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The Ethiopian Revolution and Its Implications

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THE ETHIOPIAN REVOLUTION AND
ITS IMPLICATIONS

INTRODUCTION AND PRINCIPAL POINTS

Since World War II, Ethiopia has been the centerpiece of US policy in the Horn of Africa. The Ethiopian revolution that began in early 1974 as an army mutiny has moved, stage by stage, through a period of "moderate reform," a period of dispute between revolutionaries over how radical change should be carried out and who should do it, and a period of collegial military rule, to the present essentially one-man-with-advisers regime of Lt. Col. Mengistu Haile-Mariam. In the process, the Ethiopian government has been transformed from a difficult, occasionally embarrassing, but relatively reliable client of the US into a radical socialist regime struggling to keep control of the country and looking to the USSR, Eastern Europe, Cuba, and China for help.

The analysis that follows has no specific time frame, but generally the analysts have not tried to look beyond the next two years. The memorandum was requested initially by the Department of State, but has been completed with an eye to the Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC—21: The Horn of Africa, which was issued while this paper was in preparation.

The principal points of this paper are as follows:

— The Ethiopian revolution has produced a serious degradation of political authority throughout the country, but we do not believe that internal resistance in itself will lead to a breakup of the Ethiopian state.

— At the same time, the revolution has made it more possible—we think likely—that Eritrea will have de facto independence within the next 12 months because of the inadequacy of the military means available to the revolutionary leadership and its unwillingness to compromise its unitary political outlook. We think that some territory in the Ogaden would be lost if and
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when the Ethiopians take military action to preserve their interests in the French Territory of the Afars and Issas (FTA1).

— With regard to the Afars and Issas, we believe that the odds on a war between Ethiopia and Somalia over this issue are still better than even, despite changes in French policy which appear designed to satisfy Somali demands. The Ethiopians object to these changes, and we think they will make some military demonstration if the postindependence arrangements in the FTA1 do not promise to keep the Somalis out.

— Internally in Ethiopia, Mengistu controls the revolutionary council and is accepted by much of the military, but his personal position is not yet stable. He holds this position now primarily because he has physically eliminated rivals; he could himself be similarly removed. The elimination of Mengistu, however, while it would probably produce some changes in tone and rhetoric, would be followed by a military government with generally similar objectives and basic outlook.

— The present leaders, especially Mengistu, believe that the US Government is unsympathetic, and very possibly hostile, to the Ethiopian revolution. They look to the USSR, Eastern Europe, Cuba, and China for the specialized help they need in keeping Somalia at bay, securing the revolution, and organizing their internal support, even while they try to maintain a supply line of military materiel from the US. This attitude will persist at least as long as Mengistu heads the government, and US influence on Ethiopia’s actions is likely to be minimal.

— The full extent to which the USSR will be able to capitalize directly on this situation is not easy to forecast. Fundamentally, the Soviets are certainly attracted by the prospect of developing a new relationship with the largest and potentially most powerful country in the Horn region. But this involves careful management of their relationship with Somalia, and we think that this latter, with the facilities Somalia has provided the USSR, will continue to be the focus of Soviet policy in the region.

— The Ethiopian leaders are also reaching out to new relationships beyond the Horn—to South Yemen and Libya, for example—and while these particular relationships may well be ephemeral there is a good chance that, in a somewhat longer term, the Ethiopians will be able and will wish to cultivate understandings with the more radical Arab and Third World governments. Over time, this is likely to shrink the relations between Ethiopia and Israel.
DISCUSSION

I. ETHIOPIA—REVOLUTIONARY REBIRTH OR COLLAPSE?

The Revolutionary Government

1. Two and a half years after taking power, Ethiopia’s Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC) has become an isolated military clique with a vision of a reconstituted, unified, and radical Ethiopia that most of the population resists or cannot grasp. The council’s strongman—Lt. Col. Mengistu Haile-Mariam, the son of a slave—represents the lowest rungs of the old social order. He and other members of the council who rose from the ranks on the basis of professional talent are committed to the principle of equality. But they and the troops who support them are a minority in a society which is still strongly traditional, and their attempts to impose a centralized, radical socialist regime have alienated large segments of the population. The result has been the degradation of political authority as a variety of class, ethnic, and regional groups compete with the PMAC for political power.

2. Despite growing levels of violence in the cities and worsening insurrections on the periphery, however, we believe the PMAC (or some variant) will continue to rule Ethiopia for the foreseeable future, although it is likely that territory along the periphery will be lost to the Somalis or to Eritrean separatists, and that the government’s writ may not run very far in some provinces.

3. The preeminence of the military in Ethiopia today is not an anomaly. A strong military has been the backbone of Ethiopian society, and, traditionally, there has been a fusion of political and military roles. What is unusual about the current situation is the collapse or neutralization of other societal institutions—the monarchy, nobility, church, bureaucracy, and urban interest groups.

4. The PMAC has a blueprint for a new political design. At some distant point in the future, the military will theoretically hand power over to the new civilian institutions of a People’s Democratic Republic. The major institution will be a Marxist-Leninist Party—of which the prototype is the PMAC backed All-Ethiopian Socialist Movement—grouping all “progressive” forces. These include peasant associations in the rural areas, urban dwellers associations, a new labor confederation, and women’s and youth organizations. Peasant associations are operating in a number of provinces, but the formation of urban organizations that would be tightly controlled by the PMAC has met with bitter opposition from labor and student elements.

5. Presumably, party cadres will exercise central government authority in an otherwise decentralized polity in which all ethnic groups will have autonomy in their respective areas. What is known about the PMAC’s proposals for Eritrea suggests that the “local autonomy” may be that of a Soviet socialist republic. But at present the only effective linkage between the central government and the highly decentralized peasant associations is the military.

The Politics of the PMAC

6. For the time being, Mengistu controls the PMAC and is accepted by much of the military. He has eliminated senior officers who tried to appeal to the troops over his head, and he has consistently outmaneuvered better educated and more intellectual PMAC members. He can probably only be brought down by assassination or by a complete breakdown of military command and control—such as might follow the loss of Eritrea or a defeat in a war with Somalia.

