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Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP93B01194R001300070044-3

16 MAY 1973


Dr. James B. Rhoads
Archivist of the United States
National Archives and Records Service
Eighth and Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D. C. 20408

Dear Dr. Rhoads:

Pursuant to Section 5(E) of Executive Order 11652, the Central Intelligence Agency has detailed three experienced officers to the task of conducting a systematic declassification review of those materials originated by the Agency's predecessor organization, the Office of Strategic Services, and now in the custody of the National Archives (NARS Record Group 226). They are currently in the process of developing a list identifying those records which require continued classification, indicating in each instance the reason why continued protection is deemed necessary. When completed, this list will be submitted to me for final determination and specification of the dates on which such material shall become declassified.

Declassification guidelines have been promulgated to assist the reviewing officers in fulfilling their responsibilities. Although formulated with Record Group 226 specifically in mind, the guidance is also generally applicable to related intelligence records of this Agency. The guidelines are forwarded herewith in the belief that they will prove of interest to the National Archives and of possible use in the broader context of the government-wide declassification program.

Sincerely,


James R. Schlesinger
Director

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Enclosure

SAIC:CS:GFD:mj

Distribution:

- Orig - Adse
- 1 - ES/MC
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Central Intelligence Agency

GUIDELINES FOR DECLASSIFICATION OF
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES RECORDS

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General Guidance

The purpose of declassification review is to make available to the general public the maximum amount of data consistent with the obligation to safeguard national security interests, to protect sensitive intelligence methods and sources, to avoid exacerbating foreign relations, and to respect legitimate rights of privacy. Of these, the matter of protection of sensitive intelligence methods and sources will be of paramount concern in determining whether the defense classification of OSS records must be continued. At the risk of oversimplification, "sources" can be defined as the origins of information and "methods" as the ways in which things are accomplished. Often sources and methods utilized in particular programs are essentially inseparable and cannot be considered in isolation.

The Agency's declassification jurisdiction is limited to those records for which the OSS exercised exclusive or final original classification authority. If, as is likely, non-OSS documents are found in the OSS files, such documents should be tabbed or otherwise noted and eventually referred for declassification action to whatever agency exercises current security classification jurisdiction over them. Similarly, classified materials which were received by the OSS from foreign governments or international bodies, with the express understanding that the information would be kept in confidence and that security protection be continued, should be noted for future action but must not be unilaterally declassified or downgraded.

If it is determined that a document must remain classified, but that it could be released provided that certain limited portions (e.g., one or two personal names) were excised, this fact should be noted on the worksheet. This guidance will enable National Archives reference personnel to provide sanitized versions of otherwise classified documents to researchers and should be done, although not required under the provisions of Executive Order 11652.

Detailed Guidance: Named or Identifiable Individuals

1. OSS personnel identities should be protected only if it is known that they continued their association with US intelligence organizations or were otherwise involved in intelligence activities beyond

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the date that the OSS was disbanded. If, however, an individual's affiliation with the OSS has been previously surfaced in open literature, no useful purpose would be served by continuing the classification of the document on the basis of his post-OSS intelligence associations. Documents not declassified because OSS personnel are identified can be declassified 40 years after the publication of the document.

2. Covert agents' identities, even though it is not clear that they were witting of their OSS connections, should continue to be concealed unless it is known that they have voluntarily publicized their intelligence roles or were otherwise exposed beyond any reasonable doubt. If in doubt, do not declassify; protection of agent sources from compromise is fundamental to the continued effectiveness of an intelligence organization. Ideally, agent identities should never be revealed, but such action would be impractical in the real world. Adequate protection can be afforded them and their families if documents identifying them are withheld from declassification until 75 years after the publication date of the document.

3. The identities of liaison officers from cooperating foreign intelligence or counterintelligence services should be protected from disclosure. Declassification of such matters requires the concurrence of the foreign government concerned. The date that such documents can be declassified is thus impossible to determine.

4. If a contact in a foreign government is identified as the source of information, his identity should be protected unless it is clear that he was consciously passing information to a member of the OSS in accordance with instructions from his superiors. If the document reveals a degree of collaboration between a foreigner and the OSS, the disclosure of which could be a source of acute embarrassment to him, its classification should be continued. Do not rule in favor of declassification if any reasonable doubt exists. The declassification date for such documents should be 75 years after the publication date.

