

**NATO Unclassified**



**ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE  
ATOMAL CLASSIFICATION HANDBOOK**

**NATO Unclassified**

On file OSD release instructions  
apply.

DOE review  
completed.

ENCLOSURE 4 - ACE - Atomic Classification Handbook

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N A T O    U N C L A S S I F I E D

## INTRODUCTION

This handbook on ATOMAL classification has been prepared for ATOMAL Drafters to supplement ACE Directive 70-6 as a ready reference. It is meant to remind you of classification policy, principles, authority and procedures. When making classification determinations, you should always use AD 70-6 and the NATO Nuclear Classification Guide contained in CM(68)41.

Since classification decisions are often judgmental, protect information at the highest level being considered until a final determination has been made.

Classification of information is a command responsibility. To ensure proper classification, ATOMAL Drafters are designated and trained within each command that may originate documents containing ATOMAL information. Only ATOMAL Drafters are authorized to prepare documents that contain ATOMAL information. Within each such command, a clear path for question and problem resolution should exist.

The ACE ATOMAL Classification Officer (ACO) assures that current classification guidance is available to all ATOMAL Drafters. His goal is to assure that all ATOMAL information contained in documents originated within ACE is identified for protection according to guidance furnished by the US or UK.

**CLASSIFICATION POLICY**

ATOMAL classification policy originates within the United States and the United Kingdom and is kept current by appropriate US and UK authorities.

Classification begins the process of limiting dissemination of certain information by identifying it as sensitive. Classification markings tell people, "This data needs protection." The markings also direct people to act appropriately, because they tell us how much protection is needed.

## YOUR DUTIES AS AN ATOMAL DRAFTER

As an ATOMAL Drafter you decide whether information contained in documents falls into an area requiring protection (as established by the NATO Guide).

The documents may be ones that you are preparing or may come to you from different sources. Since you know the subject material and have been trained as an ATOMAL Drafter, you can distinguish between information that needs protection and that which can be released without concern.

You must consider all pertinent factors when making classification decisions. Basic questions are:

- How does the NATO Guide for Nuclear Weapons deal with the information?
- How is the information used?
- What information can be derived from what's being considered?
- What association is there to other unclassified information, and what chance is there of forming classified information by association?

NATO Nuclear weapons information falls into one of three levels of classification sensitivity: COSMIC Top Secret ATOMAL, NATO Secret ATOMAL and NATO Confidential ATOMAL. Abbreviations are CTSA, NSA and NCA.

The classification sensitivity levels are explained in the next section, as are important concepts of classification.

## TERMS, DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS

Abuse, classification: Over or underclassification; failure to follow the proper downgrading or upgrading and declassification procedures; improper application of classification markings. Classification abuse also refers to any classification action by an individual not authorized to take that action, and to any improper delegation of authority.

ATOMAL Information: ATOMAL information is that nuclear weapons information that has been provided to NATO components under agreements, either by the US (from their "Formerly Restricted Data") or by the UK (from their "UK ATOMIC Information"). See the section, "Background Regarding ATOMAL Information." By its very nature, ATOMAL information requires strict access limitations. Only individuals granted an appropriate clearance and having a need to know may be given access to ATOMAL information.

Classification: The process of determining and identifying what information needs to be protected in the interest of security. Classification is distinct from security which is the means of protecting classified information.

ATOMAL Drafter. An ACE officer who has been authorized to prepare ATOMAL documents. All classification and declassification determinations must be based upon approved guidance.

Classification Category. The type of classified information. Within ACE, the two categories are ATOMAL and NATO information.

Compromise: Acquisition of classified information by persons not cleared to receive such information. (This does not include unauthorized or gratuitous acquisition by cleared personnel without a need to know).

COSMIC Top Secret (CTS). A classification level applied to information, the unauthorised disclosure of which would result in exceptionally grave damage to NATO.

Covering Letters. Letters covering classified enclosures must bear the markings of the highest classification enclosed. If information in the covering letter itself requires higher classification, use that. When the covering letter does not contain information, it may be handled as unclassified when separated from the classified enclosures if it contains a statement to that effect.

Declassification: Applied to information, declassification removes it from a classification category. Applied to documents, declassification is the act of determining that the documents contain no classified information. See the section "General Rules for Declassification".

Document: Any recorded information regardless of physical form or characteristics, including but not limited to:

- All handwritten, printed, typed, painted, drawn or engraved matter.
- All sound, magnetic or electromechanical recordings.
- All photographic prints and exposed or developed film.
- All reproductions of the foregoing by any process.
- Automatic data processing input, memory, program or output information, or records such as punch cards, tapes, memory, drums, disks or visual displays.



Downgrade: Lower the classification level of information or documents.  
(Does not include declassification).

Guidance: Published classification policy.

Information: Facts, data, or knowledge itself, rather than the medium for conveying it. (Documents are conveyers or containers of information; they are not information per se).

Information in the Public Domain: Just because statements, speculations or quotations from "informed sources" appear in public news media (including trade magazines), it cannot be assumed that the information has been officially released. It may still be classified.

NATO Restricted (NR): A classification level applied to information, the unauthorised disclosure of which would be undesirable in the interests of NATO.

NATO Confidential (NC): A classification level applied to information, the unauthorised disclosure of which could be prejudicial to the interests of NATO.

NATO Secret (NS): A classification level of information, the unauthorised disclosure of which would result in serious damage to NATO.

Need to Know: This access policy refers to limiting the transfer of information to those who are both cleared to receive it and who require it to perform their work. (Need to know is technically neither classification or security, but rather an operational concern).

Physically connected documents: A group of physically connected documents (e.g. stapled or bound together in a notebook). They must be classified at least as high as the most highly classified document therein. (See Principle of Association).

Precedence, classification: Sometimes a document comprises parts which are classified differently by categories and/or levels. The document should be marked at the most restrictive category and most sensitive level. For example, if a document contains information that is properly classified as NCA and NS, the document would be marked NSA. (If topics of guidance conflict, apply the most restrictive of the measures).

Principle of Association: A document cannot be unclassified if, when it is added to unclassified information already available, the combination reveals classified information.

Reclassification: With the written consent of the originator, his successor or higher authority, documents may be reclassified by one of three actions: upgrading, downgrading or declassifying. ATOMAL information may be only downgraded or declassified and then only by proper US or UK authority. Document reclassification procedures are specified in AD 70-1.

Security: The mechanism for protecting classified information.

