

SPECIAL PROJECT SECURITY IN THE SEVENTIES

(SLIDE #1) (HOUSE LIGHTS DOWN AND TITLE SLIDE ON AS SOON AS INTRODUCTION IS COMPLETED).

TODAY WE ARE GOING TO REVIEW CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE SPECIAL SECURITY PROGRAMS WHICH PROTECT SENSITIVE PROJECTS PERFORMED BY INDUSTRY FOR THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. WE ARE GOING TO EXAMINE THE ESPIONAGE THREAT AGAINST US, INCLUDING RECENT CASES WHICH HAVE DIRECTLY AFFECTED SPECIAL PROJECT SECURITY; AND WE ARE GOING TO DISCUSS THE SECURITY EFFORT TO DEFEND AGAINST THIS THREAT, INCLUDING WHAT YOU MUST DO TO HELP, IF WE ARE TO BE SUCCESSFUL.

WHEN YOU FIRST WERE GIVEN SPECIAL ACCESS APPROVAL, YOU WERE INDOCTRINATED. YOU WERE TOLD THE PROJECT YOU WOULD BE WORKING ON SUPPORTED ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT INTELLIGENCE-GATHERING OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. YOU WERE GIVEN NEW GROUND RULES FOR THE PROTECTION OF INFORMATION ABOUT THIS SPECIAL WORK. THE SYSTEM OF SECURITY WAS DIFFERENT, PERHAPS MORE STRINGENT THAN THE USUAL PROGRAMS, AND YOU WERE TOLD THAT THIS PROJECT WAS A PRIME TARGET FOR ESPIONAGE.

THE PERIODIC REINDOCTRINATION OF ALL PARTICIPANTS IS A REQUIREMENT OF THOSE COMPARTMENTED PROGRAMS - - A REQUIREMENT WHICH, BECAUSE OF OTHER PRESSING NEEDS RELATED TO GETTING THE JOB DONE, HAS NOT ALWAYS BEEN MET IN THE PAST.

RECENT EVENTS HAVE SERIOUSLY ERODED SECRECY ABOUT THESE SPECIAL PROJECTS. IN PART, THERE HAS BEEN A TREND IN THE NEWS MEDIA TO ADOPT AN ADVERSARY ATTITUDE TOWARD ALL GOVERNMENT SECRECY PROGRAMS. MANY PEOPLE, SOME OF WHOM WERE SWORN TO SECRECY, HAVE EXHIBITED A TENDENCY TO WANT TO EXPOSE INFORMATION WHICH HAS BEEN KEPT SECRET IN THE PAST. WHATEVER THEIR MOTIVES MAY BE, SOME REVELATIONS HAVE BEEN HARMFUL TO AMERICAN EFFORTS TO GATHER INTELLIGENCE -- INTELLIGENCE NEEDED BY THOSE WHO MUST GUIDE THE DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES.

HOW IMPORTANT IS SECURITY TO THESE INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS? WELL, IN SOME CASES, THE SIMPLE DISCLOSURE THAT THE PARTICULAR COLLECTION PROGRAM EXISTS IS ENOUGH TO PERMIT OUR ADVERSARIES TO TAKE EFFECTIVE COUNTERMEASURES. THAT IS, THE UNITED STATES CAN BE DENIED VALUABLE INFORMATION IF THE NATIONS WHICH ARE THE TARGETS OF THESE PROGRAMS ONLY KNOW ABOUT THEM. IN OTHER CASES, WE MAY REST ASSURED THAT THE "OTHER SIDE" KNOWS ABOUT SPECIFIC TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE GATHERING PROJECTS, BUT THEY CAN'T DEFEND AGAINST THEM EFFECTIVELY BECAUSE THEY DON'T KNOW JUST HOW GOOD THEY ARE. WHAT WE'RE TRYING TO PROTECT, THEN, IS THE LEADING EDGE OF OUR TECHNOLOGY. TO DO THIS, WE MUST MAINTAIN SECRECY ABOUT WHAT WE'RE DOING, HOW WE DO IT, AND HOW WELL WE CAN DO IT.

(SLIDE #2) THE PRIME TARGET IN ALL OF THIS, THE BULL'S-EYE AT THE CENTER OF THE TARGET, IS YOU. THE OPPOSITION USES MANY METHODS TO VICTIMIZE OR EXPLOIT PEOPLE LIKE YOU. ALMOST INVARIABLY, THEIR TECHNIQUES REQUIRE THAT YOU MAKE THE FIRST MISTAKE. THEY ALSO REQUIRE THAT YOU MAINTAIN SECRECY ABOUT THEIR EFFORTS AGAINST YOU. REMEMBER THIS POINT, WE'LL GET BACK TO IT.

THESE DAYS, THE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE ISN'T THE ONLY OPPOSITION WE HAVE TO WORRY ABOUT. THE CHINESE, THE CUBANS, EVEN THE VIETNAMESE, ALL ARE ACTIVELY OPERATING AGAINST THE U.S. BUT IN THE LIMITED TIME WE HAVE, WE'LL CONCENTRATE TODAY ON THE MOST ACTIVE AND PROFESSIONAL ADVERSARY, THE USSR.

NOW A LOT OF YOU ARE THINKING, "I'M NOT GOING TO HAVE ANYTHING TO DO WITH THE RUSSIANS. AND IF I DID, I CERTAINLY WOULDN'T HELP THEM TO VICTIMIZE ME." PERHAPS NOT, BUT IF YOU DID, YOU WOULDN'T BE THE FIRST. THERE IS A LONG LIST OF U.S. CITIZENS WHO HAVE BEEN EXPLOITED, ALL OF WHOM HAD SECURITY CLEARANCES. AFTER ALL, THE PEOPLE WITH THE CLEARANCES ARE THE ONES WHO KNOW THE IMPORTANT SECRETS, RIGHT? THAT MEANS, ONCE AGAIN, THAT WE'RE TALKING ABOUT YOU.

(SLIDE #3) HOW DO THE SOVIETS GO ABOUT EXPLOITING AMERICANS?  
BACK IN THE 1950'S, THE UNITED STATES RECEIVED, THROUGH ONE OF ITS  
OWN AGENTS, RUSSIAN DOCUMENTS INSTRUCTING THEIR INTELLIGENCE  
AGENTS IN HOW TO GATHER INFORMATION, WHO IS OF INTEREST, AND  
WHAT KINDS OF INFORMATION WOULD BE HELPFUL IN OBTAINING THEIR  
COOPERATION.

(SLIDE #4) FACTS RELATING TO INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS  
LOCATION AND SECURITY OF FACILITIES  
RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING METHODS  
LIAISON ACTIVITIES WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS  
AND ON A MORE PERSONAL NOTE:

(SLIDE #5) IDENTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL TO INCLUDE  
BIOGRAPHICAL PROFILES WITH STRESS UPON:  
SOCIAL HABITS  
CONTACTS  
INDISCRETIONS  
PERSONAL PROBLEMS  
WEAKNESSES

YEAH, BUT THAT WAS IN THE FIFTIES, YOU SAY. WELL, THERE IS  
NO INDICATION THAT THINGS ARE DIFFERENT NOW. IN FACT, THERE IS  
AMPLE TESTIMONY THAT THE EFFORT HAS NOT SLACKENED ITS PACE.  
THE FBI IS STILL CATCHING OPPOSITION SPIES, AND THE SOVIET LEADERS  
THEMSELVES GIVE EVIDENCE IN THE 1970'S THAT THE OLD CHALLENGE  
OF THE 1950'S CONTINUES TODAY. LET'S QUOTE PREMIER BREZHNEV:

(SLIDE #6) "THE SOVIET UNION REMAINS DETERMINED TO SUPPORT ALL REVOLUTIONARY FORCES OF OUR TIMES."

THE DETENTE WITH THE UNITED STATES, HE DECLARED:

(SLIDE #7) "IN NO WAY SIGNIFIES A POSSIBILITY OR WEAKENING OF THE IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE AGAINST THE WORLD."

LEST ANYONE MISUNDERSTAND, HE CONCLUDED BY SAYING:

(SLIDE #8) "ON THE CONTRARY, WE SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR AN INTENSIFICATION OF THIS STRUGGLE."

