit it, this fall, to the forty-first session of the General Assembly.

The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, together with other socialist countries, is strongly in favour of the elaboration, adoption and, above all, the full implementation of the CPD. Let me recall the words of our Minister for Foreign Affairs, Bohuslav Chnoupek, who stressed in this room a couple of weeks ago that our country fully supports the idea of compiling in one document basic disarmament measures which would, in the final result, lead to general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Such a document could ensure that the process of disarmament negotiations is not conducted in an improvised manner but purposefully, and that the tasks it sets out are not subject to fluctuations in the approach of one State or another but that they be clear component parts of the overall international disarmament strategy. We further consider that the programme should be comprehensive in nature; it should of necessity contain measures of nuclear disarmament, and the elimination of other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons, and it should deal also with the problem of conventional disarmament.

The Ad Hoc Committee for the CPD, under the able Chairmanship of Ambassador García Robles of Mexico, has, in the course of the last six years spared no effort in the search for mutually acceptable language on all aspects of the programme. Practically all delegations expressed their willingness to work towards the elaboration and adoption of the programme. What is, then, the reason that the Ad Hoc Committee and its numerous contact groups have not, as yet, succeeded in finding desired formulations for the outstanding problems?

In order to find the answer, one has to look at document CD/634. This document reflects the present state of affairs in the formulation of texts for the CPD. After a brief reading one might come to the conclusion that large sections of the programme have already been agreed and that, after all, not so many paragraphs remain in brackets. But through more careful study one finds out that practically all outstanding problems in the section on measures and stages of implementation represent important aspects of disarmament, considered almost unanimously priority questions. Already the third paragraph of this section indicates, that, for the time being, there is not even agreement on the inclusion in the CPD of such a highly desired measure as the nuclear-test ban.

One could wonder what kind of a comprehensive programme of disarmament we could seriously produce without calling, already in the first stage, for the complete cessation of nuclear-weapon testing. It is hardly conceivable that we could have both significant reductions in nuclear arsenals and continued tests of nuclear weapons. Thus, until the NTB is clearly included in the

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(Mr. Cima, Czechoslovakia)

first stage of the CPD -- and let me note that for now we do not discuss measures for the second and the third stage -- we cannot succeed in arriving at a finalized, meaningful version of the CPD.

We are fully aware of the difficulties concerning the NTB. One nuclear country has openly declared that it intends to continue nuclear testing, which is necessary for the implementation of its military programmes concerning nuclear and space weapons. Instead of negotiating the test ban itself, this country proposes to discuss its various verification aspects. The overwhelming majority of the members of the Conference on Disarmament, including my delegation, consider this unsatisfactory. As a result, the Conference has been paralysed and for the last three years has not taken any action on its agenda item 1. We continue to consider that the discussion limited only to verification cannot bring us substantially closer towards the NTB. But at the same time we feel that the present deadlock and the state of paralysis in the Conference is serving no one but the country which, though alone, stands against the cessation of nuclear testing.

Let me in this connection point out that in the framework of the CPD we do not pretend to solve all the problems associated with the successful negotiation of the NTB. All we demand is the clear recognition that the NTB is an urgent measure, which could contribute to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and would create favourable conditions for the carrying out of nuclear disarmament. This elementary expression of the importance of the NTB and of the need for its early conclusion represents the minimum that the CPD must contain.

Speaking about the problem of nuclear testing, it is impossible to avoid mentioning that one nuclear country has been refraining from nuclear-weapon tests for practically one year now. We consider the unilateral Soviet moratorium an unprecedented, bold step which clearly indicates the readiness of the Soviet Union to stop nuclear testing and to approach that problem with the necessary courage. Its introduction and repeated prolongations were welcomed world wide. These are deeds, not words. We deeply regret that other nuclear countries, especially the United States, have, as yet, not reacted positively and have not joined the moratorium. We do not accept arguments that the moratorium is unverifiable and cannot replace a negotiated ban on nuclear testing. According to our knowledge no one has ever suggested that such a moratorium should replace a permanent ban. As to its verifiability we consider that, with the present technical means, the Earth has become too small to hide nuclear explosions even under its surface, especially if those technical means are used rationally and in mutually agreed, international co-operation. In any event, we would still like to believe that some positive reaction to the Soviet moratorium from other nuclear countries might be forthcoming. We would deeply regret it if, one day, we had to look back at it as a lost opportunity.

I dwelt at some length on the NTB, and I could do so also with respect to other problems which still remain open in the present draft CPD, such as the prevention of an arms race in outer space, prevention of nuclear war, etc. But the Head of my delegation, Ambassador Vejvoda, has already done so on numerous occasions. Let me just stress in conclusion our belief that the



(Mr. Cima, Czechoslovakia)

guiding principle of our work on the CPD should be the comprehensive approach towards the problems of international security and disarmament. We have to finally admit that in today's world individual aspects of disarmament are mutually interlinked and interdependent, and that we cannot find a durable solution to only some of them, while ignoring others. That comprehensive approach was, in our opinion, well reflected in the proposals made by the Soviet Union on 15 January of this year. The three-stage programme addresses all the basic problems of disarmament and offers a logical sequence of measures that could ensure the complete elimination of nuclear weapons by the end of this century. Certainly, it is an ambitious goal but let it be noted that the CPD, due to its nature, cannot be less ambitious. Otherwise it would amount to nothing more than a shy reconfirmation, if that, of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which is hardly what we are seeking.

Mr. VIDAS (Yugoslavia): Mr. President, as I am taking the floor for the first time during your Presidency, I would like to congratulate you, the representative of Burma -- with which Yugoslavia has ties of long-lasting co-operation and friendship -- on the excellent and experienced manner in which you have guided the Conference during the month of July. I also wish to take this opportunity to thank your predecessor, Ambassador Tellalov of Bulgaria, for the successful discharge of his functions. I avail myself of this opportunity also to welcome in our midst again the representative of Peru, Ambassador Morelli Pando who has assumed his duties in the meantime.

It is also with great pleasure that I would like to welcome the presence among us today of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, His Excellency Sahabzada Yaqub-Khan, to whose very important statement I have listened with great attention.

The 1986 session is drawing to its close. The Conference has not more than a month of its work to take stock of the results achieved in the course of the 1986 session. Today I would like to limit my intervention to some of the priority issues on our agenda and to some developments outside the Conference which have a direct bearing on its work.

As far as developments outside the Conference are concerned, in the view of my delegation it is important to note that the dialogue between the two major Powers on disarmament has recently become more direct, more dynamic and more comprehensive. In some respects it has contributed to the definition of their priorities in the field of disarmament. This dialogue concerns also three key disarmament issues which are on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament: chemical-weapons ban, prevention of an arms race in outer space, and reduction of nuclear armaments. We welcome such a development, just as we have welcomed the objective of two major nuclear-weapon States to accelerate the negotiation of agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space and terminating it on Earth, with the ultimate goal of achieving the complete elimination of nuclear arms everywhere. We hope that these developments will have a positive effect on the work of the Conference on Disarmament, particularly in preparation of the 1987 session.

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(Mr. Vidas, Yugoslavia)

In the Conference on Disarmament it should be noted that during the course of this 1986 session further positive steps have been made in negotiations conducted within the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons under the able leadership of the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Ian Cromartie. This points to the possibility of a successful outcome to negotiations on other outstanding issues in this field. Of particular relevance, we consider, are efforts to identify the procedures and measures of verification at specific stages of implementation of the CW convention.

In this respect we are still faced with a number of problems and difficulties which should not be underestimated, just as should not be underestimated the fundamental differences dividing the delegations, the bridging of which will require new efforts and new political will. We should not be discouraged by these difficulties. My delegation will continue to actively participate and contribute to the work of the Ad Hoc Committee, just as we support the inter-sessional work of the Committee.

The Conference on Disarmament has recognized that prevention of an arms race in outer space is a matter of high concern, importance and urgency. It has also recognized that such an arms race is far easier to arrest now, before it has become a reality. Therefore, the efforts of the Conference on Disarmament -- which run parallel to bilateral negotiations -- should, in our view, be more focused on the resolution of this problem: because if not stopped, the spread of the arms race into outer space might have an adverse effect both on the use of space itself and on the security and peace of nations on Earth.

The debate held in the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space and numerous working papers submitted to it seem to indicate that the problems involved require extensive and complex considerations, including, inter alia, consideration of certain definitions, arriving at a consensus on activities in outer space which are intended solely for peaceful purposes and on those which should be completely banned or subjected to international control, reaching a consensus as to which of the existing outer space agreements should be reinforced or supplemented and what new agreements should be concluded. Given the serious task entrusted to the Conference in the field of outer space, we consider it necessary to promptly proceed to setting the priorities and rounding up of the activities within the mandate of the Conference. In doing so our attention should be focused on specific tasks of the Conference on Disarmament which should constitute a basis for arriving at a final result in the form of an agreement or several related agreements. Thus, the Ad Hoc Committee should, at the beginning of the 1987 session, work out a concrete programme of work, under its existing mandate, on all issues within its competence that the Conference should address.

A complex of nuclear issues -- such as nuclear-test ban, cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, and prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters -- have not yet received priority attention in the Conference. We cannot accept, and even less condone, the practice that the Conference is over and over again caught in the vicious circle of re-examining its mandate in respect of nuclear issues. The problems of

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nuclear disarmament cannot only be confined to bilateral negotiations nor limited to a small group of countries. We do not deny the primary responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States for nuclear disarmament. However, there is also the indisputable role of the Conference on Disarmament as a multilateral negotiating body in the consideration of the problems related to nuclear disarmament. The multilateral negotiations within the Conference on Disarmament -- in which, as a matter of fact, all five nuclear-weapon States are involved -- is the forum best suited to negotiate and create a basis for different agreements acceptable to all States.

As a result of their special position, the nuclear-weapon States also have special responsibilities with regard to the limitation, reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons. These responsibilities concern both negotiations among themselves or with each other, and their negotiations as members of multilateral fora such as the Conference on Disarmament. We appreciate that the two nuclear-weapon States parties to the bilateral talks, in response to the requests of the General Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament, have accepted the practice of informing from time to time, in an appropriate manner, the members of the Conference about the state of their negotiations. We consider this practice to be useful and hope that it will be continued, and that the information provided will be more substantive.

The nuclear-weapon States not party to these negotiations have repeatedly, here in the Conference and in the General Assembly, stated their reasons for not participating in the negotiations. We understand their reasons. Nevertheless, such a posture should not prevent them from contributing more concretely to initiating and conducting a much more intensive dialogue within the Conference on Disarmament than was the case in the past. We expect them to do so. In this context we appreciate the expressed readiness of the People's Republic of China to actively participate in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban.

During the course of this year the Conference considered agenda item 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", in the framework of informal meetings. These informal meetings cannot, however, be a substitute for the work which the Conference could and should carry out in fulfilling the tasks and mandate given to it by the General Assembly at its first and second special sessions devoted to disarmament. This does not mean that these meetings were a waste of time. They have helped to better understand the different aspects of the problem, and unambiguously reaffirmed the role of the Conference in that field. In the opinion of my delegation, in the period ahead priority attention should be given to problems which can directly contribute to clarifying certain concepts and formulating practical measures the Conference should undertake. Paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament should serve as a basis for achieving that aim. In this way the Conference could significantly contribute to concrete negotiations.

It is generally acknowledged that prevention of nuclear war is an urgent and global problem. We refuse to reconcile ourselves to the fact that the Conference is kept on the sidelines in consideration of this problem. The complex approach should not be an obstacle for us to seek ways of removing all the causes and averting the threat of nuclear war. Nuclear disarmament is, no

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doubt, central in this endeavour. But pending the attainment of this objective, the Conference should consider at least the initial measures which could reduce the risk of a nuclear catastrophe without losing sight of the ultimate goal. The Conference cannot, in our assessment, bypass this issue and thus lose its credibility.

It is even less acceptable that the Conference was unable to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban this year. The Conference was thus deprived of the possibility of making its own practical contribution to resolving this issue of highest urgency. A nuclear-test ban remains the central issue of the nuclear-arms race. The driving force of any arms race is, and has always been -- and now even more so because of the rapid development of technology -- an unimpeded development, sophistication and deployment of new weapons systems, including nuclear-weapon systems. Nuclear testing is precisely aimed to achieve that end. The delaying of a nuclear-test ban increases further the mistrust already existing between the two super-Powers about the genuine intentions of the other side, and gives rise to further suspicions of other nuclear-weapon States. A nuclear-test ban would represent not only an important measure for limiting the nuclear-arms race and renouncing the advantages offered by testing new nuclear-weapon systems for their development, but also one of the most important, if not the single most important, confidence-building measure.

We welcome the news about the ongoing talks between the United States and Soviet experts on nuclear-test-ban issues and hope that they will be instrumental in removing obstacles to a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. We also note as a positive development that a non-governmental group of American scientists was invited by the Soviet Academy of Sciences to install, together with the Soviet scientists, a monitoring station at a nuclear-test site in the Soviet Union. This is proof that monitoring will not be a difficult task to perform once a decision has been made to this effect by the countries concerned. It has been recognized that for a test ban to be effective it must be global and verifiable, and that the main means of verifying the compliance of a nuclear-test ban is through a world-wide network of seismological stations. In order to be effective, such a verification system must be based on the widest possible international co-operation that would provide sufficient confidence that the parties to a nuclear-test ban observe their obligations with regard to underground testing.

The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts has so far provided a vast amount of useful experience in this field and is continuing with further scientific analysis and development of necessary procedure. Its task is not yet completed and we understand that fresh efforts are needed before it can recommend more definite solutions. My delegation wishes to express its appreciation for the useful work this Group is performing.

Many scientists believe, and we share their belief, that existing technological devices make it possible to distinguish to a high degree between nuclear tests and natural seismic events. This is an encouraging deduction pointing to the possibility of establishing a global seismic monitoring network even prior to the conclusion of an NTB treaty and as its most direct preparation. There should be no technical difficulties in accomplishing this

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task. The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts could contribute considerably to speeding up the whole process of monitoring and conclusion of the Treaty if it would work out a plan and programme regarding the number, location and type of monitoring stations to be installed and utilized in the territories of individual States. We do not see any reason why this should not be undertaken right away.

Although the concrete results of our work in 1986 are far short of expectations and possibilities, it seems to us that the Conference during the 1986 session has worked very intensively in a healthier atmosphere, and that it has made a concrete step forward, primarily in regard of a chemical-weapons ban. It should not be overlooked either that the Conference has conducted a more structured and substantive debate on outer space and that it has become more involved -- at least through informal meetings -- in the consideration of issues related to halting and reversing the nuclear arms race. It is, however, far from what the Conference could do and is expected to do in this area. We hope that this more dynamic approach will bring about positive results and that the Conference will begin, in the course of its 1987 session, gradually to emerge from stagnation. We also hope that all the international efforts outside the Conference will contribute to improved prospects for disarmament consideration in general. All the members of the Conference are equally responsible for the preparation and for consideration on an equal footing of all disarmament items on its agenda. But those which are most armed have an increased responsibility for the process of disarmament through negotiations. We harbour no illusions that a breakthrough could soon be made in the work of the Conference. Yet, we do not want to accept fatalistic pessimism about its prospects either. Lasting solutions to all global problems, including disarmament problems, also require an active contribution by all the members of the international community; they cannot be treated in isolation from other burning economic and social problems of the world.

We expect that the forthcoming period will see a more effective involvement and more intensified efforts of various international fora. We hope that the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe and the Vienna talks on reductions of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe will yield the desired results. Disarmament issues will also be high on the agenda of the Eighth Conference of Heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries to be held in Harare, Zimbabwe, in August this year. All these will, we hope, provide an additional impetus to the Conference to intensify its efforts in the preparations for and the work of the Conference itself at its 1987 session.

Before concluding, I would not like to miss this opportunity to express my delegation's appreciation and that of my own to the distinguished representatives of India and the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassadors Alfred Gonsalves and Henning Wegener, who will shortly leave Geneva to assume their new, important functions. I wish to thank them both for their contribution to the work of the Conference and for the very fruitful co-operation which our delegations have had during their term of duty, and to wish them farewell and extend to them our best wishes for the future.

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The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Yugoslavia for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President and to my country. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor?

The secretariat has circulated today, at my request, a timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. It has been prepared in consultation with the Chairmen of the Ad Hoc Committees. It is understood that the timetable is merely indicative and subject to change, if necessary. I wish to note that provision has been made for the Conference to take up the technical parts of the draft annual report to the General Assembly of the United Nations at an informal meeting on Thursday and, if necessary, also on Friday. In this connection, I wish to inform you that the first draft, contained in Working Paper CD/WP.243, will be ready in English tomorrow and we expect the draft in other languages to be available on Tuesday morning. As usual, the relevant document will be placed in the delegations boxes as languages become available.

If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: Distinguished delegates, please allow me now to make a brief concluding statement as the President of the Conference, since this is the last formal plenary meeting I shall be presiding over.

The month of July is a busy month. It has seen an increase in the tempo of the work of the Conference and the Ad Hoc Committees, as we approach the conclusion of the 1986 summer session.

With regard to agenda items 4 (Chemical Weapons), 5 (Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space), 7 (Radiological Weapons) and 8 (Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament), the respective subsidiary bodies continued their activities with vigour under the able leadership of their respective Chairmen. Reflecting the sentiments of all the member delegations, I wish to express my deep appreciation of the considerable contribution made by their Chairmen, Ambassador Ian Cromartie of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Luvsandorjiin Bayart of Mongolia, Ambassador Lechuga Hevia of Cuba and Ambassador García Robles of Mexico.

During my Presidency for the month of July, I spared no effort to do what I can possibly do to deal with the pending items on our agenda, particularly the nuclear issues.

I devoted a great deal of my attention and energies to agenda item 1, "Nuclear Test Ban". I carried out intensive consultations with a view to finding ways and means to reach consensus on the draft mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee on agenda item 1. Much to my regret, my consultations during the month of July have not been successful. However, I believe that those efforts were not wasted and that they would in some way contribute to the fruition of further efforts in this direction. I am aware of the continuing efforts to reach consensus on the draft mandate for

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the Ad Hoc Committee on agenda item 1 and I extend my whole-hearted support and sympathy to these commendable efforts. "Nuclear Test Ban" is number one in our agenda, and it is our priority item. It is my firm belief that progress on other nuclear issues are inconceivable without progress on agenda item 1.

This being the case, it is imperative that the Conference on Disarmament should establish a subsidiary body on agenda item 1 at the earliest possible date to undertake substantive work on this important subject. I am of the opinion that now that the two super-Powers have started their bilateral talks on nuclear testing, the need for the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee to start substantive work on this important subject has become more pronounced.

With regard to agenda item 2, "Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament", I tried my best to follow the example of my predecessor, Ambassador Tellalov of Bulgaria, in holding informal meetings on that agenda item. Much as we desire to see the Ad Hoc Committee established to deal with the substance of this important question, the present circumstances permit us only to conduct informal meetings on that subject at this juncture. These informal meetings on agenda item 2 have proved to be very fruitful and useful. I have held five informal meetings on this item and I am going to conduct another informal meeting on this subject immediately after this plenary meeting. I hope that my successors would find it useful to carry on with this good tradition of informal meetings pending the establishment of a subsidiary body on this agenda item.

With regard to agenda item 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters", I tried to explore the possibility of having a Committee of the Whole to deal with the substance of that agenda item on the basis of the proposal made by the then President of the Conference, Ambassador Vidas of Yugoslavia, in 1984. Much to my regret, my informal consultations only revealed that no consensus could be reached on that question at this stage.

I also carried out intensive informal consultations with group co-ordinators with a view to establishing the Ad Hoc Committee on agenda item 6, "Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons". I believe we reached understanding on this question to a large extent. However, it is, perhaps, too late to establish an ad hoc committee on that agenda item this year. I hope that the early part of the 1987 session of the Conference would be able to witness the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on that agenda item.

With regard to the question of the improved and effective functioning of the Conference, I held two sessions of open-ended consultations on the subject. Many member delegations took part in those two sessions of open-ended consultations and advanced their ideas and proposals on this question. We had a very fruitful exchange of views on the subject. This useful exchange of views led me to believe that there are some areas of common ground on some issues, although there still exist differences of opinion on more substantive questions and that it might be possible for the Conference to take decisions on those areas of common ground. To my regret, the limited

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time at my disposal prevented me from taking further steps. But I hope that the Conference on Disarmament will be able to make some movement in this area in future.

I also conducted informal and private consultations with Group Co-ordinators as well as with individual delegations on the question of the expansion of the membership of the Conference. I have found out that this question needs further consultations.

I also wish to take this opportunity to express my sincere thanks to Ambassador Miljan Komatina, Secretary-General of our Conference and Personal Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General, to Ambassador Vicente Berasategui, our Deputy Secretary-General, as well as to their able staff for their tireless co-operation, which I appreciate very much.

I would also like to thank the Group Co-ordinators, the distinguished Ambassadors of Bulgaria, China, Morocco and the Netherlands, for the co-operation they extended to me during my tenure.

That concludes my final statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Thank you, Mr. President. I do not think that it is customary for a representative to take the floor after the outgoing President's statement. If I am doing so now it is for a twofold reason: firstly, because my delegation and I personally have witnessed your tireless efforts during the month of your Presidency to reach an agreement on that item to which you once again quite rightly attributed maximum importance today -- that is, the first item on our agenda.

By your efforts, Mr. President, you have earned the gratitude of all the members of the Conference on Disarmament, and if you have not been successful it is not your fault, and I would also add, nor is it the fault of many delegations at the Conference, among them my own. With respect to this second assertion, I should like to add something further. There are delegations which persist in advancing, as the sole outcome for this issue, proposals that they have submitted since 1984. No, Mr. President, my delegation considers that negotiations should be negotiations which involve mutual concessions on one side and the other. In one of my statements, the last statement I made on this point, I said that in my view the delegations belonging to the Group of 21, and especially a group of them which includes that of Mexico, have made concessions both here as well as in the Assembly, where resolution 40/80 A was adopted by the largest number of votes, 124 votes in favour. I repeat, we have made concessions that represent 90 per cent of the ground that has to be covered, and not 50 per cent, which with 50 per cent on each side would have made it possible to find a solution. We have made concessions which in my view amount to 90 per cent, so that if the other side were prepared to make a 10 per cent concession we would have reached agreement.



(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

Since last year the Group of 21 has had a draft mandate for an ad hoc committee on this matter, which is contained in document CD.520/Rev.2. But we did not claim, or in any case the delegation of Mexico did not claim, that that draft contains the revealed truth and is the only draft possible.

That is why at the last Assembly we promoted that draft resolution 40/80 A which obtained the number of votes to which I have already referred. On the basis of that draft resolution, and using some of the terms taken from what the distinguished representative of Australia included in his non-paper when he was President of the Conference on Disarmament, such as the word "objective", we thus prepared a draft resolution which we would have been prepared to submit and co-sponsor along with those delegations wishing to co-sponsor it. We continue now, and indeed, I am sure, next year will continue to be prepared to submit it. In my view, it is a draft resolution that offers the possibility for a general agreement if the other side, the Western Group, to be more precise, and perhaps, to single out delegations, two or three of the delegations in the Western Group, were prepared to make reciprocal concessions.

As this draft has not been circulated, and as I think this is worth while on this occasion when, I repeat, you have quite rightly stressed the need to arrive at an agreement on the Conference's agenda item 1, I shall read it out in extenso -- I only have it in English.

(continued in English): "The Conference on Disarmament decides to establish an Ad Hoc Committee on item 1 of its agenda with the objective of carrying out the multilateral negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban-treaty.

The Ad Hoc Committee will set up two Working Groups which will deal respectively with the following interrelated questions.

- A. Working Group 1 -- structure and scope of the treaty.
- B. Working Group 2 -- compliance and verification.

Pursuant to its mandate, the Ad Hoc Committee will take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives. In addition, it will draw on the knowledge and experience that have been accumulated over the years in the consideration of a comprehensive test ban in the successive multilateral negotiating bodies and the trilateral negotiations. The Ad Hoc Committee will also take into account the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events.

The Ad Hoc Committee will report to the Conference on Disarmament on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1986 session."

(continued in Spanish): I am convinced that to any observer objectively analysing the contents of this preliminary draft resolution, it would be very difficult to understand why the Conference on Disarmament has not been able to agree on this text or one very similar to it.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Mexico for his statement.

As I announced earlier today, I intend now to adjourn the plenary meeting and hold immediately afterwards the informal meeting devoted to the consideration of the substance of item 2 on the agenda.

As we have a long list of speakers for our plenary meeting next Tuesday, I suggest that we start the plenary meeting at 10 a.m. sharp. Otherwise it will not be possible to conclude the list of speakers in the morning. If there is no objection we shall proceed accordingly.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 5 August, at 10 a.m. The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.05 p.m.

## CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.376

5 August 1986

ENGLISH

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### FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND SEVENTH-SIXTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 5 August 1986, at 10.00 a.m.

President: Mr. A. Beeslev (Canada)

GE.86-63817/1604e

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 376th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

Allow me to make a brief opening statement, since this is the first formal plenary meeting over which I am presiding.

Canada feels particularly honoured to be entrusted with the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament during its important closing, report-writing and intersessional period. We shall endeavour to fulfil our responsibilities in a manner which fully reflects the high value Canada attaches to the work of the Conference on Disarmament.

In an era when the awesome realities of existing and emerging weapons technologies are a cause for concern to the peoples of all countries and continents, the task of devising effective agreed arms control and disarmament measures cannot simply be left to those who possess the largest arsenals. The Conference on Disarmament, which is the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, therefore performs an indispensable political and institutional role.

The fact that Canada's Presidency occurs during the concluding month of this year's session gives me an opportunity to put forward some reflections on the current international situation in relation to arms control and disarmament, and on the recent work of the Conference on Disarmament in that context.

The attention of the world, understandably, is focused on the negotiations of the United States of America and the USSR being conducted, literally, just down the road from the Conference on Disarmament. This attention often takes the form of an impatient clamour for quick results. Such expressions of impatience are politically and humanly understandable. However, we would do well to keep in mind the magnitude and complexity of the agreed objectives which the negotiating parties have set for themselves: no less than "the prevention of an arms race in space and its termination on Earth; the limitation and reduction of nuclear arms; and the strengthening of strategic stability, leading ultimately to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons".

It must also be borne in mind that the issues under negotiation involve vital security interests not only of the negotiating parties themselves but of all the members of the Conference on Disarmament and indeed all the peoples of the world. Viewed in this light, while many may have hoped for more rapid progress, there are no grounds for discouragement at this time, there are in fact hopeful signs. Available evidence strongly suggests that both parties are approaching their task with a seriousness and commitment that bodes well for eventual substantive results. It is particularly encouraging when concrete, substantive proposals are put forward at the negotiating table, as has recently been the case, rather than first being announced in public. I am sure that all members of the Conference on Disarmament would agree on the importance of conducting ourselves in ways which are supportive of continuing,

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serious pursuit of those all-important negotiations, while not abdicating our individual and collective responsibility to advance our own work with a sense of real urgency.

The arms control negotiations and discussions of the Conference on Disarmament may understandably attract fewer headlines than the bilaterals, but this should not be taken as an indication of their unimportance. It has been your task to address some of the most politically sensitive and technically difficult issues which Governments confront in this area. Just as important, in its role as a sounding board as well as a negotiating forum, the Conference on Disarmament helps in registering emerging issues of concern among political leaders and in defining areas for new negotiated measures. Your work can thus also contribute invaluable to establishing the tone and texture of the broader arms control and disarmament process. Your current session has been characterized by a most welcome lessening of polemics; there appears to be an increasing trend toward thoughtful, substantive statements, coupled with the submission of practical working papers. I applaud this new spirit, and this new approach.

As for the Conference on Disarmament's priorities, the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction is a central task of the arms control and disarmament process. Your efforts to negotiate a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons therefore is rightly a priority item on your work agenda. Official confirmation by the United Nations Secretary-General of repeated chemical weapons use in the Gulf war, which Canada resolutely condemns, as well as reports of efforts by other countries to acquire a chemical weapons capability, must add to our collective sense of urgency to achieve progress on this item. Canada does not favour diverting efforts from the negotiation of a comprehensive ban in order to address the proliferation problem separately. Nevertheless, out of concern for the problem, Canada recently increased to 14 the number of chemicals subject to export controls and, in consultation with several other countries, we are implementing a warning list procedure for a longer list of chemicals.

In the effort to negotiate a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons, there were several welcome developments during the current session of the Conference on Disarmament. The United States delegation made an important clarification of its thinking on how a treaty might apply to differing social systems. The USSR delegation made new and positive substantive proposals relating to certain aspects of verification of a treaty, which my Government hopes will soon be supplemented by further proposals dealing with other aspects of verification. The Canadian Government hopes also that the important recent United Kingdom initiative will facilitate a convergence of views on the sensitive and vital issue of challenge inspections. Under energetic and notably competent chairmanship, the Ad Hoc Committee has made further progress toward resolving some of the more difficult technical issues. The Canadian delegation submitted two working papers as a contribution to the collective effort. The holding by the Netherlands of a workshop relating to verification of non-production, as well as the broad attendance at that workshop, was gratifying and encouraging. It is important that the momentum thus generated be maintained, including through inter-sessional work to the extent practicable.

(The President)

The issue of a ban on nuclear tests has properly continued to occupy a prominent place in the Conference's agenda. The negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear test ban remains a fundamental objective of the Canadian Government. We were therefore disappointed at the failure to agree on a mandate for a subsidiary body on this question, which might have permitted practical work in preparing the ground for the negotiation of such a ban. This session, nevertheless, was not without positive developments. We have noted carefully, and welcome, the recent Soviet statement indicating a forthcoming approach on technical and institutional matters relating to the establishment and operation of a global seismic monitoring network. We are also pleased that the USSR and the United States of America are holding expert level discussions on nuclear test issues. Australia's call for a decision to establish an international seismic network is wholly consistent with Canada's longstanding concern to develop means for reliably verifying a test ban. The Conference on Disarmament is aware that we are upgrading a seismic array in our own northern territory and have commissioned other related research, and that we will be conducting a technical workshop in Ottawa this autumn, at which we hope Conference members will be widely represented. In the Canadian view, a gradual incremental step-by-step approach will be required if a comprehensive test ban is to become a reality. We intend to pursue vigorously our efforts to this end in the Conference on Disarmament and in other forums.

The prevention of an arms race in outer space is a high priority for Canada, and this Conference agenda item warrants special effort and attention. As was the case last year, Canada submitted a substantive working paper designed to facilitate consideration of existing relevant international law and the possible need for it to be supplemented by additional negotiated measures. We have also commissioned extensive research into the potential for using existing technology for purposes of space-based verification. We intend in the future to make the results of this research more widely available.

It was a matter of disappointment that a mandate for a subsidiary body on the outer space item was agreed only half way through the 1986 session. As a result, for a second consecutive year, only half of the session's time could be devoted to substantive deliberations. Once the mandate was agreed, the ensuing discussion was on the whole characterized by an impressive sobriety and thoughtfulness. In the Canadian view, the existing mandate is demonstrating its usefulness.

The Conference on Disarmament is also engaged in negotiation aimed at banning radiological weapons, which fortunately are not yet known to exist. My Government recognizes that following the tragic accident at Chernobyl, there are heightened concerns about the potential consequences of attacks on peaceful nuclear facilities. My Government hopes that there can be early agreement on how this issue can be most effectively addressed, so as to avoid prolonged further delay in concluding a radiological weapons ban.

Unfortunately, concrete achievements at the Conference on Disarmament in recent years have been scarce. This may be an indicator not so much of failure as of limits. Delegations at the Conference can achieve no more than what their respective instructions, reflective of perceived national interest and political will, allow. Nevertheless, Canada would join with others in urging a searching re-examination of the methods and procedures whereby the

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Conference on Disarmament conducts its operations. It would be regrettable, possibly tragic, if opportunities for progress were missed due to institutional inefficiencies or failings.

In conclusion, I am confident Ambassador Beesley can count on the support and co-operation of all delegations in bringing this year's Conference on Disarmament session efficaciously to its conclusion.

That concludes the message of the Secretary of State for External Affairs.

I should now like to take the opportunity to pay tribute to my distinguished predecessor, Ambassador U Tin Tun, Permanent Representative of Burma, who guided our work so skilfully during the busy month of July. I know that I speak for all distinguished delegates in conveying to him our most sincere appreciation for the effective manner in which he presided over our deliberations. He spared no effort in pressing forward our work, particularly on nuclear issues. While we share his regret that consultations directed to reaching consensus were not successful, it is stating the obvious to say that this is through no fault of his. Consultations will, of course, continue, and I am available to assist in any further effort aimed at finding common ground in the short time which remains available to us during this annual session.

Distinguished delegates, we are all aware that this month of August will be an extremely busy one for the Conference on Disarmament. There is a widespread desire, which I share, for further progress in our negotiations on chemical weapons and for the completion of our work on the Comprehensive Programme on Disarmament, as well as the continuation of other consultations on other pending issues relating to agenda items 1, 2 and 3, right up to the closing deadlines which are in the process of being established by the respective chairmen of subsidiary bodies, in consultation with the secretariat and other delegations. At the same time, we must, of course, ensure that we complete our report and approve it by 29 August, the date of the close of the present session.

Another matter which has been pending for a long time is that of the expansion of the membership of the Conference. In our report to the General Assembly last year, the Conference reported its decision to intensify its consultations with a view to taking a positive decision at this annual session. I am sure all of us appreciate the interest shown by a number of States seeking to become full members. I believe that the time has come for us to look again at this matter and see if new ideas and approaches might allow us to break the present deadlock, since the lack of progress on this question could affect the credibility of the Conference.

We are all aware of the need to use our resources effectively, the more so in light of the reduced time and technical services arising out of the financial constraints within which we are operating. Let there be no doubt, however, on two issues: firstly, our determination to continue to make as much substantive progress on as many agenda items as possible during the remaining days of the session; and second, that, notwithstanding the financial constraints, every group and every delegation has the right to express its views and have them appropriately recorded.

(The President)

If we work together towards the common objectives that I have outlined, drawing benefit from the more positive atmosphere and improved prospects referred to in today's message from Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, there is every reason to hope and expect that we will have utilized our time effectively by the close of this session.

This will require, undoubtedly, the complete commitment and co-operation not only of your President, the Chairmen of the Ad Hoc Committees, and of the Secretary-General of the Conference and his able staff, but of every delegation here. I propose to look to my predecessor, Ambassador U Tin Tun, and, if I may, to my predecessors, Ambassadors Cámpora and Cromartie, who presided over our report-writing sessions in 1985 and 1984 respectively, for guidance and "technical assistance". I shall also welcome advice and suggestions from any of you during this final busy month, as well, of course, as during the intersessional period.

I should now like to turn to our business for today. In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference starts today its consideration of item 7 on its agenda, entitled "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, radiological weapons". However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the United States of America, Indonesia, Poland and Cuba. I now give the floor to the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Lowitz.

Mr. LOWITZ (United States of America): Mr. President, the United States delegation extends to you its congratulations and best wishes on your assumption of the Chair both for the closing month of our session and for the added tasks of the intersessional period. As the parties to one of the world's oldest successful disarmament agreements, the Rush-Bagot Treaty of 1817, our countries have worked together in peace over many years to extend the domain of international security through negotiated measures. We pledge you our full support as the Conference concludes its 1986 session.

My delegation's congratulations and thanks also go to Ambassador U Tin Tun of Burma for successfully presiding over our activities during the month of July. As a newcomer to the Conference, he has distinguished himself by his patience and willingness to seek out ways to move our work forward.

Tomorrow, 6 August, is the anniversary of an event that spawned a thousand hopes and a thousand fears. On that day, 41 short years ago, a light brighter than a thousand suns burst over the Japanese city of Hiroshima, and the first nuclear explosion in war began the proximate set of actions that rapidly brought to an end a long and devastating war.

Like many wars, that largest of all wars need not have happened at all if those then in effective control of the countries the United States and its allies opposed had not ignored the lessons of history and sought unwarranted and unjust power and influence. But the seeds of aggression had taken root, and the overreaching of a few was at the expense of many innocent men, women and children.



(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

Historians may debate the precise chain of events and causes that led to the final termination of fighting in August of 1945, but the brief interval between the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the new era which began in Tokyo Harbour is fact, just as factual as the millions of deaths in the Second World War in hundreds of other cities, in concentration camps and countrysides, by famine and fire, by rifle and machine gun and high explosive. And fact as well is the strong bond of alliance and friendship that then emerged and flourishes today between former adversaries.

There is no question but that nuclear weapons, twice used, have revolutionized man's thinking about peace and war -- the energy of the atom has for all foreseeable time changed our lives, both collectively and as individuals. There is no question but that the march of technology since 1945, and the enormous arsenals of nuclear weapons, threaten the future of our small planet. There is no question but that the use of even a small fraction of these arsenals would make the destruction wrought by all past wars pale into insignificance. And thus there is no question but that a nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought.

The atomic bomb gave added impetus to the efforts of those then engaged in founding the United Nations. Well before the world learned of the existence of nuclear weapons, many realized that, out of the ashes of the world conflict and on the wreckage of the League of Nations, it was essential to create new ways to join the nations of the world to work for peace and against aggression.

Both the atomic bomb, and the fearful destruction visited on European and Asian and African lands by shell and bomb and bullet, spurred the efforts of the international community after 1945 to escape the trap of war. People had suffered too grievously, the shocks were too great. This time, it was said, the lessons had been learned, and humankind would live differently in the future.

It was not to be.

How many millions of men and women and children have died in war since 1945, though not one by the nuclear weapon? How many aggressive actions have been perpetrated on unwilling victims since 1945, though not one involving the use of a nuclear weapon? How many conflicts between nations -- conflicts that scarcely could have been imagined in 1945 -- have sprung up and continue to fester or to flare openly? Korea, South-East Asia, South Asia, South-West Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, Africa -- it seems that a peaceful land is the exceptional land in a world full of strife.

But in this strife-filled world there exists a great paradox, a paradox that the United States recognizes is not without danger and should not be allowed to endure without end. That paradox -- the paradox of nuclear deterrence -- preoccupies our thoughts, and such energies as we in this Conference and others working for disarmament can bring to bear. The reality is that nuclear weapons -- because of or in spite of their overwhelming power of blast and heat and radiation -- have not been employed for 41 years. They have not been used despite the existence of mortal conflicts, despite the masses of arms poised in readiness across the frontier that divides East and

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(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

West. Existing conflicts that could easily have escalated to all-out and major war, under other circumstances, have not reached such a level.

We sometimes hear it said that the paradox of nuclear deterrence is one that makes the super-Powers happy -- as if my country were unaware of the implications of what occurred at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, or of the even more terrible destruction that would result from a nuclear war. It is alleged that the United States is satisfied with the status quo -- that it seeks blindly to perpetuate it, or even to pursue the chimera of nuclear superiority. It is said that nuclear weapons have created two classes of States. All of these sayings are simply that -- sayings. The reality is that the United States sees no merit in any competition in nuclear arms -- it actively seeks deep reductions in their numbers and their eventual abolition.

The United States in particular sees no value in the hair-trigger situation of large numbers of intercontinental ballistic missiles poised to fly on a few minutes' notice, a situation we find especially destabilizing. The United States sees no value in any further spread of nuclear weapons, which can only destabilize a fragile balance and make more difficult the already challenging task of nuclear disarmament. §

In addition, the United States sees no merit in creating artificial distinctions. Nuclear weapons in and of themselves have neither created nor destroyed the impulses in the hearts and minds of men. They ought not obscure our need for insights into the root causes of all war. They ought not blind us to the connections between nuclear deterrence and conventional weapons, to the disparities in the balance of conventional forces that so greatly contribute to the need for a nuclear deterrent.

Since 1945, the United States has sought solutions to the problems posed by all weapons, by all wars, with full recognition of how enormous is the change that the existence of nuclear weapons has made to this search. In this regard, the United States recognizes that the large-scale use of nuclear weapons would wreck the society of the attacked State, and the inevitable retaliation by a nuclear-armed Power would visit similar retribution on the attacker. And it recognizes the peril of nuclear weapons to all mankind, if they were used in numbers sufficient to spread large amounts of fallout, or perhaps even to trigger climatic change.

But true peace in the nuclear age must be more than an absence of war. True international security will require more than the absence of arms. President Reagan has made this point very clearly: "Nations do not distrust each other because they are armed, they arm themselves because they distrust each other".

In this context, the search for a more peaceful and secure world has prompted initiatives in which the United States takes pride. From Lend-Lease to the Marshall Plan, and through bilateral aid programmes, it has helped to sustain and to rebuild societies disrupted by war. Through the great multilateral lending organizations and bilaterally, it has supported needed development in scores of States around the world. These efforts have sought to promote the conditions for free, just and prosperous lives, and to redress inequalities that can lead to conflict.

(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

The United States effort to control and to reduce arms through negotiated international agreements has been motivated by the same desire to create a more peaceful and secure world. We should not forget the first post-war attempts such as the Baruch Plan, or Atoms for Peace, which led to the use of nuclear energy under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency. We should not diminish the signal importance of such agreements as the Limited Test Ban and the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty and the Treaty of Tlatelolco, in the negotiation of which our colleague, the distinguished representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles, played such a key role.

It is worth noting that most of the provisions of existing arms control agreements do not deal with conventional weapons. As our distinguished visitor from Pakistan, Foreign Minister Yaqub-Khan, rightly pointed out at our last plenary meeting, there is a great need for control and reductions applied to these weapons as well. Technology has unfortunately increased many-fold the destructive effects of these much more widely available weapons. And conventional conflict risks escalation to nuclear conflict. It is time that the international community devote more of its attention to conventional arms control.

The threats to international security posed by nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons today are real and they are large. The future is no less challenging for us than the past was for our predecessors. And so we keep trying, we keep searching for the peaceful solutions, for the steps to more stable ground. The United States has made far-reaching proposals to reduce and eliminate nuclear arsenals, both strategic and intermediate range. It has initiated a search for defensive technologies that would protect rather than threaten. Together with the Soviet Union it agreed in January 1985 to the present nuclear and space talks. My delegation is encouraged by recent developments affecting these negotiations. For the first time, as President Reagan stated on 29 July, "We are not only pointed in the right direction -- toward reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons -- we have begun to move down that road".

Just last week the United States and the Soviet Union met here in Geneva for discussions on the entire scope of issues related to nuclear testing. The two sides expect to meet again here early next month, after a recess to allow further study of the issues they discussed.

In the Conference on Disarmament and bilaterally with the Soviet Union, United States efforts to conclude a chemical weapons ban have intensified. In Stockholm and Vienna, negotiations respecting conventional weapons continue.

The United States is not satisfied with the present, any more than any other concerned State. It recognizes the slow pace of progress, and it regrets negative developments such as non-compliance with existing agreements, and, most recently, the rejection by the Soviet Union of President Reagan's call for establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint pending conclusion of a verifiable agreement on deep and equitable reductions in offensive nuclear arms.

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(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

Our task and challenge is to continue, to be persistent, to seek agreement where it is now possible, and to create the circumstances for future agreement where it now seems impossible. Agreement for its own sake, and a lack of seriousness about compliance with agreements in being, damage our chances for a more secure future. Our own sense of well-being should tell us that our future demands much more.

These are the lessons of Hiroshima: that we never forget the suffering of not only the Japanese people but of all peoples affected by that war and by all wars; that we study our own minds and reflect on our own objectives; that we realize what, in the concrete, our technologies can do in war and for peace; that we be open to each other's initiatives, and that we seek to reach agreements that will stand the test of time and genuinely serve the cause of peace.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of the United States of America for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. I now call on the distinguished representative of Indonesia, Ambassador Sutowardoyo.

Mr. SUTOWARDOYO (Indonesia): Mr. President, speaking at the first plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament under your Presidency, it is my great pleasure to congratulate you on your assumption of the prestigious office entailing demanding duties which, my delegation has no doubt, you, with your wisdom and customary aplomb backed by a long and varied experience in the diplomatic service of your country, will be able to discharge to our entire satisfaction. It is only fitting that in this concluding month of August, when we prepare our report, the Presidency is held by the representative of Canada, whose delegation has contributed so much to the work of the Conference. I am happy to pledge hereby our full co-operation with you in the performance of your tasks.

I should further like to extend, through you, to Ambassador U Tin Tun of Burma and Ambassador Tellalov of Bulgaria, who have preceded you in the chair respectively in the months of July and June, my felicitations for the efficient and tactful manner in which they, and each in his own way, have presided over our deliberations.

I should also like to avail myself of the opportunity to extend a warm welcome to our new colleagues who have joined us since the start of our session this year and at the same time to assure them of our readiness to continue to co-operate with them in the same way that we have co-operated with their predecessors.

As we are nearing the end of our summer session the recently initiated United States-Soviet bilateral talks at the level of experts on nuclear-test issues is being held up by some as good news on the nuclear disarmament front.

We share in the hope for the success of the talks but we cannot share in any optimism or great expectation as to their results. This applies to these as well as to other bilateral negotiations concerning nuclear arms. For one thing, we have been disappointed too many times in the past. For another, the

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(Mr. Sutowardoyo, Indonesia)

information which has been given to us or has come to us through the media has been fragmentary and sometimes confusing, or even downright contradictory, so that we cannot make head or tail of them.

As to the present bilateral talks on NTB issues, their scope and nature seems to be too limited to warrant any expectation that they will lead to an early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty which we hold essential for any movement towards the halting of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament.

My delegation resents the cavalier treatment the Conference continues to be subjected to, especially on matters affecting nuclear arms, as I have alluded to earlier and as witness our repeated failures to establish an ad hoc committee for any of the relevant items on our agenda. We have been further distressed by the nature of the arguments which have been presented in the course of our current session against positions on nuclear issues which we share which, carried to their logical consequences, would amount to cynical, open advocacy against any restrictions on the pretext of the need for self-preservation whereby not the slightest consideration is given to the interests and concerns of the small, non-nuclear-weapon countries of the Third World.

Without going into the substance of the matter for now, I should like to say in this connection what my Foreign Minister, Dr. Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, had to say several years ago on the subject of disarmament, namely that the small and non-nuclear-weapon nations have not only the right but also the duty to make their voice heard even if they do so as "potential victims".

At the present stage of our work, when we are about to start with the drafting of our report, I should like to refer briefly to the situation with regard to the different items on our agenda, and at the same time to state my delegation's views on them, especially since it has not done so for quite some time. Let me say, at the outset, that on the fundamental issues my delegation's position remains unchanged.

If anything, what I want to stress in this statement is the near frustration of my delegation at failing to see any progress in our dealing with the so-called nuclear issues while research, development and probably also deployment continue, and the armament race is extended to outer space, threatening us with the spectre of weapons and weapon systems so complex and intricate as to be beyond regulation or control.

It is a matter of great disappointment to my delegation that we have again failed to set up ad hoc committees for the three items heading our agenda, which also happen to be the items to which we assign the highest priority, namely, items 1, 2 and 3.

With respect to item 1, Nuclear Test Ban, my delegation cannot accept the arguments which have been advanced that a comprehensive test ban is not possible at the moment because of the inadequacy of the state of the art of verification at present and that tests are needed to ensure the reliability of existing arsenals. Those arguments have been effectively refuted here and

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elsewhere, and my delegation can only draw the inference that tests serve no other purpose but the qualitative improvement of existing weapons.

Seen in this light, the one-year Soviet moratorium on nuclear testing is to be highly commended and we dare hope at this late hour -- as it is to end tomorrow -- that the United States Government could still be persuaded to join or that it could be seized upon some way or other by the two Powers to work out some agreement or arrangement amounting to the taking of the first step towards halting the nuclear arms race.

As to item 2, Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament, my delegation welcomes its being taken up during the summer session at informal meetings of the plenary, even though its being dealt with in an ad hoc committee would have been more appropriate. My delegation rejects as contrived the arguments which have been brought forward purporting to show that the halting of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament would not be in the best interest of mankind at least where the present conditions persist.

As regards item 3, Prevention of Nuclear War and Other Related Matters, my delegation continues to hold the view that the prevention of nuclear war is the number one priority issue to which all efforts must be devoted. We reject the thesis purporting to establish that nuclear war is most likely to breakout as a consequence of a conventional war and the thereby implied equation of the risks inherent in a conventional war with those of a nuclear war, as being intended more as a means to divert attention.

We continue to hold the view that ad hoc committees should be established for items 1, 2 and 3 with adequate mandates in accordance with the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and on the basis of subsequent resolutions of the General Assembly.

Item 4, Chemical Weapons, is the one item in which most progress has been made, even though by common standards it has been slow. My delegation feels encouraged by the more truly businesslike exchanges which have characterized the discussions in the Ad Hoc Committee as well as in the Working Groups this year, enabling real, substantive work to be done.

Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee and the Chairmen of the three Working Groups should be commended for their excellent work and exemplary dedication. The important and valuable results which have been achieved through painstaking work under their guidance should be given due recognition.

We are also grateful to the Netherlands Government for organizing the workshop on verification of non-production of chemical weapons in Holland last June, which has been very instructive and useful and, I might as well say, has helped to advance our work on this important question. I should like to make use of this opportunity to express my Government's appreciation to the Dutch Government for having taken the much-needed initiative.

Some major issues still need to be resolved to justify optimism at this stage about the prospect of an early conclusion of our work on chemical weapons. Indeed the questions which remain are of a nature which might daunt

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less hardened spirits. Take, for instance, the question of challenge on-site inspection in the context of Article IX which is being dealt with in Working Group C, of which we feel honoured to have a member of the Indonesian delegation acting as its Chairman. Further intensive work is still required for its final solution. But, on the other hand, let us consider who would have dared to predict even at the beginning of our session this year, that by this time we would have reached the stage in which we are finding ourselves now.

Important progress has certainly been made in the negotiation of the issue of on-site inspection by challenge, but it seems that further substantive work on the basis of the results achieved is needed in order that they can get the recognition they deserve in our view. Perhaps the remaining few weeks of this session could be usefully availed of for achieving this end.

My delegation believes that, given the necessary political will, on which we have been given plenty of assurances, with hard work and sufficient flexibility, a constructive approach and readiness to make mutual concessions all around, a solution of this and other still unresolved problems may yet prove to be within our reach at least during our next session.

The often-mentioned use of chemical weapons and their alleged further spread in the past few years, in addition to the great expectation that has been raised world-wide in the Conference's current work on the CW convention should make us all realize that we cannot afford to, and indeed must not, fail.

Indonesia attaches great importance to item 5, Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. We share in the concern at the prospect of outer space becoming a new arena of arms competition between the rivalling major Powers as current developments indicate. Outer space as the common heritage of mankind must be reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes and uses that are beneficial to all mankind. This is the principle that has been endorsed by the international community. We hold this principle to be sacrosanct.

There are other reasons deriving from our country's location and singular geographical composition which make us take a special interest in item 5. As a country consisting of over 10,000 islands, big and small, scattered in an area straddling the Equator, and extending roughly 5,000 kms from east to west and 2,000 kms from north to south at its widest, our domestic telecommunications system is largely dependent on the unhindered functioning of a space-based communications satellite. We are concerned at the way the militarization of outer space would impinge on peaceful satellite communications. As an equatorial country we are not less worried about the uses satellites in geostationary orbit might be put to. The GSO is a limited natural resource and its uses exclusively for peaceful purposes must be safeguarded.

We have followed with great interest the discussion and debate in the Ad hoc Committee which is so ably chaired this year by Ambassador Bayart of Mongolia. We share the view that the currently existing legal régime is not sufficient for our goal of preventing an arms race in outer space. We remain convinced of the need to remedy this situation on an urgent basis lest further

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advances in space weapons technology would render it more difficult or impossible altogether. In this context the banning of anti-satellite weapons should, in our view, be given first priority.

As to item 6, Negative Security Assurances, my delegation despairs at the fact that none of the other four nuclear-weapon Powers has so far seen fit to follow the example given by China in giving unqualified and unconditional assurances that it will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against countries not possessing nuclear arms.

This continued injustice done to the non-nuclear-weapon countries which have renounced the acquisition of nuclear arms is all the more disquieting in the absence of any progress towards nuclear disarmament and of the less than universal adherence to the existing nuclear non-proliferation régime. My delegation hopes that by the time we resume our work next year the picture would have improved sufficiently to warrant the establishment of an ad hoc committee which would then be able to engage itself in meaningful work.

With respect to item 7, Radiological Weapons, the tragic accident at Chernobyl should have made us all the more acutely aware of the danger of the release of ionizing radiation, either by accident -- as was the case with Chernobyl -- or by design, for instance, as a consequence of an attack on a nuclear facility. For us, the Chernobyl incident should have convinced everybody that the prohibition of attack on nuclear facilities should be made part of a convention banning radiological weapons.

As a developing country set to make use of peaceful nuclear technology for social and economic development we feel vulnerable to the possibility of such attack or threat thereof. The existence of high-precision weapons and their further refinement abetted by the relentless advance of weapons technology should perceivably justify our apprehension of the great risks to which we may become exposed. We are concerned lest the few research reactors we have acquired as an investment for the future and nuclear power generators we may have at a later stage of our development, and other equally sensitive facilities become the target of such attack or such threat.

Particularly disturbing to us in this connection is the fact that in our country these facilities are located in densely populated areas so that an attack on any of them may result in the loss of a disproportionately large number of human lives. This problem of having nuclear facilities of very low capacity or potency in localities with high population density is not only peculiar to Indonesia but is one which we believe we share with many other developing countries.

We further hold the view that the provisions of the radiological weapons convention must in no way hamper the activities of States, especially developing States, and international co-operation, in the field of the harnessing of the technology of radiation for peaceful purposes, such as in medicine and agriculture. Such activities should instead be encouraged. States engaged in such activities should be given the necessary stimuli and protection.