5. The identities of US private citizens who had furnished information, or otherwise cooperated with, the OSS with the understanding that their role would be kept in confidence should be accorded protection from public disclosure. In those instances where they are not identified by name, a judgment should be made as to whether the source description is specific enough to permit their identification. The date that such documents could be declassified is 75 years after the publication date.

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6. Individuals, particularly US citizens, mentioned in investigative reports or similar records, the release of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy or a breach of confidence, should be protected from disclosure. Though covered also in the Freedom of Information Act, the need for protection in national security related documents justifies continued classification. Such documents could be declassified 75 years after the document's publication date.

7. Any report containing information, the disclosure of which would place an identified or identifiable person in immediate jeopardy--whether covered by the foregoing categories or not--should, of course, continue to be classified. Such documents could be declassified 75 years after the publication date.

Detailed Guidance: Intelligence Methods

1. Sensitive intelligence methods which must be afforded protection beyond the 30-year mandatory review period include information concerning or revealing techniques of agent recruitment, nonofficial and other unconventional cover arrangements, deception techniques, methods and equipment employed for covert communications, technical surveillance devices and strategies, microphotographic methods and equipment, escape and evasion techniques, i.a., provided that such methods are not essentially identical to those universally employed by intelligence services and therefore widely known, or that advances in technology have not rendered such methods and supporting equipment entirely obsolete. Documents containing such information must remain classified as long as the methods are utilized in operations, and therefore it is impossible to fix a date for automatic declassification.

2. Methods related to logistical and other support activities--as opposed to intelligence collection and covert action techniques--adapted to the particular operations and circumstances of World War II, do not in themselves qualify as sensitive methods requiring continued protection.

3. Information with respect to the internal organization of the OSS, the chain of command, component functional missions and personnel ceilings, and intercomponent working relationships has lost much of its sensitivity with the passage of time. Moreover, a considerable amount of this sort of information has already appeared in open literature. Documents dealing with the various cover organizations created or employed by the OSS, however, should continue to be classified for 60 years after the publication date of the document.

Detailed Guidance: Communications Intelligence and Cryptography

1. Communications intelligence, cryptography, and related activities must be provided with protection from premature disclosure unless technological improvements have greatly diminished

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their sensitive nature. Included are any data concerning or revealing the processes, techniques, technical materiel and equipment, particular operations and overall scope of communications intelligence, and cryptographic security. The date for declassification of such information, being dependent upon the factor of obsolescence, is therefore impossible to predetermine.

2. Decrypted cables should be declassified on the basis of their subject matter content. Modern techniques of massive computer attack against encrypted intercepts of World War II systems are so effective that it must be assumed that any hostile intelligence service which decided to expend the effort to retrospectively process the data could have read the texts of cable messages.

Detailed Guidance: Subject Matter Content

1. Classified information contained in OSS documents and other record media, regardless of the subject, the origin of which can be clearly traced to another US Government agency, should not be declassified unilaterally. Declassifying or downgrading action must await the decision of the agency exercising current declassification authority and therefore the date would be impossible to determine.

2. Classified information which was passed to the OSS by liaison representatives of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence services and subsequently incorporated into OSS documents should not be declassified unilaterally when it is apparent that this was the case. Declassification of such material must await the concurrence of the foreign government concerned, and the date for declassification is therefore impossible to determine.

3. Any information which would probably adversely affect the conduct of present day or future US foreign policy or international security arrangements if disclosed should not be declassified without the prior concurrence of the Department of State and/or the Department of Defense, even though the document and the information contained therein is exclusively OSS in origin. Declassification or downgrading action must await the decision of the competent agency, and therefore the date would be impossible to determine.

4. Biographic information of a nature that would be highly embarrassing or compromising to friendly or collaborating foreign nationals, the release of which would be likely to impair US relations with the nation involved, should not be disclosed. Documents containing such material should not be declassified until 60 years after the publication date.

5. With the passage of 30 years, the reportorial and analytical content of the bulk of OSS documentation will have lost whatever sensitivity it once had. Illustrative of the subject matter which can be

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readily declassified are: translations or summaries from the foreign press and radio broadcasts; prisoner interrogation reports; translations or summaries of captured enemy documents; statistical data or other purely factual reporting, with little or no attempt at predictive analysis; information dealing with conditions prevailing at a particular point in time, e.g., enemy order of battle, and thus highly perishable; and any information which has been extensively and accurately reported in the press or in other open source publications.

