

SG1J Notes on **meeting with** [redacted] (DIA/OGF) 30 Jan 95:

In general:

SG1J [redacted] is Office of Ground Forces, DIA [redacted] SG1A

SG1A [redacted] His component became responsible for management oversight of the DIA Stargate program about a year ago. It is currently LIMDIS, formerly SAP (while in the Army?). It has been at DIA since the late 80s [88-89?], and may have been in the Army prior to that, but it is not clear that there is a continuous thread to follow as these may have been independent programs. [redacted] is DIA program manager, and SG1J

SG1J he has three remote viewers under his supervision housed at Ft. Meade. [redacted] discussed the various program parts from his perspective which are loosely defined as R&D, Operations, and Foreign Assessment. Other meeting attendees: [redacted] SG1I

SG1I [redacted] R&D:

SG1J The principal player in DIA's R&D effort has been Ed May of SAIC, [formerly of SRI?]. [redacted] was unable to state what the particular R&D objectives were, although he later mentioned a couple of examples. The program is apparently out of money for R&D at this point. However, [redacted] recently received an exhaustive unclassified report from Ed May addressing the research issues of the program which [redacted] used in part as the basis for a LIMDIS classified report he wrote and sent to CMS; apparently [redacted] report covers only the DIA Stargate program, and was generated in response to the SAC CDA by the deadline of March 1. [I requested copies of both Ed May's unclassified document and [redacted] report]. SG1J [redacted] said CMS had a copy of the report and that a copy is on its way to Congress. SG1J

In addition, some 40 papers by Ed May relating to the R&D aspects of the program are unclassified. These should all be part of the R&D review we conduct. We agreed to get from Ed May all the unclassified material we could.

Operations:

These consist of [redacted] directing the remote viewers to "access and describe the target" based on a limited description of the target's context. [redacted] had not actually witnessed an "operation". We agreed to go to Ft Meade and meet the viewers ourselves. SG1J SG1J

SG1B [redacted]

SG1B



Declassification Issue:

SG1J

[redacted] report is also supposed to address the declassification of the program. According to [redacted] based on the discussions which took place on this issue, it is his opinion that nothing in this program should be classified except US Government Sponsorship [why?]. He says that there is no threat to national security involved, no sensitive sources and methods. The problem may be the "giggle factor" in that this program could be an embarrassment to some. We stated that we intend to push the declassification issue hard.

SG1J

Customer Base:

SG1J

[redacted] did solicit feedback from various customers he has had for his product, and did attempt to develop the customer base. He asked some customers to fill out survey information he devised. [With the exception of DIA, [redacted] was not aware of any customers within the intelligence community.] It was [redacted] opinion that no customers returned for a second time after using the program capabilities once.

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Highlights:

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• We agreed to go and talk with [redacted] and the people currently at Ft. Meade at [redacted] suggestion.

←
did it

• We said we would push the declassification issue hard

did it

• We will get unclassified documents from Ed May

done

SG1J

• [redacted] said he'd help us get a copy of [redacted] report

done

SG1I

• We will contact [redacted] of CSI to get his help in declassification

done

• We will delay contacting the NRC to set up the Blue Ribbon Panel until we know more about the declassification issues.

done

SG1J