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Beirut as a Terrorist Center

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A Research Paper

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A Research Paper

This paper was prepared by

Counterterrorist Center, with contributions from the

Offices of Global Issues, Near Eastern and South

Asian Analysis,

It was

coordinated with the Directorate of Operations

Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Operations and Analysis Group,

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CTC,

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|  | Beirut as a Terrorist Center  |
| Summary Information available as of 1 November 1986 was used in this report. | The rise of Beirut as a terrorist center is one of the principal byproducts of Lebanon's political upheaval. The continuing power struggle between and among Lebanon's Christian and Muslim militias has transformed the city into a lawless, militarized zone—an ideal setting for international terrorists to meet, prepare, and from which to stage terrorist operations. The city is an open arena in which extremists of various affiliations can operate without strictures or fear of being apprehended by government authorities. Moreover, Beirut offers the major state sponsors of terrorism—Iran, Syria, and Libya—an operating environment for supporting or tasking various terrorist groups while maintaining plausible deniability. |
|  | Given the continuing security conditions in Beirut, the city's role in international terrorism is unlikely to change. A generation reared in the Lebanese civil war is coming of age—young Christians and Muslims who view fighting as a part of everyday life. Living conditions, especially in  |

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Figure 1 Ports in the Greater Beirut Area

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#### The Operating Environment

In effect, Beirut has been a divided city since late 1975. The Christian-controlled East continues to pay at least nominal allegiance to the government and the presidency. There is some degree of law and order—much of it enforced by the Christian Lebanese Forces militia—but frequent bursts of violence occur as rival Christian groups struggle for power. The Muslim West and especially the Shia-dominated southern suburbs are, in the words of Druze warlord Walid Junblatt, a "desert stalked by ravenous wolves." Except for a brief interlude between 1982 and 1983, West Beirut has been without effective government for a decade. Most of the terrorist activities described in this paper occurred in the western part of the city.

In a city where no law prevails and civil war has raged for more than a decade, violence is routine. Kidnapings, in particular, have become a way of life. Since 1984 approximately two dozen US and French nationals have been taken hostage in Beirut. Although some of the hostages may have been moved to the more remote al Biqa' (Bekaa Valley) at times, many have remained in Beirut where their captors have little fear of discovery. Anti-Western sentiments and propaganda have grown as extremists have tightened their grip on the city, but Westerners are not the only—or even primary—victims of the violence. Car bombings, kidnapings, and assassinations are the common instruments of dialogue between militias, but, with the departure of most of the Western presence from Beirut, such incidents garner little notice.

Within this context, Beirut provides a hospitable environment in which terrorists can carry out logistic activities to support their terrorist operations beyond Lebanon and even outside the Middle East. The city's former status as one of the Arab world's major commercial, transportation, and communications centers has contributed to its ongoing use as a crossroads

and safehaven for terrorists. In particular, the city offers a fertile recruitment ground for various terrorist organizations, as well as a major transit point—especially for those Middle Eastern groups that increasingly choose to operate in Western Europe. Beirut has also emerged in recent years as a terrorist supply and communications center. The city serves as a financial mecca, an open arena for weapons trafficking, a center for procurement of documentation, and the locale of choice for terrorists issuing claims of responsibility. In addition, many groups probably plan their operations from Beirut, although, except in cases where there are surviving terrorists in custody, information on such activity is scanty.

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#### **Key Ingredient in State Support**

Beirut offers the major state sponsors of terrorism—Iran, Syria, and Libya—an operating environment for supporting or tasking various terrorist groups while maintaining plausible deniability. Iran and Syria, in particular, have ample room to maneuver given their presence in Beirut and other parts of Lebanon. Libya is attempting to increase its terrorist options by reopening a People's Bureau in Beirut and by using the nation's largely uncontrolled financial system to transfer funds to terrorist operatives. The large number of groups—and freelance terrorists as well—that transit or are headquartered in Beirut ensures that state sponsors have access to terrorists of all stripes; conversely, terrorist groups seeking support can readily find willing sponsors in Beirut

Iran's influence in Beirut rests largely on its deep and longstanding relationship with the radical Lebanese Shia organization Hizballah. Iran does not control the group, but it maintains a significant degree of influence through the provision of funds and training. Iranian Revolutionary Guards provide training at camps located in the Bekaa Valley. Syria provides support to various militias in Beirut, according to the

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dictates of Syrian policy. Syria's presence in Beirut—and its dominance in the Bekaa Valley—ensures that Damascus is in frequent contact with those terrorist groups whose interests dovetail with those of Syria. Libya has provided financial backing to radical Nasserist groups in Lebanon and is seeking to establish a deeper foothold in Beirut.