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We should like to start, therefore, in the context of the elaboration of a convention on the banning of radiological weapons from the principle that all nuclear facilities which in some way or other have been certified as to their peacefulness must be provided protection as a matter of course. It would be difficult for my delegation to agree to anything that does not adequately meet this concern of ours which is shared by most developing nations.

We also hold the view, consistent with our principled position on nuclear weapons, that the definition of radiological weapons in the convention must be such as to preclude its being interpreted as legitimizing nuclear weapons.

We have followed with great interest the discussion and debate in the Ad hoc Committee and in the three Contact Groups. Ambassador Lechuga Hevia of Cuba, the Committee's Chairman, and the Chairmen of the Contact Groups, Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden, Ambassador Butler of Australia and Ambassador Meiszter of Hungary, merit our thanks and commendation for their untiring efforts to advance work on this item, while having to operate under a restricted mandate and being hampered by conflicting views on certain basic issues as well as on some questions of approach among different groups and delegations.

With regard to item 8, Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, my delegation is very much distressed at the prospect that this year again the Conference will not be able to present a clean text of the requested draft programme to the United Nations General Assembly. Our continued failure in the Ad hoc Committee, which has been engaged in its drafting for several years under the leadership of such an eminent personality as Ambassador García Robles of Mexico, to agree to indicate in even a few paragraphs, i.e. in very broad outlines, the road to be traversed in the pursuit of obvious disarmament goals, is perhaps symptomatic of the weakness of our commitment, taken collectively, to the early attainment of those goals and of the underlying mistrust and suspicions which we have of each other.

My delegation, in its capacity as co-ordinator for the subject, has been responsible for the formulation of the subparagraph on a Zone of Peace in South-East Asia, which was incorporated in the Report of the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament last year (document CD/634). In all likelihood, that subparagraph will be reproduced unchanged in the Committee's report this year. With regard to the footnote in which one delegation registers its reservation, my delegation hopes that the reservation, made on procedural ground, would be lifted before the Committee's report is adopted by the Conference.

As delegations are aware, the countries of ASEAN, the Association of South-East Asian Nations, of which Indonesia is a member together with Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Brunei Darussalam (which joined the Association in 1984) have agreed as far back as in 1971 on the establishment of a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality in South-East Asia. ZOPFAN, the acronym by which the concept is conveniently referred to, is conceived as a means to ensure peace and stability in the subregion and at the

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same time to contribute to the promotion of international security by insulating it from Big Power rivalry and by excluding interference by outside Powers in the affairs of the countries of the subregion.

Agreement has also been reached among the six countries of ASEAN to undertake a study on the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South-East Asia as an essential component of ZOPFAN. This proposition has now matured to such an extent that since last June work has been started for the purpose of preparing a draft treaty, which my delegation hopes would be ready before the ASEAN Summit next year.

It is our ardent hope that the proposed South-East Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone will become a reality in the near future, forming a natural extension to the recently created South Pacific nuclear-free zone, whose birth we have so warmly welcomed.

By way of conclusion allow me to say the following. The work in which we are engaged in the Conference is a difficult one. Disarmament involves the security and survival of States, whose safeguarding is considered to be a supreme national interest, and thus inviolable. No disarmament measure is theoretically possible without the agreement of each of the about 200 sovereign nation-States now existing in this world. In the Conference we have the rule of decision-making by consensus. It has struck my delegation that in the last several weeks national security and survival -- though not specifically so mentioned -- has been evoked more frequently than in the past to argue against the taking of certain specific arms restriction or disarmament measures, particularly where nuclear weapons are involved. If everyone does so the Conference's work will soon become paralysed. The non-aligned and neutral non-nuclear-weapon countries which do not belong to any military alliance would be the ones most entitled to evoke national security and survival since they are among the least protected and the most vulnerable.

I would be the last to say that countries should make a sacrifice by accepting unacceptable risks to their security for the good of all. I would only say that every time we feel the need to do so we should carefully consider if the risk we are asked to, or should, take is really so great as to imperil our security and survival. At the same time we should take into account that others, including our adversary and innocent bystanders are entitled to the same measure of security guarantee as we are. National security and survival must not be evoked too easily and too rapidly, and certainly we must eschew the penchant for 200 per cent security for ourselves. If everyone conforms to that spirit, the Conference's work would be much easier. But if the name of the game is superiority, that would be an altogether different matter.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Indonesia for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. I now call upon the distinguished representative of Poland, Ambassador Turbanski.

Mr. TURBANSKI (Poland): First of all, let me congratulate you on your assumption of the Presidency of this Conference on Disarmament for the last month of its 1986 session. It is obvious that, as in previous years, this is

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(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

going to be one of the most difficult periods to guide the work of the Conference. I am quite confident that your personal charisma, your diplomatic skill and the well-known Canadian devotion to the cause of disarmament are the best guarantees of smooth and efficient proceedings of the Conference in August. Let me assure you of my delegation's readiness to closely co-operate with you in the spirit of friendliness and mutual understanding which prevail between our delegations. I would also like to express my gratitude to your predecessor, Ambassador U Tin Tun of Burma, for the able way in which he guided the Conference for his efforts and contribution to our common work.

As the distinguished representative of the United States, Ambassador Lowitz, already recalled, tomorrow 41 years will have passed since the day when a mushroom cloud rose over Hiroshima. Thousands of victims and unprecedented destruction of the city signified that man took possession of means of war which could wipe out in seconds all the civilization built over the ages. The tragedy of Hiroshima gave a warning to the whole of humanity.

In spite of this, in the next 40 years we moved from a world with few atomic bombs to one with tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. They regrettably continue to be tested and improved. In this context one cannot but note with respect the unilateral moratorium on nuclear-weapons testing undertaken by the Soviet Union exactly a year ago. Poland deplores that this example of reason and good will has not been followed by the other major nuclear Power.

The United States position with regard to a nuclear-test ban remains the main obstacle in starting by the Conference a concrete work on a test-ban treaty, an important first step in the process of cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament. We sincerely hope that the recent and planned further bilateral USSR/United States contacts and the efforts within our Conference will bring much needed change in the United States position and will pave the way towards the solution of this most urgent question. We are now at a particularly critical point in postwar disarmament negotiations. Despite numerous talks no substantial step forward was made in the last few years. Some of the important arrangements, which in the not-so-distant past created hopes of curbing the increase of military arsenals, today are threatened. The armaments efforts are gaining dramatic speed. There is an imminent threat that the arms race will be driven into a new, higher spiral. Stories of star wars have ceased to be merely a subject for movie script-writers.

There is also an increasing understanding that unless we are able to prevent this new dangerous evolution in outer space, the search for solutions of acute problems on the Earth cannot but remain a story of failures. This is why my delegation would like to present again today some comments on item 5 of our agenda, "Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space", which is one of the most serious and pressing problems of our deliberations.

The history of disarmament negotiations is not only the history of achieved treaties, but also the history of lost opportunities.

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(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

So far there are no weapons in the Earth's orbit and there is still a chance to prevent military rivalry in outer space. Let us seize this opportunity. The basic rule of any medical treatment is non nocere -- to abstain from causing harm. The basic principle of curing the present situation should be not to make it worse. This common-sense logic has already led to a number of arms-control treaties which prevented military competition in some areas and fields. This sound approach, which can be termed as preventive arms control, is particularly valid today when we are pondering over the problem of outer space. In this vast and increasingly important area of human activity we must establish a strong bulwark against deadly competition, which, if not hindered today, will create enormously complicated problems tomorrow.

Our preventive action would be of great value in building confidence, so needed today among nations and so urgently sought in different forums. It would create much better conditions for disarmament negotiations. It would help to establish a good basis for peaceful co-operation in outer space for the benefit of all mankind.

It is a strong conviction of my delegation that this Conference, representing the world community, has an important role to play in preventing an arms race in outer space.

Poland attaches particular weight to the prevention of turning outer space into another domain of the arms race. It was emphasized in the statement made in this hall on 17 April of this year by the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland, Henryk Jaroszek. We expressed our deep satisfaction when it became possible to establish the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. It was a timely and significant step, notwithstanding the limited mandate we gave to this body.

We have been following with great interest the work of this Committee carried on under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Bayart of Mongolia. The Committee has become the forum for a substantive, active and stimulating discussion both on the existing legal régime of outer space and on proposals and new initiatives which could prevent an arms race in outer space. A considerable part of its debate has been devoted to defining basic terms and notions used in this new field of disarmament negotiations. It is a valuable exercise and an important stage in any negotiating process. As has been stressed by some speakers, the results which can emerge from this debate could become necessary "building blocks" of a future agreement. In fact, it is essential to know what we mean by using newly-coined terms or expressions.

What is more important, however, is to know what we want and what we can do. The process of creating "building blocks" will be much more fruitful if it is oriented towards a concrete goal, if we know what kind of an edifice we intend to build with these "blocks".

This Conference has received from the United Nations General Assembly a clear indication as to the way it should proceed in its efforts. It has been stressed in numerous General Assembly resolutions that the spread of an arms race to outer space should be prevented by concluding an appropriate

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(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

international agreement or agreements. This Geneva forum has been repeatedly requested to embark on negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on the text of such a treaty or treaties.

This clear guidance of the United Nations General Assembly should not be forgotten by some delegations when we define again the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee for its next session. The work of this Conference on prevention of an arms race in outer space cannot be just a simple consideration of the problem, but must be directed towards negotiating and reaching concrete agreement or agreements "preventing an arms race in all its aspects and guaranteeing that the outer space is used for exclusively peaceful purposes", as stated in General Assembly resolution 39/59.

After all the discussion we have had on this item, there is a pressing need to undertake a serious effort aimed at identifying the concrete end or ends of the work of Conference in this field. The urgency of the question has been recognized by the General Assembly, which has repeatedly asked the Conference to begin appropriate work "without delay" and called upon the States "to undertake immediate measures to prevent an arms race in outer space".

We are conscious that we are not working in a vacuum, that our work, including that on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, cannot be considered in isolation from other important negotiations and, in particular, in isolation from bilateral Soviet-American talks which are held in Geneva.

Poland wholeheartedly welcomed the agreement between the USSR and the United States to discuss bilaterally the most vital issues relating to nuclear and space weapons. We fully support the constructive Soviet approach to these talks. We understand their importance for the future of disarmament and we follow the dialogue with the hope that it will contribute to better mutual understanding and confidence of the Great Powers and will bring meaningful results. I am sure that our expectations are shared by everybody in this hall.

But does it mean that we should simply mark time and wait for the possible results of those negotiations? Let me quote the opinion of one of the States participating in those negotiations: "We cannot allow the Conference to sit idle and wait for results to be reached at neighbouring negotiations. What, in effect, prevents the starting of work on an agreement or agreements to exclude space from the sphere of the arms race, as called for by the fortieth session of the United Nations General Assembly in a resolution voted for by 151 States? Not only are there no contra-indications, but indeed there is every possible reason for it, particularly as all nuclear-weapon States and States with a space potential are represented here at the Conference".

This is the view expressed in June of this year by the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Vladimir Piotrovsky. We note this position with appreciation. I am sure that the similar attitude on the part of the United States would be most welcomed by all members of this Conference.

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(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

The fate of outer space, which is the natural environment for the whole of our small planet, cannot be determined merely by technical possibilities of military use of outer space nor by any single power which decides to take advantage of them. We cannot forget that the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 established not only some specific restrictions on the use of outer space, such as the prohibition to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, but also some general limitations. They include inter alia that: any activity of a State in outer space should take into account the common interests of all mankind in the use of outer space for peaceful purposes only; such an activity should be for the benefit and in the interests of all countries; and, further, it should be in the interest of international peace and security and promote international co-operation and understanding.

These restraints following from the language and the spirit of the Outer Space Treaty considerably limit the freedom of States in their outer space activities and give all the parties to the Treaty a legitimate right to express views on the question of how outer space is used, particularly when their interests as well as interests of international peace and security are threatened.

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This legitimate right must be recognized by all space Powers. This right is an important element of the foundation on which the work of this Conference on prevention of an arms race in outer space is based.

The discussion we have held so far on existing proposals and future initiatives has shown that there is a wide spectrum of measures which can be undertaken in this field.

They cover radical proposals such as the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from outer space against the Earth and the banning of all space-strike weapons, as well as suggestions for limited confidence-building measures which could be undertaken pending the realization of more far-reaching solutions, which include such valuable ideas as moratoria on the development and testing of space weapons. Our attention was drawn to a number of "partial" arrangements -- to a ban of anti-satellite weapons or ban of emplacement of weapons in the Earth's orbit. There was discussion on the idea of immunity of space objects and the prohibition of tests of ASAT systems. Steps to strengthen existing space law have been suggested.

It is not my intention to make a repertory or classification of all the proposals which appeared in our discussion. What I want to stress is that the work of the Ad Hoc Committee was substantive and useful for this stage. We were able to set an interesting possible menu. What we need now is to make our choice in order to move towards preparing a dish -- that is negotiating and reaching concrete agreement or agreements preventing an arms race in outer space. This is what this Conference has been asked to do and what its *raison d'être* is.

We are aware of the difficulties which are connected with this task, just as we are aware of some limitations on our efforts. But this cannot be an excuse for the lack of concrete action. Time is not our ally.

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

In fulfilling this task we need more imagination. In our discussions, the growing threat of anti-satellite weapons and anti-missile defence has often been stressed. In fact, their deployment would mean a qualitative change in the use of outer space. The consequences of this change should be assessed, however, not only in terms of the immediate negative impact for the security of nations but also in longer terms. Introduction of these weapons will not be the end but rather the beginning of a process. They must be considered as only the first chapter of a still unwritten book. One can also reasonably assume that if no limitations are established, in a foreseeable future more than two States could have space weapons at their disposal, thus escalating further the risk of war.

The 40-year lesson of "vertical" and "horizontal" proliferation of nuclear weapons -- from the Hiroshima bomb to the present arsenals -- is a good illustration of all the dangers we will have to face if we fail in our preventive action.

We also need more courage. The great danger of today is not only the existence of a number of difficult international problems. What is disturbing also is the anachronism in the search for their solution. This especially applies to the problem of security. It is urgent to begin to think about this problem in new ways. Neither international security nor the security of any nation will be ensured by development and deployment of space-weapons.

Finally, we need more of a feeling of responsibility to the forthcoming generations. If we are not able today to solve the problem of outer space, let us -- at least -- look for ways and means of postponing decisions which could lead to the point of no return. This could be done through unilaterally decided moratoria on development and testing of any type of space-strike weapons or through mutually agreed and verifiable agreements on not undertaking such development and testing for an agreed period of time. The Conference on Disarmament could play a significant role in sponsoring and elaborating such steps.

"Space exploration demands from all States new, truly global thinking and the renunciation of the categories of strength and military superiority". This is one of the basic assumptions of the ambitious Soviet programme of joint practical actions of all nations in peaceful exploration and use of outer space presented in the message of Nikolai Ryzhkov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, to the United Nations Secretary-General, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar.

It is difficult to overestimate the importance of this programme for wide, and open to all co-operation in the exploration and use of outer space. Such co-operation would mean not only a rational co-ordination and pooling of efforts that will bring tangible scientific and economic benefits to all nations. It could also be of great help in solving our task of prevention of an arms race in outer space. It will contribute significantly to trust and mutual understanding among nations. Exchange of information, joint projects, increasing openness of space activities will play a substantial role in facilitating the solution of the problem of verification. A World Space Agency, which has been proposed, could perform

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(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

similar tasks in assuring the peaceful uses of outer space to those fulfilled by the International Atomic Energy Agency in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

All this means that this important Soviet initiative should be advocated not only on ethical, scientific and economic grounds but also as an important part of efforts aiming at prevention of an arms race in outer space.

To secure that the exploration and use of outer space are carried on exclusively for peaceful purposes is one of the greatest challenges to the contemporary world. The solution of this problem is needed urgently and requires multiplication of efforts both in this Conference and in other forums. Prompt completion of the UNIDIR study on disarmament problems relating to outer space and the consequences of extending the arms race into outer space could be of great help in these efforts.

We certainly have a chance to get successfully through this period of decision on the future use of outer space, but only if all States give up egoistic political and military ambitions and seize the great opportunities of co-operation which it creates.

Before concluding, I should like to say that it is with sincere regret that we have learned that Ambassador Consalves, the distinguished representative of India, will leave us in just a few days. May I use this opportunity to express my deep appreciation and satisfaction for the co-operation we have developed during his assignment and to wish him all the very best in his new assignment.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Poland for his statement and for his very kind words to the President.

I now give the floor to our concluding speaker the distinguished representative of Cuba, Ambassador Lechuga Hevia.

Mr. LECHUGA HEVIA (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): We congratulate Ambassador Beesley on presiding over the Conference during this month. We are all very much aware of the ability of the distinguished representative of Canada, his diplomatic skill and his concern for the problems of disarmament, which augur well for the efficient guidance of our work. Last month Ambassador U Tin Tun of Burma showed his keen interest in resolving the problems facing the Conference, and we are indebted to him. We would also like to extend a very warm welcome to Ambassador Morelli Pando, the new representative of Peru. We are confident that he will make a positive contribution to the Conference's work.

Before this session ends, the delegation of Cuba wishes to refer briefly to agenda item 7. It is a commonplace that the negotiation of a legal instrument to prohibit the production and use of radiological weapons is a difficult task. The Conference on Disarmament has spent more than six years studying this item and is still only making slow progress. It is not easy to negotiate amid doubts and reservations concerning the possibility of the future existence of a weapon which many do not consider to be of any military value even if it should be developed. What we have before us in agenda item 7



(Mr. Lechuga Hevia, Cuba)

is a matter of prevention, of ensuring that another means of warfare does not come into existence and swell the military arsenals which are already bursting and keep the world in a precarious balance between war and peace.

We are of the view that this fact alone justifies the effort that has been made in the Conference to reach agreement, despite the fact that there are many doubts on the part of a wide range of countries, and also taking note of the suspicions that are sometimes voiced to the effect that any agreement on radiological weapons could serve as a smokescreen to divert attention from the absence of negotiations, because of a lack of political will, to ban the existing weapons which are actually threatening world peace today. But we must admit that there is a latent danger that radiological weapons may be produced and perhaps at this very moment work is being done on developing them in many laboratories and research centres. No one can guarantee that this is not the case.

We must recall that as a consequence of their normal operation all nuclear plants produce large quantities of radioactive waste which it has not so far been possible to destroy or neutralize. The existence of so-called "radioactive burial grounds" is a matter of concern to the entire international community given the danger they present to human beings as well as the environment. Having this abundant raw material is a temptation to use it as a means of warfare, since we know that unfortunately there is no lack of imagination on the part of the warmongering circles with which the world is plagued, and above all we know that science and technology devoted to military ends are at present very highly developed and effective. For example, laser beams are being developed and perfected, and work is being done on systems and complexes to use outer space for aggression against targets both in outer space and elsewhere; and in addition, every day new solutions are being found to military problems which up to the day before had seemed insoluble. It cannot be said that science and technology will not find a way to ensure that weapons which spread radioactive material are safe and viable, and that the vectors of that lethal material can be handled without danger to those wishing to use them.

But there is another element which provides food for thought in the case of radiological weapons, and that is the possibility that an agreement may be reached to ban chemical weapons. Some students of military science argue that many of the functions for which chemical weapons were developed can be carried out by radiological weapons. This includes the fact that radiological weapons can contaminate the ground in a military manoeuvre aimed at carrying out a quick offensive, can protect the attacker's flanks and would be capable of disorganizing the enemy's logistics, in the same way as chemical weapons. One may well think, therefore, that once a treaty is in force on the prohibition of the latter, there would be a greater incentive to resolve the problems that radiological weapons currently seem to present.

The other aspect of this item before the Conference is the prevention of attacks on nuclear facilities. We have already witnessed Israel's attack on a nuclear plant in Iraq, and this has dispelled all doubt that such an aggressive act could be repeated by other attackers against other victims,

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(Mr. Lechuga Hevia, Cuba)

particularly in the political atmosphere now prevailing in the world. The protection of nuclear plants is therefore an imperative that should be given priority in the Conference.

At the end of 1985, there were 374 nuclear plants in operation which generated 15 per cent of the world's electricity supply, and even though there is now a debate in some countries as to whether energy should still be produced by that means, the fact is that because of the continuing use, and sometimes squandering, of conventional energy resources the latter will be depleted at some point in time, while it will take a long time for renewable sources of energy to become stable and reliable. We therefore have no doubt that the energy of the future, on which mankind will depend for its basic needs, is nuclear energy.

Independently of the discussion in this area, the fact is that nuclear facilities exist and will increase and while they exist there is a danger that they may be attacked, whatever the reason or pretext, and they must therefore be protected. The unfortunate accident at Chernobyl has dramatized the danger that would result from the release of radioloactive substances as a result of an attack on a nuclear facility. What happened in Chernobyl is of minor importance compared with the consequences of a military attack on one or several nuclear power plants.

The need to protect nuclear facilities is a universal one, but it is particularly great in developing countries which usually do not have the means of making any military response to deter a potential aggressor, who would feel encouraged to attack expecting to be able to do so with impunity; and it is, of course also a requirement in terms of development needs, as we heard here from Ambassador Sutowardoyo of Indonesia a short while ago.

Of course, and it is not superfluous to recall this, what is essential is to ban all nuclear weapons and destroy existing arsenals; to work in good faith to prevent nuclear war; and to put an end to nuclear tests which have no purpose other than developing and perfecting the existing weapons and producing other more deadly ones. These objectives cannot yield in priority to other agenda items.

These are the brief comments we wished to make at this stage, and we hope too that in the negotiations under way on radiological weapons, equal consideration will be given to the interests of all countries without exception, in a spirit of compromise and flexibility, in other words, in good faith. This is the only path that can lead to a positive outcome, and in fact it is the only possible avenue if we wish to achieve concrete results in our work.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Cuba for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the President. That concludes my list of speakers. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor?

Allow me now to turn to other subjects. I have been requested by the Group of 21 to put before the Conference, for decision, the draft mandate for an ad hoc committee on item 3 on the agenda, entitled "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". That draft mandate was circulated

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(The President)

yesterday in the delegation's boxes under the symbol CD/515/Rev.2. I am informed that the text is identical to a previous proposal by the Group of 21, with the exception of the date appearing in the draft mandate. In accordance with existing practice, the Presidency will submit that draft decision for consideration at our plenary meeting next Thursday, after we have taken it up at an informal meeting. Once the list of speakers is exhausted on Thursday, we shall then suspend the plenary meeting and proceed to an informal meeting on document CD/515/Rev.2.

I wish to inform members that the secretariat has already circulated the first draft of the technical parts of the annual report of the Conference to the General Assembly of the United Nations. That draft is contained in document CD/WP.243. The English version was circulated on Friday morning and the other language versions were made available yesterday afternoon in the delegation's boxes. In accordance with the timetable for this week, we should start our consideration of the technical parts of the draft report at an informal meeting on Thursday, once we adjourn the plenary and conclude our consideration of our business for that day, including document CD/515/Rev.2.

If we cannot conclude the first reading on Thursday, we shall continue our consideration of the technical parts of the draft report on Friday morning. As you know, an informal meeting has been scheduled for 10.30 a.m. for that purpose.

I should also like to inform you that exceptionally and because of unavoidable circumstances necessitating a very brief trip to Canada to consult with my Foreign Minister on arms control matters, I shall not be presiding over the Conference at our meetings on Thursday and on Friday. These are the only meetings I shall be obliged to miss. However, in accordance with the provisions of rule 10 of the rules of procedure, the Canadian delegation will provide the Presiding Officer for those meetings.

As there are a number of questions to be taken up on Thursday, may I suggest that we start our plenary meeting at 10.00 a.m. sharp so that we may utilize fully the time allocated to us. If I see no objection, I shall make the relevant announcement.

May I take this opportunity also of joining with others in expressing my personal regret that the distinguished Ambassador of India, Ambassador Gonsalves will soon be departing. During his relatively brief time, he has made an input to our work and an impact on his colleagues which does him and his country great credit. We shall miss him.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 7 August, at 10.00 a.m. The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.05 p.m.

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.377  
7 August 1986

ENGLISH

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## FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-SEVENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 7 August 1986, at 10 a.m.

President:

Mr. A. Després

(Canada)

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The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the 377th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference today pursues the consideration of agenda item 7, "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons". In accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, however, any member wishing to do so may raise any matter relating to the work of the Conference.

As agreed at the previous plenary meeting, immediately following the last speaker on my list I intend to convene an informal meeting to consider the draft mandate submitted by the Group of 21 on agenda item 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters" which has been distributed under the symbol CD/515/Rev.2. We will then resume the plenary meeting to continue the consideration of the draft decision.

If we have enough time remaining to us, we should then consider at another informal meeting the technical parts of the Conference's annual report to the General Assembly which are contained in draft document CD/WP.243, already circulated in all languages. If we cannot today complete our first reading of the draft, we shall resume it at 10.30 a.m. tomorrow, Friday, at the informal meeting scheduled for the purpose in the time-table of meetings of 31 July.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Sri Lanka, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Romania and Venezuela. I now give the floor to the representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Dhanapala.

Mr. DHANAPALA (Sri Lanka): Mr. President, it gives my delegation great satisfaction to see the delegation of Canada presiding over our Conference this month. The Canadian contribution towards disarmament -- from within one of the two most powerful military alliances -- has been consistently impressive. We have had occasion to applaud your work in the field of verification and to thank you for the valuable documentation provided to delegations on various aspects of our work. As a tribute to Ambassador Beesley's own dedication to the cause of peace, disarmament and international law, may I quote Hugo Grotius, whom I know would have gladdened his heart had he been present, who said "It is a doctrine contrary to every principle of equity that justice allows us to resort to force in order to injure another merely because there is a possibility that he may injure us". It is a rejection of the use of force remarkably relevant to this International Year of Peace over three centuries after Grotius wrote those words.

May I also take this opportunity of thanking Ambassador U Tin Tun of Burma for his patient efforts in the month of July to move the Conference forward in its work. We also bid farewell to our distinguished colleagues Ambassador Kerroum of Algeria, Ambassador Gonsalves of India and Ambassador Wegener of the Federal Republic of Germany who have in their various ways contributed to the work of our Conference. We wish them well in their future work. We also welcome the return of Ambassador Morelli Pando of Peru to the Conference.

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(Mr. Dhanapala, Sri Lanka)

Our Conference enters the final month of the 1986 session with a record that is scarcely different from preceding years despite an international climate marked by an increasing dialogue between the two super-Powers. As several speakers noted in Tuesday's plenary, it was 41 years yesterday since Hiroshima. With the explosive power of one million Hiroshima bombs in the arsenals of the nuclear Powers today, our situation was aptly described in these words of the Five-Continent Peace Initiative Declaration "Every day we remain alive is a day of grace as if mankind as a whole were a prisoner in the death cell awaiting the uncertain moment of execution". Every session that we conclude without concrete agreement on the disarmament issues on our agenda is likewise a lost opportunity to get out of the "death cell". While the unprecedented destructive capacity of nuclear weapons is acknowledged, we are told by advocates of nuclear deterrence that the non-use of nuclear weapons for 41 years is also a fact. We cannot build our common security on fortuitous circumstance. Only concrete disarmament measures can provide the foundation for that security. At a time when the fallibility of man and machine is notoriously evident, what confidence can we have in the tensile strength of that legendary strand of hair suspending the sword of Damocles over all our heads? Curiously we end our session with a misplaced emphasis of debate on the form our report-writing should take. For our part, the Sri Lanka delegation will accept nothing less than an honest account of the proceedings of the 1986 session as an obligation to the international community on how the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament was unable to act conclusively on the vital issues of disarmament including the priority nuclear issues.

Today my delegation addresses issues on our agenda on which we can and should find less difficulty in reaching a consensus but have not done so. It remains the view of my delegation that nuclear disarmament issues constitute the priority issues in disarmament and are fundamentally more important for the security of all. Nevertheless in terms of paragraph 75 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament we recognize the importance of chemical disarmament as an invaluable measure towards general and complete disarmament. Despite bilateral talks and recent pronouncements on the need to ban this kind of weapon completely the manifestation of these commitments has not yet been evident in sufficient degree to accelerate our work in the Conference. The prospect of a convention in 1987 has been held before us tantalisingly but the necessary readiness to agree on the issues confronting us is absent. Indeed what is most disturbing is that the chemical weapons race has been resumed. Our own resolve to work assiduously for a speedy solution of the problem in order to eliminate this abominable weapon once and for all remains strong and we are ready to assist in the final spurt towards our goal.

My delegation is happy to note the progress made this year in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in its efforts to draft a chemical weapons convention. The progress is admittedly slow but has to be welcomed in the present context of the Conference's performance record. We are confident that the Chairman, Ambassador Crowmartie, will use his skills during the planned inter-sessional consultations to consolidate and extend the progress that has been achieved. My delegation wishes to address some issues relevant to the Convention so as to contribute to the orientation of the work and to highlight several other important aspects.

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(Mr. Dhanapala, Sri Lanka)

Although some key issues of a future convention such as scope, definition and criteria remain to be solved, it is apparent that the major area of controversy lies in the subject area of Article IX. The Working Papers presented by the delegation of Pakistan [CD/664] and the delegation of the United Kingdom [CD/715] in an obvious attempt to reconcile the divergent perceptions on this issue, are useful contributions which merit careful study. In this connection it is of paramount importance for the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to act in unison to consolidate the achievements of Working Group C, which performed useful work under its able Chairman, Mr. Wisnomoerti of Indonesia. In Annex III of its report on Article IX especially formulations presented for a procedure for requesting a fact finding mission could be considered as a valuable point of departure for future work.

In this context may I draw the attention of the Conference to some relevant issues that may be important in the resolution of the complex issues of verification and compliance. It has been generally acknowledged that absolute transparency within a chemical weapons convention is neither necessary nor realistic. The military significance of chemical weapons to the nuclear-weapon States dependent on the strategy of nuclear deterrence is obviously not a core issue. And yet to insist on the most rigorous standards of verification for these weapons raises doubts on their relevance to actual security needs. An intrusive and elaborate system of challenge inspection is redundant in the light of the efficacy of certain national technical means available to the two major alliances, some of which have been used adequately to monitor existing treaties. A rigid strait-jacket system of challenge verification could become politically destabilizing in a context of a tense and sensitive political climate not only between major allies but more so in regional situations where accusations and counter accusations can become the order of the day. Such a verification machinery will be difficult to operate in the best of times.

These reasons, inter alia, aptly demonstrate the need for compromise and realism. We are confident that a package which could include elements involved in the various verification methods propose, viz. "systematic continuous", "continuous random", "continuous regular", "fact finding", "on challenge" etc., could be reasonably put together if the political will exists to install an adequate system of verification to ensure compliance. After all it is clear that when there is no political will States could even withdraw or implicitly violate existing Conventions.

There are other important issues, albeit not as central as the verification issue, on which the attention of the CW Committee should be focused sooner rather than later. The question of herbicides has all along had a relevance in the negotiations of a chemical weapons ban. However this important question has not been addressed at all during this session. Ever since herbicides were used as chemical agents in hostilities, the danger of its use again is not the remote possibility that we can dismiss. A simple prohibition clause prohibiting the use of herbicides as a method of warfare against an adversary within the convention on chemical weapons or as an integral part of the convention will certainly act as a deterrent for its use in hostilities in future satisfying the legitimate concerns of countries which depend so vitally on agriculture, the tree crop sector and natural cover.

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(Mr. Dhanapala, Sri Lanka)

The chemical industry in many developing countries like Sri Lanka cannot be compared in extent or content with those in the developed or industrially advanced countries. Our chemical industry is largely concentrated on petro-chemicals, fertilizer, pesticides, synthetic fibres, dyes or paints. In some cases the industry is under multinational control. Therefore the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons should also take cognizance of the activities of multinational and transnational corporations in particular in the deliberations over Article V [CW production facilities], Article VII [National Implementation Measures], Article IX [Consultation, Co-operation and Fact Finding] and in other relevant articles. Also, in this context, in developing countries, the verification machinery envisaged under the convention should not be a burden on the already hard pressed economies of developing countries. Multinational corporations could contribute towards sharing the burden with the expertise available to them.

Another area requiring work in the Ad hoc Committee is Article XI -- Economic and Technological Development, which has remained in abeyance for quite some time. In the view of my delegation the time is opportune for delegations to give preliminary consideration to the content and scope of this Article. For developing countries adequate notice may be necessary to formulate policies which will not prejudice their legitimate aspirations for the advancement of their indigenous chemical industry.

I now move to another agenda item in our work -- radiological weapons, the subject of discussions this week according to our programme of work. Recent events have focused our attention on this important item in our forum calling for the early implementation of paragraph 76 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. My delegation wishes to congratulate the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Lechuga Hevia of Cuba, and his indefatigable Contact Group Chairmen, the Ambassadors of Australia, Hungary and Sweden, for the useful work they have accomplished. Yet wide differences which very often transcend group considerations seem to have prevented progress.

My delegation shares the view that Chernobyl makes the danger of disseminating radioactive material more real. However, we are more explicit in identifying ways in which this dissemination of radioactive material could take place. In his statement to this Conference on 8 July, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sri Lanka said:

"While expressing our sympathy to the Government and people of the USSR we cannot help drawing a lesson from this accident on the need to protect peaceful nuclear installations from not only accidental damage but also intentional attacks. The spontaneous international effort to ensure nuclear safety and the laudable role of IAEA which will hold an International Conference in September to strengthen international co-operation in nuclear safety and radiological protection augur well for the world's capacity to learn from its mistakes. Will we be similarly wise to negotiate the disarmament agreements necessary to ensure human survival and prevent a nuclear war?"



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(Mr. Dhanapala, Sri Lanka)

My delegation in principle supports any approach, "unitary" or otherwise, which will address the most important issue for us, the question of the dissemination of radioactive material consequent to an attack on a nuclear facility. Radiological weapons per se are not known to have been developed but the dispersal of radioactive material from damaged nuclear facilities is a reality. Any agreement that emerges from our negotiations should be universally acceptable. An agreement with limited adherence will not serve our security needs as long as the danger of some nuclear facilities being attacked remains.

These comments are by no means exhaustive. We must think afresh on this subject which has become more urgent as a result of the Chernobyl experience. New situations need new approaches. Alternatively, we may continue to spend our precious time on a lost cause or install régimes which are not efficacious but expensive to maintain.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of Sri Lanka for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Presidency and to Ambassador Beesley, to whom I shall not fail to convey them. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Issraelyan.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, first of all I should like to welcome the delegation of Canada to the Presidency of our Conference for the month of August and wish it success in the complicated work of preparing the report of the Conference for 1986.

On 6 August, 41 years ago, the Japanese city of Hiroshima was barbarously atom-bombed. Then, in 1945, humanity for the first time confronted a situation where its own creation became capable of eliminating life itself on Earth. The nuclear bombing of Hiroshima initiated the so-called "nuclear diplomacy" of the United States in international politics. The explosion, which cost 200,000 human lives, and the consequences of which can still be observed, was not so much the last volley of the Second World War but the forerunner or the "cold war".

But today I would not stress the events of the past but rather the lesson taught by the tragedy of Hiroshima. The nuclear age prescribes new political thinking based on the understanding of the disastrous consequences of the use of nuclear weapons and the impossibility of winning a nuclear war. It is now absurd and simply criminal, in the face of nuclear threat, to act according to the old and already dead principle that anything that is good for socialist countries must be rejected. The time has come to take into account the realities of the nuclear age, rather than draw up a policy based on illusions and delusions according to the standards prevailing before 6 August 1945. Our time resolutely demands, as the whole experience of the 41 years that have elapsed since that date shows a new understanding of the current stage of development of civilization, of international relations and of peace.

Here, in the meeting room of the Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating forum in this sphere, it is very obvious that the

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major global problem of our time, the problem of survival, is equally crucial and urgent for all continents and peoples, but it has its own special features in each part of the world. Our task here is to find common denominators in this mosaic of various interests and opinions which could move the world away from the nightmare of Hiroshima and the apocalypse of nuclear death to a world without nuclear weapons, a world of peaceful nuclear energy and peace in outer space.

We would welcome Hiroshima turning from being a symbol of nuclear death into a symbol of peace and co-operation. Carrying out the proposal made by Mikhail Gorbachev to convene in Hiroshima a Pacific Conference with the participation of countries adjoining the Pacific, along the lines of the Helsinki Conference, would contribute to this effort. Why not make this city, the first victim of nuclear evil, a sort of "Helsinki" of Asia and the Pacific?

The Soviet delegation would like to focus attention in today's statement on item 5 of the Conference's agenda, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space".

The importance and topicality of this question are beyond doubt. The nuclear-space age makes us all take a new look at the problem of war and peace and questions of international security. The realities of our age leave no State any hope of defending itself only by military and technological means, even the most up-to-date ones. The extension of the arms race into outer space would inevitably ruin the basis of strategic stability and the foundation of peace. If we cannot prevent the appearance of weapons in outer space, the arms race may become irreversible and uncontrolled and lead to a general catastrophe.

For a number of years already efforts have been made to convince us that the so-called "Strategic Defence Initiative" is allegedly the only way to rescue humanity, and various arguments have been put forward to support that idea, but none of them works. The grave danger posed by the "Star Wars" programme is widely understood throughout the world. The world public is well aware that the space strike means now being developed are primarily weapons, and this all amounts to starting an arms race in outer space.

The Soviet Union believes that the "Star Wars" concept is pushing mankind to take the road leading to nuclear catastrophe. This, for example, is how the consequences of the "Star Wars" programme are seen by the well-known American computer specialist David Palmers, who concluded, incidentally, that it was impossible to create a reliable space missile protection system. He writes, and I quote "If a 'Star Wars' system were untrustworthy, the United States would be unable to abandon deterrence. The Soviet Union could not assume that the SDI would be completely ineffective. Realizing that the United States had both a defensive shield and missiles, the Soviets would feel impelled to improve their offensive forces to compensate. The United States, not trusting its defence, would build still more missiles and the arms race would escalate dangerously". I quoted there an article by David Palmers published in the International Herald Tribune today, and the author is familiar with the substance of the subject. Until recently he was one of the members of the special Pentagon group working on the SDI. Of course, one could disagree with details of his assessment but basically we think he is

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right. Peace on Earth can be preserved not by a senseless, insane build-up of weapons but by limiting and reducing them and by banning their appearance in outer space.

The Soviet Union has opposed the policy of "star wars" with the alternative of "star peace", i.e. exploring outer space for peaceful purposes on the basis of joint efforts of all States. Responding to the call of the United Nations, the USSR has submitted for consideration by the international community the step-by-step programme of such actions, outlined in the letter of Nikolai Ryzhkov, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers to Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, the United Nations Secretary-General, made public on 13 June 1986. We hope that this programme will be studied with due attention at the forthcoming session of the United Nations General Assembly. I would now like briefly to recall the basic provisions of the Soviet programme, the adoption and realization of which is not tightly bound up with other issues.

The Soviet Union does not consider it wise to disperse and duplicate the efforts of States in space exploration. If they become joint efforts, the most difficult tasks, which a single country, even the most developed, is incapable of carrying out, could be realized in practice. The proposed programme envisages three stages and pursues the aim of laying down the material, political, legal and practical foundations for "star peace" by the year 2000.

In the first, organizational, stage, it is proposed to hold not later than 1990 an international conference or a special session of the United Nations General Assembly on outer space, or to consider these questions at some other suitable forum. The forum would approve the programme of action for the 1990s and for the next 10-15 years. It would set up a World Space Organization (WSO) and, under its aegis, specialized programmes for the realization of concrete projects of co-operation in the following areas: communication, navigation, rescue of people on Earth, in the atmosphere and outer space; remote probing of the Earth in the interests of agriculture, development of the natural resources of the land and the world's seas and oceans; the study and preservation of the biosphere of the Earth, establishment of a global weather forecasting service and notification of natural calamities; the use of new sources of energy, and creation of new materials and technologies; exploration of outer space and celestial bodies by geophysical methods and by means of unmanned interplanetary spacecraft.

Developing States could participate in these projects on easy terms, and the least developed States could receive scientific and technological results of the work as aid towards their development objectives. The Soviet Union is ready to exchange information concerning its accomplishments in outer space, and to launch the peaceful space vehicles of other countries and of international organizations using Soviet carrier rockets on mutually acceptable terms.

The Soviet Union sees the WSO as a universal inter-State organization with its own charter in the form of an international treaty, associated with the United Nations through a co-operation agreement. The Organization would

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co-ordinate the implementation of specialized programmes and be financed primarily by countries possessing a major space capability and by other economically developed States.

The WSO's efforts would be directed towards the peaceful exploration of outer space and verifying the observance of agreements on preventing the spread of the arms race into space as they are concluded. To exercise such control, it would initially use technical facilities granted by space Powers, and later its own facilities.

The second stage (material preparations) would cover the first half of the 1990s. It would comprise the designing and creation of space systems under the agreed projects. The transition to the exploitation of specific systems would take place as soon as they were ready. The co-ordination of the activities of specialized international programmes to ensure the utmost rationality and efficiency of all co-operation on a global scale, would be one of the main functions of the World Space Organization.

In the third stage (implementation) all areas of co-operation would have a tangible content by the year 2000. The corresponding spacecraft would be gradually launched, the functioning of relevant ground systems would be organized and specialized programmes in various spheres of the application of space technology would start operating on a self-supporting principle, yielding practical returns.

In other words, this would create the real prerequisites for turning terrestrial civilization into an interplanetary one from the very beginning of the third millennium.

We would like to share our views on the work of the Ad hoc Committee on item 5 of the Conference's agenda. The Ad hoc Committee has carried out over two years considerable preparatory work which we consider sufficient to proceed to work out an agreement or agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space. There are practically no obstacles preventing the beginning of concrete negotiations on this issue at the Conference. The only obstacle, as we see it, is the position of some Western States.

Indeed, we have a common goal -- to prevent the arms race in outer space, and all the participants in the Ad hoc Committee wish to attain it. The delegations in the Ad hoc Committee have already got down to studying various terms that could be included in the future agreements. Thus, the delegations of Bulgaria, Hungary, China, Sri Lanka, the USSR and Venezuela have presented their definitions of "space strike arms" and "space weapons". And, finally, all groups of countries have put forward proposals and initiatives on how to prevent the arms race in space. Besides the proposals of the group of socialist countries, Sweden has tabled a proposal on banning the creation, testing and deployment of space weapons, including anti-satellite systems, there is an Argentine proposal to study the issue of prohibiting arms in space where they have not yet been deployed, Sri Lanka has advanced ideas on international co-operation in the field of the peaceful uses of outer space, there are the Pakistan proposal contained in CD/708 and the proposal of China to solve on a priority basis the question of prohibiting development, production, deployment and use of any kind of space weapons, the proposal of

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Australia for the Conference to study the possibility of concluding an agreement on protection of satellites and their ground stations, and the proposals of France, the Federal Republic of Germany and many other States introduced at plenary meetings and in the Ad hoc Committee on outer space.

I would say that we have in fact closely approached the negotiating process and possibly have already launched its first stage. But the absence of a negotiating mandate constrains the Ad hoc Committee on outer space, does not allow it to go beyond "research", "identifying problems", "studying terms", etc. Such "exploratory" work cannot go on indefinitely at the Conference. The right place for it to be conducted is scientific research bodies -- national as well as international. International public opinion expects the Conference to produce practical treaties on disarmament, not theoretical studies.

We focus on this situation because, from the viewpoint of an objective observer, the work on item 5 of the Conference's agenda looks like this.

The whole spring session is spent in agreeing upon a mandate for the Ad hoc Committee, and part of the summer session on negotiating a programme of work. The time left for the Ad hoc Committee allows no more than a dozen meetings. But even those meetings are devoted to exploratory exercise. As a result, the Conference's work continues all by itself, while in parallel with it new types of arms are being developed and space strike weapons are being created. As we see it, the re-establishment at the outset of the 1987 session of the Ad hoc Committee on item 5 of the Conference's agenda with a mandate providing for the commencement of negotiations directed at preventing the arms race in outer space would provide the solution.

Mankind can benefit from outer space as long as it remains peaceful: it should be a source of good, not of danger. As we see it now, space is the key to many problems facing humanity. We have come close to a stage when we shall need to use space extensively on a new technological level for peaceful purposes. The Soviet Union is convinced that terrestrial civilization should enter the twenty-first century with a programme of "star peace" and not with reckless plans of "star wars".

We are approaching mid-August and it is quite natural that many among us are already preoccupied with the results of the 1986 session of the Conference which is nearing its end. Some of our colleagues have already expressed their opinion on this matter.

I think it is no secret that the Soviet delegation sees no reason for particular satisfaction at the results of the work on the majority of the priority items on the Conference's agenda. But we shall dwell upon this more extensively in another statement. Today I would like to mention an event that undoubtedly deserves appreciation.

The twenty-second session of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to detect and identify seismic events finished its work last week. Unlike a number of previous sessions of this important body, this time the Ad hoc Group produced many useful results. The report on the technical experiment conducted by the Ad hoc Group in 1984 to exchange Level I seismic data was

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agreed upon. This document sums up the results of long work in which not only seismic experts but dozens and hundreds of people in a number of countries of the world participated.

The results of the experiment, reflected in the report, should be thoroughly studied by experts of the States members of the Conference and other interested countries, but already now it can be said that they are a major contribution towards the establishment of a seismic system to verify a nuclear-weapon-test ban.

The Ad hoc Group will face still more important tasks in the future. As you know, the Soviet Union has recently proposed that the Ad hoc Group of seismic experts should start work on the development of a system for the prompt transmission of Level II seismic data, which could serve as a basis for the international seismic verification of a nuclear-test ban. It has also put forward the idea of carrying out an appropriate new international experiment.

We note with satisfaction that these ideas have been included in the recommendations unanimously adopted by the Ad hoc Group concerning its further work which, as it is stressed in the Group's report, should be conducted using all the latest advances in seismology.

I would like to express the hope that at its next session, proposed to be held in March 1987, the seismic experts will get down to the practical resolution of the new problems facing them. The Soviet Union, which considers the stopping and banning of nuclear tests a high priority issue of today and advocates strict verification of such a régime, will provide the necessary assistance to the Ad hoc Group in its important work.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now call on the distinguished representative of Romania, Mr. Chirila.

Mr. CHIRILA (Romania) (translated from French): May I first of all express the satisfaction of the Romanian delegation at seeing Ambassador Alan Beesley presiding over the work of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of August. We are certain that thanks to his competence and experience, and also to Canada's devotion to the cause of disarmament, he will successfully discharge the very important tasks entrusted to him during such a busy and decisive period for the conclusion of this year's session of the Conference. We also would like to express our wholehearted gratitude and appreciation to the head of the delegation of Burma, Ambassador U Tin Tun, for the efforts he made and for the competence with which he led our work throughout the month of July.

Our delegation intends to take the floor to express a few preliminary observations on agenda items 5, 6, 7 and 8, which have been the object of special consideration at the last few plenary meetings of the Conference.

The Romanian delegation has already repeatedly stressed the very heavy responsibility devolving on the Conference on Disarmament regarding the special need and urgency of effective measures and agreements to put an end to

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and prevent any action which might trigger off an arms race in outer space, and the need to draw up and establish a true code of exclusively peaceful conduct for States to ensure that outer space used exclusively for purposes compatible with the common interests of mankind.

The re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee for the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, even after an unduly long delay and with a limited mandate, and particularly its work under a well-conceived programme, are all positive elements. We are fully appreciative indeed of the active and even constructive spirit in which the work of the Ad Hoc Committee has taken place under the Chairmanship of the head of the Mongolian delegation, Ambassador Bayart.

A problem which the debates of the Ad Hoc Committee have always addressed more or less overtly or directly is the relationship between the already existing legal régime and the rules to be drawn up. We consider that the former should not constitute or become an end in itself, but rather its consideration should lead to practical conclusions concerning the problems to be settled and the rules as yet to be drafted. Moreover, in our view, generally speaking, we are all aware of what is required, of the major gaps in the existing conventions.

Like many other delegations here in the Conference on Disarmament or even at the United Nations General Assembly, we consider that every effort should be exerted to draw up and establish one or several international legal instruments designed to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects. Consensus regarding such a need and priority, which, we hope, no one contests or has any interest in contesting, derives moreover explicitly from the many texts adopted within the United Nations, particularly paragraph 9 of the operative part of General Assembly resolution 40/87 of 12 December 1985.

In our view, the work of the Conference on its agenda item 5 can make the desired progress only if in this specific case there is also a real will to define both the things and the terms on which we are truly going to negotiate in the nearest possible future.

All the discussions, studies and working papers so far have shown that we now do have in hand some important elements for a code of exclusively peaceful conduct in space, and rules which need to be consolidated and developed in a broad, unified manner in the light of existing and foreseen needs. The facts prove that without resolute action on the political, legal and practical front at the same time, the arms race in outer space may well become a dramatic reality, and according to views already expressed here, it can be considered that such a race has already indeed begun in specific forms.

Much has been said about concepts and the meaning of certain expressions or the criteria to be used. In our view the fundamental criterion which any attempt to establish to the legal régime cannot elude consists in the provision of the United Nations Charter regarding the duty of all States not to resort to force or the threat of the use of force: an obligation which should apply in full with respect to conduct in outer space. Likewise, any

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negotiations or any real intention to negotiate in good faith require that we must at least refrain from any act that could render future rules or even prohibitions or limitations inoperative.

Finally, the Romanian delegation considers that this year's work of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space has provided arguments and once again revealed the political, legal, security and also practical reasons for drawing the conclusion, or rather reaffirming the need, that the Ad Hoc Committee should for its future sessions be given a specific negotiating mandate within the context of more structured work oriented towards the accomplishment of the important and urgent responsibilities devolving upon the Conference on Disarmament, specifically, the drawing up of one or several international legal instruments designed to prevent the arms race in outer space in all its aspects. We also consider that the research and studies carried out so far by various United Nations bodies, particularly the Legal Sub-Committee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, also offer a useful complementary base for defining the areas and efforts yet to be undertaken and arriving at a complete code of the obligations of States designed to reserve space exclusively for peaceful activities.

With respect to agenda item 6, effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, our delegation would like to express its regret that the right conditions have not existed during the session for the creation and functioning of an ad hoc committee with an appropriate mandate. We wish to take this opportunity to reiterate very firmly the position of Romania regarding the need and the urgency of effective measures to increase the security of States which do not possess nuclear weapons. We continue to consider that the first goal of the Conference in this area should be the conclusion of an international legal instrument containing the undertaking by the nuclear Powers never, under any circumstances, to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons or force in general against States which do not possess such weapons. The simple assertion that such a legal instrument is not acceptable at this time for some States in no way removes the obligation from the Conference to explore all possibilities on the subject. We express the hope that at the 1987 session the Conference on Disarmament will be in a position to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on negative security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States in conditions where a real readiness will be displayed by all Powers which should extend such assurances.

We fully share the view expressed here, at the previous plenary meeting, by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, Ambassador Lechuga Hevia of Cuba, that the problems dealt with by that subsidiary body of the Conference, as indeed in general the issues relating to new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, should not be considered of marginal importance or urgency. In drawing up a draft convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons, the Conference is called upon to carry out important preventive work. While noting the efforts and progress made in the consideration of this question by the Ad Hoc Committee this year, the Conference should for 1987 undertake work aimed in particular towards the drawing up of texts of articles for the future convention. An important



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conclusion which emerged from this year's work relates to the need to find a solution for the protection of peaceful nuclear facilities against any military attack.

As far as the drawing up by the Conference of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, in view of the stage of the negotiations and the fact that part of the draft articles relating to important questions have yet to be agreed and finalized, unfortunately we are compelled to envisage the situation where a complete text of this document will not be submitted to the General Assembly this year. This situation in our view reflects the same difficulties that the Conference continues to confront this year on most of the items on its agenda, particularly nuclear disarmament issues. We regret the fact that, even at this stage of the negotiations, there are delegations which are not ready to accept the very idea of stage-by-stage disarmament measures and actions. The very notion of the Programme implies, along with the principles, objectives and guidelines for action, some kind of timetable, at least in terms of major stages.

As our delegation has already had occasion to stress during the session, Romania considers it of great urgency and absolute priority to draw up and implement a comprehensive programme of disarmament, where stage-by-stage nuclear disarmament measures, as well as the elimination of chemical weapons, should be accompanied by radical reductions of at least 50 per cent in all armaments and military budgets by the end of the century.

Mr. President, may I conclude this statement by promising you the full co-operation of the Romanian delegation in your accomplishment of the difficult tasks during the concluding part of the work of this year's session of our Conference.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of Romania for his statement and for the kind words addressed to Ambassador Beesley, and I now call on the representative of Venezuela, Ambassador Taylhardat.

Mr. TAYLHARDAT (Venezuela) (translated from Spanish): We are indeed highly gratified and pleased that Ambassador Beesley has assumed the Presidency of the Conference during the month of August and during the interim period between this session and next year's. As the representative of Canada, Ambassador Beesley has shown a thorough mastery of the problems confronting the Conference. Canada, moreover, has convincingly shown its interest in, and the importance it attaches to, the efforts of this multilateral body and has made extremely useful contributions to our work. For all these reasons, we should like to wish Ambassador Beesley every success in his task and to pledge to him our unstinting co-operation.

We should also like to convey to his predecessor, Ambassador U Tin Tun of Burma, our sincere gratitude for the work he performed as President for the month of July. Like other speakers, I should like to extend to those colleagues who very soon will be leaving the Conference on Disarmament a cordial farewell and I wish them every success in their new duties. We wish

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to express our appreciation to Ambassador Kerroum of Algeria, Ambassador Gonsalves of India and Ambassador Wegener of the Federal Republic of Germany for the outstanding role they have played in the Conference, and I should like to say to them that for me personally it has been a privilege to have had them as colleagues and to have had occasion to co-operate with them in the achievement of the important common goals we intend to achieve in this important forum.