Sensitivity Levels: The three sensitivity levels of ATOMAL information are Cosmic Top Secret, NATO Secret and NATO Confidential. See each in this section. The terms designate the risk, or degree of damage to NATO that can be expected if the information is disclosed to unauthorised persons.

**Upgrade:** The raising of the classification category or sensitivity level of documents.

**Upgrading Notice:** Written announcement by a classifying official either that a document has been erroneously issued as unclassified and is in fact classified, or that it has been erroneously marked at a lower level or category than appropriate. The notice indicates the corrective action needed. Upgrading notices are always classified.

### BACKGROUND REGARDING ATOMAL INFORMATION

In drafting the US Atomic Energy Act, the phrase "Restricted Data" (RD) was coined to cover nuclear weapons, nuclear material and their production. In similar fashion, UK law established "ATOMIC Information". Security restrictions that were imposed for RD were quite severe and impractical for armed forces in the field. To resolve this problem, certain types of information needed by the military were identified from within the body of RD and "transclassified". That is, this category of information was given a new name and a less severe set of security criteria. This information still related to nuclear weapons but was judged to permit security provisions that were consistent with broad use within the armed forces.

Unfortunately, the name that the US Congress used and which became common usage is confusing. They called it "Formerly Restricted Data". This name constantly causes confusion. At the very least, people assume that it is a category of information that is unrelated to Restricted Data - it definitely is closely related to Restricted Data. At the worst, they assume that it is not classified!! FRD is definitely classified.

The formal definition of FRD is: "Information pertaining to utilisation and deployment of nuclear weapons." In practical terms, it is information that relates to:

- Stockpile quantities and locations.
- Yields and effects.
- Vulnerability and hardening.

- Reliability information, or

- Arming and fusing.

Because all ATOMAL information was originally either RD or ATOMIC information, it is by law classified unless declassified by proper authority. This characteristic is referred to as "Born Classified". Because of this characteristic, the NATO Classification Guide for Nuclear Weapons specifies what information is Confidential or Unclassified - otherwise the information is Secret. It is generally true that ATOMAL information is born Secret. Within the US Armed Forces, FRD is protected in the same manner as is their regular defence information, however, it has a firm restriction regarding its transmission to other nations or treaty organizations.

## THE NATO CLASSIFICATION GUIDE FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Consistent classification determinations are accomplished by having all classifiers use the same policy and guide. All ACE organizations use the NATO Classification Guide for Nuclear Weapons which is contained in CM(68)41 and the Nuclear Planning Manual. Its purpose is to provide a basis for determining the appropriate ATOMAL classification of information concerning the characteristics, storage and use of nuclear weapons. An evaluation of all applicable topics of the guide is required in determining the classification of a document. If information appears to be covered equally well by more than one topic at different classification levels, the highest level must be chosen.

### MAKING A CLASSIFICATION DETERMINATION

1. You have a document to consider.
2. If text, pictures or graphics are classified by existing guidelines, look at guidance and give category (ATOMAL) and sensitivity level (CTSA, NSA, NCA).
3. If text, pictures and graphics are Unclassified by existing guidelines, consider this information in light of other known unclassified information. Would any combination of these cause damage if released. If so, apply the appropriate classification.
4. Finally, indicate classification category and level of the complete document and its title. Forward the document to the unit's authorized ATOMAL originator.

**GENERAL RULES FOR DECLASSIFICATION**

Declassification of ATOMAL information may only be accomplished by the proper US or UK authority. That authority must then revise the approved classification guidance to reflect the declassification decision.

Declassification of a document falls into three cases:

The first case applies when the ACE ACO determines that based upon approved guidance the information contained in the document is not classified.

The second case involves the originator of the document. Any originator may later declassify that document if current guidance permits.

In the third case, ATOMAL Drafters have authority to declassify documents by removing markings in accordance with a declassification notice from an appropriate classification authority.

## CLASSIFYING OF RECLASSIFICATION NOTICES

### UPGRADING

Upgrading notices are always classified. The level of classification depends upon both the likelihood of compromise and the contents of the upgrading notice.

- No compromise - it is reasonably certain that no actual compromise of improperly marked documents has occurred. Notices in no compromise situations are classified NATO Confidential. The notices are automatically declassified after two years to allow for retrieval of all improperly marked copies. If this provides insufficient time for retrieval, the classification may be extended for up to six years from the original date of issue. Longer extensions may only be authorized by the ACE ACO. When all upgrading has been completed (copies accounted for) the notices may be declassified.
- Definite compromise - a compromise has or is likely to have occurred. These notices will be classified at the correct level and category of the information in the document to which it pertains, e.g. those notices upgrading a document to NATO Secret ATOMAL will themselves be NSA. If it is later determined that no compromise actually occurred and all copies have been properly marked, the upgrading notice may then be declassified, providing the notice itself contains no classified information.
- Upgrading notice contains classified information - notices which contain information that is itself classified will be classified



according to the most restrictive category and level of that information.

Notices upgrading the classification of a document should be sent only to persons who are cleared to receive both the upgrading notice and the document to which it refers. If these conditions cannot be met, inform the local Security authority.

#### DOWNGRADING

Documents authorising downgrading action should identify either the applicable classification guide and its topic number or the authorising message.

Downgrading notices are normally unclassified but if the notice itself contains classified information, it must be classified appropriately.

### RESULTS OF IMPROPER CLASSIFICATION

As an ATOMAL Drafter, you should strive to avoid improper classification of documents. Information requiring protection must be appropriately identified and protected. The operational penalties for misclassification may be severe:

- Unclassified information does not receive the protection its sensitivity warrants.
- Overclassification complicates handling procedures, creates time delays, and limits distribution.

### INFORMATION AND DOCUMENTS

In classification and declassification, distinction must be made between information and documents.

### A REMINDER

The ACE ACO advises ACE personnel on current classification policy to assure that information and documents originated in this command are classified according to the latest, approved guidance. If you have questions about classification, consult other ATOMAL Drafters within your unit or the ACE ACO.

ENCLOSURE 5 - Unit Briefing

## UNIT BRIEFING FOR

### ATOMAL DRAFTERS

#### INTRODUCTION

Fursuant to ACE Directive 70-6, you are an ATOMAL Drafter because your duties include the preparation of documents that may contain ATOMAL information. Therefore, you are to become familiar with the ACE ATOMAL Classification Programme, the NATO Classification Guide for Nuclear Weapons, and the principles of ATOMAL classification.

