



25X1

~~TOP SECRET~~

UAB + Sanitization
Exhibit file



25X1

Revised and Final
Copy 22 of 32

COMOR-D-22 / 1

7 November 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: United States Intelligence Board

SUBJECT: Proposal for Downgrading and Release of TALENT Photography Acquired Prior to May 1, 1960, on the Eastern European Satellites and Communist China including Tibet


1. The purpose of this memorandum is to propose the downgrading and release at the SECRET NOFORN level TALENT photography acquired over Eastern European satellites and Communist China including Tibet prior to May 1, 1960, and to explain the ill effects of not making it available at the SECRET level (in pursuance of the request of the Department of State representative at the USIB when it considered the downgrading and release of materials on the USSR),

2. Authority to downgrade and release from the TALENT Control System at the SECRET level materials on the subject areas is a critical requirement as [redacted] it relates directly to the combat effectiveness of our strike forces in the event of an emergency. EWO and mission of CINCEUR (including USAREUR and USAFE) and CINCPAC (including PACAF) are vitally affected. Both of these commands have hundreds of targets in Satellites and China. Release of material will allow:

a. A more realistic targeting program (i. e. eliminate thousands of man hours expended on sanitization).

b. Enable combat crews to study actual photography and reports, thus insuring more effective strike effort if ever required.

25X1



~~TOP SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2003/12/03

TOP SECRET B01090R002600

150008-6

c. Provide analysts, estimators, and planners with vital information derived from over-flight program, thus improving effectiveness of planning during critical period ahead.

In the case of CINCSAC, who also has strike forces allocated to these areas, it will greatly improve targeting and eliminate thousands of hours required on sanitization. It will allow combat crews to have actual target materials, thus increasing their confidence and ability to perform mission, if required.

3. The ACIC (Aeronautical Chart and Information Center) and AMS (Army Map Service) has had to expend thousands of hours on sanitization procedures in order to apply information obtained to charts, data sheets, geodetic studies, etc.

4. Sanitization is so expensive and time consuming that numerous items obtained in satellites and China have never been sanitized. Besides, the sanitization requirement posed by other current collection efforts will require the full application of our limited resources in this field. Therefore, downgrading of these areas is not merely a matter of convenience, but is a critical requirement which could effect our national security (i. e., effectiveness of our strike forces) if not promptly implemented.

5. It is recognized that the U. S. has admitted overflights only of the USSR. It is not proposed to inform the public of our over-flight of other countries. The SECRET classification, by direction of the President of the United States, does by regulation provide a severe restriction and commensurate penalties for violation, albeit the standards for clearance at the SECRET level are noticeably less than those imposed for access to TALENT information. The source of photography will not be identified, though some will speculate as to the true source.

6. Recommendation: It is recommended that the United States Intelligence Board approve the downgrading and release to the SECRET/NOFORN [redacted] level of photography acquired over Eastern European satellites and Communist China including Tibet, prior to 1 May 1960.

25X1C

25X1A

[redacted]

Chairman
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

25X1

- Copy 2--OSD
- 3--JCS TCO
- 4--OACSI TCO
- 5, 6, 7--ONI TCO
- 8, 9--AFCIN TCO
- 10--NSA TCO

[redacted]

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP92B01090R002600150008-6

Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP92B01090R002600150008-6