



**Director of
Central
Intelligence**

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Angola: Near-Term Implications of Negotiations

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Special Interagency Intelligence Memorandum

*This Memorandum represents the views
of the Director of Central Intelligence
with the advice and assistance of the
US Intelligence Community.*

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*Information available as of 4 October 1988 was used
in the preparation of this Memorandum.*

*The following intelligence organizations participated
in the preparation of this Memorandum:*

The Central Intelligence Agency
The Defense Intelligence Agency
The National Security Agency
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Department of State

also participating:

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
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The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
Department of the Air Force
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Chairman of the National Intelligence Council.*

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Key Judgments¹

Whatever the outcome of US-mediated negotiations among Angola, Cuba, and South Africa, neither the Angolan Government nor the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) insurgency is likely to gain a decisive military advantage in the next six to 12 months. Success in achieving an agreement linking Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola to independence for neighboring Namibia, while not ending the Angolan civil war, would clear the way for dialogue on an internal settlement. Failure to reach an accord would intensify the Angolan conflict and raise chances for direct clashes between South Africa and Cuba along the Angola-Namibia border. []

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The acceleration in the negotiations and the willingness of the participants to discuss the issues seriously follow a major change in Cuba's posture over the past year that has altered the balance of forces in the region and challenged South Africa's military hegemony. The talks have significantly narrowed differences among the parties, with the remaining issues focused on the timing and pace of Cuban troop withdrawal. To maximize protection of the Luanda regime, Cuba and Angola want a longer timetable than does South Africa, which seeks a rapid Cuban exit. []

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Objectives

Cuban President Castro believes the negotiations offer him the best chance for an honorable withdrawal from a protracted and increasingly costly war, although his conditions require survival of the Angolan regime and independence for Namibia. The Angolan Government is more hesitant than Havana to take risks with the timing of a Cuban withdrawal, but believes a settlement will put it in a better position to conclude the war on acceptable terms by removing South African support for UNITA. []

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Pretoria wants to avoid an escalating conflict and believes that the talks offer the least costly way out of Namibia. Nevertheless, Pretoria is not desperate and is not interested in an agreement that threatens its long-term security interests in the region. []

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¹ Due to the sensitivity of ongoing US-mediated negotiations, distribution of this Memorandum has been restricted. Recipients should not give the document any further dissemination. []

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[REDACTED]

The Soviet Union and UNITA are also key players. The Soviets seek the removal of South African forces from Namibia and a settlement that leaves their Angolan client relatively secure. Such an outcome would be consistent with Moscow's efforts to reduce costly support to clients fighting insurgencies, improve relations with the United States, and promote a less threatening image internationally. UNITA generally supports the negotiations, but is concerned about how an agreement would affect prospects for its primary goal—an internal political settlement that provides for a power-sharing arrangement with the government. [REDACTED]

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Alternative Scenarios

Agreement on a regional settlement would gradually take Cuban forces out of the fight, but Cuba and the Soviet Union would rely on military advisers and continued arms aid to ensure that they maintained their influence in Angola. Luanda intends initially to continue military operations against UNITA, pressure on Zaire to sever remaining outside support, and intensification of its clemency campaign. Loss of Cuban support, however, would make Luanda scale back on more ambitious military campaigns. UNITA would sustain its military activity to show it had not been hurt by a settlement and continue pressure on Luanda for reconciliation. South Africa would continue covert materiel support to UNITA. [REDACTED]

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If the negotiations fail to produce a settlement, Cuba would attempt to step up pressure on South Africa, although short of launching a full-scale attack on Namibia. Castro would seek to limit his risks by encouraging infiltration into Namibia by the South-West Africa People's Organization and a major Angolan offensive into UNITA-held southeastern Angola. Meanwhile, Cuban forces would be prepared to retaliate if South Africa reentered Angola. South Africa would defend Namibia, but realizes that a preemptive attack on Cuban forces would entail unacceptable costs. Pretoria might hesitate to commit a large force to fight at UNITA's side again. [REDACTED]

