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OPENING STATEMENT FOR TESTIMONY BEFORE THE
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

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Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:

It is a great honor to appear before you as President Bush's nominee to be Director of Central Intelligence. I want to thank him for his confidence in me and for the honor of this nomination. I am humbled by it. I welcome these confirmation hearings to address the many issues I know you will raise. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you and the Committee for the fair and professional treatment of my nomination. I also want to thank Senators Dole, Kassebaum, Robb, and Warner for their kind introductions.

I have been in public service for 25 years. I arrived in Washington 25 years ago this summer, with all I owned in a 1965 Mustang and no money. The Mustang is long gone, and I still have no money, but I am enriched with a wonderful and patient wife and two great kids. I still have the idealism that I brought with me from Kansas a quarter century ago --

a deep conviction in the greatness of this country, in the uniqueness and wonder of its Constitution, and in its mission as a force for good around the world. My decision to commit my life to national service springs from these beliefs. I also still have the values I brought from Kansas -- family, hard work, candor and truthfulness, integrity, obeying the law, and a basic optimism about life.

During these 25 years, I have worked for six Presidents -- Republican and Democrat alike -- and served four of them in the White House on the National Security Council. I have served eight Directors of the CIA. I have worked closely and harmoniously with this Committee and its House of Representatives counterpart for more than 10 years as CIA's Deputy Director for Intelligence, Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Acting Director of

Central Intelligence, and as Deputy National Security Advisor. I have appeared before this Committee more than 50 times. We are not strangers to one another. In short, I do not come before this Committee as a new face, but rather as a nominee with a long track record. I anticipate that the Committee will want to examine both that record as well as my view of the future course of CIA and U.S. intelligence.

The Committees appropriately have been looking at the future of U.S. intelligence -- its structure and mission -- in the aftermath of the Cold War and now, most recently, after the revolution in the Soviet Union. Who would have thought just 5 years ago we would stand where we are today -- certainly not the intelligence analyst sitting before you today. Talk about humbling experiences. The old verities that have guided this country's national

security policy for 45 years, and thus its intelligence service, have disappeared in a historical instant. Communism everywhere is dead or dying, a number of longstanding regional conflicts are coming to an end, the Cold War is over, the Soviet Communist Party lies mortally wounded by its own hand, and the forces of real reform are at last ascendant in the Soviet Union.

Still, as ever, there are challenges, concerns and risks. The collapse of the Soviet and Russian Empire offers the promise of democracy and economic transformation. But, it also contains the seeds of grave instability, chaos and civil war in a country verging on economic collapse and possessing nearly 30,000 nuclear warheads -- the most powerful of which are still aimed at us. We cannot yet divert our attention from the Soviet Union, but clearly our priorities and our concerns have changed.

Meanwhile, a growing number of nations have or are developing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, together with the ballistic missile technologies to deliver them. Some of our allies in that long Cold War are now at times serious adversaries in the global economic marketplace. Political instability in the Third World spawns conflict, famine and chaos, challenging us politically, economically, sometimes militarily and always morally. International narcotics cartels not only feed growing global demand, but increasingly have the capability to buy governments and rule countries. Regional conflict, and its terrorist stepchildren, as in the Middle East, remain a reality despite our best efforts.

I have been deeply engaged in dealing with all these problems. I have been by the President's side when we prevented a coup attempt in the Philippines,

liberated Panama, defeated Iraq's aggression against Kuwait, saw the Berlin Wall go down and led the effort to unify Germany in NATO, fostered the Polish Roundtable Agreement, completed the CFE and START treaties, and played a role in the success of the democratic forces during the recent Soviet coup attempt.

The President and the Congress know that even as some threats have diminished, other dangers remain or have altered shape just as new challenges and problems have emerged. The death of Soviet Communism has vastly diminished the danger of global war, but the world remains a very rough neighborhood. Our nation's leaders -- at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue -- have no wish to walk those streets blindfolded.

We approach the close of the most violent century in man's history. Two world wars, a long

and hostile peace punctuated by protracted and bloody regional wars, the destruction of ancient empires and defeat of two inhuman ideologies -- Communism and Naziism -- have set in motion vast political, social and economic forces long frozen by totalitarianism and its legacy. The path to a new and brighter day is finally apparent, but will require American leadership, strength and vision -- the willingness to act against those who would prey on the weak and skillful navigation around the many obstacles that can thwart progress or send newly free but fragile democracies hurtling back into the darkness. The role of intelligence is to help the President, his senior advisers and the Congress understand and deal with these new and changing realities.

