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# Insurgency: 1985 in Review



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An Intelligence Assessment

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# **Insurgency: 1985 in Review**

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**An Intelligence Assessment**

This paper was prepared by the Insurgency Branch of the Office of Global Issues. Country assessments were prepared by the Offices of African and Latin American Analysis, East Asian Analysis, and Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis.

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Comments and queries are welcome and may be addressed to the Chief, Foreign Subversion and Instability Center, OGI,

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**Scope Note**

This review summarizes the status of 22 major insurgencies as of January 1986. Full assessments of the nine most serious conflicts provide information on the origin of the insurgency, the capabilities and performance of each side, and the prospects of the conflict. Thirteen additional conflicts, including two incipient insurgencies, are also briefly summarized. An introduction discusses the major changes in the dynamics of insurgency during the past decade, and the appendixes contain order-of-battle statistics, data on Soviet and Soviet-surrogate support to insurgents and client regimes.

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**Insurgency:  
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**Summary***Information available  
as of 24 March 1986  
was used in this report.*

On the basis of our assessment of the insurgencies covered in this review, we draw five general conclusions concerning the past 12 months and anticipate the year ahead:


- The Communists' performance as counterinsurgents has not been particularly impressive in the past year. Only in Cambodia, where Vietnam carries the combat burden, has there been significant counterinsurgent progress during 1985. In Mozambique, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua, stalemate conditions have emerged and are likely to endure during the next year. Because of the high political, economic, and military costs of countering an insurgency, stalemates almost always favor the insurgents. Furthermore, despite some counterinsurgent successes in Angola and Afghanistan, we anticipate continued insurgent aggressiveness in both conflicts during the next year.
- A review of 1985 fails to reveal any striking developments in Soviet strategy or tactics in support of leftwing insurgents or embattled Marxist regimes. Although their battlefield performance has improved in Afghanistan, progress against the insurgents has not been significant. Developments in Africa and Nicaragua, where the Soviets play a support and advisory role—often through Cuban surrogates—suggest a costly long-term commitment in support of fragile Marxist regimes.
- The governments in El Salvador, Guatemala, and the Philippines and the South Africans in Namibia achieved noteworthy progress in their counterinsurgency efforts during this past year. Each of these gains, in part, reflected improvements in the government's military and political performance. Especially in El Salvador and the Philippines, the power of elections for enhancing popular support was dramatically illustrated. In addition, disunity and low morale among the guerrillas in each of these countries were strong contributors to government success. We currently see no evidence of a significant shift during 1986 in the momentum that now favors these four governments.

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- We anticipate that the insurgencies in the Philippines, Peru, Colombia, Sri Lanka, and Sudan will intensify during the coming year. In addition, we expect the incipient conditions in Chile to deteriorate in favor of the Communists. We also expect an upturn in urban terrorism in El Salvador, Peru, and Colombia as insurgents seek to augment their rural strategy with an urban component.
- We also anticipate that the insurgencies in Iraq, Ecuador, South Africa, Burma, and Laos will continue at roughly their current level of intensity during the next 12 months. While none of these conflicts currently has the capability to topple the regime, each constitutes a continuing drain on government, political, and military resources. 

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**Introduction: The New Face of Insurgency**

In some respects, little has changed in the last few decades in the way unconventional wars are fought and countered. However, our extensive and in-depth analysis of every major insurgency since World War II shows that there have been a number of significant changes in the dynamics of insurgent conflict—especially during the past decade—that have altered the face of insurgency and complicated the process of coping with it. 

We believe insurgency has become the most prevalent form of warfare in the Third World. By our estimate, there are at least 22 major insurgent conflicts in various stages of development, numerous minor insurgencies, and several incipient situations—Chile, Ecuador, and Zaire—of concern. Moreover, unlike the immediate postwar period, few of these conflicts are anticolonial in nature. Most of today's insurgencies are based on grievances directed at local regimes. We have considerable evidence that Communist elements in many unstable nations have been effective in exploiting these grievances and are the central actors in many of today's insurgent conflicts. 



 the Soviets and their allies have developed a sophisticated infrastructure that provides considerable training, logistic, political, economic, and military support to leftwing revolutionary groups. These efforts, coupled with technological advances in weaponry, make today's leftist guerrilla better armed, better trained, and better equipped than ever before. Moreover, we have evidence that the Cubans and Nicaraguans have recently stepped up their efforts to support numerous insurgent organizations in Central and South America. 

Insurgent causes have also benefited from the substantial increase in coverage afforded by the news media. The kidnaping of Salvadoran President Duarte's daughter by Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front guerrillas, the reactions of the Sandinista

government in Managua to the latest Nicaraguan Democratic Force initiative, the threat posed by the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army in the Philippines, the latest maneuverings of Jonas Savimbi on behalf of National Union for the Total Independence of Angola in Angola, and the plight of Nelson Mandela and his African National Congress movement in South Africa have all made regular appearances on television's nightly news and the front pages of the major world press. This increased coverage has enhanced the international image and—in some respects—the legitimacy of various groups and, according to scattered evidence, boosted the morale of the guerrillas. There is, however, no available evidence of a direct relationship between increased media attention and foreign aid. 

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The number of actors involved in insurgent conflicts has increased at a significant rate. Not only has the number of insurgent organizations multiplied substantially—several countries have four or more major insurgent groups—but new actors have emerged.  links vigilantes and death squads like those in El Salvador, Guatemala, Argentina, and the Philippines with what might be termed extralegal counterinsurgency. Some multinational corporations—Del Monte Corporation in the Philippines, for example—threatened by insurgent activity now undertake their own civic action and security initiatives. In addition, the overlap between narcotics traffickers—often aided by Cubans and Nicaraguans—and insurgents has increased considerably, 

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Finally, the last decade has seen the emergence of the anti-Marxist insurgency. In Afghanistan, Cambodia, Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua, we now find Communist regimes that came to power through various forms of revolutionary warfare facing their own insurgent threat. Each of these regimes relies heavily on Soviet or Soviet-surrogate support. Consequently, the Soviets have been forced to consider the demands and support requirements of counterinsurgency, while the United States—despite ongoing

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counterinsurgency concerns in El Salvador and the Philippines—has begun to consider the essential requirements of aiding insurgents.

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These changes in the dynamics of revolutionary warfare have rendered the phenomenon a more complex issue for the policymaker, military officer, and intelligence analyst. For example, to what degree is a specific insurgency the result of indigenous factors as opposed to foreign intervention? What types of US aid and assistance are appropriate for a given counterinsurgent effort? Which incipient insurgent groups should be taken seriously? Can we identify those situations that will require a long-term commitment? What are the appropriate forms and means for supporting insurgents now engaged in combating Marxist regimes?

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To assist in answering these questions, we have recently developed a comprehensive analytic framework that provides an assessment of a specific conflict. This framework was used by each of the analysts who contributed to this review. The framework focuses on the setting and origin of the conflict, each side's strategy for victory, and the protagonists' political and military capabilities and performance in light of their strategy.

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## Net Assessments

### El Salvador

In our judgment, the Salvadoran armed forces—with critical financial, materiel, logistic, and advisory support from the United States—broke the military stalemate with the rebel alliance in 1984 and continued in 1985 to force tactical changes on the insurgents that largely reinforced the government's superiority and disheartened leftist ranks. Nevertheless, we believe that a decisive victory over the guerrillas within the next two years is unlikely. The erosion of rebel manpower will continue to be a relatively gradual and costly process for the government, and insurgent leaders will continue to shift tactics in an effort to offset the widening quantitative and qualitative advantages of the Salvadoran armed forces. We believe the government of President Duarte will remain vulnerable to dramatic acts of urban terrorism and ongoing economic sabotage that could slow or undermine El Salvador's democratization process. [ ]

### Favorable Trends

In our judgment, mid-1984 was a major turning point in the Salvadoran conflict. The inauguration of the country's first authentic popularly elected civilian president and the armed forces' decision to sustain indefinitely a high level of counterinsurgent operations gave the government a significant political and military advantage. Since then, the military has maintained its allegiance to the reformist civilian government, steadily strengthened its administrative and operational performance, and improved both its human rights record and its image with the public at large. [ ]

Meanwhile, the guerrillas have lost not only the military initiative but local support for their cause has dwindled from their own private 1980 estimates of 15 percent of the population to a level we believe is less than 5 percent. The guerrillas' increasing reliance, moreover, on tactics such as murder, robbery, kidnapping, economic sabotage, and indiscriminate use of

mines, as well as their public rejection of constitutional democracy, have reduced considerably their legitimacy overseas. This has been reflected in documented declines in materiel, funding, and diplomatic support from foreign governments and groups and harsher treatment by the international media. [ ]

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### Dangerous Problems Remain

Although we believe that time no longer favors the Marxist cause in El Salvador, the insurgent movement, in our judgment, will remain a resilient and formidable enemy, at least through the next two years. Despite improved government and military performance, the Duarte administration faces a number of problems that will continue to hamper its ability to resolve decisively the insurgent conflict. In particular, the government's poorly implemented "National Plan," designed to complement military efforts to improve rural security with ambitious socioeconomic and administrative development projects at the local level, remains vulnerable to guerrilla sabotage and harassment. The two-year-old civil defense program—key to establishing permanent government control in the countryside—in our opinion, has yet to gain momentum. This is caused in part by the lack of material and financial resources and commitment of local Army commanders to train, outfit, and support local volunteer units. In those few villages where a viable civilian defense force has been established, frequent insurgent attacks and intimidation have taken their toll on the morale of the local populace. The government will probably continue to face the dilemma of not being able to establish adequate rural security without active public cooperation or to expect such cooperation without first maintaining adequate security for a period of time. [ ]

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The government also must contend with the rebel shift in emphasis to an urban strategy that includes escalating terrorism in the capital and fomenting

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**Figure 1**  
**El Salvador: Guerrilla Operating Areas**



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student and labor union unrest. Recent leftist activities indicate that the insurgents hope to cripple the economy with widespread labor strikes and force the government to resort to repressive crackdowns that would weaken support for the Duarte administration at home and abroad. Although we do not believe such activities will be sufficient to bring the government down, they are likely to cause some important financial, materiel, and manpower resources to be diverted from the counterinsurgency effort in the countryside. Over the next two years, therefore, we believe that President Duarte will be challenged severely as he

attempts to consolidate fragile democratic institutions while the extreme left takes advantage of the open political environment to try to destabilize the system.