The purpose of this briefing is to give you sufficient knowledge to begin functioning as an ATOMAL Drafter. After this briefing, you will be given your personal copy of the ACE ATOMAL Classification handbook. Copies of AD 70-6 and the NATO Classification Guide for Nuclear Weapons are readily available within this command. The guide is included in C-M 66141 and the Nuclear PLanning Manual.

After you have read this briefing, sign and date the attached form and return them to (Rank & Name), our principal ATOMAL Drafter. At that time, you should discuss with him any questions or uncertainties you may have regarding this material.

#### YOUR DUTIES AS AN ATOMAL DRAFTER

As an ATOMAL Drafter you will decide whether documents fall into an area requiring protection (as established by the NATO Guide for Nuclear weapons).

The documents may be ones that you are preparing or may come to you from different sources. Since you will know the subject material and will have been trained as an ATOMAL Drafter, you will be able to distinguish between information that needs protection and that which can be released without consent.

You must consider all pertinent factors when making classification decisions. Basic questions are:

- o How does the NATO Guide for Nuclear Weapons deal with the information?
- o How is the information used?
- o What information can be derived from what's being considered?
- o What association is there to other unclassified information, and what chance is there of forming classified information by association?

NATO nuclear weapons information falls into one of three levels of classification sensitivity: COSMIC Top Secret ATOMAL, NATO Secret ATOMAL, NATO Confidential ATOMAL. Abbreviations are OTSA, NSA, NCA.

A complete set of definitions may be found in AD 70-6 and the NATO Guide.

#### THE NATO CLASSIFICATION GUIDE FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Consistent classification determinations are accomplished by having all

ATOMAL document drafters and classifiers use the same policy and guide. All ACE organizations use The NATO Classification Guide for Nuclear Weapons. Its purpose is to provide a basis for determining the appropriate ATOMAL classification of information concerning the characteristics, storage, and use of nuclear weapons.

An evaluation of all applicable topics of the guide is required in determining the classification of a document. If information appears to be covered equally well by more than one topic at different classification levels, the highest level must be chosen.

#### WHAT IS ATOMAL INFORMATION?

ATOMAL Information is a particular type of information that comes from the UK and US. In the UK it is called ATOMIC Information and is regulated by the Official Secrets Act. In the US it is called Formerly Restricted Data (FRD). This choice of words requires an explanation:

In drafting the US Atomic Energy Act, the phrase "Restricted Data" (RD) was coined to cover nuclear weapons, nuclear material and their production. Security restrictions that were imposed for RD were quite severe and impractical for armed forces in the field. To resolve this problem, certain types of information needed by the military were identified from within the body of RD and "transclassified." That is, this category of information was given a new name and a less severe set of security criteria. The information still related to nuclear weapons but was judged to permit security provisions that were consistent with broad use within the armed forces.

Unfortunately, the US Congress chose a name which became common usage and is very confusing. "Formerly Restricted Data" is constantly misunderstood. At the very least, people assume that it is a category of information that is unrelated to Restricted Data--but definitely is closely related to Restricted Data. At the worst, they assume that it is not classified. FRD is definitely classified.

The formal definition of FRD is: "Information pertaining to utilization and deployment of nuclear weapons." In practical terms, it is information that relates to:

- stockpile quantities and locations,
- yields and effects,
- vulnerability and hardening,
- reliability information, or
- arming and fuzing.

## THE 'BORN CLASSIFIED' PRINCIPLE

Because all ATOMAL information was originally RD or UK ATOMIC Information, it is by law classified unless declassified by proper authority. This characteristic is referred to as "Born Classified" in the US.

Because of this "Born Classified" principle, a marked difference exists between the classification of nuclear weapons information and regular defense information. It is a basic philosophical difference. The Atomic Energy Act and the UK Official Secrets Act make all ATOMAL information initially classified, therefore requiring authority to declassify it. Non-ATOMAL classification operates on the premise that all information is unclassified unless judged to require protection. Because of this basic principle, the NATO Classification Guide for Nuclear Weapons specifies what information is confidential or unclassified--otherwise the information is secret. It is generally true that ATOMAL information is born secret.

## ORIGINAL AND DERIVATIVE CLASSIFYING

A major distinction is made in classification between "original" and "derivative" classifying. Original classifying is performed without benefit of any classification guidance. An original classification determination is usually required for new ideas, such as the invention of a new device or technique. With appropriate guidance, classification determinations are made "derivatively." By the very nature of ATOMAL information, all classifying is done derivatively.

## GUIDELINES FOR CLASSIFYING INFORMATION

1. Documents will be classified on the basis of the information contained and its context.

When dealing in classification, it is important to keep clearly in mind that information and documents are quite different. Documents are carriers of information and clearly it is the information that determines if the document requires protection. This seems obvious. However, the matter of the information's context may be quite subtle and illusive. If this aspect is disregarded, unclassified information combined with its context may imply classified information not actually in the document.

2. **ATOMAL information must not be so subdivided that all its components are unclassified.**

In theory, the individual components of ATOMAL information cannot all be unclassified. At least one component must be at the level of the total information. In practice, operational considerations often tempt us to break a classified message into "unclassified" components. They would be so much quicker to send and "with the wording obscure enough, the enemy won't be able to understand what we're really saying!" Don't rely on disguised context. That's a game that can't be played--it isn't safe and it's not legal.

However, what can be done is to break the message into components to separate the categories of information. That is, a message may contain information which is Secret (NON-ATOMAL) and also ATOMAL information of a lower level, such as Confidential. In such a case, one message could be NS and the other NCA. Also, the two separate messages could be safely cross references. The result of such measures would be reduced message traffic problems and unambiguous communication.

3. Both NATO and ATOMAL information may contain items that are classified at one level in a particular context but require a higher level in another context. There is no universal rule for how much accumulated information or association merits higher classification than its individual components.

This concern for context is largely a matter of intuition. So when you feel uneasy about the adequacy of the classification level that is indicated by the NATO guide, it's time to consider the matter carefully and seek advice if the uncertainty remains. Start with your fellow AEs and work up the chain of command if necessary.

4. Classification will be based on an evaluation using all applicable guidance. Individual parts, phrases, or pieces may justifiably be assigned a particular classification level under one topic of this guide but the combination of items may reveal a higher level of classified information. If so, the higher classification will be assigned.

5. Similarly, when an item of information appears to be covered equally well by two or more topics at different classification levels, the highest level will be chosen.

6. Any postulated assessment of enemy weapons, would not be ATOMAL if based solely on intelligence data. However, if based on analysis of, or comparison with US or UK weapon designs, then such information is ATOMAL. In all cases, such determination should be made by an ATOMAL Classifier.