7. It is difficult to assess the degree to which Mengistu’s leadership role will contribute to friction among ethnic elements in the military. Most Ethiopians perceive him as a Galla 1 (although he is reportedly of mixed ancestry), and the PMAC and its civilian advisory group are popularly perceived as Galla-dominated (although Amharas have substantial representation in both bodies). But in the past, at least, the Galla have not formed a cohesive interest group, and we think the Amhara-Galla tensions are manageable unless Mengistu’s own survival becomes

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1 The Galla are numerically the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia, but are regarded by the dominant Amhara as culturally inferior.
jeopardized, in which case he probably would make overt appeals for ethnic support. While the growing strength of Eritrean or Tigrean insurgent movements makes defections of military elements from these ethnic groups more likely, this would result more from the attractions of the insurgencies than from ethnic antagonism toward Mengistu.

8. Mengistu has strongly influenced the Council's decision-making since it was formed in July 1974, and we foresee no sharp changes. One-man rule may even result in the streamlining of council procedures now that collegial squabbling has been reduced. Certainly Mengistu has demonstrated that he is ruthless both personally and as a revolutionary; we see in him a radical nationalist who finds Marxist-Leninist models to be more relevant than Western ones to Ethiopia's present needs. But his approach to ideology is eclectic—he borrows freely from Maoism and Arab socialism, as well as from traditional Ethiopian political concepts.

9. For the US, the most important single feature of Mengistu's personal outlook is that he does not believe that the US supports the revolution he is trying to carry out and that he looks instead to the Communist countries as more sympathetic and immediately more responsive associates. We also believe that Mengistu perceives a decline in US interest in Ethiopia, and thinks that the US would not come to Ethiopia's assistance in regional disputes. This leads Mengistu—forces him, probably in his own view—to look elsewhere for foreign military and diplomatic support, and the Communist countries are the most promising candidates. But we believe he seeks to use the Communists to advance his own domestic and foreign policy objectives, and that fundamentally he will resist foreign Communist influence in Ethiopian internal affairs, even as Haile Selassie resisted the British and ourselves.

Government Control of the Countryside

10. We estimate that the PMAC controls, even in a loose sense, less than two thirds of the country, the rest being in the hands of insurgent groups. But the Council can continue to govern as long as it can hold onto the major administrative centers, most transportation arteries, and vital agricultural areas (especially the state and collectivized farms south of Addis Ababa that produce a substantial part of the capital's food needs, other parts of the Middle Gallia region, the food surplus province of Gojam, and the coffee-producing areas of the west and southwest—see map). Loss of control over territory around the periphery, such as western Begemdir, most of Eritrea and Tigre, and parts of the southeast has little practical effect on the ability of the central government to function.

11. After some miscalculation, the PMAC seems to be gauging with fair success how far and fast it can implement its policies in the rural areas, and we do not foresee near-term departures from the present course of consolidating the gains of the first stage of land reform, while postponing further redistribution or collectivization of land.

12. Land reform was favorably received in the "bread basket" Middle Gallia region, where peasant associations are functioning fairly effectively. The Amhara landlords have been thrown out, and the associations have been able to build on traditional cooperative institutions and take advantage of the prevailing high agricultural prices. Here, then, galla farmers have materially benefited from the revolution, and join the military in supporting, albeit passively, the PMAC.

13. In Gojam and parts of other northern Amhara provinces, the abatement of insurgency suggests that the PMAC has managed to mollify the local population following the abortive attempt to implement land reform in these areas. The Council specifically exempted the north from some of the provisions of the land reform decree, but its conciliatory approach was sabotaged by the student campaigners, whose advocacy of immediate collectivization helped provoke insurgency. Despite the PMAC's current policy of noninterference with the land system, the northern Amhara peasants—in contrast to the Middle Gallia—remain suspicious of the PMAC, which deposed an Amhara emperor and granted equal rights to Muslims.

14. Although the Orthodox Church has been effectively neutralized at the center, priests in the Christian north could help fan new resistance to the central government. But in fact it is very hard to define the role of the church in this situation. We suspect that while the church is at least hibernating as a national political institution, the base of belief and the relationships between priest and following in the countryside are still there.

15. We also believe that insurgent movements led by local elites, and especially the Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU)—the exile group led by high-ranking officials of the old regime—could make further inroads among northern peasants. Most
peasants, both northern and southern, want to be left alone by the central government, and this attitude helps any locally based insurgency. The PMAC is prevented from suppressing these local provincial dissidents because large numbers of troops are committed to fighting in Eritrea and defending the country's borders. The tacit acceptance of a lack of government control in the provinces is not new in Ethiopian experience, and this does not appear as anomalous to the PMAC as it may to outsiders. We believe the council in those areas it controls will defer major efforts to further alter the land system or to restructure the countryside along socialist lines, but will continue its efforts at mass political indoctrination and mobilization, looking toward the establishment of permanent political institutions. The PMAC's accelerated program of forming and arming people's militias will force increasing numbers of peasants to take sides with either the pro- or anti-PMAC forces.

The PMAC and the Urban Sector

16. The conflict between the PMAC and its urban opponents has more immediate significance to the PMAC than its problems in the countryside. In seeking a social transformation, the PMAC deviates from other African military juntas that have been content with merely displacing the top layers of civilian leadership. The Ethiopian regime has sought not only to reduce income differentials between classes but also between urban and rural areas by opting for higher agricultural prices and allowing inflation to take its toll of urban incomes. The consequence has been the alienation of not only the old ruling classes but also of large numbers of the urban middle and lower middle classes.

17. So far, the most attractive alternative to the PMAC for these disgruntled urban elements is a clandestine Marxist-Leninist party, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP). The total size of the EPRP is unknown. Although the leadership of the EPRP is just as radical as the PMAC, its advocacy of socialist "democratic rights" has been wishfully interpreted as Western style democratic rights by those conservatives and moderates who stand to lose the most from PMAC policies. In fact the EPRP is organized under a Communist cell type system. It has in the past been funded by Soviet and East European sources; however, it is unknown to what extent this relationship still exists.

18. The EPRP is led by intellectuals who are warring with other intellectuals coopted by the PMAC to organize the All-Ethiopian Socialist Movement (AESM). The differences between these two groups stem from ideological debates within the student movement in Ethiopia and abroad; the key issue is whether a temporary alliance with a military government is acceptable in order to make the transition from feudalism to socialism. But the controversy is popularly seen as a split between the Amhara-Tigreans (representing the politically and economically dominant ethnic groups of the pre-1974 regime) of the EPRP and the relatively deprived Galla of the AESM.

