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# DEFENCE WEEKLY

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**SEVEROMORSK  
EXPLOSION  
THE FACTS**

# JANE'S DEFENCE WEEKLY




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**Front cover**

The nuclear-powered battle cruiser Kirov, one of 150 Soviet warships whose capability has been severely restricted by the explosion at the Severomorsk missile storage facility (Picture: MoD (UK) Navy. Chart: US Defense Mapping Agency)



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Editorial Offices: 100 Brook Hill Drive, Suite 100, Saddle River, NJ 07671  
 Surrey RH6 7YZ Telephone: (01794) 60711  
 Telex: 877798 JANES G  
 NEFAX 4800 facsimile printer: (02934) 76874

**EDITOR-IN-CHIEF: Derek Wood**

*News Editor:* Robert Hutchinson  
*Deputy News Editor:* Geoffrey Morrison  
*Naval Editor:* Antony Preston  
*Military Editor:* Christopher Foss  
*Aviation Editor:* Tim Wrixon  
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*Production Editor:* Linda Jones  
*Editorial & Production:* Frances Jary, Viv Harper, Sue Dingley  
*Librarian:* Dermck Ballington  
*Press Officer:* Richard Coltart

**USA Bureau:** Hugh Lucas, Room 2E 756, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301. Telephone: (202) 695 5526

**CORRESPONDENTS:** *Abu Dhabi:* Peter Hellyer, *Australia:* Frank Cranston, *Brazil:* Ronaldo S Olive, *France:* Jean de Galard, *India:* Pushpinder Singh, *Israel:* Benny Morris, *Italy:* Antonio O Ciampi/Antonio de Marchi, *Japan:* Kensuke Ebata, *Netherlands:* Eelco Schuller, *Norway:* John Berg, *Spain:* J Jimenez-Alfaro, *Thailand:* Joseph de Rienzo, *Turkey:* Selcuk K Emre, *Uruguay:* Dr Alphonse Emanuiloff-Max, *West Germany:* Alfred W Krueger

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**USA Eastern Region and Canada:** Anne McKrill, 951A S Rolfe Street, Westhampton Mews, Arlington, Va 22204. Telephone (703) 979 1817

**USA Central Region:** Linda Namik, Jane's Publishing Inc, Suite 331, 15612 Hwy 7, Minnetonka, Minnesota 55343. Telephone: (612) 933 2101.  
**USA Western Region:** Arthur Browne, 8211 Mammoth Circle Buena Park, Ca 90621. Telephone: (714) 994 2060.

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*France:* Marie Hélène Causse, Agence MHC, 20-22 rue Valadon, 75007 Paris. Telephone: 555 63 43. Telex: SELEX F 642138 MHC 171.

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*Hong Kong:* Alan Sze, Conmilit Press, 114 Thomson Road, 7/F, PO Box 23063, Wanchai. Telephone: 5-753877.  
*Greece:* Anwar Aswad, A & M Advertising Marketing Consultants, Zairni 7-9, Apt. 1, Palaio-Faliron. Telephone: 98 14 309. Telex: 218562 E O GR.

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# Soviets' Northern Fleet disabled . . . 'not viable' for six months

ON 13 MAY THE MISSILE STORAGE FACILITY at the Severomorsk naval base on the Kola Peninsula 1450 km north of Moscow, blew up in a series of vast explosions. As a result the 150 ship Northern Fleet, the most powerful in the Soviet Navy, will not be a viable force for the next six months. It is also conservatively estimated that it will be two years before the facility is fully operational again. *Jane's Defence Weekly* gives the full details of the blast in this exclusive report by *Derek Wood*.

FOLLOWING THE INITIAL explosion, resultant fires and secondary explosions were not brought under control until 18 May. The smoke and dust from the inferno created a pall so thick and extensive that weather satellite observers reported it as "an unusual cloud formation". The explosion registered on some seismographs, and Western analysts at first thought that one or more nuclear warheads had been accidentally detonated.

When the smoke finally cleared, the heaviest damage was shown to be in three major areas of the Severomorsk facility:

- the stores area for most of the fleet's surface-to-air missiles and surface-to-surface weapons;
- the explosive components storage area containing all non-nuclear missile warheads, missile fuel and other sensitive components;
- the naval ammunition storage depot under 1 km from the SLBM storage facility.

A number of buildings and bunkers were obliterated entirely, a further 12 were heavily damaged and 12 storage sheds disappeared completely.

Approximately 580 of the fleet's stock of 900 SA-N-1 and SA-N-3 surface-to-air missiles were destroyed, together with nearly 320 of the 400 stored SS-N-3s and SS-N-12s and the complete stock of about 80 SS-N-22 surface-to-surface missiles. Some SA-N-6 and SA-N-7 missiles were also damaged. In addition, an indeterminate number of SS-N-19 missiles were destroyed. The SS-N-22 is a new 220 km range system which only became operational in 1983. The SA-N-3s cannot be fully replenished from stores as the production line for these missiles was shut down in the late 1970s.

Three of the six SLBM bunkers suffered surface blast and debris damage. The SS-N-17s for the 'Yankee' class submarines were not affected as they are stored in deep mountain vaults, and although the naval ammunition storage depot was severely damaged, the fleet's mine reserves, also stored there, were not impaired. If the missiles in the SLBM bunkers had gone up, the Soviet SSBN force in the Atlantic would have been crippled, as all the Soviet ballistic missile submarines which patrol off the east coast of the USA are based in or around Severomorsk.

Very large quantities of missile spare

parts were destroyed, while the force of the explosions was such that components which survived were severely jarred or worse, rendering them useless. At least 200 personnel were killed and a similar number wounded.

For the Northern Fleet, the destruction represents the greatest disaster to occur in the Soviet Navy since the Second World War. It means that the fleet cannot rearm its 148 surface ships once all the onboard missiles in the magazines have been expended. The vessels include the *Kirov* class nuclear powered guided missile cruisers (CGN), the 'Kresta -I and -II' class guided missile cruisers (CG), the new *Sovremenny* class guided missile destroyers (DDG), and the 'Mod Kashin', 'Kashin', 'Kanin' and 'Kotlin' classes of DDG.


The missiles could be replaced by dividing the stocks from another fleet, possibly the Baltic. Bringing them to Severomorsk would leave the supply line vulnerable to attack. On arrival, however, there would be nowhere to store, maintain or test them.

## Six explosions in the past seven months

IN DECEMBER 1983, munitions exploded at Dolon airfield, 150 km south of Alma Ata. Subsequently, there were two more explosions elsewhere, details of which are not known. Ironically, the fourth incident occurred at Severomorsk Naval Air Station where a munitions depot blew up.

