

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

OIT-89-0145
4 October 1989

Mr. Arthur E. Fajans
Director
Security Plans and Programs
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
Washington, D.C. 20301-2000

Dear Mr. Fajans:


This is in response to your letter of 4 August 1989 concerning DoD Directive 5200.30, "Guidelines for Systematic Declassification Review of Classified Information in Permanently Valuable DoD Records." A copy of your letter and the Directive is enclosed as Tab A.

Specifically, you requested that CIA review enclosure 6 of the Directive. We have reviewed that enclosure for currency and completeness and commend DoD for its thoroughness and understanding of intelligence related matters. We have made a few additions, as you will note, but mainly we have consolidated and re-ordered the 1983 list, hopefully to increase its usefulness to DoD reviewers. A revised enclosure 6 is enclosed as Tab B.

We have also given some scrutiny to the remaining sections of the Directive and have identified a few other areas which might affect CIA interests as well. Enclosed at Tab C are some suggested changes which we believe would further safeguard information having to do with intelligence matters.

Thank you for affording us this opportunity to comment on and to clarify CIA interests in this Directive. If we can be of further assistance or if there are any questions, my point of contact in this matter is telephone

Sincerely,


John H. Wright
Information and Privacy Coordinator

STAT

Enclosures

cc: Director, Information Security Oversight Office
Director, Records Declassification Division, National
Archives and Records Administration

STAT

OIT/MSG/ISD/CRB/HRP/JSC/taj/29 Aug 89
(updated and enlarged 19 Sep 89)

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CRB #135



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-2000

POLICY

4 August 1989

Mr. Jack Wright
Information Privacy Coordinator
ATTN: [redacted]
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C 20505

STAT

Dear Mr. Wright:

Reference is made to the telephone conversation today between [redacted] of your staff and Mr. Fred Cook of this office.

STAT

We have asked Department of Defense Components and the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) to review the enclosed DoD Directive 5200.30, "Guidelines for Systematic Declassification Review of Classified Information in Permanently Valuable DoD Records," for currency and completeness.

Because enclosure 6 of the Directive deals with guidelines for systematic declassification review of areas of interest to the Central Intelligence Agency, it is requested that this enclosure be reviewed. Please advise us of the results of your review at your earliest convenience.

My point of contact is Mr. Fred Cook, telephone 695-2289/2686.

Sincerely,

Arthur E. Fajans
Arthur E. Fajans
Director
Security Plans and Programs

Enclosure
As stated

cc: (w/o encl)
Director, ISOO
Chief, Records Declassification Division
National Archives and Records Administration

AUG 9 9 44 AM '89

19 September 1989
5200.30 (Encl 6)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY--SUBJECTS OF SPECIAL CONCERN

1. Information that identifies CIA operational organizations, installations, agents, sources, or methods.
2. Information that could identify CIA personnel under official or nonofficial cover, or could reveal a cover arrangement.
3. Intelligence reports that could have come from covert sources, or information derived from them, which could divulge intelligence sources or methods.
4. Information the release of which could place an individual in jeopardy.
5. Information that could divulge intelligence interests, intelligence requirements, the value of intelligence information, or the extent of Intelligence Community knowledge on a subject.
6. Names of CIA staff personnel or agents.
7. Information divulging U.S. intelligence collection and assessment capabilities.
8. Information on technical systems for the collection or production of intelligence.
9. Methods or procedures used to acquire or produce intelligence or support intelligence activities.
10. Information on the structure, size, budget, foreign and domestic installations, security, or objectives of CIA.
11. Training provided to or by CIA personnel that would indicate CIA's capabilities or identify its personnel or agents.
12. CIA's personnel recruiting, hiring, training, assignment, and/or evaluation policies.
13. Any reports or publications by CIA, particularly NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES, other finished intelligence analysis, raw (field) intelligence reports, and related documents.*
14. Special access programs used by CIA.
15. Information on CIA's counterintelligence policies, practices, and capabilities.

17. Contractual relationships entered into by CIA, especially those which reveal specific interests and expertise.
18. Any CIA information or publication including or derived from SIGINT (COMINT, ELINT, etc.). [Material in this category should also be referred to NSA.]
19. Any CIA information or publication including or derived from overhead imagery.
20. Information on foreign nuclear programs, facilities, capabilities, or intentions.
21. Diplomatic or economic activities affecting the national security or international security negotiations.
22. Information related to political or economic instabilities in a foreign country, the divulgence of which could endanger American lives or installations in that country.
23. Covert activities conducted abroad in support of U.S. foreign policy.
24. Information on the surreptitious collection of information in a foreign nation by U.S. intelligence, especially when its disclosure could affect relations with that country.
25. Covert relationships with international organizations or foreign governments, especially liaison arrangements with foreign intelligence services and information derived from that liaison.
26. Information on the defense plans and capabilities of the U.S. or its allies, exposure of which could enable an adversary to develop countermeasures. [This is also of interest to the DoD.]
27. Information tending to disclose U.S. systems and weapons capabilities or deployment. [This is also of interest to the DoD.]
28. Information affecting U.S. plans to meet diplomatic contingencies affecting the national security. [This is also of interest to the DoS.]
29. Information the disclosure of which could lead to foreign political, economic, or military action against the United States or its allies.
30. Information on U.S. nuclear programs and facilities. [This is also of interest to the DoD and DoE.]