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#### Recruitment

A generation reared in the Lebanese civil war is coming of age—young Christians and Muslims who view fighting as a part of everyday life. Living conditions, especially in West Beirut, contribute to the radicalization of the inhabitants; Palestinians living in refugee camps—Sabra, Shatila, and Burj al Barajinah—and Shia living in the Muslim slums surrounding the camps are ready targets for terrorist recruitment. The only authority these youths have known is the militias that dominate the neighborhoods around them. Lebanon's growing unemployment—estimated at more than 35 percent of the active labor force—contributes to the disaffection of the younger generation, which sees few alternatives or costs to participation in violent activities.

We have been able to establish that several terrorists who participated in the most dramatic attacks during the past year grew up in either the Palestinian camps or the Shia slums in Beirut:

- One of the terrorists in the 5 September 1986 hijacking of Pan Am flight 73 grew up in the Sabra camp in Beirut, where he was probably recruited for the operation.
- One of the Abu Nidal terrorists who survived the December 1985 attack on the Vienna airport has said that he received instructions in Beirut—where he grew up in the Shatila camp—to go to Austria to participate in an operation.
- The Abu Nidal member who was arrested for the September 1985 bombing of the British airline office in Rome confessed that he was recruited for that mission in Beirut and traveled directly from there to Rome.

#### Terrorist Groups Located in Beirut

Beirut serves as a crossroads for many terrorist organizations. Although most groups are headquartered elsewhere, many maintain a presence in the city—especially in the Palestinian refugee camps. The following groups have resident members or offices in Beirut:


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- Hizballah organization. Cells are located in nearly every neighborhood west of the green line. Each cell maintains a bureau in its area of responsibility. Planning for clandestine operations almost certainly is not done in these public offices, but probably is handled in the homes of Hizballah members. The organization completely dominates the Harat Hurayk and Bir al Abid sections of Beirut.
- Abu Musa. The group is not headquartered in Beirut but has a presence in the city, especially in the Burj al Barajinah refugee camp.
- Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine— General Command (PFLP-GC). The group is active in the Sabra refugee camp.
- Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). The group operates in several areas but is particularly active in the Shatila refugee camp.
- Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). The group has offices in the refugee camps.
- Saiga. The group is active in the Sabra refugee camp.
- Abu Nidal. Reportedly, the group has offices in the refugee camps.
- Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA). Elements of this organization are located in West Beirut, although its headquarters is in the Bekaa Valley.

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• At least one of the radical Shia hijackers of TWA flight 847 in June 1985 was recruited from the Muslim slums in Beirut. The operation probably was planned in Beirut by Hizballah officials.

A Meetingplace for Terrorists

# Table 1 Air Travel Time From Beirut to Selected Cities

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| Because of the many terrorist organizations that have    |
|--|
| a presence in Beirut, the city plays a key role in       |
| facilitating relationships among terrorist groups—       |
| relationships that initially may be a "feeling out" of   |
| the other terrorist players, but ultimately could lead   |
| to operational cooperation among groups. In fact, in     |
| recent months we have seen signs that individuals who    |
| may be affiliated with different terrorist organizations |
| have increasingly been in contact with one another:      |

| Destinations     | Travel Time |         |
|------------------|-------------|---------|
|                  | Hours       | Minutes |
| Cairo, Egypt     | 1           | 15      |
| Tunis, Tunisia   | 3           | 10      |
| Paris, France    | 4           | 10      |
| Larnaca, Cyprus  |             | 40      |
| Athens, Greece   | 1           | 45      |
| Istanbul, Turkey | 1           | 35      |
| Moscow, USSR     | 3           | 30      |
| Damascus, Syria  | 1           | 05      |
| Amman, Jordan    | 1           | 20      |

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 Senior Abu Nidal and Hizballah officials in Lebanon reportedly meet weekly, alternating between Beirut and Ba'labakk.

erate on several key issues in Beirut. Many current

Hizballah leaders reportedly were former members

Fatah and Hizballah coop-

Only Middle East Airlines (MEA), the Lebanese-flag carrier, flies a regular schedule out of Beirut to a variety of European and Middle Eastern cities. Syrian Arab Airlines flies weekly between Damascus and Beirut, but no other Arab or Western airline services Lebanon. Aeroflot and three East European airlines fly to Beirut once a week. Three Western airlines

of Fatah.