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SPECIAL GUIDELINES FOR DECLASSIFYING DOCUMENTS ORIGINATED
BY THE WORLD WAR II PREDECESSOR ORGANIZATIONS OF THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

The Director of Central Intelligence exercises exclusive or final original classification authority over all documents originated by the Coordinator of Information (COI), the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), and the Strategic Services Unit (SSU). In light of the voluminous holdings of OSS documents (hereafter used to include COI and SSU documents as well) in records of those organizations which used the OSS product or otherwise dealt with the OSS, and in light of the limitations of time and manpower available for the 30-year review of World War II materials, this authority is being delegated to a limited degree so that non-CIA intelligence personnel can assist in completion of the task. The following special rules shall govern such review:

1. All classified documents or other material above described can be declassified, except those which, after review, are determined to contain information of the types in subparagraphs a. through k. below:

a. Information received from a foreign intelligence service through OSS liaison, whether that liaison sourcing is stated or only inferable.

b. Information which discloses the identity of foreign personnel in official liaison with OSS.

c. Information concerning communications intelligence, cryptography or related matters.

d. Information which names or effectively reveals the identity of any OSS sensitive source--human or technical, actual or planned. Classification will not be removed where any doubt exists. (Note: Captured enemy documents and personnel, refugees and casual informants are not to be considered as sensitive.)

e. Information which reveals the non-official cover (NOC) status of personnel employed by the OSS or the nature of the NOC arrangement, including the NOC name, title, etc.

f. Information which reveals any of the arrangements involved in placing and supporting OSS personnel under official cover with any degree of sensitivity attaching.

g. Information which reveals any aspect of agent spotting, recruitment, development, handling or support, the assignment of tasks, the levying of requirements, and the agent's manner of response and means of reporting or contact.

h. Information disclosing the design and operating characteristics of special devices used or under development by the OSS in support of operations in the field.

i. Information disclosing the manner and degree of financial support given to foreign political organizations and movements, and the means used to obtain and transmit such support.

j. Information which could adversely affect the conduct of present and future U. S. foreign relations.

k. Information which conceivably could place in jeopardy the life of any individual.

2. All of the documents exempted from declassification under any of the above provisions of subparagraphs a. through k. will be tabbed for further review by CIA officers. No downgrading to Secret or Confidential is authorized by these guidelines.

3. All documents deemed to qualify for declassification under the guidelines herein provided will be marked with an appropriate stamp to show that declassification action was taken under the terms of this declassification authority.

12 JAN 1977

The following is a revised draft of the CONFIDENTIAL paper "Guidelines for Declassification of CIA and Predecessor Organization Records for the Period 1946 through 1950". Attached is a suggested modification of Form 5712, Declassification Review Worksheet. It is submitted for review, prior to the 18 January organizational meeting, for comment, suggestions, or criticism.

* * *

I. GENERAL

In accordance with EO 11652, all classified records originated before the issuance of that order must be systematically reviewed for declassification no later than thirty full calendar years from date or origin. The Agency is therefore mandated to undertake the systematic review of all noncurrent classified files in its custody, and all documents in other repositories (the National Archives, Federal Records Centers, Presidential Libraries) containing information originated by or clearly attributable to the Agency and its predecessors.

II. REQUIREMENTS FOR PROTECTION

1. Under the provisions of EO 11652, Section 5B(1), only two criteria exist for the continued protection of classified documents and information beyond thirty years from date of original classification: (1) continued protection

is essential to the national security, and (2) disclosure would place a person in immediate jeopardy. Documents containing such information must be so certified, in writing, by the Director of Central Intelligence to the Archivist of the United States. The official list enumerating the documents which require continued protection will be unclassified and subject to public examination.

2. In addition, EO 11652 lists four categories of information in documents less than thirty years old which are exempted from general declassification provisions:

a. Classified information or material furnished by foreign governments or international organizations and held by the United States on the understanding that it be kept in confidence.

[Sec. 5(B)(1)]

b. Classified information or material specifically covered by statute, or pertaining to cryptography, or disclosing intelligence sources or methods. [Sec. 5(B)(2)]

c. Classified information or material disclosing a system, plan, installation, project or specific foreign relations matter the continuing protection of which is essential to the national security. [Sec. 5(B)(3)]

*The 1947 CIA
Acts on CIA?
(see para 3)*

d. Classified information or material the disclosure of which would place a person in immediate jeopardy. [Sec. 5(B)(4)]

3. The National Security Act of 1947 charges the Director with responsibility for the protection of intelligence sources and methods from unwarranted disclosure. This responsibility is re-emphasized in the CIA Act of 1949 and expanded to exempt the Agency from any legal requirements for the publication or disclosure of the organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency.