*This guideline relates to assessments of enemy weapons systems that we do not understand. Often in the process of such assessments, the analyzers will use ATOMAL information deducing just how the new enemy system may work or what its capability may be. Clearly, such a practice may cause the results to reveal ATOMAL information.*

7. The fact that a document makes reference to a classified document is not a basis for classifying that document unless the reference citation, standing alone or in context, reveals classified information.

There are topics which classify such things as "fact that ..." or "association of ... with ...". These must be considered when referencing a classified document in an unclassified one. Also there is the possibility that the title of the classified document may be classified.

8. Open publication of classified information is not a basis for declassifying that information nor does it preclude continued classification of that information. Confirmations or denials may reveal classified information or erode its protection. Consequently confirmation, denial or expansion upon public statements covering classified information is prohibited.

*This final guideline has to do with what can we say about public statements or newspaper articles which contain information that we protect as classified. Even if some need of state made the statement-- that is not a basis for declassifying the information revealed nor does it preclude continued classification of that information.*



ENCLOSURE 6 - School Lecture

MODE: LECTURE

ATOMAL CLASSIFICATION

(A Supplement to Selected NATO School Courses)

INTRODUCTION

(7:30)

During the next period, we will cover the policy, principles and practices of ATOMAL classification within the Allied Command Europe.

Many of you have positions which involve the preparation of documents that may contain Nuclear Weapons Information. This lecture has been added precisely for you. The purpose of this lecture is to establish a basis for you to perform the duties of ACE ATOMAL Drafters.

Let's start with a definition: Classification is the process of determining and identifying what information needs to be protected in the interest of security. Classification is the first step in information security. It is distinct from security which in this context is the mechanism for protecting classified information.

Classification begins the process of limiting dissemination of selected information by identifying it as sensitive.

Classification markings tell people, "This data needs protection." The markings also direct people to act

appropriately, because the markings answer the question, "How much protection?"

My remarks today are mostly limited to ATOMAL information and its classification. In 1964, Conference Memorandum (64)39 (T 2) defined ATOMAL Information as that information supplied to NATO, ATOMIC Information by the UK and Restricted Data by the US.

Besides establishing that ATOMAL information may be supplied, it lists the types of information that are transferable. These types include stockpile quantities and locations, command and control, yields and effects, vulnerability and hardening as well as delivery and fuzing. Particularly noteworthy is the requirement that US security classification is to be observed.

To assure this, the US Departments of Defense and Energy conduct an "Annual ATOMAL Survey."

ATOMAL information is said to be born classified.

That is, because all ATOMAL information was originally Restricted Data under the US Atomic Energy Act, it is by law classified unless declassified by proper authority. This characteristic causes a marked distinction between ATOMAL classification and the classification of NATO information. In the NATO category, authority is needed to classify information. So it is standard practice with NATO information that unless guidance states that certain information is classified it is unclassified. With ATOMAL information, it must be considered to be NATO Secret ATOMAL unless there is specific guidance that says otherwise.

(T 4)

The NATO Classification Guide for Nuclear Weapons implements the US and UK Classification Requirements. And (T 5) ACE Directive 70-6, "Nuclear Classification", implements the ACE ATOMAL Classification Program. ACE Directive 70-6 (T 6) is based on these four documents. Take particular note of CM(68)41--it is the official source of the NATO Classification Guide for Nuclear Weapons. Directive 70-6 applies to (T 7) "all ACE agencies that may generate nuclear information."

In response to US annual ATOMAL survey findings, 70-6 was changed in 1987 to establish a more structured, visible program within ACE. The ATOMAL surveys of 1981 through 85 resulted in very critical findings which could be summarized as, "there is no ACE ATOMAL classification program." Typical findings were: no training program, no designated classifiers, no procedure to ensure current guidance, no procedure to resolve classification issues, no management oversight. That's the bad news. The good news is that the implementing directive, 70-6, mainly formalizes what should have been happening all along.

Key elements of an effective ACE ATOMAL classification program are: (T 8)

- the ACE ATOMAL Classification Officer (ACC), and
- trained ATOMAL Drafters.

The ACE ACC is responsible to SACEUR for implementation of 70-6. Of paramount importance to an effective program are a sufficient number of properly placed ATOMAL Drafters throughout ACE. What this means is that officers whose duties include preparing ATOMAL

documents need to be designated and trained in proper ATOMAL classification procedures.

The ATOMAL classification structure within ACE looks like this:

(T 9).

Currently the ACE ACD is Wing Commander McBinty. His office is at SHAPE, at telephone extension 3967. To assure that 72-6 is implemented, (T 10) his specific actions include:

- serving as point of contact for the annual ATOMAL surveys,
- assuring training methods are in place within ACE,
- assuring that current classification guidance is available to all ATOMAL Drafters throughout ACE,
- resolving classification issues or forwarding them to the NATO Office of Security, and
- generally overseeing the management of the ACE ATOMAL

Program.

Each commander of an ACE element that may generate documents containing ATOMAL information has four functions (T 11)

highlighted in this transparency, are very similar to those shown of the previous transparency for the ACE ACD.

The most important aspect of the ACE ATOMAL Classification

Program is the requirement that ATOMAL documents may be prepared only by ATOMAL Drafters. Specifically: (T 12) an ATOMAL Drafter is authorized to prepare and recommend the classification or declassification of ATOMAL documents. ATOMAL Drafters must be: (T 13) formally designated and trained. The unit commander is responsible for designating a sufficient number of ATOMAL

Drafters. He is also responsible for their training. In addition to lectures such as this one, ATOMAL Drafters receive briefings within their commands and are issued their personal copy of the ACE ATOMAL Classification Handbook.

To be effective in his field of expertise, an ATOMAL Drafter must know how to use the NATO Classification Guide for Nuclear Weapons and he must be familiar with the basic principles of ATOMAL classification. Today I am addressing only the basic principles. Sufficient to say, practice with the guide will sharpen your ability to use it.

Actually, an understanding of the basic ATOMAL classification principles is a good start toward effective use of the NATO guide. I will address these principles by discussing six guidelines contained in Section II of 78-6 and your role as an ATOMAL Drafter. (T-14) In a moment we will consider each one in turn. Their purpose is to present guiding principles for effective classification of ATOMAL information. They cover the important concepts and philosophy of ATOMAL classification.