31. Information on research, development, and engineering that enables the United States to maintain an advantage of value to national security. [This is also of interest to a number of other U.S. Government departments.]

*[Item 13 in this revised list is designed to replace Items 30-34 in the 1983 list and to refocus attention to broader and higher-priority categories of reporting.]

Alternate wording which the Central Intelligence Agency would prefer in non-CIA segments of DoD's guideline package

In DoD Directive 5200.30, page 1, ¶B4, we would like to amend "...shall be in accordance with special procedures issued by the Director of Central Intelligence." to read "...shall ensure that all such records also be referred to CIA for its determination, as the Director of Central Intelligence is the sole statutory authority enjoined to protect intelligence sources and methods."

Ibid., page 2, ¶E1: Please add the sentence: "Any review of files concerning intelligence activities, sources, or methods shall include referral to the Central Intelligence Agency."

Loc. cit., ¶E3: Please delete: "..., intelligence sources or methods created after 1945,..."

In Encl 4, ¶2e, please change the first line to read: "The information pertains to a diplomatic..."

We would also like to ask that Encl 4, ¶2f be amended as follows:

"Declassification of information which reveals the fact of or identity of a U.S. intelligence source, method, or capability, even when such source, method, or capability is no longer employed and even when disclosure of such source, method, or capability might appear not to cause damage to the national security or place a person in immediate jeopardy, shall be carried out only by the Central Intelligence Agency. All such material shall be referred to CIA for its determination. The Director of Central Intelligence is the sole statutory authority enjoined to protect intelligence sources and methods."

We would also like to amend Encl 4, ¶3, to read as follows:

"Declassification of information that may reveal the identities of clandestine human agents shall be accomplished only through referral of said information to the CIA for its determination."

Encl 5, ¶7: In regard to the sentence: "Reports documenting conversations with foreign officials, that is, foreign government information," while we do not dispute that this is a primary interest of the Department of State, we would prefer a broader definition of the term "foreign government information," to include all information provided to the U.S. Government by a foreign nation or international body of nations, with the expectation that the U.S. Government will protect its confidentiality.



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-2000

POLICY

4 August 1989

Mr. Jack Wright
Information Privacy Coordinator
ATTN: [redacted]
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

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Dear Mr. Wright:

Reference is made to the telephone conversation today between [redacted] of your staff and Mr. Fred Cook of this office.

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We have asked Department of Defense Components and the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) to review the enclosed DoD Directive 5200.30, "Guidelines for Systematic Declassification Review of Classified Information in Permanently Valuable DoD Records," for currency and completeness.

Because enclosure 6 of the Directive deals with guidelines for systematic declassification review of areas of interest to the Central Intelligence Agency, it is requested that this enclosure be reviewed. Please advise us of the results of your review at your earliest convenience.

My point of contact is Mr. Fred Cook, telephone 695-2289/2686.

Sincerely,

Arthur E. Fajans
Arthur E. Fajans
Director
Security Plans and Programs

Enclosure
As stated

cc: (w/o encl)
Director, ISOO
Chief, Records Declassification Division
National Archives and Records Administration

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March 21, 1983
NUMBER 5200.30

Department of Defense Directive USD(P)

SUBJECT: Guidelines for Systematic Declassification Review of Classified Information in Permanently Valuable DoD Records

- References:**
- (a) DoD Directive 5200.30, "Guidelines for Systematic Review of 20-Year-Old Classified Information in Permanently Valuable DoD Records," September 9, 1981 (hereby canceled)
 - (b) Executive Order 12356, "National Security Information," April 2, 1982
 - (c) Information Security Oversight Office Directive No. 1 Concerning National Security Information, June 23, 1982
 - (d) through (g), see enclosure 1

A. REISSUANCE AND PURPOSE

This Directive reissues reference (a); establishes procedures and assigns responsibilities for the systematic declassification review of information classified under references (b) and (c), DoD Directive 5200.1 and DoD 5200.1-R (references (d) and (e)), and prior orders, directives, and regulations governing security classification; and implements section 3.3 of reference (b).

B. APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE

1. This Directive applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and to activities assigned to the OSD for administrative support, the Military Departments, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Unified and Specified Commands, and the Defense Agencies (hereafter referred to collectively as "DoD Components").

2. This Directive applies to the systematic review of permanently valuable classified information, developed by or for the Department of Defense and its Components, or its predecessor components and activities, that is under the exclusive or final original classification jurisdiction of the Department of Defense.

3. Its provisions do not cover Restricted Data or Formerly Restricted Data under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (reference (f)) or information in nonpermanent records.

4. Systematic declassification review of records pertaining to intelligence activities (including special activities) or intelligence sources or methods shall be in accordance with special procedures issued by the Director of Central Intelligence.

C., DEFINITIONS

1. Cryptologic Information. Information pertaining to or resulting from the activities and operations involved in the production of signals intelligence (SIGINT) or to the maintenance of communications security (COMSEC).

2. Foreign Government Information. Information that is provided to the United States by a foreign government or governments, an international organization of governments, or any element thereof with the expectation, expressed or implied, that the information, the source of the information, or both are to be held in confidence; or produced by the United States pursuant to or as a result of a joint arrangement with a foreign government or governments, an international organization of governments, or any element thereof requiring that the information, the arrangement, or both are to be held in confidence.

3. Intelligence Method. Any process, mode of analysis, means of gathering data, or processing system or equipment used to produce intelligence.