[Redacted]

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**Implications for the United States**

Our assessment that the rebels' current activities will not win them major new momentum is based on the assumption that US military and economic support is sustained. We see no near-term possibility that the

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Duarte administration will be able to lessen significantly its dependence on US aid and diplomatic backing. We expect that insurgent strategists increasingly will focus on undermining Washington's relationship with San Salvador. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted] various rebel factions plan to continue targeting US officials for assassination as a means of convincing Washington that its personnel are not safe in El Salvador. In our judgment, kidnappings of US Embassy dependents also would be in keeping with insurgent tactics to intimidate Washington and achieve greater leverage over the Duarte administration. [redacted]

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The guerrillas probably hope that such activities will stir renewed public and Congressional debate over Washington's role in the Salvadoran conflict and perhaps force a reduction in US materiel and financial aid. We also believe the rebels hope that by weakening US public support for El Salvador they can increase international pressure for a negotiated power-sharing arrangement with San Salvador. Although hardline insurgent leaders still aspire to military victory, [redacted]

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they appear willing to support—up to a point—efforts by rebel moderates to establish a dialogue with the Duarte government as a tactical maneuver until they can regain political and military momentum. [redacted]

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Nicaragua

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**Nicaragua**

The fighting in Nicaragua, which exhibited peaks and lulls in intensity during 1985, appeared stalemated at the end of the year, with little indication that either side can achieve a decisive edge in the near term. The course of the war has highlighted both the improved military capability of the Sandinista forces and the resiliency of the main insurgent group, the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN). Events also have underscored the rebels' vulnerability to supply problems and the vagaries of external supporters. The drain on Managua's economic and manpower resources has required tighter domestic controls while further diminishing the regime's popular support and driving new recruits to the FDN. [redacted]

**The Setting**

Organized in 1981 by supporters of former President Somoza, the rebel forces have grown to include businessmen, civic oppositionists, and disaffected Sandinistas. The insurgents claim to be fighting for the original goals of the revolution—pluralism, a mixed economy, and nonalignment. Several political parties, businessmen's organizations, and independent labor unions comprise the small domestic opposition. In addition, the traditionally passive population of late has expressed disgruntlement over the economic situation, the draft, and state controls in a few spontaneous demonstrations, according to a variety of US Embassy and press reports. [redacted]

Of the groups comprising the insurgency, the FDN is the largest—with some 17,000 troops—and best equipped. Staging out of Honduran bases, it operates widely in Nicaragua's northwest, central highlands, and south-central region. In the south, the forces of former Sandinista Eden Pastora have dwindled to an estimated 600 because of supply problems, poor leadership, and Sandinista military pressure. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] The Indian insurgents operating on the Atlantic coast, who number about 1,200, also have been plagued by logistic shortfalls and political infighting. Several factions recently formed an umbrella organization, KISAN, and are coordinating actions with the FDN. [redacted]

**Government Strategy and Rebel Response**

At the outset of 1985, Sandinista Defense Minister Humberto Ortega publicly declared it the year the insurgents would be defeated. To upgrade military capabilities, Managua increased the draft, organized elite counterinsurgency battalions—now numbering some 12 to 14—and acquired advanced Soviet equipment, such as the MI-25 helicopter gunship. In addition, according to US Embassy and press reporting, the regime relocated much of the population in the northern border area to deny the FDN safehaven and create a free fire zone. From February through May, the government pressured the insurgents in the north with artillery and multibattalion sweeps—interdicting infiltration routes, disrupting insurgent concentrations across the border in Honduras, and forcing the rebels to expend scarce ammunition. [redacted]

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For their part, the anti-Sandinistas concentrated on small-unit tactics and ambushes, maintaining their integrity as a fighting force and incorporating the swelling number of recruits that increased FDN ranks from 14,000 to 17,000 during 1985. [redacted]

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[redacted] delays in deliveries by international arms dealers and lack of adequate air resupply capabilities strained the FDN's resources, and more than half of its combatants sought refuge in Honduras during the Sandinista dry-season offensive. Moreover, Nicaraguan cross-border shelling induced Tegucigalpa to order the relocation of insurgent resupply points out of the range of Sandinista artillery and to place restrictions on rebel activities within Honduran territory. [redacted]

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By late spring, the rebels had redressed some of their supply difficulties, and an increasing number of troops were able to bypass Sandinista blocking positions along the border and penetrate deeper into Nicaragua. The leasing and acquisition of new aircraft improved resupply capabilities, [redacted]

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[redacted] and the resumption of US funding boosted morale. Moreover, the regime was forced to spread out its troops to counter expanded insurgent actions in central Zelaya, Boaco, and Chontales Departments. The FDN has sporadically challenged the regime with aggressive rebel attacks in Esteli and Chontales Departments in midsummer and

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Figure 2  
Nicaragua: Insurgent Operating Areas, 1985



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along the vital arms route from Rama to Managua in the fall, demonstrating the resiliency of the insurgency. In November, Ortega publicly amended his prediction, admitting that the war probably will last into 1987. [redacted]

Nonetheless, steady improvements in Sandinista capabilities and lingering rebel difficulties averted any significant shift in momentum toward the insurgents. The regime effectively employed both helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft for close air support and convoy escort, upgraded coordination between ground and air forces, and developed a capability to intercept insurgent communications. For its part, [redacted] the FDN remained at the mercy of a tenuous supply line and Tegucigalpa's erratic support. Moreover, command and control deficiencies have limited the FDN's control over individual field commanders inside Nicaragua. [redacted]

**The Political Battle**

Regime efforts to garner international support were undercut by repressive domestic policies, especially the expanded state of emergency announced in mid-October. The regime's foreign strategy centered on cultivating condemnation of the insurgency and of US aid to the rebel forces through the International Court of Justice, Contadora regional peace negotiations, the United Nations, and other international bodies. Although these efforts have had some success, a variety of recent US Embassy and press reports indicate some Latin and West European leaders are having second thoughts about their support for the Sandinistas. With the goal of denying the insurgents safehaven in neighboring countries, the regime increased diplomatic and military pressure—primarily through cross-border shelling—on Costa Rica and Honduras to agree to bilateral accommodations. At home, the Sandinistas reorganized the party and government bureaucracies, campaigned against corruption, and exhorted the population to increase revolutionary vigilance to counter US "aggression." Nonetheless, public dissatisfaction grew as a result of deepening economic hardships, tighter restrictions on civil liberties, and the renewal of military conscription, according to US Embassy reporting. [redacted]

Taking a page from the Sandinistas' book, the insurgents tried to improve their international image. In March 1985, insurgent and exiled political leaders called for a dialogue with the regime—which Managua has repeatedly rejected—timed to coincide with a similar call by the internal opposition. In June the formation of the United Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO) brought respected anti-Sandinista civilians into an umbrella organization incorporating the FDN and associated insurgent groups. Late in the year, UNO created a human rights staff and prosecuted some 20 FDN combatants for offenses committed against civilians. It also laid plans for a civic action medical program in the Honduran border area to promote good relations with the local population and authorities. [redacted]

[redacted]

The FDN has failed, however, to develop a political support base within Nicaragua. While the traditional passivity of the Nicaraguan people and fear of government retaliation present significant constraints, the FDN's vague political program for Nicaragua's future apparently has not inspired the population to translate its disgruntlement with the regime into acts of civil disobedience or graffiti campaigns in support of the rebel cause. [redacted]

**Outlook**

We expect that the Sandinista military will be able to meet most insurgent challenges over the next several months. Given increased government firepower and capabilities, the FDN will have to make significant strides in improving logistics, training, and command and control to gain the potential to shift momentum in its favor. [redacted]

External assistance will remain vital to each side. Continued receipt of Soviet military equipment—possibly including more advanced systems, such as SA-2s—will further strengthen Sandinista forces, while increased economic aid will be necessary to prevent further deterioration in living standards and

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popular tolerance. For its part, the FDN will be hampered in its efforts at long-term strategic planning or significant growth in its forces by the lack of military training of many of its leaders, uncertainty generated by its still tenuous supply network, and the sensitivity of its external supporters, especially Honduras.

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Although neither side currently is poised for victory, continued domestic disgruntlement with the regime could provide new opportunities for the rebels to establish internal support networks and attract additional recruits. To do so, the FDN needs to move into the populated areas on the Pacific coast and redouble efforts to present itself as a viable alternative to the Sandinistas.

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Peru

**Peru**

President Garcia's hopes for a honeymoon period in relations between his government and Peru's guerrilla groups were dashed soon after his July 1985 inauguration by an intensified terrorist campaign that included several targets in Lima. In addition to the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) insurgency, a relatively new terrorist group, the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), has emerged as a serious internal security threat. [redacted]

**Sendero Luminoso**

Sendero Luminoso (SL) continues to be Peru's most dangerous insurgent group. SL first surfaced as a guerrilla movement after the 1980 election of former President Belaunde, but its origins can be traced to the mid-1960s when its founder, Abimael Guzman, split from the Peruvian Communist Party. Guzman's radical splinter group espoused a hybrid ideology fashioned from elements of Marxism, Leninism, Maoism, and tradition-rooted rural populism. [redacted]

During the 1970s, Senderista activists fanned out through the countryside surrounding Ayacucho, providing education and social assistance to impoverished villagers and in return gaining widespread sympathy for their revolutionary cause. This strategy changed abruptly after 1980 when Sendero began a Maoist-style rural insurgency with the apparent objective of establishing a base in Ayacucho from which to expand into the coastal region. [redacted]

Perhaps the most striking feature of the Shining Path insurgency has been its affinity for violent actions calculated to shock and intimidate its enemies. At first, Senderistas butchered dogs and hung them from lamp posts. Soon they began slaughtering peasants and throwing the mutilated bodies on mountain roads. Peruvian police estimate that more than 5,000 people have died in the Sendero insurgency since 1980, including 2,300 to 2,400 civilians and a slightly higher number of guerrillas. [redacted]

For several years, most of Sendero's victims were apolitical campesinos, but in 1984 rebels increasingly directed their attacks at police, soldiers, and local officials. Approximately 225 security force personnel

have died fighting the guerrillas, according to the Peruvian Government. As of November, 36 policemen and four soldiers had been killed in 1985 in Lima alone. [redacted]

Sendero Luminoso has taken Leninist principles of party loyalty, strict secrecy, selective recruitment, and cellular organization to new extremes. As a consequence, Sendero's immediate objectives remain unclear. Its enigmatic nature and its reputation for sanguinary ruthlessness enhance the Peruvian public's fear and sense of vulnerability. [redacted]

We do not believe the Sendero Luminoso is linked to other Latin American insurgent or terrorist groups or known patron states, probably because of its fierce ideological independence. Senderista propagandists have vehemently denounced the Soviet Union and China as well as the United States. The tactic of hanging dogs from lamp posts was apparently intended to show contempt for Mao's successors during the "cultural revolution," whom Sendero branded "running dogs of capitalist revisionism." Some terrorist experts have suggested that SL's closest ideological affinity was with the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia. [redacted]

Sendero Luminoso apparently operates without any foreign assistance and acquires most of its funds, weapons, and explosives by robbing banks, taking arms from fallen police and soldiers, and raiding warehouses and munitions stores. Chronic weapons shortages, however, have been a continuing impediment to expanded guerrilla operations. It is possible that Senderistas and drug traffickers have collaborated at times, especially in the upper Huallaga River valley where both operate extensively, but there is no firm evidence that such links exist. [redacted]

The keys to Sendero's resilience are its clandestine mode of operation, which has inhibited infiltration by police and military intelligence, and the fanatical commitment of its relatively small cadre of revolutionaries. [redacted]

[redacted]

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Figure 3  
Peru: Emergency Zones



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Changes in the geographic location of terrorist incidents during the past two years suggest a major shift in Sendero's strategic focus from Ayacucho and other outlying rural areas to the capital. During 1984 and 1985, the number of recorded terrorist attacks in Ayacucho dropped by 60 percent; by contrast, such attacks jumped by a similar percentage in Lima which—partly because of the appearance of a new urban terrorist group called the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement—has become the central theater of guerrilla/terrorist operations. [redacted]