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Implications for the United States

A successful outcome to the negotiations would enhance the opportunities to promote national reconciliation. Luanda's attitude would depend on its perception of the military situation, however; if it believed UNITA were gravely weakened by loss of all outside support, it probably would hold back from serious talks. Moreover, if UNITA perceived that it had lost US support, it might reject a US role. [REDACTED]

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
Even if the talks fail, the parties probably would still be interested in an eventual resolution of the conflict short of all-out war and might seek renewal of US-mediated talks at a later date. The parties could, however, look for another mediator and threaten to freeze the United States out of participation in a major regional settlement. [REDACTED]

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Discussion

Status of the Negotiations ²

The US-mediated negotiations among Angola, Cuba, and South Africa continue after having made substantial progress through seven rounds. Talks during May in London, followed by rounds in Cairo, New York, Geneva, and lately in Brazzaville, have pushed the process along to where agreement has been reached on a settlement framework that links South African implementation of UNSCR 435 for Namibian independence to a total withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. The negotiations have established a sequence of key steps and provisional dates for reaching a regional settlement that would culminate in implementation of UNSCR 435 beginning as early as 1 November. [REDACTED]

In addition, the parties have agreed to a cessation of hostilities in southern Angola to reduce the chances of an escalation prior to reaching a settlement. South Africa pulled its remaining troops out of Angola and the Cubans promised not to move south beyond their present forward positions. The military standdown is being monitored by a joint military commission (Cuba, Angola, South Africa) from posts along the Angola-Namibia border. The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), not a party to the talks, has refused to abide by a cease-fire, but has offered to conclude one with Cuba. [REDACTED]

The talks have now come down to the contentious issue of timing and pace for a total Cuban troop withdrawal, which has been the focus of talks in

² This Memorandum was initiated by the National Intelligence Officer for Africa to assess the options—primarily military—of the principal players in Angola under the alternative scenarios that ongoing negotiations, linking total Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola to independence for neighboring Namibia: (a) succeed in achieving a regional settlement, or (b) break down or stall. [REDACTED]

Provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 435

Following agreement on a date to implement UNSCR 435 and establishment of a formal cease-fire, a UN representative and a UN planning group would administer Namibia during the transition to independence in conjunction with the South African-appointed Administrator General. A 7,500-man UN Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG), including about 5,000 troops, would supervise the cease-fire and monitor South African and South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) troops. [REDACTED]

Within three months of a cease-fire, South African forces would be reduced to 1,500 men, confined to one or two bases in northern Namibia. SWAPO forces would be restricted to specified locations in Angola under UN supervision. All political prisoners held by both sides would be released. [REDACTED]

Seven months after the implementation date, elections would be held under UN auspices for a new constituent assembly. The remaining South African troops would depart within a few months, once elections were certified by the United Nations and independence granted. Unarmed SWAPO members and Namibian refugees would be permitted to return to participate in the election process. [REDACTED]

Brazzaville. Substantial differences between the positions have narrowed, but the sides are still short of agreement. Angola and Cuba have held out for a longer withdrawal period than South Africa has

proposed. Room for compromise still exists, however, and the parties are considering various formulations.

Other issues have emerged during the discussions or in bilateral contacts, but are not formally part of the agenda. The United States is urging an end to the civil war through national reconciliation and an internal political settlement between the Angolan Government and UNITA. Luanda is pressing Washington to end support to UNITA, and Pretoria has raised concerns about African National Congress camps in Angola, financial costs of a settlement, and modifications to the decade-old UNSCR 435. The ANC issue may have been used as a sweetener in moving toward a settlement.

Objectives of the Players

The recent acceleration in the negotiating process and the willingness of the Cuban, Angolan, and South African participants to discuss the issues seriously follow directly from a major change in the military situation over the past year. In response to the unprecedented scale of South African involvement on the side of UNITA in late 1987, Cuba sent about 15,000 well-equipped and trained troops to Angola—bringing its total to over 50,000 men—and adopted a more combative strategy. This altered the balance of forces in the region and challenged South Africa's military hegemony (see annex).