On 15 May, while the explosions and fires were still raging at the Severomorsk naval arsenal, there was a major blast at Bobruysk airfield, 138 km south-east of Minsk and the base of a Badger-equipped air-to-surface missile regiment of the Smolensk Air Army. Ten of the eleven ammunition storage buildings blew up and the administration and access control buildings were destroyed. There were large craters, the trees in the area were flattened and all the foliage was destroyed by the fire.

Finally, there are unconfirmed reports that, on 25 June, an explosion occurred at an ammunition depot at Schwerin, south of Wismar in East Germany. The reports suggest that windows were blown out within a 10 mile radius of the depot.



# The Soviet ships affected and their missiles

## KIROV class



**Displacement:** 28 000 tons full load  
**Weapons:** 20 SS-N-19 SSMs, 12 SA-N-6 launchers, 2 twin SA-N-4 launchers, 1 twin SS-N-14 launcher, 2 100 mm guns, 8 30 mm Gatling guns, 2 quadruple 533 mm torpedo tubes, 1 RBU 6000, 2 RBU 1000, 3 helicopters

## 'KRESTA-I' class



**Displacement:** 7600 tons full load  
**Weapons:** 2 twin SS-N-3 launchers, 2 twin SA-N-1 launchers; 2 twin 57 mm guns; 2 quintuple 533 mm torpedo tubes, 2 RBU 6000, 2 RBU 1000, 1 helicopter

## 'KRESTA-II' class



**Displacement:** 7700 tons full load  
**Weapons:** 2 quadruple SS-N-14 launchers; 2 twin SA-N-3 launchers; 2 twin 57 mm guns; 4 30 mm Gatling guns, 2 quintuple 533 mm torpedo tubes; 2 RBU 6000; 2 RBU 1000; 1 helicopter

## SOVREMENNY class



**Displacement:** 7800 tons full load  
**Weapons:** 2 quadruple SS-N-22 launchers; 2 SA-N-7 launchers; 2 twin 130 mm guns; 4 30 mm Gatling guns; 2 twin 533 mm torpedo tubes; 2 RBU 1000; 1 helicopter; mines

## 'KASHIN' class



**Displacement:** 4500 tons full load  
**Weapons:** 2 twin SA-N-1 launchers; 2 twin 76 mm guns; 1 quintuple 533 mm torpedo tubes; 2 RBU 6000; 2 RBU 1000

## 'KANIN' class



**Displacement:** 4750 tons full load  
**Weapons:** 1 twin SA-N-1 launcher; 2 quadruple 57 mm guns; 4 twin 30 mm guns, 2 quintuple 533 mm torpedo tubes, 3 RBU 6000

## 'SAM-KOTLIN' class



**Displacement:** 7500 tons full load  
**Weapons:** 1 twin SA-N-1 launcher, 1 twin 130 mm gun, 1 quadruple 40 mm gun, 4 twin 40 mm guns, 1 quadruple 533 mm torpedo tube, 2 RBU 6000, 2 RBU 1000

## SA-N-1



**Role:** Shipborne surface-to-air  
**Service entry:** 1961 ?  
**Range:** Approx 15 km  
**Ceiling:** 12 000 m

## SA-N-3



**Role:** Shipborne surface-to-air  
**Service entry:** 1967  
**Range:** 30 km  
**Ceiling:** 25 000 m

## SA-N-6



**Role:** Shipborne surface-to-air  
**Service entry:** 1979  
**Range:** 60 km  
**Ceiling:** 30 000 m  
**Speed:** Mach 6

## SA-N-7

**Role:** Shipborne surface-to-air  
**Range:** 28 km  
**Ceiling:** 14 000 m  
**Speed:** Mach 3

## SS-N-3



**Role:** Shipborne surface-to-surface  
**Range:** 180 km (theoretical max of 840 km with mid-course guidance)  
**Speed:** Transonic  
**Warhead:** 350 kilotons nuclear or 1000 kg HE

## SS-N-12



**Role:** Shipborne surface-to-surface  
**Range:** 550 km estimated  
**Speed:** Mach 2.5  
**Warhead:** Nuclear or HE

## SS-N-19



**Role:** Shipborne surface-to-surface  
**Range:** 445 km  
**Warhead:** Nuclear or HE

## SS-N-22

**Role:** Shipborne surface-to-surface  
**Range:** 200 km estimated

SA-N-1, SA-N-3, SA-N-6, SA-N-7, SS-N-3, SS-N-12, SS-N-19, SS-N-22

# Who takes the blame for Severomorsk?



▲ Soviet Navy C-in-C Admiral of the Fleet Sergei Gorshkov

According to JDW the blame will be carried principally by local commanders.

The C-in-C of the Northern Fleet is Adm A P Mikhaylovskiy.

There will be no 'witch hunt' similar to that which led to the dismissal of the C-in-C Adm Kuznetsov, following the mining of the battleship *Novorossiysk* in Sevastopol



▲ Soviet Navy Chief of Staff Adm V N Chernavin

in 1955. In contrast, Adm Gorshkov survived a previous disaster, the loss of the destroyer *Otvazhny* in August 1974. She suffered an internal fire and explosion, and as many as 200 of her 300-strong crew died, mostly from toxic smoke generated by plastic cable coverings.

# Blast may have started in ready-use magazine

By Antony Preston

ACCORDING TO an ordnance expert, the highest standards of ordnance storage provide detailed instructions for every type of explosive. These regulations should stipulate not only the way in which each type of primary and secondary explosive and rocket propellant should be stored, but also the quantities appropriate for each category.

In long-term storage there would be no question of warheads, detonators and solid fuel propellant being kept together, although clearly at some stage the components must be brought together.

Few countries observe the highest standards. Descriptions of the Severomorsk disaster suggest that a large-scale ready-use magazine blew up, and that as too many munitions were stored too close together sympathetic detonations set off the entire complex. The equivalent installations in most NATO countries are well inland, and widely separated.

Even the number of personnel allowed in each building is strictly limited. Solid fuel propellant is unlikely to have been the prime cause of detonation, although if sufficient rocket motors were concentrated in a small area they could contribute to the magnitude of the explosions.

# Jury Gets Morison Case After Harsh Summation

By George Lardner Jr.  
Washington Post Staff Writer

BALTIMORE, Oct. 16—A Federal prosecutor assailed former Navy intelligence analyst Samuel Loring Morison today as a "petty, vain, arrogant person" who put himself above the law in leaking classified photos taken by the secret KH-11 spy satellite.

