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ORCON

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
 US ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND  
 FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755

IAFM-OPS-HU-SA

2 May 1980

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: After-Action Report (Iranian Crisis 23-25 Apr 80)

1. (U) Purpose: This report covers the period 23-25 April 1980 during which this office provided increased operational support to the Iranian hostage situation at the specific request of Special Operations Division (SOD), JCS. The request from the JCS was relayed to INSCOM via Mr. Jackie Keith (Chief, ICC, INSCOM) who took the request directly to the CG, INSCOM.

2. (S/NOFORN) Support Required: The JCS tasking specifically requested that:

a. We increase the number of operational sessions and that we attempt multiple targeting sessions;

b. We take measures to preclude having to abort sessions (if at all possible);

c. We provide them information on a timely basis using format found at Incl 1.

3. (S) Facilities: In order to accomplish the tasking mentioned in paragraph 2, it was decided to rent space in a nearby hotel for the required period of time. Initial planning estimated that we might be required to provide JCS support for ten days. Reservations were made at the Best Western Motel (3440 Fort Meade Road, Laurel, Maryland; Telephone: (301) 490-9595) for five days beginning 23 April 1980. We rented three separate rooms which provided us with the necessary flexibility (two rooms used for operational sessions and the other as a control/administrative area; plus we used the operational room that we have in Building 4553) needed to carry out the multiple sessions simultaneously.

4. (S/NOFORN) Operations: We moved into the motel shortly after 1300 hours, 23 April 1980 and conducted our first sessions at 1500 hours, 23 April 1980. Our operations plan originally called for us to conduct 9-10 sessions per day; however, I terminated operations shortly after 0200 hours, 25 April 1980 when the news reached us that the attempt to rescue the hostages had been aborted. The termination of our activities was concurred with by LTC Bob Morrell, SOD, JCS.

CLASSIFIED BY: Director, DIA  
 REVIEW ON: May 2000  
 EXTENDED BY: Director, DIA  
 REASON: 2-301c (3 & 6)

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a. Operations Completed: During the period 23-25 April 1980 we completed 20 operational sessions. Spot reports on all sessions were called in within an hour of their completion (individual sessions) and short summaries were provided to JCS within 24 hours of completion for 12 of the sessions and typed reports were provided for the other 8 sessions due to the data being reported.

b. Lessons Learned: On the whole, it appeared to be very effective operating from the expanded environment -- basically because it provided us with the operational flexibility and an atmosphere fairly free from outside noise. However, there are still some factors we need to look at and they are listed below:

(1) CON - Altering the normal work cycle of remote viewing personnel may not be beneficial to the remote viewing process. Personnel rapidly became tired working the expanded hours even though they were afforded plenty of time for rest and relaxation. It appeared that some people were not able to hold or achieve their normal level of concentration.

(2) CON - Scheduling of a large number of RV sessions was a problem for all personnel concerned. The typist couldn't keep up so we went with the abbreviated formats which increase the margin of error, especially for the analysts. The interviewers were scheduled to work from 0700 until after 0200 each day. Obviously, if we had continued for the whole ten days, we would have had difficulty in maintaining an effective work-force.

(3) CON - If we find it necessary to run this type of operations in the future, then we should reserve at least one more room. This would allow the remote viewers to have a break/rest area free from the distractions found in the Admin area. And, of course, keeps the RVers from accidentally overtaking any discussions concerning the project they are working on.

(4) CON - It was very obvious that the Project Manager carried too much of the administrative and operational burdens on his shoulders. This short exercise once again pointed out the need that the project has for an Operations Officer. We had to stop all other projects in order to properly support and control this task.

(5) CON - Security was of some concern since we were operating off the confines of a military installation. Although no problems were encountered, we were very concerned that the increased traffic in and out of the motel might attract attention.

(6) CON - The overlay problem due to a lack of remote viewer isolation continued to be a hindrance. We have now been working on the Iranian hostage situation for over five months. Project personnel, like everyone else, have been engulfed by the news media concerning the Iranian situation. It appears as though some of the RVers were not successful in being able to separate the various levels of consciousness and it might be that pure imagination took hold.

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(7) PRO - The commonality of mission importance seemed to achieve a psychological "high" for group identification and may have helped improve mission performance.

5. (S) Summary: As previously mentioned, we have been working on this problem for over five months. There is no way any project personnel can be isolated from news concerning the Iranian situation. We have now completed over 120 sessions on this tasking and have submitted approximately 90 reports. Yet, even though we are still in a training mode, we have received very little feedback concerning the value of our efforts. I feel that they (the reports) must be of some value to the tasking agency (JCS) or else they wouldn't continue to give us additional requirements. However, we still do not know how, why, when, etc., our reports have aided. I strongly believe that someone from the decision-making branch of INSCOM should press SOD, JCS for a written assessment of our effort -- even though this assessment, by necessity, will be incomplete, we should at least have our policy makers made aware of how their resources are being used and why they are being continually tasked.

*Murray B. Watt*

MURRAY B. WATT  
LTC, MI  
Project Manager

1 Incl  
as

APPROVED: *CSW*

CHAD B. WHITE  
COL, GS  
ADCSOPS-HUMINT

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ITEM BB REPORT

1. CCC
2. DTG
3. TGT: - ALPHA, BRAVO, CHARLIE,  
- DELTA, ECHO, FOXTROT,  
- GULF, HOTEL, INDIA,  
- JULIET, KILO, LIMA,  
- MIKE, XRAY, YANKEE,

OR

NUMBER 1 - THRU 53  
(SEE ATTACHED LIST)

4. KEY QUESTIONS:

- A. ALPHA TGTS: WHICH HOSTAGES IF ANY DID YOU OBSERVE  
IN THE TARGET LOCAL?
- B. NUMERIC TGTS: WHICH FACILITY DID YOU FIND THE TARGET?

FOLLOW-ON QUESTIONS:

- (a.) DESCRIBE THE FACILITY WHERE THE TARGET WAS.
- (b.) WERE THERE OTHER HOSTAGES?
- (c.) DESCRIBE ANY GUARDS YOU SAW.

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198 Laurel  
490-9595*

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