

191 MAR 1985  
**LOGGED**

**IC STAFF  
 Routing Slip**

TO:	ACTION	COORD	INFO
EO/ICS			
D/ICS			✓
DD/ICS			
EA-D/ICS			
SA-D/ICS			
SA-D/ICS-EP			
CIPC			
LL			
PPS			✓
PBS			✓
COMIREX			
SIGINT			
HUMINT			
FIPC			
IHC			✓
SECOM			✓
CCIS			
SECRETARIAT			
FLC			
AS			
REGISTRY		3/11/85	
DDCI			
SUSPENSE: _____ Date			
REMARKS:			

3/8

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**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT  
ROUTING SLIP**

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR		X		
4	D/ICS		X		
5	DDI		X		
6	DDA		X		
7	DDO		X		
8	DDS&T		X		
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC		X		
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/Pers				
14	D/OLL				
15	D/PAO				
16	SA/IA				
17	AO/DCI				
18	C/IPD/OIS				
19	NIO /S&T		X		
20	C/TTIC		X		
21					
22					

SUSPENSE \_\_\_\_\_

Date

Remarks

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**J. V. H. Rixse**

Executive Secretary

5 March 1985

Date

3637 (10-81)



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Executive Registry	
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Honorable Malcolm Baldrige  
Secretary of Commerce  
Washington, D.C. 20230

Dear Mac:

I wholeheartedly support your proposal for an NSC-led effort to deny the Soviet Union and other potential adversaries access to sensitive scientific and technical information through NTIS. As you know, we all have sought to develop effective ways for reducing the overall flow of militarily useful U.S. and Western technology that is strengthening Soviet military capabilities. Recent legislation allowing DoD to control sensitive, non-classified information of military importance has been helpful from our point of view.

In November 1984 DoD initiated a new review of the release of all technical data. That month I issued new directives requiring document reviews for export control considerations, which will lead to marking documents (including formerly classified documents) that are found to be sensitive and controlling their distribution. Because NTIS' mission is to disseminate technical data publicly, the Department of Defense (DoD) will not provide any export-controlled technical data to NTIS in the future. The DoD appears to have already made some progress in this regard. I am sure your staff has pointed out that only one of the DoD studies you cite as being available in NTIS (Polymeric Microelectronics) is dated after 1981.


I fully agree with you that we should make a coordinated, government-wide attack on the loss of S&T information. The National Security Council (NSC) could establish general guidelines, using already-implemented programs as examples. I propose that the NSC assign this effort to the Senior Interagency Group (SIG) on the Transfer of Strategic Technology. That SIG includes the relevant government agencies and can address this particular problem of technology transfer control in terms of broader Administration policy. I presume that some sort of working group would be established to involve policy officials familiar with the issue.

Finally, let me note that we also do not want to relax our efforts in stopping illegal trade in militarily-significant technology. You mention that this source accounts for little

more than 10 percent of Soviet acquisitions. But this technology is the "quality ten percent" that has been specifically targeted by Soviet intelligence under the direction of the Soviet military R&D authorities. We want to continue the Reagan Administration momentum in controlling this severe loss and improving the management of our export control system.

I look forward to continued cooperation in these and other matters of technology transfer management.

Sincerely,



cc: Secretary of State  
Attorney General  
Secretary of Energy  
Director, Office of Management and Budget  
Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
→ Director, Central Intelligence  
Administrator, National Aeronautics  
and Space Administration