Libya
has initiated contacts with Hizballah members in
Beirut and in the Bekaa Valley. Libya reportedly

fly to Beirut once a week. Three Western airlines (British Airways, Lufthansa, and Swissair) and two African airlines have arrangements with MEA wherein MEA provides aircraft and flightcrews for flights between Europe and Beirut.

Security at Beirut International Airport is controlled

has initiated contacts with Hizballah members in Beirut and in the Bekaa Valley. Libya reportedly has asked Hizballah to provide security should the Libyan People's Bureau in Beirut be reopened.

There are no indications that any meaningful attempt has been made to hinder terrorist use of the airport. The airport is surrounded by Shia Muslim slums in which pro-Iranian extremists operate virtually at will and the radical Hizballah organization is strong in most of the areas adjacent to the airport. Approximately 15 percent of all skyjackings that have occurred outside the United States during the past 15 years began, passed through, or ended at the Beirut airport, far exceeding

the number of incidents at any other airport (see

appendixes A and B). May Mansour, who placed the

#### **Transit**

as to Europe.

Beirut's role as a land, air, and sea transportation hub for terrorist groups operating in the Middle East and Europe also reflects its pre-civil-war status as the leading international transit point within the Middle East. The city is only about three hours by road from Damascus and within easy access of major Palestinian and Shiite strongholds in the Bekaa Valley. By air, Beirut is only four hours from Paris, and travel time to other European capitals is even less. Beirut's unregulated ports give terrorist groups and state supporters an easy and untraceable way to move personnel, weapons, and logistics between Lebanon and key points elsewhere in the Middle East, as well

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| Table 2                           |
|-----------------------------------|
| Air Carriers That Fly Into/Out of |
| Beirut International Airport      |

| Airline                        | Flights<br>Per Week |
|--------------------------------|---------------------|
| Aeroflot                       | 1                   |
| Balkan (Bulgaria)              | 1                   |
| British Airways a              | 3                   |
| CSA (Czechoslovakia)           | 4                   |
| Interflug (East Germany)       | 1                   |
| Lufthansa <sup>a</sup>         | 1                   |
| Middle East Airlines (Lebanon) | 64                  |
| Nigeria Air a                  | 1                   |
| Swissair <sup>a</sup>          | 3                   |
| Syrian Air                     | 1                   |
| Tarom (Romania)                | 1                   |
| Tunisavia (Tunisia) a          | 1                   |

a By arrangement with Middle East Airlines.

bomb that exploded aboard TWA flight 840 and killed four Americans last April, flew from Beirut to Cairo. She boarded flight 840 in Cairo and flew to Athens, leaving the bomb under the seat when she left the aircraft. Mansour returned to Beirut from Athens.

Seven ports—two official and five unofficial—serve Beirut and are operated by Christian, Shia, and Druze militias. Nearly all terrorist groups have access to the sea through arrangements with the proprietors of these ports. Although most terrorists apparently travel in and out of Beirut by air or land, the ports probably are used for the importation of large shipments of weapons, as well as narcotics and other contraband.

Beirut is particularly important as a transit point for terrorists traveling to the Bekaa Valley for training at various facilities there. Land access to Beirut from the north and east is controlled almost exclusively by Syria. Terrorists frequently use the Beirut-Damascus highway when traveling out of Lebanon to Syria.

| Weanons Trafficking                         |             |
|---|-------------|
|   |             |
| the continuing sectarian conf               | licts, the  |
| history of Palestinian guerrilla activity,  | foreign in- |
| volvement, and the decline in governmen     | -           |
| since 1975 have combined to turn Beirut     | •           |
|   | i iiito an  |
| "open market" for weapons.                  |             |
|   |             |
|   | the         |
| gangral availability and the relative leals | - C         |

general availability and the relative lack of government control on arms possession facilitate the procurement of terrorist weapons. The enormously large number and diversity of weapons captured by the Israelis in 1982 illustrate the magnitude of the flow of covert weapons into Lebanon.