Assistant U.S. Attorney Michael Schatzow made the charges in a stinging summation here this afternoon as Morison's espionage trial drew near a close. The jury began its deliberations just before 5 p.m., then adjourned for the night about 75 minutes later.

Defense attorney Robert Muse protested in his closing arguments that Morison "may have been wrong" in sending to a British magazine last year three KH-11 photos, showing the Soviet Union's first nuclear aircraft carrier under construction at a Black Sea shipyard. But Muse insisted that his client's conduct was far short of criminal.

He said the leaking of classified information was a common occurrence in Washington and suggested there was a strong whiff of "hypocrisy" in the government's singling out a low-level bureaucrat such as Morison for prosecution.

"If you stopped leaking in government, you wouldn't know anything," Muse told the jurors at one point. "In our government, daily, regularly, people are sending it out."

Schatzow denounced such talk as "an invitation to lawlessness."

"Mr. Muse says it's not a crime," the prosecutor said in scornful tones. "If Mr. Muse doesn't like the laws in this country, he can get on his soapbox and go down to Washington and change the law. What Mr. Muse is asking you to do," Schatzow said, pointing at Morison with a scowl, "is to do the same thing that that man did . . . ignore your oath."

Morison, a civilian analyst at the Naval Intelligence Support Center, is charged with of espionage and theft for sending the photos to Jane's Defence Weekly and for taking home portions of two other classified documents.

Muse depicted Morison as a loyal American and Vietnam veteran whose overriding interest was in a strong Navy and whose primary motive was in alerting the American public to a growing Soviet threat on the high seas. He emphasized Morison's longstanding status as American editor of Jane's Fight-

ing Ships, a companion publication to Jane's Defence Weekly, and maintained that the information about the KH-11 that could be gleaned from the photos was already well-known to the Soviets.

The defense attorney also derided the idea that the documents found in Morison's apartment, dealing with a series of 1984 explosions at a Soviet naval ammunition dump, were "potentially damaging" to the United States.

Muse acknowledged that Morison had sent a summary of the explosions incident to Jane's, but said there was "nothing in Jane's" that had not been mentioned in other publications.

Schatzow and fellow prosecutor John Douglass, however, argued that Morison must have known he was breaking the law because he "lied" repeatedly when first questioned in the summer of 1984.

Although U.S. District Court Judge Joseph H. Young has already ruled that Morison's motives were irrelevant, Schatzow voiced skepticism about the defense claims that Morison wanted to alert the American public through the medium of a British magazine where he was seeking a full-time job. "He didn't send it to CBS," Schatzow declared. "He didn't send it to The Washington Post. He sent it to Jane's."

The prosecutor maintained that a full reading of all the correspondence between Jane's executives and Morison over the years, as Muse urged the jury to undertake, would show the defendant as "a petty, vain, arrogant person. And that arrogance," Schatzow asserted, "is the key to this case in terms of what motivated him."

Both sides rested after the government called two final rebuttal witnesses this morning in an effort to counter the testimony of a retired CIA career officer, Roland S. Inlow, who turned out to be the strongest witness for the defense.

Inlow, who helped develop the KH-11 and for a decade headed the interagency committee in charge of U.S. spy satellites, said he saw "zero" damage from publication of the photos in Jane's—in light of what the Soviets already knew.

In rebuttal, retired Army Brig. Gen. Rutledge P. (Hap) Hazard, who also served as head of the National Photographic Interpretation Center, said he felt the disclosures gave the Soviets a fresh opportunity to review and modify any programs they might have had to frustrate KH-11 reconnaissance.

WASH. TIMES DEC. 5, 1985

# Morison gets 2 years for leaking Navy photos to Jane's

By Rita McWilliams  
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

**BALTIMORE** — Samuel Loring Morison, thought to be the first person in the United States convicted of espionage after leaking secret documents to the press, was sentenced in federal court yesterday to two years in prison.

A jury convicted Morison on two counts of espionage and two counts of theft Oct. 17. He was tried on charges of taking classified information from his office at the Naval Intelligence Support Center in Suitland, Md., and relaying the information to James Publishing Co., a firm that documents military vehicles

and weapons. At the time he was a civilian intelligence analyst for the Navy.

Morison, 41, of Crofton, Md., faced a maximum penalty of 40 years in prison and a \$40,000 fine. U.S. District Court Judge Joseph H. Young sentenced him to two years in prison on each count but said the sentences would run at the same time. Morison could be eligible for parole in eight months, according to prosecutors.

Morison's lawyers filed an appeal yesterday. Morison had sent three KH-11 satellite photographs of a new Soviet nuclear-powered aircraft carrier to Jane's Defence Weekly, according to

testimony in his six-day trial. Found in Morison's home were classified "Weekly Wire" reports detailing a 1964 explosion at a Soviet military installation at Severomorsk, the main ammunition depot for the Soviet Union's Northern Fleet, and a memo to Jane's about the incident.

Morison told investigators he acted out of patriotism because he thought the world should know the magnitude of the Soviet military buildup.

Morison did not testify during his trial but yesterday he apologized for his actions. "I have made a mistake, and I have admitted that to everyone I know," said Morison, who is the grandson of the nation's Pulitzer

Prize-winning naval historian, Samuel Eliot Morison. He said he knew that he was breaking the rules by sending the photos to Jane's, but that he did not know that he was breaking the law. His superiors knew he was working part-time as an editor of Jane's Fighting Ships.

In a report to the court, Robert Muse, a lawyer for Morison, said "Mr. Morison loved the Navy but simply became casual with regard to classified matters" because of his work with Jane's.

Assistant U.S. Attorney Michael Schatzow, who had asked that Morison be fined \$10,000 and given a four-year sentence, said he hoped the case would prevent other govern-

ment employees from handing out classified information.

The American Civil Liberties Union has said the conviction "will have a chilling effect" on public debate on national security matters. Mark Lynch, an ACLU lawyer who represented Morison, said he has asked for a new trial on the grounds that the U.S. government may have given China access to KH-11 photographs and technology.

Mr. Lynch said the Morison case probably will make other mid-level government employees less likely to leak information to the press, but probably would not stop many leaks by high-level government employees.

Mr. Muse said Morison had suffered enough because he had lost his job and his reputation had been tarnished. "He's made a profound mistake, he's paid a profound price," Mr. Muse said.

Mr. Muse also said Morison had leaked the KH-11 photographs to show the world that the Soviet Union was building up its military. "He lives and breathes patriotism," Mr. Muse said. "I tell you he loves his country and would never hurt it."

But Mr. Schatzow said Morison had simply been arrogant, and trying to live up to reputation of his famous grandfather.