(7 15)

The first principle is, "documents are classified by the information they contain and its context." As with most of these next transparencies, this is a paraphrase of the corresponding paragraph in 78-6. When dealing in classification, it is important to keep clearly in mind that information and documents are quite different. Documents are carriers of information and clearly it is the information that determines if the document

requires protection. This seems obvious. However, the matter of the information's context may be quite subtle and illusive. If this aspect is disregarded, unclassified information combined with its context may imply classified information not actually in the document.

(T 16 with the second sentence covered):

"ATOMAL information must not be divided into 'unclassified' components." In theory, the individual components of ATOMAL information cannot all be unclassified. At least one component must be at the level of the total information. In practice, operational considerations often tempt us to break a classified message into 'unclassified' components. They would be so much quicker to send and "with the wording obscure enough, the enemy won't be able to understand what we're really saying!" (remove cover from the second sentence) That's a game that can't be played--it isn't safe and it's not legal.

However, what can be done is to break the message into components to separate the categories of information. That is, a message may contain information which is Cosmic Top Secret (NON-ATOMAL) and also ATOMAL information at a lower level, such as Confidential. In such a case, one message could be CTS and the other NCA. Also, the two separate messages could be safely cross referenced. The result of such measures would be reduced message traffic problems and unambiguous communication.

(T 17)

If the context seems to dictate a higher classification level,

consider the sum of the parts and if necessary, get help from a fellow ATOMAL Drafter or your supervisor. This is a severe paraphrase of paragraph "2-1c" of 70-6. The concern here is mostly one of context. Both ATOMAL and NATO information may contain items that are classified at one level in a particular context but require a higher level in another context. There is no universal rule for how much accumulated information or how much association merits higher classification than its individual components. It's largely a matter of intuition. So when you feel uneasy about the adequacy of the classification level that is indicated by the NATO guide, it's time to consider the matter carefully and seek advice if the uncertainty remains. Start with your fellow ATOMAL Drafters and work up the chain of command if necessary.

4.7.18

If multiple topics are involved, the highest classification level that is indicated will be assigned. This is the essence of paragraphs "2-1d3e" of 70-6. This guideline results from the policy that all applicable guidance must be used in evaluating the classification of information. Individual parts, phrases, or pieces of the information under consideration may indicate a particular classification level under one topic of the guide. But the combination of items may reveal a higher level of classified information under another topic. When an item of information seems to be covered equally well by two or more topics at different classification levels, the highest level must



always be used.

(T 19)

"Referencing a classified document does not by itself make a document classified--but, beware of context." There are topics which classify such things as "fact that ..." or "association of ... with ...". These must be considered when referencing a classified document in an unclassified one. Also there is the possibility that the title of the classified document may be classified.

The final guideline has to do with what can we say about public statements or newspaper articles which contain information that we protect as classified. (T 20) (Pause for class to read) First of all, even if the US President made the statement--that is not a basis for declassifying that information nor does it preclude continued classification of that information. The basic precept is that confirmations or denials may reveal classified information or erode its protection. So consequently, confirmation, denial, or expansion upon public statements covering classified information is prohibited by 70-6.

Now I'd like to briefly discuss your role as an ATOMAL Drafter. As an ATOMAL Drafter you decide whether documents fall into an area requiring protection based on the NATO Guide for Nuclear Weapons.

The documents may be ones that you are preparing or may come to you from different sources. With sufficient knowledge of the operational implications and how to use the NATO guide, you will

ENCLOSURE 7 - Viewgraphs

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# **THE ACE ATOMAL CLASSIFICATION PROGRAMME**

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**ACE ATOMAL CLASSIFICATION PROGRAMME**

**AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES TO THE  
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY FOR COOPERATION  
REGARDING ATOMIC INFORMATION {C-M(64)39}**

- Defines:** • **Atomal Information - Atomic Information supplied by the U.K.**  
                  • **- Restricted Data supplied by the U.S.**
- Lists:** • **Types of weapon-related information transferable to NATO**
- Requires:** • **U.S. security classification be observed.**

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**ACE ATOMAL CLASSIFICATION PROGRAMME**

**ATOMAL information is:**

**Born Classified.**

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**ACE ATOMAL CLASSIFICATION PROGRAMME**

**THE NATO CLASSIFICATION GUIDE FOR NUCLEAR  
WEAPONS .**

**Implements U.S. and U.K. Classification Requirements.**

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**ACE ATOMAL CLASSIFICATION PROGRAMME**

**NUCLEAR CLASSIFICATION**

**AD 70-6**

**Implements: ACE ATOMAL Classification Programme.**

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## **ACE ATOMAL CLASSIFICATION PROGRAMME**

### **AD 70-6 is based on:**

- **C-M(64)39 - Agreement Between NATO Parties**
- **C-M(68)41 - Administrative arrangements to implement C-M(64)39**
- **C-M(55)15 - Security Within NATO**
- **AD 70-1 - ACE Security Directive**



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## **ACE ATOMAL CLASSIFICATION PROGRAMME**

**AD 70-6 applies to:**

**All ACE agencies that may generate nuclear information.**

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## **ACE ATOMAL CLASSIFICATION PROGRAMME**

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
### **Key elements to an effective AACCP are:**

- **The ACE ACO**
- **Trained ATOMAL Drafters (ADs)**

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## ACE ATOMAL CLASSIFICATION PROGRAMME

### ATOMAL CLASSIFICATION STRUCTURE



## **ACE ATOMAL CLASSIFICATION PROGRAMME**

### **ACE ACO RESPONSIBILITIES**

- **Implementation of AD 70-6.**
- **ACE POC for Annual Atomal Survey.**
- **Establishes training within ACE.**
- **Assures availability of current guidance in ACE.**
- **Resolves classification issues.**

## **ACE ATOMAL CLASSIFICATION PROGRAMME**

### **COMMANDER'S RESPONSIBILITIES**

- **Formally designates ATOMAL Drafters in his unit.**
- **Establishes unit training methods.**
- **Assures current guidance is available to ATOMAL Drafters.**
- **Resolves classification issues.**

**ACE ATOMAL CLASSIFICATION PROGRAMME**

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**ATOMAL DRAFTER**

**Prepares**

**and**

**Recommends the**

**Classification or**

**Declassification of**

**ATOMAL documents.**

## **ACE ATOMAL CLASSIFICATION PROGRAMME**

### **ATOMAL DRAFTERS**

- **Formally Designated**
- **Trained**

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## **ACE ATOMAL CLASSIFICATION PROGRAMME**