(SLIDE #9 - BLANK) JUST AS IN THE FIFTIES, THE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUE TODAY, TO CONDUCT ESPIONAGE AGAINST THE UNITED STATES. THE USSR MAINTAINS TWO AGENCIES TO DO THIS WORK: FIRST, THE KGB, THE SO-CALLED "COMMITTEE FOR STATE SECURITY," WHOSE FUNCTIONS PARALLEL THOSE OF THE FBI AND THE CIA, COMBINED -- AND WITH NO CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT, NO CIVIL LIBERTIES GROUPS, AND NO FREE PRESS TO CURB THEIR EXCESSES (ONE CAN'T IMAGINE THE EDITORIAL PAGES OF PRAVDA CRITICIZING THE KGB). SECOND, THE GRU, THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AGENCY: SOMEWHAT MORE SPECIALIZED, NOT AS BIG, BUT NEVERTHELESS A POTENT ADVERSARY. BOTH HAVE ENJOYED SUCCESSES AGAINST THE WEST, USING A VARIETY OF TECHNIQUES, COVER ORGANIZATIONS, AND PEOPLE TO ACCOMPLISH THEIR ENDS.

LET'S DISCUSS THE ACTIVITIES OF THESE GROUPS. ONE WAY TO TELL IF AN ORGANIZATION IS ACTIVE IS BY THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE IT EMPLOYS. GENERALLY, THE BUSIER ONE IS THE MORE PEOPLE ONE NEEDS.

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(SLIDE #11) THESE FIGURES CONCERN WHAT IS KNOWN IN THE INTELLIGENCE BUSINESS AS "LEGALS." THE LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF A FOREIGN NATION CONSISTS OF THOSE WHO ARE OFFICIALLY, OR "LEGALLY" ASSIGNED TO THIS COUNTRY. THEY INCLUDE PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO EMBASSIES, TO CONSULATES AROUND THE U.S., TO THE UNITED NATIONS, TO TRADE AND CULTURAL MISSIONS, AND VISITING GROUPS, SUCH AS ATHLETES, ARTISTS AND TOURISTS.

"LEGALS" ARE KNOWN TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, AND ARE SUBJECT TO DIPLOMATIC RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL AND OTHER ACTIVITIES . . . NOT THAT THEY ALWAYS ABIDE BY THEM.

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(SLIDE#12) BUT THAT'S NOT ALL. THERE IS ANOTHER GROUP KNOWN AS "ILLEGALS." THESE ARE INDIVIDUALS DISPATCHED BY THE KGB AND THE GRU CLANDESTINELY TO CARRY OUT ESPIONAGE TASKS IN THE WEST, INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES. THEY ARE EXTENSIVELY TRAINED IN LANGUAGES, ESPIONAGE TRADECRAFT, AND OTHER SKILLS THEY WILL NEED TO ESTABLISH THEMSELVES UNDER A FALSE IDENTITY, WHICH, INCIDENTALLY, WILL BE THOROUGHLY DOCUMENTED AND BACKSTOPPED.

IF YOU THINK THE PLACEMENT OF AN ILLEGAL INTO AMERICAN SOCIETY TO SPY UPON OUR GOVERNMENT IS A DIFFICULT TASK, LET ME REMIND YOU THAT THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE HAS ITS HANDS FULL WITH HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF ILLEGAL ALIENS WHO ENTER THE U.S. ANNUALLY. MANY OF THESE ARE UNEDUCATED AGRICULTURAL WORKERS WHO MUST RELY TOTALLY UPON THEIR OWN LIMITED RESOURCES. THE SOVIET ILLEGAL HAS THE FULL BACKING AND SUPPORT OF A WORLDWIDE, HIGHLY PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATION WITH VIRTUALLY UNLIMITED FUNDS. WHEN HE HAS PROBLEMS, HE CAN RELY ON HELP FROM THE CENTER IN MOSCOW. THE SOVIET ILLEGAL POSES ONE OF



THE MOST SERIOUS THREATS TO THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES TODAY. AND YOU WON'T BE ABLE TO DISTINGUISH HIM FROM YOUR UNCLE HARRY FROM DETROIT, INSOFAR AS KNOWING HE IS A SOVIET AGENT. THERE IS NO WAY TO ESTIMATE THE NUMBER OF "ILLEGALS" LIVING, WORKING, AND SPYING IN THE UNITED STATES.

ANOTHER WAY TO TELL ABOUT THE INDUSTRY OF THE OPPOSITION, ALTHOUGH IT IS A NEGATIVE FORM OF MEASUREMENT, IS TO LOOK AT HOW MANY SOVIETS HAVE BEEN EXPELLED FROM THE UNITED STATES.

(SLIDE #13) SINCE 1945, A TOTAL OF 93 SOVIET OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN DECLARED PERSONA NON GRATA BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. OF COURSE, IT IS GRATIFYING TO NOTE THAT EACH EXPULSION IS A DISRUPTION OF KGB OR GRU OPERATION, A SOVIET DEFEAT. BUT THESE ARE TEMPORARY SETBACKS. THE OVERALL ASSAULT CONTINUES.

(SLIDE #14 - BLANK) THUS FAR, WE HAVE REVIEWED THE MISSION OF THE PRINCIPAL OPPOSITION; WE HAVE OBSERVED THE NUMBER OF LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES THEY HAVE IN THE U.S.; NOTED THE NUMBER WHO HAVE BEEN EXPELLED, AND DISCUSSED THEIR CLANDESTINE EFFORTS AGAINST AMERICANS. HOW SUCCESSFUL HAS THIS ATTACK UPON US BEEN?

WELL, FIRST OF ALL, THEY HAVE HAD MANY FAILURES. AMERICANS AS A GROUP ARE LOYAL TO THEIR COUNTRY AND HAVE PROVED EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO RECRUIT. UNFORTUNATELY, THEY HAVE NOT ALWAYS BEEN SUCCESSFUL. THERE HAVE BEEN A FEW INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE, FOR VARIOUS REASONS, CHOSEN TO COOPERATE WITH THE OPPOSITION; INDIVIDUALS WHO ACCEPTED OR EVEN SOUGHT RECRUITMENT AND CARRIED OUT SERIOUSLY DAMAGING OPERATIONS.

LET'S REVIEW, BRIEFLY, SOME OF THE MORE NOTORIOUS INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE ENGAGED IN ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS, AND IN THIS WAY, PERHAPS, MEASURE THE SUCCESS WE HAVE HAD IN BLUNTING THE THRUST OF THE KGB AND THE GRU. AT THE SAME TIME, WE CAN BECOME MORE AWARE OF THE EVER-PRESENT THREAT POSED BY THE OPPOSITION. A PARTIAL LOOK INTO THE HISTORY OF ESPIONAGE AGAINST THE UNITED STATES INCLUDES:

(SLIDE #15) IRVING SCARBECK, A STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICER, COOPERATED WITH THE POLISH INTELLIGENCE SERVICE WHEN THEY THREATENED HIS POLISH MISTRESS, URSULA, WITH IMPRISONMENT. HIS YIELDING TO EXTORTION LED TO BETRAYAL OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION AND A SENTENCE OF 30 YEARS IN A FEDERAL PENITENTIARY.

(SLIDE #16) ARMY SGT. JACK E. DUNLAP, WHO WAS ASSIGNED TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY AS A COURIER, SOLD NSA'S SECRETS FOR MONEY. UNFORTUNATELY, DUNLAP'S ACTIVITIES AS A SOVIET AGENT DID NOT SURFACE UNTIL AFTER HIS SUICIDE.

(SLIDE #17) AIRMAN ROBERT GLEN THOMPSON, BITTER OVER WHAT HE CONSIDERED UNFAIR TREATMENT, TRIED TO GET EVEN WITH HIS COMMANDING OFFICER BY SEEKING RECRUITMENT WITH THE SOVIETS. FOR 6 YEARS OF COOPERATION, HE RECEIVED \$1,700 FROM THE SOVIETS. EVENTUALLY, HIS TRIAL RESULTED IN A SENTENCE TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT. IN MAY 1978, HE WAS RELEASED IN EXCHANGE FOR A U.S. CITIZEN HELD IN EAST GERMANY.

(SLIDE #18) U.S. NAVY YEOMAN 1ST CLASS NELSON C. DRUMMOND WORKED FOR THE SOVIETS FOR A PERIOD OF 5 YEARS. HIS MOTIVATION WAS GREED FOR MONEY - - MONEY HE NEEDED TO SUPPORT HIS EXPENSIVE VICES, WHICH KEPT HIM CONSTANTLY IN DEBT. HE WAS SENTENCED TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT.

(SLIDE #19) ANY REVIEW OF ESPIONAGE AGAINST THE U.S. MUST INCLUDE THE CASE OF ARMY SGT. ROBERT L. JOHNSON AND HIS PARTNER, ALLEN MINTKENBAUGH. THEIR ACTIVITIES SPANNED 11 YEARS, AND INCLUDED THE PENETRATION OF THE U.S. ARMED FORCES COURIER SERVICE VAULT AT ORLY AIRPORT IN PARIS. EACH OF THEM RECEIVED A SENTENCE OF 25 YEARS IN PRISON. JOHNSON LATER WAS STABBED TO DEATH BY HIS OWN SON DURING A PRISON VISIT. IRONICALLY, THE SON WAS SERVING IN THE U.S. ARMY AT THE TIME.