4. Intelligence Source. A person or technical means that provides intelligence.

D. POLICY

It is the policy of the Department of Defense to assure that information that warrants protection against unauthorized disclosure is properly classified and safeguarded as well as to facilitate the flow of unclassified information about DoD operations to the public.

E. PROCEDURES

1. DoD classified information that is permanently valuable, as defined by 44 U.S.C. 2103 (reference (g)), that has been accessioned into the National Archives of the United States, will be reviewed systematically for declassification by the Archivist of the United States, with the assistance of the DoD personnel designated for that purpose, as it becomes 30 years old; however, file series concerning intelligence activities (including special activities) created after 1945, intelligence sources or methods created after 1945, and cryptology records created after 1945 will be reviewed as they become 50 years old.

2. All other DoD classified information and foreign government information that is permanently valuable and in the possession or control of DoD Components, including that held in federal records centers or other storage areas, may be reviewed systematically for declassification by the DoD Component exercising control of such information.

3. DoD classified information and foreign government information in the possession or control of DoD Components shall be declassified when they become 30 years old, or 50 years old in the case of DoD intelligence activities (including special activities) created after 1945, intelligence sources or methods created after 1945, or cryptology created after 1945, if they are not within one of the categories specified in enclosure 2 or 3.

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5200.30

4. Systematic review for declassification shall be in accordance with procedures contained in DoD 5200.1-R (reference (e)). Information that falls within any of the categories in enclosures 2 and 3 shall be declassified if the designated DoD reviewer determines, in light of the declassification considerations contained in enclosure 4, that classification no longer is required. In the absence of such a declassification determination, the classification of the information shall continue as long as required by national security considerations.

5. Before any declassification or downgrading action, DoD information under review should be coordinated with the Department of State on subjects cited in enclosure 5, and with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) on subjects cited in enclosure 6.

F. RESPONSIBILITIES

1. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy shall:

a. Exercise oversight and policy supervision over the implementation of this Directive.

b. Request DoD Components to review enclosures 2 and 4 of this Directive every 5 years.

c. Revise enclosures 2 and 4 to ensure they meet DoD needs.

d. Authorize, when appropriate, other federal agencies to apply this Directive to DoD information in their possession.

2. The Head of each DoD Component shall:

a. Recommend changes to the enclosures of this Directive.

b. Propose, with respect to specific programs, projects, and systems under his or her classification jurisdiction, supplements to enclosures 2 and 4 of this Directive.


c. Provide advice and designate experienced personnel to provide timely assistance to the Archivist of the United States in the systematic review of records under this Directive.

3. The Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service (NSA/CSS), shall develop, for approval by the Secretary of Defense, special procedures for systematic review and declassification of classified cryptologic information.

4. The Archivist of the United States is authorized to apply this Directive when reviewing DoD classified information that has been accessioned into the Archives of the United States.

G. EFFECTIVE DATE

This Directive is effective immediately.


PAUL THAYER
Deputy Secretary of Defense

Enclosures - 6

1. References
2. Categories of Information That Require Review Before
Declassification
3. General Guidelines for Systematic Declassification Review
of Foreign Government Information
4. Declassification Considerations
5. Department of State Areas of Interest
6. Central Intelligence Agency Areas of Interest

Enclosures

✓cc: Director, Information Security Oversight Office
Director, Records Declassification Division, National
Archives and Records Administration

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5200.30 (Encl 1)

REFERENCES, continued

- (d) DoD Directive 5200.1, "DoD Information Security Program," June 7, 1982
- (e) DoD 5200.1-R, "Information Security Program Regulation," August 1982,
authorized by DoD Directive 5200.1, June 7, 1982
- (f) Public Law 83-703, Atomic Energy Act of 1954
- (g) Title 44, United States Code, Section 2103

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5200.30 (Encl 2)

CATEGORIES OF INFORMATION THAT REQUIRE REVIEW BEFORE DECLASSIFICATION

The following categories of information shall be reviewed systematically for declassification by designated DoD reviewers in accordance with this Directive:

1. Nuclear propulsion information.
2. Information concerning the establishment, operation, and support of the U.S. Atomic Energy Detection System.
3. Information concerning the safeguarding of nuclear materials or facilities.
4. Information that could affect the conduct of current or future U.S. foreign relations. (Also see enclosure 5.)
5. Information that could affect the current or future military usefulness of policies, programs, weapon systems, operations, or plans when such information would reveal courses of action, concepts, tactics, or techniques that are used in current operations plans.
6. Research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) of chemical and biological weapons and defensive systems; specific identification of chemical and biological agents and munitions; chemical and biological warfare plans; and U.S. vulnerability to chemical or biological warfare attack.
7. Information about capabilities, installations, exercises, research, development, testing and evaluation, plans, operations, procedures, techniques, organization, training, sensitive liaison and relationships, and equipment concerning psychological operations; escape, evasion, rescue and recovery, insertion, and infiltration and exfiltration; cover and support; deception; unconventional warfare and special operations; and the personnel assigned to or engaged in these activities.
8. Information that reveals sources or methods of intelligence or counter-intelligence, counterintelligence activities, special activities, identities of clandestine human agents, methods of special operations, analytical techniques for the interpretation of intelligence data, and foreign intelligence reporting. This includes information that reveals the overall scope, processing rates, timeliness, and accuracy of intelligence systems and networks, including the means of interconnecting such systems and networks and their vulnerabilities.
9. Information that relates to intelligence activities conducted jointly by the Department of Defense with other federal agencies or to intelligence activities conducted by other federal agencies in which the Department of Defense has provided support. (Also see enclosure 6.)
10. Airborne radar and infrared imagery.
11. Information that reveals space system:
 - a. Design features, capabilities, and limitations (such as antijam characteristics, physical survivability features, command and control design details, design vulnerabilities, or vital parameters).

b. Concepts of operation, orbital characteristics, orbital support methods, network configurations, deployments, ground support facility locations, and force structure.