As other speakers have stressed, the Conference session for this year is now drawing to a close. We do not intend to take stock of the results achieved; we shall confine ourselves to saying that we consider these disappointing. Yet another year has elapsed where, with the possible exception of chemical weapons, no progress towards the adoption of specific disarmament measures has been recorded.

With respect to the item of a nuclear test ban, there has rather been a backwards movement. Until 1979, the discussions in the multilateral body were moving forward promisingly under the impetus of the favourable developments apparently taking place in the trilateral negotiations between the United States, and the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. Since then, consideration of this item has regressed, as in the last few years, it has not even been possible to re-establish the ad hoc committee that should deal with the item. During this year's session, moreover, the issue has been marked by two contrasting attitudes. On the one hand, one of the main nuclear Powers has voluntarily imposed upon itself a moratorium in its programme of nuclear testing, which just yesterday had its first anniversary. And on the other hand, we have the attitude of the other nuclear Great Power which not only has not taken up the invitation to observe a similar moratorium, but at the same time conducted 15 nuclear tests. If we weigh up the two attitudes, there is no doubt whatsoever that the Soviet Union has recorded a moral victory vis-à-vis international public opinion. Venezuela wishes to associate itself with all the Governments, particularly those of countries making up the Group of Six meeting at this very moment in Mexico, to appeal to the Government of the Soviet Union to maintain its unilateral moratorium. In connection with this same question, we should like to express our pleasure at the fact that these two nuclear Powers have resumed their dialogue through technical contacts in connection with aspects of verification of nuclear tests. We hope that these contacts will produce sufficiently positive results to enable negotiations to be resumed within the Conference on Disarmament.

The only item with respect to which, as I said before, we could harbour some optimism is chemical weapons. We wish to place on record our appreciation for the work done by Ambassador Cromartie, as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee dealing with the item, and the work begun by the Co-ordinators of the Committee's three Working Groups. In this connection, we cannot however, fail to point out that the recent decision of one of the main Powers to carry forward its plans to resume the production of chemical weapons gives rise to doubt with respect to its genuine desire to make progress at negotiations currently under way, one of whose goals consists precisely in achieving the prohibition of the production of these weapons.

With respect to the item of the prevention of an arms race in outer space, even though we cannot really speak of concrete results, at least

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stimulating work has been done which enables us also to harbour a modicum of optimism. The Ad Hoc Committee dealing with the item has done work which my delegation considers both useful and positive. We should like to express our recognition to its Chairman, Ambassador Bayart, for the efficiency, devotion and impartiality with which he has led the work of the Committee.

In today's statement, we should like to make a number of comments on agenda item 5 in the light of the deliberations which have taken place, both in the plenary meetings as well as in the Ad Hoc Committee's meetings.

We wish to begin by highlighting, in connection with this item, the important contribution made by the delegation of Canada, with the presentation of a series of working papers where several very important aspects of the item are approached. The most recent of these documents, on terminology relating to arms control and outer space, is a meaty, soundly documented study and is therefore an invaluable working instrument for us. Further on in this statement, I shall refer to some of the questions dealt with in that document.

In our view, the debate held this year on the prevention of an arms race in outer space has helped to highlight a number of very interesting aspects of the task to be accomplished by the Conference on Disarmament, which I shall summarize.

Firstly, the need to spell out the meaning of certain terms and the scope of some of the concepts related to the item. In my previous statement on the item, I stressed the need to define more precisely the meaning of certain terms and the scope of certain concepts which we usually use during our deliberations. The Canadian document relating to terminology also highlights the importance of terminological precision in disarmament negotiations, and argues that certain terms should be defined. We agree therefore, with the Canadian document that the documentation of the Conference on Disarmament "reveals considerable imprecision in the use of terms relating to arms control and outer space", adding that "The tendency to use a number of terms loosely, if not corrected, could have a significant impact on the precision of language and upon the intent of statements, resolutions and treaties". The deliberations in the Ad Hoc Committee confirm these assessments and the need to achieve greater terminological precision.

Within this context, we consider that to make progress in the consideration of this item it is essential clearly to establish its scope. We need to spell out what we understand by the "prevention of an arms race in outer space". This is an idea on which there is not a uniform view in the Conference. To some, the prevention of an arms race in outer space means the demilitarization of space; to others, it means non-militarization of space; to yet others, it means the prohibition of the use of space for military purposes; and for some others, including my delegation, it means preventing the weaponization of space. These notions are apparently similar, but when carefully analysed they reveal fundamental differences which mean that the item is given a different approach and a different content in each case.

In our view, preventing an arms race in outer space consists in preventing the beginning of competition, between the Powers that have the technological capacity to do so, in the field of space armaments. Hence, it

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is a question of nipping in the bud the development testing, production and deployment of space weapons. The category of space weapons should include, in our view, any weapons likely to turn space into a theatre of war operations.

Secondly, the need for a definition of space weapons. The above characterization of the notion of the prevention of an arms race in outer space highlights the need to make an effort to spell out the concept of space weapons. In this respect, a first step has been taken at this session of the Conference with the various proposals for definitions submitted by several delegations, among them Venezuela, whose Working Paper CD/709 refers to this subject. We do not believe that it is absolutely essential for the moment to draw up an agreed definition of space weapons. We share, however, the view expressed in the Canadian document to the effect that "At this early stage of multilateral discussions on issues relating to arms control and outer space, it would be prudent to recognize, clarify and understand fully the nuances of these terms and expressions". We therefore believe that a shared view of space weapons, or at least a statement of their features or main elements, will considerably facilitate the work of the Conference on this item.

Thirdly, the existing legal order. The Ad Hoc Committee reviewed the existing legal order applicable to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In our view, the discussions on this aspect of item 5 have shown the following. (a) There exists a set of international, multilateral and bilateral legal instruments governing very important partial aspects of the issues relating to the prevention of an arms race in space. (b) It is necessary to consolidate and strengthen that set of instruments in order to ensure their full implementation and observance by States parties. (c) The existing international legal order suffers from certain shortcomings which should be corrected. These shortcomings stem, inter alia, from the fact that 30 years have elapsed since man began the conquest of space and 20 since the Outer Space Treaty was signed. In this lapse of time, space science and its military applications have developed at a dizzying pace. The existing legal régime therefore does not cover all issues involved now or at some future point in the task of preventing an arms race in outer space. In this connection we should also like to endorse the statement contained in the last paragraph of the Canadian document which after noting that space law relating to the prevention of an arms race in space has barely reached an elementary level, concludes by saying: "To prevent the risks to security on Earth which may be posed by the threat of arms placed in space or for use in space will require that States develop the law beyond this elementary stage". (d) It is essential to begin work as rapidly as possible to remedy the shortcomings and fill the gaps in the legal régime applicable to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. (e) That effort should be channelled towards the drawing up of an instrument or several legal instruments to prevent the extension into space of the arms race which is now taking place on the surface of the planet. (f) The most effective manner to achieve that objective would be to establish a general and complete prohibition of the development, testing, production and deployment of space weapons. In due course, the Conference will have to establish a precise delimitation between what constitutes research and what is understood by development, two notions that as we know carry particular importance and significance in the area of space weapons. (g) Whilst that general prohibition is being achieved, partial measures can be furthered to build up confidence and facilitate the task of negotiating a

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treaty designed to prevent, in a comprehensive manner, the arms race in space. (h) The instrument or instruments that will be agreed will naturally have to provide for the necessary verification procedures and machinery to guarantee strict observance of and proper compliance with its provisions.

I should now like to refer to some ideas and views expressed during the discussions in the Ad Hoc Committee on outer space which we do not wish to pass over in silence.

During the discussions on the legal instruments relating to the item, we heard the view expressed that the existing legal order is more than adequate to take care of current and future challenges raised by arms control in outer space. According to that opinion, there is no need to negotiate new agreements in this field and what is required is greater participation in the existing treaties and greater compliance with the existing legal régime. I think that the reasoning set forth above is sufficient to demonstrate that our delegation does not share this view.

Yet another view expressed in the Committee is that the United Nations Charter and, more specifically, its Article 51, enshrining the principle of self-defence, authorizes the use of space weapons for defensive purposes. This line of reasoning combined with the broad interpretation that is attempted of a certain bilateral treaty, would seem designed to seek support in the United Nations Charter for building up a legal justification for the possession of defensive systems based on the use of space weapons.

The meaning and scope of Article 51 of the Charter are perfectly clear. Self-defence is conceived as a recourse, as a reaction to armed aggression. Self-defence is accepted as a means to repel aggression. To try and justify the development of defensive space weapons on the grounds that the Charter authorizes the use of these weapons for the purposes of self-defence is somewhat exaggerated, to say the least.

Another view expressed during the work of the Ad Hoc Committee is that as bilateral negotiations are currently proceeding between the two main space Powers, the work of the Conference should be confined to negotiating agreement on confidence-building measures in connection with existing agreements. I think that it is not superfluous to stress the idea, now generally accepted, that bilateral and multilateral negotiations are complementary and can in no way restrict, interfere with or hinder one another. As I said above, we believe that nothing prevents the Conference, at the same time as it makes progress on the substance of item 5, consisting in preventing an arms race in space weapons in all its manifestations, from also encouraging the adoption of measures likely to contribute to creating a favourable climate for the achievement of its main objectives. We do not believe, however, that the role of the Conference can be confined, as has been suggested, to dictating a space "highway code" or designing signs and signals designed to regulate traffic in space.

In conclusion, we wish to express our hope that during its 1987 session the Conference on Disarmament will without delay tackle its substantive task on agenda item 5 and at the outset re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee to carry forward work on this important issue. In this connection, it is worth

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(Mr. Taylhardat, Venezuela)

keeping in mind what the distinguished representative of Yugoslavia, Ambassador Vidas, said in his statement last week when he expressed the view that the Ad Hoc Committee dealing with item 5 could continue working under the current mandate. My delegation is among those which consider that the work of the Conference on Disarmament does not depend on the mandate allocated to a subsidiary body but rather on the programme of work adopted. The Ad Hoc Committee on item 5 has very fruitful substantive work to carry out given an appropriate work programme. In our view, the activities of the Ad Hoc Committee next year should be directed at identifying the aspects where there is a need to complete the existing legal order so as to give the international community an appropriate set of rules designed to prevent an arms race in outer space and to establish a general prohibition of the development, testing, production and stationing of space weapons.

We trust that all member States will display the necessary political will for the Conference to accomplish its objectives with the urgency that the importance of the item requires.

Finally, we followed with keen interest the views expressed by His Excellency the Foreign Minister of Pakistan in the statement he made last week. The ideas he set out in connection with the question of conventional disarmament at the regional level deserve to be thoroughly pondered and should receive appropriate consideration by the Conference. Even though the item of conventional disarmament has not so far appeared on our annual agenda we should not forget that the question is among those on the general agenda better known as the "decatalogue", of the Conference. Hence we hope that in future the Conference may devote to that important question all the attention it deserves.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of Venezuela for his statement and for the kind words addressed to Ambassador Beesley, to whom I shall not fail to convey them. There are no more speakers on my list. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? If not, I shall now suspend the plenary meeting and, in accordance with the practice followed by the Conference, convene an informal meeting to consider the draft mandate contained in document CD/515/Rev.2 submitted by the Group of 21. In the light of the outcome of the informal meeting, the Conference will resume its plenary meeting to continue the consideration of the draft mandate and hear representatives wishing to make statements on the subject. I therefore now suspend the plenary meeting, and we shall immediately hold an informal meeting. The plenary meeting is suspended.

The meeting was suspended at 11.50 a.m. and resumed at 12 noon.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): The 377th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

I place before the Conference for decision document CD/515/Rev.2 submitted by the Group of 21 and entitled "Draft Mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee on Item 3 of the Agenda of the Conference on Disarmament". Are there any objections to this draft decision? I give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Edis.

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Mr. EDIS (United Kingdom): I wish to make a statement on behalf of the Western group of countries. Before I do so, though, I should like to say that it is a particular pleasure to see Canada in the Chair of our Conference, as a Commonwealth country with which we naturally have the closest ties. I might take this opportunity to note in passing that there are seven Commonwealth countries who are members of this Conference, more or less equally divided between two of our groups.

The delegations of the group on whose behalf I am speaking attach great importance to policies and concrete actions aimed at the prevention of war including nuclear war. We note that in their Joint Statement of November, the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union "emphasized the importance of preventing any war between them, whether nuclear or conventional".

Accordingly, we attach importance to item 3 on our agenda, prevention of nuclear war including all related matters. Since 1983, when this item was first inscribed on the agenda, we have repeatedly said that we are prepared to have a thorough discussion and exchange of views on this important subject. Our speeches and our actions in this Conference, as well as in the General Assembly, demonstrate this.

We had hoped that it would have proved possible to engage in substantive consideration of the item within an appropriate format.

We are therefore disappointed that the draft mandate in CD/515/Rev.2 is once more being put to a decision; and we are again unable to associate ourselves with a consensus on this proposed mandate.

Finally, I should like to express gratitude to successive Presidents of the Conference, and especially Ambassador de Souza e Silva of Brazil and Ambassador U Tin Tun of Burma for their efforts to find an appropriate format for the consideration of item 3.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the United Kingdom for his statement and for the kind words addressed to my delegation. After hearing the statement that has just been made, I note that for the time being there is no consensus on the proposal contained in document CD/515/Rev.2. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage in our work? I give the floor to the representative of Nigeria.

Mr. TONWE (Nigeria): May I first of all take the opportunity to congratulate the delegation of Canada on the assumption of the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament in August. The Nigerian delegation is confident that the Canadian delegation will conduct our deliberations in the most thoughtful and fruitful manner, consistent with their performance at this Conference.

I would ask you, Mr. President, to convey our best wishes to Ambassador Alan Beesley in the pursuit of his delicate task in this critical month of August.

I would also like to take the opportunity to refer to the information we all have had about the impending departure of three of our eminent colleagues

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(Mr. Tonwe, Nigeria)

here, Ambassador Wegener of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Gonsalves of India and Ambassador Kerroum of Algeria. Although they are leaving us very soon, these are three of our colleagues who have made very impressive impacts on the work of the Conference and to whom we owe a considerable debt of gratitude. We are sad that they should be leaving but at the same time we are consoled that they are all going to equally important new assignments. We wish them all God's blessing.

We, of the Group of 21, are thoroughly disappointed by the statement of the United Kingdom, which again makes it impossible for this Conference to go ahead with one of the important, if not the most important, item on its agenda, agenda item 3, on which the Group of 21's paper is before the Conference.

I need hardly emphasize the importance of this mandate nor the urgency of its adoption. United Nations General Assembly documents are bound with resolutions expressing the yearning of all States represented here and all peoples everywhere to see banished forever the threat of nuclear war. In the latest of these resolutions, 41/52 Q, it was clearly recognized that the prevention of nuclear war "remains the most acute and urgent task of the present day".

The Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Governments of Non-aligned countries, held in New Delhi from 7 to 12 March 1983, concluded that more than weapons of war, nuclear weapons are instruments of mad annihilation, and in their general declaration, on 28 January 1985, the Heads of State of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania emphasized the need for urgent preventive action to exclude forever the use of nuclear weapons and the occurrence of a nuclear war.

Last but not least, the leaders of the two principal military alliances have publicly declared their own conclusions and beliefs that nuclear war cannot be won and must not be fought. The Group of 21 deeply shares the grave concern of all those just enumerated. We ardently desire in the deliberations of the Conference on Disarmament, the only multilateral forum for a non-partisan approach to disarmament, some progress. The present draft mandate is by no means a presumptuous product of the Group of 21. It is, on the contrary, a well-considered balanced text which has taken into account the views expressed by other groups in this Conference, including the group which is represented by the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom. We are therefore deeply disappointed that in spite of the concessions that the Group of 21 has made, and the urgency of the subject, we are being put in a position where we will have nothing to justify our own mandate, which comes from the United Nations General Assembly. We of the Group of 21 think that this is regrettable and we therefore consider that it might be that the seriousness of the matter justifies a rethinking on the part of those who have expressed reservations on the subject.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of Nigeria for his statement and for the kind words addressed to my delegation. I now give the floor to the representative of Bulgaria.



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Mr. KONSTANTINOV (Bulgaria): At the outset I wish to congratulate your delegation and particularly Ambassador Beesley on his assumption of the important duty of President of the conference for the month of August. I am sure that the skill and diplomatic experience of Ambassador Beesley will help us to go through the most difficult period of our Conference this year successfully, and I wish him all the best.

I would also like to extend my best wishes to those colleagues who will be leaving us soon, Ambassador Gonsalves of India and Ambassador Wegener of the Federal Republic of Germany, and to wish them all the best in their new important duties.

I would further like to express, on behalf of the socialist countries views on the issue under item 3 contained in document CD/515/Rev.2, just presented to us.

We are disappointed, but not very much surprised, by the negative position just taken by the Western countries. This disappointment is even greater because of declarations made at the highest level by two countries, in particular with regard to nuclear war, that nuclear war should not be allowed to be fought and that nuclear war could not be won. This problem has been blocked for many years by the Western countries, as is known to all delegations here.

The position of the socialist countries is that an ad hoc committee should be established with a negotiating mandate. There have been enough proposals, there has been enough material, there have been enough statements made in this Conference, and outside the Conference confirming that the prevention of nuclear war is one of the greatest priorities on our agenda, and that this priority issue has to be approached seriously in a special subsidiary body which should start negotiating some measures to help the work of the Conference to reduce the possibility of nuclear war.

Last year the group of socialist countries supported compromise mandates put forward by the Group of 21. This year the socialist countries will give their full support to the new attempt of the Group of 21 to bring about some progress in the right direction on the issue of the prevention of nuclear war. That is why we consider it a compromise -- this is the least that the Conference could do this year, and will support it fully.

As to the substance, I would only like to say that positions of countries which have been expressed during this year's session of the Conference on Disarmament in statements as well as in informal consultations, should be duly reflected in the report of the Conference. My delegation will also have the possibility to make a more substantial statement on this issue in one of our next meetings.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of Bulgaria for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? I give the floor to the representative of China.

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Mrs. WANG (China) (translated from Chinese): First of all, I would like to express my warm welcome and congratulations on the assumption of the Presidency by the Canadian delegation. The contributions made by Canada, as well as its aspirations in the cause of disarmament, and particularly the rich experience and diplomatic skill of Ambassador Beesley, are indeed wellknown. We are confident that under the able guidance of Ambassador Beesley, this session will accomplish its task successfully.

On the establishment of the ad hoc committee on item 3 I would like to make some brief comments.

The Chinese delegation has all along attached great importance to the prevention of nuclear war, and therefore is in favour of the establishment of an ad hoc committee on this question. This year, my delegation submitted a Working Paper on the issue of preventing a nuclear war. We hope that the Conference will carry out in-depth discussions and negotiations on this very important issue. With regard to the draft mandate proposed by the Group of 21, contained in CD/515/Rev.2, we believe that this is a general mandate for the ad hoc committee. It is reasonable and realistic and therefore could serve as a basis for the work of the ad hoc committee. We therefore can accept this mandate. However, we hope that in the future the relevant sides concerned will adopt a co-operative and flexible attitude to continue the consultations on the issue relating to the mandate, therefore establishing such an ad hoc committee at an earlier date.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of China for her statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the representative of Romania.

Mr. CHIRILA (Romania) (translated from French): The delegation of Romania regrets that the draft mandate proposed by the Group of 21 under item 3 of our agenda, prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters, could not be accepted by all delegations. In other words, there was no consensus. Our delegation would like to state once again its regret on this subject, and express the hope that during the forthcoming session we will be able to set up an ad hoc committee on this important agenda item 3.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of Romania for his statement. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? I see none. At my request the secretariat has today circulated a time-table of meetings for the Conference and its subsidiary bodies for next week. The time-table was drawn up in consultation with the Chairmen of the subsidiary bodies and, as usual, is purely indicative and may be modified as necessary. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the time-table.

It was so decided

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): The secretariat has requested me to inform delegations that the Conference's draft report on agenda item 5, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", is now available in English and has been distributed in their boxes. The report will be available in the other languages next Tuesday.

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(The President)

As we still have over half an hour left to us with interpretation services, following the adjournment of the plenary meeting we shall hold an informal meeting to begin consideration of the technical parts of the draft annual report of the Conference to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 12 August, at 10.30 a.m. The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.

## CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.378  
12 August 1986

ENGLISH

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### FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 12 August 1986, at 10 a.m.

President:            Mr. J. Alan Beesley            (Canada)

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The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 378th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference starts today its consideration of reports of ad hoc subsidiary bodies as well as of the Annual Report to the General Assembly of the United Nations. However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Bulgaria, India, the Federal Republic of Germany and Mongolia. I now give the floor to the representative of Bulgaria, Ambassador Tellalov.

Mr. TELLALOV (Bulgaria): I wish to warmly welcome you as President of the Conference for the month of August. We are fortunate that a diplomat with your rich experience and skill will guide our work in its concluding stage this year. May I also thank Ambassador U Tin Tun of Burma for the successful performance of his important function as President for the month of July. It is a pleasure for me to welcome again in our midst Ambassador Morelli Pando of Peru. It is with great regret that we have learned that several of our distinguished colleagues are going to leave us soon. I would like to bid farewell to Ambassador Gonsalves of India, Ambassador Kerroum of Algeria and Ambassador Wegener of the Federal Republic of Germany, and to wish them all the best in their future responsible duties.

Delegations in the Conference have once again recalled the tragedy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as a symbol of universal concern for the future of mankind. Hundreds of thousands of innocent people perished on 6 August 1945. Many more have suffered from the fatal effects of radiation, following the United States bombing of these Japanese cities. This tragedy has left a deep scar on the memory of mankind. It is a serious warning that life on Earth may be destroyed, if the present nuclear arsenals are going to be used. In recalling this tragic episode, I wish to convey the hope that our efforts will finally result in working out disarmament agreements, capable of ensuring lasting peace and security for all.

In a regional context, General Secretary M. Gorbachev referred to Hiroshima in his recent Vladivostok statement as a possible starting point of a new process to consolidate peace and security. He outlined the elements of a programme which would involve the countries of Asia and the Pacific area in the efforts to establish a comprehensive system of international security. We have always seen great merit in promoting fresh ideas inspired by the wish to arrive at peaceful and just solutions of regional conflicts, to halt nuclear arms race and to strengthen security, mutual confidence and co-operation in that and other regions. My country has officially welcomed this recent Soviet initiative as an important contribution to the global efforts to avert the danger of a nuclear holocaust.

As our session comes to a close delegations have started to ponder over the results of the work of the Conference on Disarmament this year. I would also like to share some of our thoughts related to several important items on the agenda.

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(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

The nuclear-test-ban issue has been in the centre of our deliberations during the whole session. The unilateral Soviet moratorium, introduced on 6 August last year, has been extended several times over. This is a courageous step which has been widely welcomed as a convincing gesture of goodwill. It has broken standard military logic. It has proved that the Soviet Union means deeds. The moratorium has created conditions favouring the mutual renunciation of all nuclear tests. It is unfortunate that the other major nuclear Power has not, so far, deemed it necessary to consider this possibility seriously. Numerous appeals have been made to this effect by State leaders, public organizations and the United States Congress itself. The international community rightly expects that all other nuclear-weapon States will also respond positively to these appeals.

In this context, we welcome the new statement by the six Heads of State who advanced the Five-Continent-Peace Initiative. Their recent follow-up meeting in Mexico has produced some fresh ideas relevant to the nuclear test ban issue. The delegation of Bulgaria is going to study carefully the Ixtapastatement of the six States and reflect on it at another occasion. We believe that this new initiative deserves a constructive response by all States concerned, particularly by the nuclear-weapon States, with a view to an early cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests and their consequent negotiated ban.

The USSR and the United States are now engaged in a dialogue on "the entire scope of issues related to nuclear testing". The conclusions of leading scientists and disarmament experts from different countries, the reports of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts, working papers and plenary statements in the Conference on Disarmament, have convincingly shown that there are no objective obstacles to a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban. The latest achievements in seismology, combined with relevant mutually observed procedures, including on-site inspections, provide a high degree of certainty that such a ban can effectively be verified.

In this context, we share the conclusions drawn in document CD/712, submitted by Sweden, in response to some doubts raised by individual delegations with respect to the adequacy of the existing monitoring capabilities. We welcome also the relevant analysis offered on 29 July this year by the distinguished Ambassador van Schaik of the Netherlands to the effect that objections to a CTB, based on concerns related to the nuclear weapons modernization, reliably testing and the wish to keep design laboratories alive, are not relevant to the problem we all face.

The Conference should begin negotiations in an appropriate subsidiary body as soon as possible with a view to reaching an agreement on a nuclear-test-ban. The format suggested once again by the distinguished Ambassador García Robles of Mexico, last Thursday, serves the present circumstances. We have stated our readiness to start practical work on a CTB treaty, even under a more flexible mandate as proposed by me, for instance, in my capacity as President for June. It is our belief that the Conference ought to make better use of the political momentum gathered recently.

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(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

The Conference has decided to hold this year a series of informal plenary meetings on the substance of item 2 of our agenda "Cessation of Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament". The discussions carried out in such a format have proved to be useful and once again underlined the urgent need of a multilateral negotiating effort to take into account the interests of all States. The multilateral dimension of the process of nuclear disarmament and the ongoing bilateral negotiations in Geneva are both needed. They would complement each other.

The delegation of Bulgaria has welcomed this opportunity to address this problem with open minds and in a more organized informal manner. The consideration of the stages of implementation of nuclear disarmament, as envisaged in paragraph 50 of the Final Document, has focused on some interesting ideas.

The final goal -- the elimination of all nuclear weapons -- has been recognized by various authoritative multilateral and bilateral fora. It is not clear, however, when this ultimate goal will have to be achieved. The Soviet Union has suggested that the nuclear disarmament process should be completed by the year 2000. We support this idea. At the informal discussions we have pointed out that we would appreciate if other nuclear-weapon States could also share with us their own views on such a deadline, referred to also in paragraph 50.

It has also been recognized that the two major nuclear Powers should take the lead in starting to dismantle the nuclear arsenals. To this end, they are carrying out bilateral negotiations and we hope they will soon come out with a positive solution. This would be the beginning of the first stage of the process of nuclear disarmament. The exclusive participation of the two leading nuclear Powers in this process will be a major feature of the first stage.

The other nuclear-weapon States will also have to join the process at a later stage. The question has been raised as to at what point exactly this could take place. Why cannot we address this important issue now? The idea of achieving the necessary prerequisites for getting all nuclear weapon States involved in the nuclear disarmament, has already been put forward. The accomplishment of these prerequisites may mark the end of its first stage. It would advance this process to its next stage when all nuclear Powers will join it. We wonder whether the nuclear-weapon Powers should not agree on these points well in advance. Such an agreement would make sure that the second stage of nuclear disarmament will start with the participation of all of them. The elaboration of a common understanding on the question of prerequisites would be an important clarification and would facilitate the negotiations still covering the initial stage.

The idea of a separate conference of the five nuclear-weapon States has also been put forward. This is a useful suggestion. We wonder whether, for these purposes, we cannot make use of the Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral negotiating body where all nuclear Powers are represented. One option might be, at a certain stage, to set up a

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(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

sub-committee composed of these five States, having a negotiating mandate, with a view to contributing to the multilateral consideration of item 2 by the Conference itself.

Various other useful ideas have been advanced during the informal plenary consideration of the substance of item 2. Since there have been no verbatim records of these discussions, it is worth making an additional effort to put the basic ideas on paper, in order to facilitate the future work of the Conference. We believe, therefore, that the report of the Conference should cover this area, as factually as possible, and in a most concise manner. Many delegations belonging to all groups have contributed to the discussions. This effort should not be lost. We are fortunate to have established useful precedents in reflecting in the report the substance of many of our informal discussions carried out so far. The same pattern could be followed in this case again.

May I also touch briefly upon the situation with respect to agenda item 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". Much to the regret and dissatisfaction of many delegations, this Conference has been prevented, for four consecutive years, to proceed with concrete action on this priority matter. And once again the cause for that failure rests with the unwillingness of certain delegations within the Western Group to become involved in a positive solution.

The Socialist countries and the Group of 21 have continued their persistent efforts aimed at setting up an ad hoc committee on item 3 with a negotiating mandate. At the same time, taking into account the views of other delegations, they have demonstrated a broad flexibility and readiness to find a sensible compromise so as to assist to the greatest possible extent an early initiation of negotiations on concrete practical measures to prevent nuclear war.

The recent proposal put forward by the Group of 21 (document CD/515/Rev.2), concerning the mandate of an ad hoc committee on agenda item 3, is yet another manifestation of good will. We believe that it deserves serious consideration and support.

It is the considered view of the Bulgarian delegation that starting negotiations in an adequate subsidiary body on item 3 should remain as a priority task of the Conference on Disarmament. I wish to recall that my delegation has submitted its views on various aspects of this issue in document CD/710.

The Ad Hoc Committee on item 5 has completed its substantive work on the examination and identification of issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. All delegations have confirmed their adherence to this goal and expressed readiness to contribute to its accomplishment. Many delegations, including those of the Socialist countries, have pointed out that such a willingness should be substantiated with a view to an early solution of this problem. They have also pointed to recent developments which threaten to extend the arms race to outer space.



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(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

The consideration of the legal regime regulating activities in outer space has underlined again the importance of preserving and strengthening the existing legal restraints. There are some loopholes, however, which, if not properly addressed, could lead to the introduction of a new class of weapons -- space strike weapons. The outer space agreements in force do not preclude, for instance, the development, testing and deployment of non-nuclear ASAT weapon systems, which, incidentally, are based on technologies suitable for ABM purposes as well. A number of proposals have been put forward by delegations from various groups with a view to filling up these gaps. It is our belief that all delegations will have to consider seriously these valuable proposals. References to the ongoing bilateral negotiations could not solve a problem which has important multilateral dimensions. May I, also, recall that our agreed goal is the prevention of an arms race in outer space, which substantially differs from the idea of regulating such a race, as advocated by few delegations.

We have welcomed the efforts of a number of delegations to clarify the basic object of possible agreements in this area -- the concept of space weapons. Definitions of space strike weapons or space weapons, have been proposed by the delegations of Venezuela, Sri Lanka, the Soviet Union, China, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary and my own country. The analysis made during the proceedings of the Ad hoc Committee has revealed the existence of a very wide area of common ground among them. All suggested formulations have many common elements and cover all basic categories of space strike weapons. This is a fact which the Conference should, perhaps, further explore in its future work on the subject. Thus the work of the Ad hoc Committee on item 5 has recently acquired some negotiating features. In such circumstances it seems that the exploratory mandate of the Committee this year, has exhausted itself and even posed some artificial restraints on the substantive work on this item. The next logical and natural step should be, therefore, to set up next year an Ad hoc Committee with a mandate which permits to start negotiations aimed, directly, at the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

This year's session marked a noticeable acceleration of the negotiations on a chemical-weapon ban. The Soviet proposals contained in the January Declaration of the General Secretary of the CPSU, M. Gorbachev, and subsequently developed in the speech of my distinguished colleague, Ambassador Issraelyan on 22 April, gave an impetus to the negotiations.

The work in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons was organized in a manner that made use of all valuable texts in CD/636 and CD/651, reached during the chairmanship of Ambassador Turbanski of Poland, thus creating an atmosphere of continuity in the negotiations. The discussions in the three Working Groups not only gained momentum but also a new qualitative dimension.

The Working Groups' reports reveal that the area of agreement or mutual understanding have increased to a degree which allows almost a comprehensive assessment of the political, security, economic and legal implications of a future convention. A number of complex technical issues were solved or were brought to the point of near solution. In this regard the participation of chemical experts from many delegations was particularly useful.

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

The negotiations were conducted in a business-like manner and the atmosphere was generally positive.

My delegation also finds constructive the decision taken by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom, to encourage additional efforts for developing the texts in the Working Groups up to 20 August.

The two rounds of Soviet-American consultations on all aspects of a chemical-weapons ban that took place during the session have had, in our opinion, a positive and stabilizing influence on the overall setting of the multilateral negotiations.

The good results in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons notwithstanding, my delegation believes the Conference should not allow itself any complacency. A number of important issues await decision in context of the draft convention. The readiness to complete this draft as soon as possible should be coupled with a specific agreement to utilize better the intersessional period this year. A different course of action, as suggested by some Western delegations, might have grave political consequences. Suspicions might arise particularly in the wake of the planned implementation of the United States binary programme. My delegation hopes that a decision to resume the work of the Ad hoc Committee as early as October could be taken.

The results of our session this year considered as a whole do not seem very impressive. We regret that the Conference on Disarmament once again has to report to the United Nations General Assembly a lack of results which would fully correspond to the responsible task assigned on it by the international community. We wish the Conference were able to transform the hopes with which it started its work this year into significant achievements. The absence of such results has once again underlined the need for all of us to fully comprehend our great responsibility before the present and forthcoming generations.

In this context, may I recall the words of President Todor Zhivkov in his address to the Conference on Disarmament at the outset of our summer session:

"The world is at a crossroads in its evolution. Either the old behaviour stereotypes will have to be abandoned, or we all will fall victim to the consequences of the dangerous arms race."

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Bulgaria for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of India, Ambassador Gonsalves.

Mr. GONSALVES (India): Mr. President, I would like at the outset to extend to you the warm felicitations of my delegation on your assumption of the office of the President for the month of August and to pledge to you my delegation's full co-operation for the success of your efforts during this invariably difficult concluding month of our annual session. I have no doubt that with your dedication and experience and your acknowledged personal commitment and that of your Government to the cause of disarmament you will bring our work to a satisfactory conclusion. Our thanks are due to the

(Mr. Gonsalves, India)

distinguished Ambassador of Burma who presided over the Conference during the month of July and made an earnest and conscientious effort to resolve some of the difficult problems before us.

I have had the privilege of participating in the work of the Conference on Disarmament throughout its 1986 session. As the work of the 1986 session of the Conference is drawing to a close I am also about to complete my tenure as India's representative to the Conference. In my valedictory statement today it would perhaps be appropriate to reflect in a general way on my experience.

The 1986 session commenced shortly after the summit meeting between General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan and there was a widespread tendency in some of our earliest statements to point to the positive impact of the summit on the scope for progress in the Conference. The expectation of such progress has unfortunately not materialized. There has not only been no significant progress on most of the items of our agenda but there has also been a growing and retrograde tendency to dilute, erode and ignore the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament whose historic adoption by consensus in 1978 prescribed the charter of the Conference on Disarmament as the sole multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament. The Final Document established our agenda and identified our priorities in unambiguous terms. There has, however, been an irretrievable drift from the letter and spirit of the Bible of Disarmament, as Ambassador García Robles describes the Final Document. The fact that the Disarmament Commission has been concentrating on peripheral rather than central issues is one important reflection of this trend. Our ability in the Conference unlike in the past to adopt our agenda and programme of work for the 1986 session without any difficulty was welcomed by some as a reflection of what was regarded as the improved prevailing atmosphere which it was argued augured well for progress in our common quest for peace through disarmament. Subsequent events have established that that optimism was grossly misplaced. The continuing rigidity of positions on mandates for subsidiary bodies reflected the absence of political will to engage in earnest in multilateral negotiations on disarmament. We have also noticed a trend to unduly stress issues of regional and conventional disarmament without adequately placing them in the proper perspective of general and complete disarmament and without regard to their compatibility with our approved agenda or programme of work.

One group of States in the Conference has quite blatantly suggested that the Conference can legitimately hope to substantively tackle only the issue of a chemical weapons convention. The progress that is being made in this area alone is sought to be cited as satisfactory evidence that the Conference is in fact discharging its responsibilities. It is of course true that there have been several important contributions on this subject and I would particularly like to thank the Netherlands Government for the valuable workshop it arranged in June. There has been general agreement that the Ad hoc Committee on this subject under the able stewardship of Ambassador Cromartie has made reasonable progress during the current year and it is gratifying to note the expression of hope on either side of the ideological divide that an agreed CW convention can be presented to the forty-second session of the General Assembly. We are ourselves considerably less optimistic. While we hear reports of useful

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bilateral super-Power exchanges on this subject we regret the persistent tendency not to share the results of these exchanges with the Conference on Disarmament. We have at the same time heard the complaint that participation in the work of the Ad hoc Committee is not adequately representative to ensure the conclusion of a convention acceptable to all. In our view this situation is in no way related to or responsible for the continuing sharp differences on verification and other issues between the parties possessing the largest stockpiles. These differences can be resolved only if they display a much higher degree of mutual confidence and accommodation than has been the case so far. There is thus much ground to be covered if we are to attain the goal of a CW convention. We cannot in any case satisfy the expectant international community with the assurance that the only issue on which we are registering some progress is chemical weapons more particularly since the role of these weapons in the global military strategies of the two alliances is essentially of a secondary if not marginal character.

The more pressing areas in which we were expected to deliver, and in regard to which not an iota of progress has been made, relate to nuclear disarmament, prevention of nuclear war, a nuclear-weapon-test ban and prevention of an arms race in outer space. In regard to nuclear disarmament my delegation and the Group of 21 have categorically asserted the need for bilateral negotiations to be supplemented by multilateral action in the Conference. In document CD/526 our views on the responsibilities of the Conference deriving from the authority of the Final Document were unambiguously elaborated. Our work in the Conference can and must be facilitated by formal communication to the Conference of the issues being discussed and the extent of the progress being achieved in the bilateral negotiations. This requirement has been conspicuously ignored. One group of States has even sought to frustrate meaningful work on this agenda item on the unacceptable ground that it does not fall within the purview of the Conference. As a result we have been constrained to discuss this issue in informal meetings without any structure or sense of direction and also without records. We cannot share the view of some delegations that progress is being made in the aimless unrelated monologues on this question to which we have been subjected. This sorry and indeed retrograde state of affairs on the question of nuclear disarmament and the cessation of the nuclear arms race was fully reflected in the deliberations of the last session of the Disarmament Commission where no meaningful progress was registered and previously agreed portions of the relevant document were placed between square brackets for the first time.

The question of prevention of nuclear war has assumed critical importance at a time when arsenals of nuclear weapons particularly with the two largest Powers are steadily growing in numbers and sophistication. The Working Paper submitted by the delegation of Argentina in document CD/688 is an admirable effort to list the measures on which immediate multilateral negotiation must be initiated. Of these measures my delegation has consistently attached particular importance to a freeze on nuclear weapons and my delegation has in addition pressed for the conclusion of a convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The freeze proposal commends itself because in our view it is a logical corollary of commitments not to wage nuclear war and to eschew military superiority. The restraints of the SALT régime have been abandoned ostensibly in favour of the pursuit of reductions of nuclear

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weapons but presumably on a highly selective basis and with built-in provisions for their modernization. This cannot be regarded as progress towards nuclear disarmament. In our considered view the most urgently required measure is a comprehensive freeze on nuclear weapons to be followed by deep and substantial reductions in nuclear weapons. Consideration of the question of prevention of nuclear war can make no progress as long as the security postures of the nuclear weapon powers continue to be predicated on the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. This doctrine as an advanced posture constitutes a violation of Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations. Moreover, the threat of massive and disproportionate nuclear retaliation against an armed attack is not compatible with the relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter about self-defence. In a situation in which the threat of nuclear war is ever increasing due to overkill stockpiles and adherence to doctrines of nuclear deterrence the crying need is for a prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons. The Mexico Declaration of 7 August has called for a binding international agreement which outlaws every use of nuclear weapons. While there is very broad international support for this approach we are familiar with but do not accept the arguments used by a very small minority to reject our proposals.

In our view the need is for a systematic examination of all proposed measures to prevent nuclear war in the course of which we could negotiate our differences with a view to the conclusion of appropriate agreements. The delegation of Argentina has facilitated our task by pointing out that the various measures it has listed to reduce the risk of nuclear war can be negotiated and adopted individually. What is required is the political will to address the issues in an ad hoc committee with an appropriate negotiating mandate. Our efforts to secure this end unfortunately met with failure. We regret that some of those who profess readiness to discuss the issues stubbornly reject the establishment of an ad hoc committee and continue to disproportionately stress "related issues" which are not central to the basic question of prevention of nuclear war. The concerns of the non-nuclear weapon States which are equally threatened by the outbreak of nuclear war and perceive the consequent need to take preventive action cannot forever be ignored.

A pressing preoccupation of the Six-Nation Initiative and the Group of 21 is the immediate commencement of negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Various reasons are advanced for rejecting this proposition. The first of these relates to the absence of adequate verification machinery. Our views on this matter have been stated in considerable detail earlier. Working Paper CD/712 submitted by the delegation of Sweden constitutes a very valuable contribution to our work in that it places verification issues in their proper perspective. Let me state quite categorically for the record that we are all interested in effective verification machinery. The Six Nations Meeting in Mexico last week made a concrete offer of assistance to achieve adequate verification arrangements. These will be made available to the Conference. So far as the Conference is concerned the simple point is that we can sort out our differences on this question only if the political will can be manifested to establish an ad hoc committee with an appropriate mandate. That is sadly not the case. The second argument advanced is that a comprehensive test ban cannot be envisaged as testing is required to ensure the credibility of the nuclear deterrent. Our own understanding is that

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testing is being continued inter alia to develop an altogether new genre of weapons. The process of modernizing weapons by one side inevitably produces retaliatory action by the other and thus results in escalation of the nuclear arms race. The Six Nation Mexico Declaration of 7 August states that both the qualitative and quantitative development of nuclear weapons exacerbates the arms race and both would be inhibited by a complete abolition of nuclear weapons testing. The argument about the maintenance of a credible deterrent if pushed to its logical conclusion would mean that a nuclear-weapon-test ban would cease to be a goal even in the long run. Such a posture violates existing solemn treaty commitments and cannot but disappoint the international community. It was particularly gratifying in this context to note how effectively the distinguished Ambassador of the Netherlands in his important statement on 29 July countered the familiar arguments in support of continued nuclear-weapon testing. In our view the moratorium on nuclear weapon testing which has been maintained by the Soviet Union for a year constitutes an important step forward and the Six Nations have earnestly urged the United States to reciprocate this gesture at least until the next super power summit as a preliminary towards negotiations on a comprehensive weapon-test ban.

The Six Nation Initiative has placed particular emphasis on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. As has been pointed out by my delegation in the past the question of introduction of weapons into space has far-reaching implications not only for the space powers but for all nations. The introduction of defence systems in an altogether new arena will inevitably prompt retaliatory defence measures and enhanced offence capability by the other side resulting in the emergence of multiple new systems for offensive strikes against targets in space and on Earth. Thus the extension of the arms race into outer space through the pursuit of space-based defences against strategic ballistic missiles will merely precipitate an unrestrained competition in offensive and defensive weapons on Earth and in space which would almost certainly undermine the existing complex of arms control agreements, aggravate the risk and threat of nuclear war and result in an unacceptable misuse of scientific, technological and economic resources. The shifting objectives of the proponents of strategic defence are presently related to enhancing the existing nuclear deterrent by heightening the uncertainty element in the adversary's calculations through the introduction of space-based ABM systems rather than to rendering nuclear weapons obsolete as was earlier claimed. The uncertainty element is not new and was very similarly articulated in the debate about ABMs in the sixties. The ABM Treaty of 1972 reflected the recognition that emergence of defences against nuclear-armed ballistic missiles would inevitably produce a spiralling offence-defence arms race which would be exceedingly destabilizing and afford protection to neither side. There can be no doubt, therefore, that graduation to ABM systems on an inevitably competitive and escalating scale would bring the world that much closer to the brink of nuclear catastrophe. Surely the answer would lie in negotiating agreements to eliminate nuclear weapons on Earth rather than to venture into the hazardous area of space weapons. Fortunately the space weapon systems in question have not yet been fully developed and deployed and we still have time to take firm preventive action.

Our basic concerns relate to the dedicated and planned development of two specific categories of weapon systems in space, namely, ABM and ASAT systems.

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While the testing and deployment of the former is prohibited under the ABM Treaty there are no such prohibitions in regard to the latter. Current space technology allows for development of ABM systems through the ASAT loophole. Moreover, the ABM Treaty itself does not ban the development and testing of a limited category of ABM systems whose deployment is permitted. The advent of directed energy beams and developments related to high speed kinetic energy weapons and the assimilation of all related technologies into a single project may before long result in the development of both ABM weapons and ASAT weapons despite the existing legal restraints. A mandatory ban on ASAT weapons could contribute effectively towards the prevention of the emergence of such new weapons. Such a ban should include prohibitions on testing and deployment of ASAT weapons as well as dismantling of existing systems under appropriate verification.

We have heard arguments about the difficulties inherent in defining an ASAT weapon as a satellite can be rendered inoperational in a variety of ways. To meet this objection we would propose examination of each of these various ways and prescription of suitable measures to protect satellites from non-destructive interference with their functioning on the one hand and from dedicated ASAT weapons on the other. The major military Powers should manifest the basic political will to omit the ASAT option from their reckless global strategies. The Mexico Declaration of 7 August has called on the United States and the Soviet Union to halt the testing of such weapons in order to facilitate the conclusion of an international treaty on their prohibition. This Conference should facilitate that process and its speedy conclusion.

The Conference on Disarmament has an overriding responsibility to act to prevent the emergence of space weapons since unlike other weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear and chemical weapons these would be the first weapons to emerge since our Conference came into being. The Ad Hoc Committee dealing with this question has concluded its programme of work for this session under its seriously flawed mandate. My delegation has followed the proceedings of the Ad Hoc Committee with care and interest. We admire the dedication and skill with which the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Bayart of Mongolia, has conducted its work during this session. We regret to note, however, that the exercise being conducted in this Conference is too severely constrained by the positions of some delegations to be of any practical utility. My delegation for instance, finds no justification for an interminable examination of existing legal instruments. The scopes of these treaties are in our view self-evident. If, however, doubts about their interpretations are being raised these can be resolved only in the process of fresh negotiations. The most important instrument in this regard is the Outer Space Treaty which had codified in the mid sixties the commitments of its States Parties to keep outer space free from dangerous weapons as identified in terms of the then prevalent technologies. While the spirit of that Treaty is clearly against the use of force against space objects in general, the Treaty is silent about the rights of the contracting parties to develop, test and produce weapons for use in future space wars. Even the limited existing restraint on the use of ASAT weapons is negated by the assertion that the Outer Space Treaty would cease to apply in the event of the outbreak of war involving space Powers. In any case, an arms race is caused by the very introduction of the weapons in question regardless of the

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possibility of their use. Consequently the implied non-use prohibitions in the Outer Space Treaty or for that matter the general constraints outlined in the United Nations Charter are incapable of preventing the unleashing of an arms race in outer space. We regret that the Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space was not able this year to systematically identify the specific measures necessary to prevent such an arms race while research and development of space weapons continues apace. Through the perverse application of the consensus rule the Committee has not even been able to arrive at a consensus finding on the factual situation concerning the development of space weapons.

Despite considerable efforts made in the Ad Hoc Committee on CPD under the able Chairmanship of Ambassador García Robles, there is no prospect of this Conference fulfilling the mandate of the General Assembly to submit to it an agreed text of a CPD at its forty-first session. Apart from the rejection of the contents of various chapters of the CPD on measures some delegations have even refused to accept the concept of stages of disarmament with indicative time frames for their implementation which is surely basic to any global strategy for disarmament. The failure on this front is symptomatic of the basic refusal of certain powerful States to accept a multilateral approach to disarmament. It is this persistent negative attitude which has reduced the Conference on Disarmament to a mere deliberating body rather than the full fledged negotiating forum envisaged under its charter. It is our solemn duty to face our common predicament and to engage in collective multilateral action to enable serious implementation of the Programme of Action outlined in the Final Document. As I come to the end of my tenure as India's representative to this Conference I would like to express the earnest hope that the Conference on Disarmament can commence its 1987 session with the agreed determination to engage in constructive collective endeavour to enable us to negotiate our way out of the nuclear peril which so starkly threatens us all.

Some other heads of delegation are also due to terminate their assignments here shortly. Ambassador Wegener of the Federal Republic of Germany has during his long tenure contributed effectively to our consideration of various agenda items through his deep study and expert knowledge of the issues involved. His masterly stewardship of the Disarmament Commission in May constituted perhaps the high point of his career in the field of disarmament. Ambassador Kerroum of Algeria has had a much shorter tenure. He has nevertheless distinguished himself by his single personal contribution to our effort to make progress towards disarmament in the course of which he has so effectively articulated and elaborated the non-aligned approach to this question. Ambassador Jessel of France is also due to leave us shortly. His important contribution to our deliberations will be recalled with the deepest appreciation. I wish all of them all success in their important new assignments.

I would like to conclude by expressing my gratitude to those colleagues, including you, Mr. President, who have been kind enough to make generous personal references to me on the occasion of my impending departure. I would also like to record my deep gratitude and appreciation to the Secretary-General of the Conference and other members of the Secretariat and to all my colleagues in the Conference without whose generous co-operation and understanding my tenure here would not have been as agreeable and profitable



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as it has been. I shall cherish memories of this interesting experience while at the same time nurturing the sincere hope that the Conference can in the future perform more effectively than it has done so far.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of India for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

I have already expressed my personal good wishes, but since this is the last time that Ambassador Gonsalves is addressing this Conference, I should like to take note on behalf of the Conference on Disarmament of the significant contribution that he has made to our work. He has shown us all that he is an outstanding and experienced diplomat who has served his country with distinction at this Conference and I am sure that in his new and important functions he will continue to do so. May I extend, on behalf of all of us, our best wishes to Ambassador and Mrs. Gonsalves.

I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Wegener, who I believe is not yet making his valedictory statement.

Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): Your varied and distinguished career, your profound knowledge of all important aspects of multilateral diplomacy including disarmament, the perspicacity and precision of your political judgement, and specifically, contributions in the field of international law have conferred upon you, Mr. President, exceptional personal prestige. If your own accomplishments are seen in conjunction with Canada's impeccable record in the field of disarmament, the Conference must consider itself fortunate to see you preside over its current work.

Several times during the 1986 spring session, my delegation has called for a focused and methodologically sound debate on the outstanding issues of a CTBT, convinced that only a full grasp of the complexity of these issues will enable the Conference to proceed to their solution.

There is no doubt that the early establishment of an ad hoc committee on nuclear testing would have provided us with the optimum format for earnest co-operative research into these complexities. Notwithstanding the insufficiencies of our institutional devices, it is however particularly gratifying that useful work on the agenda item has been accomplished over the last few months. A further momentum could result if the hopes of those mature who wish to create a full-fledged Committee in this final month of the 1986 session, at least as a positive prelude to next year's work.

There has been considerable and noteworthy progress as a result of a sustained debate, commensurate with the intellectual requirements of the subject. Events outside of our assembly hall have conferred an added significance to our endeavours.

The recent round of meetings of American and Soviet experts on test ban matters should be viewed as an encouragement also in our work. My Government has voiced the hope that these talks, that will be continued in a near future, will lead to progress towards a Comprehensive Test Ban. Satisfactory solutions in the field of verification are an essential prerequisite for their

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success. The Six Heads of State or Government from four continents, in a declaration to which I will revert in the course of my statement have forcefully substantiated their call for the earliest possible conclusion of a CTBT.

Our own work has centered on one of the crucial problem areas of a CTBT, the prerequisites for its effective international verification. In the view of my delegation, the Conference has reached a remarkable momentum towards general acceptance of an effective international monitoring and verification system. This promising development, as we see it, is due to the efforts of many delegations who have all contributed important elements to a new and more refined view of test ban verification. These contributions -- notably by Japn, Sweden, Norway, Australia, my own delegation and lately the Soviet Union -- are all mutually compatible and supportive, in the sense that they have allowed us to proceed from the original and shared basic insight that an international seismic control network is indispensable for the operation of a CTBT, to far-reaching agreement on the configuration, extent and time element in the establishment of the system. We have thus jointly reached a further stage of conceptualization in the field of test ban verification.

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Needless to say, the conceptual accomplishments which I will review subsequently could only have been achieved on the basis of the purposeful and dedicated contribution by the GSE over the last 10 years, a successful co-operative international endeavour that deserves to be clearly recognized.

The novel element in my own country's contribution to this new level of verification methodology, as presented in CD/612 and 624, has been its dynamic dimension. As I recalled extensively in a statement on 18 February, our proposal aims at the gradual establishment of a permanent global seismic monitoring network, based initially on the existing facilities, as used for, and co-ordinated during the 1984 GSETT, but equipped with a built-in mechanism for geographical extension and further technical evolution in keeping with the advances of seismic technology. The advantage of this scheme, as we presented it, lies in its readiness for immediate application, its potential for gaining experience with long-term operations and for filling in its lacunae, as well as in its availability, at state-of-the-art level, at the very entry into force of a CTBT, thus moving from a comprehensive monitoring device to a true verification system.

Our approach has been taken up most clearly by Australia in Working Paper CD/717, which endorses it, heightens the sense of urgency of its application, and offers a number of useful and welcome operational indices for its swift enactment. My delegation commends Australia on its proposal and advises its early consideration by the Conference.

Australia may have offered the most clear-cut endorsement of our dynamic approach, supplementing it in a welcome manner, but other delegations, in their presentations, have also demonstrated their express or implied support, confirming my delegation in its view that all current contributions to this topic are truly compatible and complementary. This is encouraging, the more so since there has been no reasoned opposition to our scheme.