(SLIDE #20) LT. COL. WILLIAM WHALEN, A RETIRED ARMY OFFICER, WITH A DRINKING HABIT OF ABOUT A FIFTH OF WHISKEY A DAY. HE SPENT THE MAJORITY OF HIS ARMY CAREER IN THE OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE. HE PLEADED GUILTY TO THE CHARGE OF CONSPIRING TO OBTAIN DEFENSE SECRETS FOR THE SOVIETS, AND WAS SENTENCED TO SERVE 15 YEARS.

(SLIDE #21) JOHN BUTENKO, AN AMERICAN BORN OF RUSSIAN IMMIGRANT PARENTS, WAS EMPLOYED ON A CLASSIFIED PROJECT BY THE INTERNATIONAL ELECTRIC CORPORATION. HE VISITED THE SOVIET EMBASSY TO INQUIRE ABOUT RELATIVES STILL LIVING IN RUSSIA. EVENTUALLY, BUTENKO'S CONCERN FOR HIS RELATIVES LED TO HIS EXPLOITATION. FOR HIS EFFORTS IN PROVIDING CLASSIFIED INFORMATION TO THE SOVIETS, HE WAS SENTENCED TO 30 YEARS.

(SLIDE #22 BLANK) AND NOW WE COME TO SOME RECENT EPISODES IN THIS ESPIONAGE BUSINESS. LET'S LOOK AT THESE INCIDENTS AND ASK OURSELVES WHAT HAPPENED.

(SLIDE #23) FOR YEARS THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WENT ALONG, NOTING THE SUCCESSFUL OPERATIONS AGAINST EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS OF OTHER AGENCIES, AND EXPERIENCING AMBIVALENT FEELINGS . . . OF SATISFACTION BECAUSE NO SUCH CASES HAD BEEN UNCOVERED IN CIA, AND OF APPREHENSION, BECAUSE THEY WERE SURE THE SOVIETS WERE MAKING THEIR BEST EFFORT AGAINST CIA AND ITS CONTRACTORS. IT WAS INCREDIBLE TO THINK THAT THEY WERE TOTALLY

UNSUCCESSFUL. AND THEN, TWO CASES OCCURRED WHICH DAMAGED BOTH CIA AND ITS CONTRACTING ACTIVITY. PREDICTABLY, THESE CASES INVOLVED MANY OF THE FACTORS, SUCH AS SOCIAL HABITS, ASSOCIATES, PERSONAL PROBLEMS, WEAKNESSES, AND INDISCRETIONS, UPON WHICH THE KGB SEEKS TO CAPITALIZE AND WHICH WERE DISCUSSED IN YOUR FIRST SECURITY INDOCTRINATION - - FOR SOME OF YOU, LONG AGO; FOR OTHERS, IN THE MORE RECENT PAST.

LET'S LOOK AT THESE TWO INCIDENTS AND TRY TO ANALYZE WHAT WENT WRONG.

(SLIDE #24) THIS MAN'S NAME IS EDWIN MOORE, HE WORKED FOR THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AS A STAFF EMPLOYEE FOR 21 YEARS - - FROM 1952 TO 1973. USING HINDSIGHT, WHICH IS ALWAYS 20/20, WE NOW KNOW THAT MOORE HAD SERIOUS PROBLEMS DURING THOSE 21 YEARS. CIA HAS BEEN VERY FRANK ABOUT THIS CASE, EVEN THOUGH IT INVOLVES THE INTERNAL WORKINGS OF THE AGENCY, BECAUSE SOME FACTORS IN THE MOORE CASE COULD APPLY TO ANY SITUATION IN GOVERNMENT OR INDUSTRY, WHERE A WEAK, DISORIENTED, POORLY MOTIVATED INDIVIDUAL HAS ACCESS TO INFORMATION OF GREAT VALUE TO THE OPPOSITION.

(SLIDE #25) ON DECEMBER 22ND, 1976, THREE AND ONE-HALF YEARS AFTER HE RETIRED FROM CIA, EDWIN MOORE WAS ARRESTED BY THE FBI IN WASHINGTON AS HE ATTEMPTED TO SELL CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS TO

SOVIET OFFICIALS - - DOCUMENTS HE HAD TAKEN FROM THE CIA OVER THE YEARS OF HIS EMPLOYMENT. HIS ASKING PRICE WAS \$200,000. FOUR CARTONS OF CIA DOCUMENTS, SCATTERED AROUND HIS HOME, WERE RECOVERED BY THE FBI AND SOME OF THEM WERE USED IN HIS TRIAL. IN MAY 1977, MOORE WAS FOUND GUILTY ON FOUR COUNTS OF ESPIONAGE, AND HE WAS SENTENCED TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT, LATER REDUCED TO 15 YEARS.

BECAUSE OF THE SERIOUS AND TRAGIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE CASE, IT WAS NATURAL FOR CIA, AFTERWARD, TO PUT MOORE'S CASE UNDER A MICROSCOPE. HERE'S WHAT THEY FOUND.

THEY FOUND A MAN WHO HAD MANAGED, FOR MORE THAN TWO DECADES, TO BE TRANSFERRED FROM ONE JOB TO ANOTHER, MAKING A CAREER OF BEING INEFFECTIVE AND BLAMING OTHERS FOR KEEPING HIM FROM DOING THE OUTSTANDING JOB HE BELIEVED HE COULD HAVE DONE.

WHAT KIND OF PERSON WAS EDWIN MOORE? LET'S LOOK AT WHAT PEOPLE OVER THE YEARS HAD TO SAY. ON FITNESS REPORTS, VARIOUS SUPERVISORS SAID:

(SLIDE #26) "HE WAS PROFICIENT (BARELY) . . . HE WAS MARGINAL. . . HE WAS SLOW THINKING . . . HE WAS NOT CAPABLE OF HANDLING OTHER THAN ROUTINE FUNCTIONS."

LOOKING BACK TO 1959 - - SEVEN YEARS AFTER HE ENTERED ON DUTY - - AT A TIME WHEN HE WAS HAVING TROUBLE DOING ANALYTICAL WORK, HE WAS GIVEN PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING FOR JOB PLACEMENT PURPOSES. THE PSYCHOLOGISTS NOTED THAT:

(SLIDE #28) FINALLY, ONE SUPERVISOR, IN 1972, WAS HEARD TO SAY "HE WAS THE MOST DISRUPTIVE EMPLOYEE I EVER DEALT WITH." UNFORTUNATELY, SUCH LANGUAGE, THOUGH OFTEN HEARD, ALL TOO SELDOM FOUND ITS WAY INTO THE FORMAL DOCUMENTATION OF HIS FILES.

OBVIOUSLY, THERE ARE SOME LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM THE MOORE CASE, AND WE'LL GET TO THEM IN A FEW MINUTES, BUT FIRST LET'S INTRODUCE ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL WHO HAS FOUND A PROMINENT PLACE IN THE ANNALS OF ESPIONAGE.

(SLIDE #29) HIS NAME IS CHRISTOPHER BOYCE - - 24 YEARS OLD, UNMARRIED, WITH AN IQ OF 145. HE GREW UP IN A BEAUTIFUL AND EXPENSIVE SUBURB OF LOS ANGELES CALLED PALOS VERDES. HE IS THE OLDEST OF NINE CHILDREN, FROM A HIGHLY RESPECTED UPPER MIDDLE CLASS FAMILY. HIS FATHER, A FORMER FBI AGENT, IS THE DIRECTOR OF SECURITY AT ONE OF THE NATION'S LARGEST CORPORATIONS.

(SLIDE #30) FROM 1974 TO DECEMBER 1976, BOYCE WORKED IN LOS ANGELES FOR A COMPANY CALLED TRW. HE WAS A COMMUNICATOR, AND

HE ALSO HELPED OUT AS A COURIER AND DOCUMENT CONTROL CLERK. HERE IS WHAT HIS WORK PLACE LOOKED LIKE. IT WAS A VAULTED AREA, HOUSING CIA COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT, PLUS SAFES FULL OF HIGHLY CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.

(SLIDE #31) DURING HIS TRW EMPLOYMENT, BOYCE HELD CIA SECURITY APPROVALS THAT GAVE HIM ACCESS TO "NATIONAL TECHNICAL COLLECTION PROGRAMS . . . COVERT COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS . . . AND CRYPTOGRAPHIC EQUIPMENT."

UNFORTUNATELY, DURING MUCH OF THE TIME OF HIS TRW EMPLOYMENT, BOYCE WAS SELLING CLASSIFIED INFORMATION TO THE SOVIET UNION. FOR THIS INFORMATION, THE SOVIETS PAID APPROXIMATELY \$70,000, MONEY WHICH WAS SPLIT WITH BOYCE'S ESPIONAGE PARTNER - - ANDREW DALTON LEE.



