

1986

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NIC Organization and Mission

The National Intelligence Council (NIC) is comprised of the National Intelligence Officers (NIOs), their assistants, and the Analytic Group. The National Intelligence Officers serve as personal staff officers and senior advisers to the DCI in their respective areas of functional or regional responsibilities. They are responsible for producing National Intelligence Estimates and other interagency assessments. In this function, the NIC is the successor to the Board and Office of National Estimates, established in 1950, as the DCI organization to produce intelligence estimates for the President.

The National Intelligence Officers are selected from senior officers in the Intelligence Community, the Foreign Service, the military services, academia, and the private sector. They are responsible to the DCI and serve him largely in his role of leader of the Intelligence Community. Collectively, the NIOs sit as the National Intelligence Council. The Council has a chairman and two vice chairmen.



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Products

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The Products

There are four types of coordinated Intelligence Community papers. The most formal and authoritative of the four is the National Intelligence Estimate—the NIE. A recent example is an NIE published in September 1986 called *Colombia: Prospects for the New Government*, which examined the prospects of President Barco and his projected ability to deal with a growing insurgency and a thriving narcotics industry. Such country specific NIEs are becoming less typical, as we seek to broaden our estimates regionally and functionally. Special National Intelligence Estimates—or SNIEs—are similar to NIEs but deal with more time-urgent issues. SNIEs are often specially requested by a policymaker and written in a matter of weeks or days.

The two other forms of estimates are: Interagency Intelligence Memoranda (IIM) and Interagency Intelligence Assessments (IIA). Both are issued by the Chairman of the NIC, rather than the DCI. IIMs address topics in more detail, and IIAs have a quick turnaround but are usually of less immediate concern to senior policymakers than SNIEs. Finally, Memoranda to Holders may be issued for any of these four types of estimates, to update or amplify its judgments.

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The total number of estimates produced between 1979 and 1986 steadily increased to an almost even balance of NIEs, SNIEs, IIMs and IIAs. In mid-1986 the annual production plan was restructured to implement the DCI's decision to undertake more estimates that cut across traditional analytic disciplines and to reduce the number of conventional-style country-oriented NIEs, particularly on areas of marginal policy relevance. This year the plan includes about 100 formal estimative products, a list that, to assure relevance, is flexible and subject to revision. The list does not include the stream of less formal products constantly in production by the NIOs, their assistants, and members of the Analytic Group to advise the DCI or stimulate thought throughout the Community.

The following charts indicate for 1986 the percentage of formal products by type, the genesis of the requests, and the agencies providing the drafters, the latter two indicate the degree of Community involvement in tasking and execution that is typical of NIC production.

NIOs frequently attempt to challenge the Community to reexamine the conventional wisdom, and in the process often include alternative scenarios as well as indicators that will alert policymakers to a possible change in trends. An estimate on the Philippine succession written in 1985 discussed a

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broad range of less likely succession possibilities which could be used in developing policy options. Estimates before 1983 usually had focused only on what the Intelligence Community believed to be the most likely scenario.


When agencies differ on important issues, these differences are highlighted either through parallel text or footnotes. For example, a recent estimate entitled *Domestic Stresses on the Soviet System*, stated that Soviet domestic problems are likely to push Gorbachev to seek a restoration of detente. The Defense Intelligence Agency and the Air Force took a different tack, arguing that Soviet internal problems are not a significant variable concerning Moscow's foreign policies.

The estimative product is reviewed at every stage and at the end, feedback is sought from policymakers through formal and informal channels. It is enormously helpful when a senior official takes the time to write a note or call to give views on an estimate—positive or negative.

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


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Types of National Estimates Produced, 1986




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Requesters of National Estimates, 1986




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Principal Drafters of National Estimates, 1986



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Process

The Process

In order to be useful to policymakers, estimates must deal with topics that are relevant and timely; they must reach the right officials before key decisions are made. The most critical step in the estimate process is the selection of topics to be considered. A policymaker or the Director may ask that the Community take a thorough look at an issue. Alternatively, an NIO or the Chairman of the NIC may initiate an estimate in order to anticipate policymakers' needs—i.e., what he needs to hear, not necessarily what he wants to hear. Thus, successful NIOs must be constantly in touch with their key consumers as well as specialists in their field.

The NIC involves all of the components of the Intelligence Community in the rigorous process of developing and coordinating an annual production plan that is constantly updated throughout the year. Three DCI panels also participate in this process by advising on the analytic soundness and policy relevance of the plan and on key estimates in their fields. (The Military Advisory Panel is composed of eight retired flag officers, former ambassadors, systems analysts, and a university professor. The Science and Technology Advisory Panel is made up of nine leaders of industry; and the in-house five-member Senior Review Panel includes former ambassadors, retired flag officers, and a distinguished scientist.)