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Full compatibility can, especially, be recognized in the Swedish Working Paper CD/712, an admirable and knowledgeable compilation of present insight into the requirements of a global seismic network, testifying to the excellent scientific backstopping services which the Swedish delegation commands, one of the hallmarks of its exceptional contribution to the work of our Conference. The important achievement of CD/712 appears to lie in its call for -- and precise definition of -- prototype monitoring stations, along the lines my delegation has recommended, prototypes that could soon be emplaced, but then developed further in a dynamic mode.

Norway, in its Working Paper CD/714, provides recent topical information on the experience gathered by the newly developed Norwegian regional seismic array system NORESS, information not yet available in June 1985 when the Norwegian Government invited members of the Conference to visit NORESS. Norway's contribution is particularly significant in that it explores the interaction of regional small-aperture seismic arrays with a global network incorporating such arrays. The practical experiences with NORESS and similar regional arrangements provide a tangible input for the operability and continuous improvement of an effective global system.

Recent statements by Soviet speakers also indicate movement in the field of test ban verification. They clarify that verification, including on-site inspection, would not be an obstacle to the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing. Advanced technology, including high performance data acquisition systems and fast real-time data communication installations capable of handling Waveform or Level II-data, is indispensable for any meaningful attempt to verify compliance with a CTBT, by way of a global network. It is therefore noteworthy that Ambassador Issraelyan in his intervention on 22 July announced that the Soviet Union was now prepared not only to accede to an in-depth discussion of the exchange of Level II-data in the context of the work of the Group of Seismological Experts (GSE) but also to engage in a practical test exchange of these data during a test run for which the Soviet delegate envisaged the year 1988. This is good news. The crucial question of operability of a complex world-wide system of seismic data collection, communication and processing has thus been responsibly addressed. Although individual seismographic stations might work effectively, the task of operating in a reliable manner an interlinked system of as many as 50 to 100 seismic stations based in different countries and parts of the world and run by many nations and the communication of data to and from international data centres has not yet been satisfactorily resolved, as the report of the GSE on the technical test run in 1984 has shown. Thus we look forward with great expectations to the experiment proposed by the Soviet Union for 1988 that would, if successfully completed, represent a qualitative improvement in the field of verification both as to the characteristics of the data exchanged and as to the speed and reliability with which these data are transmitted. In order both to make the envisaged 1988 test run an unqualified success and at the same time to encourage even more States to participate in a test on a truly global scale, an additional and prolonged test run on the basis of the 1984 specifications, those technical difficulties that surfaced during the 1984 test run should be eliminated prior to the more demanding test in 1988.

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Again, the new Soviet proposal appears in no way incompatible with our own approach. My delegation considers it gratifying that the Soviet delegation has taken this important step, moving closer to our own verification philosophy.

My brief review of some pertinent proceedings of our Conference, in the view of my delegation amply substantiates my initial claim: that substantial progress in our work towards a common concept and a common methodology have been achieved. It is this positive trend which has recently brought Chancellor Helmut Kohl to express the view of the Government of the Federal Republic that "the possibilities of verification should now cease to form the main obstacle for an agreement" on a nuclear-test ban.

Yet, even the conceptual progress which I have observed, and which provides ample justification for Chancellor Kohl's statement, does not resolve all remaining difficulties. Verification of a CTBT will not be an easy task, and nobody can rightfully proclaim that all inherent technical problems are reliably removed. The difficulties of discrimination between nuclear explosions and seismic events, seismic measurement uncertainties, the incomplete and uneven state of seismic facilities world-wide, the lack of in-country seismic networks in countries crucial to a CTBT, and, finally, potential evasive options, including cavity-decoupling, all persist.

These challenges will continue to be with us -- yet all these problems will, in our concept, be susceptible to gradual solution, on a continuous basis, in the framework of a dynamically conceived, self-perfecting monitoring and verification system.

One of the obvious criteria by which a verification system must be measured is its effectiveness in excluding concealed nuclear explosions. Like other delegations in their previous presentations, Working Paper CD/712 by Sweden does not seriously consider successful attempts at surreptitious breach of a CTBT as probable. There is no doubt that the technical reasoning behind this view is sound. Evasion scenarios will be extremely difficult to effect, and even the existing, let alone further capabilities of a global verification system will preclude that they become a frequent occurrence.

Yet the question remains posed: how should a future verification system look at evasion options? The important thing appears to be a balanced approach, in which far-fetched evasion scenarios are just as much avoided as a mere glossing-over of evasion possibilities that may be available to a potential offender.

The dangers of breach of treaty must be soberly assessed against the technical fact that today even very few and very small test explosions may confer upon the evader a significant military advantage, and may therefore become an attractive military option -- or, on the side of other parties to the treaty a very real security risk. The possibilities of evasion must therefore be taken seriously by all. An ideal verification system would exclude all variants of evasion. In a non-ideal world the challenge is to determine levels of efficiency and confidence which allow all future parties

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to find assurance. That task can be mastered on the basis of a calm, technically well-versed and responsible analysis of all possible evasion threats.

The gradual establishment and operation of a world-wide monitoring and verification system is not gratuitous. It demands the best, from all participants, in terms of material and scientific resources. In this perspective, it is desirable that States capable of doing so embark on a major effort as of now, in order to make the best possible input into the global endeavour. As a step towards substantiating its own commitment to a global system, the Federal Government has recently decided to intensify its co-operative efforts in the field of fast and reliable data exchange and storage of formally acquired seismic data. It currently finances, on a priority basis, the establishment and continuous operation of data analysis centres, as for instance the one installed at the Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources in Hanover. By way of direct computer-to-computer links with other countries the Institute is in a position to exchange all relevant seismic data including waveform or Level II-data. GSE documents define as means of data exchange the whole range of communications, from postal mailing services to special-purpose satellite systems, while some national reports have shown that modern telecommunication systems can provide rapid exchange of the most complex data without any particular restrictions on the amount of the transmitting capacity. Yet, only a few years ago, only a limited number of countries were able to make full use of these techniques for seismic data transfer. Meanwhile, digital data networks have been established in many countries around the globe. One of these new telecommunication systems, the packet-switched-data network (PSDN), is presently available in more than 70 countries of the world. These developments have led the Federal Government to concentrate its research in the field of designing the hardware and software necessary to acquire, analyse and transmit seismic data including wave form data on direct computer-to-computer links. By designing German seismic data centres, specifically and from the outset, for open access and for remote data treatment via telecommunication links we want to share our specific knowledge in this field with interested seismic scientists from virtually any country. We explicitly request all members of the Conference to make use of this service which is described in a more technical and detailed manner in a Working Paper submitted to the GSE on 21 July last. By offering these services -- and in cases of particular interest by arranging visits of guest scientists to the participating installations the Federal Republic of Germany hopes to add, in a significant and meaningful way, to the creation of an international seismic monitoring network, destined to become a reliable verification instrument in the context of a future CTB.

On the background of our work on verification here in the Conference, and on the basis of the developments I have described, the recent proposal of the Six Heads of State or Government at their meeting at Ixtapa, Mexico, takes on great significance. While a detailed study of their proposal remains to be undertaken, the commitment of the six participants to effective verification and on-site inspection is most welcome. The proposed practical steps for the implementation of an on-site verification system merit the attention of this Conference. Chancellor Kohl has -- in a letter addressed to the participants

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in the Ixtapa meeting on the eve of their reunion -- reiterated the Federal Government's commitment to work for the achievement of a comprehensive nuclear test ban at the earliest possible moment. In his letter, the Chancellor has also conveyed his ideas on other current urgent issues of arms control and disarmament policy. His remarks will be of interest to delegations, and I have seen to it that copies are distributed while I am speaking.

In the context of verification we have noted the resurgence of plans to move towards a CTBT by way of interim steps. These take different forms. In the first place, the question of entry into force of the 1974 TTBT, and its companion piece, the PNET, is still of topical importance, and this particularly at a time when bilateral contacts on the future of these instruments have resumed. Taking the yield-threshold idea as a clue, and linking it with the problem of verifiability, the Foreign Minister of Japan, Mr. Shintoro Abe, in a now famous statement before this Conference advocated the negotiated introduction of ever lower yield limits, in keeping with the evolution of verification technology. This proposal is still before us. Over a number of years, my Government has also considered a number of possibilities for approximating a test ban through test limitations in the form of a negotiated interim régime.

On 11 April 1986, Chancellor Kohl urged that the two major Powers,

"could, as a first step, or as an interim solution, reflect on a limitation of tests. Thus, for instance, the tests required for the maintenance of the operationability of nuclear weapons could be confined to agreed, limited time intervals, and gradually be entirely discontinued in the framework of the negotiated reduction of nuclear weapons".

Now that these thought patterns regarding interim measures have become more frequent, they are emulated in many quarters, both private and official. There is thus reason enough for the Conference to establish their relative merit, and to explore their potential.

In any such discussion, the finality of the interim measure must be clearly kept in view; the further and obviously more rewarding perspective of a comprehensive test ban must remain visible. The important thing will be to visualize an interim measure as a sign of welcome movement in the right direction. The essence of such interim measures is that they would at least lead to less tests.

Interim measures, too, must be visualized in the perspective of the NPT. The legal constraints on the signatories emanating from that Treaty and from other internationally binding non-proliferation arrangements remain as unaffected by such interim agreements as the political constraints operating on the members of the international community generally.

The developments I have mentioned in this statement are welcome to my Government. They should help us to reach workable, universally acceptable solutions in our quest for a comprehensive, fully verifiable test ban. Effective verification is one indispensable prerequisite for a CTBT. Our purposeful concentration on this aspect must, however, not becloud the

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essential relationship between a test ban and the larger processes of nuclear disarmament. The views of my Government on this complex relationship are unchanged. May I again cite Chancellor Kohl who said earlier this year:

"In my view there is now a good opportunity for promising negotiations on a limitation and future cessation of nuclear tests, and on their verification. I would, however, like to state clearly that a test ban cannot be a substitute for a substantial reduction of existing arsenals of weapons."

Recently, in our midst, Ambassador van Schaik of the Netherlands has provided us with his views on the delicate interaction between nuclear disarmament and progress towards a CTBT. No matter whether one agrees with all his arguments, his closely reasoned analysis is certainly thought-provoking and calls for a detailed and full consideration by the Conference.

The various thoughts I have presented today testify to the earnest determination of my Government to attain the most rapid possible progress towards a CTBT, in view of its early conclusion. My delegation is prepared to lend its full support, as in the past, to all activities, in this Conference and elsewhere, that may further this goal.

I welcome the coincidence by which I find myself placed on the speaker's list immediately after our most distinguished colleague from India, Ambassador Gonsalves. This affords me an opportunity to thank him warmly and spontaneously for his all too generous words on my behalf. It also allows me to express my regret on his imminent departure, premature in the view of his Geneva colleagues, fortunate for his own Ministry, where a high position will now enable him to help shape the foreign policy for the benefit of his great country. We are living in an age where India's contributions to civilization are once again on a par with its role and influence in the world. Ambassador Gonsalves has been an effective and respected spokesman of modern India, aided by his knowledge and skills. At the same time he has fulfilled his mandate in the spirit of tolerance and noblesse. I have always been impressed by his ability to turn the expression of divergent views into a constructive and fruitful dialogue. On behalf of my delegation, I would like to wish him good luck in his future functions.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the President.

I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Mongolia, Ambassador Bayart.

Mr. BAYART (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): Thank you Mr. President. May I, on behalf of the Mongolian delegation, most sincerely congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the Presidency of the Conference of Disarmament for August and subsequent months until the opening of its session in 1987. We are certain that your skilful guidance, your great diplomatic experience and your talent will be of help to the Conference in

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advancing in the solution of a number of problems. We wish you great success and we pledge the support and co-operation of the Mongolian delegation for your efforts. May I also express my gratitude to the distinguished representative of Burma, Ambassador U Tin Tun, for the great deal of work he has done in discharging his duties as President last month.

I should like to avail myself of this opportunity to welcome the new representative of Peru Ambassador Jorge Morelli Pando, and to associate myself with the kind words addressed to the distinguished representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany, France, India and Algeria, who are unfortunately leaving us very soon, and to wish them all the best.

Today I should like to devote my statement to one of the high priority issues on our Conference's agenda, namely, the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and to express a number of general comments thereon.

From the time of the practical research and exploration of outer space in the 1950s, the international community has devoted unwavering attention to the task of keeping it peaceful and free from weapons. It is thanks to this that over the past few decades a number of important measures, designed to prevent an arms race in outer space have been adopted.

However, today these measures have turned out to be inadequate to prevent the "star wars" science fiction from becoming reality in the not-too-distant future. I am referring to the implementation by the United States of a large-scale programme to militarize outer space, to the development of space strike weapons designed to neutralize the nuclear capability of the USSR as a deterrent factor.

In the nuclear space age, any attempt to change the existing level of the balance of nuclear capability of the opposing sides is fraught with unpredictable danger. Everybody must feel equally safe, and the acquisition of any unilateral advantage by anyone cannot be allowed.

This principle of equality and equal security, as a basis for efforts to limit and halt the arms race, is enshrined in the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which says: "the adoption of disarmament measures should take place in such an equitable and balanced manner as to ensure the right of each State to security and to ensure that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage". This principle was reflected in the Soviet-American Joint Statement published as a result of the meeting between the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, and the United States President, Ronald Reagan, in November last year. The parties agreed that nuclear war should never be unleashed for it could not be won, that it is important to do everything to prevent war between the USSR and the United States, whether nuclear or conventional, and that they would not seek to achieve military superiority.



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However, the United States in actual fact has not been adhering to these crucial provisions, and has been putting forward various fabricated pretexts to sidestep these agreements.

It is now strenuously argued that the Strategic Defence Initiative programme is allegedly purely defensive and does not threaten anyone, that it is almost the only way to eliminate nuclear weapons and to strengthen stability, that the offensive devices which are being developed are merely harmless, and that the SDI is just a research programme.

That argument, however sophisticated, cannot mislead anyone. In connection with this, legitimate questions are raised over and over again. For instance, if the SDI is a way to eliminate nuclear weapons, then why does the United States continue increasingly to create new types of strategic offensive weapons, to develop thousands of cruise missiles, and to deploy medium-range missiles in Europe?

If the SDI is a way to stability, why do the leaders of the United States declare that it would be terrible if the Soviet Union were the first to create an anti-missile shield?

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If the SDI is mere research, then can one imagine that the United States, having spent tens of billions of dollars in the coming years, will then give up their idea simply because "the Russians will not agree to its development"?

We sometimes hear United States representatives declare that the USSR effort in the field of defence technology is much bigger than the American one and the American research is designed to establish parity with the advances made by the USSR. Were we to believe this, would it not be more advantageous and less difficult from every standpoint for the United States Administration to agree with the USSR proposals to prohibit research and to open up on a mutual basis the relevant laboratories and other institutions dealing with military research in order to verify that they are not developing offensive space weapons?

We believe that this would be the simplest, most expeditious and most effective means to solve the problem of safeguarding outer space from weapons. Moreover, we believe that one of the effective avenues leading to the prevention of an arms race in outer space is the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

When there are no nuclear explosions, the basis will also disappear for the improvement of nuclear weaponry and the creation of new types and varieties of such weapons, including X-ray lasers for deployment in outer space. At the same time there will be a qualitative reduction of nuclear charges as a result of their obsolescence and, in future, a progressive disappearance of nuclear weapons. As a result, the expensive strategic delivery systems for nuclear charges designed to span inter-continental distances would simply become unprofitable, and their use would provide no strategic advantage.

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On the basis of these considerations, we believe that in the event that nuclear-weapon tests are prohibited and given the ensuing obsolescence of nuclear weapons, the need to create an anti-missile shield which is basically conceived as a means of interception and elimination in just a few minutes of a large part of the nuclear-warhead-carrying rockets launched in a retaliatory strike, would disappear of its own accord. Hence, if we are talking about a means of making nuclear weapons "useless and obsolete", then the international community would vastly prefer just such a nuclear-test ban rather than the creation of a space anti-missile "shield".

This is shown by the well-known resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, the voice of the international community, especially loud and clear at a time when 41 years ago the inhabitants of Hiroshima and Nagasaki became the victims of the use of nuclear weapons. We must redouble our efforts to ensure that they were the very last victims of atomic bombing.

The unilateral Soviet moratorium on all nuclear explosions is now one year old. For a whole year the world's eyes have been turned to the United States and the other nuclear Powers in the hope and expectation that they will all seize the unique, historic chance provided by the USSR and make this moratorium mutual. In turn, the representatives of the five continents meeting recently in Mexico also made an appeal to this end, but unfortunately these hopes have so far not been justified.

As space strike weapons, as I said before, are designed to neutralize the adversary's nuclear capability, to eliminate facilities and installations vital for his survival, in other words, to create the conditions for a nuclear attack or nuclear first strike, unless they are banned it is impossible to reduce strategic offensive weapons.

This is particularly true when the United States is in fact abandoning the comprehensive consideration of issues pertaining to nuclear and space weapons, i.e. the prevention of an arms race in outer space and its cessation on Earth as agreed with the USSR in January 1985 and confirmed at the Summit Meeting in November of the same year, and is now attempting to impose a reduction and limitation of strategic missiles alone (in other words precisely those armaments which form the basis of Soviet strategic retaliatory forces) and to sheer off from a solution to the outer space problem.

All this is evidence that the SDI is part of the United States overall military plan based on offensive strategy. Basically, the Star Wars plans are designed to revise Soviet-American relations in the field of strategic stability, which is in fact based on mutual deterrence. Hence the conclusion must be drawn that the SDI is the main hurdle to the limitation and balanced reduction of nuclear armaments until their complete elimination.

Mankind is called upon to unite its intellectual, material, energy and other resources and together undertake the peaceful exploration of outer space. To achieve this noble task, a stage-by-stage programme for outer space exploration was proposed by the USSR in June this year. The very heart of this proposal is, in our view, the creation in the next few years of a world

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space organization whose main task would be the peaceful exploration and use of outer space through the joint efforts and for the benefit of all States without exception, and the monitoring of compliance with treaties aimed at preventing the arms race from spreading to outer space as they are concluded.

Thus, this programme represents the only viable alternative to an arms race in space and there is no doubt whatsoever that all States, large and small, developed and developing, only stand to gain from it. The member States of the Conference on Disarmament can and indeed must make a substantial contribution to the serious consideration of this important initiative at the forthcoming United Nations General Assembly, if only for the simple reason that the Conference bears the main responsibility for drawing up measures to prevent an arms race in outer space.

In the course of the 1985 and 1986 sessions the Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space has done a good deal of work to study and define issues connected with the prevention of an arms race in outer space. On some important issues concrete proposals were advanced and working papers were submitted which deserve serious and thorough consideration in future.

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At previous plenary meetings and at today's meeting a number of delegations, including the delegations of the Soviet Union, Venezuela, Bulgaria, India and others, have given their assessment of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space. The Mongolian delegation on the whole shares these assessments and, not wishing to repeat them, simply wishes to point out that the discussion held in the Ad Hoc Committee provides even more striking confirmation of the need to undertake negotiations on the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as necessary, to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects.

The recent statement of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mr. M. Gorbachev, in Vladivostok elicited a broad response in the Mongolian People's Republic. The Mongolian Government's statement stresses that the new peaceful initiatives of the USSR are designed to unite the efforts of States in the Asian and Pacific regions for a common search for ways and means to guarantee peace and security and for the solution of the pressing and vitally important problems of this region.

Far from detracting from the importance of the whole series of proposals put forward in Mr. M. Gorbachev's statement, I should like to stress the special significance for the strengthening of Asian security of the proposal for curbing the spread and build-up of nuclear weapons in Asia and the Pacific, for a phased reduction of conventional forces and armaments in Asia, and for the holding of discussions on confidence-building measures and the non-use of force in the region. It must be pointed out that these proposals have a direct bearing on the work of the Conference on Disarmament and the issues it is considering.

These proposals, as well as Comrade Gorbachev's proposals for the convening, in the city of Hiroshima, of a Pacific conference on the Helsinki model, are even weightier and acquire an even deeper significance today, when the whole planet bows in memory of the nuclear victims of Hiroshima and

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Nagasaki and once again firmly demands that an end be put to the threat of a nuclear catastrophe which, were it to occur, would cost mankind at the very least a million Hiroshimas.

Mongolia, which has actively and single-mindedly been endeavouring to implement its proposal for the creation of machinery to exclude the use of force in relations among States in the Asian and Pacific region sees its duty in world co-operation to implement the proposals of the Soviet Union which really pave the way for dialogue and mutual co-operation among States in the Asian and Pacific region and for the achievement of a security throughout that region.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Mongolia for his statement and for his kind references to the Chair. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor?

Before we adjourn, may I recall that the Conference was scheduled to hold this afternoon at 3.00 p.m., an informal meeting to consider the substantive paragraphs of the draft annual report under agenda items 1, "Nuclear test ban" and 7, "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons". The relevant texts are contained in documents CD/WP.244 for item 1, and CD/WP.245 for item 7. May I recall that these documents were circulated by the secretariat in the delegations' boxes on Wednesday and again at the informal meeting last Thursday, when the Conference began its consideration of the draft annual report with a first reading of the technical parts. I see the distinguished representative of Australia has asked for the floor and I call on him.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): I have sought the floor to speak on a procedural matter but, before doing so, as this is the first occasion on which I have spoken in a plenary under your Presidency, let me express the very deep sense of pleasure that my delegation feels at seeing you in the Chair. The length, in terms of historical time, and the depth of the relationship that exists between Canada and Australia are well-known to everyone in this room, a relationship which was, in fact, given its latest, greatest expression, last Wednesday when our two Foreign Ministers met together in Vancouver, Canada.

I am speaking on behalf of the Australian delegation. I believe too that I can speak in my role as Co-ordinator for the Western group of countries on the subject of "Nuclear Test Ban", that is item 1 of our agenda. My procedural proposal is that we do not consider document CD/WP.244 at the meeting scheduled for this afternoon, the reason being that it is clear to many delegations, and my delegation is one such delegation, that many of us in this room did not, in fact, receive the documentation involved, CD/WP.244, at a time which would allow sufficient study for us to make a meaningful contribution to this afternoon's scheduled discussion. Quite simply, we would like a little more time, particularly for the reason that I mentioned, namely, that the document was not in our hands in adequate time for the study that it clearly deserves.

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(Mr. Butler, Australia)

Under these circumstances, I must ask you please to work within our flexible work programme, which is always described as a flexible one, and schedule an early meeting on another day for our first consideration of CD/WP.244.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Australia. I would mention, of course, that there is call for concern about our time-table and I think we all agree on the desirability of trying to work as expeditiously as possible. On the other hand, we may not find that we are working expeditiously if certain delegations are not prepared for the scheduled meeting. We could hold such a meeting on Thursday, 14 August, in the morning, immediately after the plenary, although there may not be sufficient time to finish on that occasion. I would ask if there are any objections to postponing the meeting until Thursday morning at which time I would hope that all delegations would have adequate opportunity to be prepared. The Secretary-General advises me that we would also have time on Friday, 15 August at 3 p.m., when, however, we almost certainly would have to deal with other issues. Is this agreeable to all concerned?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: May I mention also, that when we do meet, as agreed, it would be helpful that we begin our meeting as quickly as possible. In that context I would like to mention that a number of members have already inscribed themselves to speak at our next plenary meeting on Thursday. As has been our recent custom may I suggest that we start our plenary meeting at 10 a.m. and that we begin punctually in deference to those who do come promptly, at 10 a.m., so that we might conclude our business as soon as possible on that morning particularly given the information that I have just conveyed to you in the decision that we have just made, bearing in mind also, that the Ad Hoc Committee on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will meet at 3 p.m. that afternoon and ought not to have any other items interfere with its programme. If there is no objection to this suggestion, I shall formulate now the relevant announcement. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 14 August, at 10 a.m. and immediately afterwards we will have an informal meeting to consider the draft annual report on agenda items 1 and 7. The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.05 p.m.

## CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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14 August 1986

ENGLISH

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### FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-NINTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 14 August 1986, at 10. a.m.

President:

Mr. J. Alan Beesley

(Canada)

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The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 379th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the outset, may I warmly welcome His Excellency, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati who will be the first speaker at the plenary meeting today. Delegates will recall that the Minister for Foreign Affairs has made statements in this Conference before, the last time being on 27 February of this year. I wish to thank him for the interest he shows in our work.

In conformity with its programme of work, the Conference continues today its consideration of reports of ad hoc subsidiary bodies as well as of the Annual Report to the General Assembly of the United Nations. In accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, however, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

As you know, the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events held its twenty-second session from 21 July to 1 August this year. As a result of its work, the Ad Hoc Group is submitting to the Conference three documents, as follows:

(a) Document CD/681/Rev.1, entitled, "Summary of the Fourth Report to the Conference on Disarmament of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events (CD/720)";

(b) Document CD/720, entitled, "Fourth Report to the Conference on Disarmament of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events";

(c) Document CD/721, entitled, "Progress Report to the Conference on Disarmament on the Twenty-Second Session of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events".

May I draw your attention to the recommendations contained in paragraphs 12 (first sentence), 14 and 15 of the Progress Report appearing in document CD/721. I am inviting today the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group to introduce the documentation put before the Conference and to report to you on further steps that the Conference may need to take in connection with the work of the Group. We shall take up those recommendations at our plenary meeting on Thursday, 21 August. At the request of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group, the secretariat is also circulating an informal paper containing a draft communication to be addressed by me, as President of the Conference, to the Secretary-General of the World Meteorological Organization. That draft communication reflects the recommendations contained in the Progress Report submitted by the Ad Hoc Group in document CD/721. Accordingly, once the Conference adopts those recommendations I intend to address a communication to the Secretary-General of the World Meteorological Organization as circulated this morning. Of course, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group will be available for any clarification that members might wish to obtain in connection with the suggestions that he has advanced in the informal paper.

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(The President)

I have on the list of speakers for today the representatives of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Japan, Mexico, Brazil, Australia, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, and the representative of the United Kingdom.

I now give the floor to His Excellency, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati.

Mr. VELAYATI (Islamic Republic of Iran): Mr. President, at the outset I would like to congratulate you on your Presidency of the Conference. I am sure that under your stewardship, the Conference will greatly contribute to the deliberations and to the successful discharge of its responsibilities. Today the entire world community is looking anxiously towards the work of this Conference, and here lies a historic opportunity to serve humanity and make history if we are able here to reach our objectives.

The Islamic Republic of Iran, as a newly born system, has been faced with numerous problems and obstacles which have been imposed upon it, and consequently we have not been able to play a complete and decisive role in the realization of the objectives of the Conference. This does not, however, negate the importance and seriousness we attach to these deliberations and as a member of the Conference on Disarmament we keenly follow its discussions and the deliberations in various committees.

The insane arms race poses a threat to the whole human community and it therefore deserves a lot of attention by any country. Apart from its universal dimensions, the subject is crucial to us for several reasons. Our country is located in a very sensitive and strategic region, under threat from direct military rivalries of the super-Powers. We have been witness to the increase of their spheres of influence and military presence in the countries of the region. The sophisticated arms delivery to the countries of the region in the past two decades is comparable with the total amount delivered to the Third World and developing countries. From the inception of the Iraqi aggression on 22 September 1980, we have been subjected to and victimized by the most sophisticated conventional and chemical weapons. We have directly experienced human loss and material damage and I am now addressing you with the deep feelings and complete comprehension of the effects of these weapons. Although we have countered and neutralized the weapons delivered by East and West, thanks to the self-sacrifice of our young, we are gradually increasing our awareness of the sensitivity attached to the international efforts for the reduction of the arms race. This awareness, particularly concerning the inhuman chemical weapons, is growing deeper and stronger. I am sorry that I have to start my statement from this very same subject, and more unfortunate still is the fact that the use of mass-killing chemical weapons has been repeated.

You are all aware of the latest report, issued in March 1986, document S/17911, filed by a United Nations team dispatched by the United Nations Secretary-General to probe into the use of chemical weapons. As you know, this is the third consecutive report. In 1984, the United Nations confirmed that chemical weapons were used in Iraqi aggression against Iran, and in 1985 the repeated use was reaffirmed after afflicted Iranians were sent for



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(Mr. Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)

treatment. In the last report, Iraq was introduced as the frequent deployer of chemical weapons on a large scale. All of these reports were followed by statements by the Security Council and a number of countries condemning the use of chemical weapons by Iraq, but none of these measures prevented the Iraqis from repeating such grave crimes.

Since the foundation of the United Nations Organization, this is the first time that a signatory to the 1925 Geneva Protocol has officially been denounced as the flagrant violator of this Protocol, repeatedly committing these crimes. This crime is not confined to one particular country, but rather others will be affected by its consequences. Deployment of chemical weapons from World War I became an international issue crucial to the peace and security of the countries. In this very Conference, the subject of the prevention of production, deployment, use and stockpiling of chemical weapons has been as equally important as the issue of nuclear weapons. But at the same time, a small country like Iraq is allowed to be equipped with sophisticated chemicals and to use them at various junctures.

Our studies, as reflected in the United Nations reports, show that Iraq has deployed cyanide and nerve gas in addition to mustard gas. The Iraqi régime does not possess the technical expertise to produce such weapons, particularly the nerve gas to which only a few countries have access because of its sophistication. We have information about the exportation of chemical weapons and the related technology to Iraq and these studies will be continued. However, this responsibility does not fall solely on us, as a victim of chemical weapons, but rather it is a common and international duty for all countries, particularly the members of the Conference on Disarmament as well as the relevant decision-making organ of the United Nations and other international organs which should carry out a thorough investigation into the matter.

With the continued deployment of chemical weapons by the régime of Iraq, the international duty to adopt practical and serious measures, vis-à-vis this régime, and to investigate the countries which have provided it with chemical weapons, becomes extremely serious. The Benelux countries have banned the exportation of 12 chemical substances to Iraq following the Security Council's statement of 21 March 1986 condemning the Iraqi régime. Other members of the European Community have also adopted special measures to impose controls on certain substances which can be turned into chemical weapons. It is, however, clear that such actions by a few countries concerning a limited number of substances and without thorough executive verification are in no way sufficient. Since the adoption of the Security Council's statement of 21 March, Iraq has deployed chemical weapons on five separate occasions in different places, the last of which was on 28 May 1986 in Gorgan and Amirabad in the south-west of the country -- resulting in the injury of over 50 persons. Mustard gas was used in all these instances and this has been reported to the Secretary-General with a request that teams be dispatched to investigate. Owing to Iraq's past record, no investigation was felt necessary in this regard and the cases were confirmed. In one case only, and following a long procrastination, we received a positive response for the dispatch of a probing team where the traces had, with the lapse of time, eroded away. Medical reports are sent to the Secretary-General on a regular basis.

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(Mr. Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)

The criminal action by Iraq has endangered the whole validity of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. If a country such as Iraq can violate this Protocol flagrantly and extensively and also keeps its insistence of its stance, then what kind of guarantee will exist for the implementation of the Protocol and even other international commitments by other countries? We are of the opinion that the Conference on Disarmament must heed and ask the co-operation of the United Nations on the implementation of the following points: first, re-condemnation of the use of chemical weapons as a "war crime"; second, investigation into the suppliers of chemical weapons and substances to Iraq; third, a total ban on the exportation to Iraq of chemical substances and related technology which can be used to manufacture chemical weapons; fourth, the dispatch of an investigation team by the Secretary-General whenever demanded by the Islamic Republic of Iran at the earliest possible date; fifth, a demand to all countries to once again announce their commitment to the 1925 Geneva Protocol which has been weakened by Iraq; and sixth, a direct call on Iraq to commit itself not to repeat the use of chemical weapons. Until the Iraqi régime announces this officially and publicly, we reserve the right to defend ourselves.

In the meantime, it seems that the continuation of the use of chemical weapons by Iraq has drawn the attention of all nations towards the dangers emanating from such weapons and, contrary to other working groups of the Conference on Disarmament, we have been witness to a certain progress. Particularly in the current session on discussions related to the Convention on banning the production, deployment, use and stockpiling of chemical weapons -- although achieving a final result seems remote. Regardless of agreement on those kinds of chemical substances which can be turned into weapons and their inclusion in the Convention, the modalities and nature of the implementation of the provisions of the Convention about other countries and the way of compliance and verification have still not gained any definite agreement. It is true that if any country is given the right of verification whenever its local information provides it, this matter provides certain ground for abuse, but allowing this process to depend on the consent of the other party can also create practical impediments to the implementation of the Treaty. Recent proposals in this area can lead us to a breakthrough although we believe that an international committee should make the final decision and judgement on the verification of each case. Such a committee should give top priority to the verification and destruction of stockpiles and means of producing chemical weapons in those countries identified as users of chemical weapons.

It is unfortunate to say that except in the chemical field, the Conference did not make noticeable progress and that the arms race showed an upward trend. This process, particularly in the field of nuclear weapons, poses a great threat for the future of humanity, capable of destroying the whole globe several times over. There is no winner for a nuclear holocaust while its loser will be the whole of humanity. The development of nuclear arsenals must be stopped immediately as the first step, but it seems that so long as the idea of "deterrence" prevails for achieving supremacy over the world, there will be no hope for the arrest of the arms race. Deterrence is in fact a justification to gain might and use it for expansion of the sphere of influence among the smaller countries. In this context, disarmament is a matter in tune with decolonization moves and the arms race a colonial policy.

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(Mr. Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)

The non-aligned and Third World countries have unfortunately entered this game of tension, intentionally or unintentionally, by using them in their relations. Competition for maintaining military supremacy on one hand leads to the deepening of dependence on the industrial countries and on the other intensifies the threat of armed conflicts among the Third World countries. What can guarantee the establishment of peace and security in the long run is reliance on the principle of common and equal security for all nations. If the Big Powers are not ready to abide by such a policy, the Third World countries as well as smaller nations should take the lead in this area.

A crucial point which has generated numerous debates and arguments is the recent initiatives to intensify the arms race in outer space. While backing and supporting the international measures and the attention paid by the members of this Conference to prevent such an adventurist move, we believe that there is a need for a more comprehensive and encompassing action. Outer space is the "common heritage of mankind" and should be used in a peaceful manner for all nations and not merely the developed ones. It has unfortunately turned into a militarized zone by a few countries, and both super-Powers, along with the countries having the technology, have saturated space with military and spy satellites. More than 90 per cent of satellites today have military purposes. The notion that the world military Powers have to acquire constant information in order to maintain mutual confidence in East-West military relations might be a justification for the presence of spy satellites, but the sphere of action of these satellites is not confined to the two blocks -- rather it brings all countries under their intelligence reconnaissance. This puts the countries independent from the two blocs in a difficult situation and removes their intelligence security, particularly as such information will be totally at the disposal of the owners of satellites and may in turn be used for political blackmail against other countries. At the moment, the Iraqi régime is benefitting from data provided by American satellites during the war of aggression launched against Iran by Iraq. This matter, which is well known, is in fact a complicity in the war while no international measure has been adopted to counter such an intervention.

This matter is noteworthy in other aspects too. The satellite can now take and process pictures as small as a few square centimetres, thanks to the progress and advancement of technology. This possibility which is at the unique disposal of a few countries, without any limitation or control, is a flagrant violation of the rights of nations to privacy. No military or civilian object is immune from the satellites' view and this is an important subject for human rights. Although the United Nations reports found the formation of an "International Satellite Monitoring Agency" difficult at the present juncture, attaining this goal is a must, and talks on this issue and studying practical and possible ways are necessary. The exact registration of satellites and their purposes is a step to this end. We believe that the arrest of the arms race in outer space is indispensable, regardless of developments on Earth. The nations can not wait for the super-Powers to reach an agreement on Earth and then talk about space -- which will be completely and irreversibly contaminated by that time. The countries having space technology should, while abiding by the existing "Outer Space Treaty" refrain from tests and the deployment of destructive weapons in space, and whatever is contrary to the peaceful use of space in the framework of a convention. The right to the peaceful use of outer space should be provided to all nations.

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(Mr. Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)

In addition, an initiative to annihilate the military satellites would have a destructive effect on telecommunication and non-military ones. Safeguarding the world system of telecommunications, including the satellites and ground stations, is an international obligation and any threat to it should be prevented. Apart from the disrespect shown by the Iraqi régime for all international values in repeatedly attacking our ground stations, other countries are fully aware of the significance attached to this point.

Our attention to the prevention of an arms race in outer space should not in any way cause negligence on comprehensive disarmament. It is unfortunate to see that the relevant committee has recorded no progress and the proposals for nuclear and chemical phased programmes of disarmament as well as reduction of conventional weapons and forces made by one bloc are sceptically received by the other. We believe that the East should react with more sensitivity, at least at the level of the West, towards the violations of existing international treaties. Not having seen any concrete reaction vis-à-vis an important issue such as the deployment of chemical weapons will undoubtedly harm the credibility of the East and consequently its proposals.

Unfortunately, the non-co-operation attitude of a few countries has made the attainment of a comprehensive test ban of nuclear weapons very difficult, if not impossible. The voluntary moratorium was a positive gesture which did not receive a positive response by the other side. If it is not possible to achieve a comprehensive agreement at the present time, due to discord on modalities of verification, a moratorium can provide suitable ground for commencement of a constructive dialogue while continuation of the tests will exacerbate tension. The positive evaluation of seismic methods for verification of nuclear test can probably make a breakthrough.

The announcement of a "Non-First-Use" commitment of the countries having nuclear arsenals is a positive step although not very substantial in the trend of disarmament dialogue. This commitment should not at the same time imply further nuclear proliferation. Generalization of the commitment to other weapons such as conventional or chemical can strengthen this guarantee provided that it is unambiguous and straight.

Another point which should receive equal attention in parallel with nuclear and chemical disarmament is the reduction of conventional forces and weapons. Although the weapons of mass destruction pose a serious threat to the security and even the survival of the human community, we should still bear in mind that a large amount of the military budgets of the countries, particularly the Third World nations, are spent on conventional weapons. Furthermore, hundreds of thousands of lives have been lost by the use of conventional weapons following World War II. In the meantime certain conventional weapons keep abreast with other weapons of mass destruction. During the course of the Iraqi aggression, thousands of Iranian civilians lost their lives in the bombardments by advanced jet fighters and their sophisticated armament provided to Iraq during the course of the war. Such indiscriminate murders must be condemned by the United Nations Organization and at the same time the Conference should pay more attention to conventional disarmament.

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(Mr. Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)

Meanwhile, the Third World countries which have not even the slightest intention of being dragged into East-West confrontation, should enjoy adequate security vis-à-vis the use of weapons for mass destruction. The announcement of zones free of nuclear and chemical weapons must be recognized and guaranteed by those countries having such weapons. Similarly, the territorial waters of non-aligned countries should be free from any military bases and manoeuvres in the context of East-West confrontation.

Development and its linkage with disarmament deserves more careful attention. The international conference on disarmament and development should meet at the earliest possible time. Furthermore, the Conference on Disarmament must devote a part of its activities to the study of how the military build-up adversely affects development, as well as the establishment and formulation of criteria to channel the resources from reduction of arms to world development and particularly the Third World.

The central role of the United Nations and its organs should be preserved by following the disarmament discussions. Any dialogue outside the framework of the United Nations should be reported to it comprehensively. Disarmament is an international issue in which the security of all nations is at stake and the countries owning nuclear and chemical weapons are duty bound to recognize the focal role of the United Nations and the Conference on Disarmament. In the meantime, efforts to attract public opinion and make people aware of issues pertaining to disarmament by creating an atmosphere suitable for achieving results, are equally important. The efforts of the leaders of the Group of Six non-aligned and other countries as representatives of five continents, to bring about such a favourable ground manifesting the aspirations of the majority of the world nations, have had positive and constructive effects.

Disarmament will remain one of the most important international issues for the foreseeable future. It seems that the work will continue in the coming years. Therefore, the goals pursued by this Conference should be constantly formulated on the basis of the preservation of security and the interests of the majority of the countries of the world, particularly the Third World nations. Meanwhile, regulation of new treaties should be accompanied by appropriate attitudes towards guaranteeing and maintaining the treaties concluded in the past.

Once again I express my sincere hope for your success as well as the Conference in the efforts to make the world more safe, more peaceful and more humane, devoid of tension, aggression and military confrontation.

The PRESIDENT: I thank His Excellency, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, for his important statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Japan, Ambassador Imai.

Mr. IMAI (Japan): Mr. President, let me begin with very sincere words of welcome to the Presidency of Canada for the very important closing month of this year's sessions of the Conference. Canada and Japan have many things in common in our dealing with the matters of disarmament. Your leadership and well-known experiences in the multilateral diplomacy provide assurances for

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(Mr. Imai, Japan)

the successful conclusion of this session. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank the outgoing President, Ambassador U Tin Tun of Burma. As I have had occasion to mention, we have a particular appreciation of the quiet but steady disarmament diplomacy pursued by this fellow Asian country and its representatives.

I have asked for the floor wishing to make a few comments on the Progress Report on the twenty-second session of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts which is being introduced today.

I first want to express the gratitude of my delegation to Dr. Dahlman, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group, for his successful efforts to finalize the Report on the Group of Scientific Experts' Technical Test concerning the exchange of Level I data through the WMO/GTS system, conducted during late 1984. It was indeed a source of great pleasure that at last the Report was adopted with the consent of all the experts representing 24 countries, identifying both the achievements as well as points of future improvements in the data exchange. It is heartening to realize that such a global scale experiment, involving so much technical preparations and advance thinking by so many scientists, has come to satisfactory results. I would also like to take this opportunity to express appreciation to the World Meteorological Organization for making available the use of the Global Telecommunication System for the experiment, and for suggesting its even further use for high-speed data transmission.

At this session, the Ad Hoc Group has made an encouraging step forward. With regard to its future work, an agreement has been reached to begin preparations for "a modern international system based on the expeditious exchange of waveform (Level II) and parameter (Level I) data and on the processing of such data at International Data Centres".

As I stated in my speech of 8 April, Japan has taken the initiative for an exchange of Level II data with the co-operation of a number of other countries. During the recent session, informal but very fruitful consultations took place with like-minded delegations from non-aligned, socialist, Western and other countries regarding the actual manner of conducting Level II data exchange. We also presented national papers GSE/JAP/23 and 24.

The Progress Report says that a large-scale experiment on the exchange of Level II data must be carefully prepared on the basis of an analysis of national investigations and also of partial bilateral and multilateral experiments. This is a good reflection of the position which Japan has been advocating as a necessary forerunner of the future global test, and I appreciate that our initiative has been well received in such a manner.

In this connection, we welcome the Canadian call for holding a workshop of data communications experts in October this year. It is, in fact, in support of our initiative and we value that all interested countries are called upon to participate. On the basis of the arrangements for communication to be made by the experts at this meeting, we would proceed to the implementation of an exchange of waveform data on a co-operative national

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(Mr. Imai, Japan)

basis by the end of this year. We shall be very happy to report the results of this exchange to the next session of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, thus consolidating the basis for a global test to be conducted in 1988.

Before concluding my statement, I wish to draw the attention of the Conference to a strange and sad contrast between the progress this Ad Hoc Group is making and the continuing inability of our Conference to set up an Ad Hoc Committee on a nuclear-test ban, the very subsidiary organ that should benefit from and build upon this progress of the Ad Hoc Group. I would like to renew my appeal I made in my speech of 17 June, that while we should by no means relax our efforts in the pursuit of a mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee acceptable to all, we should at the same time make the best use of the plenary meetings, whether formal or informal, by addressing and trying to resolve the substantive issues lying ahead of us in a practical manner. Only through such step-by-step efforts can we get ever closer to our common goal of the comprehensive nuclear-test ban.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Japan for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, guiding the work of the Conference on Disarmament during August is particularly difficult, since this month always marks the end of the annual session of the Conference which the General Assembly defined in 1978 as "the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum". Consequently, my delegation expresses great satisfaction that our deliberations are to be chaired by a person whose experience and capabilities are a guarantee of success, and I am sure that is what we all wish you in the exercise of your important functions. I would like once again to express my delegation's appreciation to your predecessor, the distinguished representative of Burma, Ambassador U Tin Tun.

On Wednesday the sixth and Thursday the seventh of August, six statesmen from Latin America, Asia, Africa and Europe, who have repeatedly and tangibly demonstrated their profound interest in contributing to disarmament and peace, met in Ixtapa, Mexico. They were Raúl Alfonsín, President of Argentina; Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado, President of Mexico; Rajiv Gandhi, Prime Minister of India; Andreas Papandreou, Prime Minister of Greece; Ingvar Carlsson, Prime Minister of Sweden; and Julius Nyerere, who was the First President of Tanzania.

The Conference they attended was a continuation of a process started with the Declaration of 22 May 1984 (contained in document CD/502) and continued with the New Delhi Declaration of 28 January 1985 (document CD/549) and with three joint messages of 24 October 1985 (to be found in document A/40/825), 28 February 1986 (document CD/676) and 8 April 1986.

At that meeting, which I had the privilege to attend, two fundamental documents were adopted, both signed on 7 August 1986. One is a Declaration bearing the title "Mexico Declaration", and the other is the "Document on verification measures issued at the Summit Meeting at Mexico". I shall try to

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(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

summarize the basic aspects of these two documents which will shortly be reproduced and circulated as official documents of the Conference on Disarmament, as has been done in previous cases.

The Mexico Declaration starts by highlighting the fact that the purpose of the meeting was to proclaim humanity's right to peace and to reiterate the authors' commitment to protecting that right so that the human race might endure. After recalling that it is 41 years since death and horror descended upon Hiroshima, it goes on to say that "The most dreadful war in history came to an end and, the world's nuclear nightmare began. Since then we have lived on borrowed time. All that is precious and beautiful, all that human civilization has reached for and achieved, could, in a short time, be reduced to radioactive dust".

The authors of the Declaration then point out that in the face of the danger of common annihilation, the distinction between the powerful and the weak has become meaningless, and they express their determination that their countries, which do not possess nuclear arsenals, will be actively involved in all aspects of disarmament, since, as they say, "the protection of this planet is a matter for all the people who live on it", and therefore it is unacceptable that a few countries should decide "the fate of the whole world".

The Declaration reiterates the priority aims set out in the New Delhi Declaration in January 1985, that is, an immediate halt to nuclear testing preparatory to a comprehensive nuclear-test ban treaty, the prohibition of the testing, production and deployment of space weapons; it welcomes the Joint Declaration made in November 1985 by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev to the effect that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought"; and it adds "Now is the time to ensure that such a war does not occur". It expresses the conviction that security is not improved by increasing the capacity for destruction through the accumulation of weapons, and so "nuclear disarmament, and ultimately the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, is an absolute priority"; and it seems obvious that "no issue is more urgent and crucial today than bringing to an end all nuclear tests".

The authors of the Declaration also recall that in October 1985 and February and April 1986, they urged the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union "to undertake a fully verifiable suspension of nuclear testing, at least until their next summit meeting", repeating that "the unilateral moratorium by one of the two major nuclear States" should become "at least a bilateral moratorium". It then proposes that a suspension of this kind, for whose verification the Six offer their unconditional co-operation, should be "immediately followed by negotiations for the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty". The Declaration also refers to the main measures that the assistance offered would comprise, a subject that I will not refer to at present to avoid repeating myself, since I will be looking at this later when I get on to the second document I mentioned.

The other aim emphasized by the six signatories of the Declaration is the same as the one that appeared in January 1985 in the Declaration of New Delhi, on which we can read inter alia in the Mexico Declaration;



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(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

"We reiterate our demand that an arms race in space should be prevented. Space belongs to humanity, and as participants in this common heritage of mankind, we object to the outer space of our Earth being misused for destructive purposes. It is particularly urgent to halt the development of anti-satellite weapons, which would threaten the peaceful space activities of many nations. We urge the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union to agree on a halt to further tests of anti-satellite weapons, in order to facilitate the conclusion of an international treaty on their prohibition. Our New Delhi warning that the development of space weaponry would endanger a number of agreements on arms limitation and disarmament is already proving to be justified. We stress that the existing treaties safeguarding the peaceful uses of outer space, as well as the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, be fully honoured, strengthened and extended as necessary in the light of more recent technological advances."

In addition to these two objectives, which are basic disarmament measures, the Declaration stresses the fact that to achieve progress in this sphere "it is imperative ... that the United Nations must be strengthened, and its Charter as well as treaties relating to disarmament be observed in both letter and spirit", as well as the consequences of squandering the world's limited resources on armaments, a matter on which the Declaration states the following:

"Poverty and economic hopelessness also constitute a threat to international peace and security. This threat is aggravated in many developing countries in which the external debt problem reduces still further their ability to allocate sufficient resources for dealing with the urgent and fundamental needs among their people. The transfer of resources from military expenditure to economic and social development is therefore a fundamental necessity of our times."

The second document I mentioned at the outset, that is, on verification measures, starts as follows:

"It is the responsibility of the nuclear Powers to halt nuclear testing as a significant step to curb the nuclear arms race. The United States and the USSR, being the two major nuclear Powers, have a special obligation to initiate the process of nuclear disarmament by immediately halting their nuclear testing. To facilitate such an immediate step the six nations of the Five Continent Initiative are prepared to assist in the monitoring of a mutual moratorium or a test ban."

The way in which the assistance offered by the Six will be given is explained in the document. It looks basically at the verification of a moratorium in co-operation with the United States and the Soviet Union, which would be an important step in establishing an appropriate verification system for a treaty on the complete banning of nuclear tests. The two following possibilities are envisaged.

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(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

First, monitoring of existing test sites, which would be intended to ensure that they are not used for clandestine tests. Three sites are involved: Nevada in the United States, and Semipalatinsk and Novaya Zemlya in the Soviet Union. These are quite small geographically, and could be monitored by a small number of seismic stations placed in the two countries, at or near the test sites. If it were possible to agree on the cessation of nuclear tests by both sides, the procedure envisaged in the document is set out as follows:

"Our six nations are prepared to establish promptly and in co-operation with the United States and the USSR, temporary monitoring stations at existing test sites and to operate them for an initial period of one year. All data should be available to the six nations and to the United States and the USSR. Data analysis could be a joint undertaking and preliminary analysis would be done at the sites. Monitoring of test sites by instruments installed on-site would provide an extremely high sensitivity down to small fractions of a kiloton and even tons of explosives".

The second hypothesis considered in the document is that of the monitoring of the territories of the United States and the USSR outside the test sites, which, as stated in the document, would be necessary to ensure that nuclear explosions are not conducted and that natural earthquakes are not misinterpreted as clandestine nuclear test explosions. Here the authors of the Mexico document indicate that, "It might be desirable to establish specific verification arrangements in some of these areas, and our six nations are prepared to co-operate with the United States and the USSR on this issue".

This statement is followed up by the suggestion that there should be an "internationalization" of a number of seismic stations selected from among those existing in the United States and the Soviet Union, "tentatively 20 to 30, in each of the two countries, by placing observers" from the six nations at the stations. Their task "would be to verify that the instruments are properly operated and that all information obtained is reported without omission. We are prepared to work out the necessary arrangements which could be made with little delay and to contribute observers for an initial period of one year".

In order to replace these temporary measures with permanent arrangements, the experts of the six nations, according to the authors of the document, "are ready to co-operate with experts of the United States and the USSR in the development of permanent verification facilities at test sites, and also in the development of an optimal network of internal stations in the United States and the USSR".

I do not wish to continue this statement further because, as I have already indicated, very soon the Conference will have available to it the complete text of the two documents on which I have been commenting. I would simply like to read out the last two paragraphs of the Mexico Declaration which, I think, give a very good indication of the spirit that moved the six statesmen who have just met in my country and the noble, lofty goals they were pursuing. These paragraphs read as follows:

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

"Our message from Mexico is to urge the leaders of the United States of America and the Soviet Union to continue and to reinvigorate the dialogue which they started last year; to set a firm date for a new meeting between them; and by an approach of mutual compromise and conciliation to ensure that such dialogue leads to practical results in the field of disarmament. Each side has the capacity to destroy the world many times over. There can be no suggestion that either would be showing weakness by a willingness to be conciliatory. The spirit of Geneva must be revived and strengthened. And we stress again our determination to try to facilitate agreement between the nuclear-weapon States, and to work with them, as well as with all other nations, for the common security of humankind and for peace.

Once again, we urge people, parliaments and Governments the world over to give active support to our appeal. Every individual has a right to peace and a responsibility to strive for it. Neither together nor separately can the peoples of the world remove the horror of Hiroshima and Nagasaki from human memory; but together we can and we must remove this looming horror from our future".

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Mexico for his statement introducing the recent and important Six-Nation declaration and for his kind words to the President. The introduction of these statements by a distinguished Nobel Peace Prize winner gives them added status. I now call on the distinguished representative of Brazil, Ambassador de Souza e Silva, speaking on behalf of the Group of 21.

Mr. DE SOUZA E SILVA (Brazil): Thank you for giving me the floor in my capacity as spokesman for the Group of 21 on item 1 of our agenda. Before making my statement allow me to congratulate ourselves on having you, Sir, with your experience, skill, leadership and fair play, presiding over our deliberations during this month of August when important decisions must be adopted for the follow-up of our work.

The Group of 21 has consistently upheld the high priority that should be attached to item 1 of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament since its inception in 1979. Its consensus views have been expressed in several documents, mainly CD/181 of 24 April 1981, and are presently stated in the draft mandate for the establishment of an ad hoc committee contained in CD/520/Rev.2 of 21 March 1986.

Recent developments between the USSR and the United States concerning nuclear tests, according to press reports, have prompted delegations from different quarters to urge this multilateral negotiating forum to resume its efforts in order to find ways and means to discharge its mandate in accordance with the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (paragraph 51).

Bilateral and multilateral efforts are recognized as important conditions that should be mutually complementary in the field of disarmament if effective agreements with universal adherence are to be achieved.