The challenge, then, to CIA and U.S. intelligence is to adapt to this changing world --

not just in places like the Soviet Union or Europe, but to the very idea of change, the idea that for years to come dizzying events, changes and uncertainty will dominate international life; that the unthinkable and the not even thought about will be commonplace. For us in Intelligence to adapt to such a changing world will require unprecedentedly close collaboration of the President and his advisers, the Intelligence Community and the Congress. If confirmed, I look forward to a close partnership with this Committee in this remarkably challenging and stimulating process.

Normally, a nominee would be circumspect about specific ideas for change. However, my nomination comes at a time when this Committee is deeply engaged in looking at the future of U.S.

intelligence and has considerable interest in my ideas about the future, and what I would do, if

confirmed, to help guide CIA and its sister agencies toward the 21st Century. I believe Director Webster's emphasis on "flexibility" is central to being responsive in a time of radical change and unpredictability. What follows are my ideas on where we ought to go from here.

First, this remarkable moment in history affords us a not to be missed opportunity to reassess the role, mission, priorities and structure of American intelligence in the aftermath of the Cold War. This should not be done off the cuff. If confirmed, I will recommend that the President launch, with the direct involvement of his most senior national security advisers, a major effort to determine the intelligence needs of the United States for the next decade or more. He should then charge the DCI to identify what the intelligence community must do to meet those needs. The two intelligence committees

should have the opportunity to participate even before proposals come before the Congress.

At a time of revolutionary change abroad and government-wide fiscal constraints at home, U.S. intelligence cannot remain fundamentally unaffected. Accordingly, we -- the Executive Branch and the Congress -- must reach agreement on mission and priorities. Once these are determined, we can then logically address structure and budget. Admiral Bob Inman as DDCI managed a similar process for the intelligence buildup during the first half of the 1980's. It is time to follow up that effort with an even bolder, much more far reaching effort. This effort ought to be completed by the end of the year, in time to influence the next budget cycle.

There are other problems and innovations that must be addressed as we change to cope with a different world:

- The intelligence budget should be considered by the President, his senior advisers and the Congress within but independently of the Defense budget.
- We must dramatically expand our clandestine human intelligence collection effort. At the same time, we must consider the implications for our covert action capabilities of a dramatic decline in Soviet aggressiveness and disruptive activities in the Third World.
- We must remedy the gap between 21st Century collection systems and a 19th Century system for informing policy makers.

- We publish too much intelligence of questionable relevance to policymakers. Less and better should be the rule.
- CIA's relationship to and support for the U.S. military must be improved.
- The process by which the information needs of policymakers are translated into intelligence requirements must be strengthened.
- The relationship between our national and tactical intelligence programs must be dramatically improved.
- Finally, the intelligence community, and CIA in particular, must build on the openness Director Webster has

encouraged to develop better popular understanding and support for U.S. intelligence activities. President Kennedy once said that CIA's successes remain secret while its failures are trumpeted. However, things have gotten out of hand when most outrageous allegations against the Agency are taken seriously; when the honor and integrity of thousands of patriotic public servants are suspect merely by virtue of where they work. CIA and its people deserve better. But changing perceptions first requires greater openness from the Agency.

I can elaborate on the proposals I have just described and others I have in mind, but my point is

clear: CIA and U.S. intelligence must change -- and be seen to change -- or confront irrelevance and growing sentiment for their dismantlement. I look forward to tackling this challenge with you.

Contrary to popular perceptions of an adversary relationship, Congress has long been a strong supporter of a vital and effective intelligence service. It was the Congressional Intelligence Committees that launched the rebuilding of U.S. intelligence capabilities in 1979 -- and their support helped sustain that rebuilding in following years. This Congressional support, not surprisingly, is valued in the Intelligence community. But the Community also recognizes and values the role of Congress in making intelligence accountable and in assuring that it operates within the law and in a manner consistent with American principles. Access to our assessments by Congress -

- Republicans, Democrats, liberals, conservatives, and moderates -- helps assure our objectivity and independence.

We know that many Americans are uneasy about CIA and U.S. intelligence activities. They understand the need for information and even on occasion for covert action, but they are uncomfortable with secrecy. Therein lies the value of Congressional oversight -- the reassurance to Americans that the laws are being obeyed and that there is accountability. This then, puts a special responsibility on intelligence agencies to be truthful, straightforward, candid, and forthcoming in the dealings with the Congress.

For more than ten years, I have had a strong and positive relationship with this Committee. I understand and respect its role (and that of its House counterpart) as surrogates for both the rest

of the Congress and the American people.
Consequently, a relationship of trust and confidence between the Intelligence Community and the two Intelligence Committees is of vital importance. Accordingly, I commit to you that, should I be confirmed, whatever differences may develop from time to time between the two Intelligence Committees and the Executive Branch generally and CIA specifically, I would resign rather than jeopardize that relationship of trust and confidence.