Recent arms shipments to the Lebanese Government suggest a high level of weapons "seepage" to the illicit arms market and probably to terrorists:

- The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) have purchased more than 50,000 assault rifles and 1,100 machineguns in the last 10 years, suggesting that Lebanon has had to completely replace its small-arms inventory at least once because of loss or theft. Many of these weapons are likely to have found their way into the hands of terrorists.
- The LAF has also purchased large quantities of grenades, ammunition, explosives, and antitank rockets and launchers from Western and Bloc suppliers since 1980. Some of the materiel has probably reached Beirut's arms market.

The Libyan Government reportedly has provided large shipments of arms and ammunition through the Beirut port of Khaldah for several Palestinian organizations. The USSR also provides weapons to Lebanese militias, either indirectly through the Syrians or directly through the ports. Other weapons are smuggled in by Lebanese returning to Beirut from abroad.

### Financial Linkages to Terrorism

Beirut has emerged in recent years as a financial center for aiding terrorists. The principal financial agent appears to be Libya, which funnels money

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Table 3
Lebanon: Air Service To/From Beirut

| Country              | City        | Airline                              | Flights<br>Per Week |
|----------------------|-------------|--------------------------------------|---------------------|
| Bahrain              | Bahrain     | Middle East Airlines                 | 2                   |
| Belgium              | Brussels    | Middle East Airlines                 | 1                   |
| Bulgaria             | Sofia       | Balkan (Bulgaria)                    | 1                   |
| Cyprus               | Larnaca     | Middle East Airlines                 | 6                   |
| Czechoslovakia       | Bratislavia | CSA (Czechoslovakia)                 | 1                   |
|                      | Prague      | CSA (Czechoslovakia)                 | 1                   |
| Denmark              | Copenhagen  | Middle East Airlines                 | 1                   |
| Egypt                | Cairo       | Middle East Airlines                 | 4                   |
| France               | Nice        | Middle East Airlines                 | 1                   |
|                      | Paris       | Middle East Airlines                 | 2                   |
| Germany, East        | East Berlin | Interflug                            | 1                   |
| Germany, West        | Frankfurt   | Middle East Airlines                 | 1                   |
|                      |             | Middle East Airlines/Lufthansa       | 1                   |
| Greece               | Athens      | Middle East Airlines                 | 5                   |
| India                | Bombay      | CSA (Czechoslovakia)                 | 1                   |
| Indonesia            | Jakarta     | CSA (Czechoslovakia)                 | 1                   |
| Italy                | Milan       | Middle East Airlines                 | 2                   |
|                      | Rome        | Middle East Airlines                 | 2                   |
| Jordan               | Amman       | Middle East Airlines                 | 3                   |
| Kuwait               | Kuwait      | Middle East Airlines                 | 2                   |
| Liberia              | Monrovia    | Middle East Airlines                 | 1                   |
| Nigeria              | Kano        | Middle East Airlines/Nigeria Air     | 1                   |
| Oman                 | Muscat      | Middle East Airlines                 | 2                   |
| Qatar                | Doha        | Middle East Airlines                 | 1                   |
| Romania              | Bucharest   | Tarom (Romania)                      | 1                   |
| Saudi Arabia         | Dhahran     | Middle East Airlines                 | 5                   |
|                      | Jiddah      | Middle East Airlines                 | 7                   |
| Spain                | Madrid      | Middle East Airlines                 | 1                   |
| Sudan                | Khartoum    | Middle East Airlines                 | 2                   |
| Switzerland          | Geneva      | Middle East Airlines/Swissair        | 2                   |
|                      | Zurich      | Middle East Airlines/Swissair        | 1                   |
| Syria                | Damascus    | Middle East Airlines                 | 1                   |
| •                    |             | Syrian Air                           | 1                   |
| Tunisia              | Tunis       | Middle East Airlines/Tunisavia       | 1                   |
| Turkey               | Ankara      | Middle East Airlines                 | 1                   |
|                      | Istanbul    | Middle East Airlines                 | 1                   |
| United Arab Emirates | Dubayy      | Middle East Airlines                 | 4                   |
|                      | Abu Dhabi   | Middle East Airlines                 | 4                   |
| United Kingdom       | London      | Middle East Airlines/British Airways | 3                   |
| USSR                 | Moscow      | Aeroflot                             | 1                   |
| Yemen, South         | Aden        | Middle East Airlines                 | 2                   |

