

~~TOP SECRET~~

*g/c*

24 April 1951

[Redacted]

3.5(c)

Copy No. *01-9*

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

DOCUMENT NO. 6  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.   
[ ] DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2005  
AUTH: HR 70-2  
DATE: 12-15-71 REVIEWER: [Redacted]

3.5(c)

[Redacted]

3.5(c)

Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

[Redacted]

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

**SUMMARY**

**FAR EAST**



3.3(h)(2)

- 3. De Lattre fears teamwork of Chinese and Vietnamese Communists (page 4).
- 4. De Lattre outlines Tonkin delta operations (page 4).

**NEAR EAST**

- 5. Government plans to curb Soviet activity in Pakistan (page 5).


**WESTERN EUROPE**

- 6. German Social Democrat leader urges stronger government stand against anti-remilitarization "plebiscite" (page 5).



3.3(h)(2)

FAR EAST



3.3(h)(2)



~~TOP SECRET~~3. De Lattre fears teamwork of Chinese and Vietnamese Communists:

General de Lattre has stated his conviction that the entry into northwest Tonkin of a Chinese Communist battalion was the result of a request from, or perhaps a bargain with, Ho Chi Minh

3.3(h)(2)

to support Viet Minh pressure on the French post at Laichau and thus divert French troops from the delta or, failing that objective, to assist the Viet Minh in establishing themselves in the Laichau region. In de Lattre's opinion, his quick airlift to Laichau forced both the Viet Minh and Chinese forces back and he expressed the belief that the latter have now retired across the border. De Lattre sees no indication of an early invasion in force from China, but he is concerned over the fact that Ho was able to obtain the support of Chinese Communist troops.

4. De Lattre outlines Tonkin delta operations:

General de Lattre states that 10,000 Franco-Vietnamese troops have just successfully completed extensive clearing operations in the guerrilla-infested lowlands southwest of Haiphong

3.3(h)(2)

within the French defense perimeter. This "viper's nest" was the base for launching attacks within the perimeter coinciding with attacks from outside.

Comment: De Lattre's use of a full mobile division in this operation, following shortly upon an easing of enemy pressure to the north, illustrates his determination to move to the offensive whenever and wherever possible. It is unlikely that Ho Chi Minh's forces, which have established numerous "fortified villages" within the French perimeter, have been completely cleared out.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

## NEAR EAST

5. Government plans to curb Soviet activity in Pakistan:


On 22 March, Mohammad Ikramullah, Secretary of the Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs, informed the US Ambassador in Karachi that his government was investigating all aspects of

3.3(h)(2)

Soviet activity in Pakistan, especially propaganda. Upon completion of the investigation, Ikramullah expects to have the permission of the cabinet to tell the Soviet Ambassador that Pakistan will permit only such Soviet activity in Pakistan as is allowed Pakistanis in the USSR. The government then plans to close bookstalls and propaganda distributing agencies employed by the Soviets and to cancel all their mailing lists.

Comment: The Government of Pakistan, which has been slow to recognize the dangers of Communism in an Islamic country, now appears to be fully aware of them. It may be that Communist implication in the recent military plot to overthrow the government has sharpened the government's interest in the subject. It is believed, however, that any anti-Soviet moves made by the Pakistanis in the near future will be more cautious and less sweeping than Ikramullah suggests.

## WESTERN EUROPE

6. German Social Democrat leader urges stronger government stand against anti-remilitarization "plebiscite":

Herbert Wehner, Social Democratic Party (SPD) chairman of the Bundestag All-German Affairs Committee, in an April 20 meeting, severely criticized the Adenauer government's failure to

3.3(h)(2)

take prompt and effective measures to suppress the new anti-remilitarization "plebiscite" sponsored by the East German Communists. He described the West German counter-propaganda moves as "half-measures." Wehner urged that the government issue a clear statement at once declaring the plebiscite illegal, and request the Laender Interior Ministries to take

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

police measures to suppress it.

Comment: Leaders of the Social Democratic Party are becoming alarmed at Communist success in influencing SPD members to support the plebiscite. They are now disturbed at the unexpected effect, favorable to the Communists, of SPD opposition to Adenauer's remilitarization program.

-6-

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)