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17 APR 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Special Group

SUBJECT: Covert Action in the Congo (Leopoldville)

1. SUMMARY

On 17 November 1961, Special Group approved a proposal to undertake specific covert actions in the Congo in support of Prime Minister Adoula and his closest colleagues, and authorized the expenditure

[Redacted]

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survival of the moderate, pro-Western ADOULA Government; dissolution of the Lumumbist regime of Antoine GIZENGA in Stanleyville and the detention of GIZENGA; disorganization of the leftist, nationalist opposition to the ADOULA Government; reintegration of Katanga and South Kasai into a unified Congo.

This memorandum presents a progress and status report and requests authority to continue certain of these covert actions

[Redacted]

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2. PROBLEM

The success of the covert actions undertaken to date has been limited by the inability of Prime Minister ADOULA and his close colleagues (hereinafter called the ADOULA Group) to use the support furnished to build viable and enduring

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political mechanisms, by the residual problems of Katanga and the still-active threat of secessionism, and by continued evidence of Soviet willingness to intervene in Congolese politics. As a result, the objectives of our covert action program are only partially achieved, and the threat to the stability of the Congo from both the left and the secessionists continues, although in less acute form. We believe that termination of the covert programs would aggravate these threats and cause the downfall of the ADOULA Government. The ADOULA Group still needs this support if U.S. policies are to continue to succeed. The Department of State believes that the ADOULA Government remains the best available.

3. FACTORS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

A. Organization of a Moderate Political Party and Direct Political Action

This objective has not been attained. The ADOULA Group, by judicious use of covertly provided funds, has kept opposition groups off balance and uncoordinated to the extent that it has survived (albeit by uncomfortably narrow margins) all efforts by Parliament to unseat it. ADOULA and colleagues, distracted by a continued series of parliamentary crises, and lacking in competent aides, have been unable to focus on party-building until very recently. Plans have been submitted for a new party, which ADOULA has accepted, and we are prepared to furnish advisory personnel

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to guide its formation.

Expenditures to date for direct political action [redacted] have been used primarily to fragment the opposition, and there is little doubt that, without these funds, the ADOULA Government would have been ousted on four separate occasions.


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It is planned that the Parliament will adjourn or be prorogued in June 1963, to be followed by new elections in 1964. This will give the ADOULA Group at least six months to organize a sound political base. It is anticipated that [redacted] will be required for this effort, and for direct political action in FY 1964.

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B. Public Relations

A public relations mechanism was established in November 1961, and has functioned efficiently since that time. Prime Minister ADOULA has accepted guidance (emanating indirectly from the U.S. Embassy in Leopoldville) in public statements. These statements, along with news and feature items presenting a favorable image of his government, have been widely distributed in the United Nations and throughout the Afro-Asian world, as well as to a limited degree in Europe. This effort has enhanced the ADOULA Government in the eyes of many Afro-Asian countries and has brought it the full backing

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of those countries in the UN. The Belgian Government's attitudes toward ADOULA have also become relatively favorable.


Professional public relations guidance was furnished to ADOULA during his visit to the UN in 1962, and to Foreign Minister Bomboko during two visits to the UN. In addition, public relations materials were furnished to Congolese delegates to several pan-African conferences.

Domestically, Prime Minister ADOULA has made a number of public speeches and shown himself with fair frequency to his countrymen, which activities have received wide domestic news, radio and photographic coverage. On trips outside of Leopoldville, he has had the benefit of continued public relations advice. This was particularly effective during his first visit to Elisabethville in February 1963. Newsreel feature coverage of his visit to the UN and U.S. during 1962 was given wide distribution in the Congo. In addition, wall posters representing ADOULA as a "man of the people" have been effective.

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With various Congo programs up for international debate (reorganization and retraining of the Congolese Army, future role of the UN in the Congo, etc.), and with efforts to organize a political party, continuation of a public relations effort is essential. Also, the presence of a public

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relations advisor at the Prime Minister's side affords an opportunity to influence not only his public posture, but also the substantive content of his public statements. It

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C. Assistance to General Joseph D. MOBUTU

We believe that this activity has been among the most effective within the program. Our support has enabled MOBUTU to retain the loyalty of his key officers throughout this period through entertainment, monetary favors and provision for dependents, and to make one extensive tour of provincial military commands. MOBUTU was able to scotch at least one attempted military coup against the Government, and to prevent military action against Katanga Provincial President TSHOMBE which could have upset United Nations plans for the reintegration of Katanga and had a perhaps disastrous effect on U.S. policy in the Congo. MOBUTU and the Congolese Army have remained throughout this period loyal supporters of the Government. [Redacted]

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As the Congolese Army remains the ultima ratio of the Government, we believe that direct assistance to MOBUTU should continue. [Redacted]

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4. COORDINATION

A. This request has been coordinated with the

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Department of State. Ambassador Edmund A. Gullion is known to desire continuation of support to the ADOULA Group.

B. The ADOULA Group would view a discontinuation of this program at this time as a major and unfavorable change in U.S. policy, which would lead to a rapid deterioration of relations. We believe it safe to say that the Group concurs on this request.

5. RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that Special Group approve the continuation of activities listed under Paragraph 3, A, B and C above.

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