The estimative process has five stages, which involve all components of the Intelligence Community:

- **Concept Paper/Terms of Reference (CP/TOR).** The CP addresses the estimate's origin and purpose and asks key questions to be answered; the TORs outline in greater detail the central issues to be addressed in the estimate. The development of the CP/TOR is closely supervised by the NIOs, as it sets the stage for all that follows. The CP/TOR are reviewed and approved by the DCI for coordination and distributed to the representatives of National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB) Principals who meet to discuss and amend them.
- **Writing the Estimates.** The NIO supervising the preparation of the estimate selects a drafter from the Intelligence Community. When the draft is completed, it is reviewed by the NIO, the Chairman of the NIC, and by the DCI's Senior Review Panel. When possible, estimates are also reviewed by specialists outside the Community and other DCI panels. Estimates accommodating these comments as appropriate are sent to the DCI with a recommendation that they be sent to NFIB Agencies for formal coordination.
- **Coordination.** Formal coordination meetings among NFIB representatives are held and differences are either resolved or highlighted, with emphasis on the latter when they are significant. Dissenting views are clearly stated in the estimates as alternative language or footnotes.

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- ***NFIB Approval.*** The DCI reviews the estimate after coordination and then submits it to NFIB Principals for final coordination. NFIB reviews the estimate, sometimes challenges its judgments and adds additional alternative language or footnotes, and recommends that the DCI approve or remand it.
- ***Feedback.*** Once an estimate is approved and published, feedback is sought from the policymakers concerning the relevance of the analysis. Further, retrospective analysis is done as the topic is being prepared for treatment again to determine how the Community's views may have changed and why.

Assuring Quality/Relevance

A good estimate digs deep, probes for factual bases of disagreement, highlights the critical uncertainties, and raises questions that need more attention. Top quality estimates do not necessarily simplify a policymaker's job; rather an excellent estimate widens the policymaker's agenda and pushes the individual toward more extensive reflection. Getting a high quality, highly relevant product out of a process involving several agencies is not an easy task. We have taken several approaches:

- NIOs attempt to integrate traditional areas of analysis (such as political, economic, social and military) in many broad estimates. For instance, an estimate in production on Islamic fundamentalism will look at this as a regional phenomenon. This study will examine the influence this religious revival is having on the social patterns, economic practices, and political behavior of key Arab states as well as discuss the implications for the United States.
- Where appropriate, estimates cut across regional and functional analytic lines. For example, the NIC has produced an estimate on the prospects for counterterrorist cooperation among developed countries, and is preparing an estimate on the outlook for US foreign basing and access rights worldwide.
- Another will take a regional look at ASEAN rather than the usual country or event-specific approach. Still another will give policymakers a better understanding of the rapid shift in economic power to the newly industrialized countries in East Asia.
- Occasionally we will attempt a totally new type of estimate. One such planned estimate will look at about 10 international high impact, low probability events. Individually, the probability of these events occurring

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is low; however, their occurrence would have a dramatic impact on the international system. The Estimate will provide warning indicators of their potential emergence.

Estimates and the Intelligence/Policy Connection

Occasionally charges are made that judgments in some estimates were written to justify a particular pre-existing policy preference. The Tower Commission expressed this concern. There have been other instances in recent years of accusations of policy corruption of objective NIC judgments as well. This is particularly marked on issues concerning Iran, Central America, the USSR in the Third World, and overall Soviet policies. The NIC must tell it like it is, and let the chips fall where they may, and that is just what we attempt to do. We always have been, and will continue to be, careful to maintain the independence of the intelligence process. While we seek policy relevance, we seek to avoid policy prescription. Our analyses have not always been congenial to the policy community. Examples of estimates that reexamined the conventional wisdom, in some cases contradicting the assumptions underlying an administration policy, are listed below. These examples, moreover, were picked from a much longer list:

- One recent estimate concluded that for the next few years constraints on Soviet hard currency would not be serious enough to spur a major shift in their foreign policy nor require Moscow to make fundamental economic reforms. The White House and some advisers at the NSC disagreed.
- In three estimates on Libya spanning five years, the Community was far more cautious and pessimistic about the impact of US political, economic, and covert sanctions on Qadhafi than some administration policy officials.
- Major estimates on Soviet strategic programs have often dealt with controversial issues.


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Estimate Process



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Strengths and Weaknesses

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Strengths and Weaknesses of the NIC**Strengths**

The strength of the NIOs derives from their freedom from the demands of current intelligence production and requirements, their focus on the longer term intelligence and trends, and their access to the DCI. Careful selection of senior people, with experience and stature in their fields, from a variety of professional and institutional backgrounds, provides objective advice and avoids institutional biases. The independence of the individual NIOs and their allegiance only to the DCI is intended to avoid conflict with policy or budget interests that tend to influence, or at least give the impression of influencing, the judgments of the intelligence services of the individual agencies.

Weaknesses

The limited ability of the Community to devote resources to a broad range of in-depth research limits the longer term estimative work of the NIC. The problem will persist to the extent that Community intelligence analysts tend to act more as all-source reports officers than in-depth researchers.