12. Information that reveals operational communications equipment and systems:

a. Electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM) design features or performance capabilities.

b. Vulnerability and susceptibility to any or all types of electronic warfare.

13. Information concerning electronic intelligence, telemetry intelligence, and electronic warfare (electronic warfare support measures, electronic countermeasures (ECM), and ECCM) or related activities, including:

a. Information concerning or revealing nomenclatures, functions, technical characteristics, or descriptions of foreign communications and electronic equipment, its employment or deployment, and its association with weapon systems or military operations.

b. Information concerning or revealing the processes, techniques, operations, or scope of activities involved in acquiring, analyzing, and evaluating the above information, and the degree of success obtained.

14. Information concerning Department of the Army systems listed in attachment 1.

15. Information concerning Department of the Navy systems listed in attachment 2.

16. Information concerning Department of the Air Force systems listed in attachment 3.

17. Cryptologic information (including cryptologic sources and methods). This includes information concerning or revealing the processes, techniques, operations, and scope of SIGINT comprising communications intelligence, electronics intelligence, and telemetry intelligence; and the cryptosecurity and emission security components of COMSEC, including the communications portion of cover and deception plans.

a. Recognition of cryptologic information may not always be an easy task. There are several broad classes of cryptologic information, as follows:

(1) Those that relate to COMSEC. In documentary form, they provide COMSEC guidance or information. Many COMSEC documents and materials are accountable under the Communications Security Material Control System. Examples are items bearing transmission security (TSEC) nomenclature and crypto keying material for use in enciphering communications and other COMSEC documentation such as National COMSEC Instructions, National COMSEC/Emanations Security (EMSEC) Information Memoranda, National COMSEC Committee Policies, COMSEC Resources Program documents, COMSEC Equipment Engineering Bulletins, COMSEC Equipment System Descriptions, and COMSEC Technical Bulletins.

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5200.30 (Encl 2)

(2) Those that relate to SIGINT. These appear as reports in various formats that bear security classifications, sometimes followed by five-letter codewords (World War II's ULTRA, for example) and often carrying warning caveats such as "This document contains codeword material" and "Utmost secrecy is necessary..." Formats may appear as messages having addressees, "from" and "to" sections, and as summaries with SIGINT content with or without other kinds of intelligence and comment.

(3) RDT&E reports and information that relate to either COMSEC or SIGINT.

b. Commonly used words that may help in identification of cryptologic documents and materials are "cipher," "code," "codeword," "communications intelligence" or "COMINT," "communications security" or "COMSEC," "cryptanalysis," "crypto," "cryptography," "cryptosystem," "decipher," "decode," "decrypt," "direction finding," "electronic intelligence" or "ELINT," "electronic security," "encipher," "encode," "encrypt," "intercept," "key book," "signals intelligence" or "SIGINT," "signal security," and "TEMPEST."

Attachments - 3

1. Department of the Army Systems
2. Department of the Navy Systems
3. Department of the Air Force Systems

Mar 21, 83

5200.30 (Att 1 to Encl 2)

CATEGORIES OF INFORMATION THAT REQUIRE REVIEW BEFORE DECLASSIFICATION
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY SYSTEMS

The following categories of Army information shall be reviewed systematically for declassification by designated DoD reviewers in accordance with this Directive.

1. Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) missile information, including the principle of operation of warheads (fuzing, arming, firing, and destruct operations); quality or reliability requirements; threat data; vulnerability; ECM and ECCM; details of design, assembly, and construction; and principle of operations.
2. BMD systems data, including the concept definition (tentative roles, threat definition, and analysis and effectiveness); detailed quantitative technical system description-revealing capabilities or unique weaknesses that are exploitable; overall assessment of specific threat-revealing vulnerability or capability; discrimination technology; and details of operational concepts.
3. BMD optics information that may provide signature characteristics of U.S. and United Kingdom ballistic weapons.
4. Shaped-charge technology.
5. Fleshettes.
6. M380 Beehive round.
7. Electromagnetic propulsion technology.
8. Space weapons concepts.
9. Radar-fuzing programs.
10. Guided projectiles technology.
11. ECM and ECCM to weapons systems.
12. Armor materials concepts, designs, or research.
13. 2.75-inch Rocket System.
14. Air Defense Command and Coordination System (AN/TSQ-51).
15. Airborne Target Acquisition and Fire Control System.
16. Chaparral Missile System.
17. Dragon Guided Missile System Surface Attack, M47.
18. Forward Area Alerting Radar (FAAR) System.

