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Director of Central Intelligence
to the Amherst, Smith, Vassar, Williams
Washington, D.C. Alumni Clubs
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CIA Auditorium

Good evening. Welcome to the CIA, Amherst men, Williams men, Vassar and Smith ladies. I guess maybe it hasn't gotten into the extracurricular side on the alumni yet has it? I don't know whether we've got ladies from Amherst here yet or not, but if you are, welcome.

I guess I'm with you tonight for a couple of reasons. One is an enduring gratitude for having had the privilege of an education, at least part of an education--I left at the end of two and a half years in a small, New England liberal arts college; one of the great institutions in our country, I believe, is private, small colleges dedicated to the liberal arts. And I'm always pleased to be with others who have shared that kind of an opportunity, but I also know that you, as leaders of this community, this country, help shape the public opinion in our country and I'm anxious to share with you our views on the Central Intelligence Agency, on the intelligence function of our country tonight because I know it's important for you and the country to understand that. We're in the midst of some important changes, some important swinging of the pendulum in this country with respect to intelligence and I would like to give you a few of my views on why I believe intelligence is important, perhaps of growing importance to our nation and what it takes to have a good intelligence capability in this country.

Let me start by saying that I sincerely believe that the decade of the 1980's is going to more precarious for our country than the decade of the 70's or the 60's. Several reasons I would say that. One, this will be the decade in which we face the first leadership in the Soviet Union that does

not feel militarily inferior to the United States. Now that's important. It is important to how we conduct our relations with the Soviet Union. We cannot bully them. We cannot feel superior to them in this regard. And first we must decide what we want to do about this with respect to our military posture ourselves, but regardless of what we do there, I would say to you that throughout most of the decade of the 1980's, there is no way we can change this perception of near parity in military forces between our two countries. Therefore we must and will have to adapt our diplomacy under these circumstances. It doesn't mean we're going to lose, it doesn't mean we are too weak to handle it, but it means we have to be more astute. We have to be more foresighted. We have to have good information.

A second reason the 80's will be precarious is that the developed countries of the free world cannot expect the same continued high rates of economic growth in this decade that we have experienced in the last several. Why? We estimate in the Central Intelligence Agency that the total amount of energy available to the developed nations of the world in this decade will increase by only a percent or two per year. And that's our optimistic side. One or two percent growth of energy available will not sustain 5 or 6% rate of growth of gross national product of our countries. And therefore we have a different economic outlook and that affects our relationships all around the world. And so, too, will the fact in the energy field that in 1980 the OPEC countries will siphon off of world trade about \$110 billion; that is, that will be their net return after they have bought everything they are going to buy from us and after they have sold everything they are going to sell to us. None of us know what billions of dollars are, but last year it was \$63 billion they took off; 2 years ago it was \$2 billion. Now the difference between \$2

billion and \$110 billion is enough to change the world economic prospect. Why? Why is it so different? Because in 1974 they increased the price of oil by 4½ times. By 1978, their benefit from doing that had decreased to \$2 billion; first, because they were buying much more from us, the West, but secondly, because we had eaten up their profits by inflation. You don't have to lecture to anybody in America today to say that the OPEC is not going to let us eat their profits up by inflation in the next four years as we did in the first four years of their price rises. They are now indexing; they are going to raise the price of oil as rapidly as we inflate. So we have a different problem in front of us. One hundred ten billion dollars over a few years gets to earn enough interest to where you are almost making \$110 billion in interest every year. It's a big and a different problem for us.