In addition, many of the the major questions require highly judgmental answers, which by nature go beyond any specific body of evidence. The questions call for political judgments of a high order with no certainty of being correct. Analysts tend to shrink from many judgments sought by the policymaker because the evidentiary base is too thin; yet these judgments can and must be made, even if qualified by explicit statements that they are based upon limited data.

We try to identify the major variables that could affect our best judgment and to determine how those variables might affect the outcome. In sum, we try as much to describe the environment within which future events will take place as we do to provide a judgment on what is most likely to happen.

Another problem is the difficulty in arriving at crisp judgments through the Community coordination process. The search for consensus often reduces the punch of those judgments, except where significant disagreements lead to alternative text or footnotes. We frequently use uncoordinated typescripts to reexamine and challenge the accepted wisdom and to get those analyses before policymakers.

The NIC's estimates production schedule routinely falls prey to staff shortages, NIO personnel changes, delays in receiving sensitive source materials, competition for the services of qualified drafters, the necessary Intelligence Community review and coordination process, and the need to

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spend valuable time in recasting less than acceptable drafts. As a result, there is a "bow wave" of estimates in queue awaiting production.

One of the strengths of the NIO system is its ability to bring the NIOs into contact with policymakers, providing the NIOs a firsthand opportunity to see the latter's information needs. This is a two-edged sword. A close working relationship is vital to our ability to provide intelligence relevant to policy decisions. Too close a relationship can lead to perceptions that the independent intelligence process can be compromised for policy—or political—purposes. We strive to maintain a proper separation between policy and intelligence in order to maintain our objectivity.

There is a constant need for NIO knowledge of "blue team" activities, that is, what our own policymakers are doing that affect foreign developments. We always need better information on the day-to-day intentions, planning, and operations of State, DOD, and CIA's Directorate of Operations in selected covert activities in order to have a full picture of the forces at play in foreign developments and to warn of unsuspected pitfalls.

There are the problems associated with finding, acquiring, and retaining the best possible personnel for the NIC. A major hurdle is the stringent hiring process—particularly the rigorous polygraph examination and the length of the interview and testing procedures—for anyone wishing to work in this building. We need to seek a representative sample of personnel from agencies and institutions inside and outside of government in the interest of a broad intellectual base. Too often, outstanding candidates simply are either intimidated and decline our offer, or exhaust their patience and accept another job offer.


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NIO Agendas

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Formal Estimative Projects Chaired by NIOs*, 1986



* Does not include other NIO products such as memos to the DCI, think pieces for the intelligence community, etc.

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Regional

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NIO/Africa

I. Key Issues

- **Libya's Defeat in Chad.** Qadhafi's army has been literally decimated, although President Habre's forces probably will need several more months to expel the remaining Libyans in the north. So rapid was the Chadian success that US policymakers have not fully formulated a follow-on US policy. They need assessments of Qadhafi's likely moves (including new Chad military ventures, new terrorism in Africa, and renewed subversion in neighboring Sudan and Niger), French intentions, and Habre's military intentions and capabilities.

 - **Instability and Economic Stagnation in Southern Africa.** US decision-makers are rethinking policy toward southern Africa. They seek new ways to use our preferred diplomatic and economic tools to reduce regional and civil violence, promote economic development and political liberalization, and curb Soviet influence in Angola, Mozambique, South Africa, and Zimbabwe.
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II. Agenda

With nearly 50 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the wide variety of problems that arise there, the NIO/AF must prioritize and be highly selective in choosing topics for Intelligence Community studies. Top priority currently goes to the myriad issues in southern Africa (including the Angolan and Mozambican civil wars, South Africa's domestic situation and regional relations, and Soviet military aid and influence in the region) along with Libyan activities in the Sahel belt (especially the war in Chad and Libyan activities in Sudan and West Africa). Second-order priorities include new problems in US relations with old friends Zaire, Kenya, and Sudan—problems aggravated recently by unavoidable reductions in levels of US foreign aid. Long-term and persistent issues are led by Africa's continuing economic decline and accompanying political instability, and also include major natural disasters such as famine, drought, and the growing AIDS pandemic.

III. Estimative Program

A total of eight estimative products were completed in 1986 and 10 are currently planned for completion in 1987 to address this agenda.

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NIO/East Asia

I. Key Issues

- **Challenges in the Philippines.** The situation in the Philippines is more difficult than many US policymakers have been willing to admit. President Aquino faces serious challenges from a stalled economy, a Communist insurgency, and even her own military.

[redacted]

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- **Potential for Political Instability in South Korea.** An unpopular Chun Doo Hwan claims he will step down from the Presidency in 1988. However, it is likely that he will try to retain political power from behind the scenes. An increasingly confrontational opposition is pushing for direct presidential elections, while the ruling party wants a parliamentary cabinet system that will ensure its continued rule. The uncertain domestic political situation is increasing the likelihood of political instability and the potential for a military move by North Korea.

[redacted]

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- **Uncertainty in China.** The removal of General Secretary Hu Yaobang and the slowing of reforms raise prospects of further instability as prospective successors to aging Deng Xiaoping jockey for position. Retrenchment on domestic and foreign policies would set back China's opening to the US and the West.

