

IRAN

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16 March 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: COLONEL CHAD B. WHITE, ADCSOPS-HUMINT

SUBJECT: GRILL FLAME Evaluation in Support of Iranian Hostage Situation (U)

1. (S/NOFORN) We have now received the final evaluation report (see TAB A) from LTC Roderick Lenahan, OJCS/J3/SOD, concerning our work in support of the Iranian hostage situation. The evaluation covers the period 23 November 1979 through 13 January 1981. TABs B through F are earlier interim evaluation reports submitted by LTC Lenahan concerning our reports.
2. (S/NOFORN) TABLE ONE shows the breakdown by Report Evaluation Category as provided by LTC Lenahan and a comparison by this office of what we feel is a better appraisal of the individual reports. I realize that it is "very dangerous" for this office to be involved in the evaluation process of our own work. However, the very nature of this particular project, the immense amount of time and manpower utilized, and the difficult, if not impossible, task of evaluating all the information provided to JCS makes it essential that decision makers receive comments from the user agency as well as the source of the data. It is interesting to note that JCS rates 37% of the reports as having some correlation/use while we raise that percentage to only 45%. The increase is not that great; however the number of inconclusive and negative reports does change drastically. Our evaluation is arrived at by studying comments prepared by LTC Lenahan on individual reports. Therefore, we are not reappraising the individual reports and giving them a separate evaluation, but rather we just studied his comments pertaining to the individual report and then assessed their value. An example to illustrate this is provided: in several cases our reports clearly stated that hostages were in specific buildings at specific times. LTC Lenahan, after reviewing the debrief reports concerning the hostages, stated that the condition described is in error and hence the report is negative. We concur! On the other hand, we provided several reports that clearly indicated that specific buildings were empty and contained no hostages. Although LTC Lenahan has stated this data was correct, he did not rate the report as positive. Instead, he gave either inconclusive or partial ratings to them. We disagree! If the question was to find out if hostages were in a specific building, and we provided the user with sufficient data to make a realistic judgment (even if after the fact) then he must be consistent in his evaluation of the reports.
3. (S/NOFORN) This specific project created numerous personal as well as psychological problems for individual members. Basically, we did not have the experience to handle such a long-range requirement nor did we know how to handle the numerous problems created by the extensive media coverage of the situation. All of our personnel tried to isolate themselves from outside sources concerning the hostages, but this was an impossible condition to live up to. Several sources became very tired working the "same problem" over and over, always without any proper feedback. The following statements reflect some of ^{the} Lessons Learned from the hostage situation as regards GRILL FLAME type activity:

JCS - 37% correlation/use

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a. (C/NOFORN) Long term projects will require more than one analyst familiar with GRILL FLAME concepts

Comment: Amount of data that will be collected during a long term project will overwhelm a single analyst and thereby lead to faulty or incomplete analysis of the project. Information collected, in many cases, will be time sensitive and needs to be thoroughly studied in that context. Analysts need to understand the collection process, how to properly target the source, and how to extract the essential elements of information that may be contained in the report.

b. (C/NOFORN) The collection element (INSCOM GRILL FLAME personnel) must insure that users can readily identify separate sources.

c. (C/NOFORN) If at all possible, there should be known physical reference points at each target site in order to provide some means of verification as to source's actual location.

Comment: Many requirements levied by JCS required data concerning physical conditions within a building. As it turns out, no one could assess the data collected because there were no details available concerning the given target. This led to a stalemate of sorts since no one could determine the accuracy of the information.

d. (S/NOFORN) Extreme or protracted duration of a project will generally lead to negative results being produced by source(s).

Comment: Long, drawn out projects result in a build up of overlay (accumulation of information concerning the target) thereby creating problems of differentiating *img* from imagination, real world situation, or actual remote viewing.

e. (C/NOFORN) Lack of feedback, or inaccurate feedback will result in a negative effect.

Comment: Analyst must insure that when he provides feedback/evaluation of individual sessions that he knows what he is talking about and not just providing evaluation because he knows "one is due." Inaccurate feedback leads to compounding the overlay problem. On the other hand, feedback is essential whenever possible so that source and management personnel can measure more accurately the procedures utilized and plan for future requirement. The source also needs the psychological encouragement that comes with the feedback....he knows whether or not he is providing help or just wasting his time.

f. (S/NOFORN) For targets about which little is known, remote viewing information must only be used for guiding other intelligence collection efforts.

g. (S/NOFORN) Data accuracy and analytic usability must be evaluated separately.

Comment: Measuring accuracy helps to gauge the methodology utilized while usability is the end result obtained. An accurate report, in terms of remote viewing data presented, might not obtain any information of value to an analyst, but might aid management in selecting a new targeting method.

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h. (C/NOFORN) Users must address problems encountered in utilizing data on a continuing basis.

Comment: If problems are addressed as they arise, then users and project management personnel can establish new or change old methods of operation if necessary.

i. (S/NOFORN) All participants in a project utilizing remote viewing must continually pursue and protect project integrity.

j. (S/NOFORN) Keying of other collection resources because of data received from remote viewing sources must be evaluated and reported.


k. (S/NOFORN) Remote viewing reports which cannot be evaluated due to insufficient data can be expected and should carry neither negative or positive weight in a final analysis.

l. (C/NOFORN) Information provided which lacks a transcript must be very carefully assessed. Such action should be avoided if possible.

4. (S/NOFORN) Summary: Despite the numerous problems encountered with this complex project, we feel that the experience gained will have tremendous impact on future endeavors. However, I do recommend that whenever possible that for future projects of this complexity that we assign an analyst from this office to work directly with the user agency. This analyst would be able to provide on-the-spot guidance concerning the reports and methods used and help provide future targeting methods. This individual would not be involved in the project in any other capacity.

One must keep in mind the relative low cost of this project versus the information gained. The data/information provided to the user apparently was information that could not be obtained through normal intelligence collection channels. The degree of success appears to at least equal, if not surpass, other collection methods.

7 Incl
as



MURRAY B. WATT
LTC, MI
INSCOM GRILL FLAME
Project Manager

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List of inclosures:

- Tab A - Memorandum for Commander USA INSCOM, Subject: Grill Flame Evaluation dated 11 Feb 81, signed by LTC Lenahan. Classified Secret
- Tab B - Memorandum for Record, Subject Grill Flame Reporting, dated 15 Sep 80, (memo prepared at request of [REDACTED] classified Top Secret.)
- Tab C - Memorandum for LTG Pustay, Subject: Grill Flame Evaluation, dated 15 Jul 80, signed by LTC Lenahan. Classified Top Secret
- Tab D - Memorandum for LTG Pustay, Subject: Interim Evaluation, Grill Flame Project, 11 Jul 80, signed by LTC Lenahan, classified secret
- Tab E - Note to LTG Pustay re: Grill Flame, dated 14 May 80, classified secret
- Tab F - Memorandum for LTC Watt, Subject: Interim Evaluation, Grill Flame Project, 10 Mar 80 signed by LTC Lenahan , classified secret

REPORT EVALUATION CATEGORY

<u>EVALUATION CATEGORY</u>	<u>JCS</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>INSCOM</u>	<u>%</u>
POSITIVE	7	4	26	19
POSSIBLE/PARTIAL	59	33	37	26
INCONCLUSIVE	16*	8	61*	30
NEGATIVE	112	63	76	55
ADMIN ABORT	8*	4	2*	1
TOTAL	202		202	

*These figures were not included in arriving at % of Positive, Possible/Partial or Negative Reports. However, they do reflect total % of complete effort.

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