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Editorial

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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
~~TOP SECRET~~ SUMMARY

GENERAL

- 1. US Embassy in Moscow claims Soviet intentions unaffected by year's setbacks (page 3).
- 2. UK Foreign Office fears impact of possible Soviet break at Paris talks (page 3).

3.3(h)(2)

FAR EAST



- 7. Coalition cabinet formed in Indonesia (page 6).

NEAR EAST

- 8. Comment on the fall of the Iranian Government (page 7).
- 9. Israeli broadcast calls for army action (page 7).

EASTERN EUROPE

- 10. Oats may be used in possible Clementis trial (page 8).
- 11. Yugoslavia favors regional Peace Observation Committee (page 8).
- 12. French Communist "peace" policy now tacitly admits inevitability of war (page 9).

WESTERN EUROPE

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GENERAL

1. US Embassy in Moscow claims Soviet intentions unaffected by year's setbacks:USSR
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In its preliminary annual report on Soviet intentions, Embassy Moscow notes that the USSR is employing separately and in combination political, psychological, economic and military weapons in the prosecution of a total war against the free world. The Embassy anticipates that the Soviet Government, in carrying out its present policy, is prepared to incur major risks of precipitating global hostilities. However, probably because the Soviet leaders are presently uncertain of victory in war, they wish to avoid committing their own armed forces. Instead, they prefer to apply continued pressures of the types mentioned, believing this will eventually create a situation more favorable to "engaging their ultimate weapon." Nevertheless the Embassy, and particularly the service attaches, feel that the USSR's present relative military strength, which will be diminished in the future as a result of Western defense efforts, could lead the Soviet Government to "cast the die without delay." The Embassy feels that Korea and the implementation of the North Atlantic Treaty have been setbacks to the USSR during the past year, but concludes that maintenance of the present uneasy balance and eventual improvement of the situation depend on Western determination and unity in rapidly increasing resistance forces to the extent necessary to convince the Politburo of the inevitable disaster of a military adventure. The Embassy is convinced that Western Europe is still the center of danger for the US, but that threats to Asia and the Middle East are of "serious import."

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2. UK Foreign Office fears impact of possible Soviet break at Paris talks:

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
A high UK Foreign Office official has expressed to the US Embassy in London his fears that the Gromyko propaganda blast in the 25 April meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers in Paris may be the prelude to the Soviets' breaking off the agenda talks to the tune of violent accusations against the intransigence of the West. The official

- 3 -

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said that such a development would put the UK cabinet in a difficult position, but that it would ride out the storm. US Embassy London comments that the official exaggerates the possible impact of a break in such circumstances upon public opinion.

Comment: Expression of these fears, albeit exaggerated, could foretell new conciliatory moves by the UK at Paris to protect its propaganda position. In the past week, however, the UK Paris delegation has been stiffening its position, at least partly in reaction to increasing evidence of Soviet uncooperativeness.

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



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After 37 days of negotiations, a coalition cabinet based principally upon cooperation between the Masjumi (Moslem) Party and the Indonesian National Party (PNI)--the two largest parties in Indonesia--was announced on 26 April. The new government is headed by Sukiman, Chairman of the Masjumi, with Suwirjo of the PNI as Deputy Prime Minister. Although three outstanding moderate Masjumi leaders of the old cabinet were excluded from the new cabinet, US Ambassador Cochran believes that US relations with the Sukiman government can be as good as, or even better than, with the former government. Chief advantages of the new cabinet are its working majority in Parliament and the support of President Sukarno.

Comment: The new cabinet includes in key posts at least two persons known formerly to have had Communist associations, and the entire cabinet composition generally appears less capable than that of the previous government. However, strong parliamentary

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support should enable the government to take decisive and necessary steps toward the achievement of law and order, currently the outstanding problem of the Indonesian Republic.