And thirdly, the decade of the 80's will be different and more precarious because the traditional mechanisms for handling these military, political and economic problems that we face are not going to work the same way in the 1980's as they had before. Our NATO allies, economically prosperous, politically stable, they want, they demand a stronger voice in the councils of the Alliance. The underdeveloped countries of the world, as you read every day in the papers, are more and more independent, aggressively independent, particularly those that produce raw materials. And in the 80's they are going to produce the quantity, the type of raw materials that suits their economic needs, not ours. Sometimes those are coincident but they need not necessarily be. Now I'm not predicting that our alliance is going to be weaker; I'm not suggesting that we are going to be in a total head-on clash with the lesser developed countries throughout the decade; I'm simply suggesting to you that the traditional mechanisms, the

traditional ways of working in these organizations will not necessarily be effective in the 1980's as they have been in the past. We must adapt. We must be more subtle, I believe. We must be more understanding of other people and their cultures, their economic problems, their political issues and so on.

And again, I come back to saying that I believe this means for us in the intelligence world, that we must do a better job of keeping our policymakers in this country well informed. Can we do that? What does it take? It is going to be more difficult in the years ahead than it has in those behind. It is more easy. It's easier to find ways to counter intelligence activities today; people are more sophisticated; people are more alert; there are more countries we need to gather intelligence on. It is a more difficult task. To be effective in the 80's we are going to have to change our ways of doing business and we are going to have to have some legislative support. Let me touch those two things quickly.

One reason we have to change our ways is that the means of collecting intelligence today are quite different than they were a decade or a decade and a half ago. Thanks to the wonders of American technology. Our technical systems for collecting intelligence information have just burgeoned; we get much more information today than we ever expected we would from our means of listening to signals, from our means of taking photographs of what is going on on the surface of the earth. Now that does not denigrate or make unusable the traditional intelligence human spying activities. But it changes the character of it. You do not go out and risk the life of a spy to get information you can obtain from a sensor. So we must, today, have a very sophisticated, complex way of integrating all of our means of collecting intelligence, moreso than

has ever, perhaps, been necessary in the past.

For instance, if by a photograph we find that country x has a new factory out here in the countryside. We wonder what it is all about. We then turn to the signals intelligence people and we say, "Why don't you find out if the network of communications from that factory to the capital goes to the Ministry of Nuclear Materials, or to the Foreign Ministry." And if it goes to the Ministry of Nuclear Materials, we will then go and find a human agent and well say, now what we want to know is not what is in that factory, but some specific element of the nuclear relationship which we will define for him and put him to work in a very targeted, specific way. It can be much more effective, but it takes much more teamwork. And it's a fascinating challenge for us.

The second side of intelligence is taking all this information that you have gathered and doing something with it. Turning it into analyses that are useful to our policymakers in the Executive Branch, to our legislators on the Hill, and to some extent, when we can do it in an unclassified form, to the American public. The challenge, the change that we have to face today on the analytic side of our house is equally great because today the number of countries we are concerned with is just so much greater than it was twenty or thirty years ago. There is hardly a country in the world not impacted by the major decisions of this country and there is hardly a country in the world that does something important on its own that isn't of interest and concern to us. We have to know what is going on. And the areas of academic expertise that we have to be able to work in are growing also, a great challenge to us. We are not only interested in the technology of missiles and tanks and ships, we are interested in the health and psychology of foreign leaders; we are interested in Soviet

grain harvest this year and next; we are interested in the flow of narcotics on the international market; we are interested in international terrorism; we are interested in the gross national product and the types of products and the profusion of technology across the world in many, many countries. And it goes on and on. There is hardly an academic discipline in any of our colleges or even the universities of this country which we do not employ here in the Central Intelligence Agency. We have to change. We have to be able to spread ourselves into many more areas than in the past.

Still another reason for change is the disinstitution the Central Intelligence Agency and the Intelligence Community in general, has become a much more public institution in our country today than it ever has been before. Or that any intelligence service has ever been in history. This came about as a result of the accusations, the charges, the investigations of the Intelligence Community in the '75-'77 time frame. It is a fact of life; we cannot turn the clock back; we have now established new sets of controls in the Executive Branch, on Capitol Hill, in the Legislative Branch. We are working well under those controls. I believe we can handle it. I believe that these changes are acceptable. But partly as a side effect of these changes of becoming a more public institution; but partly also is a side effect of Vietnam, of the Pentagon Papers, Watergate, we have lost something that we cannot afford to lose in the intelligence business--that is the capability to keep our necessary secrets. We cannot be a secret intelligence service if everything we learn is spewed out into the public domain. We are today then, asking the Congress for legislative help in this area. Now sometimes you read in the press that what we are asking for and what we need is to be unleashed, to be put under less control. That is inaccurate; that is facile misunderstanding of what in fact we need; what, in

fact, we hope the Congress will give us. What we want is protection for our ability to keep our secrets.

