

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

SC#00816/68
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COMBINED WATCH REPORT
of the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

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[redacted] 8 February 1968

Conclusions

[redacted]

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We believe that the Communists intend to continue their major offensive in South Vietnam. [redacted]

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We expect Communist pressure to continue in both northern Laos and the Panhandle. Communist forces in several areas apparently are preparing for further attacks on government positions. [redacted]

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[redacted]

I. Communist International Developments

We have noted no new developments of indications significance. [redacted]

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II. Soviet and Eastern European Military Developments

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Soviet naval patrols have been joined by air units in [redacted] reconnaissance of the US naval task group in the Sea of Japan. An additional Soviet naval force consisting of six combatants [redacted] in the southern Sea of Japan. These ships

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probably are intended to augment the present surveillance group.* [redacted]

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III. Critical Areas

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2. Vietnam (As of 0900 EST, 8 February): We believe that the Communists intend to continue their major offensive in South Vietnam. [redacted]

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While elements of many Viet Cong main force units were employed in the initial attacks, the bulk of the NVA forces were not committed. The movements and preparations of major North Vietnamese and Viet Cong main force units suggest that further operations are impending. [redacted]

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The expected Communist offensive against Khe Sanh and other targets in the DMZ area could begin at any time and almost certainly will be timed to coincide with further attacks in other areas. The extensive Communist activity in the Khe Sanh area, including employment of tanks, indicates that Hanoi is preparing for a major battle which could be an important aspect of its over-all strategy during the coming months. [redacted]

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*As of 8 February, Soviet surface forces in the southern Sea of Japan consist of:

2 Kynda CLGMs	-	guided missile light cruisers (SAM/SSM)
1 Kashin DLG	-	guided missile frigate (SAM)
1 Krupnyy DDGS	-	guided missile destroyer (SSM)
1 Kildin DDGS	-	guided missile destroyer (SSM)
3 Kotlin DDs	-	destroyers
1 Riga DE	-	destroyer escort
2 AGIs	-	intelligence collectors
2 Oilers		

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In the III Corps area, elements of all three Communist divisions now pose a threat to major population centers and allied military facilities, particularly Saigon and Bien Hoa airbase. In the central highlands, NVA regiments subordinate to the B-3 Front are in position to operate against Dak To, Kontum, Pleiku and other cities, while other NVA units have apparently been moved into positions to continue attacks on major targets in the coastal area, including Danang and Hue. [REDACTED]

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3. Laos: Communist forces in several areas apparently are preparing for further attacks on government positions. While we continue to have no firm signs of any general Communist offensive, attacks in the near future could be timed to coincide with the effort in South Vietnam to reinforce the appearance of Communist strength. The Communists continue preparations for the attack on Phou Pha Thi (Site 85) [REDACTED] [REDACTED] North Vietnamese AN-2s may again be employed against the site. The Communists have also increased pressure against government positions west and southwest of the Plaine des Jarres. In the Panhandle, a Communist attack on Saravane may occur soon. Communist forces also pose a continuing threat to government positions along Route 9. [REDACTED]

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