**The Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA)** Tupac Amaru, which first appeared in November 1983, embraces a revolutionary Marxist doctrine calling for the violent overthrow of the state and is virulently anti-American. Unlike Sendero Luminoso, the MRTA is exclusively urban based, looks to Moscow and Havana as revolutionary models, and stresses terrorist actions designed to achieve maximum political and propaganda benefits. It frequently car-bombs and dynamites public buildings, robs banks and supermarkets, and seizes radio stations but generally avoids killing people. There are no known links between MRTA and Sendero Luminoso, but attacks by the two terrorist groups have sometimes occurred simultaneously. [redacted]

Shortly after President Garcia took office, MRTA announced a temporary truce with the new government, ostensibly to give Garcia a chance to prove himself a true friend of Peru's poor and downtrodden. The truce, however, lasted only three months. In October and November, MRTA launched a terrorist campaign in Lima, occupying the offices of the daily newspaper *El Nacional*; bombing Citibank, Texaco, Avianca (Colombian National Airlines) offices, and the US and Colombian Embassies; and executing one Civil Guard police officer—all within a two-week timespan. The US Embassy believes that the attack on the Colombian legation and the killing of a guard may signal MRTA's intention to adopt more aggressive tactics, which would increase the threat to US property and personnel in Lima. [redacted]

Precise data on Tupac Amaru's leadership and composition, like the Sendero Luminoso's, is unavailable. It is apparently very small—possibly numbering no more than 40 to 50 trained operatives and a few hundred sympathizers. [redacted] MRTA may have links to Colombia's M-19 and possibly to Nicaragua's Sandinista regime and to Castro's Cuba, but solid evidence on the extent or nature of these links is lacking. MRTA probably raises most of its funds from bank robberies, blackmail, and extortion. In this connection, the US Embassy notes that a wave of kidnappings in Lima during the second week of November coincided with MRTA's reappearance as a terrorist threat in the capital. [redacted]

**Counterinsurgency: Garcia's Strategy** On the insurgent front, Garcia has followed a dual approach. While authorizing continued counterinsurgency operations, Garcia has publicly called to account military personnel accused of human rights violations, promised to devote substantial economic resources to civic action programs, and formed a peace commission to examine possibilities for a negotiated solution. We believe Garcia's strategy has potential, but, to succeed, the government will have to follow through on its promises to address the broad range of social and economic problems that have helped fuel the insurgency. Increased government spending on rural agriculture projects and other programs for improving the well-being of peasants and urban slumdweller could begin to undercut popular support for the insurgents, but Garcia is unlikely even under the best circumstances to come up with massive funding for social and economic programs that we believe would be necessary to rally the populace against the guerrillas. [redacted]

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
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**Prospects**

Even with a firmer hand, there is little likelihood that the Garcia government would defeat the Sendero insurgency or crush MRTA's small band of urban terrorists in the next year or two. Guerrilla violence is likely to continue relatively unchecked unless civilian and military authorities can agree on a counterinsurgency strategy and can provide the funds, training, and equipment to implement it. President Garcia also has said he believes a military counterinsurgency strategy would fail unless it is linked to a program of civic action and development assistance for the highlands areas to eliminate the deprivation and suffering he sees as the root causes of insurgency. Apart from an all-out war against the guerrillas—which is highly unlikely under Garcia because of his political philosophy and economic constraints—the present stalemate will probably persist indefinitely.

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Angola

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**Angola**

In our view, the Angolan Government, no doubt encouraged by gains in the 1985 offensive against UNITA insurgents, probably believes it can continue to make military progress this year. Press reports indicate that President dos Santos used an MPLA party congress in December 1985 to increase his political dominance and to affirm the goal of a military solution to the 10-year civil war. From 1983 through 1985, the South African-supported insurgents held the initiative as the government forces retained control of the urban centers but were unable to counter UNITA advances in the countryside. During the last major offensive, however, the government demonstrated improved military performance aided by more effective use of Soviet-supplied weapons—particularly aircraft and armor—and closer advisory support from the Soviets and Cubans. [redacted]

Although the insurgents have suffered a setback, we believe UNITA is resilient and has the ability to bounce back. The insurgents probably are considering steps to adjust their strategy to emphasize more classic guerrilla tactics in the expectation of another government offensive. With more intense conflict in the offing for both UNITA and the Angolan Government, the importance and direct role of their main foreign backers—the USSR and South Africa—seem likely to increase, in our view. [redacted]

**Government Military Gains**

The military objectives of the 1985 offensive were roughly the same as those in 1984—to advance on UNITA's stronghold area in southeastern Angola. This time, government forces captured Cazombo—held by UNITA since late 1983—and nearly took Mavinga until they were driven back by repeated South African airstrikes. Both Cazombo and Mavinga are important to UNITA: Cazombo because it gave them control of a small portion of the border with Zaire and served as a support base for northern operations; Mavinga because it was the first town of any size to be captured, the site of the 1982 UNITA party congress, and a station on UNITA's supply line to the north. [redacted]

The government has the tactical initiative, and we believe Luanda no doubt will try to expand on its gains in a similar major offensive this year. There is some question about when the offensive will begin. Despite UNITA's public claims that it has already started [redacted]

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[redacted] we believe the most likely time for major troop movements would be after the rainy season ends in about April. Some probing actions are likely in the interim, but Luanda probably will not throw its full weight into an offensive until extensive preparations and resupply efforts are completed. [redacted]

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**Luanda's Strategy**

Luanda, [redacted] is pursuing a combined military-political strategy intended to ultimately defeat the insurgents in a protracted conflict. Senior Angolan leaders have said that it could be a decade or more before the internal security situation is resolved. In addition to improving the military performance, Luanda seeks to revitalize the party and reform the government administration so that it can effectively win over the "heart and minds" of the population once the military has secured the territory. We believe the government's improved military performance during the recent offensive probably contributed to President dos Santos's domination of an MPLA party congress last December, which he used, according to press reports, to reinforce his position with a major reshuffling of the party leadership. Moreover, the congress made prosecution of the war against UNITA the regime's number-one priority. [redacted]

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The alternative of a negotiated power-sharing arrangement with UNITA has been publicly refused by the MPLA. It is likely to be considered, in our view, only when the government is either under extreme military pressure or believes it can negotiate from a position of strong military advantage. The hostility between the MPLA and UNITA is reinforced by ethnic and racial differences, according to various observers, and by Luanda's fear of the considerable political skills and charisma of UNITA leader Jonas


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Figure 4  
Angola: Military Activity



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Savimbi. In its public statements, the government has generally approached reconciliation in terms of willingness to provide amnesty for UNITA's rank and file but not for Savimbi. [redacted]

the Angolan operations compensates for Angolan inexperience in large-scale operations. [redacted]

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**UNITA's Support**

Since late 1983, UNITA has held the southeastern quadrant of the country, which it defends with regular forces and administers—according to visiting Western journalists—with a rudimentary but apparently effective civil administration. The UNITA-held territory, although sparsely populated and lacking economic resources, is significant to UNITA primarily as a sanctuary and support base for its logistic supply lines to guerrillas elsewhere in the country. The territory also abuts South African-controlled Namibia, affording the otherwise geographically isolated insurgents easy access to outside support and the protection of South African military forces. [redacted]

Against the insurgents, the government has an armed strength of roughly 100,000 men in the regular Army and other security forces plus another 50,000 or more auxiliaries. In addition, there is a roughly 36,000-man Cuban military contingent, including some 28,000 combat troops, that backs the Angolan Army, guards rear bases, provides essential support services, and frees Angolan troops for field operations. [redacted]

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We believe the government holds most of the conventional military advantages. It has a better than 3-to-1 advantage in manpower, and, although many of these troops are tied down in defense of fixed positions, Soviet- and Cuban-flown transport aircraft allow fairly rapid redeployment and concentration of forces throughout the country. UNITA's troops, in contrast, move primarily on foot, and movement to various theaters throughout the country is a matter of weeks or months. [redacted]

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UNITA conducts guerrilla operations throughout most of the remainder of the country but is strongest in the well-populated central highlands centered on Huambo, which is inhabited primarily by the Ovimbundu ethnic group from which UNITA draws its primary support. Beginning in 1983, UNITA pushed its guerrillas into northern Angola both to increase the military challenge to Luanda and to garner support among Angola's other main ethnic groups. UNITA has succeeded in sustaining its operations in this region despite difficulties in supplying these extended forces and the recent government offensive in the southeast. [redacted]

The government advantage in firepower and weaponry is even more pronounced. Substantial Soviet arms deliveries, particularly since 1982, have provided the Angolan Army with the full range of conventional weapons, including tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery, in contrast to the lightly armed insurgents with only small arms and other light infantry weapons. The substantial growth in Angola's air strength—fully used in the recent offensive for the first time—provides an additional advantage for which UNITA has no effective response. [redacted]

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**Balance of Forces**

According to UNITA officials, the insurgents have roughly 20,000 to 25,000 fully armed and trained regular forces organized in battalions, most of whom are deployed in UNITA-held territory. In addition, there reportedly are 30,000 to 35,000 guerrillas operating in smaller units throughout the country, many of whom are ill armed and ill equipped. UNITA's troops have been described by numerous Western observers as better trained, more dedicated, and tougher than government forces. This advantage may be narrowing, however, as government forces improve their military skills and, as in the recent offensive, as substantial involvement of Soviet advisers in directing

**Prospects**

In our view, the government success in the last offensive probably has disabused UNITA leader Savimbi of the idea, expressed frequently in the past, that he could achieve a quick win by stepping up the military pressure on the government and forcing Luanda to the bargaining table. We believe UNITA will have to face the prospect of improving government military performance, the more active use of government superiority in airpower and firepower for which UNITA has no immediate answer, and the difficulties of supporting extended guerrilla operations. [redacted]

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Although Savimbi for the present may have been knocked off stride, we judge that he is far from beaten and we do not believe that he will pull back from operations in northern Angola or elsewhere in the country. Savimbi probably is considering adjusting his tactics and strategy to cut back on semiconventional operations in favor of more purely guerrilla tactics. The necessity of challenging the government throughout the country, distracting Luanda from concentrating on his base area, and expanding his area of support and recruitment probably will compel Savimbi to try to keep up the pressure, in our view.

[redacted]

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For both UNITA and the government, the importance of the main outside backers seems likely to us to increase if only to offset the other's role. Savimbi probably will seek improved antitank and antiaircraft weapons to compensate for government superiority, and Pretoria may be required to commit forces again to defend UNITA's sanctuary and rear bases. Greater South African involvement could prompt an equivalent Cuban or Soviet response, most likely additional air defense weapons, but possibly including a more direct involvement in Angolan military operations.