Several pieces of legislation we have in mind. The first concerns something called covert action. Covert action isn't strictly intelligence. Covert action is the attempt to influence the events in a foreign country without the source of that influencing being known. It has always been assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency by Presidents as the place where it will be carried out. It used to be just three years ago that it was almost unconscionable to talk about undertaking covert action. It was very unpopular. Today even in the media, as well as in conversations with Americans, I find people saying is there not something we can do between just talking with other countries and sending in the Marines? And yes, there is. Covert action does have a place in our diplomatic portfolio. In 1974 the Congress passed the Hughes-Ryan Amendment which requires that, if we are to undertake a covert action, on direction of the President, we must notify up to eight committees of the Congress. Now that is something in the neighborhood of 200 people. I can assure you I find it very difficult to go out and recruit others to go risk their lives on behalf of doing a covert action for us if I have to confess to them that maybe only 200 people on Capitol Hill will know about it.

Now, I don't want to be critical because I think in 1974 the Hughes-Ryan Amendment may have been necessary. It may have been a good idea. It was the beginning of establishing controls over the intelligence mechanisms through the Congress--controls which had existed but withered and now were being reinstated. But, today, we do not need that same control because we have a very effective set of intelligence committees in each chamber of the Congress and they do and are only to do oversight of the intelligence community; and

they do a very effective job of it and we want and are asking the Congress, and I think you will find that tomorrow we are going to make some progress on this I hope...to pass a law that will limit this information on the covert actions to these two oversight committees. Please note that on those two committees, there are at least two representatives from each of the other committees that we are not going to inform. So, in effect, we are not cutting the numbers of committees that will know this any, we are cutting the number of people. So if the Foreign Affairs Committee, which under our hope, will not have this information in the future, needs to have it, there will be two members on it who do have that information and raise their hand in a Foreign Affairs Committee debate and say there is something in the intelligence field that is germane to our debate. Let's stop and get the intelligence people in here and we, of course, would come and inform them.

A second area where we need help is in what we call identities legislation. I am in the difficult spot today of asking Americans to go overseas, serve their country as Central Intelligence Agency officers, under cover; that is, not acknowledging that they work for us, into countries where terrorism is quite popular, into countries where their security cannot be assured by the host country very well. And I have to do that while confessing to these people that this country has not yet been willing to do anything against those American citizens who callously and, in my opinion, traitorously, deliberately go out and try to disclose the identities of these men and women. You all know that in 1975, after Mr. Agee did this with respect to our people in Greece, our Chief of Station there was murdered. You may all remember that in July of this year after Mr. Agee's cohort, Philip Wolf, went to Jamaica and went on television and said here are the pictures of 15 members of the United States Embassy who

work for the CIA, here are their addresses, here are the telephone numbers, here are their license plate numbers, the house of one of those 15 men was shot up two nights later. ^{his} Had/daughter had been there and in her bed we might not have her with us today.

We have a bill before the Congress and it, too, tomorrow and the next day, is going to make progress. And it makes it a crime and in a repeated pattern of activity and with deliberate intent to destroy the intelligence activities of our country, disclose the names of our undercover people or our foreign agents overseas. There is a great deal of controversy in the press who claim that this is unconstitutional, who fear this is going to bring them into court. Let me assure you that we have painstakingly crafted this legislation with the Congress to avoid that. The Attorney General, former Solicitor General, Robert Bork, have said that this legislation is constitutional. And they are a better source of opinion in my mind than the Washington Post or the New York Times on that subject. And only if people carry out these activities over a pattern and over a period of time and only if they do so with a demonstrated intent to destroy our intelligence capability, can people be prosecuted. We believe it is most essential to our peoples' welfare, our peoples' morale, that we have some protection and this bill is very carefully designed to give them that without intruding on the constitutional rights of our citizens.

