

**Page Denied**

**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**

**Routing Slip**

TC:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR		X		
4	D/ICS	X			
5	DDI	X			
6	DDA				
7	DDO	X			
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC	X			
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/EEO				
14	D/Pers				
15	D/OEA				
16	C/PAD/OEA				
17	SA/IA		X		
18	AO/DCI				
19	C/IPD/OIS				
20					
21					
22					

SUSPENSE \_\_\_\_\_

Date

Remarks:

Executive Secretary  
6 December 1982

Date

3637 (10-81)

STAT

*X ref with NSSD #10*

~~TOP SECRET~~

CIA TS820360  
Cy 2

No. NSDD 71

COPY #4 (CIA)

# NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INFORMATION

## Notice

The attached document contains classified National Security Council Information. It is to be read and discussed only by persons authorized by law.

Your signature acknowledges you are such a person and you promise you will show or discuss information contained in the document only with persons who are authorized by law to have access to this document.

Persons handling this document acknowledge he or she knows and understands the security law relating thereto and will cooperate fully with any lawful investigation by the United States Government into any unauthorized disclosure of classified information contained herein.

## Access List

DATE	NAME	DATE	NAME
12/6/82	[Redacted]	_____	_____
6 Dec 82		_____	_____
_____		_____	_____
_____		_____	_____
_____		_____	_____
_____		_____	_____

25X1.

~~TOP SECRET~~

L117  
NSDD71



**TOP SECRET**

UNCLASSIFIED when blank—TOP SECRET when attached to Top Secret Document—Automatically downgraded or declassified when filled in form is detached from controlled document.

**CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT**

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION		REGISTRY	
SOURCE		CIA CONTROL NO.	
DOC. NO.		<del>TS00260</del>	
DOC. DATE		DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED	
COPY NO.		6 Dec 82	
NUMBER OF PAGES		LOGGED BY	
NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS			

*ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose official duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns.*

REFERRED TO	RECEIVED			RELEASED		SEEN BY			
	OFFICE	SIGNATURE	DATE	TIME	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE	OFFICE/DIV.	DATE

*NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below and transmitted to Central Top Secret Control for record.*

DOWNGRADED		DESTROYED		DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA)	
TO		BY (Signature)		TO	
BY (Signature)		WITNESSED BY (Signature)		BY (Signature)	
OFFICE	DATE	OFFICE	DATE	OFFICE	DATE

**TOP SECRET**

SYSTEM II  
90929

**THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON**

TOP SECRET

December 2, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ  
The Secretary of State

THE HONORABLE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER  
The Secretary of Defense

THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. CASEY  
Director of Central Intelligence

GENERAL JOHN W. VESSEY  
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: NSDD-71: U.S. Policy Toward Latin America in the  
Wake of the Falklands Crisis (S)

The President has approved National Security Decision Directive 71 (NSDD-71), subject as above. A copy of the approved NSDD is attached. Please ensure special handling of this document to prevent unauthorized disclosure. (S)

*Robert G. Helms*  
William R. Clark *for*

Attachment  
NSDD-71

TOP SECRET  
Declassify on: OADR

TS 820360, CY 2 of 8 Cys  
4 of 5 copies  
CIA

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**SYSTEM II  
90929**THE WHITE HOUSE**

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET

November 30, 1982

*National Security  
Decision Directive 71*U.S. Policy Toward Latin America  
In the Wake of the Falklands Crisis (S)

The Falklands crisis has strained relations with several Latin American countries and resulted in uncertainty regarding the long-range policy goals of the United States in the region. This in turn has increased the potential for instability in Central and South America. (C)

U.S. national interests in Latin America and the region dictate policies that achieve the following objectives:

- a region free of Soviet-dominated or hostile governments;
- the development of stable and democratic political systems and institutions which promote respect for basic human rights;
- cooperative bilateral relations to deal with security and other issues flowing from geographic proximity;
- advancement of major U.S. trade and investment;
- access to raw materials;
- prevention of nuclear proliferation;
- maintenance of stable balances of power among the states in the region; and
- receptivity to U.S. leadership. (S)

Achieving these objectives has been complicated by the Falklands crisis. Accordingly, our policy must be aimed at ameliorating the following specific problems:

- Instability and irredentism in Argentina, which implies new opportunities for the USSR to gain access to a strategic position in the Southern Cone;
- Disillusionment with U.S. leadership in Venezuela and elsewhere, which provides tempting opportunities for Cuba to reduce its inter-American isolation;