(SLIDE #32) LEE HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH TRW, NOR DID HE HAVE ANY AFFILIATION WITH THE CIA. AND WHO IS ANDREW LEE?

WELL FIRST OF ALL, HE IS A LONG-TIME FRIEND OF CHRISTOPHER BOYCE - - - 25 YEARS OLD, UNMARRIED, AND ALSO FROM THE SWANK SETTING OF PALOS VERDES. HIS, TOO, IS A SOLID AND PROMINENT FAMILY - - HIS FATHER WAS A WELL-KNOWN PATHOLOGIST.

BUT UNLIKE BOYCE, ANDREW LEE FOR YEARS HAD BEEN IN TROUBLE WITH THE LAW OVER HIS ADDICTIVE USE AND SELLING OF NARCOTICS. HE IS BOLD, STREETWISE, AND A HUSTLER BY NATURE.

IN THIS MATTER INVOLVING BOYCE AND THE SOVIET UNION, LEE PLAYED THE ROLE OF CO-CONSPIRATOR. UNDER THEIR DIVISION OF LABOR, BOYCE TOOK THE DOCUMENTS OR PICTURES OF DOCUMENTS OUT OF TRW AND TURNED THEM OVER TO LEE, WHO SERVED AS THE COURIER, SHUTTLLING BETWEEN LOS ANGELES AND HIS SOVIET HANDLERS IN MEXICO CITY. DELIVERIES TOOK PLACE ABOUT ONCE EVERY TWO MONTHS.

(SLIDE #33 - BLANK) LET'S LOOK AT HOW IT BEGAN. ALL INDICATIONS ARE THAT WHEN BOYCE CAME TO WORK AT TRW HE HAD NOTHING LIKE ESPIONAGE ON HIS MIND. WE KNOW NOW THAT VERY EARLY IN HIS TRW CAREER, BOYCE WAS IMPRESSED WITH A CO-WORKER'S OBSERVATION THAT THE SECRETS HE HANDLED WOULD BE WORTH \$20,000 A MONTH TO THE SOVIETS.

LATER, AT A PARTY AT WHICH DRUGS WERE USED, BOYCE WOULD REPEAT THAT REMARK FOR MANY TO HEAR. MOST OF THOSE WHO HEARD IT THAT NIGHT DISMISSED IT AS HOT AIR. ONLY ONE LISTENER TOOK IT SERIOUSLY - - THAT LISTENER WAS ANDREW LEE.

IN THE WEEKS THAT FOLLOWED, BOYCE AND LEE GOT TOGETHER AND WORKED OUT THE BROAD OUTLINES OF THE OPERATION. LEE, IN VIOLATION OF HIS PAROLE, WENT TO THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY AND TOLD THE RUSSIANS WHAT HE COULD DELIVER AND ASKED IF THEY WERE INTERESTED. NEEDLESS TO SAY, HE WASN'T TURNED AWAY. SOON, THE OPERATION WAS OFF AND RUNNING, AND IT CONTINUED DURING THE REMAINDER OF 1975 THROUGH 1976 AND INTO JANUARY 1977.

THE BOYCE-LEE CAPER EVENTUALLY CAME TO AN END - - AND IT ENDED IN STAGES. FIRST, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO BEGAN TO FALL APART. BOYCE BECAME CONCERNED OVER LEE'S DRINKING AND USE OF DRUGS, WHICH NOW INCLUDED HEROIN. LEE BECAME FRUSTRATED WITH BOYCE - - - HE THOUGHT BOYCE WAS TOO CONSERVATIVE AND MAY BE LOSING HIS NERVE.

THERE WAS ANOTHER ANGLE. BOYCE HAD HAD SOME LIMITED DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE SOVIETS. THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT THE RUSSIANS WANTED BOYCE TO ATTEND COLLEGE - - AT THEIR EXPENSE - - PERHAPS STUDYING SINO-SOVIET AFFAIRS AND THEN ATTEMPTING TO GET A JOB WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT. THE PRESSURE CONTINUED.

FINALLY, BOYCE DECIDED HE'D HAD ENOUGH. SO, IN DECEMBER 1976, AFTER HE HAD GIVEN LEE A FINAL PACKAGE OF CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS, BOYCE RESIGNED FROM TRW, GIVING AS HIS REASON, "TO GO BACK TO SCHOOL."

(SLIDE #34) IN JANUARY 1977, LEE TOOK THE FINAL PACKAGE TO MEXICO CITY. THESE DOCUMENTS RELATED TO A PROPOSED CIA COVERT COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM. LEE WAS TENSE AND SHAKY AS HE PACED UP AND DOWN IN FRONT OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY.

IT HAD BEEN A BAD DAY. LEE'S SOVIET CONTACT HAD FAILED TO SHOW UP AT THE USUAL MEETING PLACE. TO CALM HIS NERVES HE LIT UP A MARIJUANA CIGARETTE. (SLIDE #35) THE MEXICAN POLICE, ALREADY NOTICING HIS SUSPICIOUS BEHAVIOR, MOVED IN AND TOOK HIM INTO CUSTODY. LEE, ARRESTED WITH MICROFILM IN HIS POSSESSION, WAS SUBSEQUENTLY CHARGED WITH CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT ESPIONAGE.

(SLIDE #36) LEE IMPLICATED BOYCE, AND ON 15 JANUARY 1977, BOYCE WAS ARRESTED BY THE FBI IN LOS ANGELES.

OF COURSE, YOU KNOW THE REST OF THE STORY. BOTH MEN WERE TRIED AND FOUND GUILTY, WITH BOYCE SENTENCED TO 40 YEARS IN PRISON AND LEE TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT.

AFTER THE TRIALS, BOYCE AND LEE AGREED TO BE INTERVIEWED BY CIA SECURITY OFFICERS, WHO SPENT A TOTAL OF 41 HOURS TALKING TO THESE TWO MEN. HERE ARE SOME OF THE CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM THEIR ANSWERS TO CIA'S QUESTIONS.

(SLIDE #37) WHY DID THEY DO IT? THE SHORT ANSWER IS - FOR MONEY. SIMPLY, AT THE OUTSET IT SEEMED AN EASY WAY TO GET MONEY.

(SLIDE #38) DID THEY EXPERIENCE ANY GUILT FEELINGS? NOT AS FAR AS ANDREW LEE WAS CONCERNED. WHILE BOYCE DID HAVE AN OCCASIONAL PANG OF CONSCIENCE, HE SAID THAT HE COULD EASE OR NEUTRALIZE HIS CONSCIENCE, INTERESTINGLY ENOUGH, BY READING "CIA AND THE CULT OF INTELLIGENCE," A SCATHING INDICTMENT OF CIA BY EX-EMPLOYEE VICTOR MARCHETTI. (SLIDE #39)

(SLIDE #40) DID THEY KNOW WHAT THEY WERE DOING FROM THE BEGINNING? CLEARLY THEY DID. WHILE NEITHER MAN RELISHED THE SELF-PERCEPTION OF BEING A SPY, THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT BOTH KNEW ALL THE WAY WHERE THE ROAD WAS LEADING. AT ONE POINT, BOYCE ACKNOWLEDGED, (SLIDE #41) "I KNEW THAT I HAD BECOME AN AGENT FOR A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT."

NOW THAT WE'VE LOOKED AT THE MOORE AND BOYCE-LEE CASES, LET'S ASK OURSELVES WHAT HAS BEEN LEARNED, WHAT HAS BEEN DONE AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE TO PRECLUDE A RECURRENCE.

(SLIDE #42 - BLANK) WELL, AS FOR EDWIN MOORE, HIS CASE POR-  
TRAYS A FAILURE OF THE SYSTEM TO RECOGNIZE AND DO SOMETHING  
ABOUT A PERSON UNSUITED FOR ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.  
THE SYSTEM LET HIM DRIFT AND THE PROBLEM FESTERED OVER MANY  
YEARS. IF THOSE INDIVIDUALS WHO HAD CONTACT WITH MOORE - -  
MANAGERS, SUPERVISORS, ASSOCIATES - - PEOPLE WHO HAD WATCHED  
HIM FLOUNDERING AND OBVIOUSLY FRUSTRATED OVER THE YEARS, HAD  
CONSIDERED THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS, OR IF THE SYSTEM HAD  
ACTED ON THE FEEDBACK IT DID GET, THEN A NATIONAL AND PERSONAL  
TRAGEDY MIGHT HAVE BEEN AVERTED.