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Ethiopia

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**Ethiopia**

Addis Ababa has been unable to defeat the well-organized and determined Marxist-led insurgencies in the northern provinces of Eritrea and Tigray, despite large commitments of men, materiel, and money over the years and extensive Soviet military assistance to the Ethiopian armed forces since the Mengistu regime has been in power. The government reportedly hopes that the creation of a People's Republic in 1986—with its constitutional plan for regional autonomy—will eventually bring an end to the rebellions. The insurgent leadership, however, remains unwilling to settle for autonomy on Mengistu's terms. Although the insurgents probably realize that they cannot defeat the government militarily, they apparently believe that prolonged warfare will eventually lead to the collapse of the regime and Mengistu's replacement by a more accommodating leader. [ ]

**Background and Objectives of the Insurgencies**

The Eritrean and Tigrean insurgencies have different goals, although the major groups share several characteristics and espouse varying degrees of Marxism. The Ethiopian Government—itself engaged in institutionalizing its Marxist revolution—does not understand the political grievances that are fueling the insurgencies and remains unwilling to make significant concessions to end the fighting in the north, according to the US Embassy. [ ]

**Eritrea Province**

The roots of this conflict date back to 1952, when the United Nations attached the former Italian colony of Eritrea to Ethiopia, forming a federal state in which each party had delineated powers and responsibilities. Neither side was pleased with this arrangement: Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie wanted to annex Eritrea outright, and most Eritrean political leaders favored independence. Over the next decade, the Emperor alternately used coercion and subtle inducements to dismantle the federal structure until the rump Eritrean parliament voted to dissolve the federation in 1962, making Eritrea another Ethiopian province. [ ]

This move sparked an armed rebellion that was initially led by the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), an umbrella organization that included Muslims and Christians as well as members of various political ideologies. The movement split in the early 1970s over religious and ideological issues, however, and the Christian-dominated breakaway faction later became the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF). After several years of internecine fighting, the EPLF defeated its rival and became the major Eritrean rebel group. The EPLF refuses to accept the legality of the former UN-sponsored federation and seeks an independent Eritrea organized along Marxist lines.<sup>1</sup> [ ]

**Tigray Province**

The rebellion in Tigray began in March 1975, when former officials in the province led an uprising against the military regime that overthrew Emperor Haile Selassie in September 1974. Although the original Tigrean rebel group called for a Western-style political system for Ethiopia, to a great extent the rebellion was an outgrowth of an age-old struggle for domination of Ethiopia between the Tigrean and the Addis Ababa-based Amhara ethnic groups, since several of the leaders of the revolt belonged to the royal family of Tigray. Several other smaller groups also took up arms at this time, and one of them, the Marxist-led Tigrean People's Liberation Front (TPLF), soon defeated its rivals and became the dominant force in the province. [ ]

Until recently, Tigrean spokesmen had called for the transformation of Ethiopia into a civilian-led federation that would provide for the equal participation of the various ethnic and tribal groups in the country. Failing this, they stated that the TPLF would like to acquire nearly complete internal autonomy or full independence for the province. [ ]

<sup>1</sup> The ELF dissolved into several competing factions in the early 1980s. These organizations and other Eritrean groups have offices in Sudan from which they conduct propaganda and recruitment activities. A number of them receive financial and military assistance from various Arab states, but none of them has a military arm of note and they conduct few operations within Ethiopia. [ ]

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
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Figure 5  
Ethiopia: Areas of Insurgency



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In July, however, a more radical group of Marxist ideologists seized control of the TPLF, [redacted] [redacted] They have attacked the Marxist credentials of the Mengistu government and condemned both Soviet and US "imperialism." Indeed, TPLF propaganda now calls for purging Ethiopia of all foreign influence and building a new Marxist society. [redacted]

#### Government Objectives

The Mengistu government, like the Selassie regime, is deeply committed to maintaining Ethiopia's territorial integrity and creating a centralized state. Addis Ababa claims—erroneously—that Eritrea actually was part of an Ethiopia Empire until it was colonized by Italy in 1885 and that the Eritrean rebels have little popular support. The government views the Tigrean insurgency as an offshoot of the Eritrean rebellion rather than a reflection of Tigrean nationalism. [redacted]

The regime, with strong Soviet military and advisory support, is determined to pursue a military settlement to the northern conflicts and is only willing to offer regional autonomy as a basis for a peace in Eritrea—despite the EPLF's consistent rejection of the proposal. For example, the planned constitution for a People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, according to government announcements, will establish regional administrations with a degree of autonomy in an effort to undercut the insurgents. [redacted]

#### The Military Balance

**The EPLF.** This front has an estimated 25,000 regular troops in Eritrea or in camps within Sudan. The group's regular forces are well organized and well armed, and, with artillery weapons and armor, they have a conventional as well as a guerrilla capability. Despite a series of military setbacks this past summer, when government forces recaptured several rebel-held towns in the lowlands, morale among EPLF forces reportedly remains high, [redacted] [redacted]

Eritrean military strategy is designed to exploit Ethiopian military weaknesses and to undermine the morale and fighting capabilities of the government's units in the north. The EPLF, fighting in the conventional mode, scored several major victories over the

regime during the past 18 months and in November defeated another government attempt to capture its stronghold at Nak'fa after heavy fighting. In addition, it conducts effective guerrilla operations against Ethiopian supply lines and small, isolated garrisons, aided in part by a sympathetic population that provides intelligence and other assistance. [redacted]

The EPLF suffers from several military deficiencies, however. Because of its Christian and Marxist make-up, the EPLF receives little assistance from the Arab states, which prefer to funnel their support to the minor, Muslim-dominated Eritrean factions. As a result, almost all of its weapons are captured from the Ethiopians or are purchased on the international market and smuggled into Eritrea from Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and North Yemen. This hinders, to a great extent, the EPLF's ability to conduct sustained offensive operations because it has no steady supply of weapons and cannot afford to suffer heavy equipment losses. In addition, the EPLF has a very limited air defense capability [redacted]

**The TPLF.** This front, with approximately 15,000 troops, is organized along traditional guerrilla lines and rarely fights in a conventional mode. It is lightly armed and depends on mobility and the element of surprise to attack isolated or poorly defended government garrisons. The TPLF enjoys a considerable degree of popular support, but, because of its Christian-Marxist base, it has had little success in acquiring Arab economic and military assistance. Until recently, the TPLF had close ties to the EPLF, which provided training and a limited amount of weapons to supplement what the Tigrean insurgents themselves captured from the government. [redacted] [redacted] strains have developed in the relationship, however, mainly over ideological and political issues. [redacted]

Both the TPLF and the EPLF use Sudan to infiltrate troops, weapons, and supplies into Ethiopia. The border area serves as a safehaven for the rebels, who actively recruit among the refugee camps that dot the region. The Mengistu regime—well aware of this situation—refuses to make any effort to improve the currently strained relations between Addis Ababa and

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Khartoum until the Sudanese stop these insurgent activities. Sudan, however, lacks the manpower to patrol its borders effectively, and even if Khartoum took steps to close its border to the rebels the insurgents still have several alternative infiltration routes. [redacted]

**Government Forces**

The Ethiopian Army is a heavily mechanized force that, because of superior firepower and adequate combat air support, controls the cities and major towns in Eritrea and Tigray Provinces. More than 100,000 Ethiopian troops and approximately 25 fighter aircraft are stationed in the north. Using its superior firepower, the regime has been able to contain, but not defeat, the insurgents. Characteristically, government forces launch offenses that temporarily dislodge the insurgents—such as the counterattack that forced the Eritreans to withdraw from Barentu and Teseney last summer—but usually are unable to control the countryside for any length of time. The capability of the Ethiopian Army is severely weakened, moreover, by low morale, poor leadership, logistic shortcomings, and high casualty rates, especially among junior officers and noncommissioned officers. We estimate, for example, that the Ethiopians suffered more than 6,000 casualties in their latest unsuccessful effort to capture Nak'fa. The military also has had little counterinsurgency training and receives little support from the local population. [redacted]

Moscow provides arms and maintenance support to government forces, and we believe several hundred of the 1,700 Soviet military advisers in Ethiopia are involved in Addis Ababa's military effort in the north.<sup>2</sup> In addition, Soviet officers participate in planning military operations against both the Eritrean and Tigrean rebels, according to several US Embassy sources. [redacted]

<sup>2</sup> The 2,000 to 2,500 Cuban combat troops in Ethiopia are stationed near Dire Dawa, in the Ogaden region, and are not involved in the northern fighting. We believe some of the 3,000 Cuban advisers and technicians in Ethiopia are attached to Ethiopian forces in the north. [redacted]

In conjunction with its military efforts, the Mengistu regime has tried several political and economic programs in recent years in an effort to undercut local support for the insurgents. Although primarily a military venture, Addis Ababa's ill-fated 1982 "Red Star" campaign included the commitment of economic assistance designed to rebuild the economy of Eritrea. In Tigray, tens of thousands of ethnic Tigrean peasants have been resettled forcibly in other parts of the country, partly in an effort to weaken the insurgency by separating the rebels from their rural supporters. [redacted]

**Outlook**

Neither the government nor the insurgents have the capability to defeat the other decisively. We believe the military status quo generally will continue over the near term, with both sides occasionally achieving an isolated victory or initiating offensive operations. Ethiopia will continue to see Sudanese duplicity in Khartoum's inability to deny the insurgents use of its territory. This issue, added to other problems that separate Addis Ababa and Khartoum, will ensure that relations remain strained and will be used by Mengistu to justify his assistance to southern Sudanese dissidents. [redacted]

Prospects for a political settlement also will remain bleak. In early 1985, the Eritreans announced the end of their participation in a series of negotiating sessions with the Ethiopians. The gesture was meaningless, however, since no progress on any issue was made during the two years of meetings. We believe the current Tigrean leadership will reject any proposal offered by the Mengistu regime because the TPLF refuses to recognize the legitimacy of the Ethiopian Government. [redacted]

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## Mozambique

### Evolution of an Insurgency

Mozambique's social system and physical environment have favored the emergence and spread of armed dissidence. Grievances abound in Mozambican society, which is more than 90 percent rural and fragmented into at least 10 major ethnic groups, each speaking its own language. An 11-year guerrilla war against Portuguese rule before independence in 1975 helped foster a popular resignation to the inevitability of political violence. Moreover, Mozambique's open borders, rough terrain, and thick forest cover provide an ideal environment for guerrilla operations. [redacted]

After eight years of guerrilla war, the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO)—an avowedly pro-Western insurgent movement with about 15,000 armed guerrillas—operates freely throughout rural Mozambique, while the Marxist government's weak and demoralized forces have firm control over little more than the major urban centers. In comparison to peak preindependence strengths of the now-ruling Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), the insurgent group has nearly twice as many guerrillas, is active in more than double the territory, and is opposed by substantially fewer government troops. RENAMO appears to have overcome its unsavory origins as a client of Rhodesia and South Africa and gained some popular support within the country. It has recruited heavily among ethnic groups in central Mozambique, but the group's image of being dominated by rural Shona-speaking tribesmen hinders efforts to gain supporters among urban dwellers and rival ethnic groups in the northern and southern provinces. Moreover, RENAMO has no leader with the stature of Mozambican President Machel, no workable government-in-exile, and its tribal-based grassroots political structure is ill equipped to gain countrywide popular support and to administer areas the guerrillas now dominate. [redacted]

RENAMO's gains are due as much to government weakness as to insurgent strength. The 35,000-man Mozambican Army—described by some Western military attaches as one of the poorest in Africa—is short of troops, training, and equipment despite the provision by the Soviet Bloc of about \$1 billion in equipment since 1975 and 2,100 military advisers and

technicians. Increasingly reluctant to fight, the Army relies heavily upon 5,000 or more Zimbabwean troops in Mozambique to help contain the insurgents.

