



INDUSTRIAL SECURITY

LETTER

Industrial Security Letters will be issued periodically to inform Industry, User Agencies and DoD Activities of developments relating to industrial security. The contents of these Letters are for information and clarification of existing policy and requirements. Information contained herein does not represent a change of policy or requirements until and unless officially incorporated in the Industrial Security Manual. Local reproduction of these Letters in their original form for the internal use of addressees is authorized. Suggestions and articles for inclusion in the Letter will be appreciated. Articles or ideas contributed will become the property of DIS. Contractor requests for copies of the Letter and inquiries concerning specific information should be addressed to the cognizant security office, for referral to the Directorate for Industrial Security, HQ DIS, as appropriate.

NO. 80L-4

28 November 1980

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NOTE: All paragraph references to the Industrial Security Manual for Safeguarding Classified Information (ISM) are based on the April 1980 edition which all users should now have.

1. TRANSFER OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR INDUSTRIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION TO THE DEFENSE INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

In ISLs Nos. 80L-1 and 80L-3 we reported on the decision to reassign administration of Industrial Security from the Defense Logistics Agency to the Defense Investigative Service. The effective date for the transfer was 1 October 1980. Each facility assigned for security cognizance will be informed if there is a change in cognizant security office contact points. We also plan to publish a new address list updating that furnished with ISL 80L-3 as offices are activated. For example, the areas handled by DCASMA, San Francisco and DCASMA, Baltimore have been redesignated as Regions with Headquarters in San Francisco and Washington, respectively. Cognizance in these two areas will switch from the Los Angeles and Philadelphia cognizant offices. Likewise, the facilities formerly assigned to DCASR, Chicago will continue to be inspected by people from that area; however, Chicago will no longer be a Region Headquarters and cognizance will be transferred to the cognizant security headquarters now located in Cleveland. We still emphasize that the basic procedure and philosophy for Industrial Security administration will not be changed and only a very limited number of changes will occur in the contact points established between industry and cognizant security offices.

2. VISITS BY COMMUNIST COUNTRY REPRESENTATIVES OR NATIONALS

A revised DoD Industrial Security Manual (Apr 1980) was recently distributed. A new requirement (paragraph 6a(19)) requires contractors to notify the cognizant security office of any plans to host unclassified visits by representatives of Communist countries. Although this new paragraph was not highlighted as a change, nor was it addressed in the "Summary of Changes" in the front of the publication, its existence is being brought to your attention in view of its impact. The change is designed to insure that contractors establish an internal system for identifying such visits in order for appropriate employees to be given a Defensive Security Briefing and a Counter-intelligence Awareness Briefing as provided for in Appendix VII, ISM, paragraphs A and B, respectively. This new requirement is also designed to alert contractor personnel to the provisions of paragraph 5.0, ISM, as well as the provisions of the Export Administration Act and the Arms Export Control Act, the latter being administered through the International Traffic in Arms Regulations. ISL 77L-1, dated 15 April 1977, contains more specific information on the subject of marketing with Communist countries.

3. EXPORT OF TECHNICAL DATA/VISITS FROM REPRESENTATIVES OF COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

Export of certain goods and technology is prohibited under specific statutes. Failure to observe these restrictions can result in substantial penalties. A central point of contact in the U.S. Government has been established to inform companies of the restrictions on the export of certain goods and technology which is prohibited or restricted under the Export Administration Act, the Arms Export Control Act, the Atomic Energy Act and other statutes. Companies and individuals should be particularly aware that unpublished technical data released orally, visually or in written form in

the U.S. to visitors from, and representatives of, foreign countries may be considered exports. To obtain information or clarification on what goods or technology may be embargoed or require a validated export license, companies should direct inquiries to:

Director
Exporters' Service Staff
Office of Export Administration
U.S. Department of Commerce
Washington, D.C. 20230
Tel: (202) 377-4811