[redacted]

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II. Agenda

The sheer number of Asian nations and the multitude of problems needing attention require the NIO/EA to structure his agenda with priorities much in mind. Top priorities of the moment include the Korean Peninsula, the Philippines, and China. Right behind these hot issues come a number of second-order problems that could move to the front burner rather quickly, including developments on Taiwan and Indochina. A number of other

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issues, presently more of a potential problem, need watching so that they do not catch us by surprise. The situation in Cambodia and developments in Indonesia fall into this category.

III. Estimative Program

A total of 11 estimative products were completed in 1986 and 11 are currently planned for completion in 1987 to address this agenda.

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NIO/Europe

I. Key Issues



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• **Threats to NATO's Security Consensus.** The Iceland summit and Gorbachev's latest INF proposal have stimulated reevaluation of security policies in Europe. The European left is embracing nonaggressive defense strategies that would weaken NATO, and there is movement toward greater European cooperation that excludes the US. Other potential threats to NATO cohesion include differences over counterterrorist policies, protectionism, and out-of-area disputes.



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• **NATO's Southern Flank.** With early elections probable in Italy and Portugal, possible clashes in US-Spanish base negotiations, and heightened tensions between Greece and Turkey, new problems—and potential crises—could erupt. Soviet probing is probable in connection with Gorbachev's planned visits to Italy and Greece.

• **Western Opportunities in Eastern Europe.** Imminent succession struggles and continued economic decline are key issues in Eastern Europe. Moreover, there are signs of increased friction in the Warsaw Pact as a result of Gorbachev's aggressive new policies and stiffer Soviet trade demands.



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II. Agenda

The NIO/Europe accords top priority currently to issues relating to the transatlantic alliance, including



growing threats to the NATO consensus. Secondary concern goes to programs designed to strengthen early warning capabilities in areas of high crisis potential, such as Romania, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey. A third priority includes efforts to upgrade analytic and collection resources focused on Eastern Europe at a time of high uncertainty, and potentially of profound changes.

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III. Estimative Program

A total of three estimative products were completed in 1986 and four are currently planned for completion in 1987 to address this agenda.

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


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NIO/Latin America

I. Key Issues

- ***The Sandinista Threat to Central America.*** The insurgency faces an uphill struggle, the Sandinistas are consolidating power, and Soviet support to Nicaragua is increasing.



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- ***Latin American Debt.*** Mounting foreign debt afflicts the entire Third World, but only in Latin America could default have traumatic impact on the world financial system and economy. The region owes the rest of the world \$400 billion; half is owed by Mexico and Brazil.



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- ***Narcotics.*** The narcotics flow from the Andean countries through Mexico and the Caribbean to the US is increasing. We are losing the war on drugs.



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- ***Insurgency in the Andean Countries.*** Marxist-Leninist groups are expanding in Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Chile. They are mostly Cuban- or Soviet-supported, with some Sandinista involvement.



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- ***Mexican Instability.*** Mexico's continued economic problems are resulting in a number of negative trends, including loss of popular support to the regime, rising drug trafficking, and continued illegal immigration to the United States.



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II. Agenda

Responsible for yet another area encompassing numerous countries and diverse issues, the NIO/LA must prioritize Community efforts on Latin America. Most pressing issues involve the Nicaraguan insurgency and the Soviet/Cuban foothold in Central America. Of secondary but high importance are the issues of Latin American debt, narcotics, and instability in Mexico. Continuing concerns revolve around chronic instability in Latin American countries and in their relations with the United States, Soviet Bloc, and Cuba.

III. Estimative Program

A total of eight estimative products were completed in 1986 and eight are currently planned for completion in 1987 to address this agenda.

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


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NIO/Near East and South Asia

I. Key Issues

- **Iran-Iraq War.** Iraq appears brittle, and a tactical loss could become an Iraqi rout. Newly introduced weapons are increasing the threat to shipping in the Gulf, and succession in Iran could have profound implications.




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- **State-Supported Terrorism.** The US and its allies differ over how to deal with the terrorist threat. Other than Lebanon, however, state-supported terrorism seems to be diminishing since the US bombing raid in Libya and UK sanctions against Syria. Nonetheless, the problem remains serious.



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- **Arab-Israeli Dispute.** The US administration wants to reinvigorate the peace process and shore up Egyptian stability, but policy discussion is impeded by sensitivity and bias toward issues relating to Israel.



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II. Agenda

A disproportionate share of the NIO/NESA's work is driven by ad hoc, priority requests for quick, focused intelligence assessments. Recent papers generated by these requests have focused on such issues as Egyptian military construction in the Sinai, Egypt's deteriorating prospects, and India's response to US efforts to improve bilateral relations. A second category of production in the NESA area concerns chronic policy problems that require frequent revisiting, such as the Iran-Iraq War, Libya, and the Arab-Israeli military balance. The third element of our NESA production involves long-term issues that affect US policy in the Middle East—such as the implications for the US of the Islamic revival, perceptions among the Arab states of the superpowers, and trends in Israeli social and political dynamics.