FRELIMO reportedly has lost the allegiance of many peasants through its neglect of rural areas, its inability to cope with the economic collapse since independence, and its efforts to replace tribal customs and leadership with Marxist substitutes. A more pragmatic government attitude since 1983, however, has brought an end to many of these unpopular programs, and Mozambique—with substantial foreign aid and recent good weather—is showing early signs of some economic recovery. [redacted]

### RENAMO's Origins and Growth

Shortly after Mozambique became independent, disparate anti-FRELIMO elements joined together—with the encouragement of Rhodesia's white-ruled government—to form what later became RENAMO. Included were conservative whites who had fled black-ruled Mozambique, blacks from small political parties that refused absorption into FRELIMO, disenchanted FRELIMO officials, colonial Army veterans, secret police agents, and some tribal leaders.

[redacted] Rhodesian intelligence officials began to use RENAMO in 1977 to conduct sabotage and reconnaissance operations against Mozambican-based guerrillas of Robert Mugabe's anti-Rhodesian Zimbabwe African National Union. [redacted]

When Zimbabwe became independent in 1980—and RENAMO lost its Rhodesian sanctuaries and support—South Africa took over the insurgent group to discourage Maputo from tolerating the presence of anti-South African guerrillas in Mozambique. Operating from sanctuaries in South Africa and Malawi with a nucleus of a few hundred guerrillas, the group quickly reestablished its bases in the Gorongosa Mountains and recruited thousands of new adherents there. Under pressure in central Mozambique from the Mozambican Army, RENAMO—at that point the fastest growing insurgency in Africa—expanded its operations to nine provinces by early 1983 and to distant Cabo Delgado Province in 1984. [redacted]

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**Tribal Base.** Despite its geographic expansion, RENAMO has continued to recruit primarily among Shona speakers from central Mozambique, [redacted] [redacted] Several Europeans temporarily held prisoner by the guerrillas later said that insurgent recruiters had been effective in telling local civilians that FRELIMO was dominated by southern Shanganas and mixed-race city dwellers—for example, the FRELIMO politburo currently includes four Shanganas and five Mesticos or whites, but no central Mozambicans. [redacted]

**Grievances.** Insurgent sympathizers have been disaffected with FRELIMO's inability to cope with the country's economic collapse at independence and with its Marxist programs intended to eradicate tribal customs and leaders. After a Party Congress in 1977 declared FRELIMO to be a vanguard Marxist-Leninist Party, Maputo's policies—particularly its efforts to impose collectivization on family farmers—antagonized many peasants. Most foreign managers and skilled workers had departed in 1975, taking with them or destroying nearly all of the country's vehicular transport and causing rural markets to collapse. Peasant farmers unable to sell their produce returned to subsistence agriculture. [redacted]

**Reforms**

President Machel, however, belatedly canceled several unproductive socialist programs, and a FRELIMO party congress in 1983 endorsed several initiatives at economic liberalization. FRELIMO closed or turned over to the private sector most state-owned shops, deemphasized Soviet-style state farms, and began to offer some relief to peasant farmers and small-scale businesses. Maputo also appealed to the West for economic and military assistance, most notably during Machel's visit to Europe in late 1983. Economic recovery has been slowed by RENAMO's attacks and by alternating droughts and floods during the past four years, but recent weather has been good and harvests appear to be improving. [redacted]

Maputo's boldest step to try to end the RENAMO threat came when it signed the Nkomati Accord in March 1984 with South Africa. The nonaggression pact bound both sides to deny military aid and encouragement to each other's opposition movements. FRELIMO has been bitterly disappointed, however,

by RENAMO's failure to wither and disappear. Reports of guerrilla incidents increased by more than 50 percent in 1984, according to a CIA computerized data base, and attacks recorded in Maputo Province alone increased from six in 1983 to 100 in 1984.

[redacted] South Africa has violated the agreement by continuing some supply operations, although we judge that these supplies have not been on a scale large enough to explain the insurgents' successes over the past two years. In addition, [redacted] [redacted] most weapons recovered from the insurgents had been seized earlier from the Army. [redacted]

A government offensive from August to October 1985 overran several guerrilla bases—dealing RENAMO a temporary setback and buoying government morale—but the campaign also underscored Maputo's growing military dependence on Harare. Zimbabwean forces—first sent to Mozambique in late 1982 to guard transportation routes vital to Harare, and doubled to about 9,000 troops in July and August 1985—used airstrikes, helicopters, and a parachute assault to drive the insurgents' headquarters from the rugged Gorongosa Mountains. The guerrillas avoided heavy casualties, however, by hiding among civilians or by dispersing into Tete and Zambezia Provinces, [redacted] [redacted] Insurgent activity continued throughout the country, and attacks near Maputo increased. [redacted]

**Military Balance**

RENAMO regained the tactical advantage throughout rural Mozambique during the November-to-April rainy season when large government offensives ceased, but it has yet to mount significant attacks within major urban areas. Guerrilla activity is heaviest in the central and northwestern provinces, where groups as large as several hundred men are hitting roads and rail lines, other economic facilities, and government forces. In the south, RENAMO seeks to isolate Maputo and gain maximum publicity from attacks such as the one that destroyed a munitions dump outside the capital last September. The guerrillas have an extensive network of area commands and bases, effective communications, and advance warning of government military operations. [redacted]

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Described by some Western military attaches as one of the worst armies in Africa, Mozambique's 35,000-man regular military forces and several thousand militia are ill trained and critically short of troops and material. Their manpower advantage over the guerrillas is inadequate, according to most authorities on counterinsurgency, and the ratio probably is declining because of the high rates of desertion and draft avoidance and RENAMO's continuing growth. Moreover, the Army has not been able to compensate for its insufficient manpower with superior equipment. Much of the military equipment provided by the Soviet Bloc—FRELIMO's principal supplier—is inappropriate for fighting guerrillas or beyond the capability of the Mozambicans to operate and maintain. Maputo is increasing its use of fighter-bombers and helicopter gunships against RENAMO, but other items of Soviet equipment—such as SA-3 surface-to-air missiles recently delivered at Beira, [redacted] [redacted]—are useless against the insurgents. [redacted]

Consequently, Maputo is more dependent than ever upon foreign help to contain the insurgency. Only Zimbabwe, however, has sent combat forces to assist Mozambique. Harare has left about 5,000 troops there to defend key transportation links during the rainy months, and may augment them again for offensive operations after the rains end in April, although many Zimbabwean officials would prefer to reduce their costly commitment in Mozambique and may convince Prime Minister Mugabe to do so. There are about 800 Soviet military advisers, trainers, and technicians in Mozambique, together with about the same number of Cuban military trainers and technicians, as well as several hundred East Germans working primarily with the Mozambican police. [redacted]

**Political Factors**

RENAMO has major political deficiencies despite its military expansion. The insurgents lack a leader of national stature, although [redacted] [redacted] Commander in Chief Alfonso Jacama—a Shona speaker like most of his troops—has the respect and obedience of the guerrillas. RENAMO's feckless government-in-exile in Nairobi and Lisbon has not been recognized by any foreign government. Within Mozambique the insurgents' political wing is underdeveloped, although [redacted]

RENAMO is administering areas it occupies in central Mozambique. Whereas the guerrillas are mostly from the central provinces and appear to be unified, they are suspicious of the externally based political wing under Evo Fernandes, a Mozambican of partial Indian descent who resides in Europe. [redacted]

RENAMO's tribal image will slow its effort to become a multiethnic national movement. FRELIMO itself was unable in the 1960s to organize among both the Maconde in northern Cabo Delgado Province and the rival Macua farther south. In our judgment, the independent Maconde probably resist both RENAMO and the government today. In the south, the Shanganas will be likely to continue to support FRELIMO because they are well represented in FRELIMO's senior ranks and are traditional rivals to the Shona speakers, RENAMO's principal base of popular support. [redacted]

**Ideology**

In our judgment, RENAMO lacks ideological appeal. RENAMO's founders had little in common except their shared hatred for FRELIMO, and they attracted recruits by playing up local tribal and rural grievances against the government. RENAMO exists primarily as an anti-FRELIMO group with no positive political program of its own. Many of the group's political spokesmen abroad probably seek only their own enrichment, despite their claims to favor popular elections and negotiations with FRELIMO to select a new president. In our judgment, the guerrillas probably would establish a tribal dictatorship in the event that they came to power soon, but a protracted war might lead RENAMO to broaden its support. The group is staunchly anti-Marxist, however, and a RENAMO regime probably would prefer a free market economy and political alignment with the West, to which it would look for substantial economic and military aid. [redacted]

**Prospects**

A military decision or a negotiated settlement are both unlikely over the near term. RENAMO lacks the military resources and urban support to dislodge

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
FRELIMO from the cities or to defeat the Zimbabwean-backed Mozambican Army. For its part, Maputo cannot regain the tactical advantage in the countryside without more troops, materiel, and training. President Machel's hand was strengthened by the government offensive last fall, and he could have offered to discuss peace with the insurgents at that time, but he probably could not get RENAMO to negotiate seriously if the guerrillas regain the military advantage. [redacted]

A protracted war could cause internal upheavals in both RENAMO and FRELIMO. RENAMO has no dissident rivals, but Machel could seek to weaken the group by encouraging distrust between the guerrillas and their political officials, or within the insurgents' political wing. FRELIMO has its own faultlines, however, and spectacular government military setbacks could spark a coup attempt in Maputo or a rapid collapse of FRELIMO's forces. [redacted]

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Over the longer term, we expect security to continue to deteriorate slowly throughout Mozambique. RENAMO probably already has stockpiled or can capture—even without South African help—the means to continue guerrilla operations indefinitely. Its tribal image and political deficiencies, however, will inhibit efforts to acquire multiethnic support, a grassroots administration, and international recognition. For its part, FRELIMO needs a long-term program of personnel expansion, training, equipping, and motivation to improve significantly the Army's performance. Zimbabwe's forces in Mozambique may grow and shrink seasonally, but several thousand troops probably will remain to guard Mozambican transportation links that are essential to Mugabe's long-term goal of reducing economic dependence upon South Africa. The West has increased its economic aid and is beginning to offer limited military assistance, even as the Soviet Bloc maintains its level of support. [redacted]



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**Afghanistan**

After six years of fighting Afghan insurgents, the Soviets and their client Afghan Government are bogged down in a guerrilla war of increasing intensity. The Soviets have had little success in reducing the insurgency or winning acceptance of the Afghan people; the Afghan resistance continues to strike targets throughout the country and commands widespread popular support. [redacted]

**The Setting**

Afghanistan's rugged terrain, diverse ethnic and tribal groups, fiercely independent population, and Islamic beliefs help sustain the resistance. Insurgents use numerous mountainous trails to bring supplies into Afghanistan from Pakistan; craggy slopes provide cover for ambushes and storing supplies and materiel. Insurgent groups—most are rural based and operate only in their local area—include many tribes and groups that have traditionally been little influenced by Kabul governments and have a long history of fighting invaders. The resistance effort is fragmented into seven major organizations in Pakistan and hundreds of guerrilla groups in Afghanistan. Islam provides a common bond for many insurgents, although religious differences—particularly Sunni-Shia splits—play a divisive role in the insurgency. [redacted]

**Strategies and Goals**

Although Afghan insurgents generally agree on ousting Soviet troops and replacing the Marxist-Leninist Babrak Karmal regime, there are wide differences over goals and strategy. Most insurgents fall into one of three categories:

- The Islamic fundamentalists, who want to make Afghanistan into a theocratic state, modeled on Iran.
- The traditionalists want to restore a secular government vaguely based on Islamic tenets.
- The majority, who seek considerable autonomy for their region or ethnic group and favor a minimum of interference in local affairs from Kabul. [redacted]

The insurgents avoid large, setpiece battles with Soviet forces, concentrating instead on ambush actions, small-unit assaults, and, increasingly, attacks on regime garrisons. In some areas where insurgents

are strong, they have established judicial, economic, religious, medical, and educational institutions to support the local population. [redacted]

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The Soviet strategy is aimed at transforming Afghanistan into a reliable Communist client state by:

- Developing and maintaining an Afghan army that can quell the insurgency with minimal Soviet support.
- Controlling the educational system and building a new generation of Afghans loyal to Moscow.
- Developing an effective ruling Communist party that is not torn by factionalism.
- Media indoctrination.