### **CLASSIFICATION GUIDELINES**

**PURPOSE**

**SCOPE**



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## **ACE ATOMAL CLASSIFICATION PROGRAMME**

### **GUIDELINE**

**Documents are classified because of the information they contain and its context.**

## **ACE ATOMAL CLASSIFICATION PROGRAMME**

---

### **GUIDELINE**

**ATOMAL information must not be divided into "unclassified" components.**

**Don't rely on disguised context.**

## **ACE ATOMAL CLASSIFICATION PROGRAMME**

### **GUIDELINE**

**Does the context seem to dictate a higher level?**

- **Consider sum of parts.**
- **Get help if in doubt.**

## **ACE ATOMAL CLASSIFICATION PROGRAMME**

### **GUIDELINE**

**If multiple topics involved, the topic with the highest classification applies.**

## **ACE ATOMAL CLASSIFICATION PROGRAMME**

### **GUIDELINE**

**Referencing a classified document does not by itself make a document classified:**

- **Beware of context**
- **Assure title is unclassified.**

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## **ACE ATOMAL CLASSIFICATION PROGRAMME**

### **GUIDELINE**

**No confirmation, denial, or expansion upon public statements containing classified information.**

## **ACE ATOMAL CLASSIFICATION PROGRAMME**

### **Basic Questions:**

- **How does NATO Guide deal with this information?**
- **How is the information used?**
- **What information can be derived from what's being considered?**
- **What associations exist that could form classified information?**

**THE ACE ATOMAL CLASSIFICATION PROGRAMME**



**FINAL REPORT**  
**US ATOMAL CLASSIFICATION ADVISOR'S**  
**ASSIGNMENT TO**  
**ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE**

# **FINAL REPORT**

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## **US ATOMAL CLASSIFICATION ADVISOR'S ASSIGNMENT TO ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE**

**January 8, 1988**

### **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

**An improved ACE ATOMAL Classification Program awaits publication of an implementing directive and supporting materials which were developed during a six-month assignment of William Whitesell to the Allied Command Europe as the US ATOMAL Classification Advisor.**

**The content of the new program meets all major US expectations and is acceptable to ACE as being consistent with their practices and within their current manning level and structure. An essential feature is the requirement that only formally designated and trained ATOMAL Drafters, using approved classification guidance, may prepare documents containing ATOMAL information and recommend their classification.**

## INTRODUCTION

The November 1986 DOD/DOE Program Plan proposed a sweeping upgrade of the ACE ATOMAL Classification Program (AACP) and suggested a US ATOMAL Classification Advisor (USACA) to assist in that upgrading. William Whitesell, the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Classification Officer, was selected for this assignment with SHAPE in Mons, Belgium. Phase One of the assignment was conducted from March 16 to June 13, 1987; Phase Two, from September 24 to December 11. During those periods, the USACA served as staff to Wing Commander M. T. McGinty, Chief of Security Section, CI & Security Branch, Intelligence Division, who has the additional duty of ACE ATOMAL Classification Officer (ACO). This report describes the Phase Two efforts and the final results.

A complete report of Phase One was issued on July 24, 1987. That phase resulted in a June 9 version of ACE Directive 70-6 which would have established an AACP that did not meet US expectations regarding classification appraisal, responsibilities, and training. The report was concluded with:

"Although considerably different from that suggested by AD 7X-X [the DOD/DOE drafted implementing directive], the AACP established by draft AD 70-6 represents an improvement in ACE ATOMAL classification management. It does for the first time formally establish a policy for ATOMAL classification, requiring that only designated and trained officers may prepare or originate ATOMAL documents. Without at least one dedicated billet, it is doubtful that the AACP can be further strengthened."

On September 16, 1987, AD 70-6 was redrafted at DOE Headquarters to include additional requirements to more fully meet US expectations. On the following day, Wing Commander McGinty was asked to withdraw the June 9 version from formal ACE review and to await the USACA's return the following week with a suggested revision. He agreed to this request.

Although Phase Two was originally planned to be devoted chiefly to seminars among the ACE elements, the September redraft caused it to be rescoped.

## **DISCUSSION**

### **Purpose**

Phase Two had two main purposes:

- Develop an AACP which satisfies US expectations and is consistent with ACE procedures and staffing limitations
- Prepare sufficient training materials to ensure a continuing classification education program throughout ACE. The planned ACE-wide seminars were aborted because of the September changes.

Additional goals were:

- Search and determine extent of ACE directives and documents that should be changed,
- Draft appropriate changes to the ACE ACO position description

### **Process**

A series of meetings were conducted with key officers at SHAPE, the Major Subordinate Commands (MSCs), and the NATO School to present and discuss the new version of AD 70-6 and review the draft training materials. A complete list of participating officials is contained in Enclosure 1. Their organizations were: SHAPE NUC OPS, AFSOUTH SECURITY AND NUC OPS, AFCENT NUC OPS, UK AIR NUC OPS, and NATO SCHOOL Nuclear Staff. NATO Security Office was kept informed of progress.

### **Achievements**

At the conclusion of Phase Two, a revised AD 70-6 was completed, ready for formal ACE review (Enclosure 2). An assessment of this version is presented below.

Training materials developed were:

- Supplemental classification handbook
- Unit briefing for new classification officials
- Draft lecture for selected NATO School courses with draft viewgraphs

The handbook was in final form, including its cover, (Enclosures 3 and 4) and was ready for the printshop. Each classifying official will have a personal copy of the handbook. The unit briefing (Enclosure 5) was fully coordinated and will be issued concurrently with AD 70-6.

**The School lecture and viewgraphs (Enclosures 6 and 7) required post-Phase-Two modification to reflect a last-minute title change. They were forwarded to ACE on January 8, 1988.**

One document change was made to incorporate classification indoctrination into ACE form 107(R). This form, entitled "Personnel Security Clearance," is used for initial and six-month security briefings of all ATOMAL-cleared personnel. Wing Commander McGinty's position description has been amended to include his assignment as ACE ACO.

### **Assessment Of The Results**

The merits of the new AACP may best be assessed by considering the final version of its implementing directive, ACE Directive 70-6. Key ACE officials agree that it will establish an AACP that is consistent with current procedures, organizational requirements, and staffing levels. This assessment addresses the question, "How well will the AACP meet US expectations?"