III. Estimative Program

A total of 14 estimative products were completed in 1986 and 10 are currently planned for completion in 1987 to address this agenda.

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NIO/USSR

I. Key Issues

- **Gorbachev's Position and Agenda.** General Secretary Gorbachev is staking out a bold agenda for political, economic, and social change in the USSR, but support for his program in the leadership and ruling elite remains precarious.




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- **US-Soviet Relations and Arms Control.** Gorbachev also is shaking up the Soviet foreign policy apparatus and altering long-held negotiation positions in an effort to get an agreement that will restrict SDI and ease Moscow's resource crunch.



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- **The Soviets in Afghanistan.** The Soviets are trying new military tactics and a more sophisticated political strategy, but they remain committed to the maintenance of a pro-Soviet regime in Kabul.



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II. Agenda

The NIO/USSR will devote primary substantive attention to four subjects: Gorbachev's domestic position and agenda; US-Soviet relations, especially its arms control dimension; Soviet policy in Afghanistan; and Sino-Soviet relations. All of these are issues with considerable potential for developments that could have significant impact on US interests and policy.

III. Estimative Program

A total of two estimative products were completed in 1986 and six are currently planned for completion in 1987 to address this agenda.

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**NIO/At Large and
Director, Analytic
Group**

The National Intelligence Officer at Large manages the Analytic Group, an office of eight senior estimate drafters and two research assistants. They review, comment on, and guide the production of interagency papers. In 1987 approximately 15 to 20 estimates, interagency memorandums, or research papers will be drafted by officers within the Analytic Group.

The NIO also oversees the drafting and coordination of estimates on a variety of global issues, particularly those dealing with Third World instability and low-intensity conflict. The highest priority will assess the prospects for US basing and access rights abroad by examining a broad spectrum of potential regional developments [redacted]. The second highest priority will be to respond to the DDCI's concerns that the current mix of interagency estimates leaves unaddressed a number of potential future developments that, though currently judged unlikely, would have a substantial impact on US interests if they nevertheless took place, for example, significant movement toward German reunification or the economic and political collapse of Israel [redacted].

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Estimative Program

Five estimative products are currently planned for completion in 1987 to address this agenda.

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**NIO/At Large
(Nuclear Proliferation/
Chemical and Biologi-
cal Weapons)
(NP/CBW)**

I. Agenda

One of the highest priorities is the Pakistani and Indian nuclear issues. Monitoring nuclear weapons developments in key countries, and keeping Congress up to date on the Pakistani nuclear weapons program are also top priority.

Also important is:

- Assessing current intelligence on the areas of concern with respect to nuclear and chemical proliferation 

- Assessing Soviet and Near Eastern chemical and biological weapons programs.
- Terrorist use of chemical and biological materials.

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II. Estimative Program

A total of three estimative products were completed in 1986 and six are currently planned for completion in 1987 to address this agenda.

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NIO/Counterterrorism I. Key Issues

- ***State Sponsored Terrorism.*** The motivations, methods, and targets of Syria, Libya, Iran and possibly Iraq.
- ***Radical Shia Threat.*** Including the Lebanon hostage problem and growth of nascent Shia cells in US, Europe, and elsewhere.
- ***Radical Palestinian Threat.*** Including Palestinian mainstream and factions, Western targets, and potential domestic threat.
- ***Central and South American Violence.*** Increasing use of terrorist tactics by insurgent groups, particularly in Andean nations, and the ability of governments to deal with the problem; threat to US interests in the region.
- ***Cooperative Counterterrorist Measures.*** Measures available to Western nations to increase cooperation and prospects for success.

II. Agenda

The top priority of the NIO for Counterterrorism is to continue to provide intelligence analysis on the containment of Middle Eastern terrorism and the prevention of its spread to Western Europe and elsewhere. The production of timely intelligence to assist European policymakers in dealing with their own problems of terrorism is an important part of this effort. Another key priority is to provide intelligence and analysis on securing the release of US hostages.

III. Estimative Program:

A total of seven estimative products were completed in 1986 and seven are currently planned for completion in 1987 to address this agenda.

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NIO/Economics

I. Key Issues

- **Agricultural Policies.** The US, as well as Japan and Western Europe, are under strong financial pressure to reduce government subsidies to agriculture. The US cannot act unilaterally without hurting US farmers, and US negotiators need to know what agricultural subsidies other governments provide, why they do so, and what flexibility they have to bring about reductions.



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- **Petroleum and Near East Stability.** The global oversupply of petroleum is straining OPEC's ability to cooperate and to stabilize prices. It is increasing friction between those producers with relatively large reserves and those with smaller reserves; the latter are pushing for high prices in the near-term.



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II. Agenda

Of highest priority is the issue of economic reform in the USSR. Equally important is: *Third World debt* with the goal of providing advance warning of problems and tactical support for negotiations.

