


Intelligence Information Cable

● ROUTINE
IN 249827
PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

WARNING NOTICE

SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED



STATE/DIR NSC/S SDO D/DCI/NIO SWS (COCHRAN ONLY)
JCS/MC (DIA) NSA FBI WH SITRM D/CRG

(b)(3)

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(b)(3)

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

DIST 18 APRIL 1977

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~ --WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

(b)(3)

P POLITICAL MATTERS

COUNTRY LATIN AMERICA

DOI

SUBJECT COMMENTS

~~ON OPERATION CONDOR~~

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

ACQ

SOURCE

REC-126

109-12-307-520

TO STATE: NO DISTRIBUTION EXCEPT TO MR. SAUNDERS

(b)(1)

TO DIA: EXCLUSIVE FOR LT. GENERAL WILSON

(b)(3)

TO NSA: EXCLUSIVE FOR LT. GENERAL ALLEN

MAY 16 1977

TO FBI: FOR MR. LEAVITT

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~~SECRET~~
MAY 27 1977

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IN 249827

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

RECEIVED
INTELLIGENCE DIV.

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SECRET
(classification)

APR 19 1977
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(dissem controls) CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)

1. [Redacted] COMMENT: [Redacted]

[Redacted]

REPRESENTATIVES FROM ALL MEMBER COUNTRIES OF THE CONDOR ORGANIZATION (b)(1)
MET IN BUENOS AIRES 13-16 DECEMBER 1976 TO REVIEW PAST ACTIVITIES (b)(3)
AND DISCUSS FUTURE PLANS. THE PRINCIPAL ITEM ON THE AGENDA WAS THE
DISCUSSION AND PLANNING OF COORDINATED PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE OPERA-
TIONS DIRECTED AGAINST LEFTIST AND RADICAL GROUPS IN THE VARIOUS
MEMBER COUNTRIES. OPERATION CONDOR IS A COOPERATIVE ARRANGEMENT AMONG
SECURITY SERVICES OF CHILE, ARGENTINA, BOLIVIA, PARAGUAY, URUGUAY, AND (b)(1)
BRAZIL TO COUNTER TERRORISM AND SUBVERSION.) (b)(3)

2. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] TO OPERATION CONDOR [Redacted]

[Redacted] SAID HE WAS NOT AWARE OF ANY OPERATIONS BEING

RUN IN EITHER THE UNITED STATES OR EUROPE BY CONDOR COUNTRIES. [Redacted]

CAUTIONED, HOWEVER, THAT SECURITY HAD BEEN STRENGTHENED AT THE (b)(1)
OPERATIONS CENTER IN BUENOS AIRES AND COMPARTMENTATION INCREASED AFTER (b)(3)
CONDOR REPRESENTATIVES FOUND OUT IN SEPTEMBER 1976 THAT THE FRENCH

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SECRET
(classification)

(dissem controls)

WARNING NOTICE
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[Redacted]

(b)(3)

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(classification)

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INTELLIGENCE SERVICE WAS AWARE OF THE EXISTENCE AND SOME OBJECTIVES OF OPERATION CONDOR; THUS, HE COULD NOT BE SURE ABOUT OPERATIONS ELSEWHERE, ALTHOUGH HE EMPHASIZED THAT DISCUSSION OF OPERATIONS IN EITHER THE U.S. OR EUROPE WAS NOT SURFACED AT THE MEETING HELD 13-16 DECEMBER.

[Redacted] REACTION TO THIS PARTICULAR BREACH OF SECURITY WAS (b)(1)
(b)(3)

EXTREMELY HARSH IN ARGENTINA WHICH RESULTED IN THE FIRING OF THE THEN DIRECTOR OF THE ARGENTINE STATE SECRETARIAT FOR INTELLIGENCE (SIDE) AND REPLACING HIM WITH GENERAL CARLOS ENRIQUE ~~LA I D L A W~~ ^{Argentina} THE CURRENT DIRECTOR. HE ADDED THAT THE FOREGOING INCIDENT MADE CONDOR REPRESENTATIVES REALIZE THAT THE OTHER INTELLIGENCE SERVICES ARE PROBABLY AWARE OF THEIR ORGANIZATION AND, THEREFORE, EVERYTHING IS HANDLED ACCORDINGLY (b)(1)

I.E., WITH A MAXIMUM OF CAUTION. [Redacted] COMMENT: GENERAL OTT (b)(3)

~~P A L A D I N O~~ WAS THE FORMER DIRECTOR OF ~~SIDE~~ ^{Argentina}. NO PREVIOUS REPORTING INDICATES THAT HIS REPLACEMENT WAS A DISCIPLINARY MEASURE.)