19. Ground laser designators.
20. Hawk Guided Missile System.
21. Heliborne, Laser, Air Defense Suppression and Fire and Forget Guided Missile System (HELLFIRE).
22. Honest John Missile System.
23. Lance Field Artillery Missile System.
24. Land Combat Support System (LCSS).
25. M22 (SS-11 ATGM) Guided Missile System, Helicopter Armament Subsystem.
26. Guided Missile System, Air Defense (NIKE HERCULES with Improved Capabilities with HIPAR and ANTIJAM Improvement).
27. Patriot Air Defense Missile System.
28. Pershing IA Guided Missile System.
29. Pershing II Guided Missile System.
30. Guided Missile System, Intercept Aerial M41 (REDEYE) and Associated Equipment.
31. U.S. Roland Missile System.
32. Sergeant Missile System (less warhead) (as pertains to electronics and penetration aids only).
33. Shillelagh Missile System.
34. Stinger/Stinger-Post Guided Missile System (FIM-92A).
35. Terminally Guided Warhead (TWG) for Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS).
36. TOW Heavy Antitank Weapon System.
37. Viper Light Antitank/Assault Weapon System.

Mar 21, 83
5200.30 (Att 2 to Encl 2)

CATEGORIES OF INFORMATION THAT REQUIRE REVIEW BEFORE DECLASSIFICATION
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY SYSTEMS

The following categories of Navy information shall be reviewed systematically for declassification by designated DoD reviewers in accordance with this Directive.

1. Naval nuclear propulsion information.
2. Conventional surface ship information:
 - a. Vulnerabilities of protective systems, specifically:
 - (1) Passive protection information concerning ballistic torpedo and underbottom protective systems.
 - (2) Weapon protection requirement levels for conventional, nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.
 - (3) General arrangements, drawings, and booklets of general plans (applicable to carriers only).
 - b. Ship-silencing information relative to:
 - (1) Signatures (acoustic, seismic, infrared, magnetic (including alternating magnetic (AM)), pressure, and underwater electric potential (UEP)).
 - (2) Procedures and techniques for noise reduction pertaining to an individual ship's component.
 - (3) Vibration data relating to hull and machinery.
 - c. Operational characteristics related to performance as follows:
 - (1) Endurance or total fuel capacity.
 - (2) Tactical information, such as times for ship turning, zero to maximum speed, and maximum to zero speed.
3. All information that is uniquely applicable to nuclear-powered surface ships or submarines.
4. Information concerning diesel submarines as follows:
 - a. Ship-silencing data or acoustic warfare systems relative to:
 - (1) Overside, platform, and sonar noise signature.
 - (2) Radiated noise and echo response.
 - (3) All vibration data.

- (4) Seismic, magnetic (including AM), pressure, and UEP signature data.
 - b. Details of operational assignments, that is, war plans, antisubmarine warfare (ASW), and surveillance tasks.
 - c. General arrangements, drawings, and plans of SS563 class submarine hulls.
5. Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) data.
6. Information concerning mine warfare, mine sweeping, and mine counter-measures.
7. ECM or ECCM features and capabilities of any electronic equipment.
8. Torpedo information as follows:
 - a. Torpedo countermeasures devices: T-MK6 (FANFARE) and NAE beacons.
 - b. Tactical performance, tactical doctrine, and vulnerability to counter-measures.
9. Design performance and functional characteristics of guided missiles, guided projectiles, sonars, radars, acoustic equipments, and fire control systems.

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5200.30 (Encl 3)


Monday
January 31, 1983

SECRET

Part III

**Information Security
Oversight Office**

**National Security Information; General
Guidelines for Systematic Declassification
Review of Foreign Government
Information; Final Rule**



4402

Federal Register / Vol. 48, No. 21 / Monday, January 31, 1983 / Rules and Regulations

INFORMATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT OFFICE**32 CFR Part 2002****National Security Information; General Guidelines for Systematic Declassification Review of Foreign Government Information****AGENCY:** Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO).**ACTION:** Final rule.

SUMMARY: The Information Security Oversight Office is revising its guideline which relate to the systematic declassification review of foreign government information. These guidelines are issued pursuant to the provisions of Section 3.3 of Executive Order 12356, which superseded Executive Order 12065. The Executive Order prescribes a uniform information security system; it also requires the establishment of guidelines for the systematic declassification review of certain information. The purpose of these guidelines is to assist in implementing Executive Order 12356.

EFFECTIVE DATE: January 31, 1983.**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** Steven Garfinkel, Director, ISOO. Telephone: 202-535-7251.**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:****List of Subjects in 32 CFR Part 2002**

Archives and records, classified information, Executive orders, Information, Intelligence, National defense, National security information, Presidential documents, Security information.

Title 32 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 2002, is revised as follows:

PART 2002—GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR SYSTEMATIC DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENT INFORMATION

Sec.
2002.1 Purpose.
2002.2 Definition.
2002.3 Scope.
2002.4 Responsibilities.
2002.5 Effect of publication.
2002.6 Categories requiring item-by-item review.
2002.7 Referral and decision.
2002.8 Downgrading.

Authority: Sec. 3.3, E.O. 12356, 47 FR 14874, April 6, 1982.

§ 2002.1 Purpose.

These general guidelines for the systematic declassification review of foreign government information have

been developed in accordance with the provisions of Section 3.3 of Executive Order 12356, "National Security Information," and Section 2001.31 of Information Security Oversight Office Directive No. 1. All foreign government information that has been incorporated into the permanently valuable records of the United States Government and that has been accessioned into the National Archives of the United States shall be systematically reviewed for declassification by the Archivist of the United States. Declassification reviews shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of these general guidelines or, if available, in accordance with specific systematic review guidelines for foreign government information provided by the agency heads who have declassification authority over that information. All foreign government information (a) not identified in § 2002.6 of these general guidelines or in specific agency guidelines as requiring item-by-item declassification review and final determination by an agency declassification authority, and (b) for which a prior declassification date has not been established, shall be declassified as that information becomes thirty years old.

