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## NATIONAL MARKET COVERAGE

### TRANSCRIPT

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**PROGRAM** The Diane Rehm Show **CITY** Washington, D.C.

**DATE** March 1, 1995 10:38 AM **AUDIENCE**

**SUBJECT** Melvin Goodman Interviewed

**STEVE ROBERTS:** I'm Steve Roberts, sitting in for Diane today. We're back with Melvin Goodman from the CIA.

President Clinton has selected retired Air Force General Michael Carns to lead the CIA. Carns has a daunting challenge as he takes over an agency facing budget cuts, with its mission ill-defined and its credibility and morale undermined by the Aldrich Ames case.

Joining me to talk about some of the steps General Carns could take to deal with these problems and reform the CIA is Melvin Goodman. He's a former Soviet policy analyst at CIA, now a professor at the National War College and author of regular op-ed page pieces on this subject.

Nice to have you with us.

**MELVIN GOODMAN:** Good morning. It's nice to be here.

**ROBERTS:** Mr. Goodman, why don't we start -- we mentioned that Admiral [sic] Carns is about to take over. What's he up against at this agency?

**GOODMAN:** He's up against an agency that is demoralized and, I think, in a certain amount of bureaucratic peril. When you look at the damage that was done to the agency in the 1980s by Bill Casey and Bob Gates, a lot of that damage has not been corrected as yet. That includes the Ames affair and the inability to track Ames over a ten-year period. And that also would include the politicization of intelligence in the 1980s. A lot of the people who were responsible for not tracking Ames in a more expedient fashion and a lot of the people who were politicizing intelligence are still in very important jobs. And Woolsey did not remove them. In fact, he promoted some of them.

So, that's the first thing that a new Director must deal with.

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ROBERTS: Let's take these two subjects individually. The Aldrich Ames case, of course, there's been a lot of publicity. What's the lasting impact? Is it more on morale? Is it also of practical impact on the assets around the world that might have been compromised? What -- as this rippling fallout continues to develop, what are you seeing?

GOODMAN: Well, I think the impact on resources has been exaggerated, because the interesting thing is that within a couple of years the CIA had created new resources. In fact, one of the reasons why they didn't track Ames more carefully is because they began to get new agents and they thought they were dealing with an aberration rather than a serious systemic problem. So the resources returned. And that had more to do with the decline and the collapse of the Soviet Union than it did with the power of the CIA.

The real lasting impact is that for ten years you had no accountability and responsibility in the CIA itself. And if it weren't for a brace of people at rather medium-level positions who had a certain amount of courage and tenacity, I don't think the CIA ever would have tracked Rick Ames, despite all of the clues.

So, the serious problem is one of integrity and accountability of the agency. And that a new Director can deal with very quickly.

ROBERTS: Now, the second question about the politicization of information. Of course, William Casey, the Director during the Reagan years, was well known for his strongly held political views. And what was the lasting impact there? When you say politicization, were they skewing the information? Were they providing information that buttressed a particular point of view? What are we talking about?

GOODMAN: We're talking about three kinds of politicization. In one case, they made up intelligence out of whole cloth. That was the "Papal Plot" memo, that the Soviet Union was responsible for the attempt to kill the Pope. That was created out of nothing.

In some cases, they slanted intelligence. That was done for Casey to show that Bill Casey's favorite covert action programs were going very well.

In some cases...

ROBERTS: Such as the Contras and...

GOODMAN: The Contras, aid to the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, aid throughout Central America and Southern Africa.

And in the last case, you have the suppression of intelligence. And that, of course, is the greatest intelligence

failure that the CIA has ever been responsible for, the failure to track the strategic retreat and capitulation of the Soviet Union, even before the collapse. And that was because of suppression of intelligence, and it was Bill Casey and Bob Gates who suppressed that intelligence.

ROBERTS: Well, that of course is a central issue. There was the cliché for so many years that Americans saw the Soviets as being ten feet tall. In fact, they turned out to be about three feet tall.

What accounted for such a miscalculation or a series of misjudgments there?