Although they are not direct participants in the negotiations, the Soviet Union and UNITA are key players. A Soviet observer has been available at each round of talks and has intervened informally to keep the negotiations on track. UNITA is following the talks, albeit at a distance, and has asserted its presence vocally and by military action to ensure that its interests are taken into account.

Cuba

After 13 years of military involvement in Angola, Cuban President Castro probably believes the current negotiations offer him the best chance for withdrawing Cuban troops under his requirement for honorable conditions. Cuba's decision last year to reinforce its

troop strength in Angola—and go beyond its largely defensive role by moving troops to the frontlines—was motivated by a desire to save Luanda from looming defeat and to force an end to longstanding South African intervention, either by negotiations or direct military action.

A negotiated withdrawal, portrayed as a victory, would provide an escape from a war that was proving unwinnable as long as Pretoria's involvement continued. In Castro's view, Namibian independence would effectively end direct South African military intervention on UNITA's behalf and cut materiel support by isolating the insurgents from their primary backer. Angola is also increasingly unable to pay for Cuban services—its debt may now total some \$500 million—and the Cuban population is unenthusiastic about endless foreign adventures.

Nevertheless, Castro's bottom-line conditions for a settlement require the survival of the Angolan regime along with Namibian independence from South Africa. Castro apparently is under no immediate domestic or foreign pressure to leave Angola short of his objectives. The regime's propaganda apparatus has been preparing the Cuban population for increased casualties and additional fighting if the talks break down.

Angola

The Angolan Government shares Havana's basic assumptions about the military situation and the negotiations. Luanda is frustrated by its inability to fight both South Africa and UNITA and sees a regional settlement as the best way to remove South Africa from the scene, even if it eventually loses support from Cuban combat forces.

Angolan leaders also have grown weary of the prolonged, expensive, and overbearing Cuban presence.

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The Angolan regime—with its own security at stake—is more hesitant than Havana to take risks with the timing of a Cuban troop withdrawal. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] but the Angolans probably have little choice but to follow Cuba's lead. [REDACTED]

Luanda believes a troop withdrawal agreement that removes South African forces from Namibia would put it in a better position to conclude the civil war on its terms. Luanda agrees that an internal political settlement eventually will be needed to end the war, but has so far proposed only a clemency program for individual UNITA members. The Angolan regime shies from political reconciliation that would involve sharing power with the insurgents or a role for Savimbi, despite counseling from its Cuban and Soviet allies and several African leaders. The government has attempted to defer pressure for reconciliation by arguing that a troop withdrawal agreement must be achieved first. [REDACTED]

South Africa

Surprised by the Cuban military moves and the change in the military balance, Pretoria now calculates that it would have to pay a stiff price were it forced into a larger conflict. In addition to increased military risks, high financial costs of Namibian occupation and rising domestic criticism of military operations in Angola have encouraged Pretoria to negotiate seriously. [REDACTED]

As a result, many South African officials apparently argue that the time has come to end South Africa's 73-year rule in Namibia. Nevertheless, Pretoria does not view the current military situation with desperation and is not interested in settling for an agreement that, in its view, threatens its long-term security interests and regional role. South Africa views defense of Namibian territory against possible Cuban aggression as intrinsic to its security and faces little domestic opposition to this position. Moreover, Pretoria is adamant that its participation in the negotiations not be perceived as a sign of military weakness. South Africa has recently strengthened its forces in Namibia to improve its defenses in the event that the talks break down. [REDACTED]

Soviet Union

The Soviet Union is interested in a settlement as long as it provides for removal of South African forces from Namibia and leaves its Angolan client relatively secure.³ This approach is in line with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev's overall efforts to reduce costs of supporting client states fighting insurgencies, improve relations with the United States by displaying flexibility on regional conflicts, and promote a less threatening image internationally. Moscow expects that a Cuban troop withdrawal will reduce its financial burden, now running at about \$1.5 billion annually in arms aid alone. [REDACTED]