19. Although the EPRP is tightly organized and run by zealots who can harry the government with political assassinations, it cannot replace the PMAC without military support. There have been reports of EPRP sympathizers in the military and the PMAC itself, but they have probably been liquidated or temporarily cowed by the killings in February 1977.

20. Ethiopia's economic problems probably have not provided much fuel for the EPRP cause. The PMAC has taken drastic action against hoarding and price gouging—including killing violators. Solid gains in exports, particularly coffee, have given the country foreign exchange reserves worth a year's imports ($300 million), and recent economic indicators suggest that the steady rise in the cost of living has begun to level off. For the moment, at least, the economy is doing as well as can be expected for a country lacking infrastructure and poor in resources other than hydroelectric power and agriculture. Over the longer run, PMAC mismanagement of the economy that results in severe economic problems—particularly food shortages in the urban areas where most military men and their families live—could make the EPRP a more viable opposition group.

Internal Patterns

21. Looking at the PMAC in its local context, then, we believe that we can see a pattern beginning to form:

— The regime's ideology, although not clearly spelled out, is a mix of Marxist-Leninist and other "socialist" ideas (and prejudices) that provides the leadership with a formula for political and economic development.

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2 There is no hard information on the size of the EPRP; the best estimate is that it consists of a small number of hardcore members and a few thousand sympathizers in Addis Ababa, and a small number of supporters in some of the major provincial cities.
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— It is looking to the USSR and Soviet allies as the likeliest sources of help, both in terms of immediate military assistance and organizational counsel.

— It has a program for attacking the most basic problems of the country’s agricultural social structure, and it has attracted some significant rural support for this program.

— It is demonstrating tactical political flexibility in the countryside, while concentrating on keeping control of the cities (especially the capital) and on the defense of the country’s territorial integrity.

22. But this pattern is not the only relevant one in this situation. The Ethiopian revolution has revived another tendency evident in Ethiopian history: the reassertion of provincial resistance to central authority.

The Insurgencies

23. While Eritrea has the best known and the most serious insurgency facing Addis Ababa, dissident military activity of varying intensity is also ongoing in a number of other provinces. At one time during 1976, the PMAC was faced with insurgent/dissident activity in 10 of Ethiopia’s 14 provinces. In recent months the most pressing threats have arisen in Begemdir, Tigre, Sidamo, Bale, and Hararge provinces.

24. In Begemdir Province, forces of the EDU stepped up their activity in December 1976 and January of this year. The EDU, numbering approximately 1,500 armed personnel, is an exile group led by former General Iyasu Mengesha; it maintains a headquarters in London. Two other key leaders are the former governor of Begemdir Province, General Negu Tegagne, and the former governor of Tigre Province, Ras Mengesha Seyoum. Unlike other insurgent groups in Ethiopia, the primary stated aim of the EDU is the substitution of a pro-West parliamentary democracy for the present government.

25. After almost a year of conducting little more than harassing attacks against government concentrations, EDU forces have laid siege to and captured Humera on the border between Begemdir and Eritrea. Fighting has also increased around the border town of Metemma and along the Metemma-Gonder road; a number of government troops are reported to have defected to EDU forces. The government was slow in reacting to the mounting insurgency and experienced difficulty in reinforcing and supplying its forces in the province.

26. In Tigre Province, reports indicate that the Tigre Liberation Front—the major insurgent group in the province—has incorporated other dissident elements and renamed itself the Tigre People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). The dissidents here have a variety of local objectives, but all resist the central government. They control movements along at least one major highway and reportedly control much of the countryside. The government, on the other hand, controls the major towns and can move heavily armed convoys along the north-south road from Addis Ababa to Makale.

27. In southern Ethiopia, approximately 5,000 to 10,000 Somalist-backed insurgents are operating in Bale, Sidamo, and Hararge provinces. They essentially are in two groups: Somali ethnics, who seek to reunite with Somalia, and Galla, who seek greater autonomy within Ethiopia. The main government presence in the area are elements of the 3d and 4th Divisions, which number about 10,000 men. The government forces are spread thin and, although supplemented by local militia units, have had a difficult time in maintaining order. The insurgents, well armed and trained by Somalia, have been operating in large bands and have become increasingly daring in their selection of targets.

28. The most serious southern problems, however, are being experienced in Bale Province. Very heavy fighting has been occurring around El Kere; at one time, the government’s hold on the town was precarious. Government movement is primarily restricted to convoys, but even these have come increasingly under insurgent attacks.

29. In Sidamo and Hararge provinces, areas along the Somali border have, for all practical purposes, slipped from Addis Ababa’s control. Although government forces hold the larger portion of both provinces, this is primarily because of the PMAC’s ability to concentrate forces in key locations, a step that becomes more difficult as they move closer to the frontier. One of the main problems facing Ethiopian forces responsible for security in the south is that the level of the Eritrean conflict has forced the high command to move troops and equipment from this area to the north.

30. If Addis Ababa expands its effort to maintain its hold on Eritrea, it will become increasingly difficult to respond to threats in the south and in
Begemdir and Tigre provinces. Resources and manpower are stretched thin. If the EDU and TPLF in the northwest are able to mount sustained operations and insurgent attacks in the southern provinces continue, Addis Ababa will find itself in a critical situation from a military standpoint.

31. The more serious threat to Ethiopian unity is in Eritrea, a province with a long and tragic history of difficult relationships with whatever government controlled Ethiopia. The pattern of recent skirmishes in Eritrea indicates that the guerrillas have seized the initiative and that the position of government forces in the province is deteriorating. The insurgents have besieged a number of remote government outposts, causing the abandonment of two garrisons near the Sudanese border and isolating the post at Tesseney. Lack of security along roads restricts reinforcement and resupply effort for the most part to aircraft operations, since even armed truck convoys have often been unable to overcome guerrilla resistance.

32. These insurgent activities signal a new phase of guerrilla tactics: the hit-and-run ambushes and terrorism of the past have been supplemented by larger-scale operations involving sustained attacks against serious targets. The government has withdrawn to the main military strongholds while the guerrillas have a free hand elsewhere in the western and northern parts of the province.