4. VERIFYING SECURITY CLEARANCE AND SAFEGUARDING ABILITY PRIOR TO RELEASE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

Verification of another facility's security clearance and storage capability is a critical element when transmitting classified material to another contractor. Since many cleared contractors serve as major distributors of classified information, it is essential that all personnel responsible for such activity be thoroughly familiar with the procedures in the ISM which must be followed before classified information can be transmitted outside the facility. Facility Security Supervisors are urged to review the ISM requirements (as a minimum, paragraphs 3e, 5c, f and 17), as well as the facility Standard Practice Procedures, to ensure the SPPs are adequate and their personnel are knowledgeable in this area. Any questions which arise should be referred to the cognizant security office for resolution.

5. VERIFICATION OF CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENTS ON UPGRADES, CONVERSIONS AND TRANSFERS OF PERSONNEL SECURITY CLEARANCES

Verification of U.S. citizenship is now required by paragraph 5ae, ISM, for new clearance requests at all levels, including contractor granted CONFIDENTIAL clearances. It is not applicable for those employees having security clearances converted, transferred or upgraded.

6. KEEPING EMPLOYEES INFORMED WHEN SECURITY DEFICIENCIES ARE NOTED

An important part of a contractor's security program consists in keeping employees informed of security procedures and, as indicated in paragraph 5f, ISM, advising them of any security deficiencies resulting from recurring security inspections conducted by the cognizant security office. The requirement for the self-inspection program set forth in paragraph 5ac, ISM, does not provide specific guidance regarding deficiencies noted during these inspections; however, contractors should inform their employees of any security deficiencies noted during their self-inspections in the same manner as they are provided the information following security inspections conducted by the Government. This notification will contribute to a more viable security program and encourage participation by employees in the facility's security program.

7. NOTED SECURITY DEFICIENCIES AND HOW TO AVOID THEM

A contractor furnished the following illustrations of deficiencies found during inspections by the Government and from his own self-inspection program. You'll note that he first shows the deficiency and then what should be done. This way the employee is kept informed within the intent of paragraph 5f, ISM:

o During a DoD inspection, an employee was asked to produce several SECRET documents for audit. He agreed to retrieve them from his classified container and removed the combination from his wallet in order to unlock the container. ***(Combinations to classified containers must be memorized!)

o A cleared employee from another location agreed to work overtime on a classified job but did not have access to a container to lock up the material. Another employee gave him the combination to his safe--but just to be sure he didn't forget it, also wrote it on the chalkboard in the office. This was detected by a location protection officer. ***(Combinations must be memorized and are not to be provided outsiders...What else was in the container for which the visiting employee had no need-to-know?)

o Loss of several SECRET items was reported to the Government, investigated and then authorized to be stricken from accountability records. Two years later these items turned up at another location inside reusable file hangers. ***(Thoroughly check each file folder or hanger, especially when removing them from a classified container and look behind and under container drawers.)

o Inspectors discovered that several cleared employees were assigned to U.S. activities overseas for an extended period. Special briefings had not been given nor were reports made to the Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office (DISCO). ***(The ISM requires a report to DISCO when cleared employees are assigned outside the U.S. for a period in excess of 90 consecutive days during any 12-month period.)

8. TAKING CLASSIFIED MATERIAL HOME - A HAZARDOUS UNDERTAKING

Paragraph 14e, ISM, states: "Removal of classified materials to such dwellings for 'after hours' work as a convenience to such persons is not authorized." There are those who still disregard this prohibition and pay a substantial personal penalty in addition to damaging the National Security. Consider the following case:

A mathematician employed by a cleared facility chose to take classified material home to work on after hours. His cousin, who was visiting, became aware of this and photographed the information, ostensibly without the knowledge of the mathematician. However, reports suggested that he later became aware of his cousin's actions on receiving money for his "assistance," and then failed to report the facts to appropriate authorities. The classified information, relating to NATO and U.S. Security, was allegedly passed by the cousin to the Soviet Union.