Continuing Soviet arms deliveries and support for Cuban troop augmentation suggest a calculation that military strength will allow Cuba and Angola to extract as many concessions as possible from the South Africans. At the same time, however, Moscow has given some indication that it wants to avoid the political and economic costs of an escalation in the conflict and has sought to keep the talks from breaking down. The Soviets probably believe that the Angolan Army will be able to cope with UNITA after a settlement and that Luanda will be in a position to deal confidently with UNITA in any internal political negotiations. [REDACTED]

UNITA

UNITA's primary goal is to achieve an internal political settlement that provides recognition and a power-sharing arrangement for the movement and its leader, Jonas Savimbi. Savimbi's immediate objective is to get direct negotiations with Luanda under way while international attention is focused on the US-brokered talks. Savimbi argues that a regional settlement will be unworkable without a total cease-fire and a negotiated end to the civil war. To this end, he is seeking international support for internal reconciliation and engagement of African leaders in mediation efforts. [REDACTED]

Although Savimbi is generally supportive of the negotiations, he sees both advantages and disadvantages to a regional settlement. Withdrawal of some 50,000 Cuban troops would improve the balance of forces for UNITA, even at the expense of losing South African support. [REDACTED]

Neither Savimbi nor UNITA is prepared to quit if a regional settlement reduces foreign involvement but leaves the fratricidal civil war unresolved. Even a substantial loss of outside support would not diminish the movement's dedication to its goals. Nevertheless, Savimbi's greatest immediate concern is not that UNITA will be destroyed, but that its prospects of achieving its political goals will recede in the face of another prolonged period of guerrilla war in which UNITA is increasingly isolated and vulnerable. [REDACTED]

Alternatives if the Negotiations Succeed or Fail

Successful conclusion to the negotiations would involve formal agreement by Cuba, Angola, and South Africa under the principles set in New York and approved subsequent to the Geneva talks. These principles set the date for South African implementation of UNSCR 435, a transition to Namibian independence, and Cuban agreement to begin withdrawal of its military forces from Angola at a specified pace within a set deadline. The parties also accepted other conditions—such as a commitment to cease hostilities and respect borders—intended to build confidence and smooth the way to a final settlement. The agreements do not directly address the civil war and the issue of national reconciliation. [REDACTED]

Failure, on the other hand, would entail assertion by any of the participants to the negotiations that no further progress is likely, compromise unattainable, and continued involvement useless. This reaction could be provoked by the belief that other participants are purposefully dragging out the talks or stalling to gain time. [REDACTED]

Whatever the outcome of the negotiations, neither the Angolan Government nor UNITA is likely to gain a decisive military advantage in the next six to 12 months. Success would immediately reduce the risk of Cuban–South African conflict along the border but would not necessarily reduce the level of fighting between Angolan forces and UNITA. Failure would risk bringing reinforced Cuban and South African military forces into direct confrontation. [REDACTED]

If the Negotiations Succeed


Cuba and South Africa would honor commitments made in the talks, but each would be suspicious of the other and alert for signs of cheating. Signing of a treaty would lead to an almost immediate standdown of South African forces under supervision of UN peacekeeping forces. Cuban forces would begin to pull back from the Namibian border and some would begin preparations for return to Cuba. [REDACTED]

Both Cuba and the Soviet Union would seek to maintain their influence in Angola. In any case, Soviet involvement in Angolan affairs would not be seriously affected by a settlement. Moscow provides most of Luanda's weapons and countrywide airlift, trains most of the senior officers, and has some 1,200 advisers attached to senior and midlevel commands. Although a settlement could lead to a reduction in Moscow's military support, the Soviets have indicated that they intend to continue aid at a level they deem necessary to support Angolan operations against UNITA. [REDACTED]


[REDACTED] Castro almost certainly believes that a strengthened advisory presence would sustain Havana's influence with Luanda after his combat troops depart. [REDACTED]

Luanda probably intends, at least initially after a regional settlement, to stay with the general aims of the strategy against UNITA that it already has formulated: continue the war through pressure on


Monitoring a Troop Withdrawal



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UNITA-held territory in the southeast and counterinsurgency operations elsewhere; sever UNITA from outside support by pressuring remaining backers; and intensify the clemency campaign to split the insurgent leadership and sow dissension in UNITA ranks. 