Five principal differences exist between the September 16, DOD/DOE draft of AD 70-6 and the final version:

- **The NATO Classification Guide for Nuclear Weapons** is not part of AD 70-6.
- The former title, **ATOMAL Classifier**, is now **ATOMAL Drafter**. They **only prepare** documents and recommend their classification.
- The commander's responsibilities have been reduced in number from eight to four.
- The section on classification procedures is reduced to one procedure and a reference to AD 70-1.
- One of the four purposes of ACE ACO classification oversight was deleted.

Each of these are discussed below:

**Location of ATOMAL Guide** As discussed in my November 14 progress report, there are several valid reasons for eliminating the guide from AD 70-6. One main reason is that the NATO Guide is presently located in three NATO documents: CM(68)41, the Nuclear Planning Manual (NPM), and AD 70-6. NATO uses CM(68)41 to issue revisions of the guide. CM(68)41 is considered the official guide source throughout ACE. It can be relied on to contain the current, NATO-accepted guide.

Currently, the SHAPE Nuc Ops commander insists on including the guide in his NPM for completeness. It could possibly contain a version different from

**the official guide in CM(68)41. However, since the NPM is issued annually, that risk is considered to be acceptably low.**

**Traditionally within ACE, AD 70-6 has been used solely to promulgate the NATO guide. The revised AD 70-6 has a much broader scope which will not be diminished by the lack of a guide. The implementing directive requires that all classification decisions be based on the NATO guide and informs the reader where it may be found.**

**ATOMAL Drafters are not Classifiers.** This is the most substantive change in the draft directive, based on a very fundamental difference in philosophy between ACE and US classification practice. This is the "last-minute title change" referred to above. Throughout our reviews, there had been mild to strong objections to the titles being considered. During our meeting with the last and largest MSC (AFCENT), the sound basis for one of these objections was clarified.

ACE Directive 70-1 stipulates who (by rank and position) may sign ATOMAL documents. This act of signing is also understood by knowledgeable ACE officials to constitute originating and classifying the document. They made it clear that any title with the word "classifier" for positions below the authorized signer would be inappropriate. A similar semantic problem exists regarding the document declassifier.

In this well-established practice, the signing official is supported by staff who must be knowledgeable but whose classification authority is limited to making recommendations. The title, "ATOMAL Drafter," accurately describes a staff position in their system. Although this is a foreign concept and a radical departure from the US approach, it accurately represents the situation within ACE.

Most importantly, adapting to their practices and requiring that only designated, trained people are authorized to prepare ACE ATOMAL documents increases the likelihood of correct classification.

**Commander's Responsibilities** Of the eight commander's responsibilities specified in the September 16, DOD/DOE AD 70-6, three were eliminated and one was merged with another.

The following three deletions were believed to be adequately covered in AD 70-1. The commander must ensure that:

"Personnel authorized to handle ATOMAL documents are aware of the mechanism for determining ATOMAL classification."

**"Continuous awareness of classification in the commands planning and operational activities is maintained."**

**"No documents are issued which contain instructions requiring or authorizing an action that will result in a violation of this directive."**

Maintaining a current list of ATOMAL Drafters was merged with the requirement to designate ATOMAL Drafters by specifying that commanders will formally designate them. The method of formal designation must be in writing and compliance will be checked during oversight inspections.

**Classification Procedures** The September 16, DOD/DOE AD 70-6 specified two procedures in paragraph 8; one regarded paragraph marking and the second, review of ATOMAL documents prepared by unauthorized persons. There was no reference to AD 70-1 wherein all the classification procedures (including those two) are contained.

The final version of AD 70-6 states that the procedures contained in AD 70-1 apply to ATOMAL documents. It also states that "each person who signs, or otherwise approves, an ATOMAL document will assure that it has been prepared by an ATOMAL Drafter".

**Oversight Requirements** The principal issue during the first half of this assignment was the degree of program oversight to which ACE would commit. The 1986 DOD/DOE plan included an appraisal plan which ACE found totally unacceptable. The September 16, DOD/DOE version of AD 70-6 included an approach to program oversight which was acceptable to ACE with one exception. The following purpose was deleted:

"The oversight purpose of evaluating the effectiveness of locally-developed methods of implementing AD 70-6."

This element was considered to be covered by the oversight purpose of, "Determine whether classification practices and performance conform to this directive."

## **CONCLUSIONS**

**The final draft of AD 70-6 establishes an AACP which meets all major US expectations and is acceptable to ACE as being consistent with their practices and within their manning level and structure. Its essential feature is the requirement that only formally designated and trained ATOMAL Drafters, using approved classification guidance, may prepare documents containing ATOMAL information and recommend the correct classification to their authorized originators.**

**The training materials constitute an appropriate "learning package" to increase ATOMAL classification awareness throughout ACE and to maintain an adequate level of classification education.**

**The viability of the AACP will depend upon ACE command support and the effectiveness of the ACE ACO's oversight program. In the interests of getting the new AACP off to a strong start, it is fortunate that the assigned officer is Wing Commander McGinty. His education, background, and inherent talents make him exceptionally suited to this function. The pending visit to DOE Headquarters and LLNL should further enhance his effectiveness.**



## **FUTURE ACTIONS**

### **Debriefing of Key Headquarters Officials**

This is scheduled for January 20, 1988.

### **Education of the Current ACE ACO**

As recommended in a monthly progress report and in separate correspondence, this is considered essential. Besides putting the function in proper perspective, Wing Commander McGinty's trip to the US should enhance his role by developing an understanding of Restricted Data and Formerly Restricted Data as well as the implementation of classification policy by a large, multi-level organization. This is tentatively scheduled for April 4 to 15, 1988.

### **Annual ATOMAL Surveys**

Future surveys should be conducted with an understanding and appreciation of the classification environment within ACE. The main item on the classification agenda should be, "how satisfactorily is ACE performing ATOMAL classification."

Submitted by:



William A. Whitesell

US ATOMAL Classification Advisor

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**ENCLOSURE 1 - Participating Officials**

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**ENCLOSURE 2 - AD-70-6**

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**JOINT ALLIED HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS EUROPE****GRAND QUARTIER GENERAL DES PUISSANCES ALLIEES EN EUROPE****B-7010, SHAPE, Belgium**ACE DIRECTIVE  
NUMBER 70-6NUCLEAR CLASSIFICATION

This directive supersedes Allied Command Europe (ACE) Directive 70-6, 17 January 1984. ACE Directive 00-1, "Index to ACE Directives and Manuals" will be posted to indicate the current date of this directive.

