

*all
JC*

~~TOP SECRET~~

17 March 1951

[Redacted]

Copy No. *C1-9*

3.5(c)

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

DOCUMENT NO. *37*
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. *X*
IF DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS SC
NEXT REVIEW DATE: *2009*
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: *12-15-79* REVIEWER [Redacted]

3.5(c)

[Redacted]

3.5(c)

Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

[Redacted]

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

SUMMARY

USSR

[Redacted]

3.3(h)(2)

NEAR EAST

[Redacted]

3.3(h)(2)

EASTERN EUROPE

3. Speed-up in Sovietization of Poland indicated (page 4).

[Redacted]

3.5(c)


[Redacted]

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)


USSR



~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

3.3(h)(2)

NEAR EAST



~~TOP SECRET~~


3.3(h)(2)

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)



3.3(h)(2)

EASTERN EUROPE

3. Speed-up in Sovietization of Poland indicated:

~~POCH~~
USSR



In the opinion of the Turkish Ambassador in Warsaw, the replacement of Viktor Lebedev as Soviet Ambassador

3.3(h)(2)

to Poland by Arkadi Sobolev may be attributed to the former's "failure to establish Communism with the speed and completeness required by the authorities in Moscow." He also noted that "the conviction prevails in diplomatic circles that pressure on Poland will be increased."

Comment: Lebedev had been accredited to the Polish Government since its days of exile in London and, therefore, may have been recalled as part of a normal rotation policy. However, assumption of a firmer control over Polish affairs by the USSR has been indicated by recent reports of the appointment of Soviet officers to command the Polish navy and air force.

~~TOP SECRET~~



3.5(c)