Finally, we have a bill with respect to what is known as the Freedom of Information Act. This problem is really one of perception rather than fact. Perception in this sense. If I am going to somebody overseas and saying will you risk your life for our country, and he looks me in the eye and says, but do you have to under the Freedom of Information Act release my name if they call for it? I will tell him no. But true answer, if he presses me, is that

I have never been required to do so yet; I have been challenged in the courts repeatedly and we have always won. But are you going to stick your neck on the line on the hope that we will win the next one when your name is the issue at stake. Not very likely. So we want to exempt from the Freedom of Information Act, the information in our files about our sources of information; not about information that could be in our files about American citizens or others--we really don't keep that, but we want the public to be assured that the Freedom of Information Act will still apply to their legitimate interests in what may be in our files. We hope that this will pass this session of Congress also because it will be a great boon to changing this perception, this overall perception that this country cannot keep its secrets, therefore its intelligence services cannot be trusted by those with whom we must work overseas.

In sum, you, I, this country faces a dilemma with respect to intelligence. We want our country to be as open, as free as it can be and we want our governmental institutions to exemplify that openness. At the same time, I think we all recognize that a secret intelligence service is necessary for our country so that we are not caught unawares, so that other people cannot take advantage of us in the international arena. The issue, the problem that we have is can we have both? Can we have the ideal of openness; can we have the necessity of some level of secrecy. I believe we can; I believe we can do both, and we must. I believe we can have controls on the intelligence apparatus of our country that still allow us to be effective. On the one hand, those controls today are in the Executive Branch through the President and his Executive Orders that govern us. On the other hand, they are in the Legislative Branch through the Committees of the Congress and I believe these two sets of controls give the public of this country reason to be confident that the intelligence activities

are being conducted in accordance with national policy and under the supervision of the elected representatives of the people.

On the other hand, I am very grateful that over the last two years or so, I can just feel the swing of this pendulum in terms of American public support for a good intelligence service. It is coming back and we are very, very grateful to have it. And with some help from the Legislature such as I have been describing to you tonight, I believe we can, with the support of the people, with some good legislation, continue to be as effective as this Agency has been over its 32-year history.

Finally, then, let me just say I believe these trends are all moving in the right direction and that we are shaping a new kind of intelligence for our country. We are not yet there; we continue to need your support and I don't mean just your support for these legislative initiatives that I have mentioned to you tonight, your support for the fact that this country must in the decade of the 1980's, a decade I believe will be a precarious one, must have a capability to look overseas and learn what is happening to foretell events, so that we can keep our policymakers as well informed as possible and they can make the best decisions possible for you, for our country and, in effect, for the entire Free World. Thank you.

Q&A's

Amherst, Smith, Vassar, Williams
Alumni Clubs of Washington, D.C.
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Q: Could you just outline for us the way the Central Intelligence Agency (I believe there is a Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency--I don't know whether there are still intelligence branches of the various Armed Forces, and the information-gathering functions of the State Department and the Department of Commerce and God knows how many others there are) how these all fit together?