1. APPLICABILITY. This directive applies to all agencies that prepare, originate, classify or declassify nuclear information.
2. SUPPLEMENTATION. Subordinate headquarters are authorized to supplement this directive. SHAPE will be provided with a copy of such supplement.
3. INTERIM CHANGES. Interim changes are authorized when approved by SECCOS.

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AD. 70-6

**NUCLEAR CLASSIFICATION**

## SECTION I - GENERAL

1-1 PURPOSE. This directive establishes the structure and principles to be applied throughout Allied Command Europe (ACE) to ensure correct classification of nuclear weapons related information. The principal objective of classification is to identify information correctly so that appropriate security measures can be taken to safeguard it from espionage, compromise, or unauthorised disclosure.

1-2 AUTHORITY. This directive is based on the 1964 Agreement Between the Parties of the North Atlantic Treaty for Cooperation Regarding Atomic Information (CM(64)39), document CM(68)41(Revised) and North Atlantic Council document CM(55)15(Final). The NATO Classification Guide for Nuclear Weapons is contained in CM(68)41.

1-3 DEFINITIONS. The following definitions and those contained within CM(68)41 apply to this directive:

- a. ATOMAL Drafter. An ACE officer who is authorised to prepare ATOMAL documents.
- b. ACE ATOMAL Classification Officer (ACE ACO). The person designated to manage the ACE ATOMAL Classification Programme for SACEUR.
- c. Classification Category. The type of classified information. Within ACE, the two categories are ATOMAL and NATO information.
- d. Declassification. A determination based upon US/UK guidance that a document is no longer classified. The process of removing classification markings from a document is also called declassification.
- e. Document. Any recorded information regardless of physical form or characteristics, e.g. written matter, electromechanical recordings, photographic prints or computer memory.
- f. Downgrading. Reducing the level of classification of documents. ATOMAL documents may not be downgraded to any level below NATO Confidential.
- g. Information. Facts, data or knowledge itself, rather than the medium conveying it. Documents convey information; they are not information per se.
- h. Upgrading. Raising the level of classification of documents.

**AD 70-6**

- b. **ATOMAL information must not be so subdivided that all its components are unclassified.**
- c. Both NATO and ATOMAL information may contain items that are classified at one level in a particular context but require a higher level in another context. There is no universal rule for how much accumulated information or association merits higher classification than its individual components.
- d. Classification will be based on an evaluation using all applicable guidance. Individual parts, phrases, or pieces may justifiably be assigned a particular classification level under one topic of this guide but the combination of items may reveal a higher level of classified information. If so, the higher classification will be assigned.
- e. Similarly, when an item of information appears to be covered equally well by two or more topics at different classification levels, the highest level will be chosen.
- f. Any postulated assessment of enemy weapons, would not be ATOMAL if based solely on intelligence data. However, if based on analysis of, or comparison with US or UK weapon designs, then such information is ATOMAL.
- g. The fact that a document makes reference to a classified documents is not a basis for classifying that document unless the reference citation, standing alone or in context, reveals classified information.
- h. Open publication of classified information is not a basis for declassifying that information nor does it preclude continued classification of that information. Confirmations or denials may reveal classified information or erode its protection. Consequently, confirmation, denial or expansion upon public statements covering classified information is prohibited.
- i. The topics in CM(68)41 apply to both the US and UK information unless otherwise indicated.

**2-2 CLASSIFICATION PROCEDURES.** Classification procedures contained in AD 70-1 apply for ATOMAL documents. Each person who signs, or otherwise approves, an ATOMAL document will assure that it has been prepared by a designated ATOMAL Drafter.

**2-3 NATO CLASSIFICATION GUIDE.**

- a. The classification guide contained in CM(68)41 is prepared by US with UK concurrence and is periodically revised and updated, as necessary. The Nuclear Planning Manual is issued annually with the most recent version of the NATO Guide. Only the most recent

AD 70-6

revision of CM(68)41 will be used as a basis for classification determinations.

- b. It is essential that current classification guidance be available to all ATOMAL Drafters.

### SECTION III - EDUCATION

3-1 PURPOSE. The purpose of the classification education programme is to establish and maintain the level of awareness and knowledge needed to ensure effective ATOMAL classification.

3-2 APPLICATION. ATOMAL classification education will be given to:

- a. All designated ATOMAL Drafters, and
- b. Students in nuclear-related courses at the NATO School.

3-3 TRAINING.

- a. All officers designated as ATOMAL Drafters will be trained in ATOMAL classification prior to making any ATOMAL classification or declassification determinations. This training will cover the essentials of ATOMAL classification including theory, principles, policy, authorities, procedures and practices.
- b. Each nuclear-related course given at the NATO School will include coverage of those aspects of ATOMAL classification policy and practices relevant to the content of that course.

3-4 INDOCTRINATION. All personnel authorised access to ATOMAL information will be indoctrinated in fundamental ATOMAL classification policy and procedures as part of the security indoctrination process.

### SECTION IV - CLASSIFICATION OVERSIGHT

4-1 CLASSIFICATION PROGRAMME OVERSIGHT. The ACE ACC will exercise sufficient oversight of the ACE ATOMAL Classification Programme to:

- a. Determine the effectiveness of the ATOMAL classification programme.
- b. Determine whether classification practices and performance conform with this directive.
- c. Evaluate the effectiveness of classification guidance provided by SHAPE.

4-2 OVERSIGHT PLAN. The ACE ACO will develop a plan to establish oversight requirements and practices throughout ACE down to Principal Subordinate Command (PSC) level. The plan will establish a method for evaluation within each command of:



AD 70-6

- a. The effectiveness of ATOMAL classification practices.
- b. The availability of current guidance to ATOMAL Drafters.
- c. Whether ATOMAL Drafters have been designated and trained in all organizations where needed.
- d. The quality of ATOMAL classification education.

SECTION V - PROBLEM RESOLUTION

5-1 PROBLEMS, QUESTIONS OR SUGGESTIONS. Problems concerning ATOMAL classification should be referred promptly up the military command structure to a level possessing appropriate authority and expertise to resolve them. If there is uncertainty whether specific information is ATOMAL, it will be handled as ATOMAL until a final determination is made. Questions or suggestions concerning the NATO Classification Guide for Nuclear Weapons will be forwarded to the ACE ACO.

FOR THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE:

H.G. BROWN  
Brigadier, UK A  
Secretary to the Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:

AMENDMENTS/COMMENTS

Users of this directive are invited to send comments, amendments and suggested improvements to SHAPE, INTEL Division, Attn: CI and Security Branch.

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**ENCLOSURE 3 - Handbook Cover**

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