Other problems include: global energy problems from the perspective of the tradeoff between lower energy prices and future energy security; economic differences among the major countries that result in politically sensitive trade imbalances; changing economic patterns, and prospects in Asia, and the impact of these shifts on our relations with this dynamic region.

III. Estimate Program

A total of four estimative products were completed in 1986 and eight are currently planned for completion in 1987 to address this agenda.

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NIO/Foreign Denial and Intelligence Activities

The work of the NIO for FDIA falls in a special category of support for the DCI:

- An estimate on *Soviet Intelligence Capabilities* will be published in 1987.

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- The Office of the NIO/FDIA provides the Chairman of the DCI's Foreign Denial and Deception Analysis Committee (DDAC). The Committee, among other things, is responsible for coordinating the Community's national-level, all-source analysis of the purpose, means, and effectiveness of Soviet and other foreign intelligence denial and deception measures. The Committee also oversees assessments of the substantive intelligence damage suffered or anticipated from compromises of classified US and allied information involving or impacting on intelligence sources and methods. At this time, the DDAC is now doing for the DCI (at the request of the White House and with the approval of the Department of Justice) damage assessments for the Walker/Whitworth, Pollard, Pelton, and Chin cases.

- Since its inception in 1984, the Office of the NIO/FDIA has focused on areas of potential US vulnerability to hostile—particularly Soviet—intelligence-related activities. Matters such as counterintelligence and security issues, denial and deception, and active measures (covert propaganda and covert action) all come under its purview. Historically these problems had tended to be viewed departmentally. The NIO/FDIA Staff, comprised of officers from CIA, DIA, FBI, and NSA, has been a catalyst in broadening perspectives of individual agencies and components in appraisal of these threats, and in promoting coordinated responses.



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


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NIO/General Purpose Forces

I. Key Issues

- **Warsaw Pact Military Threat to NATO.** The size and capabilities of the Warsaw Pact forces facing NATO represent a changed threat to NATO. New force organization, weapons, and training all contribute to changes in capabilities, which is ever present in the background of Soviet/West European relations.




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- **Support to MBFR Effort.** Continuous effort is expended to provide the data upon which judgments about MBFR options are made.



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- **Soviet Projection of Military Power Beyond Europe.** The presence of Soviet military forces in distant areas is often seen as evidence of their potency in international affairs but not as the real military capability that it significantly represents.



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- **NATO Military Forces.**



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II. Agenda

Assessing the complicated and formidable threat facing NATO will be the highest priority task again in 1987. Several estimates will assess the capabilities of selected components of the force, other estimates will address the threat theater by theater. Support of the MBFR and related force stabilization efforts will continue. We will also complete the military modernization program series on selected NATO countries in the context of the likely Warsaw Pact Threat. Attention will also be paid to Soviet threats and power projection outside of NATO to include maritime, foreign military sales and assistance, and activities in the Far East.

III. Estimative Program

A total of four estimative products were completed in 1986 and 21 are currently planned for completion in 1987 to address this agenda. We are looking at scaling this schedule back to a more realistic agenda for the year.

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
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NIO/Narcotics

I. Key Issues



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- **Narco-Terrorism.** The nexus between narcotics organizations and terrorist organizations is an area requiring additional intelligence and analysis. Currently, the NIO for Counterterrorism and the NIO for Narcotics are conducting a joint study of the field in an effort to define the topic more exactly and diagnose its intelligence needs more precisely.



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- **Spillover Countries.** US intelligence coverage is generally effective in the major cocaine-producing countries. More intelligence emphasis and efforts are needed on drug-related issues in countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Venezuela.



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- **R&D Effort in Support of US Narcotics Control Objectives.** A study by the Intelligence Research and Development Council is currently under way. It needs careful monitoring to ensure that a fully coordinated Community product is developed.

II. Agenda

Primary attention to three areas beyond the production of interagency papers currently listed on production schedule: supporting the DCI in his role on the National Drug Policy Board; working with major law enforcement agencies to build new policies and procedures to protect intelligence sources and methods in courtroom scenarios; and working in interagency

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forums to advise on tactical and strategic intelligence needs of law enforcement, including resolution of the question of whether a strategic (all-source) intelligence center is needed.

III. Estimative Program

One estimative product was completed in 1986 and four are currently planned for completion in 1987 to address this agenda.

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**NIO/Science and
Technology**

I. Key Issues

- Technological surprise.
- Soviet science and technology as a base for future military capability.
- Chinese efforts to narrow the huge technology gap with the West.
- Threats to US competitiveness by technological advances in other Western Countries. Potential role of the Allies in SDI.

II. Agenda

The highest priority of NIO/ST is to review recent estimates on Soviet military technology, especially in the areas related to future low observable strategic defense, and antisubmarine warfare systems.

Of lower priority but still of importance is the effort to assess Chinese and non-Communist world technological advances and prospects.

New efforts include technology available to terrorists and narcotic traffickers in the late 1990s, and what problems this would pose to the US.

III. Estimative Program

A total of four estimative products were completed in 1986 and nine are currently planned for completion in 1987 to address this agenda.