(SLIDE #43) BECAUSE SUPERVISORS HAVE A SPECIAL ROLE IN  
PROMOTING SECURITY, GOOD SECURITY MAY BE CORRELATED WITH GOOD  
SUPERVISION. MAKE IT A POINT TO BE AWARE OF YOUR EMPLOYEES'  
LIFESTYLE. GOOD SUPERVISORY TECHNIQUES INCLUDE CAREFUL OBSERVATION  
AND PROPER COUNSELING. YOU SHOULD BE INTERESTED IN THE EMPLOYEE'S  
HABITS, MOODS AND LIFESTYLE, NOT ONLY FROM A STRICT MANAGEMENT  
VIEWPOINT, BUT ALSO BECAUSE SOME OF THESE CHANGES HAVE SECURITY  
IMPLICATIONS.


(SLIDE #44) THE MOORE CASE ILLUSTRATES THE IMPORTANCE OF CANDOR IN EVALUATIONS AND THE IMPORTANT ROLE OF EMPLOYEE COUNSELING. MANY PEOPLE HAD INSIGHT, BUT FOR THE MOST PART, THEY KEPT THEIR APPREHENSIONS QUIET AND OFF THE RECORD. ANALYSIS SUGGESTS THAT THOSE WHO WERE AWARE OF MOORE'S ALIENATION, BY SAYING NOTHING, FAILED TO MEET THEIR OBLIGATIONS. (SLIDE #45) THE CASE ALSO SHOWS THAT IT IS CRITICAL THAT THOSE WHO ARE TOTALLY INCAPABLE OF PROPERLY SAFEGUARDING CLASSIFIED INFORMATION, OR WHO ARE DISGRUNTLED, BE SPOTTED EARLY. THIS IS SO THEY CAN BE REASSIGNED TO LESS SENSITIVE WORK - - FOR OUR BENEFIT AND THEIRS. THIS SPOTTING IS EVERYONE'S BUSINESS - - SUPERVISOR AND ASSOCIATE ALIKE. (SLIDE #46 BLANK) THIS LEADS US TO THAT AGE-OLD QUESTION, "ARE YOU YOUR BROTHER'S KEEPER?" PHILOSOPHICALLY AND ETHICALLY, THIS IS AN EXTREMELY DIFFICULT QUESTION. IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN. PERHAPS YOU CAN ANSWER IT MORE EASILY IF YOU CONSIDER YOUR ALTERNATIVES. THE EASY WAY OUT IS TO SAY "I DON'T WANT TO GET INVOLVED." BUT YOU ARE INVOLVED. AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF ANOTHER ESPIONAGE CASE COULD REST UPON YOUR NON-INVOLVED SHOULDERS, IF YOU CHOOSE THE WRONG ANSWER.

MOST AMERICANS ARE REPELLED BY THE THOUGHT OF REPORTING AN ASSOCIATE'S PROBLEMS. NOBODY WANTS TO BE A FINK. BUT NOBODY WANTS TO BE PLAYED FOR A SUCKER, EITHER. WHEN THE GUY WHO WORKS NEXT TO YOU IS CARELESS ABOUT SECURITY, OR TALKS TOO MUCH TO PEOPLE WHO HAVE NO NEED TO KNOW ABOUT WHAT HE DOES, OR WHEN HE'S STRUNG OUT ON DRUGS, OR HAS A PROBLEM WITH LIQUOR, OR IS ALWAYS BROKE AND LIVING BEYOND HIS MEANS, OR SEEMS TO BE PERSECUTED BY EVERYONE AND LOOKING FOR A WAY TO STRIKE BACK AT "THE SYSTEM," HE MAY BE THE NEXT ED MOORE OR CHRIS BOYCE.

MOORE WASN'T ABLE TO DAMAGE THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES BECAUSE THE SOVIETS WERE TOO CAUTIOUS - - WHEN HE THREW A PACKAGE OF MATERIAL RELATING TO CIA ACTIVITIES OVER THE FENCE AT A SOVIET INSTALLATION IN WASHINGTON, THEY THOUGHT IT WAS A BOMB AND CALLED THE POLICE. IF THEY HAD OPENED THE PACKAGE, THE OUTCOME WOULD HAVE BEEN VASTLY DIFFERENT.

BOYCE WAS ANOTHER STORY ENTIRELY. THE KGB RECEIVED VALUABLE INFORMATION RELATING TO U.S. INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS THROUGH HIS EFFORTS. IT WAS WEAKNESS THAT LED TO HIS DEFECTION IN PLACE, VIRTUALLY THE SAME WEAKNESS THAT LED TO THE ARREST OF ANDREW LEE AND BROUGHT A HALT TO THEIR ACTIVITIES.

I THINK WE WOULD ALL AGREE THAT IN THE CASE OF EDWIN MOORE, THE BEST INTEREST OF NATIONAL SECURITY WOULD HAVE BEEN SERVED IF MOORE'S PATHETIC SITUATION HAD BEEN REPORTED AND DOCUMENTED. I'LL REPEAT THE THESIS: SUCH PEOPLE SHOULD BE REASSIGNED - - FOR OUR BENEFIT AND THEIRS. EFFECTIVE AND HAPPY PEOPLE DON'T DEFECT. WE CAN'T AFFORD TO WAIT UNTIL THE END, OR NEAR THE END, AS IN MOORE'S CASE TO REPORT SUCH VITAL INDICATORS AS: (SLIDE #47)



(SLIDE #48 BLANK) WITH REFERENCE TO THE BOYCE-LEE CASE, THERE WERE NO REASONS INITIALLY TO SUSPECT FUTURE DIFFICULTIES. BOYCE WAS INVESTIGATED AND GIVEN A CIA SECURITY ACCESS APPROVAL. ANDREW LEE WAS AN UNKNOWN FACTOR IN THAT HE HAD NO CIA AFFILIATION. AS A RESULT OF THIS CASE, HOWEVER, THE CIA HAS INITIATED SOME CHANGES - - CHANGES THEY HOPE WILL PREVENT RECURRENCES.

(SLIDE #49) FIRST, CIA HAS REASSESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF ITS INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PROGRAM. AS A RESULT, THEY HAVE FORMED A UNIT TO DEAL SPECIFICALLY WITH INDUSTRIAL SECURITY. THIS UNIT MONITORS THE SECURITY OF CIA CONTRACTORS, AND PERFORMS PERIODIC, UNSCHEDULED AUDITS OF THEIR SECURITY PRACTICES.



(SLIDE #50) TWO PEOPLE ARE NOW REQUIRED IN COMMUNICATION VAULTS AT ALL TIMES. AT THE TRW COMMUNICATION CENTER WHERE BOYCE WORKED, UNDER PRESENT RULES, BOYCE WOULD NEVER HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO BE ALONE.

(SLIDE #51) THE CASE ALSO ILLUSTRATES THAT THERE IS LITTLE CORRELATION BETWEEN THE TITLE OR SALARY OF AN INDUSTRIAL POSITION AND ITS IMPORTANCE. SOME JOBS IN INDUSTRY CAN BE JUST AS VITAL AND SENSITIVE AS STAFF POSITIONS AT CIA HEADQUARTERS. AS A RESULT, CERTAIN KEY POSITIONS IN INDUSTRY NOW REQUIRE, AS A PREREQUISITE FOR A CIA CLEARANCE, THE SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF A POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION. THESE ARE JOBS INVOLVING ACCESS TO LARGE AMOUNTS OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION, OR INFORMATION OF EXCEPTIONAL SENSITIVITY.

(SLIDE #52) FROM THE VARIOUS POINTS PRESENTED THUS FAR, I THINK THE CASE HAS BEEN MADE THAT YOU ARE THE TARGET - - THE PRIME TARGET OF THE OPPOSITION. THEY WILL TRY ANY MEANS AVAILABLE TO THEM TO PENETRATE CIA AND ITS INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS. OF NECESSITY, WE MUST ALWAYS OPERATE ON THE PREMISE THAT WE HAVE BEEN PENETRATED.

AT THIS POINT, IT MAY BE WELL TO SAY JUST A FEW WORDS ABOUT SECURITY CLEARANCES AND SPECIAL APPROVALS.

(SLIDE #53) FIRST, SECURITY APPROVALS DO NOT MAGICALLY MAKE GOOD GUYS OF THOSE WHO RECEIVE THEM. THE FACT THAT SOMEONE HAS UNDERGONE A FULL BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION, OR EVEN A POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION, DOES NOT GUARANTEE THAT INDIVIDUAL'S LOYALTY TO THE UNITED STATES, OR HIS HONESTY. IT ONLY MEANS THAT HE HAS BEEN SUBJECTED TO CLOSE SCRUTINY AND NO DEFECTS HAVE BEEN FOUND THAT WOULD BE CONSIDERED DISQUALIFYING AT THAT TIME. THEREFORE, IN ORDER TO ACCOMPLISH THE THINGS WE NEED TO ACCOMPLISH, HE WILL BE TRUSTED WITH HIGHLY SENSITIVE INFORMATION. THIS IS A CALCULATED RISK DECISION. THERE IS NO ASSURANCE THAT ANY GIVEN INDIVIDUAL WILL NOT BECOME SUBJECT TO PRESSURES OR TEMPTATIONS TOMORROW WHICH WILL MAKE HIM AN UNACCEPTABLE SECURITY RISK, OR EVEN, LIKE CHRISTOPHER BOYCE, AN AGENT OF A FOREIGN POWER.