TOP SECRETDeclassify on: OADRcy 4 of 5 copies  
CIA**TOP SECRET**

TOP SECRET

2

**TOP SECRET**

- The need to improve U.S. relations with Brazil, recognizing Brazil's increased importance as a potential stabilizing factor in South America at a time when mounting economic and financial difficulties are eroding our ties and influence there and in the region as a whole.
- The vulnerability of burgeoning free enterprise economies and developing political institutions to radical insurgent movements supported by the Soviet Union and/or its surrogates.
- The interdiction threat to U.S. aerial and maritime routes in the Caribbean Basin by potentially hostile airbases and the introduction/augmentation of Soviet Bloc tactical aircraft and weaponry. (TS)

In redressing these problems, the highest priority for the United States will continue to be the reduction -- and eventual elimination -- of the influence and presence of the Soviet Union or its client states in our immediate environs -- Central America, the Caribbean and Mexico. This will be accomplished through a coordinated application of our diplomatic, economic, military, intelligence and informational resources in the Caribbean Basin and Central America. (TS)

Our second priority is to restore and reassert United States influence in South America. To this end we will:

- Maintain our diplomatic position on the fundamental Falklands issues as it existed prior to the crisis. Specifically: The U.S. will continue as a neutral on the question of sovereignty over the islands and support negotiations, mediation or other peaceful efforts to resolve this dispute;
- Attempt to preserve a regional political and military balance, by seeking certification for Argentina and Chile, as eligible for U.S. military sales, jointly if possible, and as early in the new Congress as feasible. In order to progress on this initiative, the State Department will intensify efforts to resolve those issues that currently proscribe arms transfers to Chile and Argentina.
- Rebuild a close relationship with Brazil, through:
  - increased Cabinet-level, government-to-government consultations
  - renewed cooperation in economic trade and military training
  - enhanced cooperation in science and technology (particularly space activities)
  - a dialogue on nuclear issues, and
  - exploration, over time, of arms co-production agreements.

TOP SECRET**TOP SECRET**cv 4 of 5 copies

TOP SECRET

3

**TOP SECRET**

To develop this process, the U.S. will seek appropriate positive action by Brazil on the issue of nuclear non-proliferation (e.g., restraint in exports to sensitive regions and progress in discussions on the Treaty of Tlatelolco and safeguards). We will further attempt to resolve the matter of nuclear supply and permit resumed nuclear cooperation with Brazil. As contacts on these issues show progress, in order to encourage significant movement on non-proliferation concerns, consideration will be given to seeking waivers to the Glenn/Symington amendment, permitting enhanced military training cooperation.

- The U.S. will continue to seek prevention of regional arms races, to preserve sub-regional arms balances and to upgrade bilateral military ties. In order to support the legitimate security needs of democratic governments, the Department of State, in coordination with the Department of Defense, will use flexibility, within NSDD-5 guidelines, to respond promptly to arms transfer requests. Measures will specifically be taken to reduce Peru's dependence on Soviet arms supplies.
- Within resource constraints, the U.S. will maintain assistance efforts in such economically weak states as Bolivia, Ecuador, and Paraguay. (S)

The aforementioned program -- aimed first at the Caribbean Basin/Central American region, and second at South America -- will be effected in concert with the following overall hemispheric actions:

- The United States will pursue more active bilateral diplomatic contacts throughout the continent in order to stay efforts to alter the Inter-American System. We will use a series of *ad hoc* bilateral cabinet-level meetings with substantial -- though not exclusive -- economic focus to show that dialogue with the U.S. is possible. Our Caribbean Basin Initiatives will serve as the framework for these discussions with the Central American States. In South America, the U.S. will lead with Brazil, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, and then Argentina. Throughout, our goal is to support free enterprise economies and foster the investment and trade necessary to their growth.
- U.S. global sugar policy will be reviewed to assess its foreign and domestic impact on states in the region. If advantageous to our foreign policy goals, consideration will be given to establishing more flexible sugar import levels.
- We will use our influence through traditional diplomatic channels to promote development of democratic institutions and human rights in order to facilitate U.S. public support for expanded, closer relationships with the governments concerned.

TOP SECRET**TOP SECRET**cy 4 of 5 copies  
CIA



TOP SECRET

4

TOP SECRET

- A concerted effort will be made to increase U.S. military influence in the hemisphere through promotion of U.S. military training and doctrine, greater use of small mobile training teams, expanded military personnel exchanges and increased International Military Education and Training (IMET) resources. To implement this program the Department of Defense, in cooperation with the Department of State and the Director of Central Intelligence will develop a comprehensive prioritized list of defense requirements, by country, and propose a strategy for implementation.
- In order that we can take a pro-active stance in our relations with Central and South American states, the DCI will improve intelligence collection on and analysis of Soviet bloc and Cuban actions which may create internal instability or problems in bilateral relations with the U.S. (TS)

*Ronald Reagan*

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

cy 4 of 5 copies