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These efforts have had little impact to date because Afghans adhere to traditional and religious beliefs and values, distrust the Babrak regime, and receive poor treatment from Soviets when training in the USSR and from Soviet advisers and officers in Afghanistan. Until the Soviets are able to build an effective cadre of Afghans, Soviet forces will have to concentrate on holding strategic areas—such as Kabul and key military facilities throughout the country—maintaining important lines of communication, and denying insurgents unchallenged bases in Afghanistan. [redacted]

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**Political Capabilities**

The Kabul regime, which probably numbers 50,000 to 100,000 supporters, increased its efforts in 1985 to bolster domestic support by downplaying the party, stressing traditional Afghan institutions, and employing bribery and subversion. The regime sponsored two highly publicized jirgas—traditional Afghan councils with representatives from throughout the country—and later staged local elections in selected areas of the country in an effort to create an impression of popular support. In reality, little change has occurred because most Afghans distrust the Babrak regime. [redacted]

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Meanwhile, KHAD, the Afghan intelligence service, has intensified efforts to bribe, co-opt, and subvert tribes, particularly along the Afghan-Pakistani border in areas the resistance uses to infiltrate supplies. Although some tribes have defected to the regime, their allegiance often wanes quickly. [redacted]

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**Figure 7**  
**Afghanistan**



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A newly created resistance alliance—Ittihad Islami—of the major resistance organizations, headquartered in Peshawar, Pakistan, should, in time, better coordinate operations in Afghanistan and increase effectiveness of international political efforts. The alliance has formed a military council—largely inactive thus far—to coordinate activity inside Afghanistan and expects to establish a council to more equitably channel weapons, ammunition, money, and supplies to the fighters. In the fall of 1985, the alliance sent a delegation to the UN General Assembly to focus international attention on the Afghan issue. Eventually, the alliance plans to challenge the Afghan Government for its UN seat. The alliance has also issued a

statement demanding it be a party in any negotiated settlement on Afghanistan. Alliance members, however, remain divided by deep-seated ideological, ethnic, and tribal differences that pose major barriers to cooperation.


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**Military Capabilities and Performance**

Fighting increased markedly in intensity in Afghanistan this year, but neither the Soviet-Afghan regime nor the insurgents were able to gain a significant advantage. The Soviets adopted a more aggressive counterinsurgency approach using both multibattalion

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and small-unit operations. They relied increasingly on their own efforts on the battlefield as the estimated 45,000 Afghan troops continued to prove unreliable and to perform poorly. Increasing casualties accompanied the rising tempo of activity; we estimate 30,000 Soviet, 85,000 Afghan regime, and some 40,000 to 50,000 insurgent casualties since the invasion in 1979.



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The Soviets increased their troop strength in 1985 by about 4,000 to approximately 118,000, continued to rely heavily on air assets for fire support and air assault operations, and upgraded the combat capability of some existing units. Although multibattalion operations remain the Soviets' preferred method of fighting, the smaller, better trained, and heliborne units, such as Special Purpose Forces (Spetsnaz), increased significantly during 1985. The Soviets added four Spetsnaz battalions to Afghanistan in 1985—bringing to seven the total number of such battalions in country—probably to reduce insurgent infiltration from Pakistan and Iran. The Soviets are also using indirect fire support more extensively, upgrading their weaponry,

and providing specialized training for combat forces in Afghanistan.

Despite these Soviet improvements, the insurgents retained the initiative in much of the countryside; vigorously contested control of Qandahar and Herat, Afghanistan's second- and third-largest cities in 1979; and demonstrated increasing cooperation and tactical sophistication in the field. The insurgents' capabilities improved because of the increased weapons, training, and equipment they received during the year. Some resistance forces were hurt by defections to the regime and the death of dynamic leaders.

We estimate that the number of armed Afghan insurgents has risen from 50,000 to 100,000 at the time of the Soviet invasion in 1979 to more than 150,000 full- and part-time fighters. New members are drawn mainly from the several thousand Afghan army troops who desert annually and from refugee camps in Pakistan.

**Outlook**

Barring an unlikely decision by Moscow to deescalate the war in the interests of a political settlement, we see little likelihood of major changes in Soviet force structure, tactics, or equipment in Afghanistan in the coming year. Because of the unreliability of the Afghan Armed and Air Forces, Moscow may put more effort into developing paramilitary and irregular units among Afghan tribesmen to assist in blocking insurgent infiltration. Intelligence efforts aimed at locating and killing major insurgent leaders are likely to be stepped up, as are Soviet efforts to sow discord among insurgent groups.

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Even if the Soviets step up their operations significantly, the insurgents' terrain advantages, overwhelming popular support, access to increasingly extensive supplies donated mainly by Islamic and Western countries, and sanctuary available in Pakistan will be likely to prevent substantial Soviet gains. The resistance probably will attempt to extend the war into areas of Afghanistan where fighting previously was limited and to mount stronger efforts against Afghan garrisons and Soviet facilities. International groups are increasingly attempting to provide medical, educational, and other humanitarian services to the 80 to 90 percent of Afghanistan's population that lies outside Kabul's influence.

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Although we expect casualties on both sides to increase again next year, we see few signs of war weariness among the resistance—whose morale remains high—or any lessening of Soviet determination. We believe that both the Soviets and the insurgents are improving their military capabilities, but that the

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higher learning curve and superior intelligence capabilities on the part of insurgents give them a slight advantage. Nevertheless, the Soviets can concentrate superior airpower and firepower to seize targets, almost at will. [redacted]

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Moreover, when Soviet operations end, insurgent activity usually returns to previous levels because few Soviet or Afghan troops occupy the territory. [redacted]

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The Soviets probably will increase pressure on Pakistan, the linchpin of the Afghan resistance. They probably will attempt to destabilize Pakistani President Zia's government by fomenting dissent among the population, particularly in tribal areas near the Afghan-Pakistani border, and among ethnic groups such as the Baluch. Zia is unwavering in support for the resistance and the almost 3 million Afghan refugees residing in his country, although some senior Pakistani officials have doubts about his policy. [redacted]

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Prospects for a political settlement are dim. The Soviets contend that the war can only be solved politically, but they insist that all "outside interference" cease before Soviet troop withdrawals are discussed at the UN-sponsored proximity talks between Pakistan and the Afghan Government. We believe Moscow will continue to use these talks to portray itself as responsive to international criticism and probe for concessions by Islamabad. [redacted]


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**The Philippines**

The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its military arm, the New People's Army (NPA), continued to expand during the past year. The insurgents capitalized on increased public disenchantment with the policies of former President Ferdinand Marcos to swell their membership rolls and accelerate their control over numerous rural areas. The NPA also benefited from the continued absence under Marcos of any effective government counterinsurgency program. [redacted]



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The ascension to power of President Corazon Aquino, however, has dealt the radical left a serious political setback. At a minimum, the Communists' boycott of the 7 February presidential election cost them a chance to increase their power by linking themselves to the enormously popular Aquino. Meanwhile, the quick replacement of Marcos loyalists in the Philippine military with an interim group of professional officers bodes well over the long term for Manila's counterinsurgency effort. [redacted]

[redacted] We believe the CPP decided against terrorism in Manila during 1985 because its leaders probably felt it would be counterproductive to the party's image and the effectiveness of its political operations. [redacted]

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Nevertheless, we believe the party already has the required assets in Manila to launch an urban terrorism campaign with little or no warning. [redacted]

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**Communist Fronts: A Weak Link**

**The Communist Party: Organization for Revolution**  
The current insurgency can be traced to 1968, when several young Communists formed the pro-Beijing Communist Party of the Philippines, with the aim of fostering armed revolution in the Philippines. By the 1980s, they were well entrenched on all the country's major islands. [redacted]

Party efforts to use front groups to maintain and expand its domination of opposition organizations recorded both successes and failures in 1985. Nationwide, the CPP has created some 64 front organizations and infiltrated successfully at least 500 organizations. The party relies on the National Democratic Front (NDF) as its main umbrella organization. [redacted]

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
Since the assassination of opposition leader Benigno Aquino in August 1983, CPP/NPA political and military action has escalated rapidly. The CPP has used antiregime messages to attract new members, foment strikes, organize rallies, and set up broad-based coalitions and front groups dominated by party members. From several thousand members only a few years ago, the party today may be as large as 45,000, with a mass base of support of perhaps 1 million, [redacted]

The Communists appeared to achieve a major success last April when moderate, leftist, and issue-oriented groups joined together to form BAYAN, a political party that was slated to participate in elections both this year and in 1987. The CPP nevertheless overplayed its hand at BAYAN's first congress. This resulted in a walkout by moderate elements and ended the public facade of BAYAN independence from CPP control. Similar actions have occurred frequently in the past, where dogmatic party leaders have pushed

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
**Figure 8**  
**The Philippines: Areas of Communist Influence**



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**The Alarming Growth of the New People's Army**

The most ominous development in the Communist movement has been the demonstrated increase in the size and capabilities of its military wing—the NPA.