A: How big is this octopus called the Intelligence Community? I have two jobs. I am the Director of Central Intelligence, established by law in 1947, to coordinate all of the intelligence activities, what we call the national intelligence activities, of our country. The law also provided that the Director of Central Intelligence would always be the head of the Central Intelligence Agency--one of the components of the Community. There are two kinds of components in the community--there are those who collect information and there are those who use it and analyze it. The CIA does both, but primarily collects our human intelligence. The National Security Agency collects signals intelligence. There are other components that collect photographic intelligence spread around the community. The State Department and a number of other organizations like the Federal Broadcast Information Service, collect open intelligence, unclassified intelligence, and so on. One of my key jobs, and one that President Carter has strengthened in his term of office, is to coordinate all that collection as I indicated to you was important to do so. It is also important to you and me for our pocketbook. There is a lot of money in these expensive technical systems, and we don't want too many, we don't want them overlapping, we don't want them underlapping--failing to get what needs to be collected. So I have had strengthened authority over those agencies; I control what we call their "tasking"--what they go out and collect. It's my responsibility. I control their budgets. Now the other side of the house is analyzing intelligence. There is a Defense Intelligence Agency, a large organization here called the National Foreign Assessment Center which is part of the CIA, there is the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research, there are small intelligence organizations in Energy, Commerce, and so on. We all work together and I am nominally their boss but I say nominally because we want competitive, differing analyses to come forward. We want one individual to be able to tell anybody, suppress that view. That is a crazy idea you've got here. We let it all bubble up. I then do have to make decisions what is my advice as senior intelligence advisor to the President, but if there is a strong dissenting view like from DIA, I will feel it incumbent upon me to present that as an alternative, if you see what I mean. So we try on the one hand to have a DCI who does ride strong on the collecting agencies who organizes and brings together the analytic agencies, but not with a strong control over them. The money is not very big here, comparatively speaking, and the

importance of having different centers of thinking, different centers of interpretation is very keen to our overall objective.

Q: Do you think it is possible for the Director of the CIA to properly balance for intelligence and analysts (inaudible).

A: Can a Director of Central Intelligence combine the roles of being intelligence interpreter and a policy advisor, particularly a strong-willed one and he graciously named somebody else. I don't have a very strong will just as long as we do things my way around here. Seriously, the usual question, and I'll answer it first, and maybe it's part of yours or not, is can I be the head of CIA and run all the other intelligence activities fairly because in some sense there is competition there particularly in the budget area. And it is difficult to not have two masters, but to be two bosses I guess, but I believe it can be done and in point of fact, particularly in my case, because I have such a superb deputy, Ambassador Frank Carlucci, I am really able to turn the running of the CIA over to my deputy and I make major policy decisions risk-taking decisions, and try to be as much DCI as I can rather than CIA. But can I be intelligence chief and a policy advisor--let me make it clear that one of the ethics of intelligence is to stay out of the policy business; because if I start advocating that we ought to have a SALT treaty, SALT II treaty, will the Congress or you believe me when I testify on how well I can verify the SALT II Treaty? So, we don't pick policy positions. Now, we have to stay very close to the policymakers because if we're not producing intelligence on what they are making policy on, we are here for naught. So I'm very well abreast of what policy decisions the President and others are trying to make. But I am very scrupulous in not letting intelligence advocate one position or another. Now clearly, some of the things we come up with scotch or support a policy preference or at least have a major impact on it, but because we want those to be appreciated as being non-biased, we very carefully try to stay out of the policy process. For a strong-willed person it's a hard thing to sit there in the National Security Council and hear everybody advocating something you know is just wrong. And not speak up, but I do try. And do.

Q: Admiral Turner, we've heard a good deal this evening about some of the activities of the CIA--intelligence-gathering, covert action activity (by that I understand now you to mean an attempt to influence affairs in another country without that country being aware of where the influence comes from. I wonder if you would comment for us, compare for us the very effective role of the CIA in Chile, both in its intelligence gathering and in its covert activities which resulted in the murder of Allende, and that of the CIA's role in Iran, which seems to have a great deal of difficulty attached to it, both in terms of its ability to convey information to the American Congress and the President as to what was about to happen and it seems, obviously in terms its current covert activity which I understand or would assume is going on at this very minute.