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(Mr. de Souza e Silva, Brazil)

Being aware that the USSR and the United States are actually engaged in bilateral conversations on the question of nuclear tests, and bearing in mind that in spite of their special responsibilities for disarmament measures (Final Document, paragraph 48), and notwithstanding the year-long unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests by the USSR, they are both responsible for the largest number of tests, the Group of 21 considers that it is incumbent upon them to report to and inform the Conference on Disarmament on their joint endeavours so that multilateral and bilateral efforts may usefully complement each other. Otherwise, parallel and unconnected discussions or negotiations on the same issues would be of little avail for the purposes of the Conference.

The request stated above is in line not only with the obligations of both countries to co-operate for the compliance of the mandate assigned to the Conference but also with previous practice the last of which was the submission to this forum of the Tripartite Report on the status of the negotiations on a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapon test explosions in all environments. The Group of 21 wishes to underline that in that report it is stated: "The desire to achieve an early agreement, which is so widely shared by the international community, has been repeatedly expressed at the highest level of all three Governments" (document CD/130 of 30 July 1980). That is the end of the statement.

Mr. President, the Group of 21 wishes that the statement I have just read out be duly reflected in our report to the General Assembly.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Brazil, speaking on behalf of the Group of 21, for his statement and for his kind words to the President. His statement will, of course, be duly reflected in our records.

I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Australia, Ambassador Butler.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): The Conference is now moving towards the point of final decisions on the work of its 1986 session.

In this context, later this morning the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, Dr. Dahlman, will table at the Conference the progress report of the Group on its twenty-second session.

I understand it will be proposed to the Conference that it should take note of that report at a plenary meeting next week.

Action by the Conference to that effect would provide further authority to the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts for the continuation of its work, specifically in terms of the proposals for future work which are made in the report, to be tabled later this morning.

Australia has participated strongly in the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, and we are convinced that the Ad Hoc Group's work has made an invaluable contribution to global co-operation in seismology and we have very high expectations of future work to be carried out by the Ad Hoc Group.

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(Mr. Butler, Australia)

We have studied its progress report and will readily agree to the recommendations provided in it.

It has been recognized for many many years that a global seismological monitoring network would lie at the heart of the verification régime needed to support a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

The mandate under which the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts operates calls upon the Group to "work on such measures which might be established in the future for the international exchange of seismological data under a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons tests". It will be understood why I will not at present comment on the scope aspects of that mandate. What is relevant now is for us to recognize two things. First, the mandate for the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts clearly envisages the establishment of a global seismological network. Second, in the work that has been undertaken by the Ad Hoc Group under this mandate and in work undertaken by way of individual national efforts, we have arrived at the point where it would be entirely appropriate and certainly positive for the Conference to take the decision Australia has called for, that is to call into existence a global seismological network.

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The programme of future work proposed by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts would be compatible with such a decision and would in fact constitute further practical steps towards realizing a fully operational and permanent global network.

There have been some other relevant developments, including some in recent time, on some of which we have heard reports this morning. I have in mind, for example, the resumption of bilateral discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union on verification issues.

Last week an immensely significant set of decisions were taken by the six Heads of Government meeting at Ixtapa in Mexico which included the offer by those six States of an important contribution to verification of a nuclear-test-ban treaty, including by seismological means. Three weeks ago, in this Conference, the distinguished Ambassador of the Soviet Union announced a new policy approach towards Level II data on the part of his Government, and at our last plenary session on Tuesday an extremely constructive and highly relevant statement was made by the Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany. In that statement he recalled other contributions which have been made to this work by other delegations, including my own. A lot has happened in this field.

Three weeks ago, I tabled at this Conference document CD/717 which constituted a proposal to the Conference that it should express its will that a global seismological network should exist. It is the hope of my delegation that the point of decision on this proposal will be, next week, at the time of the Conference's action on the Report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts on its twenty-second session.

The fact is that all of the elements of a global seismological network exist. The technical test conducted by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts in 1984 gave us an illustration of how important parts of such a network would operate.

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(Mr. Butler, Australia)

Only one further step is required to make the network a reality and that is for us to decide to establish a global network thus ensuring that all further work, for example under the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, will be conducted within the framework of the establishment of a global network.

Once we have labelled the existing capabilities as constituting a global network, Conference members could dedicate themselves to filling in the gaps and improving that network by stepping up exchanges of data and technology and by establishing the administrative structure necessary to manage a global network.

In this regard, the proposed future work of the GSE is highly relevant: filling in gaps and defining, as well as refining, existing and future capabilities -- first on the basis of an analysis of national investigations, second through partial bilateral and multilateral experiments in the use of Level II data, culminating in the large-scale global experiment now foreshadowed for 1988.

It is true that we have heard some concern and questions raised about the financial constraints on what countries might be able to do immediately in the field of international co-operation in seismic monitoring.

Australia is not free from such financial constraints but we do believe that a hard look at the possibilities will find that there are useful things that can be done within existing budgets and we are doing this.

Indeed, it is obvious that none of use will know whether we would be willing or able to fund additional undertakings until we have considered precisely what such undertakings might be and how they would fit in with global activities, and therefore what they would cost and what their benefits would be.

I might mention that Australia stands prepared to fully co-operate with other countries on seismic monitoring, and to expand that co-operation just as we are at present expanding our own seismological capability, and we will, in fact do this irrespective of what action on this matter is pursued in the event in the context of the Conference on Disarmament.

But in discussing this proposal, or thinking about this proposal, I would like to recall a piece of history which is that the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts' work, which is now so widely supported, started rather more modestly as a Swedish initiative a number of years ago. The truth is, it was only adopted by the Conference on Disarmament when its work became so interesting that very few wanted to be left out. I think that it is a model and an example that we should bear in mind when we look towards a decision on a global seismological network. We propose that the Conference take that action because it is required, it is realistic, it would represent progress, it is within the competence of the Conference and it would be a clear step in the right direction. This can be done by the Conference agreeing to the principle of the proposal made in document CD/717, to establish a global seismological network and we hope that it will do this next week when it adopts the report of the twenty-second session of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts.

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Mr. DAHLMAN (Sweden): The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts celebrated its tenth anniversary during its recent meeting conducted from 21 July to 1 August. It did so by concluding its fourth report covering the results of the 1984 technical test and by outlining important and challenging tasks for the future.

The establishment of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts 10 years ago provided a frame for systematic work towards a global data exchange system and for a constructive dialogue on related technical issues between experts of member and non-member countries of the Conference.

The Group has outlined the principal design of an international data exchange system containing three basic components: a global network of seismological stations operated by individual countries; a system for the exchange of data between individual countries and specially established international data centres; and international data centres where data are routinely processed and from which results are distributed to participating countries.

During its work the Group has established detailed technical specifications guiding the establishment and operation of such an international system. These include instructions on how to operate seismological stations and to analyse data in a standardized way. Together with the WMO the Group has established detailed specifications for the exchange of parameter or Level I data. Procedures and computer programs to be used at international data centres have been developed for the routine analyses of such data.

The Group has not only developed methods and procedures, it has also conducted technical tests of various components of the system. Some of these experiments have been small-scale bilateral undertakings, others have been more extensive with broad participation. In 1984 the Group conducted a large-scale technical test with the participation of 75 seismological stations in 37 countries and three international data centres. The test was conducted in close co-operation with the WMO, an organization with which the Group has enjoyed an excellent co-operation throughout the years.

The present work of the Expert Group has been supported by research programmes in a number of countries. Numerous national working papers, summarizing results of these programmes have been presented as a necessary technical and scientific basis for the Group's work. The data exchange system that has been developed is thus the result not only of efforts by experts in the Group but also of research work conducted by a large number of people at seismological stations and laboratories around the world.

I have on earlier occasions reported to the Conference on the successful outcome of the 1984 Technical Test, skilfully co-ordinated by Dr. Peter McGregor of Australia, and on the excellent co-operation that was established between participating institutes worldwide. I will today not reiterate the results of the Test but only report that the Group at its recent meeting finalized its fourth report, which covers the Test. I have the pleasure to introduce this report, which is contained in document CD/720. The report has extensive appendices containing the more detailed technical

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(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

material, which will not be distributed but will be available at the secretariat in the Group's working languages. I also introduce the summary report, contained in CD/681/Rev.1, which is only a slight and formal revision of the provisional summary (CD/681) submitted to the Conference on 24 March 1986.

In introducing these reports I express my gratitude to the Group's Scientific Secretary, Dr. Frode Ringdal of Norway, who has done an excellent drafting work. I also express my appreciation to the secretariat for its efforts and co-operation in finalizing these documents.

In its work until now the Group has primarily focused on the exchange and processing of parameter or Level I data. During its recent meeting the Group devoted considerable time to in-depth considerations of its continued work. In the progress report from its meeting, as contained in document CD/721, which I have the pleasure to introduce, the Group recommends:

"That it continue its work under the existing mandate, given by the Committee on Disarmament on 7 August 1979 (CD/PV.48).

The future work of the Group should be directed towards the design of a modern international system based on the expeditious exchange of waveform (Level II) and parameter (Level I) data and on the processing of such data at International Data Centres (IDCs). This work should draw upon previous results and experiences, taking into account the Group's recommendations in its earlier reports, and making use of all achievements in seismology. This work would, inter alia, include:

- working out technical specifications of modern prototype stations able to collect and exchange high quality waveform data from seismic events at all distances, including arrays able to provide preliminary location data for detected events,
- further developing and testing methods, procedures and computer algorithms for automatic signal detection as well as for computer-interactive data analysis,
- developing and testing methods and procedures and investigating and testing communication links to be used for the expeditious exchange of seismic waveform and parameter data between national facilities and international data centres,
- further developing and testing methods, procedures and computer algorithms to be used at IDCs, for the processing of waveform and parameter data, for co-operation and communication among such centres and for the distribution of event bulletins to national facilities.

This system specification would require substantial research and testing.

The Group's further work should include planning and carrying out a large-scale experiment on the exchange of Level II data. The experiment, which will include Level I data as well, will be conducted using



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(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

the WMO/GTS and other accessible channels of communication, including satellite transmission where possible. It must be carefully prepared on the basis of an analysis of national investigations and also of partial bilateral and multilateral experiments in the use of Level II data. The Group envisages carrying out this experiment in approximately 1988.

The principal purpose of this experiment should be testing of methods and procedures developed by the Ad Hoc Group to extract and transmit the data from stations to the Experimental International Data Centres (EIDCs) and to process them at EIDCs."

The Group took note of the recent decision of the WMO Executive Council that the WMO/GTS circuits may accommodate a certain amount of additional types of seismic data. To contribute to the preparation and efficient carrying out of the experiment the Ad Hoc Group recommends that the Conference on Disarmament request the WMO to allocate its transmission channels on a regular basis starting as soon as possible for the transmission of Level II seismic data. I have informally submitted some suggestions to the President of the Conference as to the content of such a recommendation to the WMO and this has been circulated to you.

The Ad Hoc Group further recommends that the Conference assist in involving as many States as possible in carrying out the experiment.

The design and testing of a modern international seismological data exchange system, based on the expeditious exchange and processing of waveform data, is a considerable undertaking and is likely to provide a number of scientific and technological challenges. In addition to considerable efforts within the Group this task would require extensive national and co-operative international research and development efforts. This is necessary to provide the scientific and technological basis for the design of a system which in many aspects goes far beyond what is available today on a global scale.

The Group very much looks forward to coping with these new and challenging tasks.

The Ad Hoc Group suggests that its next session, subject to the approval of the Conference on Disarmament, should be convened from 2 to 13 March 1987.

This concludes my introduction of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts' fourth report, CD/720, its summary report, CD/681/Rev.1, and its progress report, CD/721. I am prepared to try to answer any questions that distinguished representatives may have.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished Chairman of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts for his important and interesting report. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Cromartie.

Mr. CROMARTIE (United Kingdom): I should like to thank Dr. Dahlman, the Chairman of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts, for his clear and concise introduction of the Group's report. I should like to convey the sincere

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(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

thanks of the United Kingdom delegation to him and to the Secretary, Dr. Ringdal, and to all the members of the Group for the dedicated work that they have been undertaking for the last 10 years.

The tenth anniversary this year of the establishment of the Group in 1976, under the Chairmanship of the late Dr. Ulf Ericsson, is a landmark in an important international scientific endeavour.

It is most encouraging that the Group have been able to celebrate this anniversary by finishing their report on the Level I experiment carried out in 1984, and that a programme of work with a view to conducting a further experiment involving the exchange of Level II data has been agreed. In this respect, we welcome the statement made on the subject by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Issraelyan, on 22 July.

I should like to take this opportunity to express the warm appreciation of my delegation to the initiative of your Government, Mr. President, in organizing a workshop in Ottawa at the beginning of October on communications for the exchange of data.

Similarly, we very much welcome the useful work for a Level II experiment being organized by Japan, to which the distinguished representative of Japan, Ambassador Imai, referred in his statement this morning. The United Kingdom welcomes the opportunity to participate in both these valuable contributions to progress on the subject.

Concrete contributions of this sort, which follow the good example set by the Government of Norway last year, demonstrate a real commitment to the goal of a CTB. We should very much like to see more countries, especially non-aligned countries, more involved in the work of the GSE than at present.

Finally, I should like to mention another encouraging development. I refer to the recent bilateral contacts between the United States and the Soviet Union on verification issues in Geneva. We understand that it is the intention that these contacts should continue, and we very much welcome this.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom for his statement. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor?

The secretariat has circulated today, at my request, a timetable of meetings to be held during the coming week. It was prepared in consultation with the Chairmen of the Ad hoc Committees and it is, of course, merely indicative and subject to change, if necessary. As we are coming to the end of the session and there are still a number of pending questions, I suggest that we start our plenary meetings at 10 a.m. sharp until the end of this annual session. Once again I would make a plea to delegations to get here at 10 a.m. since even the loss of 20 or 30 minutes can make a difference when it is taken cumulatively. This suggestion is reflected in the timetable distributed this morning. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

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The PRESIDENT: Before we adjourn, may I recall that, in accordance with the agreement reached at our last plenary meeting, the Conference will hold immediately after this plenary meeting an informal meeting to consider the substantive paragraphs of the draft annual report under agenda items 1, "Nuclear Test Ban" and 7, "New Types of Weapons of Mass Destruction and New Systems of Such Weapons".

The secretariat is circulating this morning, in the Conference Room, substantive paragraphs of the draft annual report under agenda item 3, entitled "Prevention of Nuclear War, Including All Related Matters" which is contained in document CD/247, as well as those relating to agenda item 6, entitled "Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons", which appears in document CD/WP.246. Copies of those working papers were placed in the delegations' boxes yesterday morning and early afternoon. As indicated in the timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference next week, I intend to take them up at the informal meeting next Tuesday, immediately after the plenary meeting, time permitting.

I wish also to inform you that, after the agreement reached on the reflection in the draft report of the discussions held at both plenary and informal meetings on item 2, the secretariat is concluding the drafting of the relevant substantive paragraphs. It is expected that the English text will be available by mid-day on Monday and other languages on Tuesday morning. In accordance with the timetable, we shall take up those substantive paragraphs under agenda item 2 at an informal meeting to be held immediately after the plenary meeting on Thursday, 21 August.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 19 August at 10 a.m. The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.10 p.m.

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

W/PV.300  
19 August 1986

ENGLISH

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## FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND EIGHTIETH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 19 August 1986, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. J. Alan Beesley (Canada)

GE.86-63949/1686e

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 380th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In conformity with its programme of work, the Conference continues today its consideration of reports of ad hoc subsidiary bodies as well as of the Annual Report to the General Assembly of the United Nations. In accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, however, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

As agreed in the timetable for meetings to be held by the Conference during this week, we shall hold an informal meeting immediately after the adjournment of this plenary meeting to continue our consideration of the draft annual report to the General Assembly. At that informal meeting, we shall take up the first reading of the substantive paragraphs under agenda items 3, entitled "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters", and 6, "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the German Democratic Republic, Bulgaria, and New Zealand. We have had some brief consultations on a slight change in the order of some of our speakers and although the Bulgarian Ambassador kindly agreed to lead off, I think we can begin instead with the second speaker on the list as you will have seen it, namely, Ambassador Rose on behalf of the German Democratic Republic. I call on Ambassador Rose.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): Mr. President, since it is the first time that my delegation takes the floor in the month of August, allow me please to extend to you, on behalf of the delegation of the German Democratic Republic, our congratulations on your assumption of the high and responsible office of President of the Conference on Disarmament. I am convinced that your great experience and diplomatic skills will enable you successfully to discharge your important mission. Permit me to express thanks and appreciation to the President of the Conference for the month of July, the distinguished Ambassador of Burma. I should like to avail myself of this opportunity to say good-bye to three of our distinguished colleagues, Ambassador Gonsalves of India, who has already left, and Ambassador Wegener of the Federal Republic of Germany and Ambassador Jessel of France, who will soon take up other assignments. I thank all of them for their co-operation and wish them all the best.

The issue of a comprehensive test ban is playing a very prominent role in the disarmament discussions conducted in different fora, including the Conference on Disarmament. This reflects growing awareness of the urgent need for meaningful action.

Only recently, six heads of State or Government adopted the Mexico Declaration, launched an appeal to the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States to extend or declare a moratorium on all nuclear explosions, and made detailed proposals regarding verification measures.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev announced yesterday that his country will extend to 1 January 1987 its unilateral moratorium on all nuclear testing. This is renewed proof of the Soviet determination to do everything in its power to halt the nuclear arms race, based on the realization that political security must take the place of military security. The USSR's step is a courageous one, since that country had to take into consideration the fact that the United States pursued its full testing programme last year. The rash negative reaction from the other side is utterly regrettable. A major nuclear Power with a great responsibility must be expected to take a different attitude.

The call for a complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests has become the focus of world-wide efforts to lessen the risk of nuclear war and strengthen international security. We are currently observing a growing polarization of champions and opponents, separated by the answer to the following simple question: are nuclear arsenals to be modernized and space weapons with nuclear components created by means of tests, or is testing to be stopped so that a long overdue step can be made towards containing those arms and lessening the threat of nuclear war?

The arguments put forward by the test-ban opponents ignore the global security need. There is even a large number of prominent figures in the leading political parties of the United States who seem to have more and more doubts as to whether continued nuclear-weapon testing is really indispensable to the national security of their country.

One fact is clear in any event: the reciprocal cessation of nuclear-weapon tests by the Soviet Union and the United States would not, from a military point of view, result in any disadvantage to either side, but would have a far-reaching positive impact on the development of the international situation and constitute an incentive to the other nuclear-weapon States to follow the example.

The lively and interesting debate in the Conference testifies in a particular measure to the increasing realization that we must not let slip what may well turn out to be a unique chance for us to guide in the right direction the course of events in a matter of crucial importance to mankind.

The delegation of the German Democratic Republic profoundly deplores the fact that it has again not been possible to enter into treaty negotiations during the 1986 session of the Conference. The reason for it is plain to see and should not be hidden. As far as the Government of the leading Western nuclear Power is concerned, a test ban has not been a primary objective in the last six years. On the contrary, the continuation of nuclear-weapon testing is regarded by it as indispensable to national security. The position that a CTB was a long-term goal has not only been upheld, but further preconditions have been added for the conclusion of such a treaty.

Allow me, Mr. President, to have a look at some of the problems we have been confronted with.

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(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

Firstly, efforts to agree on a mandate for an ad hoc committee on a nuclear-test ban. Most delegations -- and it is my understanding that quite a few from the Western Group are among them -- stated that they were committed to an early and comprehensive ban on nuclear tests. It is difficult for some delegations, however, to explain why they do not support a negotiating mandate which would open a direct road to the conclusion of such a treaty. This year, we have been engaged in an intensive search for solutions acceptable to all. The Group of Socialist Countries has actively participated in that endeavour and demonstrated readiness to arrive at an understanding. It is precisely on this basis that my delegation is in a position also to support the proposal which Ambassador García Robles made on 31 July 1986 and which is marked by willingness to compromise and would permit the start of meaningful work. In the consultations conducted, both the Group of Socialist Countries and the Group of 21 were ready to modify mandates previously suggested by them. By contrast, the Western Group's position boils down to the following: either its own old mandate or none at all. But let me add that the argument about the mandate for a committee is just the reflection of a deeper-rooted problem. It must not lead to a situation where the sides which are sincerely striving for a comprehensive test ban accuse each other of lack of readiness to commence serious work on a treaty. The call for more flexibility and political will needs to be addressed to someone else.

Secondly, some remarks about the verification problem. As in the past, various delegations have suggested this year, as a solution to the problem, that we should, for the time being, deal exclusively or predominantly with the verification of nuclear tests. They have gone so far as to propose an elaborate comprehensive verification system to be established no matter whether a test ban exists or not or negotiations on it have begun. In an effort to explain this position, CD/717 refers to the history of test-ban negotiations: "Review of this history reveals that the principal stumbling block has consistently been the capacity to verify compliance and the associated issue of how to deal with so-called peaceful nuclear explosions. In the late 1970s an opportunity to conclude a test ban among three nuclear-weapon States was lost as a result of protracted argument over the verification requirements." My delegation has doubts about this statement. Permit me to quote from the report issued on 31 July 1980 by the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom to the then Committee on Disarmament: "The three negotiating parties believe that the verification measures being negotiated -- particularly the provisions regarding the international exchange of seismic data, the committee of experts, and on-site inspections -- broke significant new ground in international arms limitation efforts and will give all treaty parties the opportunity to participate in a substantial and constructive way in the process of verifying compliance with the treaty." At any rate, the historical view is of no more relevance to the development since 1980, as a glance at the reasons given in rejecting the conclusion of a CTBT as a present-day task will easily reveal.

In our search for an accord, we should be aware of existing differences in positions. Like the other socialist countries, the German Democratic Republic supports effective and reliable verification of compliance with a

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(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

test ban. Whatever is necessary to this end must be negotiated and agreed. Still, my delegation remains firmly convinced that the verification issue can, in the final analysis, only be resolved in connection with the drafting of a treaty. Whenever my delegation speaks of practical work, it means the entire subject. I share the view that verification must not be an end in itself, an opinion that has been expressed by various sides.

The main objective is a verifiable test ban. Scientific and technical background material on verification can, of course, be useful in this context. So, Working Paper CD/712, submitted by Sweden, contains remarkable conclusions. Any future discussion would certainly be enhanced if other papers were revised in the light of latest developments. Many scientific studies undertaken in the last few years have furnished proof that even small and concealed nuclear explosions can be reliably monitored. Even the comparatively small stations used by United States scientists at the Soviet test site near Semipalatinsk were able to record perfectly well a test conducted in the Nevada Desert more than 10,000 kilometres distant. By employing state-of-the-art techniques and complementing them by on-site inspections, very effective verification is possible. The statement published following the scientific meeting held in Moscow a few weeks ago under the theme "For an End to Nuclear Testing" and a recent in-depth study by the American Geophysical Union are all agreed on that.

My delegation welcomes the readiness to take part in the monitoring of a reciprocal moratorium on a test ban expressed at the second six-nation summit in Mexico. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that today's verification techniques, which rely on seismic means, are of so sophisticated a nature that they can guarantee full and credible verification. My delegation endorses the view that the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts should continue its activities and start developing a system ensuring the prompt transmission of Level-2 seismic data and prepare for an international experiment on their exchange. The recommendation in paragraph 12 of the Group's progress report, published in CD/721 of 1 August 1986, meets with the full support of my delegation.

What my delegation regards as very problematic indeed, are proposals aimed at verifying continued testing rather than verifying a test ban, and at setting up a seismic monitoring system, independently of a test ban. There is no doubt about it, a verification system needs to be created and tried and tested in time. In so doing, the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests must always remain the agreed fundamental objective. This is exactly the position on which Working Paper CD/701, presented by the socialist countries, is based.

With this in mind, my delegation has serious problems with the proposal in Working Paper CD/717, concerning the establishment of a global seismic monitoring network. For the purpose of clarification, I would appreciate an answer to the following question: would the sponsor of that document be prepared to accept a slight modification of the first line in the operative part of his text so that it would read: "... decide to establish forthwith, in the framework of a mutual USSR-US moratorium on nuclear testing, a global seismic monitoring network ..."?



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(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

I wish to reiterate that my delegation is opposed to the monitoring of a continued arms race that is becoming more and more dangerous, since no monitoring will change that. It supports, however, most effective verification of arms limitation and disarmament measures. Naturally, a great deal at this Conference will depend on how things are progressing outside the conference hall. It is to be hoped that events will turn out favourably. As for our practical activities, we should seize any opportunity presenting itself in the months until the beginning of the next session to prepare the ground for an understanding on a committee mandate acceptable to all so that we may be able to work out the details of a CTBT as soon as possible.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the German Democratic Republic for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the representative of Bulgaria, Ambassador Konstantinov.

Mr. KONSTANTINOV (Bulgaria): As everybody knows, General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev made, yesterday, a very important statement announcing that the Soviet Union has decided to extend its unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests until the end of the year. My delegation warmly welcomes this decision as a new affirmation of the Soviet Union's constant policy of strengthening world peace and of seeking ways to bring to a halt the dangers of a continuing arms race, and in the first place the nuclear-arms race. With full understanding that such a decision was not easy to take, bearing in mind the present international circumstances, we consider the importance of the moratorium in the light of creating favourable conditions for a mutual renunciation of all nuclear tests and for nuclear disarmament. In this conjunction, and with regard to the assertions of some delegations that the policy of moratoria is doomed to failure, my delegation wishes to emphasize once again that the moratorium as such could not be a failure, but the lack of reciprocity and the unchanged policy against any measure conducive to nuclear disarmament are provoking the failures in this field. Our expectations this time are that the other major Power, in spite of its first negative reaction, as well as all other nuclear-weapon States, would reconsider their nuclear policies and would respond positively to the sound Soviet initiative of introducing a moratorium and thus create the necessary conditions for starting serious negotiations on a test-ban treaty.

I would like to speak briefly today in my capacity as co-ordinator of the Group of Socialist Countries on item 6 of our agenda "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

We consider the item related to the security of non-nuclear-weapon States in the nuclear age as an important one. The socialist countries have repeatedly reaffirmed their interest in helping advance the consideration of this subject. It is so because we believe that the need to strengthen the security of non-nuclear-weapon States in the present circumstances has not decreased. On the contrary. Many developments in the nuclear field, all over the world, have clearly shown that the vulnerability of those States,

(Mr. Konstantinov, Bulgaria)

which cannot become a source of a nuclear threat to other States, has actually increased. I believe I do not need now to specify developments of this kind, since all delegations are well aware of them. These developments underline, however, the urgency of the task assigned to this Conference by the General Assembly to arrive at arrangements to effectively, uniformly and unconditionally assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the growing danger of use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against them.

The socialist countries believe, therefore, that the Conference on Disarmament should not give up its efforts to look for a meaningful common solution of the problem of security assurances, a solution which is acceptable to all and could be vested in an international instrument of a legally binding character.

It is our considered view that the most effective guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Until this objective is achieved on a universal basis, it is imperative for the international community, respectively for the Conference on Disarmament which acts on its behalf, to develop effective measures to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States which are not in a position to pose any nuclear threat to other States.

In this context, we strongly favour conclusion of an international legally binding instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States having no nuclear weapons on their territories against the use or threat of use of such weapons. This is the global approach that has been discussed a lot in the frame of the Ad Hoc Committee on item 6, still inconclusively. We regret that procedural problems have prevented the Conference from re-establishing the Committee this year, with a view to continuing the work started seven years ago. What we regret even more is that those States which practise a policy of nuclear deterrence based on first-use of nuclear weapons have not yet re-examined this unilaterally declared policy and position which has proved to be the stumbling block to successful completion of the negotiations under item 6. As stated by the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, in the search for a solution to the problem of negative security assurances, priority should be given to the legitimate security concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States, which by virtue of foregoing the nuclear option and of not allowing nuclear weapons to be stationed on their territories, have every right to expect to be most effectively guaranteed against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

The socialist countries also support other similar measures, either unilateral or multilateral, providing for negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to nuclear-weapon-free zone arrangements. They have welcomed the solemn declarations made by the Soviet Union and China concerning non-first-use of nuclear weapons, and are convinced that if all nuclear-weapon States were to assume obligations not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, this would, in practice, ban the use of such weapons against all States, including all non-nuclear-weapon States.

The socialist countries believe that their views as expressed in plenary, since there has been no opportunity to set them out in an ad hoc committee on

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(Mr. Konstantinov, Bulgaria)

item 6, will find a proper reflection in the report of the Conference on Disarmament. We believe that the work of the Conference should be continued next year in the format of the last six years, up to 1986, in an ad hoc committee of the Conference on Disarmament.

In concluding, I would like to make some brief remarks in addition to what was said by my delegation on the question of the prevention of nuclear war in our last statement, a week ago.

As Co-ordinator of the socialist countries on this issue I would like to express the opinion of the Group of Socialist Countries that the approach of some Western delegates on prevention of nuclear war reflected in draft resolutions A/C.1/39/L.40/Rev.1 and A/C.1/40/L.74, on which no action was taken by the General Assembly, was contradictory to the approach and principles of the Final Document on this issue. In fact, these draft resolutions place the issue on the prevention of nuclear war in jeopardy and detract the attention of the Conference from taking concrete actions aimed at negotiations on the prevention of nuclear war.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Bulgaria for his statement. In accordance with the decision taken by the Conference at its 338th plenary meeting, I now give the floor to the representative of New Zealand, Mr. Lineham.

Mr. LINEHAM (New Zealand): It gives my delegation considerable pleasure to see you, the representative of Canada, as President of the Conference for this concluding month of the summer session. New Zealand and Canada share much in common, we have traditions of justice and equality and a common desire for peace. We are both members of the Commonwealth, both strongly committed to Western values and both Pacific countries. Although we are from different hemispheres we have the common interest in seeing our Pacific region continue to develop in harmony with prosperity and free from discord.

We are also grateful to the Ambassador of Burma, for the skilful way in which he guided the work of the Conference in the month of July.

The purpose of my intervention today is to reiterate my Government's support for the work of this Conference on chemical weapons.

I do not wish to speak for long. But I do wish to stress that my Government is concerned that the Conference work towards concluding a chemical weapons convention as soon as possible.

New Zealand took the opportunity to address this Conference in the first part of the 1986 session. We expressed the hope that the Conference on Disarmament should be able to make a better rate of progress. We focused on that occasion particularly on its work on a nuclear-test ban treaty.

The New Zealand Government has demonstrated its commitment to disarmament. Its disarmament policies have been based on the primary principle that effective disarmament measures must increase the security of all, not diminish the security of anyone.

(Mr. Lineham, New Zealand)

New Zealand has excluded nuclear weapons from its territory, including its ports. There has never been a need for nuclear weapons in New Zealand. Their exclusion does not diminish security in any way. It enhances it. New Zealand has joined with the other countries of the South Pacific Forum in the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty to limit the chances of nuclear rivalry in the South Pacific. As the Prime Minister, Mr. David Lange, pointed out when he addressed the Conference last year, that Treaty, by lowering the nuclear risk, increases the security of all.

New Zealand places the greatest importance on the work of the Conference on Disarmament in negotiating disarmament measures based on that central principle. We seek to work with the Conference to help achieve that objective of increasing global security through effective controls on armaments.

We are encouraged that the Conference has worked in a positive atmosphere this year. We look to the future with hope for progress on a number of items on the agenda. It would be a serious commentary on the disarmament process if those hopes are again frustrated.

We join with those who express the hope that there will be results in the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on nuclear arms and arms in space. If the political will is shown in those negotiations, this Conference will be better able to negotiate the agreements to give the multilateral framework for effective disarmament measures.

Chemical weapons is the area in which the Conference has moved closest to fulfilling its mandate of negotiating disarmament agreements to provide increased security for all. During the last two or three years the concern of the world about chemical weapons has heightened considerably. We have a common conviction that we urgently need a convention completely banning the development, production, stockpiling as well as the use of chemical weapons.

Earlier this year a group of specialists appointed by the United Nations Secretary-General confirmed that Iraqi forces had used chemical weapons against Iranian forces. And there have been assessments made in this Conference by other delegations that further countries are developing the capability to produce and deploy chemical weapons. These developments point out the necessity and the urgency of concluding as soon as possible a comprehensive chemical weapons convention.

New Zealand has always condemned the use of these barbaric weapons, whose employment in war has been outlawed for over 60 years. We have accepted and strongly support the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of Biological and Toxin Weapons. New Zealand was associated with the resolution 37/98D adopted by the United Nations General Assembly which elaborated the procedures which provide for investigation by the Secretary-General into allegations of the use of chemical weapons.

Pursuant to these procedures we nominated a chemistry laboratory of the New Zealand Department of Scientific and Industrial Research to undertake tests for the presence of prohibited chemical agents if called upon to do so.

(Mr. Lineham, New Zealand)

More recently the Government took further steps in order to limit the possibility that chemical manufacturers or suppliers in New Zealand could be used indirectly to contribute to the proliferation or use of chemical weapons. Since 1984 we have controlled the export of chemicals that could be used in the manufacture of chemical weapons, and have warned our industry of other chemicals that could be used in that category.

Notwithstanding all the action that we and other countries have already taken, there is no substitute for the successful negotiation in this Conference, of a treaty imposing a comprehensive prohibition on the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons.

A comprehensive convention would reinforce the existing international legal prohibition on the use of chemical weapons. It would stop any further proliferation of chemical weapons. It would provide for the total elimination, over as short a time as possible, of chemical weapons and production facilities. And it would also build confidence and enhance mutual security through measures to ensure the observance of its prohibitions.

It is encouraging that the atmosphere in the chemical-weapons negotiations this year has been both reasonably positive and constructive. This has undoubtedly been helped by the agreement of President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, in their Joint Statement on 21 November 1985, to accelerate efforts to conclude an effective and verifiable convention. The bilateral talks which the United States and the Soviet Union have been holding as a complement to the multilateral negotiations may also have helped. This Conference may never have had as good an opportunity to make rapid progress on a chemical weapons treaty as it now has.

Progress has been made this year in a heightened spirit of commitment. We understand, full well, the enormous complexity of the negotiations on this subject. However it is important to match expressions of good intention with agreement on treaty language. That said, we do welcome points of agreement when they emerge, notably the language agreed last year on a provision which would unequivocally prohibit the use of chemical weapons.

As an observer, New Zealand has not been as close to the details of the negotiations as others involved in the work of the ad hoc committee. We would, however, offer some observations of a more general kind.

It is possible for negotiations to become bogged down in the discussion of detail. A comprehensive prohibition on chemical weapons requires, admittedly, the consideration of much detail and those negotiating must be vigilant to ensure that important details are not overlooked but also be awake to the possibility that some difficulties are not, in reality, central to the negotiations. Other speakers have referred to certain key issues in the negotiations and we would agree that it is on such issues that the negotiations should concentrate.

Much work has been done on lists of chemicals that pose a risk of diversion for the production of chemical weapons. Consideration is being

(Mr. Lineham, New Zealand)

given to listing chemicals that will be banned and chemicals that will be subject to monitoring régimes of varying degrees of stringency. This is necessary work since the toxic chemicals and their precursors that are subject to surveillance will need to be clearly listed so that the parties to the convention and the chemical industry are certain of the chemicals involved.

Consideration has also been given this year, however, to the régimes applied to those chemicals, and it does seem to us that this is a key area for future work. It is the devising of acceptable and effective régimes that will determine whether any chemical-weapons convention will be successful. We are encouraged by the progress that has been achieved in Working Group A this year, during intensive work under Australian chairmanship, on the whole question of criteria, lists and régimes and permitted activities.

In a disarmament treaty of this kind, where a whole category of weapons of mass destruction is to be banned forever, the formulation of provisions to verify compliance with the convention is central to the convention régime. Such provisions would include procedures for conducting international on-site inspections -- we do not see that such inspections could be left to national verification authorities -- and also for conducting inspections at short notice, so-called challenge inspections, in cases when breaches of the convention are suspected. It is expected that such cases would be exceptional.

Inspections will need to be provided for not only in the case of alleged breaches of obligations to declare and to destroy existing chemical weapons and production facilities, but also in the case of the obligation not to produce new chemical weapons. There are grounds for some encouragement at the progress that has been made in the negotiations in this area. We have appreciated the intensive efforts made by the Indonesian delegation on verification and compliance issues in Working Group C. We have also noted the very recent United Kingdom proposals on "challenge inspection" which seem to have given rise to a good deal of interest.

These and other proposals were put forward in this Conference in an effort to find consensus, and we would hope that procedures which are acceptable to all can be devised to resolve this long-standing issue. Agreement on the inspection provisions would constitute a major breakthrough in the negotiations. This should be a priority area for future work.

A comprehensive prohibition on the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons, and in particular procedures in the Convention for verification of compliance, could be expected to be of some significance for the civilian chemical industry. We expect that New Zealand's industry, like others, would co-operate in the application of such measures and by doing so demonstrate that it does not want to contribute in any way to the manufacturing of chemical weapons.

In the elaboration of the procedures there will naturally be some concerns, such as the protection of commercial confidentiality and the

(Mr. Lineham, New Zealand)

unhindered commercial operations of the industry, which will have to be taken fully into account. But the devising of procedures which meet such concerns should be seen as a positive and constructive process which will contribute to the objectives of the convention and not as an obstacle in the negotiations.

I would like, before concluding, to touch on some other developments in the Conference this year on the subject of chemical weapons. The New Zealand delegation would like to express particular appreciation to the Government of the Netherlands for the Workshop on the verification of the chemical weapons ban held in June this year and for making it possible for countries like my own to participate. This was, in our view, a superbly organized affair and we would further thank the Dutch delegation for its follow-up reports and willingness to enter into discussions, in the Committee, on the results of the Workshop. Similarly, as another practical reference point for the negotiations, we would thank the Australian Government for its paper, tabled again in June, on the trial inspection of an Australian chemical facility conducted earlier in the year. We would also commend Canada for the material that it has made available to the Conference this year, including a handbook for the investigation of allegations of the use of chemical or biological weapons and the very useful compendia of Conference working papers and statements.

Finally, we would mention recent initiatives of both the United States and the Soviet Union relevant to the negotiations, that is, the provision by the Soviet Union in April of detailed proposals on certain issues in the negotiations, and the demonstration by the United States, in its paper on its chemical stockpile disposal programme, of the sort of openness that will help to build confidence that chemical-weapon stockpiles have, in fact, been destroyed. We welcome such developments.

In concluding, I would like to express the hope of the New Zealand delegation that the Ad Hoc Committee will be able to maintain momentum in the negotiations and in particular to continue work on specific subjects under consideration in the working groups after the current session of the Conference has ended for this year.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of New Zealand for his statement and for his kind comments to the President. I call on the distinguished representative of Yugoslavia a little earlier than he might have intended to speak, and I now give him the floor.

Mr. VIDAS (Yugoslavia): Mr. President, in the plenary on 31 July 1986 I presented my delegation's views on some of the major issues on the agenda of the Conference. Today I am taking the floor, with your permission, Mr. President, just to bid farewell to those of our colleagues who will shortly leave Geneva, being asked to take up new responsibilities: the distinguished representatives of Algeria and France.

But in taking the floor I would like first of all, and indeed with great pleasure, to congratulate you on your assumption of the Presidency of the

(Mr. Vidas, Yugoslavia)

Conference for the month of August, at the end of the 1986 session. In the fulfilment of the responsible task facing you, you may count on the full support and co-operation of my delegation, particularly as your term of office will last till the beginning of the new session of the Conference in 1987. I am sure that all the members of the Conference will agree that your assumption of the Presidency at the end of the 1986 session and in preparation for the 1987 session means the right man in the right place.

I would like to express my delegation's appreciation to the distinguished representatives of Algeria and France, for their contribution to the deliberations of the Conference and for the excellent co-operation existing between our delegations. The distinguished representative of Algeria, H.E. Mr. Nourdine Kerroum, will be shortly leaving Geneva to take up his new assignment as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Yugoslavia. Our two countries are bound by long-lasting friendship and co-operation. The foundations of this friendship have constantly been reinforced by the policy of non-alignment that both countries helped to inaugurate and promote further. Ambassador Kerroum is very well known in my country. Many of his Yugoslav friends are looking forward to welcoming him in Belgrade as the distinguished representative of non-aligned and friendly Algeria, and I would like to extend to him my best wishes.

I would also like to take this opportunity to bid farewell to the distinguished representative of France, Ambassador Jacques Jessel who also leaves for a new assignment. I would like to express my pleasure at the fruitful co-operation existing between our two delegations and I wish him success in his new function.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Yugoslavia for his statement and for his kind words to the President.

We did have another speaker on our list today, the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. I understand that it is not possible to hear their statement now, and indeed, it may not be possible to hear it today. However, I have received an indication from a group which is engaged in consultations that they would welcome a 10 to 15 minute adjournment. This is a somewhat unusual procedure, but if I have the consent of the Conference I could adjourn to give a little time to the delegation of the Soviet Union and then resume this meeting for a statement if desired, otherwise we would proceed to hold our informal meeting.

I do not wish to embarrass the delegation of the Soviet Union in any way. I call on the representative of the Soviet Union.

Mr. KASHIRIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Because of a series of unavoidable circumstances, Ambassador Issraelyan was unable to make an important statement today. We would like to apologize to you for that as well as to the members of the Conference. The Soviet delegation is not asking, in this connection, for a suspension.



The PRESIDENT: I thank the Soviet delegation. That therefore concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor?

You will recall that, at our plenary meeting last Thursday, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events introduced for the Conference's consideration three documents, as follows: CD/681/Rev.1, containing a summary of the Fourth Report of the Ad Hoc Group; document CD/720, which contains the Fourth Report of the Ad Hoc Group in full, and document CD/721, which transcribes the Progress Report of the Ad Hoc Group on its twenty-second session.

As I noted then, the Ad Hoc Group is submitting in the latter document a number of recommendations, contained in the first sentence of paragraph 12 as well as paragraphs 14 and 15. I indicated last week that we shall take up those recommendations at our plenary meeting next Thursday, 21 August. I propose to do so and, on the basis of those actions, I will address to the Secretary-General of the World Meteorological Organization the communication which was circulated to you in draft form simultaneously with the documents produced by the Ad Hoc Group.

I wish also to announce that the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space will hold its last meeting this afternoon at 3.30 p.m. in this Conference Room.

In this connection, I wish to emphasize the need for the Conference and its subsidiary bodies to maintain the timetable already agreed upon, as we are now very close to the end of the session and the question of processing official documents and reports is now creating some difficulties. We should avoid bottlenecks and also keep in mind that processing of documentation by the technical services now takes longer.

Before we adjourn, I wish to recall that the Conference will hold an informal meeting immediately after this plenary meeting to start its first reading of the substantive paragraphs of the draft annual report, under items 3 "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters", and 6, "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 21 August, at 10 a.m. The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 11.15 a.m.

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.381  
21 August 1986

ENGLISH

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## FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-FIRST PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva  
on Tuesday, 26 August 1986, at 10.00 a.m.

President:

Mr. J. Allan Beesley

(Canada)

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The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 381st plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In conformity with its programme of work, the Conference continues today its consideration of reports of ad hoc subsidiary bodies as well as of the Annual Report to the General Assembly of the United Nations. In accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, however, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

As announced previously, I intend to put before the Conference today document CD/721, which contains the Progress Report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events on its twenty-second session. You will recall that I noted at previous meetings that this document contains a number of recommendations in the first sentence of paragraph 12, as well as in paragraphs 14 and 15. Once the list of speakers is exhausted I shall invite the Conference to adopt these recommendations of the Ad Hoc Group.

I wish also to recall that the Conference will hold today an informal meeting immediately after this plenary meeting to continue our consideration of the draft annual report to the General Assembly. We had originally expected to deal today with agenda item 2, but we have not been able to keep to the agreed timetable and we should today take up first the substantive paragraphs under agenda items 3 and 6. I hope that we shall make up for the delay and that we will be able to deal with both agenda items and then move to agenda item 2. Otherwise, I should inform you that I do not see how we can conclude the annual session in the time left to us.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Czechoslovakia, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Japan, Algeria, Poland, China, Australia, France and Canada. I now give the floor to the representative of Czechoslovakia, Ambassador Vejvoda.

Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): Mr. President, it is a pleasure to see you, the experienced and skilful representative of Canada, in the Presidency of the Conference for the concluding month of its session. Under your efficient guidance we shall undoubtedly be able to appropriately evaluate what happened in the Conference during the last year and conclude the elaboration of our report to the General Assembly. My thanks go also to your predecessor, Ambassador U Tin Tun of Burma, for his efficient Presidency in July.

We note with satisfaction that negotiations on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons have entered an intensive stage. The Ad Hoc Committee and its three Working Groups were working very actively throughout this session, and some important aspects of the chemical-weapon ban were also addressed at the bilateral United States-Soviet consultations. It is thus only natural that a certain optimism is emerging. Our delegation also welcomes the fact that the chemical-weapons ban seems closer now than it did a year or two ago. We recognize the positive impact which the new Soviet proposals exerted on the ongoing process of negotiations. A flexible approach, demonstrated once again by the Soviet proposals of 22 April, is the only attitude which can lead to final success. It is desirable that, as we try to finalize the convention, flexibility should mark the approach of all delegations.

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(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

But there are unfortunately, not only positive developments concerning chemical weapons. While the Conference is doing its best to outlaw them, the NATO alliance is preoccupied with search for the rationale for the production of binary weapons and their eventual introduction in Europe. We deplore the Brussels decision of 22 May and we fail to understand how it fits in with widely proclaimed readiness to achieve a CW ban. This inconsistency makes us wonder what is wrong with the present process aimed at chemical disarmament if, in spite of its relatively advanced stage, it has not eliminated the drive towards a further chemical-arms build-up. Does this inconsistency result simply from the approach of individual military planners, or is it an indication of a wider, general policy line?

We can hardly find an exhaustive answer to that question. But some conclusions might offer themselves if one looks back at the development of CW and at the inner logic of the chemical-arms race. Within the span of about half a century several generations of CW were developed and it was mainly their toxicity which constantly increased. As a result, in terms of toxicity and area coverage, modern CW agents surpass the agents used in World War I by several orders of magnitude. A simple comparison of lethal effects of various CW agents illustrates this progression very clearly. If, in the case of phosgene, used in 1915, this represented 3,200 mg per cubic metre of air within a minute, for yperite (1917) it was only about half of that amount. For sarin, produced in 1939, the lethal effect threshold went down sharply to 100 mg/m<sup>3</sup> of air, for nerve agent VX (1960/1) to 38 mg/m<sup>3</sup> of air and the chemical designed as EA 5774 (1979) to just about 10 mg/m<sup>3</sup> of air. Thus, today's CW agents are substantially, "qualitatively", different from the old ones. It might be further demonstrated by the simple fact that for percutaneous administration - which represents an important method of military use - about 200 drops of yperite are needed to constitute a lethal dose, while the same effect can be achieved by a simple drop of VX compound.

But even this extreme toxicity does not, unfortunately, represent a limit which could not be further lowered. Toxic compounds, which the United States is considering for military use and which are currently still in the development stage, are estimated to produce lethal effects even at a concentration of 0.1 to 0.001 mg per cubic metre of air. It might be safely presumed that these "prospects" are tempting to military planners and represent an important reason why they are not ready to abandon the chemical-arms race in their quest for superiority.

With the overall development of weapons and military equipment, the means for delivering chemical weapons are also becoming faster, more accurate and more penetrating. Today a whole spectrum of such means exists, from already obsolete chemical mines and hand grenades for use in combat to more sophisticated artillery and multiple-rocket-launcher shells, air force bombs and containers, chemical warheads for short-range and medium-range ground-based missiles. Here again, a new generation of delivery means appears on the horizon. For instance, it has been reported that specific systems for delivering organophosphorous compounds by means of cruise missiles are being developed and have already been tested. They will make it possible to carry out surprise attacks on pinpoint targets well behind the battle lines, using highly toxic and fast-acting chemical warfare agents.

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(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

These, and possible future developments in the delivery means for CW, could lead to dangerous calculations about increased use of CW against the civilian population. It is obvious that, even without this "special concern", civilian populations will have to pay an extremely high price in the event of a conflict with the use of CW. It has been estimated that the ratio between killed soldiers and civilians could be as high as 1 to 20. - In case of conflict in densely populated Europe, or other similar regions of the world, the civilian casualties would be immense.

These indiscriminate effects of CW, against both armed forces and the civilian population, render chemical weapons, by their nature, primarily offensive weapons. Since chemical weapons would demonstrably cause greater loss of life among civilians than among military personnel, it would make little sense to employ them as a means of defence against an invader. Instead of halting the enemy's advance, CW would, in the first place, provoke severe losses among one's own civilian population. Thus, the justification of the need for chemical weapons to serve defensive purposes simply does not hold water. Likewise, the necessity to possess CW in order to deter chemical aggression would simply disappear with the universal elimination of CW stockpiles. Weighing all the pros and cons, the most accurate conclusion seems to be that for supporters of the development and manufacture of ever new chemical weapons these play a far from insignificant role in scenarios for the offensive use of military power.

The NATO Airland Battle Doctrine is quite outspoken in this respect. The possible use of CW in offensive military operations might also be contemplated in conjunction with both nuclear and conventional weapons. Under certain scenario CW could be more readily used in place of another kind of weapons of mass destruction -- nuclear weapons. This could apply to situations when long-term contamination of an attacked area is undesirable. Some chemical warfare agents may cause prolonged ground contamination, but this property is limited to only a few of these weapons. As a rule, chemical contamination would be much more shortlived than radioactive contamination due to nuclear weapons.

The increase in the toxicity of CW and the development of equipment for their use went through more or less clearly defined stages. It seems obvious that we are now somewhere between the two stages. The nerve agents of World War II are now firmly in the chemical arsenals of a number of countries and they have reached more than desirable perfection. But today, after long years of research and experiments, which in some instances took decades, a new generation of CW is already prepared for massive production.

It is thus only natural that the Conference on Disarmament has been considering the problem of a chemical-weapons ban in the course of the last six years. This fact alone confirms that the international community feels the need to prevent the introduction into arsenals of new, even more toxic and more sophisticated CW. To avert this new stage does not appear, however, to be an easy task. The problem is that it has in fact begun a long time ago. While existing CW were further improved, research on new weapons went on in parallel.

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(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

In this connection, the announcement by the United States in 1969 that it would stop manufacturing lethal CW agents is of some interest. Many nice words have been said about that decision and we are not going to question its value. But one aspect is usually omitted -- the United States could afford to halt the production of the chemical agents known at that time because it had begun to develop binary weapons under a programme for the military use of new types of CW agents.

By 1969, extensive research on binary weapons had already been accomplished. It started in 1954, when the United States Army Chemical Corps embarked on a binary weapons programme, followed by the United States Navy six years later. Widely-financed research in the following years made it possible that in 1965 binary nerve gas bombs of the Big Eye type were patented by United States Navy and Air Force, as well as binary cluster bombs in 1968. In 1969 the XM 687 binary howitzer shell prototype was field tested at Dugway proving ground. The ensuing extensive work brought us to June 1980, when the United States House of Representatives appropriated the funds needed to set up a new production facility for binary chemical weapons at Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas. There followed the necessary political decisions from both the legislative and executive branches of the United States Government, and the stage was set for the actual production of this new generation of CW.

If binary and multi-component weapons production is launched, the verification of the desired CW ban will be substantially complicated. The problem is that components required for binary weapons can be made in the civilian chemical industry with no need to conceal huge stockpiles. They may also be used for peaceful purposes, e.g. to manufacture insecticides, pharmaceuticals or other chemicals. Furthermore, the binary technology makes it possible to contemplate the use of substances earlier thought to be unsuitable for military application because of their shortlived chemical stability. These are by no means all the potential dangers this new technology might bring about. If we fail to prevent binary-weapons production, we would set ourselves on a path full of unknown and often unpredictable dangers.

In our opinion, no country would start binary-weapons production out of purely security considerations. Rather, various aggressive designs will be kept in mind as well as the eternal quest for profits. And the mass production of binary and multi-component chemical weapons would ensure the arms contractors involved enormous extra profits. About \$US 10 billion is to be spent on the binary-weapons programme of the United States in the years up to 1990. Moreover, the eventual introduction of binary weapons into various regions of the world would substantially increase the chemical threat to many countries, which can only contribute to further proliferation of chemical weapons. We maintain that neither staunch aggressiveness of outdated military strategists nor financial interests of the military -- industrial complex represent a valid reason for States to launch a new round of the chemical-arms race. We are ready to believe that political realism will prevail and that finally the right choice -- the chemical-weapons ban -- will be made in time.

Let me stress one more aspect which renders a CW ban an urgent measure. With the development of the chemical industry one might note that commercial and military chemical substances are somewhat closer to each other than in the

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(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

past. Nobody can exclude that in the relatively near future some military use might be found for today's purely commercial chemicals and vice versa. For instance, single-purpose precursors, like QL or DF, have no commercial use today. But with the rapid development of science and technology no one can give us a guarantee that in the future some commercial use will not be found even for these substances. If that happens, these substances might spread quickly throughout civilian chemical industry. If the CW ban has not been achieved by that time, it would become then substantially more difficult to negotiate it and ensure compliance with it. Thus, a rather peculiar situation emerges -- in the absence of the CW ban, the natural development of chemical science and technology, which no one can stop, might objectively hamper prospects for the cessation of the chemical-arms race. On the contrary, early achievement of the ban and full compliance with it can give us a sufficient guarantee that future development in the field of chemistry will remain peaceful, with more favourable conditions for fruitful international co-operation.