III. APPLICABILITY

1. These guidelines have been prepared for the systematic review of classified material originated in the 1946-1950 period over which the Agency maintains exclusive or final declassification authority.

2. The aim of the review is to identify documents and information exempt from declassification under EO 11652 which must be segregated from parent files and be certified by the Director as requiring continued security protection.

3. The following determinations are to be applied in the conduct of all declassification reviews:

a. Reviewing officers will familiarize themselves with the DCI's "Aspects of Intelligence Sources and Methods of the Central Intelligence Agency That Require Protection from Unauthorized Disclosure" (classified SECRET), dated 12 January 1976. Although this document has a contemporary focus, its definitions can be applied to earlier intelligence activity. As the most definitive official statement on the subject issued to date, it is included as an interpretive annex to these guidelines.

b. The judgment of "immediate jeopardy" will be made on the basis of physical or legal jeopardy, (not) that of political or social embarrassment.

c. The language of the CIA Act makes retention of classification optional on information pertaining to the disclosure of the organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency. The individual judgment of reviewers on this material will

right "be justified under foreign relations"

ie. Agency has a legal requirement for

be guided on precedents developed in the course of past or current review projects.

d. These guidelines will be applied to all information originated by or clearly attributable to the Agency and its predecessors in the documents of other agencies, wherever they may be held.

e. These guidelines do not apply to documents and information originated by, or clearly attributable to other agencies, nor to the interests and equities of other agencies which might be found in documents originated by the CIA or its predecessors. Such documents and information should be identified for further action by the agency of origin (or its successor) unless declassification authority has been delegated to Agency representatives.

IV. DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW ACTION

1. Declassification review action will be based upon the systematic examination of discrete file units within the administrative purview of each reviewing component. Piecemeal review of documents will be avoided. The integrity of the file will be respected at all times.. ✓

2. The primary record for all declassification actions will be the Declassification Review Worksheet. These forms will be used to prepare the lists of documents which the Director will certify as requiring continued security protection for the Archivist of the United States. The information provided on the worksheet must include enough basic information about each document to insure ease of identification for future retrieval either individually or as part of a category, series, or group in a computerized system. (The Agency has been advised that the Archivist can accept certain series of documents on the certification lists where an entire series clearly requires protection beyond thirty years.)

*Some
items will
be classified*

3. Each discrete file unit under review will be given a project number. This project number should be used on all memos, worksheets, reports or other papers pertaining to the declassification of that file unit. Each reviewing component will establish a register which will identify each project number.

*system
project*

4. If a security sensitive document is located in any file container, the designation of its folder or case (if there is such) should be given before the document itself is listed.

maintain security

5. Each security sensitive document should be identified as to sender, receiver, date, file number, and any other way which the reviewer believes will assist its later identification.

with applicable (see para 9) below

6. In the exemption column, the reviewer will use the letter "A" to denote national security reasons for continued protection and the letter "B" to denote reasons of individual jeopardy. Exemption categories under "A" will be further cited by the appropriate number from Section 5B of EO 11652 (e.g., foreign-originated material not covered by existing declassification authorizations would be cited as "A/1"). *A/2 A/3 A/4*

must do this

7. The interests and equities of other agencies of the U.S. Government will be concisely stated in the exemption column (e.g., Army/A2).

not use A/1. try & date

8. Declassification of documents and information received from foreign liaison can only be done as authorized by the liaison service involved. The reviewer should therefore list this exemption with an "L" followed by the country involved and date (e.g., 1948).

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9. If there are multiple reasons for protecting a document, all should be cited, whether Agency or non-Agency in origin (e.g., 1947; NSA/COMINT; Army/A2; DDO/B).

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10. The presence of non-textual records (microfilm, photographs, motion picture reels, computer tapes, etc.) should be noted in the "Remarks" column.

11. Unless the reviewer notes otherwise in the "Remarks" column, all documents to be certified as requiring continued protection after thirty years will be retained at the Confidential level. (This downgrading need not be shown on the individual documents until they are withdrawn from file.)