(SLIDE #54) IT IS IMPORTANT TO REMEMBER, THEREFORE, THAT SECURITY ACCESS APPROVALS ARE ISSUED FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROVIDING TO THE INDIVIDUAL, ON A NEED TO KNOW BASIS, ONLY THAT SPECIALLY PROTECTED INFORMATION WHICH HE NEEDS TO EFFECTIVELY PERFORM HIS PRESCRIBED JOB. (SLIDE #55) IF ANYONE SHOULD BECOME A FOREIGN AGENT, IT IS VITAL THAT HIS ACCESS SHOULD HAVE BEEN RESTRICTED TO THE MINIMUM. THIS CAN BE DONE ONLY THROUGH RIGID COMPARTMENTATION.

(SLIDE #56) IN VIRTUALLY ALL THE CASES OF TREASON OR ESPIONAGE AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, A CENTRAL FIGURE HAS HELD SECURITY CLEARANCES. BOYCE, JOHNSON, MOORE, SCARBECK, DRUMMOND, ALL WERE CLEARED. SECURITY IS NOT A MATTER OF CLEARING PEOPLE AND FORGETTING ABOUT IT. SECURITY CONTINUES AS A DAILY RESPONSIBILITY OF EACH OF US. A SECURITY APPROVAL MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO BECOME, AS IT DID IN EACH OF THE CASES PREVIOUSLY CITED, A LICENSE TO STEAL.

(SLIDE #57) IT ISN'T ONLY THE GUY OR GAL WHO WORKS BESIDE YOU WHO CAN BE THE SOURCE OF COMPROMISE. THE SECURITY INTEGRITY OF THIS COMPANY DEPENDS UPON YOU AS MUCH AS ANYONE. YOU MAY THINK SECURITY IS SOLELY THE CONCERN OF YOUR SECURITY OFFICER AND THOSE WHO GUARD THE DOORS AND MONITOR THE ALARM SYSTEM.

WELL, BEAR IN MIND THAT BOTH OF THE ORGANIZATIONS THAT EMPLOYED EDWIN MOORE AND CHRISTOPHER BOYCE, CIA AND TRW, HAD FENCES, AND LOCKS, AND VAULTS, AND SAFES, AND ALARMS, AND GUARDS, AND SECURITY OFFICERS WHO WERE COMPETENT AND DEDICATED - - BUT THE HUMAN ELEMENT FAILED IN BOTH CASES. (SLIDE #58) THE WHOLE SECURITY PROGRAM GOES DOWN THE DRAIN WHEN ONE OF US, THROUGH CARELESSNESS, LACK OF CONVICTION, OR OUTRIGHT TREASON, FAILS TO DO HIS OR HER PART TO SUPPORT SECURITY.

PERHAPS IT WON'T DO MUCH GOOD TO APPEAL TO SOMEONE WHO ALREADY MAY BE FOLLOWING IN MOORE'S AND BOYCE'S FOOTSTEPS. WE CAN ONLY HOPE THAT IF SUCH A CASE EXISTS, IT CAN BE DETECTED BEFORE THE DAMAGE TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY BECOMES OVERWHELMING.

WE CAN TRY TO CONVINCE THE REST OF YOU, HOWEVER, THAT ANYTHING LESS THAN A FULL COMMITMENT TO SECURITY CAN BE DANGEROUS. YOU CAN NEGATE THE ENTIRE SECURITY EFFORT IF YOU FAIL TO FOLLOW CERTAIN SIMPLE RULES:

(SLIDE #59) DON'T DISCUSS THE CLASSIFIED ASPECTS OF YOUR JOB AROUND PERSONS WHO HAVE NO NEED-TO-KNOW - - NOT JUST AWAY FROM WORK, AT SOCIAL GATHERINGS (REMEMBER, THIS IS THE WAY CHRIS BOYCE STARTED OUT), BUT EVEN RIGHT HERE AT WORK, IN THE PRESENCE OF UNCLEARED VISITORS.

PERHAPS THERE MAY BE REFERENCES IN THE NEW MEDIA TO CLASSIFIED PROJECTS, AND YOU MAY HAVE INTIMATE KNOWLEDGE OF THESE PROGRAMS. PLEASE DON'T YIELD TO THE TEMPTATION TO TELL YOUR FRIENDS HOW MUCH MORE INSIDE INFORMATION YOU HAVE. REMEMBER, YOU HAVE ACCEPTED AN OBLIGATION TO MAINTAIN SECRECY. THE PRESS HAS NO SUCH OBLIGATION. ONE OF THE BLESSINGS OF OUR SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT IS THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF A FREE PRESS. THE MEDIA WILL BROADCAST OR PUBLISH WHATEVER THEY ARE ABLE TO FERRET OUT. IT IS UP TO US - - YOU AND ME - - TO PREVENT HARMFUL DISCLOSURES.

AND DON'T FORGET THAT EVEN AMONG YOUR FELLOW EMPLOYEES,  
NOT EVERYONE IS AUTHORIZED TO KNOW EVERYTHING YOU MAY KNOW ABOUT  
A CLASSIFIED PROJECT.

(SLIDE #60) DON'T MAKE UNAUTHORIZED COPIES OF SENSITIVE  
DOCUMENTS. SEE THAT ALL CLASSIFIED MATERIAL IS LOGGED AND  
ACCOUNTED FOR IN THE PRESCRIBED MANNER.

(SLIDE #61) DON'T TAKE CLASSIFIED MATERIAL HOME TO WORK ON IT.  
IT DOES NO GOOD TO BUILD A STRONG SECURITY SYSTEM AT WORK IF  
PEOPLE CARRY OUT MATERIALS, REGARDLESS OF HOW GOOD THEIR  
INTENTIONS MAY BE. ONCE YOU REMOVE SENSITIVE MATERIAL FROM  
THE SECURE ENVIRONMENT, YOU HAVE PLACED IT IN JEOPARDY.

(SLIDE #62) DON'T HANDLE DOCUMENTS CARELESSLY, SO THEY CAN  
BE VIEWED BY PEOPLE WHO HAVE NO RIGHT TO SEE THEM. THIS CAN  
HAPPEN IN CORRIDORS, ON ELEVATORS, OR EVEN IN YOUR OWN WORKING  
SPACE. VISITORS ARE NOT ALL CLEARED FOR EVERYTHING ON YOUR  
DESK. NEVER LEAVE CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS UNATTENDED AND  
UNSECURED.

(SLIDE #63) DON'T ALLOW VISITORS OUT OF CONTROL WHEN YOU ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR ESCORTING THEM. IT ONLY TAKES A MOMENT FOR AN UNATTENDED PERSON TO PLANT A LISTENING DEVICE. AND, WHILE YOU MAY BE CERTAIN THAT YOUR VISITOR IS COMPLETELY LOYAL TO THE UNITED STATES, THERE IS ALWAYS THE PROBLEM OF INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE. A "BUG" PLANTED BY A COMPETITOR MAY STILL RESULT IN SENSITIVE INFORMATION FINDING ITS WAY TO THE SOVIETS.

(SLIDE #64) TECHNICAL PENETRATION IS THE TERM INTELLIGENCE SERVICES USE TO DESCRIBE OBTAINING INFORMATION BY USE OF A CLANDESTINELY IMPLANTED LISTENING DEVICE. WHILE THE STATE OF THE ART ISN'T GENERALLY UP TO JAMES BOND STANDARDS, SOME OF THE DEVICES BEING USED TODAY WOULD HAVE STRETCHED THE IMAGINATION OF AN IAN FLEMING JUST A FEW YEARS AGO. TO STIMULATE YOUR AWARENESS OF THIS THREAT, WE'LL SHOW YOU SOME OF THE THINGS THAT U.S. TECHNICAL SECURITY OFFICERS HAVE FOUND.

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(SLIDE #70) FOR SHEER NERVE, THE PRIZE HAS TO GO TO THIS DEVICE - - A MINIATURE RADIO TRANSMITTER IMPLANTED IN THE HEEL OF THE SHOE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION, THE NUMBER TWO OFFICIAL AT THE U.S. EMBASSY IN BUCHAREST. THE DIPLOMAT'S MAID SAW TO IT THAT HIS SHOES WERE KEPT IN GOOD REPAIR, TAKING THEM TO THE COBBLER'S FREQUENTLY FOR HEELS, SOLES, - - AND NEW BATTERIES.