We appreciate the fact that the Conference is paying due attention to the elaboration of the CW ban. Its relevant Ad Hoc Committee is by far the most active working body of the Conference with a unique negotiating mandate. Delegations are prepared to work actively not only during the Conference session itself but also in the intersessional period. Serious interest in chemical disarmament is also demonstrated by such actions as the recent Workshop on the verification of non-production of CW organized by the Netherlands, for which we would like to thank the Dutch delegation.

We maintain that each and every delegation should contribute towards the achievement of the CW ban. This is not a problem for only the handful of countries that possess the largest chemical capabilities. The need to provide for world-wide compliance with the ban, and its possible impacts on the civilian chemical industry and international trade in the field, require that countries take an active part in the formulation of the convention's basic provisions. It would not be a wise choice to wait until the convention is ready and then only try to fit it to a State's own interests.

Judging by some political decisions, like the one I mentioned in the beginning of my statement, it seems that for the time being in some NATO countries there are two opposite tendencies -- one supporting the prohibition of CW while the other favours the massive production and deployment of new CW. But these two tendencies cannot go on side by side for a long time. We are now at a point in time when extremely important decisions will have to be made. If the second option prevails and new CW production programmes are launched, negotiations on a CW ban will be seriously hampered and the tasks to be solved will become incomparably more difficult.

I cannot conclude my statement without expressing our deep appreciation of the decision of the Soviet Union of 18 August to prolong its unilateral moratorium on nuclear-weapon testing till the beginning of next year. We consider it a bold and unprecedented step aimed at the effective cessation of the nuclear arms race. It is high time that other nuclear-weapon States, in the first place the United States, reacted appropriately to this constructive invitation which the world applauds. These are deeds, not words!

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(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

As regularly happens in the month of August, a number of our colleagues will be leaving us. Ambassador Gonsalves of India is already back in New Delhi discharging his new important functions. I would ask the Indian delegation to convey to Ambassador Gonsalves how I appreciated close co-operation with him. Ambassador Kerroum of Algeria, Ambassador Jessel of France and Ambassador Wegener of the Federal Republic of Germany are also leaving us. We enjoyed working together with them and we wish them all success in their new important assignments. Let me also welcome among us the new representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador von Stülpnagel. We are certain that he will contribute constructively to the work of the Conference.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Czechoslovakia for his statement and for his kind words to the President. I would also like to thank him for the speed of his delivery, given the length of our list.

I now give the floor to the representative of the USSR, Mr. Kashirin.

Mr. KASHIRIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The members of the Conference and the observers from several countries taking part in its work already know that the Soviet Union has again extended the unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions which it has been strictly observing for one year now. The special decision to this effect taken by the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government was made public by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Mikhail Gorbachev, in his address on Moscow television on 18 August, which, at the request of the Soviet delegation, will be circulated as an official document of the Conference.

It should be especially clear to experts on disarmament that this was not an easy decision. It was taken in accordance with the Soviet Union's fundamental policy of ensuring general security by means of disarmament, and taking into account the multitude of factors, events and problems that determine the face of today's world and the realities of the nuclear space age.

Those realities are grim. Mountains of nuclear and every other type of weapon have been built up, but the arms race is not abating but accelerating. The danger has arisen that it will be transferred to outer space. The militarization of the United States of America and the entire NATO bloc is proceeding at high speed. The pace of development of military technology is so rapid that it is leaving less and less time for peoples, States and politicians to awaken to the real threat and reducing mankind's opportunities to halt the slide towards the nuclear abyss. There must be no delay, or such sophisticated arms systems will emerge that agreement on their control will be altogether impossible. The situation is becoming increasingly intolerable. Today it is not enough to preserve the existing treaties; major practical steps are required, steps which can curb militarism and bring about a turn for the better in the course of events. The balance of fear is ceasing to be a factor of restraint. That is so not only because, in general, fear is no wise counsel and can only lead to actions with unpredictable consequences. Fear is a direct participant in the arms race. By heightening distrust and suspicion, it forms a vicious circle of enhanced tension.



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(Mr. Kashirin, USSR)

Pre-nuclear thinking in fact lost its significance on 6 August 1945. Today it is impossible to ensure one's own security without taking into account the security of other States and peoples. There can be no genuine security unless it is equal for all and comprehensive. To think otherwise is to live in a world of illusion, in a world of self-deception.

Two tragedies involving nuclear and space-age technology have happened recently: the loss of the Challenger crew and the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear plant. They have heightened anxiety and been a brutal reminder that man is only just beginning to master the fantastically powerful forces he has himself brought into being and is only now learning to place them at the service of progress. These events have furnished an object lesson in what would happen should nuclear weapons be used. A major, perhaps the major lesson is that the weapons devised by man should never be used and that today it is simply suicidal to build relations between States on the illusion that superiority can be attained in terrible means of destruction. Their complete elimination is the only way towards genuine peace. Specialists have estimated that the radiation from the explosion of the smallest nuclear warhead would be equivalent to three Chernobyls. This estimate is very probably correct. And if it is, that means that exploding even a small part of the accumulated nuclear arsenal would be a catastrophe, an irremediable catastrophe. Anyone who still dares to make a first nuclear strike will doom himself to an agonizing death -- not from a retaliatory strike, but from the consequences of the explosion of his own warheads. This is not propaganda, not political extemporizing, not the heightening of fears, but reality. It is simply irresponsible to reject it, and criminal to disregard it.

The decision made by the Soviet Union a year ago on a moratorium was based on the devotion of socialism as a social system to the cause of peace and on profound awareness of its responsibility for the future of civilization. The Soviet Union, as a socialist State and as a nuclear Power, regards as its supreme duty to do everything it can to save the peaceful future of the planet. Our desire to move the course of international development towards détente is consistent with our philosophy and our socialist morality, but in the nuclear age, saving the Earth from nuclear annihilation is a universal human task, a matter for all peoples.

We can, of course, only take inspiration from the fact that people of good will have welcomed our decision to extend the moratorium on nuclear explosions. We have been hearing words of approval and support from all corners of the world. Politicians and parliamentarians, public figures and mass organizations have seen in this step an example of the correct approach to the present-day problems and a hope of deliverance from the fear of a nuclear catastrophe. The Soviet moratorium was approved by the United Nations General Assembly -- the most representative gathering of States in the world. Throughout the world now, in the minds of peoples, politicians and public figures of the most diverse orientations and world outlooks, a conviction is asserting itself ever more strongly: the very existence of the human race is at stake, and the time has come for resolute and responsible action. This is shown, incidentally, by the statements of many delegations in the Conference on Disarmament. The importance of the Soviet moratorium has been mentioned here by the distinguished representatives of Mexico, India, Sweden, Venezuela and many other countries.

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(Mr. Kashirin, USSR)

To be fair, it should be said that some delegations, while paying tribute to the Soviet moratorium, have nevertheless expressed doubts as to whether it can provide an answer to the arguments put forward by the opponents of a test ban. I have in mind, in particular, the interesting and in some respects very convincing statement made by the distinguished representative of the Netherlands, Ambassador van Schaik, on 29 July 1986 on the issue of a nuclear test ban.

In this respect, I would like to emphasize that, as we have stressed on numerous occasions in the past, the Soviet Union does not regard a moratorium as an end in itself or as a substitute for a comprehensive test-ban treaty, but as an important first step towards such a treaty. Moreover, the Soviet Union has expressed its readiness to agree on a series of verification measures to check compliance with a Soviet-United States bilateral moratorium, including on-site inspections when necessary.

Thus, a mutually verifiable moratorium could become the dress rehearsal, as it were, for the comprehensive test-ban treaty the conclusion of which has been and is still our principal goal in this sphere. In this respect, I would remind you that, in the past, a moratorium on nuclear testing contributed to the conclusion of the 1963 Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water.

Many delegations at the Conference have noted with concern that the United States still refuses to follow the Soviet Union's example and join in a moratorium. Indeed, the United States, the champion as regards the number of explosions for 40 years, has detonated another 18 nuclear devices during the year of the Soviet moratorium, and three of them were not declared. Moreover, as a rule it has done so ostentatiously, timing the tests to coincide either with a Soviet announcement of the extension of the moratorium or with some other Soviet initiative. They even invited us to Nevada to watch it all happening. To this it should be added that the present United States Administration is implementing the broadest of military programmes. In a word, the Soviet Union has ample justification for resuming its nuclear tests. And yet we are still convinced that the ending of nuclear testing not only by the Soviet Union but also by the United States would be a genuine breakthrough towards stopping the nuclear arms race and would speed up the elimination of nuclear weapons. The logic here is simple: if there are no tests, there will be no upgrading of nuclear weapons -- which both sides have in any case stockpiled in abundance. This is demonstrated by the appeals made to the United States and the Soviet Union by a substantial and prestigious part of the world community States. It includes the "Delhi Six", a standing forum of leaders of countries in four continents -- Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Tanzania and Sweden. A few days ago, at a meeting in the city of Ixtapa, they adopted the Mexico Declaration, which contains a further appeal for an end to all nuclear tests. That is also the demand of the majority of the States members of the non-aligned movement. The Soviet Union is, of course, aware that forces which have no wish to disarm at all are active in the United States. Moreover, they are doing their utmost to drag us into ever-new spirals of the arms race, to provoke us into slamming the door at the talks. But we would like to hope that realism and understanding of the need for a joint quest for ways of improving the international situation, halting the senseless arms race, to eliminate nuclear weapons, will prevail in American assessments and actions.

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(Mr. Kashirin, USSR)

Under these conditions, the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and the Government of the Soviet Union having thoroughly and scrupulously weighed all the pros and cons and guided by their responsibility for the fate of the world, have decided to extend the unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions until 1 January 1987. In taking this step, the Soviet Union believes that people in all countries of the world, political circles and international public opinion will correctly assess the lengthy silence on Soviet nuclear test ranges. As Mikhail Gorbachev emphasized in this connection, and I quote, "On behalf of the Soviet people, I appeal to the reason and dignity of Americans not to miss another historic chance on the path towards an end to the arms race". The Soviet Union is confident that an agreement on ending nuclear tests can be reached speedily and signed before the end of this year at the Soviet-American summit meeting. That event would, without a doubt, be the main tangible outcome of the meeting and a considerable step towards ending the arms race. It would be a kind of prologue to further progress at the talks on nuclear weapons and their elimination and to radical improvement in the world situation as a whole. The Soviet Union's moratorium on nuclear explosions, being an action and not merely a proposal, is practical proof of the earnestness and sincerity of our nuclear disarmament programme and of our calls for a new policy, a policy of realism, peace and co-operation. More than half of 1986, which was declared the Year of Peace by the United Nations, has passed. By extending its unilateral moratorium, the Soviet Union is contributing to the common striving to ensure that this year goes down in history as being worthy of its name. That is the essence of the Soviet Union's new political initiative.

The Soviet delegation would like to take this opportunity to introduce its working paper, CD/724, devoted to issues of seismic verification of the non-conducting of nuclear tests. This document has already been distributed to delegations. The document puts forward the Soviet Union's ideas on this important aspect of verification of a nuclear test ban, including the relatively rapid exchange of Level II seismic data, and on the carrying out of an appropriate international experiment. The Soviet Union's proposals on this matter are prompted by a desire to expedite in every possible way the conclusion of a multilateral treaty on a general and comprehensive nuclear test ban under effective control.

As the Soviet delegation has repeatedly stressed, our country is prepared to use all possible roads leading to that goal. Here, at the Conference on Disarmament, we have persistently worked for the establishment of an ad hoc committee on the topic, showing considerable flexibility during the consultations on its mandate, and we cannot, of course, but express regret and disappointment at the fact that, despite all the efforts of the socialist countries and the States members of the Group of 21, the Conference has not managed to agree on setting up such a committee. In this regard, we would like to express agreement with the view of the distinguished representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles, that the States supporting the commencement of multilateral negotiations on a nuclear test ban had gone the greater part of the way in the search for a compromise. It is clear that it is only the inflexible stance of the United States and its closest allies that has, for three successive years, been preventing the Conference from getting down to practical work on this issue. It is regrettable that the Western countries

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which were the authors of documents CD/521 and CD/621 have not displayed one iota of flexibility and have not heeded the opinion of the other countries that form the majority of the Conference.

While we attach the greatest importance to the elaboration of a multilateral test ban treaty, we deem it important, for wholly understandable reasons, that measures to stop nuclear tests be taken first by the United States and the Soviet Union. That is why the Soviet Union, which declared a unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions last year and recently extended it afresh for almost another half-year, is so persistently trying to obtain the United States participation in that moratorium and so keenly pursuing the question of the resumption of, and the attainment of practical results in the tripartite negotiations between the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom.

As regards the question put by the Group of 21 to the delegations of the USSR and the United States concerning their countries' bilateral efforts on the issue of banning nuclear tests, we should like to point out that we share the view of the non-aligned and neutral countries that bilateral and multilateral efforts can usefully supplement each other. As regards the bilateral efforts in this area, as you know, a round of Soviet-United States negotiations on the problem of halting nuclear-weapon tests took place in Geneva from 25 to 31 July of this year. The Soviet delegation at those talks firmly insisted that their aim must be to define the methodology and terms of a nuclear test ban as well as to solve the problem of verification. On issues of verification, our position was and is based on the need for the verification to be of the prohibition and not of the conducting of nuclear tests. We have followed that line in all forums dealing with the prohibition of nuclear tests. Unfortunately, the position of the other side offers no evidence of any constructive approach on the part of the United States Administration to what is one of the most acute problems of our time, a problem whose urgent resolution is now being called for by an overwhelming majority of States and by millions of people throughout the world, including a majority of the population of the United States itself. The Soviet Union will continue to work steadfastly to ensure that the Soviet-United States negotiations, the next round of which is scheduled for early September, will end specific agreements that will at last enable headway to be made towards the resolution of this urgent problem.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the USSR and I now give the floor to the representative of Japan, Ambassador Imai.

Mr. IMAI (Japan): It is not without emotion that I realize that this August marks the completion of four full cycles of my duty at the Conference on Disarmament. In addition to the United Nations First Committee and various review conferences, something like 24 months of deliberations and negotiations in this Council Chamber have been added to my diplomatic career. I should like to say that it has indeed been a pleasure and a privilege. In the normal course of my duty, it is rather unlikely that I shall be here for the fifth time next February and, as today is likely to be the last opportunity for me to address the plenary as head of the Japanese delegation, I should like to ask for the indulgence of my colleagues for a moment while I review what, in my mind, are the most important features of the international disarmament exercises.

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We can all recall the good old days when no one doubted that the whole point of disarmament negotiations was to reduce arms and thereby to bring about increased security. Of all weapons, nuclear explosives and their delivery systems are obviously the most crucial. When the post-war disarmament process started in the 1950s in Geneva, it was natural that one central topic should have been the ban on nuclear testing, which, in addition to the concern over environmental contamination, was the shortest-cut to restraining the development of new and more powerful weapons. These were the days of crude nuclear warheads and testing methods, and the logic of the test ban was very clear. Also, a complete ban of nuclear weapons and complete international control of the related technology and material were still very much on the horizon. I would like to refer a little later to this central theme of the Geneva process.

From the late 1950s, the composition of the Geneva negotiating forum has changed, first involving 10 East/West countries, then adding eight non-aligned States to make up the ENDC, and finally to today's Conference on Disarmament with its 40 member States. Arms control negotiations have been conducted in other forums including the United States/USSR bilaterals, trilaterals, or multilaterals with a European focus. Also there have been regional approaches.

In spite of the expansions in the number and scope of negotiating forums, we are today unfortunately no closer to successful reductions in arms, nuclear or otherwise. Instead we have seen a tremendous growth in the number and destructive capabilities of nuclear warheads, the rapid increase in the number, range and throw-weight of missiles, advancement in target acquisition and in their state of readiness. The only thing we have succeeded in so far was stopping the increase in the number of nuclear-weapon States, and this, thanks to the collective wisdom and courage of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We look at the on-going Geneva negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union for deep, balanced and verifiable reductions in nuclear weapons with a great deal of interest. They may become the first ever to achieve real nuclear arms reductions instead of just placing ceilings on their expansion, and we sincerely hope that such measures will be realized between the two negotiating parties.

The thought leads us back to the real purpose of arms control and disarmament negotiations. It has been pointed out that, in spite of the tremendous increase in nuclear arsenals, or maybe because of such an increase, the world has managed to avoid a nuclear catastrophe for the past 40 years. The destructive capabilities of the two arsenals are such that both physical and psychological deterrence are at work, while highly sophisticated command and control systems are in place to prevent accidental nuclear warfare from inadvertently breaking out. What has at one time been described as the two scorpions in a bottle has somehow survived. The situation is described as MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) plus the minimum CBM (Confidence-Building Measures) to enable co-operation in crisis management.

The situation is far from being ideal, but in this way the world continues to be livable, and here I would like to touch upon the concept of "nuclear winter". I have always felt somewhat uneasy with those who venture to make numerical predictions regarding the effects of a nuclear war based on a simple one-dimensional climatic model. The Earth's atmosphere is governed

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by much more complicated equations. I was pleased to read in the recent issue of Foreign Affairs an important clarification regarding the possible deficiencies arising from the adoption of an over-simplified model.

There is a theory that the most important part of arms control and disarmament is not necessarily their output as signed and sealed documents, but the continuation of the process itself, in which the two major nuclear Powers are constantly in touch and maintain dialogue regarding each other's war-fighting capabilities. If one imagines a situation in which the two would not talk to each other, that would be a far more dangerous world.

Unfortunately, in the present situation, the above-mentioned view is far from being overly pessimistic. If we recall the very long period of time that was necessary for the two partners to work out the SALT Agreements, it may be reasonable to argue that the process of negotiations is at least as important as the output. We can add that the similar considerations apply in the case of multilateral negotiations.

I would like to refer to the following three points. One is the need of maintaining contact, or of not giving up. One can see a telling example of this perception in the importance given to the hotline as a part of crisis avoidance between the two most powerful countries. The second point is in fact widely accepted as the basis for stability and security, and that is the proper balance between the two forces. I shall not get into theoretical details regarding what is and what is not deterrence in modern strategic thinking. The conceptual framework has changed with time. It is sufficient to point out that the balance of military forces, including both conventional and nuclear, is an essential ingredient of modern arms control. Thirdly, there is a great deal of hard work that must go into the writing of any disarmament agreement. We all know that "definitions", "declarations" and "verification" have to be elaborated carefully and in painful detail so that the essential balance which is the very core of any agreement can be clearly described and be implementable.

I do not need to point out that the Conference is in the middle of such detailed work with regard to a convention banning chemical weapons, while on some other agenda items there is disagreement as to how we, as the Conference, should handle these essential building blocks. In any event, these considerations definitely lead us to conclude that mere declaratory positions about disarmament and arms control are no longer sufficient or convincing.

As we continue these considerations, it becomes important that we examine again the role of a multilateral forum such as ours, in the context of the continuing arms control dialogue between the two major Powers. The Conference is the sole multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament. It would then be useful to review what were the basic expectations at the time of its establishment by the Final Document. In view of the seven years' record of the Conference's existence which failed to produce a single disarmament agreement, this cannot be a trivial point.

It is easy enough to blame the situation on the lack of so-called political will on the part of someone else, and thus avoid the blame on oneself. If the usefulness of the multilateral negotiating forum is primarily

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as an instrument in propaganda, then that is another matter. Japan, for one, has never considered the Conference as a forum for a public relations exercise, or as an apparatus to improve one's own political image. I believe that we have much more serious issues at hand and its importance transcends mere pride of participation or an alibi at the expense of someone else's "political will".

There were times in the Geneva process when joint drafts presented by the United States and the Soviet Union were sufficient. The multilateral forum first acted as a sounding board, then examined the drafts, commented on their provisions and sent them on the General Assembly for final considerations and adoption. The Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the NPT of 1970 and other examples are available in this category. The Antarctic Treaty of 1960 and the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 went through a somewhat similar procedure.

On the other hand, there have been a number of purely bilateral agreements worked out around what were then considered to be solely bilateral problems. In the negotiating history of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, we find an interesting reference to possible offensive capabilities of a third party. However, there was no question that the matter of balance between offensive and defensive arms was primarily a bilateral affair. At the same time, although no other States except the United States and USSR held any meaningful capability or intention to place weapons of mass destruction in Earth orbit, the Outer Space Treaty was conceived of and agreed upon as a multilateral instrument.

We live and work today in an atmosphere different from the days of joint chairmanship and joint drafts, and this in itself is a development reflecting an increased role for multilateral participation. At the same time, it should be clear that any idea of nuclear or space disarmament which does not command the simultaneous support of the two major Powers cannot be a viable proposal. Awareness of this fact does not in any way diminish our role or responsibilities. It enhances our function in arms control and disarmament by forcing us to make efforts either jointly or separately to reason with the major Powers to accept viable disarmament measures, which, after all, are not just matters of bilateral concern.

Perhaps I have talked too long about generalities. These, however, are not only my personal convictions but represent the philosophy with which I have been conducting my duty in this forum for the past four years. I would now like to turn to the issue of the nuclear-test ban, which has been one of the central focuses of the Geneva disarmament process.

As to the actual final steps which led the negotiators in 1963 to the partial NTB agreement, including assessment of seismic detection and the effects of underground testing on warhead design, we have available limited records of the United States side only. The Soviet Union did not disclose any meaningful information reflecting their considerations leading to acceptance of the Partial Test Ban Treaty, nor indeed on any policy or technological background regarding military-related decisions. This makes it very difficult for us to form a realistic assessment of the comparable positions of the two States regarding a comprehensive test-ban régime. All we have from the

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Soviet Union is a declaratory position without explanation. I believe that there can be a range within which explanation of details would help and not impede the progress of the test ban régime.

Japan has consistently emphasized the importance of the world-wide seismic network in which both Level I and Level II data may be effectively exchanged. We have presented a number of working papers on the subject and have made proposals in the hope of making some sort of viable multilateral verification system a real going concern. The recent developments in the Conference to encourage further work by the GSE (Group of Scientific Experts) is gratifying. What is not very clear is the question of bilateral verification. The maximum sensitivities of NTM or National Technical Means are never made known (nor for that matter have NTMs ever been defined in an international agreement) and we do not know whether there exists a certain band below which detection and identification of underground nuclear explosions becomes unclear. Even with the on-site installation of devices capable of detecting and analysing weak signals, unless they are installed in the immediate neighbourhood of any and all test sites, there may be a limit below which the signal-to-noise ratio would be such that meaningful identification is difficult. At the same time, there are reports of nuclear devices of sub-kiloton yields which are useful either as weapons or as triggering devices for other weapons. Although the probability that computer simulation can effectively take the place of an actual nuclear explosion does not sound very convincing, it provides an opportunity to carefully review the meaning of a CTB régime.

There are also arguments that occasional testing is necessary in order to check the shelf-life of the existing arsenal, a point of view which is rejected by other experts. Although we are not in a position to press for judgement regarding all these arguments, it was with these things in mind that Japan, back in 1984, proposed a step-by-step approach to this problem. It has been very unfortunate that the Conference has spent most of its energy in this field on the matter of a mandate for an ad hoc committee, and has never had the opportunity to closely examine the substantive matters, including those we have been suggesting for some time.

Since it is difficult to believe that actual engineering and scientific logic of nuclear weapons design and testing would be different from one country to another, the inability on our part to appreciate Soviet thinking on this subject is effectively preventing us from having a better understanding of the fine structure of the problem. For the deliberations at the Conference to be meaningful, I believe a disclosure of some of the relevant details would have been much more useful than proposals for a freeze, which, in spite of any positive impressions it might create, is nevertheless a unilateral position with all the associated memories of historical problems.

If we can imagine ourselves in the process of writing a convention on a nuclear-weapons ban after the style of a CW convention, we may be able to see more clearly the place of a test ban within the comprehensive structure of nuclear disarmament. We would, of course, need to have definitions, and this would require clarification of the respective national positions regarding laboratory-scale examinations of the nuclear explosion phenomena. Then, one may have to deal with "permitted activities" or "protective purposes", which



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may be no more than a contradiction in terms. Initial declarations of weapons stocks will be followed by their verification and then elimination. One should also talk about non-production, in which the experience of the International Atomic Energy Agency on nuclear safeguards may be pertinent.

I mention these as matters we would be investigating if we were to be writing a convention to ban nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, it looks to be a rather remote possibility as a disarmament objective. Nothing, however, prohibits us from engaging in such an exercise as a means of setting up an ultimate goal as a criteria against which we may make assessment of various test ban possibilities. When Japan made a test-ban proposal, I do not think that we had any illusions about what could be meaningfully achieved in the short term. At the same time we did not feel constrained in insisting on the basic logic of the subject matter.

I would now like to touch on some other items on the Conference's agenda.

Outer space is already very much in use, such as for meteorological observation, commercial and other communications, or geological and geophysical observations as represented by activities of the Earth resources satellites. At the same time there is no question that outer space represents the most sophisticated and advanced technologies of our time. Also, the distinction between peaceful uses, military uses, and offensive and defensive systems has traditionally been one of the most challenging and conceptually complicated.

In spite of a considerable degree of complications, technical, legal and financial, we nevertheless feel that outer space has to be jointly and multilaterally administered, based upon a widely accepted legal and technical régime. Mankind's contact with outer space has been so far very limited, while the number of countries with direct access to various Earth orbits has not been large. We suspect, however, that with the expansion of such contact, extensive and complicated work will be required, and if that is the case, we should begin now, and begin with the examination of the broad framework of possible agreements as to what kind of order we would like to see in outer space from the viewpoint of effective prevention of an arms race. In this sense, although disarmament may be our primary concern, we do not need to limit ourselves to the immediate subjects such as ballistic missile defence or anti-satellite weapons. To do so hastily will confuse the issue. In my understanding, many BMDs are technically capable of ASAT functions, while most ICBMs may be BMDs.

I have had a number of opportunities in the past to discuss our CW work and have no intention of repeating myself today. I would rather like to point out the following.

Because of the difficulties which the Conference is encountering in the negotiation of other agenda items, there is a distinct interest in CW as the only available subject for negotiations. This in itself may be a welcome sign, especially with the increasing interest in various capitals. At the same time, since the major part of the work is conducted at the working group level, which meets five or six times a week, it is not easy for anyone to have a good grasp of all the technical and legal details of the current work. It

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is not inconceivable under the circumstances that both technical experts and non-experts might lose sight of the overall structural logic of the convention, obviously each into different directions. While we are all for the early realization of a CW convention, there is an additional consideration of importance. That is the fact that the convention, by necessity, will be an instrument which will place the world's chemical industry under some restrictions. Since extensive control of what is in effect a gigantic and mature industry is neither feasible nor desirable, it is important to draw a clear line at which an effective ban on chemical weapons can be carried out without undue interference in the day-to-day operation of the peaceful chemical industry. That is easier said than done, but obviously there is no alternative.

It seems to me that there are several key provisions in the convention that mark the dividing lines, and once these are identified and become parts of a shared common understanding, then ways can be found so that the respective details may be handled separately by appropriate experts in the most expeditious manner. If we were to fail to clarify these key provisions, then it is possible that the conceptual framework of the convention might be overwhelmed by the nuts and bolts aspects of the detailed provisions. Then we would indeed be wasting what seems to be a common political will to achieve this convention as soon as possible.

Finally, I would like to say a word about radiological weapons, in particular, what we commonly refer to as "track B", if only because of my past association with nuclear power stations. The reactor accident at Chernobyl was a very sad occasion. We express our deep sympathy to those who have lost their lives and to those whose sufferings do not seem to have ended yet. At the same time there are a number of technical features of that accident which are specific to Chernobyl, and it is very difficult to generalize. One feature that is a lesson of that accident is a need for organized and quick international action, including immediate information of accidents and necessary joint decisions to minimize the damage. In this regard we are glad to note that last week in Vienna, a governmental expert group successfully worked out the text of a "Convention on early notification of a nuclear accident" and a "Convention on assistance in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency" within a short period of time. At the same time, we have always been aware of the possible consequences of unmanaged and large-scale dissemination of radioactivity and such a concern did not originate with Chernobyl. It has been our national position that we should agree to prohibit military attacks on peaceful nuclear activities, but for the moment avoid the complicated task of trying to define quantitative thresholds of such facilities. We took this position when we offered the idea of an optional protocol to the Conference in 1982, and our thinking remains unchanged.

If I have over-generalized, or over-philosophized, I offer my apologies. At the same time, it is part of my conviction that in dealing with arms control and disarmament one should occasionally leave polemics and details behind and philosophize a bit as to what we really want to achieve. During my four years in this Council Chamber my seat has made a roughly 180° turn from the right-hand corner to where I am sitting today. I said at the beginning of my intervention that this is likely to be the last occasion for me to speak

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before the plenary and I took the liberty of sharing with you some of my convictions. I hope I have made sense. Thank you, Mr. President, and through you I should like to thank all my colleagues.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Japan for his statement. We have learned that Ambassador Imai is likely to be leaving us after having served his country and this Conference for four years with outstanding diplomatic competence. I do not need to recall his significant contributions to our work as they are well-known to all of us. We shall, however, miss his advice, sense of humour, his wisdom, his personal expertise and also, if I may say so, on behalf of all of you, his humanistic optimism, which is the rational nature of man, and his capability to master and regulate the course of his destiny. On behalf of the Conference, I wish Ambassador and Mrs. Imai all the best in their personal as well as their diplomatic life.

I now give the floor to the representative of Algeria, Ambassador Kerroum.

Mr. KERROUM (Algeria) (translated from French): First of all, Mr. President, I wish to congratulate you on behalf of the delegation of Algeria on your election as President of our Conference. I am convinced that your well-known competence and your outstanding experience, as well as the commitment of the Government and people of Canada to the cause of disarmament, will guarantee the success of our work as well as help to prepare for the next session. I would also like to pay tribute to your predecessor, the Ambassador of Burma, U Tin Tun, for his devoted and dedicated discharge of his task as President during the month of July.

As the 1986 session of the Conference on Disarmament draws to a close, my mandate as representative of Algeria to this Conference is also coming to an end. A year with you is certainly not long enough for me to claim to enrich the usual stock-taking at this phase of our work, but I will perhaps take advantage of the privilege that I had of being in this very spot in 1979 to share with you some thoughts that I have had, given this two-fold experience with a few years in between.

In February 1979, just after the holding of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament and of its success as shown in the form of the Final Document, as in February 1986 following the Geneva summit meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev and its international impact, it was more than reasonable to hope that there would be a decisive breakthrough towards disarmament and that we would see the Conference on Disarmament, an expression of the common destiny and joint effort of nations, effectively play its role and fully discharge its mandate as the sole multilateral negotiating body in its field. Now it must be said that the expectations of the international community have not been met. Neither the impetus provided in 1978 by an international consensus commensurate with the challenge facing mankind, nor the solemn will expressed in 1985 by the two major Powers, has enabled the Conference to make significant headway. On the contrary, judging from the turn taken during the session, from the debates on the various agenda items, it appears that in 1986 we are even further away than we were in 1979 from the Final Document that is, and must remain, our benchmark.

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True, considerable commendable effort has been made and progress has been achieved in the discussions on a chemical weapons convention. However, while it notes this positive development, the delegation of Algeria today is more inclined to express its concern at the trend which is emerging. It appears that little by little we are losing sight of the objective of a total ban on chemical weapons and that we are now envisaging a concept closer to a non-proliferation régime. If this trend was confirmed, it would mark a step backwards and one all the more negative in that it would carry within itself the seeds of the inevitable failure. Over and above the requirement of security, the signature of and compliance with an agreement of this nature are of necessity dependent on the production potential and development needs of States. I must therefore reaffirm what I said on 25 February 1986: that a chemical weapons convention "can only mean the total elimination of chemical weapons if it prohibits their development, production and stockpiling. It cannot possibly have a non-proliferation function or constitute any sort of obstacle to the chemicals industry, which is the very foundation of development, particularly in agriculture".

The greatest disappointment concerns a nuclear test ban; that is because of the symbolic importance of such a ban, which is seen as an indication of the determination to halt and then reverse the arms race. General acceptance of a moratorium and full preparedness to embark on a negotiating process continue to constitute the sole appropriate response to the expectations of the international community. The inability to set up an ad hoc committee with a negotiating mandate, and the attendant interminable discussions, can only lead to frustration.

The debate on this item, however, was certainly not futile. Backed up by the work of the Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, the debate has helped to show that, where nuclear tests are concerned -- and this applies to chemical weapons too -- verification problems are no longer insurmountable obstacles if there is political will to succeed and the necessity of an agreement is accepted.

The disappointment and frustration are the same as regards outer space. Rather than the possibility of preventing the development of the arms race in outer space while there is still time, the preference seems to be to consider no more than controlling that race.

Despite the numerous commendable efforts that have been and still are being made, this stalemate and this tendency to move backwards cannot, logically, lead to substantive results as regards either the prevention of nuclear war or a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

In politics, the art of the possible, realism is undeniably a fruitful virtue. Now, it may seem more realistic, in a world which is more and more governed by the law of relative might, to focus our energies on controlling the arms race, but that same realism should lead to the realization that sooner or later, with the constant improvement of more and more sophisticated and destructive weapons and the unceasing growth of mistrust, the arms race will inevitably become uncontrollable. That realism ultimately accepts the assertion -- unacceptable because what is at stake is the survival of

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mankind -- that war, even nuclear war, is a biological necessity. At all events, it contradicts what was said in the joint statement issued after the Reagan-Gorbachev summit to the effect that a "nuclear war cannot be won and should never be fought".

In this state of affairs, one question remains of burning concern: how to remove the so-far insurmountable obstacles on the road to disarmament? The delegation of Algeria is of the view that there is a beginning of an answer in the solemn declaration by the two major Powers of their renunciation of military superiority. It is the search for, or fear of military superiority that is at the very source of the arms race. That is true of the greatest Powers, as well as of the smallest nations. The result is a climate of suspicion, aggravated by the feeling that security is always to be perceived in military terms -- and that at ever-higher levels -- and is always precarious.

The renunciation of military superiority gives cause for hope because it implies that security is no longer a function of military parameters alone and that weapons are neither the only, nor even the best means of ensuring security. It enables the problems of disarmament to be set in their true context -- that of international relations as a whole. It encourages awareness that the business of disarmament can only be viable if dialogue replaces confrontation, co-operation, antagonism and international law power politics and, above all, if a far more just system of economic relations is established. The heightening of inequalities in levels of development, constitutes an increasing threat to international peace and security. The failure to come to grips with this problem dramatically illustrates the impasse in which we now find ourselves. It is regrettable enough that, even though it is included in the Final Document, the link between disarmament and development has never been debated within this Conference. It is even more regrettable that the international conference that was scheduled on this matter has had to be postponed. Considerations of circumstances apart, it seems that, in the final analysis, the postponement of this conference, as well as the standstill in the work of the Conference on Disarmament, are due to the same factors and particularly to the persistence in seeing all problems, whatever they may be, in a single perspective -- that of controlling the arms race.

The true nature of the link between disarmament and development implies that institution of a healthier international environment would, initially, enable all countries, particularly the poorest, to devote the bulk of their national resources to their development. That would already be an immense step forward and one, at all events, in keeping with the principle of relying first of all on oneself. In the second phase, once mistrust had diminished or perhaps even disappeared and dialogue and co-operation prevailed, restructuring of the international economic system along the lines of justice and equity would, far from causing insoluble problems, become a demand shared by all and enable development efforts to bear full fruit. One could, finally, envisage a third phase in which a disarmament for development fund could be established, not so much as a decisive means of bringing about development, but more as a means of giving concrete form to a basic principle, that of international solidarity.

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(Mr. Kerroum, Algeria)

Disarmament is too noble a cause, too vital to mankind's future, for us to give in to despair. My presence for a year alongside representatives who are so devoted to this cause has strengthened me in this belief. In February 1987 I shall no longer be here with you. I should like to take the opportunity today to express my thanks and gratitude for the full co-operation and willingness to assist shown to me by all representatives, by the Secretary-General of the Conference and by the secretariat. I am fully aware that, without their co-operation, sometimes even their indulgence, my task would have been an impossible one.

One always has mixed feelings when leaving. Feelings of regret, consolation and gratification. The regret comes when I think that I shall no longer be participating in your work and that I shall have no chance to build on the relations that I have had the privilege of establishing with other representatives to this Conference.

I am consoled, however, when I think that in any event I would not have had the pleasure of seeing certain representatives again as they, too, are about to leave. I have in mind the representative of France, Ambassador Jessel, whose competence and experience one cannot but admire, and the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Wegener, whose contribution to the work of this Conference is unanimously recognized and who has constantly been willing to engage in discussions that I have always found enriching. I am thinking, finally, of the representative of India, Ambassador Gonsalves, a man remarkable for his keen sense of political reality and one who has brilliantly expressed and defended his country's position and ardently advocated the principles of the non-aligned.

I am also consoled, and proud, when I think that I shall have the honour of representing my country, as of 1 September 1986, in Yugoslavia. Everyone is aware of the exceptional ties between Yugoslavia and Algeria and of the friendship between the peoples of those two countries. These ties and this friendship stem from the similar sacrifices made to obtain our freedom and they have been strengthened over the years by the common struggle in the cause of non-alignment. They are expressed in co-operation, in the context of our exemplary self-help relations. Furthermore, I shall, sooner or later, have the great pleasure of seeing Ambassador Vidas again and so of continuing the friendship we formed here. I shall also have the equal pleasure of seeing Ambassador Komatina again regularly, if only during the brief holidays that he will have from his demanding post and that is one privileged link with the Conference that I shall be keeping.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Algeria for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President, and for the touching words with which he concluded his statement.

We will all miss Ambassador Kerroum, whose extensive experience and diplomatic ability, coupled with his constructive and positive and co-operative approach, have been invaluable to the work of the Conference. Albeit for too short a period, I am sure we would all feel that. His thoughtful presentation, including his statement today, belie the modest but obviously sincere opening comments he made. He has represented his country with great distinction in this Conference and I feel sure that he will be

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successful in the new and important post which has been entrusted to him. I extend to Ambassador and Mrs. Kerroum on behalf of all of us our best wishes.

I now give the floor to the representative of Poland, Ambassador Turbanski.

Mr. TURBANSKI (Poland): Mr. President, before I come to the main subject of my statement today, which will be chemical weapons, I would like to welcome wholeheartedly the recent extremely important decision taken by the Soviet Union with respect to the extension until the end of this year of its unilateral moratorium on all nuclear tests, which was so fully presented by the representative of the Soviet Union, Comrade Kashirin.

This courageous step of the Soviet Union is renewed proof of its determination to stop the nuclear-arms race, and a further contribution to the United Nations International Year of Peace, so frequently referred to in this hall.

In announcing this decision General Secretary Gorbachev said:

"Being an act, and not only a proposal, the Soviet Union's moratorium on nuclear blasts proves in action the seriousness and sincerity of our nuclear disarmament programme, of our calls for a new policy -- that of realism, peace and co-operation."

Such a new policy of realism, peace and co-operation is also expected by the peoples of the world from the United States. Regrettably, this is not the case so far.

As I have indicated, today I should like to make several comments and observations on some aspects of item 4 of the agenda, i.e. chemical weapons. Poland attaches great importance to negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. My delegation does its best to contribute to the Conference's work in this field, including as item co-ordinator for the group of socialist countries.

The Conference on Disarmament is getting closer to its goal of elaborating a draft treaty on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Over the years a lot of work has been done, but the convention as a whole has not yet been born. Let us believe the delivery will be prompt and successful. I think there is a sound basis for this belief.

This being my fourth consecutive year of involvement in CW negotiations, I feel that we are entering a new stage, hopefully the final one.

It seems to us that the overall atmosphere of the negotiations has improved, positions of the delegations, although tough, are business-like and in general co-operative and compromise-oriented.

The negotiations are being carried on multifariously -- in the Ad hoc Committee, in the Working Groups, and at various multilateral and bilateral consultations. A valuable contribution to the Committee's work was the

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bilateral Soviet-American consultations -- which we wholeheartedly welcome. It was broadly felt that their results were simultaneously incorporated into the work of the relevant Working Groups.

During this year's negotiations, new incentives were given to the Conference and many interesting, valuable ideas and proposals were put forward.

The proposal made by the General Secretary of the CPSU, Mikhail Gorbachev on 15 January 1986 to get rid, before the end of this century, of weapons of mass destruction, one of them being chemical weapons, paved the way for more fruitful and faster work in the Ad hoc Committee. The ideas stemming from this proposal were later developed and specified at the Conference. I have in mind the Soviet Union's proposals of 22 April 1986. They opened new possibilities for the solution of the crucial problem of elimination of the industrial basis for production of chemical weapons, thereby enabling faster work and progress in Group B.

My delegation considers as well that the Workshop held in the Netherlands in June this year also served its purpose. It brought out a better understanding of problems concerning verification of chemical industry with regard to the area of non-production, making it also more clear that actual possibilities of such verification are not unlimited, that they are bound to have certain limitations which need further study. At the same time it seems that this practical exercise indicated the important role which verification at the national level could and should play in this respect. Allow me, Mr. President, through you to thank the authorities and the delegation of the Netherlands for this useful initiative, hospitality, and excellent organization of the Workshop.

Many other interesting, thought-provoking working and conference room papers were put forward in the Committee, in the plenary and in the Working Groups, especially with regard to various aspects of verification of the future convention.

But the intensity of work on CW prohibition, impressive as it is, has not so far brought results which are equally impressive. I have to admit, however, there is always a certain degree of intermediary results which are still not mature enough to appear in a written, agreed form. What seems to be also important is that there is more creative thinking in seeking new, mutually acceptable approaches. Sometimes it is better to start from a general definition before getting into details, but in other cases it might be more productive to start from details before coming to more general notions.

That is why an attempt to assess or to measure progress made during this year's session would not only be a very difficult task but the result of such an assessment would most probably be rather inaccurate.

I think, however, that today, at the end of the 1986 session, everybody would probably agree that the achieved results, though not up to some expectations, are certainly not disappointing. We have moved forward in the elaboration of the CW convention. The body of the preliminary structure of the convention is getting thicker and more concrete, though I believe we should be careful not to overload it with too many details.



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The question of non-production is one of the basic issues of the future convention, the one which from the very beginning would have direct bearing on chemical industry of all States parties to the future convention, though, due to various structures and level of development of chemical industry, this bearing may differ.

If we have a look at the issues considered in Group A, it becomes clear that the existing material worked out by the Group consolidated and developed last year's work, especially the so-called Integrated Approach for Listing Relevant Chemicals. A more clear picture of the problems we face in this area was created. It is obvious, however, that article VI, that is Activities not prohibited by the Convention, and relevant annexes, especially Annex I relative to Super-Toxic Lethal Chemicals and [especially dangerous key precursors] [key components of chemical weapons systems], still need a lot of work before they could reach a stage of mutual agreement and actual drafting. Some further consideration of this question is needed in the capitals. With regard to my delegation this will be done during the recess in the Committee's work. I do believe that consultations to be undertaken by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee in the intersessional period would be a very useful forum to further elaborate on these issues before they are formally put again for consideration by the Committee.

It is especially in this area of non-production that all delegations should bring the most active contribution to working out final solutions. Only by a common effort would we be able to agree on uniform procedures of transmitting statistical data and procedures of systematic international on-site inspections. We all know and agree that this system of control should not be detrimental to the normal activity of chemical industry, but we seem to understand it in different ways. Statements of some delegations in the Ad hoc Committee suggest their reluctance to submit the relevant chemical industry to adequate control.

If one takes a closer look at issues under consideration in Group A, it seems that at this stage of negotiations particular attention should be paid to the following questions:

Scope of data on production, distribution and use of relevant chemicals to be submitted to the Consultative Committee. In our view, it would be the simplest, the most basic and the cheapest form of verification of non-production of chemical weapons.

We are of the opinion that an important and urgent task should be to reach agreement on the list of key precursors in Annex II to Article VI. The problem is difficult as there seem to exist rather opposed approaches either to broaden or to narrow this list. Like always, a mutually satisfactory solution has to be found.

There is a need to work out an appropriate régime for key precursors. It is yet not entirely clear -- at least for my delegation -- whether such a régime should be uniform with regard to all chemicals in the list, or should be diversified. A preliminary scheme of this régime would make it easier to finally agree on the whole list. It would also be helpful to determine a militarily significant level for every key precursor.

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A still deeper analysis is needed with regard to the issue of super-toxic lethal chemicals (STLC), which at present are not used in CW production, but their future use for that purpose cannot be totally excluded today. As is known, some STLCs are being produced by the pharmaceutical industry, others in small quantities in research laboratories. I think that a clearer picture of this question is needed in order to solve comprehensively the STLC issue in the convention.

More attention should also be paid to multinational corporations, as they create some additional specific questions in the context of the verification of non-production of CW.

There has been a promising development of Group B in a very difficult and sensitive area of elimination both of chemical weapons and of the CW production facilities.

I think everybody would agree that further rapprochement of positions was achieved with regard to the content of relevant declarations as well as to the process of elimination and its control. It has to be noticed that formulations of Articles IV - Measures on Chemical Weapons and V - Measures on Chemical Weapons Production Facilities, together with relevant annexes, though still in some instances heavily bracketed and footnoted, show a clearer picture of this difficult part of the convention than was the case last year.

The results achieved in Group B, especially with regard to production facilities, would be very helpful in working out a still outstanding definition of production facility.

What seems to be more and more perceptible is a comprehensive blue-print of indispensable provisions concerning the whole process from declarations up to final elimination of CW stocks and CW production facilities. That is why we see in the present text of these articles obvious signs of progress. No doubt we have gained momentum in our work on these issues, and this momentum should not be lost.

One of the crucial outstanding issues is still the question of challenge inspection. There has been some conceptual rapprochement of positions which, however, does not suffice at present for working out a mutually acceptable solution. I think I would commit no mistake by saying that there seems to be general agreement that challenge inspection should not occur in everyday practice but rather in exceptional circumstances. There is, however, not enough clarity as to what is really meant by these exceptional circumstances. The need to resort to challenge inspection would depend very much on the efficiency of the whole system of verification including systematic on-site inspection. The better the routine verification system, the lesser, to our mind, the probability that challenge inspection would be needed. In short, we think that having a clear and precise picture of the whole system of so-called routine verification would help in final construction of the concept of challenge inspection.

Let me also, Mr. President, dwell briefly on some organizational aspects of our future work. The methods of work should always be in keeping with the stage of progress achieved. What is proper for today may not necessarily be

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most useful tomorrow. I do not have any concrete ideas to offer at this juncture, but I merely would like to suggest that we should think over how to best organize our future work, which we would like to hope will be the final stage of the elaboration of the preliminary draft of the CW convention.

On the one hand there is an increasing need of a comprehensive review of the whole material with a view to make not only further preliminary drafting but also some rearrangement of the material if necessary.

On the other hand, there are still many detailed, sometimes minor, though important, problems which could be initially elaborated in smaller groups before being the subject of working groups or Committee's consideration.

One of the assets still not fully utilized by us is time. My delegation is of the opinion that there should be no place in our work for too long recesses. That is why we welcome the agreement achieved in the Committee to hold the traditional extended session in January as well as consultations by the Chairman in preparation for this resumed session. However, I would like to point out that the delegations of the socialist countries were prepared to use the recess in our work more fully. Unfortunately, this desire was not shared by some delegations which so often advocate the need for continuous negotiations on the convention.

In concluding I would like to congratulate and thank the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Ian Cromartie of the United Kingdom, for his able guidance of the Committee's work. His chairmanship will continue for some time and I am confident it will be no less productive. Let me also express high appreciation of the contribution made by Ambassador Cromartie's collaborators -- the Chairmen of the three Working Groups, Mr. Rowe, Mr. Popczew and Mr. Wisnomoerti, whose efforts have brought us closer to our common goal -- a treaty on prohibition of chemical weapons.

Before I finish, may I welcome back in our midst my distinguished neighbour at the Conference table, Ambassador Morelli Pando of Peru. I look forward to renewing our co-operation. May I also thank for good co-operation and wish all the best in their future assignments our colleagues who will be leaving Geneva soon, Ambassador Wegener of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Kerroum of Algeria, Ambassador Jessel of France, and Ambassador Imai, who indicated to us today that he is also preparing to leave. I am sure that their contributions to the work of this Conference will be long remembered.

Mr. FAN Guoxiang (People's Republic of China): Mr. President, as the 1986 session of the Conference on Disarmament is approaching its end, the Chinese delegation wishes to make some observations on the work of the current session and on the outlook for next year.

The current session has been held against the background of certain relaxation in the tense international situation. When the session began, many delegations entertained hopes for progress at the session. Thanks to the joint efforts of all delegations, the session has made some progress over the past six months or so, yet its outcome falls far short of expectations.

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This session, like previous ones, has again failed to set up ad hoc committees on the priority items pertaining to the nuclear issue. For years, people throughout the world have been ardently hoping that the Conference could carry out substantive negotiations on these items and produce practical and effective results. It is therefore disappointing that year after year the Conference has remained in a state of inertia. This year, however, differs from the previous ones in that, under the guidance of Ambassador Sousa de Silva of Brazil, President of the Conference for the month of April, a series of informal meetings were held on item 2, "Cessation of nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament", and substantive discussions were held on such issues as the stages and measures of nuclear disarmament. The Chinese delegation took an active part in the discussions. In our view, given the serious divergence of views between various sides on this issue, such informal exchanging of views is conducive to enhancing the understanding of each other's positions, reducing differences and identifying greater common grounds. However, since informal discussions are only an interim arrangement pending the establishment of an ad hoc committee, they cannot supplant substantive negotiations. We share the view of many delegations that the Conference, as the sole multilateral negotiating forum, should play its due role in nuclear disarmament -- an issue of common concern to all countries -- rather than wait idly for the outcome of the negotiations by the two major military Powers. Multilateral and bilateral negotiations, far from being mutually exclusive, are mutually complementary and promotive. We hope that next year the Conference will reach agreement as early as possible on the establishment of ad hoc committees on such issues as a nuclear test ban, nuclear disarmament and prevention of nuclear war.

Here I would also like to mention the adoption of the Report on the Group of Seismic Experts' Technical Test (GSETT), 1984 and its proposals on future data exchange. We are pleased with this positive result.

Though the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space was relatively late this year, it is a positive result of the current session. Under the able guidance of Ambassador Bayart of Mongolia, this Ad Hoc Committee has engaged in extensive and in-depth discussions on issues relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Delegations have further examined the existing international legal instruments on outer space, held preliminary discussions on the definition of space weapons and put forth various proposals and programmes on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

It is clear from these deliberations that the existing international legal instruments, notwithstanding certain positive significance, all have their limitations and are thus inadequate for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It is therefore necessary to conclude new international legal instruments. More and more delegations agree that at the present stage the Conference should proceed to negotiations with the emphasis on prohibiting all space weapons. Many delegations proposed to start with the prohibition of ASAT weapons. Such a proposal, in our view, merits consideration. In so much as the importance and urgency of the prevention of an arms race in outer space have already been widely recognized, we are of the view that at the beginning of the next session the Conference should re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space at an earlier date, so as to enable it to address substantive issues as soon as possible.

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The elaboration of the Comprehensive Programme for Disarmament reflects the urgent desire of the people throughout the world for curbing the arms race and promoting disarmament. This year, under the experienced guidance of Ambassador García Robles, the Ad Hoc Committee on CPD has carried out intensive and detailed work and managed to overcome numerous difficulties. The six contact groups have made progress to varying degrees, as evidenced by the closer positions of various sides. However, we cannot fail to note that this is still a far cry from the elaboration of a programme acceptable to all parties.

The Chinese delegation has always attached importance to the elaboration of the CPD. We have participated in the discussions and consultations with a constructive approach and made some necessary concessions to facilitate progress in our work. At present, views still differ on the division of stages and time-frames, relating to the introduction and the part on the machinery and procedures of the CPD. In our view, CPD should naturally contain stages and an indicative time-frame for each stage, so as to promote the implementation of disarmament measures. We hope that agreement can soon be reached on this subject.

The prohibition of chemical weapons has all along been an item of greater promise for progress in the Conference. Trends more positive than before have emerged in the negotiations on the Convention this year. The positive and business-like discussions and consultations among delegations have brought about progress on certain issues. For instance, on List C intended for chemicals with wide civilian uses which can at the same time be used for chemical weapon purposes, there is basically a consensus on most of the chemicals to be included in the list and their régime. Preliminary discussions have been held on the contents of List A containing chemicals for key precursors of chemical warfare agents which can at the same time be used for peaceful purposes, and a considerable degree of agreement has been reached on the scope and extent of the data-reporting system. A common understanding has largely been achieved on the need for taking action without warning or unpredictability in routine inspections of the relevant production facilities. There has also been some progress on the issue of the destruction of chemical weapons and their production facilities. Useful attempts have been made to narrow the differences on challenge inspection, which has long been a subject of deep controversy. In this connection, the working papers put forward by Pakistan, the United Kingdom and Japan merit our attention.

These achievements are inseparable from the efforts of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Cromartie, and the Chairmen of the three working groups, whose devotion and diligence have contributed to the progress in negotiations. Here I wish to mention the useful role of the workshop on verification sponsored in early June by the Netherlands Government in promoting the negotiations in this field.

While giving due credit to these achievements, we should not overlook the fact that a large amount of work still needs to be done in negotiating a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, in view of the differences on verification, particularly challenge inspection, and on certain other issues that are yet to be solved. We welcome the willingness expressed by the

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two States with the largest chemical arsenals to expedite the negotiations on chemical weapons and hope that they will substantiate their intention with action.

For many years, the non-nuclear-weapon States have been making ceaseless efforts against the nuclear threat and for security guarantees. China has all along held that the most effective security guarantee to non-nuclear-weapon States is the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. In order to reduce the nuclear threat to non-nuclear-weapon States, all nuclear-weapon States should, pending nuclear disarmament, undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-free zones. China has declared on many occasions that it unconditionally assumes this obligation. We are also in favour of concluding an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. However, it is regrettable that our Conference has been stagnant on the issue of security assurances. We will continue to support all efforts conducive to the breaking of the present impasse.