**More national news: Page 4D**

# Conviction upheld in leak of spy photo

RICHMOND, Va. (AP) — A federal appeals court upheld yesterday the espionage and theft of government property convictions of a former intelligence analyst who gave spy photographs of a Soviet ship to a British military journal.

Samuel Loring Morrison, grandnephew of the late Pulitzer Prize-winning naval historian Samuel Eliot Morrison, was convicted in October 1985 of giving U.S. satellite photographs of a Soviet nuclear aircraft carrier under construction to the Defense Weekly.

A unanimous three-judge panel of the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals rejected arguments by Morrison, who worked for the Navy, that the statutes under which he was found guilty were unconstitutionally vague and were intended to cover "classic spying" for a foreign government rather than leaks to the press.

The defense also said the espionage prosecution violated Morrison's right to free speech and would intimidate low-level government employees from leaking information that would embarrass their superiors.

But the judges concluded: "The mere fact that one has stolen a document in order that he may deliver it to the press, whether for money or other personal gain, will not immunize him from responsibility for his criminal act. To use the First Amendment for such a purpose would be to convert the First Amendment into a warrant for 'thevery'."

Morrison remains free on a \$100,000 appeal bond, his attorney, Mark Lynch, said yesterday from his Washington office. Mr. Lynch said he had not seen the 4th Circuit's opinion and had not decided whether to seek a rehearing before the full court or

a review by the U.S. Supreme Court.

Because Morrison's prosecution raised questions about the Constitution's free speech and freedom of the press guarantees, several news organizations — including The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal and the nation's three major television networks — filed briefs in the case.

The photos were published by Jane's on Aug. 11, 1984, and later by other publications and news organizations.

Morrison, a civilian employee of the Naval Intelligence Support Center in Suitland, also was convicted of the theft of the photos and government documents that described a May 1984 explosion at Severomorsk, the main ammunition depot for the Soviet Union's northern fleet.

Morrison was sentenced to two years in prison by U.S. District Judge Joseph H. Young of Baltimore.

Prosecutors said Morrison's actions endangered national security because the photographs revealed to the Soviets how a U.S. spy satellite worked. They also said Morrison leaked the photos to get a full-time job with Jane's after doing part-time work for the publication while employed by the Navy.

Defense attorneys contended their client was trying to educate the public about a Soviet naval buildup and that the photographs showed the Soviets nothing they had not learned already from a former CIA official's 1978 sale of the spy satellite's operations manual to a Soviet agent.

Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III agreed that First Amendment interests in the case were significant, but said the way in which the photographs were released threatened an equally important public interest, "the security of sensitive government operations."

Cal. Waters

A20 THURSDAY, OCTOBER 10, 1985 ... R

THE WASHINGTON POST

# Satellite Unchanged From Manual Bought by Soviets, U.S. Officials Say

## Testimony Maintains That Publication of Photos Was Damaging

By George Lardner Jr.  
Washington Post Staff Writer

BALTIMORE, Oct. 9—The top secret KH-11 spy satellite is still operating just as it was supposed to work when a Soviet agent bought its official manual from a CIA officer in Athens 7½ years ago, it was disclosed in federal court here today.

This confirmation came from a government prosecutor, with elaborations from a high-ranking CIA official, at the espionage trial of former Navy intelligence analyst Samuel Loring Morrison on charges of leaking three KH-11 photos to a British magazine last year.

Richard E. Hineman, deputy CIA director for science and technology, said he still regarded Morrison's dis-

closures to Jane's Defence Weekly as "potentially" damaging to the United States and "potentially" helpful to the Soviets.

Under cross-examination by defense lawyer Mark Lynch, Hineman acknowledged that all the details that could be gleaned from the pictures about the KH-11's capabilities, including its ability to singe out tiny details from distances of hundreds of miles, were set out in the original 1976 manual that was sold to the KGB two years later.

But he testified that the Soviets could not have been sure of the satellite's capabilities without "confirming evidence," such as the photos of the nuclear carrier in the Black Sea shipyard.

The computer-enhanced KH-11

photos published in Jane's, showing a nuclear-powered Soviet aircraft carrier under construction, were taken on a slanting angle and from as far away as 504 miles, Hineman disclosed. Surface-to-air missile sites and much smaller details were plainly visible. It was the equivalent, as U.S. District Court Judge Joseph H. Young observed, of watching the "the Colts play in Indianapolis from a seat in Baltimore."

The testimony at Morrison's espionage trial here amounted to an unprecedented series of official revelations about the KH-11. Hineman confirmed, for instance, that a 1981 shot published in the Dec. 14, 1981, editions of Aviation Week of Ramenskoye airfield near Moscow had been taken by a KH-11 only a few

days earlier, on Nov. 25. It showed three Soviet aircraft, one of them a new swing wing Blackjack bomber.

The CIA official also indicated that the KH-11, which transmits electronic images back to earth in "near real time," usually a matter of seconds, is used "against active military targets for early warning purposes," and not simply to verify arms control agreements.

The Young CIA official who sold the KH-11 manual to the Russians, William Kamplis, was sentenced in 1978 to 40 years in prison, but after a trial that contained only vague allusions to what the Russians had learned.

Hineman, by contrast, said the document included detailed descriptions of the satellite system's "coverage capacity," the quality of its photographs, its timeliness, and its responsiveness to assignments from the U.S. intelligence community. He said the manual set out the "planned-for and hoped-for capabilities of the system" since it was written before the satellite became operational. Hineman added the KH-11 "turned out" just as planned.

Added government prosecutor

Michael Schatzow: "We will acknowledge that the [1976] manual describes the system as it is operating today."

Hineman conceded under cross-examination that much the same confirmation could have come from the Aviation Week photo and from a whole series of KH-11 photos that were left behind in the abortive 1980 mission to rescue the American hostages in Tehran. They were subsequently published by Iranian students in a magazine sold on the streets.

The CIA official took the position, however, that it was still potentially helpful to the Soviets to know that the system was still operating in 1984 and being targeted so frequently on such slow-moving projects as the aircraft carrier code-named "Black Com II."

Morrison's lawyers are contending that the pictures published in Jane's told the Russians nothing they didn't already know and are still apparently powerless to prevent.

Morrison, who worked at the Naval Intelligence Support Center in Suttleland, had official approval for his part-time job as American editor of Jane's Fighting Ships since 1976,

according to some testimony. But John R. Lewis, Morrison's supervisor at the NISC, said, "I felt that it was immoral" for Morrison to use NISC facilities for the work. It was largely because of his difficulties with Lewis that Morrison had been hoping for a full-time job with Jane's when he sent them the KH-11 photos in the summer of 1984.