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| Chronology of Terrorist-Related Use of Ports in the Beirut Vicinity, May 1985 to October 1986   | through Beirut banks to support a variety of militias, groups, and individuals in Lebanon and elsewhere.  Iran also disburses millions of dollars each year to the Hizballah operating in Beirut.  We believe that only a small portion of the money is   | 25 <b>X</b> |
|---|---|-------------|
| • In June 1985 a Libyan-flag vessel unloaded arms and ammunition at Khaldah port, probably for use by Palestinians in the refugee camps in Beirut.  | spent by these entities on terrorist operations, however, and that the bulk is expended on arms, salaries, and refugee aid, among other things.   | 25X         |
| • In July 1985 one Cypriot and one Greek ship were reported to have delivered Soviet-originated arms to Fatah loyalists through the port of Khaldah.  | Since the US freeze of Libyan assets, Tripoli has had to replace US banks as the principal intermediaries for Libyan funding of terrorism.  Libyan Government accounts in the Arab-   | 25X<br>25X  |
| • During August 1985 an unnamed Syrian vessel delivered a variety of Soviet-made weapons to Amal fighters, then engaged in fighting with Palestinians in Beirut refugee camps, via the port of Awza'i.  | Libyan Tunisian Bank (ALTB)—60 percent of which is owned by Libya—have been used to transfer funds to groups, such as the Abu Musa and Saiqa, and to some individuals who, we believe, are involved in terrorism. The bank's location probably provides proximity and ease of transfer to known terrorist bank  |             |
| • During late August 1985 the Israeli naval forces (INF) intercepted the yacht Casselredit at sea between Cyprus and Lebanon. Aboard was a Force 17 squad.  | accounts at commercial banks in Damascus, Cyprus, and Paris.  Documentation   | 25 <b>X</b> |
|   | Although Beirut is by no means the only place where terrorist groups can obtain false documentation, the absence of effective government authority ensures that the manufacturing and sale of such material can proceed unimpeded. Although some groups produce false documents only for terrorist operations, other organizations sell such documentation on the black | 25X         |
| • In October 1985 weapons for pro-Arafat Palestinians were found in containers marked food at Khaldah.  | market to any individual able to pay their asking price:  | 25X1        |
| • In July 1986 the INF intercepted the Cypriot-flag vessel Anton with five Fatah persons aboard while in transit from Cyprus to Khaldah.  |   |             |
| • On 30 August 1986 the INF once again intercepted a vessel in transit from Cyprus to Khaldah. Aboard were approximately 200 each RPGs, RPKs, and Kalishnikovs, along with a speedboat, all intended for pro-Arafat personnel in the refugee camps in Reject Sidon and Tyre | Communications Beirut has long been an international news media center. It has become a communications center for many Middle Fostern torquist constitutions where  | 25.         |

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spokesmen call Beirut news agencies or the Voice of Lebanon to assert responsibility for terrorist attacks and to issue threats against their chosen enemies. Although some of these claims are authentic, many of them represent attempts by groups seeking to take advantage of others' "successes." Most of the incidents for which credit is claimed via the media in Beirut occur outside Lebanon. The number of extremists of various stripes living in the area and the lack of any investigative authority contribute to the ease with which terrorists can use Beirut to communicate with a wider international audience:

- The Hizballah cell holding the US and French hostages, under the covername Islamic Jihad, always releases statements, threats, photos, and videotapes to news agencies in Beirut.
- The Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction (LARF) always issues communiques in Beirut to claim responsibility for its attacks. It sometimes duplicates those claims in other countries. LARF has also used the media in Beirut to issue threats against the French and Italian Governments.
- The Unified Nasserite Organization—believed to be affiliated with Libya—issued a press statement to a Beirut newspaper claiming responsibility for the August 1986 attack on the British airbase at Akrotiri, Cyprus.
- Abu Nidal, using the covername Arab Fedayeen Cells, claimed responsibility in Beirut for the 1985 attacks at the El Al ticket counters at the airports in Rome and Vienna.

- Following the hijacking of the Egyptair flight from Cairo in November 1985, Abu Nidal and the "Organization of Egypt's Revolutionaries" issued a joint communique in Beirut claiming responsibility for the incident.
- Abu Nidal has used the Voice of Lebanon to issue threats against King Hussein and Yasir Arafat.

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# Appendix A

# Hijackings Involving Beirut International Airport

| 14 June 1985 | TWA flight 847 from Athens to Rome was diverted to Beirut. After two round trips to Algiers, during which some hostages were released and a US Navy            |
|--------------|--|
|              | serviceman was murdered, elements of Hizballah and Amal took control of the operation in Beirut. The rest of the hostages were released on 30 June through the |

intercession of the Syrian Government.