NEAR EAST

8. Comment on the fall of the Iranian Government:

The resignation of Prime Minister Ala and his cabinet on 27 April may postpone parliamentary action on the oil question. The Shah, who will have a difficult time finding a satisfactory successor, might resort to appointing Seyyid Zia, the most prominent candidate. Since Seyyid Zia is popularly viewed as a UK minion, his appointment would be followed by widespread disapproval and unrest. Even if the Shah meets the crisis in some other manner, the situation will remain tense and popular irritation over the oil issue will continue to contribute to any government's instability.

9. Israeli broadcast calls for army action:



Tel Aviv broadcasts on 23 April heard in Damascus called for decisive action by the Israeli Army to deal with the "intolerable" situation in the demilitarized zone. While the

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US Legation in Damascus is unable to judge whether the broadcasts were "authoritative," it notes that there is local concern that the present lull in the UN Security Council proceedings might permit Israel to present the world with another fait accompli. UN officials and observers have expressed disillusionment and frustration to the Legation over lack of guidance on the basic points at issue and have also let their opinions be known to the press. The Legation has been informed by a Syrian Army staff officer that the Syrian Army will open fire if Israeli Army units "invade" the demilitarized zone.

Comment: Despite threatening Israeli broadcasts and strong statements by the Syrian Army, there is no specific data which

- 7 -

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
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would indicate that large-scale hostilities are likely to break out.

EASTERN EUROPE

10. Oatis may be used in possible Clementis trial:




US Ambassador Briggs cables from Prague that the arrest of William N. Oatis may be part of Communist plans for a trial involving Clementis and numerous others, possibly in-

cluding the Fields, with important, albeit undisclosed, issues and purposes. He states that charges against Oatis follow the usual Communist pattern, that there is practically no chance of obtaining Oatis' release prior to the trial, and that his conviction is virtually assured regardless of his innocence. Briggs advises that a protest alone would be futile, but he cautions that the US must recognize the limitations and possible consequences of actions that it may take, such as a rupture of diplomatic relations.

Greech
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11. Yugoslavia favors regional Peace Observation Committee:



Upon instructions from Tito and Kardelj, Yugoslav UN delegate Bebler has informed Ambassador Austin that Belgrade would be interested in establishing a regional Peace

Observation Commission (POC) to cover a broad area, including perhaps Morocco, Berlin, Greece, Turkey and the Arab-Israeli dispute. Bebler declared, however, that Yugoslavia was resolutely opposed to any military observer group limited to Yugoslavia since it would appear provocative and might create panic in Yugoslavia. He added that Yugoslavia would accept a POC to observe Yugoslav-Satellite borders only if the Satellites agreed to admit such a team. Bebler also reported that Belgrade was considering having a POC or some other UN body send a diplomatic mission to Belgrade and Satellite capitals with a view to examining the causes of tension and attempting conciliation.

Yugos
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- 8 -

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Comment: A regional POC appears to have little immediate prospect for success. Neither Turkey nor Greece can see any necessity for the introduction of such a team within their borders. The UK has expressed the opinion that a regional team might tend to increase world tension.

WESTERN EUROPE

FRANCE
3.3(h)(2)12. French Communist "peace" policy now tacitly admits inevitability of war:

 Auguste Lecoer, French Communist Party politburo member, has told the party's Central Committee in a keynote speech that the threat of war is growing constantly as the balance of power becomes less favorable to the "imperialist" camp. He reportedly failed to state that war was not inevitable--a declaration made on similar occasions by Thorez in September and Duclos in February. Lecoer went on to exhort French Communists to be prepared to undertake general strikes and even revolution as a way to "defend peace."

Comment: Lecoer's statement presents no new facet of French Communist policy, but is noteworthy for its confident tone, particularly in the sharp reminder of what is expected of the party in an international crisis. Some of this militancy, however, may be explainable as an attempt on Lecoer's part to regain the favor of top Communist leaders, since he was reportedly admonished on 12 March for "deviationist" ideas.

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