33. From the central government’s point of view, the situation is particularly ominous in light of clear and accumulating signs of declining morale among troops of the 2d Division and other units sent to reinforce it in Eritrea. Defections are commonplace and represent an important source of new recruits for insurgents. Mutinies, desertions, and rapid turnover of top officers—execution or removal being the consequence of displeasing the PMAC—are additional signs that government forces are dispirited. Moreover, reports indicate that there is decreasing inclination among troops to engage in combat or even to reinforce besieged garrisons. Relative inactivity has replaced the aggressive sweep operations of the past, allowing the insurgents to consolidate and build their forces in the countryside.

34. This low morale stems in part from a growing conviction among troops in Eritrea that the war is a fruitless and debilitating exercise and that the PMAC should replace its pursuit of military victory with a policy aimed at achieving a political settlement. In mid-January a delegation was sent to Addis Ababa from the large military center at Keren to present demands for a peaceful solution—but to no avail, since its entreaties were summarily rejected.

35. The PMAC’s response to these challenges has been to build up its military forces in Eritrea; it has shown no willingness to meet the insurgents’ terms. Within the past year new units assigned to the Eritrean campaign have included an airborne battalion, five “Flame” (light “elite” infantry) battalions, and about eight “Father Fighter” battalions—recalled veterans assigned to guard duties. In mid-February elements of a mechanized battalion were moved from the 3d Division area (in the southeast near the Somali border) to Asmara. These incoming contingents have more than compensated for losses from casualties and defections, bringing the total Ethiopian military strength in Eritrea to more than 25,000, compared to 12,000-15,000 armed insurgents in the three Eritrean movements.

The Military Outlook

36. The military position of the Ethiopian forces in Eritrea can be expected to continue to deteriorate within the foreseeable future. This does not preclude the possibility that one significant insurgent victory could precipitate an even more rapid deterioration. As insurgent confidence builds and Ethiopian morale declines, such a development becomes more likely. However, the Ethiopian ability to defend the main centers—such as Asmara, Keren, Massawa, and Assab—remains formidable. As the insurgents are presently equipped and organized, they are incapable of taking these strongpoints, and the Ethiopians show no signs of abandoning them. Hence, the near-term pattern is likely to be one that entails guerrilla possession of the countryside and small towns while government forces concentrate upon maintaining their grip on the major cities.

Is the State Breaking Up?

37. Except for Eritrea, we are reasonably confident that the internal situation alone will not produce a fragmentation of Ethiopia, although it may be some time before a central government’s writ runs freely in the outlying provinces. Ultimately, however, a central government will regain not only formal authority but may establish more pervasive influence than that enjoyed by the Emperor.

38. We would argue that, except for the Eritreans and ethnic Somalis in the southeast, the provincial

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3 This figure includes about 3,000 Emergency Strike Force Police, who are trained and equipped as light infantry.
dissidents are in fact dissenters, not liberation movements, and that a central government can, and in the end will, either come to terms with them or suppress them. In the meantime, of course, the provincial insurgencies will feed Mengistu’s and his colleagues’ suspicions that foreign powers are working against their revolution and will further embitter Ethiopia’s relations with its immediate neighbors.

39. The Eritrean situation is different; it has developed into a genuine insurgency with serious foreign support, although it is still plagued by divided leadership. If this insurgency escalates, as we think it is likely to do, and the central government is no more capable than it now seems to be of taking effective counteraction, Eritrea will probably be lost as an integral part of Ethiopia. While the precise nature of the relationship that will emerge between Ethiopia and Eritrea cannot be forecast in detail, our best estimate at this time is that the process is likely to result in de facto independence within the next 12 months.

II. BROADER IMPLICATIONS OF THE REVOLUTION

Impact of the Revolution on Regional Affairs

New Direction in Foreign Relations

40. The revolution has brought some profound changes in Ethiopia’s foreign relations. The PMAC’s militant socialist rhetoric and its harsh military measures against secessionist guerrillas in Eritrea have alienated even previously friendly regional neighbors and attracted only one—South Yemen. The PMAC’s search for new foreign help in an effort to maintain the country’s territorial integrity, ensure its own survival, and enhance its nonaligned credentials has led to diminished Western and rapidly growing Soviet, East European, and Cuban influence in Ethiopia. This has had an unsettling effect on the entire Red Sea region, and led African and Arab states to focus relatively more attention than previously on developments in the Horn.

The FTAI Problem

41. In terms of regional relationships, however, the PMAC does not as yet see itself in a new light; it is still surrounded by hostile neighbors, and its most immediate problem area is the French Territory of The Afars and Issas (FTAI).

42. The PMAC believes that Somali President Siad’s regime is bent on achieving either a client government in the FTAI or actually assimilating the area into Somalia after France grants the territory its independence—now scheduled for June. The PMAC is determined to block either outcome; it sees access to the sea through the FTAI as just as critical to Ethiopia’s survival as the Emperor did.

43. The effect of Ethiopia’s revolution, however, has been to limit severely the government’s ability to counter Somalia’s moves in the FTAI. French policy over the last year has worked to Ethiopia’s disadvantage, but the council has been unwilling to shape a new policy to meet the changed situation, resulting in Addis Ababa’s virtual exclusion from playing a meaningful role in the arrangements leading to independence.

44. France’s own tactical reverse field maneuver last year—it replaced Ali Aref, the pro-French and pro-Ethiopian head of the territorial government, with an advocate of ethnic reconciliation and cooperation with Somalia—was sharply criticized in Addis Ababa. The Ethiopians saw this move as playing into the hands of Somalia and refused to support the new FTAI government of Abdullah Mohamed Kamil. The PMAC has not been reassured by Paris’ claim that it is attempting to establish a strong government that will protect Ethiopia’s interests in the territory. The PMAC’s attitude has effectively cut Addis Ababa out of the negotiations leading to FTAI’s independence, while Somalia is now cooperating with France in working out new arrangements. Somali President Siad believes political developments in the territory have enhanced the chances that a pro-Somali government will come to power legally, and he is attempting to influence that evolution by political action as well as by keeping on good terms with the French.

45. Ethiopia thus cannot now match Somalia’s influence on the FTAI’s domestic politics, although the PMAC is still meddling in FTAI affairs with what resources it can muster. Ethiopia’s allies in the territory can probably at best elect a few pro-Ethiopian politicians to office in the first post-independence government or foment disorders in an effort to undermine the government’s authority, but they are not in a position to rely on political action to deter Somalia from pursuing its own plans for the FTAI.