THESE CASES ILLUSTRATE HOW THE PERFECTLY MUNDANE ITEMS WE DEAL WITH DAILY CAN BE TURNED AGAINST US. BUT IN EVERY INSTANCE, SOMEONE HAD TO BRING THE DEVICE INTO THE TARGET AREA. THAT IS ONE REASON WHY VISITOR CONTROL IS SO IMPORTANT.

(SLIDE #71) IT IS IMPORTANT TO REALIZE, TOO, THAT THOSE WHO PLANT THESE LISTENING DEVICES OFTEN ARE NOT SOVIET AGENTS, BUT PEOPLE WHO HAVE BEEN DUPED BY THE SO-CALLED "FALSE FLAG APPROACH." IN A FALSE FLAG OPERATION, THE VICTIM MAY WILLINGLY COOPERATE WITH PEOPLE HE THINKS ARE SUPPORTING A CAUSE HE FAVORS. THERE IS REASON TO BELIEVE THAT ADVOCATES OF VARIOUS POLITICAL CAUSES, RANGING FROM QUEBEC SEPARATISTS TO ARAB NATIONALISTS, HAVE BEEN USED BY SOVIET INTELLIGENCE TO PERFORM MISSIONS WITHOUT KNOWING WHO THE TRUE BENEFICIARIES WERE. HERE IN THE UNITED STATES, PEOPLE WHO WOULD NEVER KNOWINGLY SUPPORT THE KGB MIGHT BE INDUCED TO ENGAGE IN INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE FOR CASH. THEY MIGHT ALSO RUN THE RISK THAT THE INFORMATION THEY COLLECT WILL GO DIRECTLY TO MOSCOW.

(SLIDE #72) YOU - - EVERYONE IN THIS ROOM - - RUN THE RISK OF BEING "BUGGED" EVERY DAY THAT YOU COME TO WORK. IN THE ARSENAL OF ESPIONAGE, THERE ARE MANY ITEMS - - SOME CONVENTIONAL, SOME EXOTIC - - BUT NONE THAT HAS MORE POTENTIAL TO DAMAGE THAN THE ORDINARY TELEPHONE. THIS INSTRUMENT, THE ONE THAT YOU HAVE ON YOUR DESK, POSES A FORMIDABLE THREAT, EVEN WHEN MEASURED AGAINST THE MOORES, THE BOYCES AND THE LEES. WHY? BECAUSE EVERY TIME YOU USE THIS INSTRUMENT YOU RUN THE RISK OF BEING OVERHEARD. THE NON-SECURE TELEPHONE OFFERS THE OPPOSITION A GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY TO LISTEN IN ON YOUR CONVERSATION. THERE ARE ANTENNAS AT EVERY



SOVIET OFFICIAL INSTALLATION IN THIS COUNTRY - - THEIR EMBASSY, THEIR CONSULATE IN SAN FRANCISCO, EVEN THEIR UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN NEW YORK. THESE ANTENNAS CAN RECEIVE COMMERCIAL MICROWAVE TRAFFIC. ANY TIME YOU MAKE A TELEPHONE CALL, YOU MAY ASSUME THAT THERE IS A THIRD PARTY LISTENING TO YOUR CONVERSATION. AND YOUR EFFORTS TO TALK AROUND THE SUBJECT PROBABLY AREN'T GOING TO BE EFFECTIVE. THE POINT: DO NOT DISCUSS CLASSIFIED OR SENSITIVE INFORMATION ON THE TELEPHONE. IF YOU MUST DISCUSS CLASSIFIED INFORMATION BETWEEN BUILDINGS, USE THE GOVERNMENT-FURNISHED SECURE TELEPHONE, WHICH PERMITS CONVERSATIONS UP TO AND INCLUDING TOP SECRET COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION. IF THE COMPANY DOESN'T HAVE A SECURE PHONE, YOUR NEXT CHOICE IS THE SECURE TELETYPE, OR "CABLE." IT ISN'T AS FAST, BUT IT IS SECURE.

IF YOU DON'T HAVE A SECURE ELECTRICAL COMMUNICATION LINK, THEN YOUR ONLY ALTERNATIVE IS VIA SECURE COURIER, OR, IN CERTAIN CASES, REGISTERED MAIL. THIS IS EVEN SLOWER, BUT IT'S PREFERABLE BY FAR TO RISKING ALMOST CERTAIN COMPROMISE OF THE INFORMATION WE'RE SUPPOSED TO BE TRYING TO PROTECT.

(SLIDE #73 BLANK) A LOT OF DON'TS HAVE BEEN MENTIONED SINCE WE BEGAN. THERE MUST BE SOME POSITIVE THINGS WE CAN ALL DO TO BOLSTER SECURTY. LET'S TALK ABOUT SOME OF THEM.

FIRST, WE'D LIKE YOU TO TAKE AN ACTIVE INTEREST IN SECURITY, INSTEAD OF REGARDING IT AS AN INESCAPABLE BURDEN, TO BE SHRUGGED OFF WHEREVER POSSIBLE. PERHAPS YOU NEVER THOUGHT OF IT THIS WAY BEFORE, BUT THE SENSITIVE MATERIAL YOU HANDLE IS JUST AS VOLATILE - - IN FACT, IT IS THE SAME MATERIAL - - AS THAT BEING HANDLED IN WASHINGTON AT THE PENTAGON, THE STATE DEPARTMENT, OR CIA.

(SLIDE #74) TRY TO REDUCE YOUR INVENTORY OF CLASSIFIED MATERIALS. RETURN COPIES OF DOCUMENTS WHICH AREN'T CURRENTLY NEEDED TO YOUR GOVERNMENT CUSTOMER FOR DESTRUCTION. YOU CAN ALWAYS OBTAIN THEM AGAIN IF THEY'RE NEEDED. MAINTAINING A PACK RAT COLLECTION OF CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS EXPOSES MORE MATERIAL TO POTENTIAL COMPROMISE, AND MAINTAINING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR IT CREATES A NEEDLESS WORKLOAD FOR THE COMPANY.

(SLIDE #75) BE SURE TO OBSERVE ALL THE RULES REGARDING THE PROPER MARKING AND HANDLING OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL. IF YOU HAVE ANY DOUBTS ABOUT PROCEDURES, CHECK WITH YOUR SECURITY OFFICER.

(SLIDE #76) IF YOU'RE A SUPERVISOR, PAY ATTENTION TO SECURITY WHEN YOU EVALUATE THE PERFORMANCE OF THOSE YOU SUPERVISE. REMEMBER THE LESSONS OF THE MOORE CASE. IF YOU HAVE A "BAD APPLE," BE SURE SECURITY GETS THE WORD BEFORE IT'S TOO LATE. IF THERE IS NO REAL PROBLEM, THEN NO HARM HAS BEEN DONE. IF THERE ARE SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS TO SECURITY, IT IS BEST FOR THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY TO DISCOVER IT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

(SLIDE #77) VISIT YOUR SECURITY OFFICER. YOU WILL FIND THAT HE'S AN INTELLIGENT, HARD-WORKING PROFESSIONAL, JUST LIKE YOU. CONTRARY TO WHAT SOME PEOPLE SEEM TO THINK, YOU WILL ALSO FIND THAT HE DOESN'T LIE AWAKE NIGHTS THINKING OF WAYS TO MAKE LIFE MORE DIFFICULT FOR YOU. SECURITY OFFICERS ARE EXTREMELY "PEOPLE ORIENTED." THEIR BUSINESS ESSENTIALLY IS PROTECTION - - NOT JUST PROTECTING THE GOVERNMENT, OR THE COMPANY, BUT PROTECTING YOU, YOUR FAMILY AND YOUR FRIENDS. BUT NO MATTER HOW GOOD THEY ARE, SECURITY OFFICERS NEED BROAD-BASED SUPPORT AMONG THEIR ASSOCIATES IF THEY ARE TO BE SUCCESSFUL IN THEIR EFFORTS.

(SLIDE #78) YOU ARE THE VITAL FACTOR IN THE SECURITY EQUATION. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, SECURITY CAN BE NO BETTER THAN YOU, PERSONALLY MAKE IT.

(SLIDE #79) I HOPE YOU HAVE BEEN CONVINCED THAT THERE IS AN ACTIVE, CAPABLE OPPOSITION OUT THERE, LOOKING, WAITING, AND SEARCHING FOR ANY OPPORTUNITY IT CAN USE TO ADVANTAGE. FORTUNATELY, FOR THEM, THEIR JOB IS MADE EASY - - MUCH EASIER THAN THE TASK THAT CONFRONTS US.

