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1 June 1951

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Copy No. CI-9

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

DOCUMENT NO. 41
 NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
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 AUTH: HR 70-2
 DATE 12-15-77 REVIEWER: [Redacted]

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Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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SUMMARY

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FAR EAST

- 2. Chinese prisoners taken recently are of inferior calibre (page 4).
- 3. Testimony regarding MacArthur's removal affects Japan adversely (page 4).

NEAR EAST

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EASTERN EUROPE

[Redacted]

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WESTERN EUROPE

- 6. Soviet officials interfere once again with West Berlin trade (page 6).
- 7. Italian Communists gain votes, lose control of city governments in industrial north (page 6).

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
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GENERAL

1. Swedish and Yugoslav officials comment on Soviet approach regarding Korea:

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In a conversation with the US Ambassador in Stockholm, Swedish Prime Minister Erlander expressed regret that the Swedish UN delegate had confirmed the existence of a Soviet peace feeler and indicated that he had not attached any importance to the approach. Erlander said that he was not at liberty to disclose the identity of the Russian contact or of the

Swedish intermediary. In a subsequent conversation, Swedish Foreign Minister Unden argued that the approach might be important, because the Russian, an important Communist, had categorically asserted that the Korean conflict could be terminated on the basis of a return to the status quo ante, and because the Moscow press had given prominence to similar proposals (e. g. Senator Johnson's resolution).

Yugoslav UN delegate Bebler has reaffirmed his belief that the USSR is ready for bilateral US-USSR talks leading toward a Korean settlement along the 38th Parallel. Bebler elaborated that Chinese Communist military defeats have placed the USSR in a position where total victory in Korea can be achieved only by open Soviet intervention, a stake which is too high for the USSR because it does not want a global war. He added that the USSR fears that otherwise another UN invasion of North Korea would result in a Soviet loss of prestige throughout all of Asia.

Comment: Soviet UN delegate Malik's denial on 28 May that the USSR has made any offer to discuss a settlement of the Korean war can be regarded as an indication that the USSR does not wish to become involved in bilateral negotiations on Korea at this time. Malik did not deny, however, that the USSR might be willing to participate in negotiations regarding Korea, despite the USSR's public protestations of non-involvement in the Korean dispute.

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FAR EAST

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2. Chinese prisoners taken recently are of inferior calibre:

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The US Far East Command reports that, with respect to status of training and physical appearance, the "calibre" of Chinese Communist prisoners of war taken in the current offensive has been appreciably lower than that of previously captured prisoners.

Comment: This is the first firm indication that the Chinese are now using inferior soldiery in the Korean campaign. Previous Chinese prisoners (particularly those from the 3rd and 4th Field Armies) were veterans with a considerable degree of training and a fairly high level of combat efficiency.

3. Testimony regarding MacArthur's removal affects Japan adversely: 3.3(h)(2)

According to the US Political Adviser in Tokyo, the testimony of Secretary Marshall and the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding MacArthur's removal continues to have an adverse effect on Japanese public confidence in the US. The "overly frank revelations" regarding present US military unpreparedness to meet the world-wide Communist threat, the impression that Europe has the highest defense priority and the President's reference to the "terrible danger" facing the free world combine to make the Japanese grimly conscious of their precarious position on the edge of Communist Asia.

According to the US Political Adviser, while most Japanese seem eager to remain aligned with the US, the "revelations" give greater plausibility to the Japanese Socialist-Communist line calling for neutrality in the East-West struggle. The Socialists, although roundly defeated in the last election, can not be disregarded as a potentially strong political party that would work seriously to US disadvantage if it were to come to power or become an effective opposition to a pro-US conservative government.

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
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Comment: The Socialists currently face the possibility of a split over their party's "neutrality" stand. In these circumstances, there appears little likelihood that they will be able to effect a strong opposition stand for a considerable period of time.


NEAR EAST

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EASTERN EUROPE

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
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**WESTERN EUROPE**


6. Soviet officials interfere once again with West Berlin trade: 3.3(h)(2)



Soviet authorities in Berlin have initiated new measures that are holding up West Berlin's export trade with the West. Approximately two weeks ago, the Soviet authorities responsible for screening interzonal trade permits for certain restricted goods shipped by West Berlin firms to Western Germany began refusing all requests for permits, insisting that they be accompanied by a certificate showing the origin of the raw materials used in the manufacture of the goods. So far, this move has resulted in a back-log of over 5,000 permits.

Comment: In view of the extreme importance of West Berlin's trade with the West, this Soviet move constitutes the most serious recent harassing measure in Berlin. It follows upon recent Soviet measures closing two canal locks and thus making the delivery of goods between Berlin and Western Germany more difficult.

7. Italian Communists gain votes, lose control of city governments in industrial north: 3.3(h)(2)



In the local elections held on the week-end of 27 May in 28 provinces, largely in north Italy, the Communist bloc tallied about 35

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percent of the vote as compared to 32 percent in the national elections of 1948, while the pro-Government bloc won approximately 44 percent as compared to 49 percent in 1948.

The anti-Communist parties gained administrative control of 2,340 out of 2,735 communes.