Morrison told of taking the pictures from a colleague's desk and mailing them to the magazine in a statement to the FBI and the Naval Investigative Service immediately after his Oct. 1, 1984, arrest.

NIS agent David W. Swindle took the stand today to recount Morrison's statements to the jury. He said he informed Morrison in the Oct. 1, 1984, interview that scrutiny of his typewriter ribbon had shown a letter to Jane's executive in which Morrison said that "the public should be made aware of what is going on on the other side."

At that, Swindle said, Morrison told him "you hit it" and that "this was the reason he stole the classified photos and mailed them to Jane's Defence Weekly."



# Morison Guilty of Spying, <sup>pos</sup> Stealing Navy Documents <sub>18 Oct</sub>

## 1st Espionage Conviction for Press Leak

By George Lardner Jr.  
Washington Post Staff Writer

BALTIMORE, Oct. 17—A federal court jury here found former Navy intelligence analyst Samuel Loring Morison guilty today of espionage and theft for leaking three spy satellite photographs that were classified secret to a British magazine.

Morison, the 40-year-old grandson of the late famed naval historian Samuel Eliot Morison, also was convicted on separate espionage and theft charges for taking portions of two other Navy documents, both classified secret, and keeping them in an envelope at his Crofton, Md., apartment.

It was the first time that anyone has been convicted under the espionage statute for leaking docu-

ments "relating to the national defense" to the press. Congress enacted the law in 1917.

Morison could be sentenced to up to 10 years in prison and a \$10,000 fine on each of the four counts. U.S. District Judge Joseph H. Young said he will pass sentence on Nov. 25, and he released Morison on the same \$100,000 bond posted for him last year.

Morison stood somberly at the defense table, looking disappointed as he heard the verdicts, and later left the courthouse without commenting.

"He can't say anything," one of his attorneys, Mark H. Lynch of the American Civil Liberties Union, said. "There's a sentencing proceeding pending that's very sensitive."



SAMUEL LORING MORISON  
... could face 10 years in prison

Lynch said the verdict will be appealed. ACLU officials have contended that a successful prosecution in the Morison case poses a grave danger to freedom of the press, at least insofar as reporting on national security matters is concerned.

See MORISON, A11, Col. 1

## Health Officials

THE WASHINGTON POST

# Morison Found Guilty Of Espionage, Theft

MORISON, From A1

The chief prosecutor in the case, Assistant U.S. Attorney Michael Schatzow, took sharp exception to such complaints and accused the ACLU of an "orchestrated campaign" dating to last year to "try this case in the newspapers."

"I don't think it means something about reporters waking up with subpoenas in their hands in the morning," Schatzow said after the verdict. "That's not going to happen. That's ludicrous."

The prosecutor said that he hopes the case will have a deterrent effect.

"Certainly, I would hope that people who are tempted to give out in an unauthorized fashion information relating to the national defense will stop doing it," Schatzow said.

"It may be true," he said, "that if people with access to classified information follow the rules, then the press won't receive what you refer to as leaks. That's different from going after the press."

The ACLU has argued that a conviction, if sustained on appeal, could give the Reagan administration a working version of Britain's Official Secrets Act, a law that makes it a crime to disclose any government information without proper authorization.

Under the prosecution's theory, government officials would be vi-

olating the espionage and theft statutes for leaking information "relating to the national defense" and, by that same theory, members of the press would be violating those same laws in keeping the information.

Schatzow emphasized that neither Jane's Defence Weekly, to whom Morison provided the photographs taken by the KH-11 reconnaissance satellite last year, nor any of the other news organizations that reprinted the pictures were indicted.

"Nobody prosecuted Jane's," Schatzow said. "Nobody prosecuted The Washington Post . . . Nobody prosecuted CBS. Nobody prosecuted AP [the Associated Press] . . ."

"In my view, this was a case about a fellow who worked for the government, who had a top secret clearance, who knew precisely what he was authorized to do and not authorized to do and who for his own venal purposes abused his position and violated his oath," Schatzow said.

The seven-day trial began after months of legal skirmishes, most of them ending in victories for the prosecution.

Citing congressional debates in 1917 and when the law was amended in 1950, Morison's lawyers claimed that the sections of the espionage statute at issue were meant to apply only in a clandestine

setting, to people like "spies and saboteurs," and not to disclosures to the press.

But Judge Young said it was "conceivable that Congress, in 1950 when the statute was amended, would have considered a person who 'leaked' national security information to the press a 'saboteur' or one who would weaken the internal security of the nation, and thus subject to prosecution."

Defense lawyers tried to portray Morison as a patriotic American who wanted to alert the public to growing Soviet naval power, but the judge ruled that his motives were irrelevant.

All the government had to establish, Young held, was that Morison willfully transmitted photographs and documents "relating to the national defense" to someone "not entitled to receive" them.

By the time both sides rested, there was no dispute over the facts, only whether they amounted to criminal conduct.

The testimony showed that Morison took the three KH-11 photographs from an absent colleague's desk at Naval Intelligence Support Center headquarters in Suitland sometime in late July 1984, cut the "secret" markings from them and had them mailed to Jane's.

The magazine used the photographs for a cover story about construction of a Soviet nuclear aircraft carrier in its Aug. 11, 1984, edition.

FBI analysis of the typewriter ribbon Morison used at work showed that he had been corresponding with Jane's and, in fact, had been hoping for a full-time job with the magazine.

Morison had been the U.S. editor

for Jane's Fighting Ships since mid-1970s and had been at its heads for months with his boss, John R. Lewis, who said he thought it "immoral" for Morison to use NISC facilities for the magazine and once told him not to use "unclassified data available" for the magazine.

Before he sent off the photographs, it turned out, Morison had sent Jane's a rundown on the results of a devastating explosion: Soviet naval ammunition depot Severomorsk on the Barents Sea. Jane's Defence Weekly editor Erik Wood had a \$300 check sent him for that and other contributions in preceding months.

Morison was arrested Oct. 1984, after the head of British intelligence had retrieved photographs from Jane's apartment turned out to have Morison's thumbprint. A search of his apartment, apartment turned out to be two so-called Weekly Wires that detailed the damage done to Severomorsk as revealed by elite imagery.

With all that beyond dispute, the trial boiled down to two key questions. The first was whether the information about the KH-11 elite system that could be gotten from the photographs in Weekly Wires was still that "held" in light of past leaks.

The jurors also were asked to decide whether disclosure, in light of past leaks, would cause "substantial" damage to the United States or "potential" advantage to foreign power.