46. Despite the Ethiopians’ distrust of Paris’ policy, the French may in fact act in such a way as to reduce the pressure the Ethiopians will feel to take some
action. If French troops are kept in the FTAI, in effect as a guarantee of independence, this could come to be seen from Addis Ababa as the best of a bad bargain. But at present, the Ethiopians do not see it that way, and they will still be seeking more satisfactory guarantees that the FTAI will not fall into hostile Somali hands.

47. At present, some kind of military demonstration is still Ethiopia’s least unsatisfactory option for trying to get what it wants. The timing of such a demonstration would depend on when the PMAC becomes convinced that a government favoring affiliation with Somalia is about to come to power in the territory or if it believes Somalia is preparing to send its own forces into the FTAI. With French troops in the FTAI, this point may not be reached for some time, possibly not even within the next year, but we still believe that Ethiopia will make a military demonstration—for essentially political objectives—when this point is reached.

48. The success of such an Ethiopian operation is problematical at best, especially if it were undertaken within the next few months. Over half the Ethiopian army is tied down fighting the guerrillas in Eritrea, and most of the remaining troops are fighting other insurgencies. The 3rd Division, which will bear the brunt of any fighting with Somalia, is understrength.

The Ogaden Problem

49. The Somalis have long claimed the Ogaden and, if Ethiopia were militarily preoccupied with the FTAI, would probably conclude that the time was opportune to gain control of the Ogaden and incorporate its ethnic Somali residents into “Greater Somalia.” The Somali army would probably be successful in establishing a Somali presence in at least part of the Ogaden, thereby shifting the Ogaden problem into reverse. We could then see a militant, vengeful Ethiopia awaiting its chance to have another round with the Somalis.

The Sudan Problem

50. Relations between Ethiopia and Sudan have seldom been easy. For over two years, Sudanese President Numayri has permitted arms for Eritrean guerrillas to transit Sudanese territory. Numayri was not hostile to the old Ethiopian regime, however, and he held back from supporting the Eritreans’ demand for complete independence even after the military came to power. He offered to mediate the dispute, although his efforts never achieved much progress, despite several rounds of separate talks with the Eritreans and Ethiopian officials.

51. Numayri has become increasingly disturbed, however, by the attitudes and policies in Addis Ababa, and in 1975 began to allow the EDU, an anti-PMAC party, to use Sudanese territory as a base of operations. But after a few minor raids in late 1975, this group remained virtually inactive until the past few months.

52. Ethiopia retaliated against Sudan’s support of Ethiopian dissidents by providing refuge, some training, and arms to Sudanese dissidents, mainly members of the Ansar religious sect and southern Sudanese separatists who refused to accept the 1972 settlement that ended their own guerrilla war against the Khartoum government. The Ethiopians probably intended to induce Numayri to curb his support for the Eritreans. Instead, all this has now escalated. The Ethiopian army has suffered continuing setbacks in Eritrea. The EDU has renewed its activities along the border, and poses a serious threat to the government’s control of Begemdir Province.

53. These developments increased Ethiopia’s concern about Sudan’s role in supporting the guerrillas, and made Addis Ababa receptive to overtures from Libyan President Qaddafi for a joint effort to topple Numayri. Numayri in turn has publicly accused Ethiopia of collaborating with Libya in support of Sudanese dissidents; he has also announced his open support of Eritrean independence. This amounts to a “diplomatic revolution,” putting Ethiopia in the camp of the Libyans—who currently also associate with the Soviets.

54. Neither Ethiopia nor Sudan is likely to initiate serious hostilities, at least in the near term, although the PMAC might, if really hard pressed by the EDU, arrange some sort of strike against EDU camps in Sudan, and Sudan could do the same against the Ansar camps.

55. Historically, this new pattern of Ethiopian-Sudanese relationships has as much validity as the previous association and we do not believe that it will be possible, short of an unlikely counterrevolution in Ethiopia, or a fresh overturn in Sudan, to bring the Sudanese and Ethiopians back into a tacit alliance. The Ethiopians are likely instead to cultivate new allies.
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The Libyan and Arab Involvement

56. We believe that the PMAC perceives substantial value in developing close relations with Libya and South Yemen, even though Libya’s track record is not one of reliability.

57. Qadhafi, in addition to arming the Ansars, has promised financial and military assistance to Addis Ababa. He is also cutting his previously substantial military and financial assistance to the Eritrean insurgents, and has urged them to accept a settlement short of independence.

58. Relations with South Yemen have also warmed considerably over the past 6 months. The South Yemenis apparently view Ethiopia as a fellow “progressive” state—an attitude the Ethiopians have encouraged. Mengistu has said that South Yemen is Ethiopia’s only friend in the area. Aden has provided some arms and ammunition to Ethiopia and has become more restrained in its support of the Eritreans, although a guerrilla office still operates discreetly in Aden. Ethiopia values good relations with Libya and South Yemen for more than material assistance. The council hopes mistakenly, we believe—these ties will be well received by other radical Arab countries and induce them to cease supporting the Eritreans and other domestic dissidents.

59. Ethiopia’s relations with other Arab countries, on the other hand, are becoming increasingly hostile. The more beleaguered the regime has become, the more it has lashed out at the Arabs for conspiring to weaken Ethiopia’s socialist revolution and destroy its territorial integrity. There is some justification for Ethiopia’s animosity. Arab support for the Eritreans has kept their insurgency alive and reinforced the historical Ethiopian tendency to view the Arab world as hostile.

60. The PMAC’s view that most of the Arab states have sought its downfall from the start is exaggerated, however, and it ignores the extent to which the recent increase in Arab animosity has developed in reaction to the hostile policies followed by the Council toward them and toward the Eritreans. There is no evidence that the Arab states have taken initiatives to overthrow the military regime. The moderate Arab states are disturbed by the council’s excesses and increasingly leftists bent, but they have attempted to maintain good bilateral relations. Egypt made a determined effort to forge closer ties with Ethiopia in early 1976, but it was rebuffed. The Egyptian attitude soured after the PMAC lied to them about the presence of Israeli advisers in Ethiopia.

61. The PMAC’s assessment of the Arab role in Eritrea seems particularly misdirected. The Eritrean insurgents have received the bulk of their financial and military assistance from Libya, Iraq, and Syria. Other Arabs have provided mainly diplomatic support and limited financial and humanitarian aid. Only Syria and Iraq have consistently supported independence for Eritrea. Most other Arab states have favored a compromise settlement that would give Eritrea a sizable amount of autonomy within the Ethiopian state, but the PMAC has ignored these distinctions.