Insurgent tactical capabilities also improved in 1985. The composition of NPA formations—which normally are limited to 30 to 50 men—frequently expanded to company size (100 to 300 men) to facilitate large-scale attacks on townhalls and government military detachments. Insurgent intelligence and communications also improved as a result of the continued theft of private and government mobile radios. The military believes the NPA is now capable of intercepting government communications while using the radios to coordinate their own operations. Finally, the NPA acquired four pumpboats, which government officials in Manila believe will enhance the insurgents' smuggling operations and facilitate the movement of guerrillas and party officials among the various islands in the Philippines. [redacted]

Although Soviet support for the NPA is not yet in evidence, and military support is likely to require extensive negotiation and calculations of advantage by both parties, [redacted]

[redacted] In our judgment, financial and propaganda support, rather than military assistance, would be the most likely outcome of any direct CPP-Soviet negotiations. [redacted]

too quickly to gain or maintain control of front activities. Moreover, Filipino reluctance to join groups publicly identified as Communist controlled have hampered efforts by the CPP to gain credibility and legitimacy for its fronts. [redacted]

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The remarkable growth and improvement in NPA tactics, in our judgment, is attributable to the quality of the leadership. In addition to competent battlefield skills, the NPA leadership also has effectively cultivated a nationalist image among Filipinos to attract and retain new recruits and expand the base of popular support. [redacted]

[redacted]

**Government Forces in Disarray**

In contrast to the leadership capabilities of the insurgents, the Philippine Armed Forces (AFP) counterinsurgency effort has been, for the most part, inept and counterproductive. Throughout 1985 the main reason for this failure, in our judgment, was ex-President Marcos's decision to rely almost exclusively on military means to deal with the insurgent threat. Hampered by a politicized leadership, resource constraints, institutional infighting, and a minimal civic action program, the armed forces proved unequal to the Communist challenge. [redacted]

**Leadership Problems.** The politicization of the AFP under Marcos severely hampered its limited counterinsurgency capabilities. With loyal but incompetent officers advancing through the ranks, little progress was made in addressing such critical issues as human rights abuses, favoritism in promotions, improved training for combat troops, and redeployment of men and equipment out of Manila. The resultant demoralization of large segments of the armed forces only further worked to the insurgents' benefit. [redacted]

**Resource Constraints.** With an inflation-adjusted, 1985 military budget only half that of 1979, the armed forces last year experienced shortages of critical items such as food, fuel, uniforms, ammunition, medicine, and trucks. These shortages and the continuing decline in funding for the AFP seriously [redacted] restricted the duration and effectiveness of AFP combat operations. Equally significant, they generally precluded military

forces from remaining in the field to protect government supporters from returning NPA cadre. Along with the government's failure to pay promised salary increases, the shortages fostered disciplinary problems and disrupted civil-military relations as abusive soldiers extorted local populations for needed supplies. Resource constraints last year also hampered efforts to expand the AFP. Short both of facilities to train and of materiel to equip new units, AFP expansion was limited to creating additional understrength units by stripping excess personnel from headquarters and administrative staffs. [redacted]

**Institutional Infighting.** Bureaucratic battles within the armed forces over roles, missions, and responsibilities hampered effective intelligence operations and the command and control of forces in the field.

[redacted]

Similarly, inter- and intra-service rivalries crippled operational effectiveness. For example, [redacted] often were unwilling to risk using their aircraft to support Army combat operations. Within the Army itself, field commanders occasionally would not pursue insurgents into areas outside their assigned responsibility. [redacted]

**Civic Action.** AFP efforts to gain public confidence in the government remained underfunded, resource short, and limited in effectiveness. Equipment and fuel shortages curtailed efforts at road building and school construction, while rural medical care and educational outreach programs suffered from the AFP's own limited capabilities in these areas. [redacted] military civic action programs accomplished little because they were only an adjunct to military operations and not part of a coordinated, government-wide effort to tackle the root causes of the insurgency. [redacted]

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**Outlook**

President Aquino, with her sweeping popular mandate to tackle the problems facing the country, has an opportunity to undercut the Communists' appeal by restoring public confidence in the central authorities. Over the longer term, the threat from the left will depend on Aquino's housecleaning of the senior military command, the development of a coherent counterinsurgency program, and her success in addressing concerns of the professional soldier. If Aquino stumbles in these efforts, the insurgents will be well positioned after the new government's honeymoon period ends to resume expanding their military strength.

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**Cambodia**

Nearly seven years after it invaded Cambodia, Vietnam is moving aggressively to subdue the resistance and consolidate its control over the country. Hanoi has announced its intention to resolve the Cambodia problem by 1990 and to withdraw the bulk of its forces. To achieve these goals, Vietnam has implemented an aggressive strategy that calls for relentless military pressure designed to demoralize the resistance and its foreign backers, allowing Hanoi to secure a political solution on its own terms. But, while the non-Communist resistance groups remain ineffective on the battlefield, Communist Democratic Kampuchea (DK) forces continue to mount an active guerrilla campaign throughout the country. International political and materiel support for the rebels remains solid. Moreover, the Vietnamese-installed People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) regime under Heng Samrin still cannot stand on its own, in our judgment, precluding a substantial Vietnamese withdrawal any time soon. [redacted]



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Nonetheless, the three resistance groups in 1982 formed the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) to present a united anti-Vietnamese front, at least in international political forums. The CGDK has won UN recognition, but the fragile coalition is largely a paper organization. Deep-seated personal antipathies, factional rivalries, and fundamental philosophical differences for the most part prevent meaningful cooperation among the three groups. As a result, each faction operates autonomously, and the DK continues to launch sporadic attacks against non-Communist forces operating in areas inside Cambodia that it considers DK territory.



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**Vietnam's Aggressive New Strategy**

The Vietnamese have adopted a tough new strategy over the past year and a half that represents a radical departure from the dry-season offensive/rainy-season retrenchment cycle that Hanoi had followed previously.<sup>3</sup> [redacted]

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**Background**

Border tensions between Cambodia and Vietnam escalated in the late 1970s, climaxing in an all-out Vietnamese invasion that toppled Pol Pot's Democratic Kampuchea regime in January 1979. While Hanoi concentrated on building a new Cambodian government under Heng Samrin, DK forces regrouped in remote areas along the Thai-Cambodian border. By 1981 the DK were conducting guerrilla operations along the border and in several interior provinces. In recent years, Communist guerrillas have been able to build an extensive network of supply caches and local contacts in the interior, improving their ability to sustain an active interior campaign. [redacted]

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After overrunning every major resistance base during the 1984-85 dry season, Vietnamese and PRK forces have remained deployed along the border. Intensive sweep operations launched throughout the border region have kept the non-Communists off balance and have hampered infiltration by more resilient DK forces. In addition, the Vietnamese have established semipermanent blocking positions on strategic high points in several areas to monitor and disrupt resistance activity. [redacted]

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Along with the DK, the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF), under former Cambodian Prime Minister Son Sann, and Prince Sihanouk's National Army (ANS) are opposing the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. Although the two non-Communist factions politically are more acceptable in the international community than the DK, neither group figures prominently in the military situation. [redacted]

<sup>3</sup> The dry season in Cambodia runs roughly from November through May followed by several months of heavy monsoons. The Vietnamese typically have keyed their military operations to coincide with the dry season, which favors their heavy conventional forces. During the rainy season, Hanoi has withdrawn its units to garrison areas in the interior where they are less vulnerable to guerrilla attack. [redacted]

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The Commander of Vietnamese forces in Cambodia, Le Duc Anh, wrote in late 1984 that Hanoi's strategy is designed to demoralize the resistance and its foreign backers by demonstrating the futility of their cause. The Vietnamese believe they can achieve this goal by sustaining military pressure against the guerrillas to deny them territorial holdings in Cambodia and to block infiltration to the interior. The Vietnamese almost certainly realize as well that to relent now would ensure the erosion of past gains and a return to the unproductive cyclical pattern of previous years. [redacted]


guerrillas appear to have stepped up proselytizing among local villagers to develop popular support. [redacted]

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In a parallel effort to block infiltration, the Vietnamese have conscripted thousands of Cambodian civilians to construct barriers along the border. The barriers consist primarily of dual barbed wire fences with landmines and other booby traps placed in between. In addition, fences and dikes have been constructed around some major population centers and military installations inside Cambodia to cut off resistance contact with local civilians and to improve security. Vietnamese officials admit that they cannot "seal" the border completely, but that they have been able to inhibit resistance infiltration and to exact heavier than normal casualties on guerrilla units moving to the interior. [redacted]



In addition to working to bolster its military position in Cambodia, the DK also has attempted to improve its political image. The DK last July issued a sweeping communique purportedly outlining its view of the future of Cambodia. According to this statement, the DK envisions a "liberal capitalist economy" and a parliamentary political system with Prince Sihanouk as president—a marked contrast to the highly centralized, authoritarian DK regime that ruled from 1975 to 1978. Communist guerrilla officials pledged to abide by election results even if they were not included in the new government. In addition, Pol Pot last September announced his retirement and named Son Sen commander of DK forces and appointed Khieu Samphan president. But these were largely cosmetic moves, in our view, and we doubt that the fanatical Pol Pot would abandon his radical Communist ideology or relinquish command of his army as long as he is physically able to retain control. Officials in Hanoi so far have dismissed the maneuvers even though Pol Pot's removal is a key Vietnamese precondition to negotiations involving the DK. [redacted]

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**The DK Adjusts**

Vietnamese pressure clearly has hampered Communist guerrilla operations but the DK, in our view, has suffered little permanent damage and has sustained an active guerrilla campaign over the past several months. Hanoi's preoccupation with the border has thinned forces normally dedicated to internal security. As a result, DK units appear to be able to operate freely in the interior once they have penetrated Vietnamese and PRK border defenses. The DK has targeted Vietnamese and PRK transportation routes, local government offices, and food storage warehouses in an effort to undermine confidence in the Heng Samrin regime. But the Vietnamese show no signs of redeploying forces to beef-up internal security—a sign that Hanoi considers the situation to be manageable. [redacted]

Nevertheless, we believe the DK since mid-1985 has mounted a concerted effort to strengthen its position in the interior for expanded operations. Communist


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**The Non-Communists Falter**

Non-Communist resistance forces so far have had little impact on the military situation in Cambodia. Although they extoll the merits of guerrilla warfare, until recently the non-Communists concentrated on defending large border camps even though their forces were no match for the vastly superior Vietnamese forces. [redacted]



US diplomats report that the Thai in November relocated the bulk of ANS and KPNLF troops to temporary assembly areas deeper in Thailand for additional guerrilla training. Thai officials reportedly plan to dispatch small units for infiltration into Cambodia as they complete the training program. We believe Bangkok hopes to forestall Vietnamese attacks against resistance border camps by withdrawing guerrilla forces deployed there. But the redeployment

signifies an unprecedented effort by the Thai to increase their control of the resistance and probably reflects ASEAN's conclusion that the non-Communists cannot resolve their debilitating leadership, discipline, and morale problems on their own. While Thailand apparently considers the redeployment as a long-term investment in the non-Communist resistance, it is likely to hurt the non-Communists' political credibility and will diminish the near-term chances for substantial progress in their guerrilla effort. The lack of near-term progress in developing an interior support base in turn will dim the chances for dramatic long-term gains by the non-Communists. [redacted]

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**The 1985-86 Dry Season: A New Pattern Emerging?**

Hanoi probably will stick with its current strategy of maintaining military pressure along the border while mounting intensive sweeps against guerrillas in the interior—a departure from the traditional dry-season pattern that featured large-scale assaults against guerrilla bases. [redacted]

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[redacted] With the military balance tipped strongly in their favor, the Vietnamese have no compelling reason to incur the political and military costs implicit in large-scale attacks against resistance camps in Thailand. The withdrawal of non-Communist forces from the border, moreover, has removed several potential Vietnamese targets. [redacted]