The jury delivered its verdict shortly before 3 p.m., concluding after six hours of deliberations.

POST  
10 OCT

# Photos Did No Damage, Ex-CIA Official Testifies

## *Morison Case Focuses on Satellite Pictures*

By George Lardner Jr.  
Washington Post Staff Writer

BALTIMORE, Oct. 15—A retired CIA veteran who once headed the interagency committee in charge of spy satellites said yesterday he saw "zero" damage from publication of three KH-11 photos last year in a British magazine.

Called as a defense witness at the espionage trial of Samuel Loring Morison, former CIA official Roland S. Inlow repeatedly and flatly disputed the prosecution's contentions that the disclosures could have given the Soviets important tips about U.S. intelligence-gathering capabilities and priorities.

Morison, a civilian analyst at the Naval Intelligence Support Center, is charged with espionage and theft in the leaking of three photos of a Soviet nuclear aircraft carrier under construction to Jane's Defence Weekly in hopes of securing a full-time job there. His defense, constricted by rulings from the bench, tried to show that information about the KH-11, even though classified secret, was not "closely held" and that disclosure of the photos posed no danger to the nation.

Government prosecutor Michael Schatzow sought repeatedly to get Inlow to concede that Jane's August 1984 publication of the photos could at least have prompted the Soviets to take "countermeasures" against such satellite reconnaissance.

Inlow, who headed the U.S. intelligence community's Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation (COMIREX) for 10 years, responded with a soft-voiced lecture.

"The Soviet Union has a very good intelligence capability, very good analysts," he said. The countermeasures they take, Inlow said, "in my judgment, simply do not hinge on something so trivial or haphazard or chancy a thing as the appearance of these photographs in the western press."

Inlow said he was only mildly surprised when he saw two of the pictures of the 75,000-ton Soviet carrier republished in Aviation Week.

"My reaction was that somebody had decided to release these photographs," he recalled. "I was somewhat surprised at that. But in all honesty, my reaction was much more 'ho-hum' than 'oh, my God.'"

COMIREX, which Inlow headed from 1969 to 1979, decides what targets the KH-11 and other spy satellites should photograph and what agencies should get which photos to analyze. He directed the so-called "damage assessment" of CIA officer William Kampiles' 1978 sale of the entire KH-11 operations manual to a KGB agent for \$3,000.

According to Inlow, the manual told the Soviets all they needed to know about the KH-11's technology. The 1984 photos, he suggested, could have hurt the United States only on two other scores: if the Soviets had been imprudent enough to assume that the satellites weren't working or if they had been surprised that it had been focused on the shipyard, a "very routine and mundane" target to which the KH-11 has "daily access."

"If they think it important to deny our imaging of an installation such as this, they will do so . . . independent of these three photographs," Inlow said. He concluded there was "zero" damage on all three scores. "Zero plus zero plus zero," he added, "is zero."

Other testimony dealt with companion espionage and theft counts stemming from Morison's taking home portions of two classified documents dealing with explosions at the main ammunition depot for the Soviet Union's Northern Fleet.

One witness, David R. Huff, who used to work with Morison at NISC, said it was "common practice to carry home" various papers one was working on. Another witness, former Washington Post reporter Scott Armstrong, said he had often received classified documents from government officials. Under the government's theory of the case, such activity would be a crime.

Defense lawyers then tried to call CBS television correspondent William Lynch and UPI reporter Richard C. Gross to confirm that stories they did in June 1984 about spy satellite information concerning the ammunition dump disaster came from government officials, but without naming the officials.

U.S. District Judge Joseph H. Young said he respected the reporters' privilege not to name their sources, but held that this would put the prosecution at a disadvantage. He refused to allow it.

# Espionage Trial Jurors Split for Several Ballots

## Potential Impact Caused Spirited Debate

By George Lardner Jr.  
Washington Post Staff Writer

BALTIMORE—The 12 jurors who found former Naval intelligence analyst Samuel Loring Morison guilty of espionage and theft here last week reached their verdict after several ballots and some spirited debate over the potential impact of his leaks of classified information.

Morison, 40, is the first American to be convicted under the espionage statute for providing information "relating to the national defense" to the media.

But one of the jurors said after the verdict that it would have made "a big difference for me" if U.S. District Court Judge Joseph H. Young had included in his final instructions an explanation of the word "potential," an explanation that the judge had initially said he would provide.

A crucial question left hanging as the case went to the jury was whether disclosure of the secret KH-11 spy satellite photos and other classified documents Morison was accused of stealing would have been "potentially" damaging to the United States.

Unknown to the jurors, Judge Young had informed prosecution and defense lawyers Tuesday evening he would instruct the jurors that "the potential must be real and not imagined." But he subsequently changed his mind and left the defense-proposed instruction out of his final charge to the jury late Wednesday.

The landmark case has touched off warnings from the American Civil Liberties Union that it could have a chilling effect on news reporting, especially in connection with national security matters.

The Justice Department, in turn, has dismissed as "nonsense" talk of a wave of repressive censorship-by-prosecution. But officials there refuse to rule out more indictments under the same statutes, given sufficient evidence. Neither the government officials who do the leaking, nor the news publications at the receiving end, these officials add, should consider themselves exempt.

Here in Baltimore, the jury of seven men and five women, most of them in their fifties and sixties, returned their decision Thursday afternoon after six hours of deliberations. But several seemed reluctant when the court polled them individually.

One, Evelyn Miller of Baltimore, remained silent when asked if she agreed with the verdict and had to be prodded by the judge to speak up before she said yes.

"There were two or three of us that had a real problem" [with the guilty verdict], one of the jurors, who asked not to be identified, said later. It took several ballots and some wrenching debate, the juror added, before the reluctant panelists made it unanimous. The controversy in the jury room, as in the courtroom, centered on two key questions, it was explained.

nuclear aircraft carrier under construction.

A civilian analyst at NISC since 1974, Morison also was found guilty of one count of espionage and one count of theft for taking home portions of two NISC "Weekly Wires," a sort of classified newsletter, dealing with a devastating series of explosions in May 1984 at Severomorsk, the main ammunition depot for the Soviet Union's Northern Fleet.

Morison, who for years had been the American editor of the authoritative military yearbook, Jane's Fighting Ships, had sent off a summary of the incident at Severomorsk to JDW in late June 1984.

But his dispatch to Jane's made no mention of the "Weekly Wires" or the fact that the information in them had been gleaned from "satellite imagery." It was not until government witnesses at the trial began citing chapter and verse from the Wires that the Soviet Union was on notice of the "potential" value of these documents.

