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**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN**

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**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

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SUMMARY

FAR EAST

1. Chinese Nationalists lack capability for mainland invasion (page 3).
2. Communist prisoners taken recently in Korea expect heavy support for coming offensive (page 3).

NEAR EAST

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3.3(h)(2)

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FAR EAST

1. Chinese Nationalists lack capability for mainland invasion:



In conversation with US UN delegate Gross, T. F. Tsiang, head of the Chinese UN delegation, who has just returned from Taiwan, stated that responsible leaders on Taiwan do not feel that the Chinese Nationalists have the capacity for a successful invasion of the China mainland at this time. Tsiang added that of the 600,000 ground forces now on the island approximately 300,000 could be considered as "combat effectives."

3.3(h)(2)

Comment: In February, General Sun Li-jen, Commanding General of the Nationalist ground forces, asserted that in addition to logistic support, diversionary actions would have to be undertaken elsewhere in China by military forces other than Chinese to insure success of a Nationalist mainland attack, and that operations then in progress in Korea and Indochina were not sufficient for this purpose.

2. Communist prisoners taken recently in Korea expect heavy support for coming offensive:




North Korean and Chinese Communist prisoners taken since late February have reported over-hearing or being told that a great quantity of air, armor, and artillery support was being assembled in Manchuria to be sent into Korea to support a coming major offensive. Estimates varied from 4,000 aircraft and 3,000 tanks to a vague reference to a "large number of tanks, artillery and 400 aircraft to be received in time for the 'May offensive.'" CINCFE evaluates these prisoner of war reports on increased Soviet supply of materiel and plans for stronger air and armored support as "probably true."

Korea  
China

3.3(h)(2)

Comment: The large number of reports received, not only from Korea but also from sources within China, concerning the expected scale of Soviet materiel support for Communist



troops in Korea lends added credence to the probability that any future offensive would be supported by additional heavy equipment, probably manned by Chinese Communists or North Koreans.

NEAR EAST

3.3(h)(2)