62. The Council believes Saudi Arabia has played a major role in supporting the Eritreans and influencing Sudan to adopt a more hostile stance toward Ethiopia. These charges probably rest more on the assumption that Saudi Arabia is inherently inclined to use its wealth to subvert socialist regimes than on any specific evidence. Until recently, Saudi Arabia’s policy toward the military government was guided mainly by its traditional desire for a stable, unified Ethiopia. Both Saudi Arabia and Egypt—as well as Sudan—are now exhibiting more active opposition to the military government.

63. Ethiopia’s collaboration with Libya in support of Sudanese dissidents trying to topple President Numayri has angered Cairo and Riyadh as well as Khartoum. Egypt has warned Ethiopia against meddling in Sudan, and has increased its military cooperation with Numayri. Sudan, at a recent meeting of the presidents of Sudan, Egypt, and Syria, became a member of the largely symbolic joint political command established by Egypt and Syria last December.

64. Egypt, Sudan, and Saudi Arabia are also concerned over the growing Soviet influence in Ethiopia. The Saudis, in particular, believe the turmoil in Ethiopia provides fertile ground for Soviet expansion in the Horn—an area they consider of great importance to their own strategic interests.

65. Saudi Arabia’s concern over developments in Ethiopia is likely to lead it to increase its support for Eritrean rebels. The Saudis have probably concluded that the present regime should be weakened in order to keep it from subjugating Eritrea and making mischief in Sudan. The growing strength of the Eritrean insurgents has probably increased Saudi Arabia’s determination to prevent more radical Arab governments from gaining control of the secessionist movement. Closer ties with the guerrillas also provide some insurance that Soviet influence, even if it
continues to expand in Addis Ababa, will not extend to Eritrea.

66. Ethiopia’s alienation from the moderate Arabs in many respects runs counter to its own policy toward Somalia. Egypt and Saudi Arabia are opposed to Somalia’s annexing the FTAI because they fear this would result in the expansion of Soviet and perhaps radical Arab influence in the area. Their efforts to prevent a Somalia takeover could have aided Ethiopia’s own efforts, but this is now a fading possibility.

67. All this seems to reinforce traditional Ethiopian concepts of their country as a Christian island surrounded by a hostile Muslim sea. We believe that this is likely to continue but that the Ethiopians are also likely gradually to find more in common with some Middle Eastern Arabs than they do now, especially as they become less preoccupied with internal problems and give more attention to broader North-South issues. Not only will the Ethiopian regime almost surely be drawn into these, but it will also be compelled to seek more allies against Somalia and Sudan.

The Kenyan Relationship

68. The military regime has maintained cordial but not overly friendly relations with Kenya. Ideological differences and Kenya’s distaste for the excesses of the Ethiopian revolution have been submerged by desires to maintain a common front against Somalia, which claims portions of both countries inhabited by ethnic Somalis. Ethiopia and Kenya signed a mutual defense treaty in 1963 aimed at ensuring military cooperation against Somalia. The Council, however, regards Kenya—rightly, in our view—as a paper ally at best and doubts that it can be relied on to help Ethiopia in the event of war with Somalia. Kenya, for its part fears Ethiopia’s domestic problems will encourage Somali aggression and is worried about the increasing Soviet influence in Addis Ababa.

69. Kenya is unlikely to play a major role in any conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia limited to the FTAI. Even if Somalia attacks the Ogaden, it is questionable whether Kenya would be able to aid Addis Ababa. Kenya last year agreed to allow Ethiopia to use Kenyan airfields and to use the port of Mombasa to import military and other items in the event of war. The agreement is of marginal military significance, but in the event of hostilities, Kenya might point to its willingness to allow Ethiopia to use the port and airfields as fulfilling Nairobi’s obligations under the defense treaty.

The African Community

70. The PMAC has not earned acceptance by the African community as a whole. Violence and political fragmentation have done more to determine its image in Africa than its commitment to the transformation of a feudalistic society and adoption of extreme Third World rhetoric. The PMAC has devoted little effort to cultivating bilateral ties with African states, and few of these see any reason for choosing to support actively one side over the other in Ethiopia’s regional disputes, although the OAU has passed resolutions calling on all countries to respect the FTAI’s territorial integrity.

71. Ethiopia has gained broad African diplomatic support on the Eritrean issue, but this stems almost entirely from the Africans’ adherence to the principle of maintaining the territorial integrity of OAU members, and not from any positive feelings of sympathy toward Addis Ababa. Some African governments are probably beginning to question Ethiopia’s ability to hang on to Eritrea, and most would probably tacitly accept Eritrean independence if presented with a fait accompli, although they would prefer an autonomist arrangement.

72. Ethiopia, under the PMAC, has lost the “world statesman” image that cloaked the venerable figure of the Emperor. The poor security situation in Addis Ababa and the government’s capriciousness and frequent disregard of diplomatic practices had led to talk of moving the OAU headquarters to another country. We frankly find the outlook for Ethiopia in African regional affairs to be clouded. Over the longer term, some resurgence is possible, but much of Ethiopia’s present diplomatic talent is being dissipated by the revolutionary leadership.

The Revolution and the Outside World

The USSR

73. The military regime is becoming increasingly dependent on the Soviet Union and East European countries for ideological training, policy guidance, and material and political support. This process began to accelerate during the past year and has received another major impetus in the short time since Mengistu emerged as Ethiopia’s single strongman. Mengistu favors expanding ties with the Communist countries; he does not seem interested in maintaining lasting ties with the West. The Soviets obviously see a serious opportunity to increase their influence, and have gone to great lengths to demonstrate their support for Mengistu’s approach to his problems.
74. The Soviet Union responded favorably to the military regime from the outset, but did not move rapidly to exploit Ethiopia’s overtures. Moscow’s caution about extending major new military or economic aid presumably stemmed from natural doubts about the regime’s durability and the seriousness of its commitment to socialism and from concern for the substantial Soviet investment in Somalia.

75. Relations in other fields began to expand significantly in 1976. The PMAC’s progressive development of its vision of Ethiopian society, economy, and ideology along socialist lines, with an organizational system patterned after those existing in the Communist world, was paralleled by a significant increase in cultural and educational exchanges with Communist countries. High-level Ethiopian delegations visited the USSR and Eastern Europe—as well as China—and the Ethiopian media became dominated by reports either emanating from Communist sources or reflecting Communist views. Communist countries increased substantially the number of scholarships offered to Ethiopian students. The government encouraged this trend by forbidding students to study in the West except in scientific and technical fields.