Some of the jurors contacted declined to discuss their deliberations.

James A. Frye, a retired manufacturing engineer from Glen Burnie, said he did not feel free to talk "until someone gives me the authority."

Lester L. Troup, a retired dairy farmer from Rockville, took exception to a reporter's inquiry.

"If you want to find out what happened in that room, you talk to Judge Young," Troup said. "I think you're invading my privacy if you try to find out what happened in that room. I think you're invading my privacy and the privacy of the 11 other people in that room."

Another juror said, however, that there was heavy debate over the two key issues. Told of the instruction about the meaning of "potential" damage the judge had said he would

give and then decided against, this juror paused and said, "That would have made a big difference for me."

Morison, the grandson of the U.S. Navy's foremost historian, the late Samuel Eliot Morison, will be sentenced Nov. 25. He could be sentenced to up to 10 years in prison and \$10,000 in fines on each count.

His attorneys have said they will appeal the conviction, and they have indicated that one of the grounds they plan to cite will be Young's decision to drop the "potential" damage instruction.

The controversy over the effect of the case on the media, meanwhile, is far from settled. Under the government's theory of prosecution, anyone who "willfully" transmits photographs or documents "relating to the national defense" to someone not authorized to receive them is guilty of espionage, "no matter how laudable his motives."

In addition, under the theft statute as applied in the Morison case, it is not only a crime for a government official to take information worth more than \$100 without authorization, but also a crime for anyone to receive that information "with intent to convert it to his use or gain."

The ACLU's Washington director, Morton H. Halperin, contends that the biggest danger lies in in-

hibiting effects of the Morison conviction. "Every time a reporter comes into a newsroom with information relating to the national defense, the question will be, 'A risking an indictment?'"

"The reporter will call the tagon and they'll say, 'We view information as closely held.' The newspaper will then call its lawyer and the lawyers will say, 'We could put you in jail.'"

Halperin concluded that the case is going to have "a chilling effect" on what reporters are prepared to write and what their editor prepared to print.

The assistant attorney general in charge of the criminal division, Stephen Trott, said in an interview the Justice Department is mindful of the legitimate interest [of the media] in issues of public concern.

"The sense that this is part of some program to pursue an O Secrets Act is a bunch of nonsense," Trott added. "There's a certain stigma about what we're up to."

But beyond that, he said, laws will be enforced. "I think it's at all helpful to whether we will or will not [against a publication]. Every or potential case will be reviewed on the basis of the facts."

... R2

## THE WASHINGTON



ASSOCIATED PRESS

**Jurors say they convicted Naval intelligence analyst Samuel L. Morison after several ballots and debate over the potential impact of his leaks. Story, Page A24.**

The first was whether the information about the KH-11 satellite system was "closely held" in light of leaks dating to 1978.

The second was whether the disclosure of the documents Morison was accused of stealing—two of which never left his apartment—could have hurt the United States or helped a foreign power, again in light of past leaks.

The Soviet KGB, the jurors were reminded frequently, had bought the KH-11 operations manual from a renegade CIA officer for \$3,000 in 1978, and other KH-11 photos had leaked out before.

Government witnesses insisted in response that the new disclosures could still have prompted the Soviets to take fresh "countermeasures" against KH-11 surveillance.

Against this backdrop, Morison was convicted of one count of espionage and one of theft for taking three KH-11 satellite photos from a colleague's desk at the Naval Intelligence Support Center in Suitland and sending them to Jane's Defence Weekly in the summer of 1984.

H-1  
10/2/84

READ FORWARD IN TIME (RF), READ BACKWARD (RB), SCAN FORWARD (SF), OR  
SCAN BACKWARD (SB)   
3 10-02-84 11:07 AED

FBI ARRESTS TWO FOR SECURITY VIOLATIONS

WASHINGTON (UPI) — THE FBI ANNOUNCED TUESDAY THE ARREST OF AN EAST GERMAN NATIONAL FOR ALLEGEDLY TRYING TO OBTAIN CLASSIFIED MATERIAL FOR THE SOVIETS AND, IN ANOTHER CASE, APPREHENSION OF AN AMERICAN ON CHARGES OF DISCLOSING CLASSIFIED PHOTOGRAPHS.

DETAILS WERE SKETCHY, BUT IN THE FIRST CASE, THE FBI SAID ALICE MICHELSON, 67, AN EAST GERMAN NATIONAL, WAS CHARGED WITH TRAVELING TO THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF ACQUIRING SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION ON BEHALF OF THE SOVIET COMMITTEE FOR STATE SECURITY.

MICHELSON WAS ARRESTED MONDAY NIGHT AT KENNEDY INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT IN NEW YORK.

IN THE SECOND CASE, THE FBI AND THE NAVAL INVESTIGATION SERVICE ANNOUNCED THE ARREST OF SAMUEL LORING MORISON, AN ANALYST WITH THE NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT CENTER AT SUITLAND, MD., ON CHARGES OF UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF THREE CLASSIFIED PHOTOS PERTAINING TO NATIONAL DEFENSE.

MORISON WAS ARRESTED LATE MONDAY AT DULLES INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, ACCORDING TO THE FBI.

IN THE FIRST CASE, THE FBI SAID MICHELSON WAS ARRESTED IN POSSESSION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION SHE ACQUIRED NEAR BALTIMORE LAST WEEK AND THAT CONCERNED AN FBI INVESTIGATION.

THE FBI DECLINED TO ELABORATE ON THE MATERIAL OR HOW MICHELSON OBTAINED IT. IF CONVICTED OF THE CHARGES, SHE WOULD FACE UP TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT.

THE SECOND CASE INVOLVING MORISON INVOLVED THE TRANSMITTAL OF THREE CLASSIFIED SATELLITE PHOTOGRAPHS OF A SOVIET AIRCRAFT CARRIER UNDER CONSTRUCTION IN A BLACK SEA NAVAL SHIP YARD TO JANE'S DEFENSE WEEKLY, A BRITISH PUBLICATION, THE FBI SAID.

ONE OF THE PHOTOGRAPHS APPEARED IN AN AUG. 8 ARTICLE IN THE WASHINGTON POST, ACCORDING TO THE FBI.

MORISON ALSO IS EMPLOYED BY AS A PART-TIME EDITOR FOR JANE'S FIGHTING SHIPS, ANOTHER BRITISH PUBLICATION THAT KEEPS TRACK OF NAVIES OF THE WORLD. IF CONVICTED, HE FACES UP TO 10 YEARS IN PRISON, ACCORDING TO THE FBI.

