

~~SECRET~~

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

NIC 01316-86
12 March 1986

National Intelligence Council

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

FROM: Robert D. Vickers, Jr.
National Intelligence Officer for Latin America

SUBJECT: Agenda for March 1986 Latin America
Warning and Forecast Meeting

1. The March 1986 Warning Meeting for Latin America will be held on Wednesday, 19 March 1986, at 1015 hours in Room 7 E 32, CIA Headquarters. Invited agencies and components should please keep their representatives to a necessary minimum because of space limitations.

2. We intend to discuss the following countries/topics:
Chile, Costa Rica and Jamaica.

Chile

The National Accord for a transition to full democracy has bogged down in recent weeks. This is primarily due to President Pinochet's intransigence and the opposition's inability to agree on goals, strategies and tactics. The Communist Party and the Revolutionary Leftist Movement are delighted with Pinochet's hardline position since they believe that polarization of the moderates will result. Cuba is advocating a two-pronged strategy of maintaining pressure on Pinochet through terrorism while urging their leftist allies to forge links with moderate groups to position themselves to exploit the military regime's "eventual downfall." Are there any signs of waning military support for Pinochet? Will public protests increase in intensity as people return from summer vacations and schools reopen? Can Cardinal Fresno regain the initiative? Will the radical left and right redirect some of these protests toward US diplomatic representatives? (DIA - 30 minutes)

Costa Rica

The 24 February borders discussions in Managua between representatives of Nicaragua and Costa Rica revealed certain basic differences in expectations. Nicaragua is reported to have been thinking

STAT

~~SECRET~~

STAT

SECRET [REDACTED]

STAT

in terms of an armed military presence of 1,700 men on each side of the border, whereas Costa Rica was thinking in terms of 10 civilians on each side. Nevertheless, the talks, which were described as friendly, are to be continued on 12 March. The impact, of course, was immediately felt beyond the two principal countries. What has been the reaction of the Core Four, the Contadora Group and the rest of Latin America? Are Arias' comments largely rhetorical or does he actually intend to make policy changes regarding the use of Costa Rican territory by the anti-Sandinistas? Will Honduras be seriously tempted to follow Arias' precedent? (STATE/INR - 30 minutes)

Jamaica

As Jamaica's economy continues to deteriorate, Michael Manley, leader of the opposition, seems less inclined to press for an early election. He appears to be perfectly content to let Prime Minister Seaga make the unpopular economic decisions that are expected in the next few months. Manley feels that the resultant popular resentment will work to his advantage, at the polls as well as in the streets, if an announcement of even more stringent austerity measures triggers widespread civil unrest. Can Seaga weather another round of demonstrations, particularly if they are more violent than those in 1985? Local radical leftist groups, principally the Hot Steppers, add a potentially violent component to Manley's strategy. Is he likely to use them to add to the violence and will this work to his advantage? Can the Jamaican security forces cope with widespread demonstrations if they turn violent? Is Manley inclined to press for elections in the aftermath of rioting or is he more inclined to let Seaga take the brunt of the adverse economy for a longer period? (CIA/ALA - 30 minutes)

3. Please have your clearances passed [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] with your attendance plans no later than noon Tuesday,
18 March.

STAT
STAT

Robert D. Vickers, Jr.

SECRET [REDACTED]

STAT