§ 2002.2 Definition.

"Foreign government information" as used in these guidelines means:

(a) Information provided by a foreign government or governments, an international organization of governments, or any element thereof with the expectation, expressed or implied, that the information, the source of the information, or both, are to be held in confidence; or

(b) Information produced by the United States pursuant to or as a result of a joint arrangement with a foreign government or governments or an international organization of governments, or any element thereof, requiring that the information, the arrangement, or both, are to be held in confidence.

§ 2002.3 Scope.

(a) These guidelines apply to foreign government information that has been received or classified by the United States Government or its agents, and has been incorporated into records determined by the Archivist of the United States to have permanent value.

(b) Atomic energy information (including information originated prior to 1947 and not marked as such; information received from the United Kingdom or Canada marked "Atomic," or information received from NATO

marked "Atomic") that is defined and identified as "Restricted Data" or "Formerly Restricted Data" in Sections 11y and 142d of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, is outside the scope of these guidelines. Such information is not subject to systematic review and may not be automatically downgraded or declassified. Any document containing information within the definition of "Restricted Data" or "Formerly Restricted Data" that is not so marked shall be referred to the Department of Energy Office of Classification for review and appropriate marking, except for licensing and related regulatory matters which shall be referred to the Division of Security, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

§ 2002.4 Responsibilities.

(a) Foreign government information transferred to the General Services Administration for accession into the National Archives of the United States shall be reviewed by the Archivist of the United States for declassification in accordance with Executive Order 12356, the directives of the Information Security Oversight Office, these general guidelines, and any specific systematic declassification guidelines provided by the agency with declassification authority over the information.

(b) Accessioned foreign government information in file series concerning intelligence activities (including special activities), or intelligence sources or methods created after 1945, and cryptology records created after 1945, shall be subject to review by the Archivist for declassification as it becomes 50 years old. All other accessioned foreign government information shall be subject to review by the Archivist for declassification as it becomes 30 years old.

(c) Agency heads who have declassification jurisdiction over permanently valuable foreign government information in agency records not yet accessioned into the National Archives of the United States are encouraged to conduct systematic declassification reviews of it in accordance with the time limits specified in paragraph (b) of this section. These reviews shall comply with the provisions of Executive Order 12356, the directives of the Information Security Oversight Office, these general guidelines, and specific agency systematic review guidelines that have been issued in consultation with the Archivist of the United States and the ISOO Director.

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(d) Foreign government information falling within any of the categories listed in § 2002.6 of these guidelines shall be declassified or downgraded only upon specific authorization of the agency that has declassification authority over it. Such information shall be referred to the responsible agency(ies) for review. Information so referred shall remain classified until the responsible agency(ies) has declassified it. If the responsible agency cannot be readily identified from the document or material, referral shall be made in accordance with § 2002.7 of these guidelines.

(e) When required, the agency having declassification authority over the information shall consult with foreign governments concerning its proposed declassification.

§ 2002.5 Effect of publication.

(a) Foreign government information shall be considered declassified when published in an unclassified United States Government executive branch publication (e.g., the *Foreign Relations of the United States* series) or when cleared for publication by United States Government executive branch officials authorized to declassify the information; or if officially published as unclassified by the foreign government(s) or international organization(s) of governments that furnished the information unless the fact of the U.S. Government's possession of the information requires continued protection.

(b) The unofficial publication, in the United States or abroad, of foreign government information contained in classified United States or foreign documents does not in or of itself constitute or permit the declassification of such information. Although prior unofficial publication is a factor to be considered in the systematic review process, there may be valid reasons for continued protection of the information which could preclude its declassification. In particular, the classification status of foreign government information which concerns or derives from intelligence activities (including special activities), intelligence sources or methods shall not be affected by any unofficial publication of identical or related information. The final declassification determination shall be made by the agency or agencies having declassification authority over it.

§ 2002.6 Categories requiring item-by-item review.

Foreign government information falling into the following categories require item-by-item review for

declassification by agencies having declassification authority over it.

(a) Information exempted from declassification under any joint arrangement evidenced by an exchange of letters, memorandum of understanding, or other written record, with the foreign government or international organization of governments, or element(s) thereof, that furnished the information. Questions concerning the existence or applicability of such arrangements shall be referred to the agency or agencies having declassification authority over the records under review.

(b) Information related to the safeguarding of nuclear materials or facilities, foreign and domestic, including but not necessarily limited to vulnerabilities and vulnerability assessments of nuclear facilities and Special Nuclear Material.

(c) Nuclear arms control information (see also paragraph (k) of this section).

(d) Information regarding foreign nuclear programs (other than "Restricted Data" and "Formerly Restricted Data"), such as:

(1) Nuclear weapons testing.
(2) Nuclear weapons storage and stockpile.
(3) Nuclear weapons effects, hardness, and vulnerability.

(4) Nuclear weapons safety.
(5) Cooperation in nuclear programs including, but not limited to, peaceful and military applications of nuclear energy.

(6) Exploration, production and import of uranium and thorium from foreign countries.