12. Concerning documents and information over which the Agency exercises exclusive or final jurisdiction, which must be protected beyond thirty years, the reviewer should cite a year in which the material becomes automatically declassified (DC) or should be re-reviewed (RR). Decisions on periods of time required for protection will be made within the following limits:

*data
elements
origin*

<u>Category</u>	<u>SSU</u>	<u>CIG</u>	<u>CIA</u>
Personnel/Cover	75	75	75
Defectors	50	60	75
Security/Contracts	50	60	75
Finance	50	60	75
General Intelligence	30	30	30
Operations	50	60	75
Communications	50	50	50
Science and Technology	50	50	50
Research and Development	50	50	50
Named Relationships	50	50	50

*time period can
be lowered depending
on content of
information under review*

These periods begin with the date of origin of the classified document, using the categories from the Director's 12 January 1976 determination on "Aspects". The time periods may be lowered, depending on the content of the information under review.

13. The "Remarks" column should be used by the reviewer to denote special problems in the records under review concerning the interests and equities of the CIA, other agencies of the U.S. Government, foreign liaison services, etc.; the presence of foreign language material; and any unique insights helpful to those responsible for taking further action on material in which security sensitive information has been located.

14. The columns marked "CIA" and "non-CIA" under "Further Action" will be used to denote action by reviewers examining security sensitive information from Agency components other than that of the original reviewer and by reviewers from other government agencies or foreign liaison services.

15. Each reviewing component should, if necessary, develop supplemental guidelines pertaining to specific problems present in its records that will assist the reviewers in other components in their declassification work.

V. PRECEDENTS

1. Agency reviewers should remember the transitional nature of the 1946-1950 period for U.S. intelligence. While the SSU was a vestige of the wartime OSS, thus meeting a number of the same declassification criteria applicable to COI and OSS documents and information through 1945, it (and its successor, the CIG) constituted the nucleus of postwar centralized organization and activity. While COI and OSS records and information could be reviewed within a "prosecution-of-the-war" context, with emphasis on declassification and release, records of the 1946-1950 period are an integral part of the U.S. intelligence continuum, in which current and future equities can be affected by declassification of earlier materials.

2. Past experience of CIA officials in reviewing 1946-1950 records for declassification under either the mandatory review provisions of EO 11652 or the Freedom of Information Act provides useful precedents to assist the systematic review of such documents. These areas of past decision are:

a. The organizational structures of the SSU, CIG and CIA at the headquarters level during 1946-1950 can be declassified except for component breakdowns of those predecessor elements of the present DDO.

b. The fact of presence and activity abroad by the SSU, CIG, and CIA is not sensitive, but the details of location, organization cover, staffing and activity abroad are usually to be protected.

c. The functions and missions of the SSU and CIG are not generally sensitive when broadly described, but are sensitive when related to particular areas and circumstances or to specific capabilities and intentions.

d. The functions of the CIA in the 1946-1950 period tend to be more sensitive than those of the SSU and CIG, particularly with the assignment of covert action by the NSC. Covert action program details are to be protected except where prior official disclosure clearly dictates otherwise.

e. Names and official titles of personnel in SSU, CIG and CIA during 1946-1950 are generally protected up through Division Chief in the DDO and Office Director elsewhere, with selective exceptions based on prior disclosure, cover and operational considerations.


f. Numbers of employees and size of budgets are protected, as should be any other quantitative factor indicating scope or thrust of the intelligence effort of the period.

g. Estimative material published prior to the formation of the Office of National Estimates on 13 November 1950 is generally releasable.

h. Situations and analytical reporting of the period is generally releasable if sensitive sourcing is not stated or otherwise identified.

i. SSU and CIG reports are generally releasable except for disclosures of sources and methods, including sensitive foreign liaison relationships. CIA field reports must omit the source line, field report number and place acquired in order to be releasable.

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k. Pseudonyms, cryptonyms and codewords are part of intelligence methodology, causing need for classification on documents containing such.

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 DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW WORKSHEET

Start new sheet for each box. Use as many continuation sheets as necessary.

RECORD GROUP NUMBER (circle one) 226 263	RECORDS CENTER JOB NUMBER	ARCHIVES OR RECORDS CENTER BOX NO.	ENTRY NUMBER AND/OR SERIES TITLE
REVIEWER	REVIEWING COMPONENT	DATE OF REVIEW (yr-mo-da)	ORGANIZATIONS OTHER THAN OSS OR CIA WHOSE RECORDS ARE INCLUDED IN BOX
REFATORY NOTE			

DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION (include no. of pages)	DATE (yr-mo-da)	ORIGINAL CLASSI- FICATION	RECLASSI- FIED TO	EXCAT	REASON FOR CONT. CLAS- SIFICATION	REMARKS	AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON 31 DECEMBER

