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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Senior Review Panel

16 May 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. F. Hutchinson, Jr.,
National Intelligence Officer at Large

SUBJECT: Agency-Military Relationships

REFERENCE: Memo for ED fm HIO/AL (Mr. Hutchinson),
dtd 2 May 1983, Subject, "Survey of Selected
Agency-Military Relationships"

1. Your report (which I think was excellent) addresses in some detail the growing unease between the Agency and the military services. Some measure of mutual suspicion, I suggest, is ineradicable but the present level of background noise indicates we have a problem. As you point out, the absence of a uniformed officer in a conspicuous position in the Agency is undoubtedly exacerbating the normal minor frictions of doing business.

2. On page 6 you tick off some of the procedural and technical problems. I suggest solutions to these can be worked out on a mutually satisfactory basis. However, both the military services and the Agency will have to agree to devote people and time to the development of the solutions. Right now I do not think either group is organized to exploit the capabilities of the other.

3. My first overall suggestion is that when a major bureaucratic snafu is detected in the interface between two major government departments, an organizational change within one or both departments is inevitable. Without this change, recriminations will grow, positions harden, and solutions get to be more expensive.

4. I think the Agency needs to develop and staff an organization which will manage its liaison activities,

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not only with the military but with friendly foreign intelligence services. This organization would perform screening, tasking, clearance, distribution, and a host of similar functions which are required to fulfill the peculiar and unique requirements of the liaison functions which are now or will be required if the Agency is to fulfill its responsibilities. The emergence of the office would require careful preparation within the Agency and no doubt will generate some serious problems of its own. Having a uniformed serving officer head the new group would by itself do a great deal to improve the climate of cooperation between the military and the Agency.

5. War Planning. I don't know if the Agency has current plans for operations in the event of a minor or major war. Certainly I think the Agency should have a group of experienced and talented planners working on the measures which might be needed in crises varying from Grenada-type operations to general nuclear war. These plans would involve actions from the national level to the station level. Stay behind agents in the field and expanded economic analysts on the national level should be of equal and current concern. I don't think the routine appointment of a crisis management ad hoc group will meet the problem.

6. Crisis Management and Emergency Support. It is inevitable that if CIA does not appear to meet the perceived needs of another department, the other department will somehow get the funds, allocate the people, and do it themselves. Some degree of duplication is not entirely a bad thing but common sense indicates we continue to resist this tendency. Once war breaks out, the urgency of military operations will overwhelm economic considerations, and, as far as NRO programs are concerned, I suspect DoD will get exactly what it wants when the bombs begin to burst.

7. One comment. The CIA has never (in my opinion) quite had the guts, or the clout, or the ability to be the boss of the intelligence community. It has been content at most to be first among equals. To perform the guiding role it is uniquely capable of carrying out, it needed a complete life cycle to develop officers with the experience and talent of a Helms, Ray Cline, John McMahon, Chuck Briggs, etc. The Agency should now produce a steady supply of talented and dedicated professionals who know the nitty gritty, are educated, trained, and competent to administer a National Intelligence Program. Mr. Casey is capable of providing the political support, at least as far as the White House, that will permit the organizational realignments needed to

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increase the effectiveness and decrease the overlap of the national intelligence effort. I think you can lead the movement from your present desk.

8. All your other suggestions are obviously sensible and should be pursued. Basically, CIA is better at producing intelligence than it is in marketing as far as the military services are concerned. I suggest the effort should be made to make the channels between the Agency and the military services more effective.

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