A Palestinian protesting the hijacking of a Jordanian flight the previous day seized a plane on a Beirut-to-Cyprus flight after it landed in Larnaca, Cyprus. He was

talked out of the hijacking by authorities.

11 June Six gunmen from the "Suicide Brigade Imam al-Sadr" stormed a Jordanian

airliner while it was on the ground at the Beirut airport and forced the crew to fly to Cyprus, Italy, and back to Beirut before releasing the passengers and blowing

up the plane.

1 April A lone gunman commandeered a Middle East Airlines flight from Beirut to

Jiddah. The plane continued to Jiddah where the hijacker was persuaded to

surrender.

23 February A Lebanese Druze, protesting the high cost of living, seized an aircraft on the

ground in Beirut and forced it to fly to Larnaca and then back to Beirut, where he came under the protection of Druze leader Walid Junblatt. One person was killed

and seven wounded.

7 February A group of Shias from the Musa Sadr Brigade seized a Cypriot airliner at the Bei-

rut airport and demanded that the Cypriot Government release two colleagues held for an earlier hijacking. Apparently, after receiving the assurances sought,

they departed the plane. The Cypriots later released the two prisoners.

4 December 1984 The four Lebanese Shias who hijacked a Kuwaiti airliner from Dubayy to Tehran

began their mission from the Beirut airport. Two Americans were killed in Tehran

by the hijackers.

31 July Radical Shias diverted an Air France flight from Frankfurt to Beirut before

heading to Tehran, where they released their hostages and blew up the plane's

flight deck.

21 July An Abu Dhabi-to-Beirut flight was hijacked by a Lebanese Shia who demanded

to hold a press conference to denounce the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon.

24 February 1982 Terrorists from the Musa Sadr Brigade commandeered a Kuwaiti airliner in

Beirut.

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| 7 December 1981  | A Libyan flight from Zurich to Tripoli was hijacked by Amal members demanding information concerning the Imam Musa Sadr. The plane was forced to fly to Beirut, Athens, Rome, and back to Beirut.                       |
|------------------|---|
| 24 July 1980     | Two Jordanians, attempting to collect a debt from a Kuwaiti merchant, hijacked a Kuwait Airways Beirut-to-Kuwait flight to Bahrain, then to Tehran.   |
| 10 March         | A man with a toy pistol attempted to hijack an Amman-to-Beirut flight to focus attention on the Imam Musa Sadr's disappearance in Libya in 1978.  |
| 31 January       | Three Lebanese Shias armed with pistols and grenades were arrested at the Beirut airport trying to board a flight to Paris.   |
| 28 January       | A lone hijacker diverted to Beirut a Middle East Airlines flight leaving Baghdad. He was arrested by Lebanese authorities after he read a statement about the disappearance of the Imam Musa Sadr.                      |
| 18 January       | A Shia gunman demanding the return of the Imam Musa Sadr attempted to divert a Middle East Airlines flight to Tehran. After allowing the plane to land in Beirut for refueling, he surrendered to Lebanese authorities. |
| 7 September 1979 | An Alitalia Tehran-to-Rome flight was hijacked by three Lebanese Shia students demanding information about the Imam Musa Sadr.  |
| 16 January       | Six Lebanese Shias demanding the release of the Imam Musa Sadr hijacked a Middle East Airlines plane in Beirut and diverted it to Jordan and Cyprus.  |
| 6 May 1978       | A Swiss woman planning to hijack a Zurich-to-Cairo flight was arrested after receiving explosives in the transit lounge at the Beirut airport. She had planned to demand the release of Palestinian terrorists.         |
| 8 July 1977      | Six Palestinians demanding the release of 300 prisoners in Arab jails hijacked a British Midlands plane bound from Beirut to Kuwait.  |
| 5 June           | Two Arabs hijacked to Kuwait a Middle East Airlines flight en route from Beirut to Baghdad. After the plane landed in Kuwait, government commandos overpowered the skyjackers.  |
| 19 March         | Two Turks diverted to Beirut a Turkish airliner on a domestic flight. Upon landing, they surrendered to authorities.  |
| 4 October 1975   | Four Palestinian terrorists killed three and wounded 14 while trying to hijack a plane bound from Beirut to Cairo.  |
| 15 March 1974    | Six Palestinians reportedly belonging to the PFLP were arrested while attempting to smuggle weapons and explosives aboard a KLM aircraft in Beirut.   |