DRAFT GUIDELINES FOR THE DELEGATION OF DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY FOR CIA AND PREDECESSOR AGENCY DOCUMENTS AND
INFORMATION ORIGINATED BETWEEN 1946-1950 TO DESIGNATED
NARS PERSONNEL

I. The Director of Central Intelligence exercises exclusive or final declassification authority over all documents and information originated by or clearly attributable to the Central Intelligence Agency and its postwar predecessors, the Strategic Services Unit (SSU) of the War Department (1945-1946) and the Central Intelligence Group (CIG, 1946-1947). In addition, the CIA has a subject matter interest in documents and information originated by or attributable to other agencies which relate to the personnel, organization, functions, and responsibilities of the CIA and to similar documents and information of inter-agency bodies with which the CIA was associated, such as the National Intelligence Authority (NIA), Intelligence Advisory Board (IAB), and the National Security Council (NSC).

II. These guidelines apply only to documents and information originated by or clearly attributable to the Central Intelligence Agency and its predecessors and over which the Central Intelligence Agency now exercises exclusive or final declassification authority. Any guidelines and declassification instructions issued by any other federal

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agency or foreign government remain in effect and are to be applied to documents and information originated and clearly attributable to them. The Central Intelligence Agency does not exercise final declassification authority over non-CIA material.

III. In accordance with Section 5 of Executive Order 11652, the Central Intelligence Agency delegates the following declassification authority to selected staff members of the Records Declassification Division (NND) of NARS, after suitable briefing by CIA personnel. All classified documents and information originated by or clearly attributable to the Central Intelligence Agency, its predecessors, and inter-agency bodies upon which the CIA was represented which relate to the personnel, organization, functions, and responsibilities of the CIA (or its predecessors), may be declassified, if dated between 1 January 1946 and 30 June 1950, unless the following types of information is present:

(1) documents and information received in confidence from a foreign intelligence service through liaison channels, whether that liaison source is stated or inferred;

(2) information which discloses the identity (for example, by name, title or function) of any personnel, including agents and liaison officers, of foreign intelligence or security services, irrespective of whether they represent friendly or

(3) information concerning communications intelligence (COMINT), electronic intelligence (ELINT), and related matters;

(4) information which names or effectively reveals the identity of any CIA human or technical source, either actual or planned;

(5) information which reveals the non-official cover (NOC) of personnel employed by the CIA and its predecessors or the nature of the NOC arrangement;

(6) information revealing arrangements for the placing and supporting of personnel of the CIA and its predecessors under official cover;

(7) information revealing the covert connection of CIA or predecessor agency personnel with other government agencies of the United States Government, inter-agency boards and committees outside the intelligence community, and with non-governmental organizations;

(8) information revealing any aspect of agent spotting, recruitment, development, handling or support, the assignment of tasks, the levying of requirements, and the agent's manner of response and means of reporting or contact;

(9) information disclosing the manner and degree of support (including financial and administrative) given by the CIA and its predecessors to foreign governments, organizations, and movements, and the

(10) information disclosing the design and operating characteristics of special equipment and devices used or developed by the CIA and its predecessors to support operations in the field;

(11) information revealing the appropriation and budgeting of CIA funds, the internal distribution of those funds, and the techniques by which confidential funds are secretly placed within the appropriations for other government agencies;

(12) documents and information pertaining to the letting of contracts by the CIA to private businesses, commercial enterprises, or non-governmental institutions;

(13) documents and information pertaining to the personnel, organization, responsibilities, and functions of the CIA and its predecessors which were originated by or clearly attributable to inter-governmental multi-agency organizations upon which the CIA or its predecessors were represented and/or to which they reported;

(14) documents and information identifying American citizens, businesses, and non-governmental organizations upon whom the CIA was reporting;

(15) information which could have an adverse current impact on the conduct of present U.S. foreign relations, or present relations between two or more foreign states;

(16) information which could place an individual in jeopardy.

IV. All documents and information exempted from declassification by NARS personnel by any of the provisions cited above will be reviewed by CIA officers. Routine references to the CIA or its predecessors in the correspondence, memoranda, and other papers which were originated by other government agencies may be declassified. Classified documents originated by the CIA and its predecessors are automatically downgraded to "Confidential." This authority may not be redelegated to any other component, either custodial or administrative, of NARS. No declassification authority issued by any other agency of the United States Government will apply to information originated by the CIA and its predecessors appearing in documents originated by those agencies.

*As per above from
automatically declassified
at end of 6 yrs?*