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NIO/Strategic Programs

I. Key Issues

- ***Soviet Strategic Offensive and Defensive Force Capabilities and Prospects.*** Assessment of these force capabilities is crucial to the US national security process. The sum capabilities are constantly reexamined. Our estimates are essential to US strategic military programs and are used in detail by the Pentagon and Strategic Air Command. The President, Executive Branch, and Congress receive extensive briefings on the work. We are currently focused especially on ICBM force modernization, mobile missiles, ABM developments, directed energy weapons development, military space programs, and deep underground leadership protection program.

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- ***Support of US Strategic Arms Control Negotiations.*** Our assessments of Soviet attitudes toward compliance and verification and US capabilities to monitor agreements are critical to the US arms control process.

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II. Agenda

The NIO/SP expends the majority of effort on the annual NIE 11-3/8, *Soviet Forces and Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict Through the Late 1990's*, which is a year-long multi-volume enterprise. Other estimates and ad hoc memoranda will specifically address more narrowly focused questions raised by the arms limitation process or by prospective developments in US forces or weapons. We will be intensifying our support to the Strategic Defense Initiative organization and will continue our deep involvement in the arms control process. We have underway a definitive NIE on our monitoring capabilities. Estimates will be produced covering all of the key issues noted above.

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III. Estimative Program

A total of five estimative products were completed in 1986 and 16 are currently planned for completion in 1987 to address this agenda.

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NIO/Warning

Pursuant to the Director of Central Intelligence Directive 6/1, the National Intelligence Officer for Warning is responsible for advising the DCI in all matters pertaining to warning and recommends when the issuance of warning is appropriate. He also reviews the collection and analysis of intelligence from all sources for warning implications in assessing intelligence judgments within the Intelligence Community and promotes research and training in methodologies and procedures for warning and for developing warning consciousness and discipline throughout the Intelligence Community. The NIO for Warning substantively duplicates in his area of coverage all the areas of the regional NIOs while specifically seeking out the issues for which warning is warranted.

Estimative Program

Two estimative products are currently planned for completion in 1987 to address this agenda, in addition to a monthly warning report for the DCI.

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**Chairman, National
Intelligence Council
Major General Frank
B. Horton III, USAF**


Received his commission and a B.S. degree from the US Military Academy in 1962. Earned a M.A. in public administration in 1966 and a Ph.D. in political science in foreign and defense policy in 1969, both from Harvard University. Completed Squadron Officer School in 1970, Air Command and Staff College in 1974, Air War College in 1966, and the National War College in 1978. Taught international politics and defense policy at USAF Academy 1968-73, except for a year in Vietnam 1970-71. From 1973 to 1977 was assigned to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations, US Air Force in Washington, D.C. Served in various positions at the wing level throughout the Strategic Air Command over the next several years, including commander of the Minuteman III wing at Grand Forks, N.D., 1982-84. From September 1984 to June 1985, served as Director of Command Control, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, Headquarters, SAC. Became Deputy Director for the National Strategic Target List, Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff in June 1985. Assumed his present duties as Chairman of the National Intelligence Council in September 1986.

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**Vice Chairman/NIC
Graham E. Fuller**

Received a M.A. in Russian Regional Studies from Harvard University in 1961. In 1962, studied Chinese language and Far Eastern History at London School of Oriental and African Studies.




In 1983, became NIO for Near East and South Asia before becoming the Vice Chairman on 1 January 1986.

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**Vice Chairman/NIC
Hugh Frederick
Hutchinson, Jr.**

Received a B.A. in Political Science from West Virginia University and a M.A. in Public Law and Government from Columbia University.



Appointed the NIO for Warning in 1981 and served concurrently as the Vice Chairman of the National Intelligence Council through 1982. Was on special assignment with the DCI for two years and then assumed duties as NIO for Foreign Denial and Intelligence Activities in 1985. Named Vice Chairman of the NIC on 16 March 1987.

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**NIO for Africa
Frederick L. Wattering**

Received a B.A. cum laude in Political Science from the University of Illinois in 1961 and received a M.A. in International Relations from the University of Illinois in 1962.

he assumed duties as NIO for Africa on 19 November 1984.

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**NIO at Large/Director
of Analytic Group
Katherine J. Hall**

Received B.A. in History and Economics from Mount Holyoke College in 1973 and a M.A. in International Affairs from George Washington University. Has completed most of course work for a Ph.D.

became NIO at Large and Director of the Analytic Group in November 1986.

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**NIO at Large/NIO for
Nuclear Proliferation/
CBW
Major General David
W. Einsel, Jr., USA
(Ret.)**

Received both a B.A., cum laude, with distinction in Chemistry and a M.A. in Physical Chemistry in 1950 from Ohio State University. In September 1950, as a Distinguished Military Graduate, entered active duty and has served in many responsible positions with the Department of the Army working on planning, policy, and operational matters on nuclear, chemical, and biological affairs. In 1956, received a MS in Physics from the University of Virginia. Retired from the military in June 1985 and became NIO at Large in September 1985.

