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Letters


'We Really Don't Need an Intelligence Czar'

To the Editor:

Adm. Stansfield Turner, the Director of C.I.A. as well as the Director of Central Intelligence, has proposed to President Carter that the intelligence community have a single chief unaffiliated with any of the component agencies, such as C.I.A.

In considering this proposal, one should not forget that Admiral Turner already wears the hat of Director of Central Intelligence, the President's key man on all intelligence matters. The question is not that the Director of Central Intelligence is also the Director of C.I.A., where there have been a number of capable Deputy Directors who can and have run the C.I.A. for prolonged periods in the absence of the Director or when no Director had been appointed, but that the Director of Central Intelligence has not acted like the Director of Central Intelligence.

Most of this inaction on the part of the Director of Central Intelligence is due to the fact that the Presidents of the United States, from Truman on, have been satisfied with inaction. They have been satisfied, as former Senator Mansfield told the Murphy Commission, with a "swollen, expensive and inefficient intelligence community." Part of the inactivity was because the Director of Central Intelligence would only involve himself in battles that



would dissipate his energies and detract from the necessary intelligence-collection activities of the intelligence community if he tried to act without Presidential backing and authority.

What could be done without creating an "intelligence czar"?

(1) Responsibility and final authority for the intelligence community's

budget could be placed in the hands of the Director of Central Intelligence.

(2) Personnel cuts could be made in the agencies of the intelligence community. Senator Mansfield recommended a reduction in the number of personnel in the National Security Agency, in view of the fact that each of the armed forces maintains its own cryptological capability. The Defense Intelligence Agency could safely be cut from 5,000 to 500, with a corresponding cut in budget, making the D.I.A. something like the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in the Department of State. Published figures indicate that there are about 38,500 in Army intelligence, 10,000 in Navy intelligence and 60,000 in Air Force intelligence. There is justification for having a cadre of trained personnel available for wartime purposes and even for peacetime purposes, but no one having knowledge of peacetime intelligence production of these services and the fact that there is little correlation between peacetime intelligence training and combat intelligence work can justify such numbers.

(3) With real supervision by the Director of Central Intelligence, backed by the President, and after consultation and tough decisions on what the vital interests of the United States are, hundreds of messages could go out around the world to cut back on peripheral intelligence collection. The problem is that no one has been willing to make a decision on what to cut and then cut. There have been efforts to beat The New York Times on everything. President Nixon jokingly told Mr. Colby on his being sworn in as Director of C.I.A. and Central Intelligence not to allow him to be surprised by something he read in the newspaper.

We really don't need an intelligence czar, with the incumbent risks of hearing only one voice. What we do need is Presidential initiative and determination to rationalize and support the Director of Central Intelligence and intelligence community concepts.

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