On the issue of expansion of the membership of the Conference, the successive Presidents of the current session have all engaged in most responsible and patient consultations with various parties. Since the number of applying States is more than double the number that can be admitted, difficulties of selection have naturally arisen. We hope that a solution acceptable to all will be found so that those peace-loving countries that have actually contributed to the cause of disarmament can be soon admitted. For this purpose, we have proposed seeking a partial solution when a comprehensive one is unfeasible all at once and settling the remainder of the problem when conditions are ripe. The Chinese delegation will continue to consult with other delegations in order to facilitate the solution of this issue.

Not long ago, the leaders of Mexico, Argentina, Greece, Sweden, India and Tanzania held an important meeting and issued the Mexico Declaration, calling upon the United States and the Soviet Union to immediately stop nuclear testing and urging the leaders of the two countries to continue the negotiations on such issues as the reduction of nuclear armaments. The Declaration also voiced opposition to the development of ASAT weapons by the two super-Powers and to their arms race in outer space. This is a just demand for peace and disarmament.

Cessation of the arms race and the maintenance of world peace are the common aspiration and strong demand of the people throughout the world and of all peace-advocating countries. The super-Powers pursuit of military preponderance through various means and their intense confrontation have created turbulence in the international situation and aroused worldwide discontent and opposition. To settle differences and disputes through dialogue has become the trend of the contemporary world, it is welcomed by and enjoys the attention of the international community. We sincerely hope that, at such an important juncture, the Conference on Disarmament will score real achievements, instead of going through the motions.

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His Excellency Dr. Henning Wegener, Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany, His Excellency Ambassador Alfred Sylvester Gonsalves of India, His Excellency Ambassador Nouridine Kerroum of Algeria, and His Excellency Ambassador Jacques Jessel of France will leave the Conference soon. Just now we heard that Ambassador Imai of Japan will also leave us soon. Though the duration of their involvement in the Conference varies, their experience, knowledge and valuable contributions have won praise from us all. Please allow me to wish them further and greater successes in the future.

Mr. President, in conclusion, I would like to wish you success in discharging your heavy duties at the last stage of this session. The talent and devotion you have displayed in performing your functions are highly appreciated by all of us. I would also like to thank the President for the previous month, Ambassador U Tin Tun of Burma, for the enormous effort he made. I wish also to avail myself of this opportunity to thank Ambassador Komatina, Ambassador Berasategui and the staff of the Secretariat for their industrious efforts and their assistance to the Chinese delegation.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of China for his statement and for the kind comments addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the representative of Australia.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): I did not intend to make this statement. But I am bound to do so because, at our last meeting, a question was put to my delegation. For wider reasons too, I am obliged to exercise the right of replying to the statement made, last Tuesday, by the Ambassador of the German Democratic Republic.

Mr. President, in the Australian Parliament -- the Australian political system is one of parliamentary democracy -- there is an established convention under which any Member of Parliament may seek the attention of the presiding officer and request that he be permitted to make a personal explanation. The form is that the presiding officer then enquires of that member whether or not he claims to have been misrepresented. If the Member then claims to have been misrepresented, he is, automatically, granted leave to make his explanation.

This is not quite the procedure followed in this Conference and on this occasion I want to make it clear that my delegation certainly does claim to have been at least misrepresented in the statement made by the Ambassador of the German Democratic Republic.

But I want to make it equally clear that what I will say now is by no means an explanation. I make this latter point because, as any rational person knows, it is axiomatic that an explanation is what is not required in the face of misrepresentation. What is required is a correction.

In his statement, the Ambassador of the German Democratic Republic claimed that "it is difficult for some delegations, however, to explain why they do not support a negotiating mandate which would open a direct road to the conclusion of such a treaty" -- that is, a comprehensive test-ban treaty. My delegation has no such difficulty. We have stated repeatedly that our policy and purpose is to take the "direct road" to the conclusion of a nuclear-test ban treaty. This is precisely why we have supported and continue to support the mandate proposed in CD/521. 740

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If that direct road has been severed, if it has had a massive road block built across it, it has been so impeded by those such as the Ambassador of the German Democratic Republic and the group of States for which he has sometimes spoken who have insisted that nothing can take place, that no passage down that "direct road" can occur unless we first genuflect to the mere word "negotiation". This blockage is confirmed only a few sentences later in the most recent statement by the Ambassador of the German Democratic Republic, when he speaks of the need for us to start "meaningful" work.

What would be "meaningful" work other than work on the scope of the means of verification and compliance with a nuclear test ban treaty? This is precisely the meaningful work, specifically defined and called for in the draft mandate provided in document CD/521.

While the Ambassador of the German Democratic Republic has avoided addressing this question when he refers to "meaningful" work, he has not resisted the temptation of throwing up the other, now extraordinarily tired and battered roadblock which is to question the need for collective work on the means of verification of a test-ban treaty. Indeed, he has chosen to distort what my delegation and other Western delegations have said about verification when he has claimed that we want to concentrate "predominantly" on the issue of verification.

Mr. President, if this seems confused, then we should be patient, because there is more.

The Ambassador claimed that the German Democratic Republic "supports effective and reliable verification and compliance with a test ban", yet he charges us with some deception or with some transgression when we say that we want the same. But he is generous. He offers a solution and that is that "the verification issue can, in the final analysis, only be resolved in connection with the drafting of a treaty".

May I pose another question, that is, why? Why does he assert that these two related but quite different activities must be inherently, fundamentally, connected? The drafting of a treaty is something that we all know could be done, perhaps not in the twinkle of an eye, but in only a little longer time than that. The treaty itself would be an amazingly simple document. After all, it would presumably contain one and only one obligation, that is, never to conduct nuclear tests. The hard part is to settle the scope of such a treaty and to build the means of verification and compliance with the simple undertaking that would be stated in that treaty.

So, by making the difficult part completely dependent upon the totally simple part, the Ambassador of the German Democratic Republic would single-handedly prevent the beginning of work on solving the only serious problems which need to be solved if there is to be an end to nuclear testing. And he asks us to believe that this policy is pursued because of the sanctity of an entirely notional concept called negotiation. And worse, he says that those who question the logic and sincerity of his position should stand accused of some kind of perfidy.



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My delegation has proposed that the Conference establish, without delay, a global seismological network. Australia has done this because it knows that such a network will be required as part of the means of verifying compliance with a nuclear test-ban treaty. We have made this proposal now because we know that, if a treaty were written down on a piece of paper in the way that the German Democratic Republic seems to prefer, it would be nothing more than a piece of paper, unless and until the obligations it established were able to be verified. We have also made this proposal partly because the work of the Group of Scientific Experts has progressed to the point, and will progress further, where it is practical and feasible for such a global network to be established. Yet the Ambassador of the German Democratic Republic has said this proposal is not acceptable.

I pose another question: Why is it not acceptable, especially given that he says his Government and those other Governments for whom he is occasionally charged to speak, want to see the means of verification of a treaty established? Why, then, is this proposal not acceptable to his Government? What reason does he give?

The best answer he has been able to supply so far is an answer in the form of a question to my delegation to the effect: will we be prepared to consider a "slight modification" to our proposal so that it proposes the establishment forthwith of a global seismological monitoring network "in the framework of a USSR-United States moratorium on nuclear testing"?

So, all is now revealed: The delegation which claims an interest in any means of verification is not, in fact, interested in the establishment of such means. Apparently its only interest is to use the proposal for such a network as a bargaining chip, as leverage, towards the establishment of a bilateral nuclear testing moratorium.

By this action, he makes the establishment of a vital means of verification, a means that would be fundamental to any serious global non-nuclear testing régime, hostage to a different and separate political consideration. Surely this calls into serious question the sincerity of his Government's position and that of any others for whom he claims to speak, on the fundamental issue of verification as such. Specifically, nowhere does he say that a global seismological system isn't needed, can't be built, or wouldn't work. He prefers instead a bilateral moratorium. I guess this would sit well with his proposed chemical-weapons-free zone in central Europe. I might be forgiven for commenting that such Eurocentricity is matched only by this gross insensitivity to our 40-nation Conference. Quite simply, what about the other nuclear-weapon States? What about those of us who don't live in Europe? What about French nuclear testing in the Pacific? Most of us in this room want a universal comprehensive test ban, not a bilateral moratorium. It was interesting that just half an hour ago in this room, the representative of the Soviet Union confirmed that a bilateral moratorium is "not an end in itself but an important first step towards a treaty". The Soviet Union would thus seem to be clearer about our real objective than it has appeared to be in the past and we will certainly study carefully the paper tabled today. Perhaps the delegation of the German Democratic Republic may now wish, in the light of that announcement, to reconsider the question it put to us last Tuesday.

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(Mr. Butler, Australia)

Anyone who is serious about bringing about an end to nuclear testing via a treaty with that purpose and effect will begin by recognizing that it is easy to write down the treaty obligation on a piece of paper. The hard part is to produce the means of verification which will make that treaty effective. Thus we should begin by solving the practical problems of verification. To refuse to do this is to refuse to walk down what the German Democratic Republic has called the "direct road".

I recall that at about this time last year I made a statement in this Conference on the same issue. Interestingly, it was, if I recall correctly, at least partly in response to a statement made by the representative of the German Democratic Republic. In that statement I said that, while the first victim of misrepresentation was truth itself, the real cost was progress towards a test ban treaty. It appears that, at least because of the actions from one side of this house, the victim has remained the same in 1986 and we have been obliged to continue to pay the same price. I hope this will stop soon.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Australia for his statement. I might clarify one point on which I do not think that there is any difference of views. The opening comments of the Australian delegation suggest that the practice of entitlement to a right of reply is not the usual procedure in the Conference. What ever views may be on that, it is my understanding that a delegation is entitled to request a right of reply and I wanted to confirm that I am not aware of any such request having been made earlier and denied. I think it may be just a case of interpretation of the opening comments.

I now call on the representative of France, Ambassador Jessel, who I think is not making his valedictory statement, but his penultimate statement.

Mr. JESSEL (France) (translated from French): As you just said, Mr. President, this is indeed not my valedictory statement, but as I am taking the floor for the first time since you have assumed the Presidency, allow me to extend to you my heartiest congratulations. I should like to congratulate you as the representative of a country which my country has particular reasons to cherish because, as you said correctly, Canada has the privilege of having two mother countries, one of which is France, and that explains the warmth and the permanence of our ties.

I should also like to congratulate you personally. I think we can rightly be glad that you have the formidable honour of presiding over our destinies during this difficult month of August, for by the many qualities which you have, your calm, your prudence, your persuasiveness, you have already begun to show us the way towards a reasonable and satisfactory conclusion of our work during this session. But to get there will still require from you, and from all of us, a great deal of effort.

I would also like to thank Ambassador U Tin Tun of Burma, who preceded you as President and who, in guiding our work during the month of July, showed enormous patience and good will.

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(Mr. Jessel, France)

I would also like to tell those of our colleagues who have left or will soon leave us how grateful I am for the bonds of esteem and friendship we were able to establish and I would like to express my warmest wishes to them in their future assignments, to Ambassador Gonsalves of India, and to Ambassador Imai of Japan, who will soon be leaving us. I would also like to extend the same wishes to Ambassador Kerroum of Algeria, our neighbour in the Mediterranean with whom we have so many things in common. I would, further, like to tell all of them that I hope we will meet again in the pursuit of our nomadic careers. I would also like to express warm wishes to Ambassador Wegener of the Federal Republic of Germany and to his successor, Ambassador von Stülpnagel. With the first I have established, and with the second I am beginning to establish, relations akin to the close and exemplary contacts of co-operation and friendship that have developed between our two countries, not only to their mutual benefit but also, I think, to the advantage of the international community as a whole because the world community can only welcome the reconciliation between France and Germany which has played, and I think will continue to play, a considerable role. As you know, Mr. President, I shall also be joining the ranks of those who are leaving, but a little later, at the end of September.

I hope to have another opportunity to take stock of the results and prospects of our present session and I would like to devote my statement today to our negotiations on chemical weapons. I should like to say at the outset that I do not share the opinion of those who consider that these negotiations are only a secondary matter. On the contrary, this is a problem and these are negotiations to which we attach great importance and it is our impression that many people around this table share that attitude. In addition, our role as a depositary of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 induces us to give this problem particular attention and vigilance. For this reason we continue to denounce all violations of that Protocol wherever they occur and by whomever they are perpetrated. For this reason we are anxious to help with everything that can further progress in the current negotiations.

For this reason too, we are happy to note that the Ad Hoc Committee and its working groups have done a serious job, in a constructive spirit, as the report adopted yesterday by the Committee shows. The Workshop on verification organized by the Netherlands in June gave a first-hand view of the complexity of the problems which confront us and contributed to the serious atmosphere and realism of our work this summer. For that reason, I am happy to join those who have already expressed their deep gratitude to the Netherlands authorities for having organized that very useful meeting and organized it so well.

We welcome the decision taken, as last year, to continue consultations between sessions in order to make progress on the matters remaining pending. France had been making similar proposals for a long time; it even hoped that more would be done, but the agreement now reached is satisfactory.

It is true, after all, that a whole series of problems still require considerable work for the various viewpoints to be brought closer together. That is why, in particular, agreement has not yet been possible on the question which is at the heart of our negotiations, that of verification of compliance with the Convention. Within our Conference, and outside it too,

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(Mr. Jessel, France)

everyone has noted the new things being said on this matter by the Soviet Union. However, the clarifications we have been given, including those given within the framework of the Conference, do not seem to us to have provided so far the truly decisive elements that we expected. We must therefore patiently continue the search for a satisfactory solution to this key problem.

Here in April I presented France's view of the general structure of a verification system based, in almost all cases, on international on-site inspections -- "routine" inspections -- and on the regular exchange of statistical data. Unfortunately, this has been a further year with no in-depth discussion of those matters.

To be complete, the system we have to set up must also provide for the exceptional cases where, doubt having arisen regarding the compliance with its obligations by a State party to the Convention, the regular "routine" inspection measures cannot be enough to dissipate it. In that case it becomes necessary to be able to resort to other measures, to other machinery. To be effective, such a "safety net" must, in our view, meet several criteria: first, the time interval between the request for an on-site inspection and the implementation of that request should be extremely brief so that there is no time to get rid of the evidence of a possible violation; for this reason, the procedure must be automatic, that is a State which wants to initiate an inspection should not have to go through an institutional obstacle course which, aside from wasting time, would also have the disadvantage of making it possible to block a request; finally, replying to a challenge should as a general rule be mandatory and not simply voluntary. Only if it meets these three criteria can an international on-site challenge-inspection régime serve as a genuine deterrent.

The United Kingdom delegation has submitted to the Conference, in working document CD/715, a draft which meets these criteria. It is based on two fundamental elements which seem to us both to guarantee the effectiveness of the system proposed and to respect the legitimate security requirements of each State.

To explain: on the one hand, the United Kingdom proposal calls for a public procedure of which the bodies of the Convention would be kept fully informed from beginning to end but the implementation of which would be the responsibility of the two States concerned, the State which requests the inspection and the State to which the request is addressed. The initiation of the procedure as well as the consequences to be drawn therefrom are up to them. Thus, whether the replies given by the "challenged" State are satisfactory or not can, all things considered, only be decided by the party whose suspicions have been aroused.

The second characteristic of this proposal is to provide that in very exceptional cases, where the security of a State is at stake, satisfaction could be given by measures other than unrestricted access to the installation with regard to which there are doubts. But those measures would have to be such as to enable the challenging State to come to the conviction that prohibited activities were not taking place at the installation in question. A State which requests an inspection being by definition the only judge of when

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(Mr. Jessel, France)

it considers itself reassured regarding the activities being carried out at the installation, this procedure seems to us to meet the requirements that I have just stated. In addition, it would have a deterrent effect because no State concerned with its international reputation would be likely to take the risk of undertaking manufacture in violation of the Convention when it had, in advance, accepted as a general rule that an international inspection team could go to factories that came under suspicion.

The situation is different for the proposals that have been put forward elsewhere. Those which would only allow inspection at sites defined in advance would have the effect of defining, a contiaro, the places where it would be permissible to circumvent the provisions of the Convention. Others, which would leave open the possibility of purely and simply refusing a request for access, would simply aggravate the crisis of confidence which has led to the call for challenge inspection; yet others, which would permit parties to hide behind delaying procedures within a committee that would in all likelihood be unable, because of the absence of agreement among its members, to make the necessary decisions, would ultimately lead to a result just as negative as the rest.

For all these reasons, and after very careful study of the problem, the French delegation gives its full support to the United Kingdom proposal. It earnestly hopes that that proposal will win the support of all sides and thus contribute to solving one of the key problems of these negotiations.

On this occasion I should also like to compliment the Ambassador of the United Kingdom, Mr. Cromartie, on his efforts as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee and to thank him for the results that have been achieved due largely to his skilful tenacity, as well as to the work done by the chairmen of the various working groups. We are happy to see that he will, as usual, be continuing his work at the head of the Committee until next February, and we earnestly hope to see that he will be able to make further progress during that period. He will find that all the easier if we all help him in the firm determination to move ahead and to achieve results.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of France. In asking whether any other delegation would like to take the floor, and I see the German Democratic Republic has asked me to do so, I would inform you that I am proposing to leave the decision required of us on the Ad Hoc Seismic Group report until 3 p.m. this afternoon, because we are running into the problem of going past 1 p.m. So what I would propose for this afternoon is that we have a very brief plenary meeting to take that decision and immediately go into informal plenary to resume work on our report. I would leave it to the representative of the German Democratic Republic, and now I have also Czechoslovakia, to decide whether they wish to speak now or whether they will speak at 3 p.m.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): Please give me a few minutes, I will be very brief. If you would permit, I should like to make a short statement.

The PRESIDENT: I have already said that every delegation has the right of reply and I would let the delegations in question pick the timing of it. I

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(The President)

intended also, however, to allow you the necessary time, which you would then have at your disposal better, at 3 p.m., but go ahead now.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): I listened with indignation to the statement just made by the distinguished representative of Australia, Ambassador Butler. My first impression is that the length of his statement is a clear indication of the difficulties he had in giving a clear answer to a very simple question which I put to him last Tuesday, concerning the proposal submitted in document CD/717. The style of statement is another proof that some delegations have difficulties in entering into a business-like and substantive discussion and exchange of opinions, as soon as their position is questioned. I have to examine whether the rest of the statement is worth responding to but, in any case, I have immediately to reject the unbelievable accusations against my delegation and my Government. I have also to reject the unbelievable distortions regarding our position in general and the position I outlined in my statement last Tuesday. Misleading is not enough, it was distorting.

Ambassador Butler should know that we are not political chameleons, and our position as far as a nuclear test ban has been and will be that we are only in favour of a reliable or reliably verifiable test ban and that is what I explained last Tuesday. As far as the proposal in CD/717 is concerned, I would recommend to Ambassador Butler to put it to a decision so that we can see who is in favour and who is against.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the German Democratic Republic. I do not wish either to prevail unduly upon the representative of Czechoslovakia but, if he is willing to wait, then we could perhaps resume our meeting at 3 p.m.

I now have also requests from the representatives of Australia and Mexico.

I would make a plea to all of you to agree to make your statements at 3 p.m. this afternoon; I would even say 3.15 p.m., against all principles, since we are running over a little bit. Do I have the agreement of all of you? The representative of Czechoslovakia has the floor.

Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): I will be extremely brief. I just wanted to say now something it will not be possible to say in the afternoon.

We have always listened with interest to Ambassador Butler's statements and I think that his eloquence and his oratory have brought juice into our deliberations; that we have sometimes admired. But today, and I must say not only today, in his statement there is a certain aspect which surprised us: trying to put the blame for the lack of progress on the issue of a test ban on someone upon whom the blame should not lie. I think this is not the way that we shall break the vicious circle into which we are moving. My delegation fully supports the endeavours of the Government of the German Democratic Republic for disarmament -- as is well known -- and it fully supports also the endeavours and work of the delegation of the German Democratic Republic here. That is all I wanted to say.

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The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Czechoslovakia, who, like the preceding speaker, was brief, and call on the representative of Australia. After his statement I shall determine whether others wish to speak.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): In his right of reply, the Ambassador of the German Democratic Republic said among other things that he would like to examine the statement that I made. For that purpose, I had intended to provide him with a text after I had made my statement. But I wonder if I could ask him through you, does he already have a copy of my text?

The PRESIDENT: I believe that a question has been addressed to the representative of the German Democratic Republic, I will not attempt to answer on his behalf. I do now call on the representative of Mexico.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): As what I have to say is very short and as we shall probably be able to finish our work on this item this morning, I prefer to speak now. I only have the English text here, so I shall read that and make things easier for the interpreters, who will not have to work any more. At the 363rd meeting, on 19 June 1986, I made a statement in the course of which I said:

"If our goal is that the comprehensive test-ban treaty for which we are striving should include among its provisions all those that seem desirable for suitable verification of the obligations entered into, a view with which my delegation has always agreed, I think that resolution 40/80 A which I have already mentioned provides for a procedure offering every guarantee that this will be so. That resolution not only calls on all States members of this Conference, and 'in particular the three depositaries of the Moscow Treaty and the Non-Proliferation Treaty' to promote the establishment of 'an ad hoc committee to carry out the multilateral negotiation of a treaty on the complete cessation of nuclear-test explosions', but also expressly recommends to the Conference that 'it instruct such an ad hoc committee to establish two working groups which will deal, respectively, with the following interrelated questions:

(a) Working Group I - Structure, and scope of the treaty,

(b) Working Group II - compliance and verification.'.

This resolution, which, of the four adopted by the General Assembly at its last annual meeting on the topic with which I am dealing, was the one that received the highest number (124) of votes in favour, was based on a draft sponsored by a group of nine non-aligned or neutral States -- Ecuador, Indonesia, Kenya, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Yugoslavia and Mexico -- and certainly represents a praiseworthy example of a conciliatory effort to satisfy, without prejudice to principles, the standpoint of the very small number of members of the Conference which have hitherto made it impossible to progress in the consideration of this topic.

With regard to the Group of 21, whose position on this matter has been supported by a Group of Socialist States and by China, it may be said that the procedure advocated in resolution 40/80 A represents a step of not 50 but 90 per cent to bridge the distance between the two positions."

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The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Mexico. I would like to conclude the meeting. I still have some things I must say, particularly, I must put to you the decision on the Ad Hoc Seismic Group report. May I recommend to Ambassador Butler that he follow up on his question, if he deems it necessary, after lunch, when we reconvene, rather than now. I cannot insist on that, of course, if he wishes to take the floor. I give him the floor.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): This will not take more than a minute. I posed a very serious question a few moments ago, through you, to the Ambassador of the German Democratic Republic, which he declined to answer. I would like to make clear why I posed that question.

First of all, the text that I delivered today is different from some 15 copies which I delivered to the secretariat solely for interpretation purposes, because I made some amendments to the text before delivery. Secondly, it has been drawn to my attention that it seems extremely likely that, in fact, the Ambassador of the German Democratic Republic has a copy of my text. I so -- and I would be delighted to learn that this is not the case -- if so, there has been an unauthorized distribution of my text to the Ambassador and I think that is a matter of very serious concern to all of us.

The PRESIDENT: Since the question Mr. Butler has posed raises some matters that are sufficiently important and serious to warrant consultations between the Secretary-General and myself, I suggest we pursue this after the luncheon break, not with any idea of sweeping anything under the rug, but rather in order to give people a chance to keep commitments they may have made and also to come back refreshed and make a new start on the problems facing us. So I will now adjourn the meeting until 3.15 p.m.

The meeting was suspended at 1.15 p.m. and reconvened at 3.15 p.m.

The PRESIDENT: I am going to begin with the question that was left open to us all when the meeting was suspended. I had thought that the information I am now about to make known had already been passed on to Ambassador Butler and I expect we will not have to return to this matter. I have been informed that the document in question was not the one which it was perceived to be -- that it was another one, a previous statement that looked very much like it. This is the reason for the confusion and the misunderstanding. As has been indicated privately, not on the record, there was no advance text given to the delegation in question. I would ask all delegations to accept that in good faith. I would also ask the Secretary-General to state for the record the normal practice on such matters and what steps he took in this case to ensure that the normal practice was followed. After this has been done, I hope we can go back to other matters.

Mr. KOMATINA (Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament): I would like, for the record, to say the following:

The secretariat considers the distribution of documentation as a very serious problem which it handles always very carefully. The secretariat is very sensitive to avoid any negligence, let alone non-observance of rules. The proof that it is so is that, during the several years of existence of the Conference. Such a situation has never occurred before. We control carefully, to the extent possible, all documentation at our disposal, including the



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(Mr. Komatina, Secretary-General of the  
Conference on Disarmament)

copies of speeches, of course, and their circulation. I want to assure the Conference that we will continue to do all that is possible to ensure the normal functioning of the whole system of servicing of the Conference and the handling of its documentation.

As this particular problem arose, we have investigated and found out that all copies were in the possession of members of the secretariat who were supposed to have them.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Secretary-General for that explanation. Does the representative of Australia wish to comment? I give him the floor.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): Of course the security of documentation is an extremely important issue. Our task in this Conference is difficult enough without it being made more difficult by unauthorized passage of documentation between delegations or anywhere else. I raised the question that I raised this morning because, as I said, I had every reason to believe that our colleague from the German Democratic Republic had received, and in advance, an unauthorized copy of the statement that I was about to make.

One of the reasons why I believed that was that, and I would like this to be on the record, about half an hour before I spoke, ...

The PRESIDENT: I wish to interrupt the representative of Australia.

I will set aside time at the end of the day if delegates wish to stay and hear this. I want to get on with our work. I have given an explanation and asked you all to take it in good faith. I take it for granted that the Australian delegate would not have raised this kind of issue unless he had what appeared to be good reason for doing so. He does not need to demonstrate his good faith. We take it for granted and I think that can be said of other delegates, and certainly of the secretariat. I do not think that there has been any implication of improper conduct on the part of the secretariat. We have heard an explanation and I really plead with you all to leave this matter to rest and get back to our work. We do not have this kind of time and I mean that as no criticism of any delegate. I think we do have to get on. I ask the Australian delegate kindly to heed the President's plea.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): Mr. President, this morning you said that this matter would be looked into and that it would not be swept under the carpet; I took that in good faith. I would now propose to accept your decision that we should get on with our business. I regret to say that it remains my view that your intention that this matter not be swept under the carpet has not been fulfilled.

The PRESIDENT: We shall get on with our work now. I will ask the Deputy Secretary-General to speak to the Australian delegate along the lines that I understood he had done, but it turned out that there was an incomplete communication of information. But I am not prepared to hear this kind of thing.

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(The President)

As announced at the close of the plenary meeting, I will now put before the Conference for decision the recommendations contained in document CD/721, entitled "Progress Report to the Conference on Disarmament on the Twenty-Second Session of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events". May I remind delegations that those recommendations appear in the first sentence of paragraph 12, as well as in paragraphs 14 and 15. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts those recommendations.

It was so decided.

In accordance with the decision that we have just taken, the next session of the Ad Hoc Group will be convened from 2 to 13 March 1987.

At this stage I have some further information, some of it bad news, about our own timetable and the flexibility of it as things are going, but I will call on the distinguished representative of the USSR. I would make a plea to him that, if it is in connection with the subject discussed just before, he try and adhere to the same stipulation that other delegations adopted and be as brief as possible.

Mr. KASHIRIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): We have been compelled to ask for the floor because at this morning's meeting the representative of Australia initiated a discussion and, regrettably, quite rudely made what, to our mind, were insulting attacks on the delegation of the German Democratic Republic. In so doing, the representative of Australia resorted to what, in our view, were not entirely fitting methods of using statements by, in particular, the Soviet delegation to the effect that the Soviet Union views a moratorium not as an end in itself or as a substitute for a comprehensive test ban treaty, but as an important first step towards such a treaty. The distinguished representative of Australia made accusations against the German Democratic Republic, alleging that the delegation of that country was distorting Australia's position. I think that such a description is entirely applicable to the methods that have been employed today by the representative of Australia. Yes, the Soviet Union views a moratorium as something other than an end in itself, that is entirely obvious, and the entire logic of human thought tells us that a moratorium is really a temporary measure. When, at Tuesday's meeting, the representative of the German Democratic Republic suggested an amendment to the Australian proposal so that that proposal would be truly applicable to a moratorium by the USSR and the United States, that appeal to another nuclear Power seemingly similarly aroused the anger of the Australian delegation. But why, if the Australian delegation is so concerned to achieve the earliest possible agreement on the banning of nuclear-weapon tests, does it not, like the Delhi Six and many other delegations here and non-aligned States, call upon the other nuclear Powers to follow the example of the Soviet Union? That would really open the way to the achievement of a genuine and verifiable accord. The Soviet Union will not accept verification of the conducting of tests, it has said that repeatedly and will say it again. The Soviet Union will accept the most resolute and effective measures for the verification of the non-conducting of such tests. And that is just what was proposed in the suggestion by the German Democratic Republic.

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The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Soviet Union. I will now refer to the timetable that I mentioned, then I propose to adjourn the meeting. Delegates can, of course, return to the issue of substance, should they so desire, at the next plenary meeting.

The secretariat has circulated today, at my request, a timetable of meetings to be held during the coming week. Unlike other cases during the annual session, I should inform you that this time the timetable may not be subject to change. We have to try to keep to it if at all possible. As we approach the last week of the annual session, we should conclude our second reading of the draft annual report to the General Assembly of the United Nations at the latest on Wednesday, 27 August, early in the afternoon. Any delay beyond that date would imply a postponement in the closing date, with additional financial expenditures which I am sure we want to avoid. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts that timetable.

It was so decided.

I wish to recall the intention expressed earlier, this morning, that the Conference will hold an informal meeting in a few moments in order to continue its first reading of the substantive paragraphs of the draft annual report under items 3 and 6, as well as item 2, if we have time to take it up.

Before I adjourn the meeting, I give the floor to the Australian delegation.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): I do appreciate that we have had a very active morning. I, in fact, had asked much earlier this morning to be listed to speak following the adoption of the report of the Group of Scientific Experts and it is on that subject that I would like to speak very briefly.

Australia supports and welcomes the adoption by the Conference of the 22nd report of the Group of Scientific Experts. We support the programme of work it contains and will contribute to it to the very best of our ability. As is well known in this Conference, Australia has submitted, in document CD/717, a proposal on the establishment of a global seismological network. Such a development would be consistent both with the mandate of the Group of Scientific Experts and the past results and with the future programme of its work. We had hoped that, on the adoption of the 22nd report of the Group of Scientific Experts, the Conference would also be able to take a decision in terms of document CD/717. I understand that this will not be possible today, but Australia hopes, however, that the Conference and the Group of Scientific Experts will take the Australian proposal fully into account in their future work. We will also seek to ensure that our proposal is appropriately noted in the 1986 report of the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Australian delegate and apologise for the inadvertence on the part of the President for not calling on him; I did not understand earlier that he would wish to speak.

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(The President)

If there are no other speakers, I am going to adjourn the plenary meeting, but may I remind you that we are going to resume in informal plenary virtually immediately.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 26 August, at 10.00 a.m.

The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 3.50 p.m.

## CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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26 August 1986

ENGLISH

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### FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-SECOND PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 26 August 1986, at 10 a.m.

President:

Mr. J. Allan Beesley

(Canada)

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The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 382nd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference continues today its consideration of reports of ad hoc subsidiary bodies as well as of the Annual Report to the General Assembly of the United Nations. In accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, however, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

At the outset, I wish to extend a very cordial welcome in the Conference to His Excellency the Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Friedrich Ruth. Ambassador Ruth does not need any introduction. His active involvement in disarmament questions is well known, not only in representing his country but also as a distinguished member of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies. I am sure that his visit to Geneva will be a fruitful one.

Before we proceed with our business for today, I should like to recall that, at our last plenary meeting, we adopted the recommendations contained in the Progress Report on the twenty second session of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. As announced then, I have already addressed the relevant communication to the Secretary-General of the World Meteorological Organization. It only remains for us now to take note of the Fourth Report of the Ad Hoc Group, contained in document CD/720, and of the Summary of that Report, which has been circulated in document CD/681/Rev.1. In doing so, we shall follow the practice of the Conference in dealing with the substantive reports of the Ad Hoc Group. I intend to proceed accordingly once the list of speakers is concluded.

As you know, we have a long list of speakers for today. We may not be able to conclude the plenary meeting in the morning but, in any case, the Conference will hold an informal meeting this afternoon at 3 p.m. to begin the second reading of the draft report to the General Assembly of the United Nations. Unfortunately, there are still some very important questions pending in the Drafting Group and we will not be able to proceed as far in the second reading as might be necessary to conclude our work within the limited time available between today and Friday unless we are able to move very expeditiously.

We should, however, be able to take up again document CD/WP.243, containing the technical parts of the report, which has remained practically unchanged since we completed our first reading. There are only very minor questions pending in that connection which do not justify the reproduction and circulation of a new document. We might also start our consideration of document CD/WP.249, dealing with the expansion of the membership of the Conference and the draft substantive paragraphs contained in documents CD/WP.245/Rev.1, CD/WP.246/Rev.1 and CD/WP.248/Rev.1.

We shall also listen today to the presentation of the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, contained in document CD/722. I shall invite the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee to introduce that report once the list of speakers is exhausted.

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(The President)

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany, the United States of America, Nigeria, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Italy, Australia and Cuba.

I now give the floor to the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Ruth.

Mr. RUTH (Federal Republic of Germany): It is a real privilege to address the Conference on Disarmament, today under your Presidency. Our two countries share a common view on matters of security and arms control through your long-standing activities in the field of disarmament and arms control. You are particularly qualified to perform the difficult and important task of President of the final phase of this year's work of the Conference on Disarmament. I extend my best wishes to you for this work of yours and of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the start of this summer session Foreign Minister Genscher presented the views of the Federal Republic of Germany on current disarmament and arms control issues. I am pleased to have this opportunity now at the end of the session to appraise once more the state of the arms control process and evaluate important developments of the last few weeks.

This underscores once again the great importance which the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany attaches to the Geneva Conference on Disarmament in the quest for disarmament and arms control. The Federal Government is convinced that the global and multilateral arms control process plays a decisive role complementing the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union and the negotiations between West and East. The importance of the world-wide dialogue on disarmament is illustrated by the degree of success of the policy on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and by the high expectations attached to the negotiations for a world-wide ban on chemical weapons. At the same time, there can be no doubt that the East-West negotiations can and must make a decisive contribution to world peace and security.

As in other areas, co-operation in the field of security has become a key objective. Efforts towards disarmament and arms control are a decisive element of a strategy aimed at strengthening peace through co-operation. This strategy is based on the perception that every attempt must be made, for the sake of reliably preventing war, to supplement security founded on autonomous defence efforts by co-operative security efforts. It is evident that these efforts for co-operation cannot be pursued in isolation. Co-operation for the purpose of reliably preventing war needs a broad basis. In our view, this includes the cultivation of bilateral relations, the continued pursuit of the CSCE process in all its components and active participation in the work of the United Nations.

While being ready for co-operative security efforts, we do not underrate either the existing substantial problems or the differences that continue to shape the relationships between States or groups of States. What the participants in this process must have in common is a desire to prevent any kind of war and a readiness to achieve more stable peace through concrete and balanced agreements.

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(Mr. Ruth, Federal Republic of Germany)

This conceptual development is reflected in the United States-Soviet Statement of 8 January 1985 and the summit communiqué of 22 November 1985. A central element of the declaration of 8 January 1985 is the objective of strengthening strategic stability by means of effective arms control agreements. The objectives laid down on that occasion were reaffirmed by the summit communiqué. The latter additionally states that both sides, conscious of their special responsibility for maintaining peace, were agreed "that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. Recognizing that any conflict between the USSR and the United States could have catastrophic consequences, they emphasized the importance of preventing any war between them, whether nuclear or conventional. They will not seek to achieve military superiority."

The importance of these statements is indicated by a brief review of arms control developments over the last two decades. In 1967, the year of the historic meeting in Glassboro between United States President Johnson and Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin, a new approach to arms control became visible. Apart from the discussion of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, they focused on the question of how an agreement can be achieved that helps to limit both sides' arsenals in a balanced manner and thus reduce the risk of war, especially nuclear war. The establishment of stability as a means of preventing war has thus become a subject of negotiations and a major objective of arms control.

You are familiar with the subsequent developments: in 1972, the Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Weapons and the ABM Treaty; up to 1979, SALT II negotiations; from November 1981 and June 1982, INF and START negotiations; since March 1985, the Geneva negotiations. In the conventional field, negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions in Central Europe were started in 1973. With these MBFR talks, bilateral United States-Soviet negotiations were for the first time supplemented by multilateral arms control efforts; efforts to obtain conventional stability in the geographical area with the highest concentration of military forces were initiated in parallel with the endeavour to achieve nuclear balance.

It was no coincidence that in the Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance, i.e. the Harmel Report prepared in 1967, the Atlantic Alliance stated that the efforts for collective security through adequate military strength determined by the principle of equilibrium as well as political solidarity of the Alliance are to be supplemented by the readiness to develop further the dialogue and co-operation with the members of the Warsaw Pact.

Today, in the opinion of the West, arms control has a central role to play in this co-operation. The North Atlantic Alliance has stated that arms control and disarmament together with deterrence and defence are integral parts of its security policy.

The process of negotiations initiated in 1967 has not yet led to the results hoped for especially in view of the present situation; however, there is no cause for resignation. The necessary conclusions have been drawn from the experience gained and from the new developments requiring solutions in the field of arms control. For example, the mandate agreed on at Madrid in 1983 for the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures



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and Disarmament in Europe is based on the perception that limitations and reductions of conventional forces in the whole of Europe would be facilitated and must therefore be preceded by concrete confidence-building measures. At the MBFR talks, the West suggested in December 1985 in an innovative, co-operative approach that central problems of the negotiations be solved through the exchange of information combined with effective verification measures.

The declaration of 8 January 1985 also builds on previous developments by making "strategic stability" the key concept. This concept not only relates to certain weapon systems, but also aims at reliably safeguarding peace and security.

In the present situation we are faced with the question of whether the emphasis on the limitation of military potentials can be replaced by a process dominated by agreements on reductions. Recent developments could then prove to be the beginning of a new chapter in the history of arms control and disarmament. The arms control policy of the Federal Government is based on the obligation enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations to refrain from the threat or use of force and is directed towards the overriding goal of preventing war.

Determining principles of this policy are:

Arms control efforts must encompass the entire military balance between East and West, including conventional forces. The reduction of nuclear weapons must not be allowed to increase the likelihood of a conventional conflict in Europe,

Arms control efforts must take account of the need to maintain defensive capabilities and of the role of the Alliance. They must respect the legitimate security interests of all concerned,

Arms control efforts must be designed as a step-by-step process so that the effects can be calculated and controlled at every stage. They must guarantee undiminished security,

Greater transparency and openness can lead to greater predictability of military behaviour. The West is already making substantial contributions to this goal,

Agreements on the reduction and limitation of forces and weapons must be based on reliable data,

Arms control agreements must be balanced and militarily significant,

And finally, reliable verification of compliance with arms control agreements in line with their purpose is indispensable. Verification is the consequence of mistrust existing between potential parties to a treaty. It is needed to create confidence in disarmament and arms control agreements being implemented and complied with. Verification can, on the one hand, be understood as an offer of openness to convince

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the other parties to the treaty of one's own faithful compliance with the treaty. It is, on the other hand, a contribution made by one side to justify the other side's confidence in the reliability of the agreement.

We note with satisfaction that the East is also moving in the direction of these principles, despite some differences on individual points. Potentially of great importance for the further development of arms control are the recent declarations by the Soviet Union and the other countries of the Warsaw Pact showing a greater readiness to allow effective verification. It is now essential that the substance of those declarations be demonstrated in the individual negotiation forums. Above all, it is important that verification does not just relate to the implementation of reductions, but also to the effective monitoring of compliance with agreements through sufficiently detailed information and obligatory on-site inspections. This would permit decisive improvement in the field of military predictability through transparency and thus bring about greater confidence.

The last few weeks have impressively demonstrated the importance of negotiations on disarmament and arms control in the present political realities. On all major areas of the military relationship, proposals have been submitted which hold out the prospect of progress. This applies both to the bilateral negotiations and to the multilateral negotiations at the European and global levels.

In the bilateral negotiations, proposals by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev are on the table. The proposals presented by President Reagan are the result of intensive discussions within the North Atlantic Alliance. They have the full support of all the Allies.

At the negotiations on nuclear and space weapons, the aim now is to make intensive efforts, in keeping with the summit declaration, to find common ground for the solution of existing problems. Following the recent proposals by both sides, prospects have improved for arriving at co-operative arrangements.

At the negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear weapons, an interim agreement leading towards the global elimination of Soviet and American land-based LRINFs is taking shape as a realistic perspective. This interim agreement would limit LRINFs at a low level, their world-wide elimination remaining our ultimate objective.

American and Soviet experts held talks in Moscow on 11 and 12 August with a view to examining the state of negotiations on nuclear and space weapons in the light of recent proposals and exploring possible areas of compromise. These experts will come together again in Washington before Foreign Ministers Schultz and Shevardnadze attempt at their meeting on 19 and 20 September to pave the way for the second summit. One cannot deny that the prospect of the second United States-Soviet summit, which we would like to see held this year, is creating additional strong momentum for the ongoing negotiations. In our view, efforts must now be focused on tackling the relationship between offensive and defensive systems and thus clearing the way for the reduction of offensive nuclear arsenals and achieving results that strengthen strategic stability.

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As far as nuclear tests are concerned, we welcome the fact that another session of Soviet and American experts recently examined the question of how limitations of nuclear tests and a subsequent comprehensive ban on tests can be reliably verified. These talks, too, will be continued shortly. These contacts hold out the prospect of ratification of the agreements of 1974/1976 and a possible programme for the reduction of tests, thus bringing us nearer the goal of a global, comprehensive test ban.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany strongly supports a comprehensive and verifiable ban on tests at the earliest possible date. The key problem of arms control in the field of nuclear tests consists in ensuring reliable verification. In connection with the extension of the unilateral Soviet moratorium until 1 January 1987, General Secretary Gorbachev stated on 18 August, as you know, that the Soviet Union is willing to allow on-site verification of this moratorium, this willingness should be translated into verification proposals aimed at reliably monitoring all nuclear tests. The Federal Government has, for its part, made a substantial contribution to the discussion of this subject here at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament by submitting a proposal for a world-wide seismological system for monitoring nuclear tests. I note with satisfaction that this approach has met with the broad support of the countries represented here.

We also welcome developments which have recently taken place in this Conference's negotiations concerning a global ban on chemical weapons. The Federal Government greatly welcomes the proposal recently submitted by the United Kingdom relating to on-challenge inspections. In our opinion, the approach chosen by the United Kingdom -- while insisting on the obligatory nature of inspections -- could show a way of advancing the negotiations in a positive fashion.

Another problem to which this Conference must still devote extensive attention is that of effective means of verifying the non-production of chemical weapons. We remain convinced that it will be possible to resolve this problem, including verification of a ban on new developments. We note with satisfaction that here at the Conference a high degree of agreement is emerging on the concept of a triple matrix listing the chemical substances that are to be subjected to controls. On this basis, we consider routine inspections and an exchange of statistical data to be suitable measures for effectively verifying that no substances are being diverted from civilian chemicals production to the manufacture of warfare agents. Our delegation is preparing a working paper on methods for exchanging statistical data.

Foreign Minister Genscher stressed here that the Federal Republic of Germany accords the highest priority to a convention banning chemical weapons, and he urged that all resources be mobilized so that the negotiations can be completed in 1987. We therefore welcome the Conference's decision to hold three rounds of consultations on chemical weapons between this and the next session. It is now essential that this additional time be used for efforts aimed at achieving concrete results.

In discussing Conference on Disarmament matters, I have concentrated on the topics of chemical weapons and nuclear testing. At the same time we

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attach great importance to the discussion of other topics, such as the prevention of war and outer space, as shown by our contributions here and in New York.

In the conventional field I have already mentioned the far-reaching proposal made by the West last December for an initial MBFR agreement. Unfortunately, the Eastern reaction at the negotiating table to the central issue of verification has until now been disappointing. We hope that this is not the last word of our Eastern colleagues.

In Stockholm, the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe has reached a crucial stage. The contours of an agreement are emerging. During the brief period left, all resources must be determined to obtain results which produce substantive improvements to the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act relating to confidence-building measures. Such results would be an important step towards the building of greater confidence in Europe and would have a positive impact on East-West relations in general. They would be a good prelude to the third CSCE follow-up meeting in Vienna.

The MBFR talks and the CDE are already dealing with important elements for achieving conventional stability in Europe. Progress and results at these negotiations are essential preliminaries for more extensive arms control efforts by which the elimination of the conventional imbalance in Europe and the resultant risks could be addressed. The Foreign Ministers of the North Atlantic Alliance advocated at Halifax on 30 June 1986 that bold new steps be made in the field of arms control towards strengthening stability and security in the whole of Europe through increased openness and the establishment of a verifiable, comprehensive and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels. The high-level task force set up in Halifax is now examining a concept for attaining these objectives. The countries of the Warsaw Pact stated their readiness in Budapest on 11 June to negotiate arms control measures applicable to Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. The Federal Government welcomes this declaration and hopes that it will take effect at the ongoing negotiations in Vienna and Stockholm.

The efforts undertaken by the Federal Republic of Germany and its allies for stability by means of arms control are not only important to East-West relations. The achievement of East-West stability would also be a contribution to global stability. We are convinced that, in this ever more interdependent world, different degrees of security for individual regions -- the parallel existence of regions of stability and of instability -- must be of concern to us all. Thus disarmament and arms control efforts must have a global dimension and include all regions.

The West feels encouraged in its efforts towards achieving stability by the strong support that the objective of the reduction of nuclear weapons enjoys worldwide. At the same time, experience gained in the process of promoting East-West stability can be made use of in other parts of the world. This applies especially to the endeavours to reach agreement on confidence- and security-building measures and conventional stability in the whole of Europe. It was considerations of this kind that prompted the Federal Government to launch an initiative within the United Nations a few

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years ago for the development of confidence-building measures applicable worldwide; such measures now enjoy broad support among members of the United Nations.

This review of the ongoing negotiations on arms control and disarmament reveals the problems that still have to be solved until concrete results and genuine breakthroughs are achieved. Yet it also reveals the great opportunities that now exist for laying the foundations for more far-reaching agreements. The credibility of arms control and disarmament efforts and the opportunities for achieving co-operative contributions to stability are inextricably linked with the ongoing negotiations. Progress and results can and must be attained there. The ability to achieve such results soon is now being put to the test:

(1) At the bilateral United States-Soviet negotiations on nuclear and space weapons, including those on INFs;

(2) In the efforts of European and North American participants to achieve in the allotted time-frame a substantive result at the Conference for Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. Without such a result, steps towards more extensive negotiations in the field of conventional arms control would not be credible;

(3) At the Vienna MBFR negotiations, where progress in line with the latest Western proposals would demonstrate that it is possible to solve difficult problems through co-operative measures;

(4) At the negotiations for a global ban on chemical weapons. In this connection, the Conference on Disarmament must devote all its energy towards achieving definitive results by the end of next year. The credibility of this Conference and its weight as a multilateral global negotiating forum call for a commitment on the part of all participants to the attainment of such a result.

Concrete results in these areas could indeed play a key part in opening a new chapter in the history of arms control and disarmament. Agreement on balanced and verifiable results could show that the establishment of balance and stability at substantially reduced military levels is a realistic objective.

On 18 August, General Secretary Gorbachev stated that the problem of international security is a common problem and necessitates common concern and responsibility. We share that view. The perception of the need for co-operative solutions in the field of security, which is one of the most important conceptions of this war-torn century, must now be translated into concrete measures which effectively prevent any type of war and which are so reliably implemented as to justify to all States involved the amount of confidence invested in them.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany for his statement and for his kind comments to the President.

I now give the floor to the representative of Nigeria, Ambassador Tonwe.

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Mr. TONWE (Nigeria): First of all, I would like to express the appreciation of the Nigerian delegation to Ambassador Friedrich Ruth, Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, for the food for thought which he has kindly given us this morning. The Nigerian delegation finds the statement to be full of encouragement and, at the same time, something which everyone should take home and try to study carefully. The Nigerian delegation will do that and will draw whatever lessons it finds compatible with its own policies.

Mr. President, I had the opportunity, at the beginning of the month, during your brief absence on duty elsewhere, to say how glad the Nigerian delegation was that you should be chairing our deliberations during this crucial month of August. Your professional skills, your contagious moderating tone, your profound wisdom are generally recognized. Your country's enlightened policies on various serious problems facing the international community are well known. The manner in which you have conducted the affairs of this Conference since the beginning of the month more than indicates the sentiments the Nigerian delegation expressed a few weeks ago. We have no doubt whatsoever that you will lead our work at the end of this session to a successful conclusion as is now possible.

One of the most striking paradoxes of the painful stagnation in nuclear disarmament negotiations, is that the same States which, after years of intensive analysis and soul-searching, have come to the conclusion that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought", are the ones that are also clinging doggedly to their doctrines of the balance of terror, deterrence, massive retaliation and what have you, and are galvanizing their nuclear stockpiles, frantically and methodically developing new and ever more terrifying nuclear weapons and delivery systems, for deployment in ever more destabilizing environments.

This contradictory and irrational behaviour of nuclear-weapon States is, to our mind, strong evidence of the desperation, frustration and panic that have seized the major military machines of the world and the dangerous extent to which they have come to rely on the "inadmissible" weapon to mitigate their ever-increasing sense of insecurity.

Equally disturbing is the substantial evidence that the foundations of the nuclear deterrence strategies of some nuclear-weapon Powers are so shaky that they even seek to circumscribe the just demand of non-nuclear-weapon States for a legally binding international instrument by which nuclear-weapon States would undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. It is this question, inscribed as item 6 of our agenda that I would like to address today.

The Nigerian delegation has carefully examined the arguments put forward by some nuclear-weapon States for imposing conditions on their unilateral security assurances for those who do not possess the weapon. We regret to say that we have found some of the arguments unnecessarily obstructive. We believe that, with some political will, the underlying reservations of some nuclear-weapon States can be overcome.

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Let me explain. There are three categories of non-nuclear-weapon States: (a) those which do not belong to any military alliances with nuclear-weapon States and have no nuclear weapons on their territory; (b) those which belong to military alliances with a nuclear-weapon State or States but have no nuclear weapons on their territory; and (c) those which belong to military alliances and have nuclear weapons on their territory.

Considering the unilateral declaration of the nuclear-weapon States, the Nigerian delegation believes that it should be easy to agree to the text of legally binding security assurances for the first category of non-nuclear-weapon States. Nuclear-weapon States also have the most elaborate armies equipped with the most sophisticated and destructive conventional arms. The Nigerian delegation is absolutely convinced that, in the unlikely event of a conventional war, nuclear-weapon States do not need the nuclear blackmail to defeat non-nuclear-weapon States belonging to this group.

For non-nuclear-weapon States which are allies of nuclear-weapon States but have no nuclear weapons on their territories, the Nigerian delegation sees no insurmountable hurdle. The findings of nuclear scientists of great repute have demonstrated to all the calamitous consequences of a nuclear war for both the victor and the vanquished, as well as for those who have no part in the conflict. In short, the Nigerian delegation realizes that it is now even meaningless to talk of security assurances in connection with a major nuclear war. But we also believe that, irrespective of the nuclear winter scenarios, the chances of finding some form of life somewhere in our planet after a nuclear war would be greater if not every part of it is subjected to a direct hit.

The strategy of the major nuclear-weapon States is based on the balance of terror of their respective nuclear arsenals. Non-nuclear-weapon States which have a mutual defence pact with any of them, but have no nuclear weapons on their territory, could not really be said to add to that balance. An attack on their territory would not in any way reduce the offensive or retaliatory nuclear capability of the nuclear-weapon ally. It is not, therefore, justifiable to deny such a State the security assurances that we demand. My delegation has no doubt that formulations can be worked out which will meet the reservations of all nuclear-weapon States in respect of the second group of non-nuclear-weapon States.

The third group are those which belong to military alliances and have nuclear weapons on their territories. Members of this group will become involved in a nuclear war if the principal nuclear-weapon State, launching a nuclear attack, decides to take pre-emptive measures against nuclear-weapon installations in their territory, or attacks such installations in their territory as part of a general massive retaliatory measure. This is hard to take, but it must be conceded that, given the nuclear weapon strategies of some nuclear-weapon States, it is conceivable that these situations could arise, in an atmosphere of severe international tension involving the major alliances possessing strategic or tactical nuclear-weapon defence systems. We cannot wish away that fact, however we try! If we are realistic, what we should be seeking to avoid, therefore, is the automatic assimilation of a non-nuclear-weapon State in this third category to a nuclear-weapon State with its finger on the button. This distinction is necessary because we

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believe that, between a conflictual situation and the actual launching of a nuclear attack from the territory of a third party, there is time to dissuade the potential attacker, as was seen a few months ago in a more limited military action. This invaluable time available to "third countries" to renounce nuclear war affords us a crucial opportunity to reduce the damage to mankind in the event of nuclear war. We must not shut the door to that opportunity. It does not jeopardize obligations in military alliances. On the contrary, by providing a potential safety valve against nuclear war, it works in the interest of all, in an age when even the most resolute protagonists of nuclear deterrence have concluded that nuclear war is in no one's interest.

