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FAR EAST

1. Expected enemy strategy in current Korean offensive:

Korea




3.3(h)(2)

The G-2 section of the US Far East Command, in an evaluation of Communist intentions in the 22 April offensive, reports a belief that the enemy's major effort will be mounted in the west by an estimated force of 337,000 with an objective of capturing the communications complex of Seoul by 1 May. A secondary effort will be made in the central zone down terrain corridors by an estimated 147,000 troops with the objective of cutting the UN routes of communication with the south. This secondary effort in the central sector has, so far, effected the deepest penetration (12 miles) and has placed the enemy in a position to exploit his successes along the eastern approaches to Seoul. A diversionary effort has been made in the eastern sector by two rehabilitated North Korean corps,

Comment: The concentration of two -- and possibly three -- Chinese Communist army groups in the western sector north of Seoul continues to pose the main threat to UN forces. The taking of additional prisoners from the Chinese Communist 3rd Army Group north of Seoul tends to confirm the presence of this new major force in the concentration area in the west.

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3.3(h)(2)

3. Indian Ambassador in Peiping advises against new peace approach:

*Iranian
China*

[Redacted]

Indian Ambassador Panikkar in Peiping has reportedly advised against making any further "peace approach" to Communist China at this time. Panikkar reportedly feels that the Chinese Communists are in a "belligerent frame of mind," "particularly because of the alleged bombing" of the Fukien area by US aircraft.

3.3(h)(2)

Comment: Aircraft of the US 7th Fleet conducted reconnaissance flights over parts of the Southeast China coast on 11 and 13 April; the Peiping radio claims that these planes strafed and killed civilians in the area and that other US aircraft bombed Manchurian cities in early April. There has been no evidence that Communist China has at any time been prepared to modify its conditions for a "peaceful settlement" in Korea.

NEAR EAST

IRAN

4. Extreme nationalists attack Iranian student parade:

3.3(h)(2)

[Redacted]

The US Ambassador in Tehran, in reporting the demonstration of some 3,000 high school and university students in Tehran on 22 April, stated that it was well-organized and led by members of the pro-Communist Tudeh Party. This planned demonstration was aimed against the British and emphasized the death of four students in the recent Abadan riots. When supporters of the National Front and Fedayan Islan (extreme Nationalist groups) attempted to disrupt the march, rioting broke out which required police action. The Ambassador notes that the "active break" between Tudeh and the Nationalist groups underlines a growing rift based on Fedayan's fanatic anti-foreign attitude and its dislike for Tudeh propaganda regarding

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the emancipation of women. Moreover, the Nationalists insist that nationalization be applicable throughout Iran; Tudeh would not oppose an oil concession to the USSR.

Comment: The Tudeh Party, with its allegiance to the USSR, has made common cause with religious fanatics and extreme nationalists in their desire to nationalize the Iranian oil industry. This temporary alliance appears now to be breaking up. While the antipathy demonstrated by the recent clash may result in a temporary lessening of the clamor for nationalization, the component elements have not altered their viewpoints and it may be anticipated that nationalization will continue to be urged.

5. UN authority in Palestine area reported inadequate:

3.3(h)(2)

Lebanon



In commenting on the general Israeli-Arab frontier problems, the US Minister to Lebanon reports that considerable criticism has been voiced over the fact that the several Mixed Armistice Commissions (a separate MAC is organized for each Arab state which has a common frontier with Israel) have no machinery to impose their decisions, with the result that no reliance can be put on the Commission in the event of a serious situation. The Minister believes that much of this criticism could be avoided if the chairman of the UN Truce Supervision Organization, which controls the MAC's could count on prompt and forceful support in the event that either side disregards its decisions. The Ministry states that disrespect for the authority of the MAC's increases with each incident and that complete backing for the Truce Supervision Organization seems the only way to avoid (1) an increasing number of appeals to the Security Council, (2) complete loss of confidence in the UN as an effective body, or (3) an ultimate outbreak of hostilities.

Comment: The urgent need for definitive UN authority so that recurrent incidents along the entire Israeli-Arab frontier may adequately be handled has been previously stressed by US and French diplomats in Tel Aviv, Amman and Damascus, as well as by the reports of UN observers and US press correspondents in the area. Apparently opinion is nearly unanimous that a strengthened Mixed Armistice Commission organization is urgently needed in the Palestine area.