(e) Information concerning intelligence activities (including special activities) or intelligence or counterintelligence sources or methods including but not limited to intelligence, counterintelligence and covert action programs, plans, policies, operations, or assessments; or which would reveal or identify:

(1) Any present, past or prospective undercover personnel, installation, unit, or clandestine human agent, of the United States or a foreign government;

(2) Any present, past or prospective method, procedure, mode, technique or requirement used or being developed by the United States or by foreign governments, individually or in combination to produce, acquire, transmit, analyze, correlate, assess, evaluate or process intelligence or counterintelligence, or to support an intelligence or counterintelligence source, operation, or activity;

(3) The present, past or proposed existence of any joint United States and foreign government intelligence,

counterintelligence, or covert action activity or facility, or the nature thereof. (For guidance on protecting United States foreign intelligence liaison relationships, see Director of Central Intelligence Directive "Security Classification Guidance and Foreign Security Services," effective January 18, 1982.)

(f) Information that could result in or lead to actions which would place an individual in jeopardy attributable to disclosure of the information, including but not limited to:

(1) Information identifying any individual or organization as a confidential source of intelligence or counterintelligence.

(2) Information revealing the identity of an intelligence or covert action agent or agents.

(3) Information identifying any individual or organization used to develop or support intelligence, counterintelligence, or covert action agents, sources or activities.

(g) Information about foreign individuals, organizations or events which if disclosed, could be expected to:

(1) Adversely affect a foreign country's or international organization's present or future relations with the United States.

(2) Adversely affect present or future confidential exchanges between the United States and any foreign government or international organization of governments.

(h) Information related to plans (whether executed or not, whether presented in whole or in part), programs, operations, negotiations, and assessments shared by one or several foreign governments with the United States, including but not limited to those involving the territory, political regime or government of another country, and which if disclosed could be expected to adversely affect the conduct of U.S. foreign policy or the conduct of another country's foreign policy with respect to a third country or countries. This item would include contingency plans, plans for covert political, military or paramilitary activities or operations by a foreign government acting alone or jointly with the United States Government, and positions or actions taken by a foreign government alone or jointly with the United States concerning border disputes or other territorial issues.

(i) Information concerning arrangements with respect to foreign basing of cryptologic operations and/or foreign policy considerations relating thereto.

(j) Scientific information such as that concerning space, energy, climatology, communications, maritime, undersea, and polar projects, the disclosure of which could be expected to adversely affect current and/or future exchanges of such information between the United States and any foreign governments or international organizations of governments.

(k) Information on foreign policy aspects of nuclear matters, the disclosure of which could be expected to adversely affect cooperation between one or more foreign governments and the United States Government.

(l) Information concerning physical security arrangements, plans or equipment for safeguarding United States Government embassies, missions or facilities abroad, the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to increase the vulnerability of such facilities to penetration, attack, take-over, and the like.

(m) Nuclear propulsion information.

(n) Information concerning the establishment, operation, and support of nuclear detection systems.

(o) Information concerning or revealing military or paramilitary escape, evasion, cover or deception plans, procedures, and techniques, whether executed or not.

(p) Information which could adversely affect the current or future usefulness of military defense policies, programs, weapons systems, operations, or plans.

(q) Information concerning research, development, testing and evaluation of chemical and biological weapons and defense systems; specific identification of chemical and biological agents and munitions; and chemical and biological warfare plans.

(r) Technical information concerning weapons systems and military equipment that reveals the capabilities, limitations, or vulnerabilities of such systems, or equipment that could be exploited to destroy, counter, render ineffective or neutralize such weapons or equipment.

(s) Cryptologic information, including cryptologic sources and methods, currently in use. This includes information concerning or revealing the processes, techniques, operations, and scope of signals intelligence comprising communications intelligence, electronics intelligence, and telemetry intelligence, the crytosecurity and emission security components of communications security, and the communications portion of cover and deception plans.

(t) Information concerning electronic warfare (electronic warfare support measures, electronic counter-countermeasures) or related activities, including but not necessarily limited to:

(1) Nomenclature, functions, technical characteristics or descriptions of communications and electronic equipment, its employment/development, and its association with weapons systems or military operations.

(2) The processes, techniques, operations or scope of activities involved in the acquisition, analysis and evaluation of such information, and the degree of success achieved by the above processes, techniques, operations or activities.

(u) Present, past or proposed protective intelligence information relating to the sources, plans, techniques, equipment and methods used in carrying out assigned duties of protecting United States Government officials or other protectees abroad and foreign officials while in the United States or United States possessions. This includes information concerning the identification of witnesses, informants and persons suspected of being dangerous to persons under protection.

(v) Information on deposits of foreign official institutions in United States banks and on foreign official institutions' holdings, purchases and sales of long-term marketable securities in the United States.

(w) Information concerning economic and policy studies and sensitive assessments or analyses of economic conditions, policies or activities of foreign countries or international organizations of governments received through the Multilateral Development Banks and Funds or through the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

(x) Information described in § 2002.6 (a) through (w) contained in correspondence, transcripts, memoranda of conversation, or minutes of meetings between the President of the United States or the Vice President of the United States and foreign government officials.

(y) Information described in § 2002.6 (a) through (w) contained in documents originated by or sent to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, his Deputy, members of the National Security Council staff, or any other person on the White House or the Executive Office of the President staffs

performing national security functions.