A: Would I compare our intelligence success in Chile with our intelligence failures in Iran? I am not asked the question in quite those terms, but it's a good one. We in both Chile and Iran, undertook covert actions. In Iran way back in 1953 and in Chile in 1970. Let me emphasize that in some sense the one in Iran was successful in 1953 and it achieved what the country asked us to do. The country did not ask us to murder Allende and we did not do that in Chile, but generally speaking, I do not think we were successful in achieving what the country wanted in Chile. But, I would only emphasize to you in both cases the covert action activities of this Agency in those countries were authorized by the President of this country, checked by the National Security Council and we were conforming with the national policy in those regards. Now, as to the so-called failure in Iran in 1978, when the Shah, actually fell in early 1979 but he began to lose power in 1978; we have been accused of an intelligence failure here, and we would like to have done better there. Let me just say this in our self-defense without trying to be too defensive, but the most difficult part of intelligence is the political side, particularly the side of predicting coups, revolutions, changes like this that come about suddenly. Now in this instance, throughout 1978, beginning in January, we were reporting to the President that there were a lot of problems in Iran. There was a lot of undercurrent of unrest. We saw it from people who were dissatisfied with their economic status, dissatisfied because they did not have a role in the political process, dissatisfied because their Islamic traditions or practices were being profaned and dissatisfied because there was graft and corruption, and so on. What we did not forecast was that these various centers of dissatisfaction would coalesce around a 78-year old cleric who had been an expatriate for 17 years and would become a force of greater strength than the Shah could handle and right up to October I personally, while seeing this building, felt that because the Shah had such strong police and military forces, that he was going to step in at a critical moment and take control and suppress this. He did not do so for reasons that I'm sure we will probably never understand, indicative in part that not even the Shah understood the strength and the welling up of these forces and their coalescence. What happened in Iran is what we term a "societal change" not a revolution. It is a lot easier in many ways to predict a revolution, an organized activity, something where you can infiltrate it with a spy and find out what they are going to do. This was, in fact, a true revolution, a change in the society brought about by these many centers of dissatisfaction that managed to bring themselves together and topple the Shah on a program that was strictly anti-Shah. A lot of the chaos we have seen and which is frankly getting worse in that country today is that that kind of a cement between a group of different does not hold very well. Once the Shah is gone they haven't been able to find that same motivating factor. They are working it around their religion, but there are great differences within the country over that today. And we have a situation in Iran where there are so many different power centers in the country today that it is tending towards chaos.

Q: Right now, sir, what is the parity of our intelligence effort vis-a-vis Russia and Western Europe?

A: What's the parity comparison of our intelligence effort capabilities with Europeans and the Russians. An interesting question. Because today there are only two countries in the world that have a full intelligence capability--ourselves and the Soviets. You see, technical systems have become so expensive that there is no other country that has the full range of them that we and the Soviets do. Now that does mean the Europeans are not good in intelligence. I'm just saying that they have limitations that we do not because of our greater breadth of intelligence capabilities. As far as the Soviets are concerned, we are definitely ahead of them in the technical collection that I described to you because of superior American technology. On human intelligence they are much bigger than we; it's very hard to measure, but I'm not dissatisfied, I think that we're more clever and do just as capable a job with a smaller number of people. But that, of course, is a disputable issue. It's very hard to tell. Finally, the other half of intelligence is analysis and I believe we have a great advantage over the Soviets here. because I do not think you could do as good analysis when you're in a very structured, authoritarian society where you may lose your job and your head if you come up with the wrong conclusions. I can go to the President and say I think you're wrong, boss and I'm not sure my counterpart, Mr. Andropov, can get away with that. I think that inhibits good analysis. I think we have a great advantage on them there.