| 3 March 1974      | Two men claiming membership in the Palestine Liberation Army and demanding release of terrorists held in Athens hijacked a British Airways flight out of Beirut and forced it to land in Amsterdam.  |  |
|-------------------|--|--|
| 27 April 1973     | Two Palestinians and one Lebanese about to board an Air France flight from Beirut to Nice were arrested after their luggage was found to contain explosives and timing devices.  |  |
| 29 October 1972   | A Lufthansa flight from Beirut was hijacked and forced to fly to Munich, Nicosia, Zagreb, and Tripoli by two Palestinians who demanded and obtained the release from West German imprisonment of the surviving members of the Black September terrorist group that had conducted the Munich Olympics massacre. |  |
| 22 August         | A Beirut-to-Cairo flight was hijacked to Libya by Palestinians seeking political asylum.   |  |
| 4 October 1971    | Two Fatah members tried but failed to hijack a Beirut-to-Amman flight.   |  |
| 16 September      | Lebanese sky marshals prevented a member of Fatah from hijacking a Beirut-to-Amman flight.   |  |
| 8 September       | A Fatah lieutenant was granted political asylum in Libya after hijacking a Beirutto-Amman flight.  |  |
| 10 September 1970 | Three Arabs attempting to hijack a Beirut-to-Cairo flight were overpowered by security officers.   |  |
| 9 September       | A Bombay-to-London flight was diverted to Beirut and then to Jordan by three PFLP members demanding the release of other PFLP members from prison.   |  |
| 22 July           | A Beirut-to-Athens flight was hijacked by six Palestinians from the Popular Struggle Front who demanded release of comrades in Greek jails.  |  |
| 22 June           | An Albanian-born American hijacked to Cairo a Beirut-Rome-New York flight to protest US involvement in Vietnam.  |  |
| 9 January         | A lone gunman diverted a Paris-to-Rome flight to Beirut to protest US assistance to Israel.  |  |

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# Appendix B

# Other Terrorist Activities Involving Beirut International Airport

2 April 1986 May Mansour flew from Beirut to Cairo where she boarded TWA flight 840. She

disembarked in Athens, after leaving a bomb on the plane. Mansour returned to

Lebanon via Beirut International Airport.

December 1985 One of the Abu Nidal operatives involved in the Vienna airport attack flew from

Beirut to West Germany and then to Budapest, where he took a train to Vienna.

1 September An Abu Nidal operative flew directly from Beirut to Rome to carry out a bombing

of the British Airways office there on 25 September.

9 June American University of Beirut official Thomas Sutherland was kidnaped by

several carloads of gunmen after arriving at the airport.

23 May A French journalist and researcher was kidnaped while driving into Beirut from

the airport.

Fall 1984 Fatah loyalists began reentering Lebanon via the airport. Personnel working at the

airport have reportedly assisted Palestinian operatives entering and leaving

Lebanon.

18 November A Lebanese Shia terrorist carrying explosives in his luggage was arrested in

Zurich after arriving from Beirut on a Middle East Airlines flight. He was linked to seven Lebanese arrested in Rome on 24 November for conspiring to bomb the

US Embassy.

25 August A large suitcase bomb was defused at the airport.

25 July 1983 Armenian terrorists flew from Beirut to Lisbon where they took part in the seizure

of the Turkish Embassy.

February 1982 European dissidents traveled to Beirut for training in Palestinian camps. Many

instances of such travel have been reported.

February 1980 Numerous members of Latin American insurgent groups were spotted flying to

Beirut for meetings and possible training with Palestinian groups.

6 May 1977 A Norwegian was arrested when explosives were found in his luggage. He was en

route to Frankfurt.

13 November 1975 Two members of the Palestinian group Saiqa held five persons hostage at the Pan

Am hangar, demanding jeeps and trucks.

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29 June 1975

downtown Beirut. They were released four days later minus their money and passports.

28 April 1973

Palestinians placed a bomb in an airport restroom to force the release of three terrorists arrested the day before for a hijacking attempt at the airport.

5 October 1970

Forty-three Palestinian guerrillas held an airport official hostage until they received guarantees that they would not be forced to leave Lebanon.

Two US businessmen were kidnaped from a taxi en route from the airport to

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