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17 April 1951

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Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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SUMMARY

GENERAL

- 1. Rau recommends new Indian approach to Peiping (page 3).

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- 3. Little air activity on China's east coast revealed by US air reconnaissance (page 4).

EASTERN EUROPE

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WESTERN EUROPE

- 5. Purge of Communists in Austrian police force to be dropped temporarily (page 5).
- 6. Communist plans for sabotage of Italian rearmament (page 6).

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GENERAL

1. Rau recommends new Indian approach to Peiping:

 Sir Benegal Rau, chief of the Indian delegation to the UN, has recommended to his government that it instruct Indian Ambassador Panikkar in Peiping to approach the Chinese Communist


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foreign office, referring to recent events as serving to remove any Peiping suspicions and urging Peiping to respond to the Entezam communication.

Comment: A note from UN General Assembly chairman Entezam to the Peiping regime, inviting Communist China to negotiate with the UN Good Offices Commission, was dispatched on 15 February. There has been no reply to, or acknowledgment of, the note. The Indian delegate apparently regards the removal of General MacArthur as providing Peiping with a face-saving device and therefore as warranting another peace effort.

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FAR EAST



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3. Little air activity on China's east coast revealed by US air reconnaissance:


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 Reconnaissance of the China coast opposite Taiwan conducted by aircraft of the US Seventh Fleet on 11 and 13 April revealed the airfield at Amoy to be operational, while airfields at Foochow and Swatow were non-operational. The field at Chien-ou (inland about 100 miles northwest of Foochow) had been extended since August and was in operational condition except for a rockpile in one turning circle. No unusual shipping concentration was observed in any of the major harbors. Anti-aircraft fire was encountered over Foochow, Amoy, and Swatow, but none was encountered over Chien-ou.

Comment: Reports received earlier in the year generally agreed that the Chinese Communists were engaged in extensive airfield improvement and air activity, and in the construction of coastal defenses along the southeast China coast. These reconnaissance flights tend to support the claims that the Chinese have taken steps to improve coastal defenses.

Chinese Communist broadcasts, heard in Tokyo over the week-end, charged the US with violation of the China coast by a flight of 200 aircraft. These charges probably refer to the above mentioned reconnaissance flights.

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EASTERN EUROPE

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
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**WESTERN EUROPE****5. Purge of Communists in Austrian police force to be dropped temporarily:**

Austrian Interior Minister Helmer has informed US High Commissioner Donnelly in Vienna that, because of the current "tough" Soviet attitude in Austria, Donnelly should not

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expect further overt action at present against the Communists in the Austrian police. According to Donnelly, Helmer appears particularly worried about the Soviet refusal to accept the dismissals of Communist police already ordered by the Austrian Government and claims that this refusal may indicate a trend toward the establishment of a separate Soviet zone police. As further evidence of Soviet "toughness," Helmer cited (a) the Soviet reopening of the denazification issue, (b) the renewed cases of abduction and (c) Soviet demands for the removal of two non-Communist police officers in the Soviet zone, for the return to Vienna of a Communist police chief who has been transferred to the provinces, and for the evacuation of an Austrian gendarmerie school.

Comment: At US instigation, the Austrian Government began a drive in late March to purge the Austrian police of Communists, beginning with the Vienna administrative police. The Soviet authorities reacted vigorously by seizing the opportunity to bring counter-charges against loyal Austrian police and to demand their removal.

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Austrian capitulation on this issue will demoralize the police force and result in a serious weakening of the Austrian will to resist further Soviet demands.

6. Communist plans for sabotage of Italian rearmament:

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 The Italian Communist Party reportedly has a three-stage plan for the sabotage of Italian rearmament: (1) large-scale strikes in war production plants, ostensibly for economic motives in order to woo public sympathy; (2) in the event that strikes fail, acts of sabotage scheduled for April 1951 in selected factories, particularly in the automotive field, and on the railroads, to be carried out by specialists selected and detached from the Communist para-military forces; and (3) mobilization of the entire para-military organization for sabotage and guerrilla action in the event of a deterioration of the international situation to the point where a state of emergency is declared and the government calls out large numbers of reserves. Communist leaders are reportedly not optimistic over the success of the strikes but believe that the working masses are ready for revolutionary action to obtain satisfaction of their demands.

Comment: Since the government is capable at this time of handling any internal insurrectionary activity, sabotage alone appears to offer the Communists some chance of success, particularly in the transportation field, where the Italian Communist Party controls the great majority of workers.

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