Q: (Inaudible)

A: We've got a couple of big issues here. I hope you're prepared to stay a while. Does covert action contravene the principles and ethics of our country in essence is part of the question. And don't we need both public and Congressional oversight to ensure that covert action doesn't go off and do things as unsuccessful as what we did in Chile. First of all, if it's a covert action, by definition, you can't have public oversight. Now you can have Congressional oversight on a classified basis and what I'm saying to you and asking the Congress is not to reduce or eliminate Congressional oversight, I'm trying to reduce the number of people on Capitol Hill who have to know this and thereby reducing the probability of leaks. Let me emphasize to you, please, I do not mistrust the Congress for leaks anymore than I mistrust anybody else in the intelligence world, but the danger of a leak is geometrically proportional to the number of people who know it, in a broad sense. We want oversight; we want oversight of the covert action process but two committees, on which are represented the other 6 committees, I believe is adequate for public assurance that the covert action is being undertaken in an authorized and a proper way. And we don't even go up and start a covert action unless it has been signed off in writing by the President of the United States. So, I think it's under very tight control. Is it against our ethic, is it against our country's morals to undertake covert action? Let me give you an example of a covert action. We want to influence another country to take a certain position in the United Nations on the Camp David Accords. Now our foreign minister, our Secretary of State can go to their foreign minister and say, Joe we really think you ought to do so and so on this position in the United Nations. Now what's Joe going to think? The first

thing he is going to say is, is Mr. Muskie telling me that because it's good for the United States or it's good for my country? So, if we want to be effective with that Foreign Minister, we may find that it's better to have someone else suggest to him that the best thing for him to do is to take a certain position in the United Nations about the Camp David Accords. And I believe there is quite a role for that kind of thing. Now you're much more concerned with assassinations, paramilitary, overthrows of governments and so on. To begin with, we have an Executive Order that forbids anyone in our government considering assassination, any assassination effort. So we have drawn a very clear and unequivocal line there; on military support, overthrowing governments, I can only say to you that if that is ever undertaken, it is undertaken with the approval of the National Security Council, the President of the United States and at least two, and today 8, committees of the Congress. So it has to, in some sense, reflect the will of the people. Rather than pass a law and say you won't do any covert action, I think it is better to trust these organs of the country which are constituted under the Constitution to reflect the will of the people in these regards.

Q: (Inaudible)

A: Top Secret? No, I'd rather not discuss that because the President simply has to be able to get advice from his advisors without it all coming out that Joe said this and Bill said that and Pete said this; because if it really does all fall out in the press as it does so often, people get wary about this and pretty soon the President is deprived of this kind of advice.

Q: Looking at both Iran and Nicaragua, we've come up with the Ayatollah and the Sandanista guerrillas (inaudible). Is there any guidance within the USG at this point not only binding on your Agency, but also on the State Department and others that when we see some dictator, some in control about to go down, that we do something to promote getting someone in position to take over power who is friendly to our interests?

A: That's a very difficult question to answer. It's one that transcends intelligence and gets into broad policy. It is one on which if I could share the innermost thought that I have wouldn't entirely satisfy you because we do things pretty much on an ad hoc basis country-by-country. Let me come back to this other question which relates to it. One of the ways to do just exactly what you are suggesting, and it is a good suggestion, and I would like to answer you yes, we always do it, but I can't in all honesty; is to undertake a covert action years in advance of that crisis. That is, to covert subsidize and work with people who stand for moderation for freedom, for democracy, so that when the country collapses around a dictator, we are able to help bring to the fore the kind of people who stand for the kinds of things we stand for. That is one of the things that it is covert action. You see, covert action is not, when anything I do that isn't collecting intelligence, collecting information and analyzing it, is defined as covert action. If I'm out supporting the democratic elements in a country of the right or the left, I'm doing a :

covert action and I need to have that freedom to do just what you suggest.

Q: (Inaudible.)

A: ^{not} Why did it/work in South Korea? Either we hadn't tried a covert action or we didn't do it well. I'm sorry to be somewhat facetious. We, it's a very difficult thing to do. I'm suggesting we should try, but I certainly guarantee you 100% success if I'm asked to do this. You have to have some moderate elements from which to build to begin with and I can tell you, we have declined in recent times. We have declined to undertake a covert action for that very reason, that we did not think there was an adequate moderate base upon which to build in a particular country, and we felt we would be deluding our decisionmakers if we undertook what they were suggesting we might want to do. See what I mean? There was such a low probability of our being able to build a base of support that we said, really, you're just kidding yourselves if you think you're going to accomplish something through us in this particular country.