Comment: The final series of local elections, which will be held 10 June, can be expected generally to follow the same pattern. The pro-Government parties gained control of municipal councils in most of the important industrial centers of northern Italy (except Bologna) by virtue of an electoral system that permitted the large bloc of pro-Government parties to win two-thirds of the municipal council seats wherever it won a plurality of votes. On the other hand, Communist control of industrial labor appears stronger than ever. The gains of the pro-Communist bloc indicate that Premier De Gasperi and his Christian Democrats were unable to keep domestic problems (e. g., high cost of living, unemployment) from becoming the main issue of the campaign.

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Report of Articles Submitted 1 - 15 June 1951

I. Summary

153 articles submitted
53 articles rejected
100 articles published

Of those submitted:

1 was held over from previous day
21 were not recorded as to time of receipt
132 were recorded as to time of receipt

Of the 132 recorded:

3 were received before 1200
3 were received between 1201 and 1300
3 were received between 1301 and 1400
24 were received between 1401 and 1500
41 were received between 1501 and 1530
58 were received after 1531


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CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: _____
AUTH: HS TO
DATE 12-15-51 REVIEWER: _____

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II. Detailed report

<u>Issue</u>	<u>Article #</u>	<u>Published</u>		<u>Rejected</u>	
		<u>Submitted</u>	<u>By</u>	<u>Submitted</u>	<u>By</u>
1 June	1	1700/31	1	1615/31	2
	2	1525/31	2	1520/31	3
	3	-- /31	2	1520/31	3
	4	1500/31	2		
	5	1543/31	1		
	6	1520/31	3		
	7	1520/31	3		
2 June	1	1551/1	2	-- /1	2
	2	-- /1	2	1215/1	2
	3	-- /1	2	1515/1	2
	4	1415/1	3		
	5	-- /1	1		
	6	1415/1	3		
	7	1415/31*	3		

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<u>Issue</u>	<u>Article #</u>	<u>Published</u> <u>Submitted</u>	<u>By</u>	<u>Rejected</u> <u>Submitted</u>	<u>By</u>
3 June	1	-- /2	1	1405/2	2
	2	-- /2	2	1530/2	2
	3	-- /2	2	1530/2	3
	4	1530/2	3	1530/2	3
	5	1530/2	3		
5 June	1	-- /4	3	1455/4	3
	2	1515/4	1		
	3	-- /4	2		
	4	1536/4	2		
	5	1545/4	3		
	6	1628/4	2		
	7	1455/4	3		
6 June	1	1555/5	2	1614/5	2
	2	1537/5	2	1525/5	3
	3	1500/5	2	1525/5	3
	4	1555/5	2	1525/5	3
	5	1525/5	1	1600/5	2
	6	1525/5	3	1600/5	2
				-- /5	3
7 June 51	1	1510/6	2	-- /6	3
	2	1510/6	2	1502/6	3
	3	1510/6	2	1710/6	2
	4	1510/6	2	1710/6	2
	5	1637/6	2	1502/6	3
	6	-- /6	2	-- /6	3
	7	1335/6	3		
	8	1335/6	3		
8 June	1	1556/7	3	-- /7	3
	2	1640/7	2	1420/7	3
	3	1530/7	1	1420/7	3
	4	1442/7	2	1605/7	2
	5	1546/7	2	1524/7	2
	6	1645/7	2		
	8	1458/7	1		
	8	1440/7	3		
9 June	1	1517/8	2	1540/8	3
	2	1622/8	2	1540/8	3
	3	1402/8	2	1517/8	2
	4	1635/8	2	1517/8	2
	5	1635/8	2	1535/8	2
	6	1610/8	2	1500/8	1
	7	1526/8	1		
	8	1500/8	1		
	9	1540/8	3		
	10	1540/8	3		

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<u>Issue</u>	<u>Article #</u>	<u>Published</u>	<u>By</u>	<u>Rejected</u>	<u>By</u>
		<u>Submitted</u>		<u>Submitted</u>	
10 June	1	1455/9	3	1415/9	2
	2	1555/9	1	1525/9	3
	3	1516/9	1	-- /9	3
	4	1513/9	2		
	5	1525/9	3		
	6	1525/9	3		
	7	-- /9	3		
	8	1525/9	3		
	9	-- /9	3		
12 June	1	-- /11	2	1535/11	2
	2	1502/11	2		
	3	-- /11	2		
	4	1611/11	1		
	5	1600/11	1		
	6	1666/11	1		
	7	1555/11	1		
	8	1421/11	3		
	9	1421/11	3		
13 June	1	1604/12	3	1210/12	2
	2	1540/12	2	1120/12	2
	3	1530/12	2	1152/12	2
	4	1210/12	2	1422/12	3
	5	1120/12	2	1545/12	3
	6	1555/12	1	1545/12	3
	7	1624/12	3		
	8	1604/12	3		
	9	1545/12	3		
14 June	1	1551/13	2	1602/13	3
	2	1517/13	2	1625/13	3
	3	1515/13	2		
	4	1532/13	2		
	5	1602/13	2		
	6	1538/13	2		
	7	-- /13	1		
	8	1628/13	1		
15 June	1	1541/14	3	1445/14	3
	2	1512/14	M	1541/14	3
	3	1432/14	2	1541/14	3
	4	1512/14	2	1605/14	1
	5	1547/14	1	1532/14	2
	6	1700/14	1	1345/14	2
	7	1445/14	3		

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