The cousin was arrested in New York, convicted as a spy, and sentenced to 22 years in prison. The mathematician was also tried; not for having furnished

information to his cousin, but for failure to report a potential compromise (18 USC 793(f)(2)). His conviction resulted in a sentence of three years imprisonment and the court denied his appeal. (See U.S. vs. Dedeyan 584 F.2d 36(1978).)

The message is loud and clear; the risks are just too great if you remove classified material from an authorized work area and take it to your residence to work on. Car accidents, burglaries and thefts, not to mention uncleared family members, all portend compromise. The subsequent threat to a career through administrative or disciplinary action is ever present. It's just not worth it!

9. REPORTS PERTAINING TO TRANSMITTAL OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL

The term "shipment" as used in the ISM has occasionally been interpreted to pertain only to the movement of classified material by an authorized commercial carrier. This erroneous interpretation could lead to a failure to submit reports required by paragraphs 6a(11) (Evidence of Tampering) and 6a(12) (Improper Shipment). Reports required by these paragraphs should be submitted to the cognizant security office whenever any classified material is improperly transmitted (shipped) to them.

10. SHIPMENTS BY COMMERCIAL CARRIERS

Recently, classified material transmitted via an authorized Commercial Carrier on a commercial bill of lading, was lost in transit. Investigation of the incident determined that the bill of lading issued by the shipping contractor was not marked with the annotation "Signature Security Service Required" as required by paragraph 17d(3)(b), ISM. As a result, it was impossible to trace the shipment to determine the point of loss.

Contractors should review the procedures they use in the shipment of classified material via commercial carriers to ensure full compliance with the provisions of paragraph 17a(2), 17c(5) and 17d(3), ISM. Prior to the use of a commercial carrier for the shipment of classified material, the designation or qualification of a qualified carrier must be obtained from the contracting officer or his designated representative.

11. CONTROL BOXES LOCATED WITHIN CLOSED AREAS

A recently approved change to paragraphs 36a(1)(d) and (2)(b), ISM, will modify the current requirements to lock control panels with three-position dial-type, changeable combination padlocks. Essentially, the change means that, when the mechanical mechanism for setting the combination to a locking device for entry control is located in a control box within the Closed Area, it will no longer be necessary to secure the control box by a combination lock. The new wording states that, "if the control box is located within a closed area it shall require only a minimal degree of physical security protection designed to preclude unauthorized access to the mechanism. The cognizant security office may be requested to approve the security measures afforded the control box."

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12. CLASSIFYING PREVIOUSLY UNMARKED MATERIAL

A contractor-generated document which may inadvertently contain classified information might be distributed outside the facility without any markings to identify the document as classified. Although such a situation is not covered specifically by the ISM a common sense approach to reestablish control of the information should be taken by the contractor. Efforts should be made to determine that all holders of the document are authorized access to it and that control of the information has not been lost by the unclassified communication. If both these conditions are determined to exist, then promptly notify all holders of the document of its proper classification and applicable associated markings. The contractor's written notice should, as a minimum, be classified Confidential and can be marked with a declassification instruction such as "Unclassified when Upgrading Action is Completed." The "Classified by" line on the notice should cite the applicable DD Form 254. If, however, it is found that control of the document has been lost through, for example, secondary distribution by the Defense Technical Information Center, or that uncleared personnel have had access to it, a report of the compromise to the cognizant security office under the provisions of paragraph 7d, ISM, is required.

