

~~SECRET~~ (When Filled In)



Intelligence Information Cable

● ROUTINE

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

IN 775641

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DIST 19 DECEMBER 1975

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SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED --

[Redacted]

COUNTRY ARGENTINA

[Redacted]

3.3(b)(1)

M

SUBJECT COMMENTS BY ARMY COMMANDING GENERAL JORGE RAFAEL VIDELA

ON [Redacted]

3.3(b)(1)

[Redacted]

RESULTS OF THE

ARMY ANTI-SUBVERSIVE CAMPAIGN.

[Large Redacted Block]

3.3(b)(1)

1. ON 13 DECEMBER 1975 GENERAL JORGE RAFAEL VIDELA,

COMMANDER OF THE ARMY

[Redacted]

3.3(b)(1)

[Redacted]

CONCERNING VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE CURRENT POLITICAL

3.3(b)(1)

SITUATION IN ARGENTINA.

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

2. VIDELA SAID THAT WHILE CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR A MILITARY TAKE OVER OF THE GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN COMPLETED, NO DATE HAS BEEN SET. THE DETERMINING FACTOR WILL BE THE COURSE OF EVENTS. I.E., THE POLITICAL/MILITARY SITUATION MUST DETERIORATE TO THE POINT WHERE MILITARY INTERVENTION IS VIRTUALLY THE ONLY OPTION. VIDELA BELIEVES THAT SUCH DETERIORATION, PERHAPS IN A TWO TO THREE MONTH TIMEFRAME, IS INEVITABLE, BUT HE RECOGNIZES THAT THE NATION COULD CONCEIVABLY MUDDLE THROUGH UNTIL ELECTIONS WITHOUT ENOUGH DETERIORATION OCCURING TO JUSTIFY A COUP D'ETAT.

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[Redacted]

3.3(b)(1)

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3. VIDELA ACKNOWLEDGES THAT SOME OF HIS SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS ARE PUSHING FOR IMMEDIATE INTERVENTION, BUT HE IS CONFIDENT THAT THEY

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WILL CONTINUE TO FOLLOW HIS LEADERSHIP AND WILL NOT ACT ON THEIR OWN. WHEN AND IF THE ARMY DOES MOVE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT, VIDELA EXPECTS IT WILL BE UNDER HIS LEADERSHIP. HE BELIEVES THAT HE HAS CONVINCED ALL HIS COMMANDERS TO POSTPONE ACTION FOR AT LEAST TWO MONTHS.

4. IF THE SITUATION REMAINS ROUGHLY AS IT IS NOW WELL INTO 1976 AND INTERVENTION IS NOT WARRANTED, VIDELA EXPECTS THAT THE MILITARY WILL HAVE A ROLE IN THE ELECTION PROCESS TO THE EXTENT OF INFLUENCING THE SELECTION OF CANDIDATES. SPECIFICALLY, THE MILITARY INTEND TO PREVENT PRESIDENT MARIA ESTELA MARTINEZ DE PERON FROM RUNNING AGAIN FOR THE PRESIDENCY. THEY ARE CONVINCED THAT PERONISM STILL HAS SUCH AN ATTRACTION FOR THE MASS OF VOTERS THAT IF MRS. PERON WERE TO RUN, SHE WOULD LIKELY WIN. THIS, VIDELA BELIEVES, WOULD BE CATASTROPHIC FOR THE NATION.

5. REGARDING THE ANTI-SUBVERSIVE CAMPAIGN, VIDELA BELIEVES THAT THE ARMY HAS MADE CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS IN REDUCING THE PEOPLES' LIBERATION ARMY (ERP) RURAL GUERRILLA FORCES TO VIRTUAL INEFFECTIVENESS. BUT THE SITUATION IS THE OPPOSITE WITH THE MONTONEROS, WHOM VIDELA CONSIDERS TO BE GROWING IN SIZE AND EFFECTIVENESS. THE MONTONEROS' CONCENTRATION ON URBAN AND INDUSTRIAL GUERRILLA ACTIVITY MAKES THEM THE MORE FORMIDABLE OPPONENT. THE ARMY, IN REPRESSING THEM,

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WILL OF NECESSITY FIND ITSELF MUCH MORE OPEN TO CRITICISM FOR COMMITTING EXCESSES BECAUSE THE MONTONEROS HAVE CLOSER TIES WITH THE POPULACE THAN HAVE THE ERP. PART OF THE ARMY COUNTER EFFORT WILL BE TO CUT OFF THE SOURCE OF MANPOWER SUPPLY FOR THE MONTONEROS. A MAJOR TASK IS TO DETECT AND REMOVE THEIR SUPPORTERS IN THE UNIVERSITIES, WITH CONCENTRATION NOW ON REMOVING THOSE WHO SURFACED DURING THE LEFTISTS INTERLUDE OF THE HECTOR CAMPORA PRESIDENCY (1973).

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