GOODMAN: Well, several factors are important here. One is the failure of the social sciences. Our mind-set was wrong. It was larger than a failure of the intelligence community. I think it was a failure of the media, of the pundits, of the professors, of places where I studied Soviet studies and Russian studies. There was no scenario, there was no concept for the fact that this system may not hold together, that the ideology is flawed. And we tended to exaggerate the Soviet Union and it became a justification for very large defense budgets and particularly the defense increases in the 1980s, when President Reagan added \$1 1/2 trillion to a very large defense budget.

So, I think the mind-set was indeed a problem. But in the case of the 1980s, when the evidence began to come in that the Soviet Union was much weaker than we had perceived, there was a great deal of suppression of very good evidence about the weakness of their weapons systems.

ROBERTS: Deliberate suppression.

GOODMAN: That is deliberate suppression, particularly on the part of Bob Gates, because he was the filter for Bill Casey's ideological perception.

ROBERTS: Of course, I remember in the 1984 presidential campaign Ronald Reagan -- one of the major ads he ran was "the bear in the woods." His whole strategy was to continue to focus and, I guess, exaggerate the Soviet threat.

GOODMAN: That's true. But that was consistent in American politics. Remember, Eisenhower had to stand up to the so-called bomber gap, but he did. Kennedy was responsible for the so-called missile gap, which was a fraud. Richard Pipes from Harvard came in and tried to create an intentions gap, that the Soviet Union was actually building a weapons delivery system for first-strike capability. And then Casey added to it with the idea that the Soviets were indeed ten feet tall and responsible for all of the terror around the world.

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So, it's a rather consistent strain in American politics. But the CIA was dissociated from those accusations until Casey and Gates drew them in.

ROBERTS: Now, Melvin Goodman, in writing about James Woolsey, the outgoing Director of the CIA, you wrote, somewhat critically, that he was still a cold warrior. Even though a Democrat, Mr. Woolsey had been involved with Republican Administrations in the past, as well.

Is it time for a new mind-set at the CIA? Is it propitious that someone like Woolsey, who you describe as a cold warrior, is now leaving. And can we get a new look now at the top of the agency?

GOODMAN: Woolsey is a man of great integrity and tireless in terms of the energy he devoted to the CIA. But I do think he was part of an old mind-set.

And one of the unfortunate things about the Aspin Commission is, before you can reform the intelligence community and the CIA, I think you have to look at the international arena to see how it has changed over the past ten years and decide what are the objectives of a new American foreign policy in this new arena. And then you should try to reform the intelligence community.

But failing that, yes, the intelligence community has to take a very hard look at the international arena and the international agenda and look at the nontraditional sources of problems. And this is what Woolsey failed to do. Woolsey was extremely traditional. He looked at the world in terms of adversarial relations. His metaphors were wrong. He talked about the fact that we had slain the dragon but there were still more dangerous snakes out there in the international community. Well, the fact is, the American national security position has never been stronger since the end of World War II, and we should acknowledge that. That means we can spend less on intelligence, just as we spend less on defense. And a new Director will have to tackle that.

ROBERTS: You mentioned that 75 percent of the CIA budget, if I'm not mistaken, was directed at the Soviet Union, at the Warsaw Pact, at China, and that this is one area where you think savings can be made.

GOODMAN: Yes. But I think that reorientation has already been accomplished. I think the 75 percent figure would now be less than 20 percent. But the fact is, the mind-set that you study military systems, you study the weapon system is still the primary mind-set. Whereas the real threat, I think, to American security, or systemic threats, are nontraditional problems: ethnicity, nationalism, ethnic wars, religious militancy, separatism,

dissidence, ecology problems, environmental problems, energy, economic problems.

These are the very problems that Bob Gates said should no longer be done or examined by the CIA, that should go back to other agencies. I think these are the problems that threaten the interests of the United States on a global basis.

ROBERTS: And are we equipped or is the agency equipped, say, to provide intelligence on a situation like Bosnia, to take one example? Or, another one, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in countries like Algeria? Which to at least -- while at the moment are contained within national borders, but do have at least the potential for threatening our interests in other places.

GOODMAN: I believe the CIA does.

One of the remarkable things about the CIA is it's the most impressive collection facility or collection agency in the world. They can collect data on problems, on institutions, on economic matters that no other agency can deal with. They do have that centralized and highly sophisticated facility. That's why they were able to monitor arms control agreements over the past 30 years. That's why they were able to monitor trade restrictions on the Soviet bloc over a 40-year period. So it's a remarkable collection facility.