Q: What portion of your efforts are describable as military intelligence as opposed to political or civil or did Brezhnev sleep well last night?

A: It's very hard to put numbers on it, but I would say to you that intelligence on the Soviet Union is probably 70% of our effort, the whole Soviet Communist Bloc; that within that, better than half is military-related; and those are very broad numbers because you just can't do it by a timeclock; that isn't the only factor here, but yes, we still have a very high percentage of our effort on military affairs, particularly Soviet military affairs. And it's one of my big problems. First of all, it's hard to change any institution of this size and change its direction. Secondly, you asked me what military intelligence would I cut out in order to do more economics--it's a very difficult decision because we are under a very definite military threat today. We pare a little here and hope to get some more from the Congress and we add a little there. But it's not easy.

Q: As DCI at the time you started working for the CIA, there was a document you had to sign, to say if after your employment at the CIA if you were ever to make comment on international affairs you had to submit them to a CIA Board of Review. Now you have a predecessor by the name of George Bush who is presently running for Vice President, who apparently signed the same document, except has not fallen under this requirement. Why?

A: If I can get through the next 40 days without too many more questions like this I'll be in great shape. Mr. Bush signed a secrecy agreement with us; he has indicated to us that he will live up to it, including his activities during the campaign. The agreement does not say everything we write, publish or comment on after we leave the CIA must be submitted for review. It says that which deals with the intelligence process, that which deals with what we learned about or in the intelligence business

here must be clear, it's not censored; it's cleared for security reasons only. Mr. Hetu is the Chairman of the Publications Review Board that does that. The point being that every someone as knowledgeable as Mr. Bush may not know three or four years after the fact whether something is still or be inimical to the interest of the country if it were disclosed.

Q: (Inaudible.)

A: That is a very perceptive question and I glossed over that. I do become an advocate of policy to some extent when I suggest a covert action solution. Let me say this in mitigation. We only originate covert actions suggestions here as a supplement to existing policies. Only is a strong word, but I don't know of a case when it hasn't been that way. That is, I don't think we would come along and say there's country over here and we think we ought to start a whole new thrust in there. What we say to ourselves is, in our base in the National Security Council, I hear them saying they would like to try to get country x to stop doing this. I'll come back to my staff here and I'll say, this is the direction the country wants to go. The Secretary of State wants to go. The President wants to go and has endorsed it. Can we help? If so, we develop a proposal and send it down for the review of the National Security Council. But it is getting us into the policy business in that one sphere. For that reason, some people suggested get covert action out of here. Not unreasonable. Let me suggest one reason you may not want to do that. Right now, covert action is part of the CIA and we have people who go into the covert action department and they spend 2, 3, 4, 5 years there and they work and they come back and they go into other parts of the CIA and they move around. If you take and you create a whole new Agency for covert action, what are going to get. You get a lot of pressure for covert action. You've got a bureaucracy dependent upon the flourishing of covert action. So they are going to generate it. If my covert action people today don't get any business for the next two years and they didn't for a number of years practically around here, they're not really worried about their job anymore, anyway, because they are going to go back into other departments of the Agency. In short, it is not a full-time profession for people in this organization and, therefore, it does not generate a constituency. Lastly, let me say that it would be very expensive to duplicate because many of the same individuals carry out our intelligence collection to do the covert action. See what I mean. You have an agent overseas. Today he's giving you information about what that foreign minister is thinking, tomorrow he's talking to the foreign minister saying, hey, why don't you vote in the United Nations? Lastly, the two relate together very much--intelligence collection and covert action, because again, if you support a democratic politician in a foreign country before he comes into power, he's your friend afterwards. One time you're working covert action with him, the next time you're working intelligence.