**NIO for Counter-
terrorism
Charles E. Allen**

Received a B.A. from the University of North Carolina in 1957. Is a distinguished graduate (1972) of the Air War College and did graduate studies in International Relations at Auburn University, 1971-72.

Became NIO for Counterterrorism in January 1985. Also served from January 1985 to February 1986 as the NIO for Narcotics.

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**NIO for East Asia
Carl W. Ford, Jr.**

Received B.A. in Asian Studies in 1968 and a M.A. in East Asian Studies in 1969 from Florida State University. Was a Ph.D. candidate from 1972-75 in International Relations at American University.

the National Security Affairs Adviser to Senator John Glenn. Became NIO for East Asia in February 1985.

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**NIO for Economics
Deane Hoffmann**

Received B.A. in Business from Babson College in 1966 and a M.A. in Economics from the University of Maine in 1978. From 1968-71 taught in the Business Department at Worcester Polytechnic Institute and attended Clark University.


[redacted] Became NIO for Economics on 15 October 1986.

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
**Acting NIO for
Europe
Robert L. Hutchings**

Received B.S. from the United States Naval Academy in 1969, M.A. in Government from the College of William and Mary in 1975, and a Ph.D. in Government from the University of Virginia in 1979. Formerly served as Deputy Director of Radio Free Europe in Munich, West Germany, and as Assistant Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia, where he taught Soviet and East European politics. Currently a Professorial Lecturer in East European Politics at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University. Has written *Soviet-East European Relations: Consolidation and Conflict*, 1968-1980 (University of Wisconsin Press, 1984), *Foreign and Security Policy Coordination in the Warsaw Pact* (Cologne: Bundesinstitut fuer ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, 1985), and several articles on East European politics and Warsaw Pact affairs. Appointed Acting NIO for Europe effective 16 March 1987.

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Received B.M.E. (Mechanical Engineering) from Cornell University in 1953, M.B.A. from Columbia University in 1959, and Ph.D. in economics from Columbia University in 1962.



Served in a broad spectrum of positions culminating as senior projects manager in the DI for which he was awarded the National Intelligence Medal of Achievement in 1985. Assumed current position as Assistant NIO/FDIA and Chairman, DCI's Foreign Denial and Deception Analysis Committee in April 1984. Appointed acting NIO/FDIA effective 16 March 1987.

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**NIO for General Pur-
pose Forces
Major General Stephen
E. Nichols, USA**

Received B.S. from the US Military Academy in June 1952 and holds a M.A. in Public Administration from George Washington University. Commands in combat in Korea and Vietnam; Deputy Commanding General V Corps; Commanding General Readiness Region V; and Staff tours at SACEUR and US Mission NATO. Is a serving officer with an extensive background as a consumer of both strategic and tactical intelligence. Became NIO for General Purpose Forces in September 1984.

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**NIO for Latin America
Robert D. Vickers, Jr**

Received B.S. in International Affairs from Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in 1965 and a M.S. in the same discipline from the London School of Economics and Political Science in 1968.

[Redacted]
[Redacted] Became NIO for Latin America in July 1984.

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**NIO for Narcotics
William R. Kotapish**

Received an A.B. and an M.A. in social science and psychology from the University of Michigan.

[Redacted]
[Redacted] Became NIO for Narcotics on 1 February 1986.

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**NIO for Near East and
South Asia
Daniel K. Webster**

Received a B.A. in International Relations from American University and has completed additional studies in International Relations and Business Administration from American University and the University of Massachusetts.

[Redacted]
[Redacted] Became NIO for Near East and South Asia on 5 May 1986.

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**NIO for Science &
Technology
Julian C. Nall**

Received B.S. with distinction in physics and mathematics from Southwestern College, M.S. in physics and electronics from MIT, and Ph.D. in physics from Vanderbilt University. Is a graduate of the National War College.

[Redacted]
[Redacted] Became NIO for Science and Technology on 12 September 1983.

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**NIO for Strategic
Programs
Lawrence K. Gershwin**

Received B.S. in physics from the California Institute of Technology in 1963 and a Ph.D. in physics from the University of California in 1969. Is former officer of RAND Corporation and the Institute for Defense Analysis. Served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense between 1979-81. Became NIO for Strategic Programs in October 1981. Recipient of Distinguished Officer Award, 1984 and Meritorious Officer Award, 1987.

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**NIO for USSR
Robert E. Blackwell,
Jr.**

Received A.B. in political science from University of Georgia in 1964, M.A. in 1965, and a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Michigan in 1971 with concentration in Soviet politics. From 1969-75, was Assistant Professor of Political Science at Emory University. [redacted] [redacted] Became NIO for USSR on 5 January 1987.

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**NIO for Warning
John J. Bird**

Received Bachelor's degree from Seattle University and a M.A. in economics from the University of Washington. Served in both the US Marine Corps Reserve and the US Army. [redacted]

[redacted] Became NIO for Warning in October 1984.

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