What is missing is the inability on the part of the CIA to attract outside scholars to come in for short periods of time to research very specific issues. And the reason they are unable to do that is because of the emphasis on clandestine activity and secrecy and security, which makes it very hard to bring in an established scholar for a short period of time. And that's why the CIA has to become more open in this post-Cold War environment to attract outside expertise.

ROBERTS: We're talking with Melvin Goodman, who teaches at the National War College. He's a former Soviet policy analyst at the War College -- or at the CIA. And you can join our conversation for the next ten minutes or so, up until the eleven o'clock hour. Our phone number, as always, is 202-885-8850....

You're talking about, Melvin Goodman, about the new tasks, the new challenges in front of intelligence agencies. And of course we had the very graphic demonstration of this in the last few days with the whole fracas with the French and the expulsion of American espionage agents from -- or alleged espionage agents from France. And it must be -- when you talk about mind-sets, it must be rather difficult to now see allies who were military allies in that long-standing confrontation with the Soviet bloc now seen as rivals in the whole area of economic competition. And of course you just

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take the area of aircraft sales, a major export item. The United States and the French of course are bitter rivals.

Is the CIA doing a good job in adjusting to that? The fact that they got caught in France emblematic that they're still not doing it very well? What's going on there?

GOODMAN: Well, I'm not shocked by the fact that they were caught. I'm shocked by the fact that the French brought it to our attention and we didn't quietly remove the agents. That is the traditional way of handling matters of this type.

The important thing is, there were agents out there collecting, I think, intelligence that was important to the interests of the United States -- that is, economic intelligence. I hope we weren't paying too much, however, for secrets dealing with France's position on GATT affairs, because you could pick up The Economist every week and get a lot of that intelligence for about \$3 an issue.

ROBERTS: I remember Jim Woolsey, when he testified during his confirmation hearings, did talk about the growing importance of using the CIA on behalf of American national interests in the commercial realm and not just in the military realm.

GOODMAN: Yes, but that showed the lack of political sophistication of Jim Woolsey, because he made headlines all over the world, particularly in Japan, with his emphasis on economic espionage.

If we are going to discuss and collect economic data, that requires a great deal of sensitivity, because you are creating problems for domestic political entities around the world with that kind of collection. I think they know the CIA is doing it. We know the French are doing it. But this should be done quietly. And I think this is where clandestine becomes very important in your activities.

ROBERTS: I should tell our listeners who haven't been following the news on Capitol Hill that our information is that Senator Dole has recessed the Senate today....

Let's go to a couple of our callers, Melvin Goodman. We've got John on a car phone....

JOHN: I just tuned in and I only caught the very last part of the comment on whether or not we need to reduce intelligence in the post-Cold War era and the comment on why the CIA can't hire trained academics.

One point on the academics. My recollection is that they did at one point try to hire, at least Nadaav Safron (?), who is a

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Middle Eastern expert, and he subsequently, when his connection to the CIA was discovered, I believe he lost his position at Harvard. So that's one reason why I think the CIA can't get trained professionals, that there's a taint to it. Whether the taint is proper or not is another issue.

As regards the post-Cold War era, it seems to me that we would need to increase our intelligence in the post-Cold War era, rather than cut it down. We don't need to focus on the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact, but certainly all the intra-country fights and the potential for regional conflict is still tremendous.

And I'd like a comment on that, please.

ROBERTS: Thanks for your call, John.

Melvin Goodman?

GOODMAN: Well, I would agree with a lot of what he said. But the problem is, we just do not face the same threats we did in the 1950s and 1960s. Now, the threats are more complicated, in many ways, and more convoluted, but they represent less of a threat to American national interests. Therefore, you have the resources, you have the budget authority. Certainly the CIA has a great deal of money to spend, and it should go public with that figure. But they need to reorient what they do, not to add to what they do. And there's too much of an emphasis on intelligence that's collected by clandestine means.

There is this accusation I always see, or defense of clandestine intelligence that this is the only way to get into the minds of world leaders. Well, we don't do a very good job of getting into the minds of world leaders. That's why there have been so many intelligence failures over the past 40 years.

ROBERTS: Okay. Let's go to Alice from Arlington....

ALICE: I wanted to ask if, since Casey was involved in setting up the Heritage Foundation, whether or not he continued his activity with that group while he was Director of the CIA.

