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28 March 1951

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Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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SUMMARY

FAR EAST

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
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FAR EAST

3.3(h)(2)



2. De Lattre's reinforcements to come from North Africa:



Implementing its decision to provide De Lattre with the reinforcements he requested for Indochina, the French Government will

send two below-strength French Army divisions, totalling 13,000 men, from North Africa to Indochina as soon as transportation is available. These divisions will be replaced with conscripts and volunteers.

3.3(h)(2)

Comment: The apparent settlement of the Moroccan crisis and the absence of sympathetic demonstrations in Algeria and Tunisia permits the French to substitute recruits and conscripts for the seasoned troops now in North Africa. Army strength in that area -- now approximately 88,000 -- is adequate to maintain order.

These reinforcements are not expected to begin arriving in Tonkin until 1 May, and therefore may be too late to aid the French in countering an all-out Viet Minh offensive which is believed to be imminent.

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3. French hope to forestall Chinese Communist intervention in Indochina:

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General De Lattre and the French Government evidently believe that, by maintaining a non-provocative attitude toward the Chinese Communists in military and informational operations, they can reduce the likelihood of an invasion of Indochina. De Lattre apparently hopes that, with an improved military situation, he will be able to negotiate with the Chinese Communists for the cessation of aid to the Viet Minh. As a matter of policy, the French are playing down any reference to Chinese assistance and doubtlessly intend to ignore the issue as long as possible.

Comment: De Lattre's estimate that the situation in Indochina can be "normalized" by the end of 1951 is based on the premise that Chinese Communist units will not support Viet Minh's forces. Like the British, he is apparently willing to negotiate with the Chinese Communists, at least until French efforts to obtain a joint US-UK-French policy in the Far East are successful.

EASTERN EUROPE

4. Izvestia charges US with planning aggression against Albania:

3.3(h)(2)

[Redacted]

The Moscow press has, for the first time, adopted the Satellite propaganda line concerning "Operation Lightning," an alleged plan for Western aggression against Albania this spring. A 25 March Izvestia article describes "Operation Lightning" as a US-sponsored affair involving a coordinated Turkish-Greek offensive, supported by Tito, against Albania. The article charges that Yugoslavia, Greece and Italy are committing border violations with the ultimate purpose of enslaving Albania.

Comment: Heretofore, accusations regarding Western plans for an imminent attack on Albania have emanated only from Satellite and Free Greek sources. Albanian propaganda dealt with the threat to Albanian territorial integrity, while the other Satellite and Free Greek radios outlined Western plans to attack the USSR, advancing through the Balkans by means of "Operation Lightning."

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LATIN AMERICA

5. Peron seeks maximum propaganda benefit from atomic energy announcement:



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Comment: It is becoming increasingly evident that Argentina is attempting to derive full propaganda benefits from Peron's recent claim of atomic energy successes. Present information does not permit a definite conclusion as to what Argentina has accomplished in the field of atomic research. However, it is unlikely that anything has been accomplished which would enable Argentina to produce atomic weapons or atomic power.

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