76. By late 1976, the Soviets had decided that they could safely manage a more active role in Ethiopia without seriously harming their equities in Somalia. In December, after a series of meetings extending over several months, the two countries concluded a substantial military sales agreement. It provided for the sale of mainly defensive weapons—small arms, ammunition, missile patrol boats, and air defense systems—to Ethiopia over a 4-year period.4

77. The Soviets and the East Europeans moved quickly to consolidate their relations with Mengistu after he emerged as the preeminent member of the PMAC. The Soviet ambassador conveyed Moscow’s congratulations to Mengistu the day after the deaths of his main rivals. Ambassadors of other Communist countries followed suit. The Soviets reportedly agreed to accelerated delivery of some of the arms purchased under the sales agreement, and made an additional grant of small arms. Poland offered to provide small arms and ammunition quickly, and Czechoslovakia offered to construct a small-arms ammunition factory in Ethiopia. East Germany offered assistance in economic planning and made overtures about providing assistance in internal security and intelligence matters.

78. Mengistu sees clear-cut advantages in closer relations with the Soviet Union and other Communist countries. Ethiopia wishes to diversify militarily, with the specific aim of reducing its dependence on the US. It considers an increase in Communist influence as necessary to revitalize Ethiopia’s nonaligned credentials, thus enabling it to compete more effectively with Somalia and the Arabs for international support. Mengistu also sees Communist political and economic models as useful for the Ethiopian revolution.

79. Mengistu also hopes that closer ties with the Soviets will induce them to restrain Somalia from pursuing its territorial ambitions against the FTAI and Ethiopia. This aim has achieved added importance as the regime’s growing domestic problems and Franco-Somali cooperation have steadily narrowed Ethiopia’s options for dealing with Mogadiscio.

80. We doubt, however, that the Soviets will be able to arrange a settlement of the FTAI issue acceptable to both Somalia and Ethiopia. We believe the Soviets have already urged President Siad to follow a cautious policy toward the FTAI and to avoid a war with Ethiopia, but they would find it difficult to actively mediate the dispute. Soviet mediation, however evenhanded in intent, would probably be interpreted by Somalia as favoritism toward Ethiopia, since it would put the Soviets in the role of gaining for Ethiopia what the Somalis believe Addis Ababa has no hope of gaining on its own.

81. The Soviets have not yet moved so rapidly or so far in Ethiopia that they could not withdraw if the risks began to outweigh the benefits. Somalia is unhappy with the developing Soviet-Ethiopian rela-
tionship, but it is too dependent on the Soviets to jeopardize its own ties with Moscow any time soon. ⁵

82. The Somalis nevertheless will probably begin a more earnest search for alternative sources of aid. Serious Somali overtures toward the Arabs or the West might cause the Soviets some pause about becoming too deeply involved in Ethiopia, and they are not likely to take measures that seriously imperil their position in Somalia. The Soviets maintain their major Indian Ocean support base at Berbera and provide Siad’s government with all its military equipment and substantial economic aid. As a result, Somalia is, and is likely to remain for some time, the focus of Soviet interest in the Horn, while the Soviets continue to probe and cultivate possibilities in Ethiopia.

Cuba

83. Cuba has also moved to solidify its ties with Mengistu and seems prepared to provide medical and other forms of technical assistance as well as military training. The extent of Cuban interest was demonstrated by Fidel Castro’s visit to Addis Ababa in mid-March. This visit was preceded by a high-level Cuban delegation in late February. That delegation was headed by a general who in the past has been used to arrange military, economic, and technical aid to African countries, and military assistance was almost certainly discussed. Castro’s decision to visit Ethiopia strongly implies that the Cubans have already decided to provide some assistance. Cuba—which has trained in Somalia some of the guerrillas operating in the Ogaden and is training others for possible use in the FTAI—is likely to take into consideration Somali sensitivities as it moves toward greater involvement in

⁵ Somalia’s “dependence” on the USSR is strongly focused on the Soviet provision of military equipment—about $290 million worth since 1960, although the Soviets have provided nearly 19 percent of the economic aid disbursed from all sources to Somalia, and the $60 million that Moscow allocated to Somalia in 1975 was the largest such Soviet allocation in sub-Saharan Africa since 1966. In trade, Somalia sends less than 6 percent of its exports to the USSR and receives less than 10 percent of its imports—mostly petroleum products, machinery, and equipment—from the Soviet Union. Italy and Saudi Arabia are much more significant trading partners with Somalia. Little is known, however, of the terms of repayment to the USSR for the arms Moscow has sent to Somalia. Up to a third is believed to have been grant military aid, with the balance 8- to 10-year loans on concessionary terms. The Soviets have elsewhere demonstrated that they are willing to extend the repayment period for a good client. The USSR is Somalia’s main creditor, accounting for about 38 percent of all foreign loans. US aid obligations during the period FY 1954 through September 1976 totaled $83 million, entirely in economic assistance, including $15 million in PL-480 credits.

Ethiopia, even though Havana, like Moscow, probably views this as an ideal moment to gain influence in the larger country. During this visit Castro arranged a meeting between himself, Mengistu, Siad, and South Yemen President Ali in Aden in an attempt to get Mengistu and Siad at least to agree in principle to resolve their differences. Mengistu was agreeable, but the talks ended in failure when Siad insisted on discussing Somalia’s claim to parts of Ethiopian territory—a demand unacceptable to Mengistu. Siad maintained his position despite Castro’s pleas for some agreement as part of a strategy to block an alleged imperialist and reactionary Arab threat to the Red Sea area. We do not believe that the Cubans, any more than the Soviets, will be successful in this role as an intermediary between Ethiopia and Somalia.

The United States

84. The military regime from its inception cooperated with the US less than the Haile Selassie regime had done, and placed more emphasis on improving Ethiopia’s nonaligned credentials and strengthening relations with the Communist world. The militancy in the PMAC have felt from the outset that the US is basically antagonistic toward Ethiopia’s socialist revolution, and the absence of any signal from the US of special sympathy for the Ethiopian revolution has impaired the Ethiopian-US bilateral relationship and sharply diminished US influence.