(z) Federal agency originated documents bearing Presidential, National Security Council, or White House or Executive Office of the President staffs' comments relating to categories of information described in § 2002.6 (a) through (w).

(aa) Information as described in § 2002.6 (a) through (w) contained in correspondence to or from the President or the Vice President, including background briefing memoranda and talking points for meetings between the President or the Vice President and foreign government officials, and discussions of the timing and purposes of such meetings.

(bb) Information as described in § 2002.6 (a) through (w) contained in agency message traffic originated by White House or Executive Office of the President staff members but sent through agency communication networks.

§ 2002.7 Referral and decision.

(a) When the identity of the agencies having declassification authority over foreign government information is not apparent to the agency holding the information, or when reviewing officials do not possess the requisite expertise, the information shall be referred for review and a declassification determination as follows:

(1) Categories 2002.6 (b) through (d), Department of Energy or Nuclear Regulatory Commission (as appropriate).

(2) Categories 2002.6 (e) and (f), Central Intelligence Agency.

(3) Categories 2002.6 (g) through (l), Department of State.

(4) Categories 2002.6 (m) through (t), Department of Defense.

(5) Categories 2002.6 (u) and (w), Department of the Treasury.

(6) Categories 2002.6 (x) through (bb), National Security Council.

(b) Referrals to agencies shall include copies of the documents containing the foreign government information. Agencies shall review the referred documents and promptly notify the Archivist of the United States of the declassification determination. Forwarded copies of the documents shall be marked to reflect any downgrading or declassification action and shall be returned to the National Archives.

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§ 2002.8 Downgrading.

Foreign government information classified "Top Secret" may be downgraded to "Secret" after 30 years unless the agency with declassification authority over it determines on its own, or after consultation, as appropriate, with the foreign government or international organization of governments which furnished the information, that it requires continued protection at the "Top Secret" level.

Dated: January 27, 1983.

Steven Garfinkel,
*Director, Information Security Oversight
Office.*

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DECLASSIFICATION CONSIDERATIONS

1. Technological developments; widespread public knowledge of the subject matter; changes in military plans, operations, systems, or equipment; changes in the foreign relations or defense commitments of the United States; and similar events may bear upon the determination of whether information should be declassified. If the responsible DoD reviewer decides that, in view of such circumstances, the public disclosure of the information being reviewed no longer would result in damage to the national security, the information shall be declassified.
2. The following are examples of considerations that may be appropriate in deciding whether information in the categories listed in enclosure 2 may be declassified when it is reviewed:
 - a. The information no longer provides the United States a scientific, engineering, technical, operational, intelligence, strategic, or tactical advantage over other nations.
 - b. The operational military capability of the United States revealed by the information no longer constitutes a limitation on the effectiveness of the Armed Forces.
 - c. The information is pertinent to a system that no longer is used or relied on for the defense of the United States or its allies and does not disclose the capabilities or vulnerabilities of existing operational systems.
 - d. The program, project, or system information no longer reveals a current weakness or vulnerability.
 - e. The information pertains to an intelligence objective or diplomatic initiative that has been abandoned or achieved and will no longer damage the foreign relations of the United States.
 - f. The information reveals the fact or identity of a U.S. intelligence source, method, or capability that no longer is employed and that relates to no current source, method, or capability that upon disclosure could cause damage to national security or place a person in immediate jeopardy.
 - g. The information concerns foreign relations matters whose disclosure can no longer be expected to cause or increase international tension to the detriment of the national security of the United States.
3. Declassification of information that reveals the identities of clandestine human agents shall be accomplished only in accordance with procedures established by the Director of Central Intelligence for that purpose.
4. The NSA/CSS is the sole authority for the review and declassification of classified cryptologic information. The procedures established by the NSA/CSS to facilitate the review and declassification of classified cryptologic information are:

a. COMSEC Documents and Materials

(1) If records or materials in this category are found in agency files that are not under COMSEC control, refer them to the senior COMSEC authority of the agency concerned or by appropriate channels to the following address:

Director
National Security Agency
ATTN: Director of Policy (Q4)
Fort George G. Meade, Maryland 20755

(2) If the COMSEC information has been incorporated into other documents by the receiving agency, referral to the NSA/CSS is necessary before declassification.

b. SIGINT Information

(1) If the SIGINT information is contained in a document or record originated by a DoD cryptologic organization, such as the NSA/CSS, and is in the files of a noncryptologic agency, such material will not be declassified if retained in accordance with an approved records disposition schedule. If the material must be retained, it shall be referred to the NSA/CSS for systematic review for declassification.

(2) If the SIGINT information has been incorporated by the receiving agency into documents it produces, referral to the NSA/CSS is necessary before any declassification.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE AREAS OF INTEREST

1. Statements of U.S. intent to defend, or not to defend, identifiable areas, or along identifiable lines, in any foreign country or region.
2. Statements of U.S. intent militarily to attack in stated contingencies identifiable areas in any foreign country or region.
3. Statements of U.S. policies or initiatives within collective security organizations (for example, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Organization of American States (OAS)).
4. Agreements with foreign countries for the use of, or access to, military facilities.
5. Contingency plans insofar as they involve other countries, the use of foreign bases, territory or airspace, or the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons.
6. Defense surveys of foreign territories for purposes of basing or use in contingencies.
7. Reports documenting conversations with foreign officials, that is, foreign government information.

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