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10 April 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR:

[Redacted]
Policy & Plans Group
Office of Security

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FROM:

[Redacted]
Deputy Chief, Special Security Center
Office of Security

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SUBJECT:

CHOSUN Network Security Manual (U)

The following comments are offered relative to the subject matter:

A. 5.6 Security Indoctrination -- Maintenance of NDAs for a period of 70 years after access termination seems excessive and unnecessary. Recommend review of that requirement with a view to reducing the period to something closer to 15 years. Consideration should be given to the aspect of physical storage of these NDAs.

B. 5.6,a "All indoctrinations shall be accomplished by the NSO, PM, NISSO or HISSO." This is a rather severe limitation on those authorized to indoctrinate. Suggest adding "or officially appointed alternate representatives of these officers."

C. 5.6,b(1) Notification to the NSO for a simple "change of address" seems unnecessary. Recommend deletion of that requirement.

D. 5.6,b(2) Reporting "unauthorized contact with a citizen of a foreign country" is impractical and unnecessary. Suggest changing wording to read unofficial contact with any citizen of a hostile nation (Soviet, Bloc Countries, PRC, etc...nations designated in DCID 1/20) and continuing unofficial contact with citizens of any foreign country.

E. 5.6,b(4) Recommend change of wording to "Upon change of marital status. Basic biographic data for an intended spouse should be provided."

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F. 5.7,d Periodic reinvestigation -- Recommend adding following language "The requirement for reinvestigation on a five year recurring basis may be extended to a longer period or waived on authority of heads of NFIB Agencies (or their designates) and on authority of the DCI (or his designate) for non-NFIB Agencies."

G. 5.8,a Recommend addition of following...The NSO will be responsible for notification to NFIB Agencies when an individual is terminated for cause from CHOSUN access.

H. 6.2,b Recommend adding in line 5 -- Group I lock mounted on hardplate; acoustic seal etc... In latter part of this paragraph... I believe we can live with the requirement to forward a record of the lock combination(s) to the NSO for storage, but we must maintain a local record of the combination in this Agency as well. This is contradictory to the last sentence in the paragraph.

I. 6.3.1,b It is my contention that a vibration detection system is unnecessary, fallible and not worth the cost of installation and maintenance. I believe PSD and TSD will take a similar position.

J. 6.4.1 Access Roster -- Any roster containing a listing of Agency personnel must be classified at least confidential. Transmittal on a weekly basis may be a less desirable administrative task than perhaps monthly. The latter is recommended.

K. 7.1.3 Para 4 This is a garble "Multiple Sources" belongs on the "Derived From" line rather than the "Classified By" line.

L. 7.2.3 Portion Marking -- In this Agency, it is our practice to mark each portion of a document with the abbreviation for the classification at the end of each portion. Can we continue that practice in documents relative to CHOSUN?

The last sentence of this paragraph is not applicable to the Agency. The abbreviation "CNWDI" is not used by CIA. In our case SIGMA is substituted for CNWDI. This is not an arbitrary action by CIA, but a differentiation established by DOE.

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M. 6.3.2c Response time not to exceed five minutes is reasonable for a limited number of facilities in NFIB Agencies. Such a short response time may be unrealistic if applied to a wide number and variety of nodes. (U)



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