2 10-02-84 09:38 AED

(COMPLETE WRITETHRU SINN FEIN MEN RELEASED)

BELFAST, NORTHERN IRELAND (UPI) — POLICE ARRESTED EIGHT IRISH NATIONALIST LEADERS INCLUDING THE PRESIDENT OF THE IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY'S POLITICAL WING TODAY AND QUESTIONED THEM ABOUT HOW A U.S. LAWYER ENTERED ULSTER ILLEGALLY TO ADDRESS A PRO-IRA RALLY.

A POLICE SPOKESMAN SAID SINN FEIN PRESIDENT GERRY ADAMS AND THE OTHERS WERE RELEASED FIVE HOURS AFTER THEIR ARREST PENDING FURTHER INVESTIGATION AND ANY DECISION TO PRESS CHARGES "WILL NOT BE TAKEN FOR SOME TIME."


ADAMS IS ALSO AN ELECTED MEMBER OF THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT FOR WEST BELFAST BUT HAS REFUSED TO TAKE HIS SEAT TO PROTEST BRITISH RULE IN NORTHERN IRELAND.

THE POLICE SPOKESMAN SAID THE EIGHT MEN WERE QUESTIONED IN CONNECTION WITH THE ILLEGAL ENTRY INTO NORTHERN IRELAND IN AUGUST OF THE NEW YORK LAWYER MARTIN GALVIN, PUBLICITY DIRECTOR OF THE PRO-IRA IRISH NORTHERN AID COMMITTEE, NORRID.

THE BRITISH AND U.S. GOVERNMENTS HAVE CHARGED THAT FUNDS COLLECTED IN THE UNITED STATES BY NORRID ARE USED TO BUY WEAPONS FOR THE IRA'S TERRORIST CAMPAIGN TO UNITE THE BRITISH PROVINCE OF NORTHERN IRELAND WITH THE IRISH REPUBLIC AND ESTABLISH A SOCIALIST STATE.

GALVIN SHOWED UP IN NORTHERN IRELAND IN DISGUISE DESPITE A BRITISH BAN ON HIS ENTRY AND AN IRA SUPPORTER WAS KILLED BY A POLICE PLASTIC BULLET DURING CLASHES WHEN POLICE TRIED TO ARREST HIM.

10501  
19 July




▲ A more detailed photograph of the CVN dry dock. Analysts believe that the flight deck amidships has been completed, as has the hangar deck in both the bow and stern sections of the ship. The stern section, seen in the upper right-hand corner of the photograph, is due to leave her slipway in autumn 1985, floated out into the river stern first and then mated to the larger portion of the ship. It

is thought the carrier will have two aircraft lifts, one aft of the island on the starboard side, and will have 75 aircraft when operational, with heavy emphasis on fixed-wing counter-air and strike attack aircraft. The ship will begin sea trials in 1988-9 and enter full operational service some time in 1994, it is thought

THE WEEK

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▲ This computer-enhanced satellite photograph, taken at an oblique angle, shows the general layout of the Nikolaiev 444 yard in the Black Sea, with what appears to be a foundry in the foreground and assembly shops behind. Buildings housing technical staff lie alongside the dry dock where the 75 000 ton nuclear carrier is under construction. This dock, with twin mobile overhead gantry cranes, was where the four 43 000 ton Kiev class conventional carriers were built: it was,


however, too small for the CVN, so the shipyard had had to resort to the unusual practice, for such a large vessel, of building in two sections. At the top of the picture, the stern section of Kharkov, the fourth Kiev, can be seen with work continuing on her fitting out. Nearby, an amphibious landing ship, apparently of the 13 000 ton Ivan Rogov class, is under construction.

THE WEEK

338°

15 July

THE WEEK



## Satellite pictures show Soviet CVN towering above Nikolaiev shipyard

THREE EXCLUSIVE PICTURES, taken by a satellite only last month, show the Soviet Navy's 75 000 ton nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, codenamed BLACK COM 2 by NATO, under construction at Nikolaiev shipyard 444 on the Black Sea.

The photographs on pp 172-3 also show an amphibious landing ship of the *Ivan Rogov* class under construction in a nearby dock, and the fourth 43 000 ton *Kiev* class conventional carrier, *Kharkov*, continuing to be fitted out.

The pictures clearly indicate that the CVN is being built in two parts: the major portion, measuring 264 m in length, lies beneath the shipyard's two giant overhead gantry cranes which have a combined lift of more than 1000 tons.

The stern section, 73 m in length, is under construction on a slipway alongside. Analysts believe that this section will be floated out stern first and mated to the remainder of the carrier by September/October 1985.

The amidships section of the flight deck is nearing completion. One of the pictures indicates the position of vertical silo-launched SAM missiles forward of the superstructure.

These silos were shown on the artist's impression of the completed CVN, apparently named *Kremlin*, published in *Jane's Defence Weekly* on 28 July. Despite this, it seems unlikely, given the Soviets' preference for heavy armament, that the carrier will not be fitted

with some SSM capability. The drawing also showed two deck lifts, three steam-operated catapults, and phased arrays, similar to the SPY 1A paired arrays on the US Navy's *Ticonderoga* class cruisers, on the superstructure.

Work on the ship began in January 1983 in the dock where the four *Kiev* class carriers were built. However, the pictures suggest that earlier reports that work on her has been speeded up are correct: clearly the CVN has been accorded priority by the C-in-C Soviet Navy, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union, Sergei Gorshkov. The pictures show railway lines carrying heavy material to the dockside and a profusion of heavylift cranes and scaffolding towers.


The latest estimate by *JDW* sources for sea trials for the CVN are 1988-9 with entry into full operational service around 1994. Tests with a full-scale CVN flight deck in concrete at an air base "in the Black Sea area" have been going on for three to four years, using arrester wires and an angled deck.

It seems likely that a navalised variant of the MiG-23 Flogger will initially operate off this carrier as a trial squadron, with the Sukhoi Su-27 Flanker all-weather counter-air fighter, carrying eight beyond-visual range AA-10 radar-homing missiles, on later ships of the class. It is believed that up to four and possibly eight strike carriers are planned, each with 75 aircraft on board, with the emphasis on fixed-wing interceptor/attack aircraft, making them potentially formidable adversaries for the US Navy's Carrier Battle Groups.

# JANE'S DEFENCE WEEKLY

VOLUME 2 NUMBER 5

11 AUGUST 1984



1114L  
15 JULY

338°

1. Measure sun Azimuth
2. Measure elevation angle from height of crane (90m) to end of shadow
3. Figure sun declination - *DO of sun on instrument*