13. WARNING NOTICES AND OTHER NOTATIONS REQUIRED ON CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS

Paragraph 11c of the ISM may be interpreted to mean that "warning notices" include the "Notations Concerning Downgrading and Declassification" specified by paragraph 11c(5). Such markings are not "warning notices" in the same sense as the markings in paragraphs 11c(1) through 11c(4). Further, the present construction of paragraph 11c requires that the markings, specified by all of its subparagraphs, are to be placed on the cover of a classified document if there is one. It is not essential that the "Classified by" and the "Declassify on" or "Review for Declassification on" markings appear on the cover of a document. Paragraph 11c(5) states that procedures governing marking for downgrading and declassification are to be found in Appendix II. Paragraph C of that Appendix stipulates that such markings shall be on the "face" of the classified document. The use of the word "face" in this context is intended to mean either the cover, first, or title pages or in a similarly prominent position. Certain "warning notices" should, of course, be placed on the cover of a document if there is one, but the markings specified in Appendix II do not have to be so placed. An appropriate revision to paragraph 11 is being made.

14. WITNESS TO DESTRUCTION

Concern has been expressed relative to the utilization of a subcontract guard as a witness for the destruction of classified material. Paragraph 19d, ISM, addresses the optional use of a "subcontract employee" for witnessing destruction. We would consider a subcontract guard as a type of subcontract employee.

15. PSQ AND FPC DEFICIENCIES WASTE TIME AND MONEY

The Personnel Security Questionnaire (PSQ) and Fingerprint Card (FPC) reject rate continues to be of great concern to the Defense Industrial Security

Clearance Office (DISCO). This problem costs cleared contractors thousands of dollars yearly because, in most instances, the processing of the security clearance request is delayed until the information missing from the PSQ or FPC is obtained from the contractor or the applicant. In other words, the case just sits in DISCO until the missing information is obtained. This means that the request for investigation is delayed, the case processing time is increased, and the amount of time a contractor cannot use an employee on a classified contract is increased. It is a well-known fact that these delays are costly to contractors, and this situation is especially disturbing when it is apparent that the problem could be solved through careful completion of the PSQ and FPC. Since the privacy portion of the PSQ is not reviewed by the contractor, it is important to stress to the employee the need for care in completing that portion.

Due to the severity of the reject problem, a reject study was conducted by DISCO in November 1979. Review was made of 1,072 rejected cases. The arrest block of the PSQ presented the most serious reject problem in that incomplete arrest data was at least one of the reject reasons in 261 of the surveyed cases. Other serious reject problems which were surfaced during the survey include the absence of the applicant's current employment starting date, the failure of the security supervisor to sign the PSQ, and the absence of dates or places of treatment for mental disorders, drug addiction and alcoholism. In regard to FPC rejects, 23 cases were rejected because the applicant did not sign the card; 70 were rejected because identifying data, such as the applicant's physical description, was not listed, and there were 49 cases rejected because no FPCs were submitted at all. It is imperative that all of the requested information be placed on the FPC. The FPC must always be signed by the applicant and the prints must be clear and classifiable.

Paragraph 26b, ISM, also requires in the case of immigrant aliens that the applicant for clearance produce for the contractor's review, the Alien Registration Receipt Card (Form No. I-151 or I-551) which has been issued to the individual. DISCO systematically processes DD Forms 49 (PSQs) whereon the employer or designated representative attests that the applicant presented his/her card; however, extensive, costly investigation often discloses that the applicant is a nonimmigrant alien; therefore, not eligible for a security clearance. DISCO suggests that the space immediately to the right of the "Yes" and "No" blocks in Part II of the DD Form 49 be used to record the date the applicant was afforded permanent residence in the U.S. by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. In addition to providing very pertinent information, this could preclude a perfunctory check in the "Yes" block.

During 1981, DISCO intends to establish a computer system that will show which contractors have the most serious reject problem. This system will enable Industrial Security Representatives to discuss the reject situation with individual contractors during industrial security inspections.

Just a reminder! The DISCO after-hours telephone number is Area Code 614, 236-2058. Status information can be obtained by calling Area Code 614, 236-2265.