3. CONCERNING CURRENT CONDOR OPERATIONS, [Redacted]

BELIEVED THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON SUBVERSIVES AND TERRORISTS WAS BEING CONDUCTED MOSTLY BILATERALLY BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES OF MEMBER COUNTRIES. IN THE COVERT ACTION FIELD, [Redacted] BOTH (b)(1)
(b)(3)

5 ARGENTINA AND CHILE WERE MAKING EXTENSIVE USE OF THE COMMUNICATIONS 5
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SECRET
(classification)

(dissem controls)

WARNING NOTICE
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[Redacted]

(b)(3)

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(classification)

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MEDIA FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES. HE ADDED THAT THE THRUST OF THESE PROPAGANDA EFFORTS WAS TWOFOLD: TO REFUTE CRITICISM LEVELLED AT THE RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS BY THE FOREIGN COMMUNICATIONS MEDIA AND INTERNATIONAL FORA AND TO INSTILL A NEW SENSE OF NATIONAL PRIDE IN THE POPULATION. [Redacted] CHILE HAD RECENTLY COMPLETED TWO FILMS (b)(1) ON "CHILE AFTER ALLENDE" WHICH IT WAS ASKING CONDOR REPRESENTATIVES (b)(3) TO SHOW ON TELEVISION IN THEIR COUNTRIES. TO DATE, ONLY URUGUAY AND ARGENTINA HAVE AGREED TO SHOW THEM. ACCORDING TO [Redacted] PARAGUAY HAD (b)(1) ONLY MADE USE OF THE PRESS, THE DAILY NEWSPAPER "PATRIA" IN WHICH (b)(3) PROPAGANDA WAS PERIODICALLY INSERTED. HE SAID THAT A REQUEST TO USE TELEVISION FOR THIS PURPOSE WAS UNDER CONSIDERATION BY HIS SUPERIORS AS WAS A REQUEST FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL NEWS AGENCY. [Redacted] THE LATTER WOULD PROBABLY NEVER COME TO PASS BEC (b)(1) FUNDS SIMPLY WERE NOT AVAILABLE FOR SUCH AN UNDERTAKING. (b)(3)

4. LASTLY, [Redacted] THE MEETING THAT WAS TO BE HELD (b)(1) IN ASUNCION IN MARCH 1977 ON "PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE TECHNIQUES AGAINST (b)(3) TERRORISTS AND LEFTIST EXTREMISTS" WAS CANCELLED BECAUSE OF THE INABILITY OF ARGENTINA AND PARAGUAY TO PARTICIPATE. [Redacted] (b)(1)

BOTH COUNTRIES' INTELLIGENCE SERVICES HAD BEEN DEEPLY INVOLVED IN

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SECRET

(classification)

(dissem controls)

SECRET (When Filled In)

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IN 249827

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

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SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE THIRD CONGRESS OF THE LATIN-AMERICAN ANTI-COMMUNIST CONFEDERATION HELD 28-30 MARCH, AS WELL AS IN THE PREPARATION FOR THE 20 APRIL STATE VISIT OF ARGENTINE PRESIDENT JORGE VIDELA TO PARAGUAY. A NEW DATE FOR THE NEXT CONDOR MEETING HAD NOT BEEN SET.

Argentina

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)

5. [Redacted] DISSEM: [Redacted] SENT

[Redacted]

CINCSO (GENERAL MCAULIFFE ONLY).

REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED-


[Redacted]

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SECRET (classification) (dissem controls)



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SECRET

CITE

DIST 12 APRIL 1977

POLITICAL MATTERS -

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)

COUNTRY: BOLIVIA/LATIN AMERICA


DOI:

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

SUBJECT: THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF THE CONDOR ORGANIZATION

ACQ:

SOURCE:



1. IN LATE MARCH 1977

COMMENTED THAT THE CONDOR ORGANIZATION IS

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

SUFFERING FROM A LACK OF COORDINATION AMONG MEMBERS WHICH HAS RESULTED IN A LACK OF RESULTS AND ACTIVITY ON THE PART OF CONDOR.

CITED THE FOLLOWING POINTS JUSTIFYING HIS CRITICISM:

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

A. CONDOR HAS HELD SEVERAL MEETINGS BUT HAS ACCOMPLISHED NOTHING, AS MEMBERS HAVE GENERALLY NOT FOLLOWED THROUGH ON THE PROPOSALS AGREED TO DURING THE MEETINGS. THE MEETINGS SERVE

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

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SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

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(classification)

MERELY AS SOCIAL OCCASIONS;

B. MEETINGS OF CONDOR ARE CONSTANTLY BEING SCHEDULED AND SUBSEQUENTLY CANCELLED OR POSTPONED;

C. BASED ON A PROPOSAL AGREED TO BY ALL MEMBERS DURING A CONDOR MEETING, THE GOVERNMENT OF BOLIVIA ASKED ALL MEMBERS TO PROVIDE TRACES ON CERTAIN LEFTISTS. HOWEVER, NOT ONE CONDOR MEMBER RESPONDED TO THE REQUEST. THE GOB ALSO REQUESTED INFORMATION FROM ALL MEMBERS CONCERNING THE FIFTH CONFERENCE OF NON-ALIGNED NATIONS AND ARGENTINA WAS THE ONLY MEMBER TO RESPOND;

D. THE PRINCIPAL ACTIVITY OF CONDOR APPEARS TO BE ONLY THE BI-LATERAL EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION BETWEEN CHILE AND ARGENTINA;

E. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE DEPARTMENT OF CONDOR IS THE MOST ACTIVE WITHIN THE ORGANIZATION, HOWEVER, THAT ACTIVITY IS

SECRET

IN 247101

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

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SECRET

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CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT.

(classification)

LIMITED TO AN EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AND AN OPERATION HAS NEVER
BEEN CARRIED TO COMPLETION.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

2.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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