The logic of what we have said is that it would be desirable to seek, through negotiations on an internationally binding instrument on item 6, the form of negative security assurances which could be given to non-nuclear-weapon States which have nuclear-weapons on their respective territories.

The upshot of all I have said in this statement is that, for every category of non-nuclear States described above, there are feasible treaty formulations of negative security assurances which would be realistic, discourage the geographical spread of nuclear weapons, and satisfy the legitimate security concerns of all parties. Such a consensus is not going to be offered on a platter of gold, it would have to be negotiated. It would not be helpful for delegations to prejudge the outcome of such negotiations.

The question of negative security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States is an extremely important one for the future of disarmament negotiations and international agreements in general. The vast majority of the world's non-nuclear-weapon States have undertaken, under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, not to develop or acquire nuclear weapons, because the weapons are considered particularly dangerous for the survival of mankind. Nuclear-weapon States undertake to accelerate negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons from their arsenals. If, in spite of these undertakings, nuclear-weapon States should give the slightest impression that they do not totally exclude the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against those who have denied themselves their acquisition, then the very basis of the Non-Proliferation Treaty would become morally indefensible. Furthermore, the impression would be created that the more powerful countries only seek to perpetuate their present military superiority and deny the poorer ones the right to political dignity and intellectual freedom. The Nigerian delegation, therefore, believes that the nuclear-weapon States have a primordial responsibility to assure non-nuclear-weapon States of their honesty of purpose. Unless this honesty is transparent, those who have adhered to the NPT cannot be expected to feel vindicated and those who did not accept the Treaty in 1970 would justifiably move even further away from its objectives.

In the light of the foregoing, the Nigerian delegation cannot but feel disappointed that no progress has been made this year towards setting up an ad hoc committee, duly mandated, to negotiate the provisions of a legally binding instrument, giving non-nuclear-weapon States the negative security assurances they require. We sincerely hope that this will be done at the very beginning of the 1987 session.

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The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Nigeria for his statement and for his extremely kind comments to the President.

I now give the floor to the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Lowitz.

Mr. LOWITZ (United States of America): As we conclude our plenary session for 1986, the United States delegation extends its best wishes to our departing colleagues. Ambassadors Kerroum of Algeria, Jessel of France, Wegener of the Federal Republic of Germany, Gonsalves of India, and Imai of Japan, will not be with us next February. Their presence will be missed. I hope they will retain good memories of their time in Geneva, and that they will remain involved in the work of disarmament in their new surroundings.

My delegation also extends a warm welcome to our distinguished visitor from Bonn, Ambassador Friedrich Ruth, Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control of the Federal Republic of Germany. I have noted his important and positive statement with great interest.

The 1986 session, in the view of my delegation, will, on balance, be remembered favourably. That it was clearly more productive than the past several sessions provides some grounds for optimism as we look forward to 1987.

The most noteworthy progress has been recorded in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. The Chairman of the Committee, Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom, is to be congratulated for overseeing a year in which significant elaboration and restructuring of the draft text of the convention took place. As a result, five articles of the rolling text now appear in a more complete form: these are the articles on the elimination of chemical weapons production facilities, on chemical weapon stockpile destruction, on activities not to be prohibited by the Convention, on the consultative committee, and on consultation, co-operation and fact-finding. In addition, progress is reflected in the elaboration of four annexes addressing supertoxic lethal chemicals, key precursors, large volume commercial chemicals which could be used as weapons, and principles, methods and organization of the elimination of chemical weapons.

Last August, my delegation expressed cautious optimism for these negotiations. It seems to me that this optimism was justified, and that it can again be expressed for their future course.

This is not to say, of course, that complete agreement has been reached on any of the new texts. Bracketed sections, footnotes, and incomplete text reflect that many important issues have not yet been resolved. All areas require additional work. Key outstanding issues include the declaration of stockpiles, non-production in the civil industry, and challenge inspection. And work has barely begun on working out detailed verification procedures.

In particular, the United States delegation looks forward to a serious consideration of challenge inspection. My delegation would be particularly interested in hearing the detailed views of the Soviet Union on challenge inspection. While a number of States have provided constructive contributions in the area of verification during the session, and the Soviet Union has

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repeatedly expressed its acceptance of the concept of challenge inspection, it has yet to set forth any comprehensive proposal. This is of concern to my delegation. We need to be mindful of what has transpired in other multilateral negotiating forums. In particular, in the Stockholm Conference, the highly publicized "agreement in principle" by the USSR to on-site inspection is now apparently so qualified as effectively to obstruct progress on this issue.

It is to be hoped that we are not witnessing a trend which could adversely affect the progress we see in other areas of the chemical weapons negotiations.

My delegation repeats yet again its view: that article X of the United States draft, document CD/500, was not presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, and other approaches that provide the equivalent level of effectiveness to article X will find a ready reception for careful consideration. The crucial importance of the issue of compliance with agreements, and the experience of my Government with regard to non-compliance with existing agreements, remains a key factor in our work.

In other years, members of this Conference could have been greatly pleased with the progress made on chemical weapons. This year our expressions of satisfaction must be tempered by the fact that our task is clearly becoming more urgent, and that the road ahead is long. The United States is thus in complete agreement that extended consultations should be undertaken this Fall, especially in late November and early December. Together with the January meeting of the full Committee, these should provide another opportunity to advance the negotiations prior to the start of our 1987 session.

The Conference on Disarmament's work was also carried forward during 1986 on the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Useful consideration of relevant issues, begun last year, did continue. But because of protracted delays in reaching agreement on a mandate, and then on a programme of work consistent with that mandate, the limited time available meant that this work did not get very far. The United States will carefully review the results of the Committee's work prior to next year's session. However, our initial evaluation suggests that the mandate under which the Committee is operating is far from being exhausted.

With regard to agenda item 2, for the first time in a number of years the Conference held a series of informal meetings to consider issues related to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. It should be noted in passing that this year the contents of our final report on this agenda item consist largely of a summary of these informal meetings. The United States delegation found the series of exchanges useful, in that it provided all delegations an opportunity to lay out their own positions and accurately assess the positions of others in this vital matter. Such an exchange of views is especially relevant in light of the considerable activity in the area of nuclear disarmament following the beginning of the nuclear and space talks in March 1985, and the further intensification of this activity which has occurred since the November 1985 meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev. Substantial reductions in nuclear arsenals

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is a primary goal of the United States. And in the United States view, these can presently best be accomplished in the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the USSR.

With regard to the nuclear test-ban issue, agenda item 1, there has also been considerable intensification of effort. Most notably, the United States and the Soviet Union completed at the end of July an initial round of discussions on the full range of issues concerning nuclear testing. These talks were the subject of a joint press statement issued on 1 August. The statement is not long, and it is worth setting out in full:

"Meetings have been held between United States and Soviet experts on the entire scope of issues related to nuclear testing.

"Extensive discussions have been held and a detailed exchange of views has taken place.

"Both sides expect to meet again in Geneva in early September, after a recess announced on 1 August, to allow further study of the issues that had been discussed."

I should point out that these talks, which the United States had long sought and which it now welcomes, did not constitute negotiations. They were characterized as discussions, because that is what they were. Accordingly, I must respectfully disagree with the remark of the distinguished deputy representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Kashirin, made at our last plenary meeting, that "a round of United States-Soviet negotiations on ceasing nuclear tests was held in Geneva 25-31 July".

In these discussions the United States presented and discussed its views on the verification of existing agreements on nuclear testing. As President Reagan has affirmed, agreement on measures that would provide for effective verification would allow the United States to move forward on the ratification of the Threshold Test-Ban Treaty of 1974 and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty of 1976.

With regard to our own work on the nuclear test-ban agenda item, the Conference has taken note on 21 August of the progress report of the Group of Scientific Experts dealing with seismic monitoring of the underground environment in connection with a nuclear test ban. It goes without saying that the United States wholeheartedly welcomes this report containing the recommendations of the GSE for its future work, together with the report of the 1984 Technical Test of Global Seismic Data Exchange Procedures. My delegation again congratulates the experts who worked so long and hard on the Technical Test, and who over the years have sought to introduce new concepts and technology into the approaches to a global seismic network. Of the large number of those experts, I would single out for special commendation Dr. Peter McGregor of Australia, Dr. Frode Ringdal of Norway, and Dr. Ola Dahlman of Sweden.

Part of the future work envisioned by the GSE is more extensive and intensive use of so-called Level II seismic data, that is, the exchange on a rapid basis of larger quantities of full seismic waveforms. As long ago as

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the 181st plenary on 24 August 1982, the United States urged that such work be undertaken. My delegation is naturally very pleased that other delegations, including that of the Soviet Union, have now become persuaded of the utility of investigating issues related to Level II data exchange. There is undoubtedly a considerable amount of work to do in this regard. The efforts of delegations such as Canada, which plans to sponsor a workshop on topics related to Level II exchange, have already pointed this work in the right direction.

Although the work of the Group of Scientific Experts has been quite productive, by contrast, the Conference for the third year was unable to reach consensus on establishing an ad hoc committee under agenda item 1. My delegation shares the widely-held sense of disappointment that the Conference has not been able to deal with the substantive issues of a test ban in committee. A mandate was and is available for a committee to be established. It is a matter of grave concern; it is regrettable; it is even deplorable that consensus on that mandate was prevented by certain delegations. As the Presidents of the Conference for the first five months will attest, it was not for lack of trying that the efforts were unsuccessful. I know I share the views of many delegations when I say that perhaps those who did not support document CD/521 this year will reconsider prior to our next session.

With regard to the third item on our agenda, prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters, there were a number of plenary statements that addressed the issue, but my delegation has only had its own earlier views on this item reinforced by the sterile and fruitless exercise over its organizational aspects. Such an exercise, which is geared to giving the appearance of completely separate substance to a subject which is the basis of all our work, is doomed to failure. A format for this agenda item similar to that employed this year for agenda item 2 might be a more fruitful manner in which to explore the views of all delegations.

In assessing our work for this year, we should also give some thought to our present activity, that of preparing our Annual Report. I believe that in most areas our report-writing works reasonably well. The reports of the Chemical Weapons, Outer Space and Radiological Weapons Committees are cases in point. We can point with some satisfaction to these reports as largely factual, balanced, and free of polemic. Unfortunately, that is not universally the case, in particular on agenda items 1 and 3.

With regard to agenda item 1, it is regrettable that differences of view -- differences which everyone acknowledges are substantive -- are seriously affecting the drafting of the report. The accusatory approach that some delegations seem to apply to the task results in an unduly contentious and confrontational exercise, with finger-pointing and name-calling the order of the day. Such behaviour, for a body such as this, can never be justified. Clearly, better ways of proceeding can and should be brought to bear. We should attempt to conclude our report in a spirit of mutual tolerance and respect for different viewpoints.

I want to conclude on a somewhat hopeful note. If we survey the field of disarmament, the level of activity is higher than it has been for many years, at our own Conference, at other multilateral bodies, and bilaterally.

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(Mr. Lowitz, United States)

Activity by itself does not constitute a successful outcome. But there can be no successful outcome without activity. The United States delegation looks forward to the Conference's work on chemical weapons prior to our 1987 session; to the next round of nuclear testing discussions beginning on 4 September; to the next session of the nuclear and space talks beginning on 18 September; and to the forthcoming bilateral meeting at the ministerial level on 19 and 20 September. The hard work represented by these efforts, coupled with a willingness to seek fair resolution of differences, can result in success. Let us all seek to ensure that the Conference on Disarmament makes its contribution, realistically and effectively, to advancing arms control and to strengthening international security.

Mr. ISSRAELIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, as members of the Conference are aware, the Heads of State or Government of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico and Sweden and the first President of Tanzania met in the Mexican city of Ixtapa on 6 and 7 August 1986 and adopted important documents: the "Mexico Declaration" and the "Document on verification measures issued at the Mexico Summit". Ambassador Garcia Robles dwelt in detail on these documents in his statement on 14 August. They have been distributed as official documents of our Conference, as have the messages from the leaders of the six countries to the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mr. Gorbachev, and to the President of the United States, Mr. Reagan.

In response to the calls of an important and influential part of the world community of States among which particular importance attaches to the Mexico Declaration, the Soviet Union took an extremely important and crucial decision to extend its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing until 1 January 1987. In accordance with its instructions, the Soviet delegation would today like to acquaint the members of the Conference with Mr. Gorbachev's reply, dated 23 August, to the message from the leaders of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania. This reply states, in particular:

"We are in full agreement with the conviction stated in your declaration that responsibility for protecting our planet lies with all the peoples who live on it. The task of preserving human civilization and preventing it from perishing in the flames of nuclear catastrophe is indeed a common cause for all States and all peoples. Once a nuclear war broke out it would affect all and everyone. We share your assessment of the fatal consequences to which the use of even a small fraction of the world's existing nuclear arsenals could lead. The process of upgrading and further stockpiling is continuing and nuclear-weapon tests are contributing to it. That is why the Soviet leadership believes that there is no more urgent and important task today than that of putting an end to all nuclear testing."

Mr. Gorbachev's letter continues:

"There are no obstacles to ending nuclear testing except the position of certain Powers rooted in a suicidal reliance on nuclear muscle. The interests of preserving human civilization in the nuclear

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(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

space age urgently require new political thinking, which should be based on recognition of the fact that the build-up of nuclear arsenals, far from enhancing security, can on the contrary lead to "zero" security, in other words total self-annihilation.

"Guided by a sense of responsibility for the fate of mankind, we instituted a unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions. Today, after it has been in effect for one year, the Soviet leadership has once again decided to extend it until the beginning of 1987."

As Mr. Gorbachev stressed,

"It was not an easy decision for us to arrive at. You know that the United States, in spite of our moratorium, has not ceased conducting nuclear explosions and is consequently moving forward in building up nuclear arsenals. Nevertheless we consider that our unilateral action is justified because it should help to solve the problem of nuclear testing and to save mankind from the nuclear threat. In taking this step, we believe that people in all countries will correctly assess the lengthy silence reigning at Soviet testing sites. It is my profound conviction that if the United States joined the Soviet moratorium -- and the extension of our moratorium gives it a further chance to do so -- a serious and responsible step would have been taken towards stopping the improvement of the most destructive weapons and their stockpiling. Such a bilateral moratorium would undoubtedly promote progress towards a treaty banning nuclear-weapon tests. The verification measures developed to monitor compliance with the moratorium could become an important step towards the establishment of a system to verify compliance with a comprehensive test-ban treaty."

In this connection I should like to draw the attention of representatives to the press conference held in Moscow yesterday by the Soviet Foreign Ministry with the participation of the First Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr. Y.M. Vorontsov, and the Chief of General Staff, Field-Marshal S.S. Akhromeev. At this press conference Mr. Vorontsov stated in particular that the Soviet Union saw no obstacles to the monitoring of a test ban.

In a general political context, too, the moratorium could create favourable preconditions for the conclusion of such a treaty. The Soviet-United States talks which began in Geneva in late July should work towards that goal.

At the same time, Mr. Gorbachev also spoke of the important role which the Conference on Disarmament can play in banning nuclear tests. In his reply to the six leaders he states: "The Disarmament Conference could become an important forum for multilateral talks on this problem if artificial barriers preventing it from working effectively to prepare a draft treaty banning all test explosions were removed."

In our view, efforts in this field should be made in all areas and one set of talks should not preclude or replace others but, on the contrary, complement them. "I therefore believe", Mr. Gorbachev emphasized, "that the meeting you propose between experts from the six countries and Soviet and

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(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

United States experts could make a valuable contribution to achieving the goal of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban and set the stage for an energetic and businesslike multilateral dialogue on these issues. We are ready to send Soviet experts to such a meeting".

"The Soviet Union has already expressed its readiness", the letter continues, "to follow up your proposal concerning the provision of assistance in verifying the suspension of nuclear tests, including on-site inspections, providing of course it is accepted by the other side. Naturally, it would be useful to consider your new proposals jointly and to seek mutually acceptable solutions to the problem of verifying the cessation of nuclear testing".

Mr. Gorbachev's reply deals, in addition to the problem of ending nuclear tests with another very important question raised at Ixtapa -- the arms race in space.

"It is clear from the Mexico Declaration adopted by you", the Soviet leader writes, "that you and we have the same approach to the serious consequences which would ensue if outer space were to become a new arena for the arms race. Like you, we are convinced that space should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes, in the interests of all mankind. This is the basis for our recent initiative calling for the development of international co-operation in averting an arms race in space and promoting its peaceful use. At the Soviet-United States talks on nuclear and space weapons we have tabled specific proposals aimed at ensuring that outer space does not become an arena of military rivalry".

At the end of his reply, Mr. Gorbachev states:

"You also deal in the Mexico Declaration with the question of another Soviet-United States summit. The Soviet Union is in favour of such a meeting. However, this new meeting should promote the normalization of relations between the USSR and the United States, improvement of the international situation and more rapid progress in the arms reduction talks. We would be prepared at such a meeting, for example, to sign an agreement banning nuclear tests. In brief, a meeting of the Soviet and United States leaders should be genuinely meaningful. This was the thrust of the understanding reached by the leaders of the two countries in Geneva.

"I should like to express my conviction that our joint efforts to curb the arms race and halt nuclear-weapon tests will eventually be translated into concrete measures that will lead to the attainment of that important goal."

In view of the significance of the reply of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the Heads of State or Government of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico and Sweden and the first President of Tanzania, the Soviet delegation has requested the Secretariat to distribute it as an official document of the Conference.

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(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

I should like to say a few words on various events taking place in the Conference. First of all I should like to welcome the participation in today's meeting of the special representative on disarmament and arms control questions of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Friedrich Ruth. We shall carefully study the statement he made at today's meeting. I also wish to thank him for his hospitality during the consultations between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany held in July in Bonn.

We have also learned that a number of ambassadors are leaving Geneva to take up new and responsible assignments. We are pleased with the co-operation we have had with Mr. Nourdine Kerroum of Algeria, who has had great experience in working on Soviet-Algerian relations. He has worthily represented the interests of his country at our Conference. We are sorry to learn that Ambassador Imai of Japan and Ambassador Jessel of France are leaving. We have had many useful working meetings with them on various questions concerning the activities of the Conference, and it is our hope that these have contributed to the further development of Soviet-Japanese and Soviet-French relations. We should like to believe that their successors will continue the co-operation with the Soviet delegation. The head of the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Wegener, is also leaving Geneva. I, probably more than anyone else at this Conference, shall feel his absence, since we were the main participants in many, sometimes lively, discussions. I wish him success. I should like to read the following excerpt from a book by the United States authors Fisher and Ury entitled "Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement without Giving In", which many of us would find it useful to remember.

"How you see the world depends on where you sit. People tend to see what they want to see. Out of a mass of detailed information, they tend to pick out and focus on those facts that confirm their prior perceptions and to disregard or misinterpret those that call their perceptions into question. Each side in a negotiation may see only the merits of its case, and only the faults of the other sides."

"The ability to see the situation as the other side sees it, difficult as it may be, is one of the most important skills a negotiator can possess."

I hope that Ambassador Wegener may add to the many skills which he demonstrated at the Conference, the one I have just mentioned.

Mr. FRANCESCHI (Italy): May I first refer to the very deep relations of friendship which bind our two countries. May I also underline how much we do appreciate having the very able and generally appreciated leader of the Canadian delegation presiding over the very delicate work of the Conference in these last very busy days. I would also like to welcome Ambassador Friedrich Ruth, who delivered today a very important speech.

On behalf of the Group of Western countries, I would like to address some concluding remarks on the work which has been done this year on item 5 of our agenda, that is, the prevention of an arms race in outer space. This is an



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(Mr. Franceschi, Italy)

objective to which Western countries are deeply committed. We are also of the view that it is a subject on which the Conference on Disarmament can play an important role.

In our view the Ad Hoc Committee on this item has achieved some useful work in this session. In this context we would like to congratulate Ambassador Bayart of Mongolia for the calm and efficient way in which he has guided this Committee in implementing its programme of work. Despite the regrettable delay in getting down to work, we were able to gather information which can assist our future endeavours. While some aspects of this topic have been usefully clarified, it is, however, apparent that in view of the limited time which has been available much still remains to be done.

One of the more helpful features of the Ad Hoc Committee this year has been the discussion and elucidation of the existing legal régime in relation to arms control and outer space. We have studied many of the important agreements in this area, which already play a wide-ranging role in the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Any further initiatives in this area should clearly build on these existing provisions and not duplicate them. We would also stress the importance of strict compliance with the existing legal régime and the importance of wider participation in it.

The Ad Hoc Committee has also given us the opportunity to examine some of the activities which are currently being carried on in outer space. It is clear that the use of outer space for military purposes has occurred since the start of the space age. Activities such as the use of satellites to monitor compliance with existing arms control agreements and the use of communications satellites have a stabilizing function and thereby contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security.

It is also apparent that to refer to outer space as a zone which is immune from use by certain active military systems is inaccurate. Apart from the fact that ballistic missiles are programmed to travel through space on the way to their targets, it is apparent that one country already has an existing and deployed ASAT system.

The Committee is clearly in need of more technical and other information. We would in particular call upon the Soviet Union to display the same degree of openness and transparency in regard to its activities in outer space as that which is already shown by other countries.

Apart from the study of technical matters to which I have referred there are several other areas which merit continuing and intensified consideration.

The contribution on terminology which your delegation has made, Mr. President, in Working Paper CD/OS/WP.15, is most pertinent and could help us in our future work.

It has in fact been apparent that much of the terminology used in this area is unclear, especially in relation to some of the new language being used. Terms such as "weaponization" and "militarization" are frequently used but often without clear or precise definition.

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(Mr. Franceschi, Italy)

Moreover, the important issue of verification has not yet received the attention which it deserves. We would note the contribution on this subject made by the United Kingdom in the Committee on 29 July. Verification is at the heart of any arms control measure: an undertaking which cannot be adequately verified can have a negative and destabilizing influence. In the context of outer space there are clearly particular difficulties such as detecting, identifying and tracking in the vastness of space itself, the possibility of concealment of existing weapon systems on Earth, and the limitations of existing verification technology.

We were disappointed that the discussion of proposals in this year's Ad Hoc Committee tended to concentrate on some of the less realistic and less constructive ideas which have been put forward. The attempt by some countries to press their ideas on so-called "space strike weapons" seems to us to be particularly unhelpful, first because the particular term chosen is an emotive one, secondly because it is selective in the systems which it seeks to ban, and thirdly because it seems designed to put pressure on one party to the bilateral negotiations at present being conducted.

We are convinced that those bilateral negotiations have a very important role to play in the prevention of an arms race in outer space and we would emphasize that the work carried out in this Conference should be complementary rather than prejudicial to the outcome of those bilateral negotiations. We would also note that the bilateral negotiations are tackling the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space in the context of overall strategic stability and disarmament. This is certainly a reason why the call for immediate negotiations on a particular subject like "space strike weapons" seems to us not to represent a practical way of proceeding.

While much time was spent on the discussion of these ideas, other proposals received less attention. We hope that next year the Committee will be able more thoroughly and systematically to carry out its mandate.

In conclusion, Mr. President, I would like to emphasize that, although useful work was done this year, the time at our disposal was severely limited. There is still a great deal to be accomplished within the framework of the existing mandate. In this respect we welcome the indications in plenary statements by some delegations that they could continue work on this basis. We intend therefore to encourage this Conference to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee under the present mandate at the earliest possible opportunity in the 1987 session so that this important and substantive work can be pursued.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Italy for his statement and for his comments to the President.

I now give the floor to the representative of Australia, Ambassador Butler.

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Mr. BUTLER (Australia): On several occasions during the course of our work this year statements have been made on behalf of a group of Western States on item 1 of the Conference agenda -- nuclear test ban. This present statement is made on behalf of that same group of Western States. It is made in order to ensure that there is complete clarity about the position of that group of States, especially given the nature and progress of consideration of the report of the Conference on its work, during 1986, under agenda item 1.

We have made it clear repeatedly, this year, that we attach great importance to item 1 of our agenda. We have made it clear that we believe that serious conduct of work on that agenda item requires, indeed, demands, that an ad hoc committee of the Conference be established with an appropriate mandate. We have proposed such a mandate, the text of which appears in document CD/521.

As is well known, that mandate provides for a substantive examination of the specific issues involved in a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, in particular, those of scope, verification and compliance. We have made it plain in our mandate that the purpose of such substantive work would be with "a view to negotiation of a treaty on the subject", that is, a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty.

It has been a source of deep regret to us that our mandate has not been accepted and that an ad hoc committee has not been established in 1986. This disappointment is real because of the seriousness of our purpose on the subject at issue. The reality of that disappointment is made sharper by the frequency and ways in which both the terms of our mandate, and the seriousness of our purpose, have been misrepresented by a few delegations.

It is of importance for us to make this point: we reject any suggestion that our mandate is a device to delay work on this important subject. Any such representation of our mandate both distorts the reality of it as such and the policies which support it. This is also true for statements seeking to assert that our proposal reflects only ideas of one or a small group of countries within the Western Group.

Given developments both bilaterally and multilaterally in recent months with regard to the nuclear test ban issue, it has been a matter of special concern to us that those developments have not been able to be complemented and accompanied by a consensus decision in this Conference enabling the Conference on Disarmament to resume work on the nuclear test ban issue. In saying this we are aware too that only a few weeks ago it seemed possible to find consensus in terms of our draft mandate, in a way which would have enabled an ad hoc committee to be established and work to have been started. Even though that work would have been late in this year's session it would have started and it clearly would have carried over into our session next year.

Also of deep concern to us is the manner in which some delegations have tried to have the Conference's final report misrepresent why no ad hoc committee was formed. We do not believe that it is constructive to frame the Conference report on this subject in an accusatory way.

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(Mr. Butler, Australia)

The purpose of this statement is therefore not to make or register any such accusations. Instead it is to reiterate our deep concern that the willingness of the majority to see practical work advanced on this important subject should have been thwarted, in 1986.

It is also of fundamental importance to us that the Conference report on this subject indicate that a group of Western States, attached great importance to practical work being resumed, in the Conference, on the substantive issues involved in a nuclear test ban treaty, deeply regretted that this was not possible in 1986, and is committed to doing whatever it can to ensure that such work commences at the earliest possible moment during the 1987 session of the Conference.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Australia for his statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Cuba, Ambassador Lechuga, who will speak in his capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons to introduce the report of the Ad Hoc Committee, contained in document CD/722.

Mr. LECHUGA (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): In my capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, I wish to discharge my task of introducing to the Conference the report on the work done this year, which has been circulated among delegations in document CD/722.

The Committee began its meetings on 7 March and held a total of 17, as well as a number of consultations among members. The Committee's last meeting was held on 11 August.

In keeping with the agreement reached, the Committee continued to work on the basis of the so-called unitary approach, that is to say, the prohibition of radiological weapons in the "traditional" sense, and the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities.

It was also agreed to continue consideration of both questions without dividing them into two "tracks", without giving priority to either of them, and on the understanding that this working method was without prejudice to the final position of delegations or to the link between both questions and the most appropriate form of considering them.

The programme of work adopted for 1986 was the same as for the previous year and to deal with it the Committee adopted our suggestion of establishing three contact groups, open to the participation of all delegations, to deal with the issues of scope and definitions, peaceful uses and cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and the subjects of verification and compliance, which were co-ordinated by Ambassadors Ekeus of Sweden, Meisster of Hungary and Butler of Australia.

Active work was carried out in the context of the contact groups and was obviously very much enhanced by the efforts made by all delegations and by the co-ordinators, whose task it was to guide the work of the groups.

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(Mr. Lechuga, Cuba)

By way of conclusion, Mr. President, the Committee considered that it did useful work in terms of the mandate assigned by the Conference, in the sense that the positions of countries were clarified and differences of substance and approach were revealed with regard to the questions under consideration.

The Committee recommends to the Conference that, at the beginning of its 1987 session, it should re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee, which should, inter alia, consider the ways and means of how best to proceed further.

It is also recommended that, as a basis for the future work of the Committee, account be taken of the documents referred to in paragraphs 6, 9, 10 and 11 as well as any other document or proposal that is relevant in accordance with the report.

I would not like to conclude this introduction without thanking all delegations, and particularly Ambassadors Ekeus, Meiszter and Butler, of Sweden, Hungary and Australia respectively, for the work that was done and their continuous co-operation, as well as express thanks to Mr. Victor Slipchenko and his colleagues in the Secretariat who, with their efforts and devotion, rendered substantial support to the Committee.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Cuba for his statement introducing the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons. This concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor?

I call on the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Rose.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): Having closely studied the written text of the statement which the Australian Ambassador made last Thursday, I would like to reaffirm what I said the same day. A detailed answer would require a lot of time as his statement contains a host of distortions and misrepresentations, to say the least of it. But, time is urgently needed for the conclusion of the Conference's work. That is why I have asked the Secretariat to distribute the text of the speech I made last Tuesday. The passages marked will help to compare the two statements. Let me add the following observations.

It was with particular vehemence that the Ambassador of Australia expressed his opposition to the request for immediate CTBT negotiations and, in this context, accused delegations of obstruction of progress. It is bad enough that such a thing should be said by someone who knows perfectly well, for example, who turned down the President's compromise proposed last February, and who did not. However, this is not my main point, since everyone here is aware of the efforts my delegation has been undertaking to help find a solution acceptable to all. I should like to remind you of the fact that the United Nations General Assembly adopted resolution 40/81 at its session last year. Paragraph 4 of that resolution is as follows:

"Urges the Conference on Disarmament to establish at the beginning of its session in 1986 an ad hoc committee under item 1 of its agenda entitled 'Nuclear Test Ban' to begin negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty".

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(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

Not only did Australia, represented by Ambassador Butler, give its approval to this resolution but it acted also as one of its co-sponsors. I think this speaks volumes, so that no further comments are needed.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): I will not delay the Conference any further. I think every one would agree that this exchange that has taken place in the last couple of plenary meetings has been interesting. I thank the Ambassador of the German Democratic Republic for redistributing his text of 19 August and underlining certain passages. I agree that will help others make the comparison of statements which he has called for. It is important, I think, that I simply record that I stand by what I said at our last plenary meeting. I reject any suggestion that my statement contained distortions or misrepresentations, but I think, as I said, we have probably had a fair exchange.

Finally, I am grateful that attention was drawn to resolution 40/81. It was an important resolution and indeed it was co-sponsored by Australia. It received a very considerable vote in the General Assembly. It is perhaps sufficient for me to end these remarks by calling attention to who voted which way on this resolution.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): In some earlier statements and in those made today by the distinguished representatives of the United States and Australia it would appear from them that their authors are convinced that the arguments they advance with regard to item 1 of our agenda are arguments that have the support of the majority.

I wish to believe that they are not referring to the Assembly, because in the Assembly we have very concrete facts, year after year and the latest at the fortieth session, which speak for themselves. At that session, resolution 40/80B was the one that obtained the highest number of votes among the resolutions relating to complete cessation of nuclear tests. Therefore, I wish to believe that they are referring to the Conference on Disarmament. However, we might have differing opinions, yet it is not opinions that count but facts.

The distinguished representative of Australia refers, every time he takes the floor, to the draft in document CD/521. It is draft that dates from 1984. If chronology were to have any value here then we the members of the Group of 21 could mention another draft, in document CD/520, which is a day older than the one of the Western countries. But we do not believe that in the negotiations this type of draft should be put forward as an ultimatum, a "take it or leave it". For this reason we have not submitted any detailed programme amplifying what we said in our draft mandate in document CD/520. We have nothing, therefore, that is equivalent to document CD/621, which is simply a detailed elaboration of document CD/521. Any why? It is because we knew that document CD/520 was not acceptable to some delegations, hence it would have been a waste of time to draw up a document 620 giving more details on document 520.

So what have we done Mr. President? What we have done has been to endeavour to understand what aspects are of particular importance to the Western European Group, and it would appear that one of those aspects is that

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(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

of verification, of verification and compliance. Therefore in our draft resolution, which became resolution 40/80A, we suggested the establishment of an ad hoc committee and, in that ad hoc committee, two working groups, one of which would deal exclusively with those aspects of particular interest to the Group of Western European States, and the other would deal, and I think this is quite normal and natural, with those aspects of particular interest to us. Those two working groups would work, as the resolution says, on all the various interrelated problems.

I believe that a draft based on what was recommended by the Assembly in resolution 40/80A has the majority and a significant majority, not a majority of 21 to 19, but a majority of more than 30 in favour. Yet perhaps I am mistaken. Therefore I would like to propose to the distinguished representatives members of the Western European Group a procedure that would dispel any doubts. We still have another meeting, the meeting on Thursday, and I would suggest that the Group of 21 on the one hand, or a group of delegations of the Group of 21, present under their sponsorship a draft that would be based on the draft mandate which the Assembly expressly recommended in its resolution 40/80A; and as regards the Western European Group and other countries which are convinced, apparently, of the virtue of the 1984 draft, they could submit another draft, another draft mandate reproducing the 1984 draft. Then, at the meeting on Thursday there would be, not a vote -- we already know that we do not vote here, this is done by consensus -- but a simple illustrative ceremony. The President could have a small urn in front of him and we would all put in a folded paper in which we would express our preference for one of the two mandates, and I am convinced, that the draft mandate which the Assembly recommended in its resolution 40/80A would be the one that would obtain a majority, and I repeat, not a very close majority but an overwhelming majority. Naturally, this would only be to dispel any doubts on this point, I repeat, I know the Conference on Disarmament takes its decisions by consensus, but if our colleagues who have taken the floor and to whom I referred a few moments ago are convinced about what they said to us, I offer them a procedure that can remove any doubts.

Mr. RUTH (Federal Republic of Germany): Since it is my good fortune to be here today, I would like to take the opportunity on behalf of my Government to thank you and the members of the Conference on Disarmament for the very friendly and broad co-operation which you have given to Ambassador Wegener in the time he was here. I think the standing of the Conference in Bonn and the broad information which we are given of your activities is very much due to his affection for this body. I would like to ask you very much to continue the co-operation which you have extended to him, to his successor as well.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Ruth, speaking for the Federal Republic of Germany. I can perhaps tell him what may be obvious, that since it is our understanding that Ambassador Wegener will be speaking on Thursday we will, in any event, be making clear to all Governments, including his own, the high regard in which he is held in this Conference. Normally, it is the practice, as you yourself know, for the President to withhold such statements until what we have tended to call the valedictory statement. I thank you for this expression of appreciation of the co-operation given to you and to Ambassador Wegener, which I am sure will be given to his successor by all members here.

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(The President)

I wonder if we can close the meeting or not. Again it is one of my failings that I tend sometimes to speak frivolously of important subjects and I cannot help wondering whether we need an urn for the ashes of the Conference on Disarmament if we continue as we sometimes do. My preference would be to see the spiral of white smoke that is sometimes viewed in the capital of a representative who spoke this morning. I do not suggest that we elect anyone and signify election by white smoke, but rather that we reach agreement on our report as quickly as possible. Nevertheless, I am sure that all delegations have taken note of the proposal of the representative of Mexico, whether it will be proceeded with or not. May I ask then if I have any other speaker?

May I now then proceed to our next item of business. As announced previously, we should now take note of the Fourth Report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, which was circulated under the symbol CD/720, as well as of the Summary of that Report, as contained in document CD/681/Rev.1. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference takes note of the Fourth Report of the Ad Hoc Group as well as of its Summary.

It was so decided.

I wish to inform you that I shall invite the Chairmen of the Ad Hoc Committees on Chemical Weapons, Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space and the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament to introduce the reports of their Committees at the opening of our plenary meeting on Thursday. We shall adopt those reports at the end of that plenary meeting, together with the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, which was introduced today by the Chairman of that Committee. May I suggest that those members wishing to make statements in connection with the reports of the Ad Hoc Committees inform the Secretariat accordingly and express their preference to speak either before or after the adoption of the Reports of the Ad Hoc Committees.

I feel duty bound to inform you that the Secretariat has informed me that, unless we are able to proceed rather more expeditiously than we have been doing, we will face two possibilities, one of which might lead to the other. One is the unpalatable prospect of attempting to extend our session, against the very severe financial constraints that we face -- it may in any event, prove impossible to have such an extension. The other alternative I have in mind, of course, is that we do not reach agreement on a report and an extension may be the first step towards reaching new agreement. I hope that neither of those prospects is an imminent one.

May I recall that we shall hold this afternoon, at 3 p.m., an informal meeting of the Conference to begin the second reading of the draft annual report to the General Assembly of the United Nations and to consider other matters. In talking about a second reading, as previously announced, and depending on the results of various informal consultations, we may be able to hold a meeting of the Drafting Committee immediately after the informal plenary meeting, assuming, as we hope to be the case, that the informal plenary meeting will be relatively brief.



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(The President)

So, let me recapitulate. At 3 p.m. we will be holding an informal meeting of the Conference to begin the second reading of the draft annual report, basically those parts that we have been able to give first reading to. Depending on the results of informal consultations, we may be able to hold a meeting of the Drafting Committee immediately after the informal plenary meeting.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 28 August at 10 a.m.

The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.25 p.m.

## CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.384

29 August 1986

ENGLISH

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### FINAL RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-FOURTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Friday, 29 August 1986, at 5.30 p.m.

President:

Mr. J. Allan Beesley

(Canada)

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The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 384th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference will adopt at this plenary meeting its annual report to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

As announced yesterday at the end of the plenary meeting, the draft annual report is contained in document CD/WP.243/Rev.1. It was made available to delegations this afternoon and another circulation has been made available at the table for this plenary meeting. I am grateful to those delegations which have not yet received it in their own language and have agreed to allow us to continue.

The draft annual report appearing in document CD/WP.243/Rev.1 includes the technical parts of the annual report, as well as the substantive paragraphs on those items on the agenda on which no ad hoc committees were established during the 1986 session. The reports of the Ad hoc Committees, which the Conference adopted at our plenary meeting yesterday, will become an integral part of the annual report. They will be added to the text before you in document CP/WP.243/Rev.1 once the report is adopted, at the time of its submission for processing as an official document of the Conference. They will therefore be in the final text which will be circulated here as well as during the General Assembly.

You will notice that some blank spaces still remain. They will be filled in by the Secretariat at the time of processing the annual report. Members finding any errors of an editorial or technical character in the various languages should transmit their comments and suggestions directly to the Secretariat. I think you will all agree that we should not lose time now dealing with such questions.

No member has asked to speak before the adoption of the annual report. Accordingly, I shall now proceed to submit the text for consideration.

I put before the Conference for adoption the draft annual report to the forty-first session of the General Assembly of the United Nations as contained in document CP/WP.243/Rev.1. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts its annual report.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I now give the floor to the representative of Belgium, Ambassador Clerckx.

Mr CLERCKX (Belgium) (translated from French): My delegation, on the orders of its Government, would like to make a brief comment regarding the text we have just adopted.

When the report was being prepared in the Drafting Committee, my delegation had expressed its disagreement with the sentence which appears in

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(Mr. Clerckx, Belgium)

the section on item 3 of our agenda, "Prevention of Nuclear War", in paragraph 79, which says that members of the Group of 21 were of the view that it was inadmissible that the prospect of the annihilation of human civilization was used by some States to promote their security.

In its bombastic form and the context in which it is placed, the intention behind that sentence, in a way that no one can fail to grasp, is offensive to those States which depend in particular on nuclear deterrence for their security.

My delegation remains opposed to that formulation, just as it remains opposed to any formulation of the same nature, in any context, and of any origin whatsoever.

In a document which is intended for the General Assembly of the United Nations and, through the General Assembly, to inform world opinion of the progress of our efforts towards peace and disarmament, a document which, in short, is aimed at fostering understanding and dialogue among peoples, there is no place for offensive insinuations or accusations against any country.

This is why my delegation would have wished that, in the circumstances, the idea contained in the paragraph could have been expressed in doubtless just as clear a way, but without any unpleasant implications.

A sentence such as "Members of the Group of 21 were of the view that no country should promote its security by means involving risks of annihilation of human civilization" would I think have been entirely appropriate. At this stage I would only submit this as an example to illustrate that, with good will we can eliminate from a report the far too deliberately sharp edges without, however, distorting the content or the significance. My delegation regrets this could not be done.

However, in spite of this deep concern, my delegation did not want to hinder the process of our Conference and adopt an attitude which would have prevented the timely achievement of a consensus on the report.

Therefore, it did not insist, and in a spirit of conciliation based on practical considerations -- and only in that spirit -- in this instance it agreed to ignore something it none the less regards as a text which is out of place.

However, I should like to emphasize quite clearly that, in the future, my delegation will no longer endorse formulations drafted in this way.

Mr. CHIRILA (Romania) (translated from French): Mr. President, allow me to reiterate the Romanian delegation's satisfaction at seeing you preside over the work of the Conference on Disarmament in the month of August. We would now like to add how much we have appreciated your special skills and we wish to express our gratitude to you for the efforts that you have so resolutely deployed in order to lead the work of the Conference for this year to a

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(Mr. Chirila, Romania)

successful conclusion. The most convincing proof of this is the preparation and adoption of the report of the Conference under conditions that we are all well aware of.

Romania's position in regard to disarmament as well as its assessments of the role and the work of this multilateral negotiating forum have been the subject of statements by our delegation throughout this year's session of the Conference. The very essence of our position was reflected above all in the declaration of the Grand National Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Romania concerning the International Year of Peace, which our delegation had the honour of presenting during the plenary meetings of the Conference. In the present international circumstances, Romania considers it a matter of the utmost importance and priority to elaborate and implement a complex disarmament programme, in which measures for stage-by-stage nuclear disarmament, as well as the elimination of chemical weapons, must be accompanied by radical reductions, of at least 50 per cent, in all weapons, troop forces and military budgets, by the end of the century. All disarmament measures and programmes must be guaranteed by appropriate and effective international control, with broad participation by all States.

We believe that the report on the Conference's session this year reflects by and large the increasing awareness in this forum of the abjective needs and urgent priorities in halting the arms race and achieving a genuine process of disarmament, and also the responsibility incumbent upon the Conference, and upon each Member State in this regard.

But the essential thing that still has to be done, in our opinion, is to make the actual shift to concrete negotiations to arrive at agreements and implement effective measures.

Generally speaking, in the circumstances we all know and which our delegation has already had occasion to mention, we are obliged to note that the results up to now far from confirm our expectations.

The work on the first three items of the agenda and also on item 6, which covers what is unanimously recognized as being the most urgent and important problem, namely nuclear disarmament, has not gone beyond the phase of general statements. It has not been possible to establish effective working bodies.

In all the work of the session, the specific topics on which marked headway could be made include, above all, the elaboration of a draft convention on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons. We welcome the measures adopted by the Conference to ensure the requisite continuity and effective conditions of work in the intersessional period for the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.

As to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, we consider that the work this year of the Ad Hoc Committee and of the Conference in general have revealed yet again, and in a most convincing way, the political, legal, security, and also practical, reasons for reconfirming the urgent need to assign the Ad Hoc Committee in the future with a specific mandate for

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(Mr. Chirila, Romania)

effective negotiations to elaborate one or more international legal instruments designed to prevent an arms race in space, in terms of all those aspects.

We also express the hope that the Conference will be in a position, even in the first part of its next session, to fulfil its mandate of elaborating the comprehensive programme of disarmament. Lastly, the Romanian delegation hopes that, in the face of today's demands, the Conference on Disarmament will in the future be in a position, through genuine negotiations and a resolute common quest to elaborate specific and verifiable agreements, meet the greatest challenge of our times, namely the elimination of a nuclear danger and of war in general.

Mr. President, I would like to take this opportunity once again to convey to you our congratulations and thanks again for the exemplary way in which you have conducted our work. Similarly, we wish to express our warm thanks to the Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Komatina, the Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Berasategui, and all the members of the Secretariat and the interpretation services for their efforts in ensuring the proper functioning and successful completion of the work of this year's session of the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Romania for his statement and for his kind words to the President. I now give the floor to the representative of Nigeria, Ambassador Tonwe.

Mr. TONWE (Nigeria): As we approach the end of the 1986 session of the Conference on Disarmament, I would like to make a few remarks in my capacity as Co-ordinator of the Group of Non-Aligned and Neutral States, the Group of 21.

Yesterday, the Conference on Disarmament adopted, thanks to your ingenious guidance, and the co-operation of delegations, several important elements of its report for 1986. Today, we have just adopted the entire report for the year. We may rejoice at what we have achieved, we may lament what we have left undone. It has not been all negative. We have achieved practically nothing in the areas to which the Group of 21 and, it must be said, the United Nations General Assembly, through its various resolutions, attach the greatest priority. We have nevertheless made some progress, which is discernible, for example, towards a chemical weapons convention.

All through our deliberations, the Group of 21 has, as usual, tried loyally to implement the relevant resolutions of the United Nations, while remaining constructive, tolerant and flexible. In spite of our approach, it has not been possible to agree on many fundamental issues with all other groups. The right to disagree, Mr. President, is the sovereign right of every delegation. So is the right of every delegation to have its views recorded for the information of the United Nations General Assembly. We in the Group of 21 believe that the exercise of these rights is essential for the correct assessment of the outcome of our work by the General Assembly. Any attempt to gloss over divergencies would therefore have been counter-productive.

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(Mr Tonwe, Nigeria)

I do not wish to spur a discussion. I merely wish to say that the very fact that we have been able to get a report for the 1986 session is in itself a success, and that that success in a small measure is due to the understanding and flexibility of all delegations.

The main credit, however, goes to you, Mr. President. Your confidence-inspiring personality, your professional skill, your wisdom, patience and affability are largely responsible for the fruitful conclusion of our sessional work. That is the enthusiastic judgement of the Group of 21 and, I believe, that of other delegations and groups.

Having said that, permit me, Mr. President, to say how sorry we are to see so many worthy members of our Conference leave finally at the end of this session. I speak about Ambassadors Celso de Souza e Silva of Brazil, Henning Wegener of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ryukichi Imai of Japan, and Jacques Jessel of France.

Ambassador de Souza e Silva is a highly respected veteran of disarmament negotiations, whose contributions at the Conference, and at the meetings of the Group of 21, were always highly professional, instructive and constructive. The Nigerian delegation and the Group of 21 will miss his incisive statements and his friendship. We wish him every success in his new endeavours.

Ambassador Henning Wegener's brilliant contributions to the work of the Conference are recognized by all. He was dynamic and forthright. He presented the views forcefully and clearly. His intellectual honesty was never in doubt. If one could not agree with him, one knew it. His intellectual strength, his warm and pleasant personality endeared Ambassador Wegener to his colleagues. We are happy to see him go to a fitting assignment which will, inevitably, make him maintain a keen interest in the work of our Conference.

Ambassador Ryukichi Imai of Japan has, in his characteristically friendly way, made invaluable contributions to our work, by consistently seeking what was practicable. His unique ability to reconcile the aspirations of the Group of 21 and the policies of the Western Group helped the progress of our negotiations. We wish him every success in his future assignment.

Ambassador Jacques Jessel of France took over the leadership of his country's delegation not so long ago. During this short period, he established his reputation as a highly skilled, profound and personable diplomat. We regret his early departure and wish him every success.

May I take this opportunity to welcome Ambassador Stulpnagel of the Federal Republic of Germany and Ambassador J.D. Teja of India, who have recently taken over the leadership of their respective delegations. We look forward to continuing the fruitful co-operation which we have had with their predecessors.

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(Mr. Tonwe Nigeria)

Mr. President, I would also like to convey, through you, the appreciation of the Nigerian delegation, and that of the Group of 21, to Ambassador M. Komatina, Secretary-General of the Conference, his Deputy, Ambassador V. Berasategui, and all members of the Secretariat, whose recognized professional experience, diligence and dedication have greatly facilitated our task.

Finally, I should thank the team of interpreters without whose tireless efforts our Conference, instead of being the unique multilateral disarmament negotiating forum that it is, would have even looked more like a Tower of Babel.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Nigeria for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President.

I call on the representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Cromartie.

Mr. CROMARTIE (United Kingdom): I am very happy that it falls to me as co-ordinator of the month for the Group of Western Countries to thank and congratulate you very warmly on the conclusion of the 1986 session of the Conference, by the adoption of its annual report to the General Assembly of the United Nations. I think that it is generally recognized that August is the most difficult month to preside over this Conference and I can testify to this from personal experience. Some of the tasks tackled by Presidents can, if necessary, be bequeathed to their successors, but not the adoption of the Conference's report, for which the responsibility lies with the President for the month of August. You have brought to this formidable task long experience of multilateral diplomacy and accomplished it with great tact and patience by the judicious exercise of your impartial authority as President. We are all most grateful to you for your dedication and skill in guiding the Conference to consensus. In accordance with our Rules of Procedure your term extends to the end of January, but this is the highpoint and we congratulate you most sincerely on it.

I should like to thank the Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Komatina, and the Deputy Secretary-General, Ambassador Berasategui, for all they have done for the Conference this session and especially for their contribution to making today's results possible in spite of the particular difficulties this year in view of the financial stringency. I should also like to thank all other members of the Secretariat, seen and unseen, who have assisted our work, especially the interpreters, translators and all those who have helped to produce the necessary documents with limited resources and compressed deadlines.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United Kingdom for his statement and for his kind words to the President.

There is no other representative inscribed to speak after the adoption of the annual report. Does any other member wish to take the floor at this stage? If no other member wishes to speak, allow me to make some concluding observations.



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(The President)

In my statement at the beginning of August, I noted our determination to continue to make as much substantive progress on as many agenda items as possible during the remaining days of the session. I also noted the requirement for the complete commitment and co-operation of the Chairmen of the Ad Hoc Committees, and of their working groups, of the Secretary-General of the Conference and of his able staff, and of every delegation here, in order to reach these objectives.

I am of course extremely pleased that, as a result of the co-operation wholeheartedly given by all concerned, further substantive progress was achieved on several Conference items and, moreover, we have adopted our report to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

I will not take your time to outline in any detail what we may have achieved in this session of the Conference, as you are well aware of what has been accomplished -- our hopes, our expectations, our failures, our successes.

Assessments of the results differ in any event, if they fell short of our hopes, and even our expectations, none the less there is a widespread view that there were some positive and substantive developments which can be noted. There was also less antagonism, the atmosphere was healthier, and, as a consequence perhaps, there was more business-like work, more in-depth discussions, and greater clarification of basic arms control issues, even on such questions as outer space and a nuclear test ban. There are positive signs even on these last two issues, although not, I am sure, as much as we would all wish. On the unresolved nuclear disarmament issues, deep divergencies remain, but we have at least begun to learn how to structure our work more successfully, which I hope can be further developed when next we meet. There is little, if any, disagreement that we have made significant progress in the negotiations on chemical weapons, and that we must not only maintain but accelerate the intensity and pace of our work. We leave it in good hands, having left a part of the work with our present Chairman, Ambassador Cromartie, and he will pass on the torch, of course, to Ambassador Ekéus.

As to our report, it will be recalled that I undertook, in my statement of 5 August, to work with you to ensure the right of every delegation and every group to have its views recorded. I hope that you will agree that, together, we have fulfilled that commitment. You will recall that I drew attention also to the improved atmosphere in the Conference which I have just noted and expressed then the hope that this would facilitate our work. It is now quite clear that the constructive manner in which delegations and groups agreed to express their views, often on subjects on which there are quite profound differences of opinion, played no small part in further improving the atmosphere and thus in achieving an agreed report. A widespread desire to produce a more concise and less controversial report was evident. If we achieved any success to this end, it is as a direct result of the co-operative and conciliatory attitudes of all of you, the delegations here.

Undoubtedly, there is scope for improvement in our report-writing process. Indeed, if I were faced with this task of presiding again, I would

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(The President)

seriously consider recommending a change in the name of my country so that I would be able to miss the opportunity. I take the liberty of commending to you for your consideration an informal suggestion by one of the most senior and distinguished members of the Group of 21 that we consider establishing a group of wise men early in the Spring session next year to consult on means of improving the efficiency of our report-writing process.

Much has been said about the tremendous contributions to our work made by the Chairmen of the Ad Hoc Committees and there is much that I could say, but little I can add except to say that we have been fortunate, indeed, in our choice of chairmen.

Much has been said also about the tremendous contributions of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Komatina, the Deputy Secretary-General, Ambassador Berasategui, and his whole staff throughout the Conference, including perhaps, particularly sometimes, the interpreters and the translators who have to make us sound a little better than we are. But I think it is in enabling us to produce a report in the time available, given the serious financial constraints within which we are working, that we have seen truly incredible accomplishments on the part of the Secretariat. I have personally never encountered a more dedicated, competent and highly professional group of international public servants in my 25 years of involvement in multilateral diplomacy. I express, on behalf of all of you, our thanks to each of them.

In closing, may I add my most sincere appreciation to each of you, for your co-operation, again and again, whenever it has been asked of you. More than any other single factor it is this very spirit that gives me reason to be hopeful for our future work.

Of course, I am fully aware that my duties as President of the Conference do not end with this statement. During the intersessional period, I shall be available, here, and for relatively brief periods in New York, for any consultation that might be deemed desirable in connection with the organization of the next annual session of the Conference. All of you may rest assured that I remain at your disposal to assist in any effort intended to advance our work.

This concludes our business for the 1986 session of the Conference on Disarmament. Before I adjourn this plenary meeting I should like to announce that the next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 3 February 1987, at 10.30 a.m. As agreed by the Conference at the time of the adoption of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, document CD/727, paragraph 10(c), the Ad Hoc Committee will officially resume its work on Monday, 12 January 1987, at 3 p.m. in Conference Room III. I should also like to recall that open-ended consultations of the Ad Hoc Committee will be held between 24 November and 17 December 1986, including, when necessary, meetings with full services.

The plenary meeting is adjourned and the 1986 session of the Conference on Disarmament is closed.

The meeting rose at 6.35 p.m.

**Secret**

**Secret**