Nevertheless, many of the departing Cuban troops would have to be replaced by Angolans, and the Angolan Army—already stretched thin—would have to scale back on more ambitious operations to secure important urban areas, garrisons, and vital economic targets. Even though capture of Jamba will continue to be one of Luanda's primary objectives, a force for

such an effort is not currently available for renewal of a major offensive like the one in 1987. The government probably will not be ready until next year, and a successful campaign to take Jamba probably would, in any event, entail several years of fighting. Luanda also may have in mind a series of smaller, more regionally focused offensives, like the one just concluded at Munhango in central Angola, or other operations intended to isolate UNITA's regional components. 

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Cuban Troop Repatriation

It is unlikely that Castro would attempt immediately to redeploy large numbers of Cuban troops from Angola to another client state. Rather than involve Cuban troops in another regional conflict, Castro probably would concentrate on absorbing the returning Cuban forces and resolving other domestic problems. Approximately 15,000 of the troops belong to regular military units and would return to their garrisons on the island. Almost all the remaining troops are reservists who would be phased into the Cuban economy gradually over the withdrawal period, although some almost certainly would be converted into advisers and remain in Angola.

In addition, reactivation of the Mariel Accord, which provides for the emigration of up to 20,000 Cubans annually to the United States, also would help offset any problems associated with absorbing large numbers of returnees.

Luanda sees Zaire as the most important regional supporter of UNITA after South Africa and has charged that UNITA's use of Zairian territory allows the insurgents to support guerrilla operations in the north and to infiltrate supplies. In the aftermath of a settlement, Luanda probably would focus on Zaire as UNITA's remaining means of access to the outside and use a combination of cajolery, blandishments, and threats to discourage Zairian support for UNITA. For example, the Angolan Government might sponsor infiltration of Zairian dissident factions and even direct cross-border raids.

Luanda probably would drag its feet on an internal political settlement in the hope that its "harmonization" or clemency program would show some progress. The government's aims are to deny recognition of UNITA as a political movement and reject Savimbi's involvement in the political process, although it

might entertain compromises. Luanda has recently indicated that it is willing to consider a more conciliatory approach and deal with African mediators. Still, Luanda would be likely to keep the military pressure on UNITA to maintain its bargaining position and probably hopes that military gains would enable it to compel acceptance of the harmonization policy. If, on the other hand, government forces fail on the battlefield, Luanda might become more open to African-backed efforts to promote an internal settlement.

For its part, UNITA almost certainly would sustain its military activity to show that it had not been hurt by the settlement and continue pressure to move the government toward reconciliation. The insurgents probably would have stockpiled sufficient supplies to support operations at current levels of activity for a year. UNITA no doubt would, however, closely monitor the levels of outside support, and any suspicion that a support cut was looming probably would lead UNITA to implement organizational changes more in line with a protracted conflict. These might include greater concentration on guerrilla units, a corresponding deemphasis of larger, semiconventional military units, and conservation of resources. Savimbi is loath to give up UNITA-held territory in the southeast or fixed bases, such as the headquarters at Jamba, however, and he would seek to defend the territory for as long as possible.

Although Pretoria would lose the capability for major direct intervention on UNITA's behalf, it would provide continuing support to UNITA to maintain some influence in Angolan developments. South African logistic support following a settlement would have to be covert, however, and operational limitations would reduce the quantity that could be delivered. Pretoria realizes that substantial Soviet and Cuban military assistance to Angola will continue after a settlement, and has urged UNITA to reevaluate its organization and tactics to cope with government advantages in conventional forces.