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16. DISCONTINUANCE OF ADVANCE TELEGRAPHIC LETTERS OF CONSENT

DISCO has discontinued sending telegraphic notification of clearance to DISP contractors. The experience of a representative segment of industry reveals that the telegraphic notification was not of sufficient benefit to industry to justify the cost to the Government. Letters of Consent will continue to be mailed from DISCO in the most expeditious manner.

17. OVERSEAS REFRESHER BRIEFINGS FOR INDUSTRY UNDER PARAGRAPH 97d, ISM

The Office of Industrial Security, International, has noted that requests have increased for them to conduct the annual refresher briefings of cleared contractor personnel assigned to duty stations outside the U.S. OISI is not staffed to routinely administer these briefings and solicits the cooperation of contractors to reduce these requests to those unusual cases where it is impractical for the contractor to accomplish them as required by paragraph 97d, ISM.

18. ERRATA ON ISL 80L-3

a. Since publication of ISL 80L-3, a few changes have been noted and are included here to enable recipients to make pen and ink changes to the telephone numbers listed on page 7:

<u>City and State</u>	<u>Address</u>	<u>Area Code</u>	<u>Telephone Number</u>
Atlanta, GA	(no change)	404	429-6340
Los Angeles, CA	(no change)	213	643-0203
San Francisco, CA	(no change)	213	" " (interim)

<u>Cognizant Security Ofc</u>	<u>Area Code</u>	<u>Telephone Number</u>	<u>AUTOVON Number (For Govt. Agencies Use)</u>
San Francisco	415	561- 5029	586- 5029

NOTE: It should be noted that the last sentence of ISL 80L-3 cautions that, "Pending formal notification, contractors should continue to maintain contact with the offices now providing security services." Appendix VIII, ISM, will contain the updated information and additional corrections when published.

b. On page 3 of ISL 80L-3, the following counties (parishes) were left off under ATLANTA in the State of Louisiana: Saint Charles, Saint Helena, Saint James, Saint John the Baptist, Saint Martin, Saint Mary (and part of Saint Martin), Saint Tammany, Tangipahoa, Terrebonne, Vermilion, Washington, West Baton Rouge, West Feliciana. Additionally, Sherville should be changed to read Iberville.

c. Also on page 3, under BOSTON, add Chautaugua and correct Cheenectady to read Schenectady.

d. Also on page 3, under WASHINGTON, add "and the city of Alexandria, VA."

e. On page 4, under CLEVELAND and the counties in Illinois, correct Sangamon to read Sangamon.

f. On page 6, under SAN FRANCISCO and the counties in California, correct Greenn to read Glenn.

19. COGSWELL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY AWARDS FOR 1980

Seventeen firms were selected by the Defense Logistics Agency for demonstrating superior performance in carrying out security obligations on classified defense contracts.

Recipients of the James S. Cogswell Awards, named for the Agency's first Chief of its Office of Industrial Security, were selected from over 11,000 industrial firms having Department of Defense facility security clearances to perform on classified contracts. Winners were chosen on the basis of criteria that included the degree of security consciousness and cooperation by management; effectiveness of employee security education and motivation programs; security practices and procedures; and ability to sustain progressive security systems.

Plaques for outstanding performance have been or soon will be presented to:

<u>Facility</u>	<u>Facility Security Supervisor</u>
Avondale Shipyards, Inc. Avondale, Louisiana	George L. Carcabasis
Base Ten Systems, Inc. Trenton, New Jersey	Oleh Pavlovsky
Bulova Systems and Instruments Corp. Valley Stream, New York	Arlene Christodoulou
Dynamics Research Corporation Wilmington, Massachusetts	Mary E. Brindamour
Environmental Research Institute of Michigan Ann Arbor, Michigan	Sarah G. Ward
Ford Aerospace and Communications Corp., Aeronutronic Division Newport Beach, California	Robert K. Murray
General Instrument Corporation Government Systems Division Hicksville, New York	John L. Pfeiffer