ROBERTS: I don't know the answer to that.

Do you, Melvin Goodman?

GOODMAN: I just don't know. I think he was rather busy doing what he was doing at the CIA.

ALICE: Well, he was rather busy when he was Director of SEC and he had time to handle the legal work for setting up the Heritage Foundation at that time. And since the four people who were initially involved in that were very heavily involved in

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defense contracting, it seems to me that that's where their interest was.

ROBERTS: Okay. Thank you. Thank you, Alice.

I don't know more about that particular story. Do you?

GOODMAN: No. No, I don't.

ROBERTS: Let's go to Mike....

MIKE: I was the Director of the White House Situation Room during the second Reagan Administration and I'm pretty familiar with what Casey and Gates and the CIA did during those years. But I'm concerned that there are -- that you're missing other voices, other views of the CIA, perhaps that differ from Mr. Goodman and...

ROBERTS: Well, that's why we're glad you called, Mike. Go ahead. Give us your views.

MIKE: I'm not prepared to give my view. I'm just hoping that NPR would invite two sides, invite people to tell two sides of the story on a show like this.

ROBERTS: Well...

MIKE: There are people that have just the same experience as Mr. Goodman, perhaps credentials that are even more polished, that could offer a different view of the CIA in the last few years. And I think the listeners would benefit from two sides of that story.

ROBERTS: Well, I -- we try very hard on this program and all through NPR to do that, and all views do get a chance to be heard here. That's one of the reasons why we take calls. But we're happy to hear what your main criticism of Mr. Goodman is, if you want to tell us.

MIKE: I have nothing that I'd like to air publicly. I'm just suggesting that everyone has a bias in this town, and when you invite somebody to a show like this they're going to give you their views. And I think the other side of the story should be heard simultaneously.

ROBERTS: Well, I'm sorry you don't want to give us your views, because that's why we have call-ins. But I do appreciate your call.

MIKE: Sure. Thanks.

ROBERTS: Thanks.

Let's go to Line One, Ambassador Kelmans?



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[No response]

ROBERTS: Let's go to Charlie from McLean....

CHARLIE: I, many years ago, spent a short time with the agency and I have tremendous respect for it and have followed it ever since. I probably was there before Mr. Goodman joined.

But my question is a very simple one. Would Mr. Goodman -- I like what he says and it sounds very reasonable. Would he accept if a position if General Carns offered it to him as a senior position in the agency?

ROBERTS: [Laughter] What about that, Melvin Goodman?

GOODMAN: I'm very happy at the National War College, thank you.

ROBERTS: But is there a problem of recruiting good people to the CIA today? Has it lost some of its appeal? One of the earlier callers pointed out that Nadaav Safron -- and I don't know the details of that case -- as a scholar, suffered from his association with the CIA.

GOODMAN: Well, that, in part, was Safron's fault, because he covered up some of the sources of financial support he was getting from the CIA.

The fact of the matter is, Woolsey recruited Joseph Nye to come down from Harvard, and Nye in turn recruited Eric Vogel from Harvard. But then they stopped, and they should have done more outside recruiting. And they have the National Intelligence Council, that I think should be based, in part, on the expertise of outside scholars. In that way, you reenergize the CIA and you reenergize intelligence analysis.

ROBERTS: We only have time, just one more minute, Mr. Goodman.

If you could sum up your advice to the new Director of the CIA, Admiral Carns, what would you tell him? What two or three things you would tell him to do?

GOODMAN: Well, the two most important things are restoring the integrity and the credibility of the CIA. And you restore the integrity by moving out the people who were responsible for the scandals of the 1980s. And you restore the credibility by a real policy of openness, in terms of declassified documents from the 1950s and the 1960s, allowing the State Department to publish its foreign relations series with materials from the CIA archives, and you go open on the budget figure. The whole world knows the CIA spends about \$3 billion a year, and I thought it was foolish for

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Woolsey to continue this charade of keeping secret the budget of the CIA.

There is a real problem on how a secret soci -- a secret agency conducts its affairs in a democratic society. And I think the General is going to have to confront that problem.

ROBERTS: Thank you so much, Melvin Goodman, who now teaches at the National War College and a former Soviet policy analyst at the CIA.

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