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Nonetheless, we expect the Vietnamese to launch limited cross-border raids against resistance positions, which probably will result in occasional sharp clashes with Thai forces. For its part, Thailand on occasion may feel compelled to respond sharply to Vietnamese intrusions to demonstrate for domestic and international consumption firm resolve in defending Thai soil. Nevertheless, we believe Bangkok and Hanoi will avoid serious escalation. [redacted]

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Although the non-Communists probably will not be a factor for the next several months, the DK will at least sustain its current campaign and will continue efforts to bolster internal support. We believe recent efforts to reorganize and reposition forces will improve the DK's potential to step up interior guerrilla operations. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted] we doubt that the DK will be able to alter the current military situation dramatically. [redacted]

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**Briefs**

The following briefs summarize the status of 13 additional insurgencies. The judgments are based on our review of extensive evidence [redacted] over the past year. [redacted]

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**Colombia**

A marked upsurge in terrorist actions over the last several months probably foreshadows an eventual collapse of the country's current pseudopeace with the insurgents, perhaps when President Belisario Betancur's term expires in August 1986. Moreover, we believe a renewed outbreak of insurgency would quickly reach levels comparable to those that existed before Betancur took office in 1982. Although in 1984 Betancur obtained cease-fire agreements with FARC, M-19, and EPL insurgents—ELN guerrillas refused to participate—only the truce with the FARC still remains in effect. Furthermore, largely because his policies have not significantly reduced levels of domestic violence, popular support for Betancur's approach has steadily eroded. [redacted]

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**Guatemala**

The fortunes of Guatemala's four leftist insurgent groups—the EGP, FAR, ORPA, and PGT/O—are in decline. Available evidence indicates that ideological and personal differences among guerrilla leaders and a successful counterinsurgency campaign are limiting the insurgency's effectiveness and frustrating Havana's and Managua's efforts to unite Guatemala's rebel groups. In addition, although the insurgents maintain their ability to conduct low-risk, high-profile acts of urban terrorism, government-sponsored civilian defense programs and various civic action initiatives have helped to reduce insurgent ranks to no more than 1,500 full-time combatants. We do not expect the insurgency's negative trend to change during the next 12 months. [redacted]

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**Ecuador**

Ecuador, long one of the few Andean nations not affected by terrorist violence, now faces a growing insurgent challenge. The most prominent radical group—Alfaro Vive, Carajo! (AVC)—first appeared in 1983 and now numbers some several hundred armed members and sympathizers. There are also indications that this “anti-imperialist” and anti-US group is the beneficiary of increasing amounts of arms, money, and training from foreign governments and insurgent organizations. Although the AVC does not currently possess the numbers or resources to threaten the government, we believe its terrorist capability makes it a serious concern. In addition, the combative political style of Ecuador's fiscally conservative, pro-US President—Leon Febres-Cordero—has alienated many Ecuadoreans and is giving the radicals new opportunities to attract support. [redacted]

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**Chile**

We believe Chile's current social and political environment is turbulent and conducive to the development of a serious insurgency within the next two to three years. The Chilean Communist Party (PCCh) with its affiliated terrorist group—the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR)—is attempting to exploit these conditions. [redacted]

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[redacted]

25X1

[redacted] If President Pinochet tries to consolidate his power by further curtailing human rights and obstructing the return to democracy, we believe he will polarize Chilean society and increase the likelihood of widespread leftist violence. [redacted]

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25X1

**Iraq**

The Kurdish insurgency in Iraq is now causing growing concern within the Hussein regime over the threat of a two-front war. Baghdad's preoccupation with the Iran-Iraq conflict has allowed the insurgents to seize extensive tracts of territory along the Iranian and Turkish borders over the past five years, and the two principal insurgent groups—the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the Popular Union of Kurdistan (PUK)—now show signs of mending their former bitter rivalry. Moreover, the government's heavyhanded counterinsurgent tactics have alienated many formerly moderate and loyalist Kurds and added to the insurgents' ranks. [redacted]

25X1

[redacted]

25X1

[redacted] To date, Baghdad has tried to contain the insurgency as cheaply as possible—using reserve troops to keep only key areas secure—and will, we believe, postpone complete pacification efforts until after the Iran-Iraq war. [redacted]

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25X1

**Namibia**

The South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO) is facing increased difficulties in its bid for power. Although SWAPO maintains the political support of the majority of black Namibians; boasts 7,000 to 8,000 guerrilla fighters; and receives money, arms, and training from the Soviets; the South Africans have succeeded in containing and reducing SWAPO's capacity for guerrilla action. Moreover, SWAPO is showing signs of disorganization and low morale. Tribal conflicts within SWAPO, growing impatience over the failure of international negotiations for Namibia's independence, and the group's inability to gain a foothold in the country—it controls no Namibian territory—have eroded the insurgents' effectiveness. We believe SWAPO will continue its armed struggle during the next year—primarily through low-level terrorism—but will avoid a major guerrilla offensive, which could lead to a crippling defeat. [redacted]

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**South Africa**

South Africa's main insurgent group—the African National Congress (ANC)—has gained international and domestic stature in the past year. The ANC's antiapartheid activities have drawn international sympathy and increased its already wide popularity among South African blacks. Moreover, the ANC continues to receive considerable military training and equipment from the Soviet Bloc and nonmilitary support from Scandinavian states, the Organization of African Unity, and the United Nations. However, the ANC lacks the type of effective guerrilla network in South Africa's townships—a tactic Pretoria has denied the group through its pervasive internal security apparatus—they will need to mount a government-threatening insurgency. We do not expect this deficit to change during the next year. [REDACTED]

25X1

**Sudan**

The Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA)—Sudan's major insurgent group—continued its rapid expansion in 1985 in pursuit of a “unified, secular, federated, and socialist Sudan.” The Ethiopians provide the insurgents with a cross-border sanctuary and considerable economic, training, and arms support. Khartoum lacks a cohesive leadership and an army capable of defeating the insurgents. Unless the government is able to open a political dialogue with the SPLA, or convince the Ethiopians to reduce their insurgent support—prospects we find unlikely during the next 12 months—the insurgents will continue to generate instability and hinder Sudan's prospects for developing their economic resources in the south. [REDACTED]

25X1

**Chad**

Chadian President Habre faces periodic attacks by more than 3,000 rebel troops based in Libyan-occupied northern Chad. In the last year, Libya has worked to improve the combat readiness and effectiveness of these forces, while also augmenting Libyan ground forces, bringing assigned Libyan troop strength in the north to about 6,000—its highest level since 1984. Habre has reinforced and resupplied his northern garrisons in response to this Libyan and rebel force buildup, forcing him to base some 5,500 of his 16,000-man Army in the north. [REDACTED]

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Habre also faces a chronic Libyan-backed rebel insurgency in the south. Although successful counterinsurgency operations by the government over the past year have improved the security situation, stepped-up Libyan resupply and funding of the rebels could stir unrest at any time. Under an amnesty program, some 5,000 guerrillas have rallied to the regime, but in the past Libya has successfully convinced them to rejoin the insurgency by passing out bribes. We calculate that southern insurgents now number less than 1,500, well below their peak strength of more than 10,000 in 1984. Habre has improved his political standing in the south by replacing corrupt northern officials with southerners and punishing northern soldiers who abuse the local southern population. Despite this success, however, Habre will have to move slowly to integrate southerners into his regime to avoid alienating his key northern backers. [REDACTED]

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**Sri Lanka**

We believe Tamil insurgents will pose a long-term threat to the government even if a negotiated settlement is reached. Fighting in the eastern and northern provinces could escalate if negotiations fail altogether. Prospects have become increasingly remote for a political resolution of the conflict between President Jayewardene's government—representing the Sinhalese Buddhist majority—and the Tamil Hindu minority—and we do not believe a military solution is in the offing. Moreover, the problem of maintaining any agreement may be even more difficult than reaching one because of both sides' inability to prevent violence and reprisals.

[redacted]

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**Thailand**

The threat posed by the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) insurgency remained minimal in 1985. Since 1979, Beijing has virtually ended its support to the CPT as part of its strategy to maintain Bangkok's stand against the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. In addition, despite some united front activity in rural and urban areas, the CPT remains devastated by the ideological quarrels and mass defections of the early 1980s. We see no evidence of a reversal of this trend at this time. A Vietnamese-supported CPT splinter insurgent group—the Phak Mai—also presents little threat to the Thai Government at this time.

[redacted]

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**Burma**

Fundamentally, the various Burmese insurgent conflicts have not changed during the past year. Most Burmese ethnic minorities have been in almost continuous revolt against the central government since independence in 1948; and, contrary to government rhetoric, these insurgencies are not on the verge of being crushed. The government's Army reportedly suffers from a high desertion rate, low morale, and poor discipline in many frontline areas. Moreover, despite an increase in manpower, the Army lacks the resources to effectively control or defeat the insurgents. In the Karen State, where the Karen National Union (KNU) insurgents enjoy widespread popular support, the insurgency has become a war of attrition. The government's effort is now focused on isolating the guerrillas from the population and eliminating smuggling as a source of revenue for the KNU. Government operations against other leading insurgent groups—the Kachin Independence Army and the Burmese Communist Party—have likewise yielded few positive results.

[redacted]

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**Laos**

Low-level insurgent activity continues in Laos, but we doubt that the resistance will be able to mount a credible challenge to the government for the near future.

[redacted]

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[redacted] while villagers in some areas offer at least passive support, the Lao populace in general appears indifferent to the resistance movement.

[redacted]

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
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**Appendix A**



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## Appendix B

Soviet and Soviet-Surrogate Support  
for Client Regimes, 1980-85

	Advisory (mid-1985) Military			Other			Military (1980-84)		Economic (1980-85) <sup>a</sup>		
	(Numbers of people) USSR	(Numbers of people) East Europe	Cuba	(Numbers of people) USSR	(Numbers of people) East Europe	Cuba	(Million US \$)		(Million US \$) USSR	(Million US \$) East Europe	Cuba
Afghanistan	3,000	NA	0	5,000	250	100	2,200	Aircraft, ground, helicopters, munitions	1,500	100	0
Cambodia	200	0	0	300 est.	0	0	200	Ground, aircraft, munitions	450	NA	NA
Angola	1,200	500	0	1,500	1,125	6,000	2,500	Aircraft, ground, naval, ADA/ SAM	35	15	0
Ethiopia	1,700	600	3,000	1,775	725	1,100	2,400	Aircraft, ground, na- val, ADA- /SAM	500	135	25
Mozambique	800	500	800	600	2,500	900	714	Aircraft, ground, naval, ADA/SAM	80	75	0
Nicaragua	50- 75	60- 80	2,500- 3,500	225	250	3,500- 4,000	556	Aircraft, ground, naval, ADA/SAM, radars	325	300	250
Iraq	1,000	200	0	5,500	12,200	400	12,800	Aircraft, helicopters, ground, ADA, muni- tions	245	75	0
Laos	500	0	0	300 est.	0	0	250	Aircraft, ground, helicopters, munitions	270	NA	NA

<sup>a</sup> Disbursed.

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