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<u>Facility</u>	<u>Facility Security Supervisor</u>
Lockheed Missiles and Space Co., Inc. Missile Systems Division Cape Canaveral, Florida	Francis D. Lindhorst
Martin Marietta Corporation Bethesda, Maryland	Thomas H. Farrow
Northrop Worldwide Aircraft Svcs., Inc. Vance AFB, Oklahoma	Warren C. Scheife
Optical Coating Laboratory, Inc. Santa Rosa, California	Robert D. Donovan
Radiation Research Associates, Inc. Ft. Worth, Texas	Norman Schaeffer
Sentinel Electronics, Inc. Bristol, Pennsylvania	Michael W. Kott
TRW Defense and Space Systems Group Cape Canaveral Field Office Cape Canaveral, Florida	Henry D. Newson
United Technologies Corporation Pratt and Whitney Aircraft Group East Hartford, Connecticut	Carl F. Dobler
United Technologies Corporation Pratt and Whitney Aircraft Group Rocky River, Ohio	Joseph C. Chew
United Technologies Corporation Sikorsky Aircraft Division Stratford, Connecticut	Andrew J. Stanchick

It is planned that the Defense Investigative Service will continue recognizing those industrial facilities which demonstrate superior performance in carrying out security obligations by continuation of the James S. Cogswell Awards.

20. PERSONNEL CHANGES

a. Regional Cognizant Security Offices: The Director, Defense Investigative Service, Mr. Bernard J. O'Donnell, has recently named the following as Directors of Industrial Security in the listed cognizant security offices:

Boston - Mr. Wayne A. Ambrose (former Chief, Management Support Division, DCASR, Boston); Cleveland - Mr. Donald L. McAlister (former Director of Industrial Security, DCASR, Chicago); Los Angeles - Mr. Joseph (Leo) Poirier (former Chief, Management Support Office, DCASR, Los Angeles); Philadelphia - (to be announced at a later date); San Francisco - Mr. Alfred (Bill) Hazen (former Chief, Industrial Security Division, DCASMA, San Francisco); Washington, DC - Mr. Richard F. Williams (former Industrial Security Staff Specialist, Executive Directorate, Industrial Security, DLA).


b. Director for Industrial Security, Defense Investigative Service: Due to the retirement of Captain R. A. Mauldin, USN, who was the last Executive Director, Industrial Security, under the Defense Logistics Agency, Mr. Frank Larsen, his Deputy, was named as Acting Director for Industrial Security, effective 1 October 1980. Mr. Larsen was successor to the late Colonel James S. Cogswell in July 1966 and served as the Chief, Office of Industrial Security, in the then Defense Supply Agency until August 1967. Subsequently, he retired as a Captain from the U.S. Navy and spent six years with industry in security, program management and engineering support. From 1973 until he returned in October 1979 to the Executive Directorate, Industrial Security, Defense Logistics Agency, he was employed by the Department of the Navy where he served primarily in security of classified information at the policy level.

c. Three of our key staff personnel technically retired effective 31 August 1980; however, they have agreed to extend their services for a number of months until the many details involved in the functional transfer from Defense Logistics Agency to the Defense Investigative Service are worked out. Our gratitude goes to:

Mr. Robert E. Green, Chief, Industrial Security Program Division
Mr. Jervie P. Fox, Chief, Industrial Facility Program Division
Mr. James A. Reeder, Chief, Industrial Security Education & Training

21. A PERSONAL NOTE FROM THE ACTING DIRECTOR FOR INDUSTRIAL SECURITY

As this year draws to a close, I feel most appreciative for the confidence and cooperation exhibited by contractors and our Government colleagues in helping us do our job. I am also confident that 1981 will provide challenges and opportunities for all of us. With continued display of teamwork and unrestrained communications, the future outlook for our industrial security programs has never been better.


FRANK LARSEN
Acting Director for
Industrial Security

**DEFENSE INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE
DIRECTORATE FOR INDUSTRIAL SECURITY
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