

This file contains detailed and specific information on a number of unauthorized disclosures from the 1974 and earlier period. In several cases, follow-on target activities are described thus giving some cause and effect history. Suggest this be retained for reference value. One element of this file describes the attempt in 1974 to attempt to cost out the consequences of specific leaks. No final paper was forwarded in that regard because of inability to establish definitive terms of reference.

DIA, ARMY reviews  
completed.

SECOM Staff


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SECRET  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

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Copy No. 9 of 11  
SC No. 04611-74

19 September 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chairman and Members  
National Security Council  
Intelligence Committee

SUBJECT : Guidance Governing Disclosures  
of Classified Intelligence

The attached is a memorandum regarding disclosures of classified intelligence which I have forwarded to the United States Intelligence Board. Of particular interest is that USIB Principals of your departments are available to review and provide advice to you on proposals for the release of intelligence so that such releases do not jeopardize intelligence sources and methods unnecessarily.

*W. E. Colby*  
W. E. Colby

*w/o*  
Attachment  
USIB-D-9: 2/53, Copy No. \_\_\_\_\_

This memorandum can be downgraded to Confidential upon removal of the attachment.

Exempt from general declassification schedule of E.O. 11652, exemption category 5B(2). Automatically declassified on: impossible to determine.

TOP SECRET

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## THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

131

4 January 1974

## MEMORANDUM FOR USIB PRINCIPALS

SUBJECT: Intelligence Leaks

1. In recent weeks there have been a number of instances in which highly classified material has appeared in the press. In some situations these reflected a conscious release of information about world developments by senior officials of our Government. Such cases are quite appropriate in view of the necessity to inform the American people of developments in conformity with our American constitutional structure.

2. In some instances, however, the revelations have gone into detail as to intelligence sources and methods well beyond senior officials' releases and have apparently originated from independent release of the information without authorization. While it is clear that information will and must be made available to the public by authorized levels of the U.S. Government, it is equally important that the Intelligence Community take steps to protect sensitive intelligence sources and methods. Such unauthorized revelations can:

a. Threaten the safety and welfare of individuals who may be providing us intelligence at a substantial personal risk.

b. Permit the identification of our sources and their consequent termination.

c. Lead other nations to make substantial changes in procedures which terminate our access to information now being collected.

d. Produce substantial diplomatic and political difficulties in our foreign relations.

3. A number of actions have been taken to close this gap in the security of the Intelligence Community. Personal representation by previous Directors backed by strong expressions of Presidential concern have been made. You have established security guides which, if scrupulously followed, should reduce the number of inadvertent disclosures and limit damage from deliberate leaks. These actions have had some success, but in the final analysis the solution to the leak problem rests with the individuals at all levels who have authorized access to classified materials.

4. The responsibility for protection of foreign intelligence sources and methods requires a personal commitment. It requires the individual to take upon himself the responsibility to ensure the integrity of the privileged information with which he is entrusted. It requires that the individual accept the general and fundamental concept that one individual cannot assume responsibility independent of proper authority for deciding what should and what should not be revealed. It requires use of established procedures when release of intelligence seems indicated for whatever reason.

5. I ask the Members of the Board to make these comments known to all individuals with access to our intelligence materials. I also request that you remind them of the guidelines and procedures to be followed for the authorized release of intelligence and encourage their full utilization.



W. E. Colby  
Director of Central Intelligence

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20330



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30 SEP 1974

Responses to  
19 Sep Memo

C-64,611/DS-6C

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Guidance Governing Disclosures of Classified Intelligence (U)

Reference: USIB memorandum, USIB-D-9.2/53, 19 September 1974, subject as above.

1. (C) The Department of Defense shares your concern about the problem of press leaks. Secretary Schlesinger discussed the matter at the 9 September 1974 meeting of the Armed Forces Policy Council. He based his comments on a paper prepared by the Defense Intelligence Agency which cited several particularly damaging leaks of intelligence information.

2. (C) Your letter of 19 September 1974 was discussed at the 25 September 1974 meeting of the Military Intelligence Board. The Board also reviewed existing Department of Defense procedures for security review of information for public release. Each of the Military Departments has been informed of your concern.

3. (C) A copy of your letter has been sent to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. I have informed Secretary Schlesinger that I am personally available for urgent declassification actions.

DANIEL G. GRAHAM  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Director

Classified by DIADS-6  
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
EXEMPTION CATEGORY #2  
DECLASSIFY ON 31 Dec 2004

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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**  
**OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE**  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

*Handwritten initials*

REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF: DAMI-DOI

1 OCT 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHAIRMAN, US INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Disclosure of Classified Intelligence (U)

1. (C) I share your concern about unauthorized releases of classified intelligence appearing in the news-media as expressed in your memorandum of 19 September 1974 (USIB-D-9.2/53).

2. (C) I have set in motion a series of educational efforts to remind senior Army staff officers and commanders, to include senior civilians of the Army Secretariat, of the serious results of unauthorized releases of sensitive classified intelligence. The following actions are being aggressively pursued:

a. Publication of an appropriate reminder and warning article in the Army Chief of Staff's Weekly Summary, which is directed to senior commanders and staff agency heads.

b. A special briefing for the Army Policy Council, the senior military and civil leadership of the Army.

c. Publication of an appropriate article in my weekly personal communication to senior intelligence officers of the Army for their use to inform their superiors.

d. Review of clearance procedures and instructions concerning the release of intelligence.

3. (C) We will continue our efforts to make available to all Army personnel, especially to those individuals who have access to sensitive intelligence, the assistance of my office in reviewing information proposed for release and assuring compliance with clearance procedures.

(sgd) Harold R. Aaron

HAROLD R. AARON  
Major General, GS  
ACoS for Intelligence

CF:  
✓ Dir, DIA

Classified by ACSI, DA  
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SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 2  
DECLASSIFY ON Approval of ACSI, DA

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