(SLIDE #80 BLANK) AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE INVESTS A LOT OF MONEY AND MANPOWER IN STUDYING THE SOVIET PRESS AND RADIO AND ANALYZING THEIR OUTPUT FOR INTELLIGENCE. JUST IMAGINE HOW MUCH EASIER THIS WORK WOULD BE IF THERE WERE AN OPEN SOVIET SOURCE OF INFORMATION EQUIVALENT TO THE AMERICAN NEWS MEDIA.

(SLIDE #81) SECURITY TODAY IS MUCH MORE COMPLICATED THAN IT WAS TEN OR TWENTY YEARS AGO. NOWHERE IS THIS SEEN MORE CLEARLY THAN IN THE NEW RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE MEDIA. IN THIS AGE OF THE INVESTIGATIVE REPORTER - - SUCH AS THE JACK ANDERSONS, AND THE SEYMOUR HIRSCHES - IT IS OBVIOUSLY IMPORTANT TO BE WARY OF THE MEDIA. (SLIDE #82) AN INCREASINGLY SERIOUS PROBLEM IS THAT OF UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES. NOT ONLY SHOULD YOU DECLINE TO RESPOND TO PRESS INQUIRIES REGARDING SENSITIVE PROJECTS, BUT SUCH INQUIRIES SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF YOUR SECURITY OFFICER IMMEDIATELY.

(SLIDE #83 BLANK) THERE ARE OTHER AREAS WHERE GUIDANCE SHOULD BE SOUGHT FROM SECURITY. REMEMBER THAT LETTER OF INSTRUCTION OF A TYPICAL SOVIET AGENT THAT WAS PRESENTED EARLIER? ONE OF THEIR MISSIONS IS SPOTTING AND IDENTIFICATION AND THE COMPILATION OF DOSSIERS ON PROSPECTS FOR EXPLOITATION.

(SLIDE #34) THE FIRST OF THE ITEMS ON WHICH SECURITY GUIDANCE SHOULD BE SOUGHT IS FOREIGN TRAVEL. IN CERTAIN PARTS OF THE WORLD, THE OPPOSITION HAS A FREE HAND TO TRY AND ENTRAP AND EXPLOIT AMERICANS WHO MAY HAVE VALUABLE INFORMATION. AS WE POINTED OUT EARLIER, THERE HAS BEEN NO APPRECIABLE SLACKENING OF THE PACE OF THE STRUGGLE FOR INFORMATION. BLACKMAIL, EXTORTION, AND ALL OF THE OLD AND NEW TECHNIQUES OF SQUEEZING INFORMATION OUT OF SUSCEPTIBLE AMERICANS WILL BE BROUGHT TO BEAR BY THE KGB IF THEY GET A CHANCE. ADVISE SECURITY OF YOUR PLANS TO TRAVEL ABROAD AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE. LET THEM PROVIDE ADVICE AND GUIDANCE TO KEEP YOU FROM THE PITFALLS THAT MAY BE WAITING.

(SLIDE #35) SPEECHES AND PAPERS ARE ALSO IMPORTANT. IF YOU ARE GOING TO ADDRESS A PROFESSIONAL SOCIETY ON YOUR SPECIALTY, IT MAY PREVENT EMBARRASSMENT AND LOSS OF SENSITIVE INFORMATION IF YOU SEEK SECURITY GUIDANCE BEFOREHAND. SOVIET LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES IN THIS COUNTRY PARTICIPATE IN THE CONVENTIONS AND MEETINGS OF A WIDE RANGE OF ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING

TECHNICAL GROUPS. (SLIDE #86) OF COURSE, WE DON'T KNOW WHETHER THERE ARE SOVIET "ILLEGALS" AMONG THEIR MEMBERS, BUT CONSULTATION WITH SECURITY COULD BE VERY HELPFUL BEFORE YOU JOIN A NEW ORGANIZATION.

(SLIDE #87) CLOSE AND CONTINUING RELATIONSHIPS WITH FOREIGN NATIONALS, ESPECIALLY THOSE FROM THE COMMUNIST-GOVERNED COUNTRIES, SHOULD BE THE SUBJECT OF A CONVERSATION WITH YOUR SECURITY OFFICER. HE CAN TRY TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT HAS ANY INFORMATION ON THE INDIVIDUAL THAT WOULD CAUSE APPREHENSION ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP. AT ANY RATE, REPORTING THE ASSOCIATION COULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO WARN YOU IF PROBLEMS SHOULD DEVELOP LATER ON.

(SLIDE #88 BLANK) IT MAY BE EMBARRASSING TO TELL YOUR SECURITY OFFICER THAT YOU HAVE TO APPEAR IN COURT, OR THAT YOU'VE BEEN ARRESTED. BUT IF ONE OF THESE SHOULD HAPPEN TO YOU, IT IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT THAT SECURITY BE NOTIFIED. IT IS LIKELY TO COME TO THE ATTENTION OF SECURITY ANYWAY, AND THE INFORMATION WILL CERTAINLY BE DEVELOPED WHEN YOUR BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION IS UPDATED. MEANWHILE, IF YOU TRY TO KEEP THE SECRET, YOU WILL HAVE MADE IT EASY FOR A FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE TO EXPLOIT YOU. IF YOU FALL INTO THAT TRAP, THE ORIGINAL PROBLEM WILL SURELY BE PALE IN COMPARISON.

CHRISTOPHER BOYCE, WHO FEARED HE HAD BEEN COMPROMISED AT A POT PARTY, TOOK A COVERUP PATH THAT LED INEXORABLY TO FORTY YEARS' IMPRISONMENT. THE MISERY HE BROUGHT UPON HIMSELF AND HIS FAMILY COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED.

THE SECURITY PROGRAM PRACTICED IN THE SPECIAL PROJECT AREA IS GEARED TO AVOIDING PROBLEMS, ASSISTING THOSE WHO GET INTO DIFFICULTY (AND SOME OF US INEVITABLY WILL), AND PRESERVING THE SECURITY OF THE PROJECTS. WE TRY TO ADMINISTER THIS PROGRAM WITH LARGE DOSES OF COMPASSION AND HUMAN UNDERSTANDING. YOUR SECURITY OFFICER IS GENUINELY INTERESTED IN HELPING YOU WHEN AND IF YOU REQUIRE ASSISTANCE. THE MOST IMPORTANT ASSET IN THESE SPECIAL PROGRAMS IS THE PEOPLE WHO WORK ON THEM. AND BECAUSE THEY ARE PEOPLE, SOME OF THEM ARE GOING TO BE FACED WITH FINANCIAL ENTANGLEMENTS, DOMESTIC STRIFE, ACCIDENTS, PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH ALCOHOL OR DRUGS, LEGAL DIFFICULTIES OR EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCES. IT DOESN'T IMPROVE SECURITY ONE IOTA NOT TO PROVIDE WHATEVER ASSISTANCE WE CAN TO THOSE UNFORTUNATE ENOUGH TO FALL VICTIM TO HUMAN FRAILTY.

NOW THAT WE HAVE REVIEWED THE ACTIVITIES OF THE OPPOSITION, THEIR TACTICS, THEIR SUCCESSES AND FAILURES, WE CAN CONCLUDE THAT WHILE THE PATTERNS OF ESPIONAGE MAY CHANGE IN FORM OVER THE YEARS, THERE IS LITTLE OR NO CHANGE IN SUBSTANCE. THERE IS STILL THE OBJECTIVE OF GETTING INFORMATION WITH AS LITTLE RISK OF EXPOSURE AS POSSIBLE. THERE IS STILL THE CERTAIN KNOWLEDGE THAT THE WAY TO DO THIS IS TO EXPLOIT THE MISTAKES OF THE PEOPLE WHO HAVE THE INFORMATION: TO LISTEN TO THEIR UNGUARDED AND CARELESS REMARKS, OR BETTER STILL, TO SUBVERT THEM AND OBTAIN THEIR COOPERATION.

(SLIDE #89) FROM TODAY'S DISCUSSION, IT IS LOGICAL TO CONCLUDE THAT EACH OF US IS POTENTIALLY A TARGET FOR ESPIONAGE. SECURITY CAN ASSIST YOU BY PROVIDING A SECURE ENVIRONMENT, BY ESTABLISHING PROCEDURES AND GUIDELINES FOR SECURLY CONDUCTING YOUR DAILY BUSINESS, AND BY ADVISING YOU ON SPECIFIC PERSONAL MATTERS HAVING SECURITY IMPLICATIONS.

(SLIDE #90) THE BOTTOM LINE, HOWEVER, IS THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR IN THE ENTIRE SECURITY SCHEME OF THINGS IS YOU. IF YOU FAIL IN THIS RESPONSIBILITY, NO ONE ELSE CAN MAKE UP FOR IT.