If the Negotiations Fail

Failure to reach a negotiated settlement—whether through outright breakdown of the talks or the prospect of their indefinite prolongation—would leave substantial Cuban and South African military concentrations on the Angola-Namibia border, held in check by a temporary cease-fire. Chances of an inadvertent escalation would increase as each side would be uncertain of the other's intentions and might overreact to perceived threats. Although both Cuba and Pretoria probably are prepared to deal with or even provoke some escalation in the conflict, both sides appear to have put limits on how far they would be willing to carry the fight. Moreover, even if fighting broke out, they both might be willing to return to the negotiations at a later date if no significant advantage were won by either side. []

In the near term—notwithstanding the risk of a wider conflict—Havana would not be satisfied with the status quo and would be willing to ratchet up the military pressure on Pretoria to obtain South African withdrawal from Namibia and an improved military position for the Angolan Government. Purely military resolution of the issue through a full-scale Cuban invasion of Namibia does not appear likely, however. Cuban forces at present lack the size and capability for operations on this scale, and we believe Castro would be very reluctant to incur the inevitable costs of major fighting with South Africa. []

Instead, Castro likely would seek both to gain the military initiative and to limit his risks by encouraging infiltration of Namibia by the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) and an Angolan Army offensive against UNITA. Cuban forces would be prepared to support and assist these operations and strike back if provoked or if South African forces reentered Angola. In Havana's view, Pretoria is sensitive to increased white casualties and security costs in Namibia. Castro might calculate that SWAPO's performance—even though it would not seriously threaten South Africa's hold on Namibia—would raise the political costs to Pretoria of remaining in Namibia. Additional SWAPO units have already been moved into southwestern Angola where they are supported and sheltered by Cuban units. []

Moreover, Castro probably would back another major Angolan offensive against UNITA-held southeastern Angola, although this option would not be immediately available. Some Cuban forces—specialists, such as pilots, tank drivers, and artillerymen—could become directly involved in eventual fighting, but Castro has repeatedly asserted that the fight against UNITA is Luanda's responsibility. Castro almost certainly would prefer that Angolan troops bear the brunt of combat and order Cuban troops into the fight only as a last resort. More likely, Cuba would keep its forces in reserve, ready to retaliate if Pretoria again intervened on UNITA's side. Nonetheless, in anticipation of the increased danger of a wider military engagement arising from these initiatives, Havana would be willing to expand its expeditionary force in Angola if required. []

For its part, Pretoria is vitally concerned that it avoid any appearance of military weakness and almost certainly would choose to maintain its hold on Namibia, which is too important to be given up without compensation or a fight. South African officers believe they can defend Namibia against Cuban or SWAPO attacks by stopping small incursions on the border or, in the event of a larger attack, by falling back to lure the invader into overextending itself. Although Pretoria has the capability to mobilize rapidly and deploy large numbers of forces, a direct, preemptive attack on Cuban forces in Angola does not appear likely; cooler heads among the South African military realize that a major escalation would entail unacceptable costs. Nevertheless, Pretoria has suggested that the Cubans are vulnerable to attacks along their lines of communication and might consider harassing operations of this sort. []

A repeat of South African intervention in support of UNITA would be problematic. Materiel support almost certainly would be provided, but South Africa might hesitate to send large military forces to fight at UNITA's side in the event of another major government offensive. Pretoria would be mindful of the vocal

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domestic opposition to its last intervention as well as the threat to its flank posed by Cuban troops in the southwest. [REDACTED]

Implications for the United States

The United States is inexorably linked to these negotiations, whatever the outcome, and will receive credit for a success or blame for a failure. If the negotiations lead to a regional settlement, the participants would hold the United States responsible for compliance despite the United Nations' official monitoring role, and charges of cheating or other violations would be directed at the United States for answers or resolution. Moreover, continued civil war despite a regional settlement would bring Zaire under increased Angolan pressure to curtail its assistance to UNITA. [REDACTED]