85. The regime persists in alleging that the US supports its domestic opponents. The media campaign on this issue has recently intensified and has resulted in some increased danger to American citizens in Ethiopia. The media consistently make other hostile comments about the US, even though Ethiopian officials privately have continued to express a desire to maintain good relations with the US and have asked for continued military and economic assistance. ⁶

86. The PMAC thus far has been restrained from a further loosening of ties with the US by Ethiopia’s continued requirement for US military materiel to support its virtually 100-percent US-equipped forces. Ethiopian officials have reacted negatively to recent US statements about human rights violations in Ethiopia and the announced US intentions to end grant military aid except for limited military training. Such statements are certain to be interpreted in Addis Ababa as further evidence of US reserve or even

⁶ The US and other Western donors still provide the bulk of Ethiopia’s economic aid, but US bilateral economic assistance is declining.
hostility, despite the fact that the US continues to make materiel available through foreign military sales programs.

87. Indeed, we believe that the Mengistu regime is already acting on the basic assumption that the US is no longer a major factor in Ethiopia. For example, the military rulers now conclude that Ethiopia's dispute with Somalia must be handled without assuming direct US involvement. They doubt the US would provide new military assistance in the event of a war with Somalia. This belief, while promoted most strongly by radicals on the Council and their Marxist advisers, is probably shared by other military and civilian officials who are generally pro-West. The US rapprochement with Sudan and close US ties with Saudi Arabia and Egypt, together with the regime's view of a growing Arab conspiracy against it, has reinforced the belief that the US is fraternizing with the enemy camp.

88. We see no reversal of this trend. Although Ethiopia will probably try to maintain trade and economic relationships with the US—despite the fact that it resists settling expropriation cases involving US interests—and will continue to press for military resupply and spares for existing equipment, there is growing sentiment against any military association with the US. Significantly increased military assistance and political support from Communist countries—even if not sufficient to replace US support—would add weight to the arguments of those opposing further reliance on the US.

89. In the immediate future, developments concerning the FTAI will play an important role in determining how far and how fast Ethiopia will go in distancing itself from the US. Addis Ababa is now placing its hope on the USSR as a restraining factor, and evidence that the Soviets have made progress in curtailling Somali ambitions will lead Ethiopia further into relationships with the USSR. We doubt the Soviets will be very successful in their role of honest broker, but even in the event of hostilities, the Soviets might still gain ground at the expense of the US. If the US did not take Ethiopia's part, and if Addis Ababa suffered a humiliating defeat, the Ethiopians might well look to the Soviet Union in the hope of at least salvaging something out of their adversity. In this case, the Soviets could find themselves in the position of backing a winner—Somalia—and gaining a loser—Ethiopia.

90. The PRC

90. The military regime, as part of its general campaign to improve ties with Communist countries, has expanded Ethiopian contacts with China. Peking is the largest single source of Communist economic assistance, and it has provided a supply of small arms and ammunition, but its arms aid—and its influence—is unlikely to match that of the Soviet Union. There is a strong ideological affinity between the Ethiopians and the Chinese; the military leaders view China in particular as a model for economic and social development. Over the longer term, we believe there are good possibilities of a closer Chinese-Ethiopian relationship; for now, these possibilities are limited by Ethiopia's immediate need to shift the Soviets away from their pro-Somali tilt.

91. Israel

91. The military regime has established significant, albeit discreet, relations with Israel. The PMAC would no doubt like to reestablish diplomatic relations, but it is not willing to go against the African consensus on this issue. Like governments in other sub-Saharan countries, the Haile Selassie regime broke relations—although reluctantly—in 1973. Ethiopia's military leaders, including many who are now on the Council, placed great value on Israeli training and were opposed to the break.

92. Last year Israel, in response to the PMAC's request, sent about 10 military advisers to train a newly formed counterinsurgency division. The Israeli contingent probably diminished as the training progressed, and all the advisers had probably left by July.

94. Israel is motivated by its long-standing concern about the political orientation of countries at the southern end of the Red Sea; it would like to prevent the growth of radical or Soviet influence over the Bab
el Mandeb strait, through which the shipping to Israel’s port of Eilat must pass.

95. Most of the Arab states on the Red Sea were aware of the presence of Israeli military advisers in Ethiopia, but they probably are not aware of more extensive cooperation between the two countries. The Arabs were predictably disgruntled, but the Israeli-Ethiopian connection did not appear to be a crucial factor in turning them against Addis Ababa. Qadhafi presumably also knows about the Israeli-Ethiopian contacts. He may use his influence to exert some pressure on Ethiopia to break off the relationship, but he will probably not push too hard. His more immediate concern is the overthrow of Numayri, and he wants to maintain cooperation with Ethiopia for that purpose.

96. Despite the heritage of Solomon and the Queen of Sheba, we do not believe that the Ethiopian-Israeli relationship has a great future. It is essentially one for immediate, tactical purposes, encouraged by the Ethiopians’ current paranoia toward the Arabs (except Qadhafi); the Israeli role is likely over time to shrink as the Ethiopians attempt to develop broader foreign support.

### COMPARATIVE STRENGTHS AND MAJOR EQUIPMENT

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<th>Somalia</th>
<th>Ethiopia</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Army</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
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<td>Mortars</td>
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<td><strong>Air Force</strong></td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>SAM battalions</td>
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<td><strong>Navy</strong></td>
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<tr>
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<td>Ships</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Paramilitary</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>30,000 (plus)</td>
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* Does not include 2,250 US 66-mm one-shot, throwaway rocket launchers.

### ETHIOPIAN INSURGENT STRENGTH ESTIMATES

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<th>Organization</th>
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<td>Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF)</td>
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<tr>
<td>People's Liberation Forces (PLF)</td>
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<td>Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tigre People's Liberation Front (TPLF)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Somali-supported insurgents in south</td>
<td>5,000-10,000</td>
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THIS MEMORANDUM IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT, AS FOLLOWS:

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the Memorandum:

The Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the National Security Agency.

Concurring:

The Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community, Vice Chairman
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence representing the Central Intelligence Agency
The Director of Intelligence and Research representing the Department of State
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, National Security Agency
The Deputy Assistant Administrator for National Security, Energy Research and Development Administration
The Special Assistant to the Secretary for National Security, Department of the Treasury
The Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Abstaining:

None

Also Participating:

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
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The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
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