A successful outcome, however, also would raise the opportunity to expand a US peacemaking role, and to encourage Luanda to open discussions with UNITA on the unresolved problems of ending the civil war and national reconciliation. The Angolan Government's attitude would hinge principally on its perception of the military situation: should UNITA make

gains despite loss of South African support, Luanda probably would become more disposed toward internal negotiations; alternatively, prospects for further curtailment of UNITA's external backing would encourage the government to hold back from serious talks. UNITA's attitude would also be important. Belief that its interests were slighted during the negotiations or that US support was waning might lead UNITA to reject a US role and hold out for direct talks or another mediator. [REDACTED]

In the event of a breakdown, the United States might still remain involved. Even with additional fighting, the parties probably would still be interested in eventual resolution of the conflict short of all-out war. Despite occasional complaints about the US role, the participants have acknowledged the utility of US mediation as a useful framework for talks. There would be a danger, however, that the parties might seek another mediator and threaten to freeze the United States out of participation in a major regional settlement, especially if any of the parties perceived that US policy was becoming hostile to their interests. [REDACTED]

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Annex

The Military Balance

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	Should Cuban troops be withdrawn from Angola, government military capabilities would deteriorate. Cuba would focus during the transition period on enhancing Angola's ability to continue fighting and to assume rear area support and point defense roles. The presence of Cuban and Soviet Bloc military advisers and shipments of supplies and equipment would continue. Nonetheless, the government's ability to conduct offensive operations after a Cuban troop withdrawal would decrease. Primary emphasis would be placed on defending key areas.	25X1

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UNITA

Although the withdrawal of South African combat forces from Angola has reduced UNITA's ability to counter large-scale government offensives, continued South African covert logistic support will facilitate its ability to conduct widespread insurgent operations. UNITA's strengths include effective leadership, high morale, and good organization in addition to South African support. Weaknesses include limited logistic and conventional combat capabilities. [REDACTED]

Should South African forces withdraw from Namibia, UNITA's military capabilities would not suffer significantly during the first six to 12 months. Over time, however, dwindling fuel supplies would have a detrimental effect on its ability to conduct more conventional operations. Nevertheless, UNITA would retain the ability to conduct insurgent operations throughout the country, using captured and existing stocks. [REDACTED]

The South Africans

The unprecedented move of Cuban and Angolan forces to the border area has stimulated a South African buildup on the Namibian side of the border.

[REDACTED]

For now, however, the deployment is defensive. The South African Air Force—whose aircraft can only be replaced at great expense and difficulty—has the capability to conduct only limited offensive air operations, and would probably devote a majority of its assets to air defense missions. Currently deployed South African air defense weapons would not deter Cuban airstrikes [REDACTED]

Upon implementation of UNSCR 435 and South African withdrawal from Namibia, supply channels to UNITA would be restricted, and would become even more covert in nature. The capability of the South Africans to support UNITA with conventional forces would still exist, but would necessitate use of impractically long air logistic lines or reoccupation of bases in Namibia. The South Africans probably have already found ways to continue special forces advisory and covert resupply activities in support of UNITA, some of which likely include joint efforts with Zaire and the use of Zaire as a conduit. [REDACTED]

If negotiations break down, the South Africans could launch a major offensive but would risk significant losses and a protracted conflict with the Cubans. Were the South Africans to decide on such a course, they could deploy to Northern Namibia—on short notice—as many as eight squadrons totaling 170 combat aircraft, including jet fighters and bombers. Five airfields suitable for support of such operations are available within the border area. Ground forces could also be reinforced quickly. South Africa can mobilize approximately 15 conventional force battalions or two brigades, totaling about 11,500 personnel, on the first day of mobilization. Using civilian and military transport aircraft and rail assets, most of these troops could be at the front within four days. Within one month, the South Africans could have a total of 60,000 conventional forces in Namibia, an acceptable force level for offensive operations against the Cubans now present in southwestern Angola.

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