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SECURITY INFORMATION

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
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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SUMMARY

USSR



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
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
USSR



FAR EAST

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2. Communist night air activity further restricts UN over northwestern Korea:



While Communist night interceptor aircraft have been encountered in limited numbers over North Korea since December 1950, until recently no UN aircraft was known to have been damaged in such meetings. On the night of 16 November a UN light bomber, flying at 6,000 feet near the Chongchbn river, was caught in a light cone from 15 searchlights and was immediately attacked by two conventional fighters which inflicted "major damage."

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The Far East Command observes that the "skilled manner in which the pilots combined attacks with the use of radar-directed searchlights indicates a high degree of proficiency."

Anticipating an increase in both the number and effectiveness of enemy night interceptions, FECOM believes that the enemy's capability to restrict UN night operations has considerably improved and may be expected to be a limiting factor on future UN night air activity north of the Chongchon river.

Comment: If the Communists fully attain the capability to deny the air over northwestern Korea to UN night bombers, it will permit the nearly unmolested completion of their program of basing jet and conventional aircraft on airfields within Korea. 3.3(h)(2)



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3. Dutch-Indonesian relations at impasse over West New Guinea question:



The Dutch Foreign Minister, discussing with US representatives in Paris the current impasse between the Netherlands and Indonesia over West New Guinea sovereignty, requested US support in the event Indonesia unilaterally abrogates the Netherlands-Indonesian Union and probably other agreements negotiated by the two countries in 1949. He emphasized that transfer of New Guinea from the Netherlands to Indonesia at present is a political impossibility.

Meanwhile, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, also in Paris, has proposed a de jure transfer of sovereignty over the area with a guarantee of national treatment to Dutch subjects and the extension of certain privileges to the Netherlands for a period of twenty-five years. No Dutch comment on his proposal has been received. The Indonesian Foreign Minister doubted that his government would be willing to accept a Dutch proposal to negotiate a bilateral treaty to replace the 1949 agreements and then allow some time to lapse before considering the New Guinea question.

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Comment: The Dutch and Indonesian attitudes on New Guinea are forcing both governments into relatively uncompromising positions. Continued intransigence from both governments could lead to a break in Dutch-Indonesian relations. The Dutch, who have continually sought postponement of action on Dutch-Indonesian issues until after the 1952 parliamentary elections, are not expected to give way to Indonesian demands.

The question is further complicated by the attitude of Australia, which has always opposed the transfer of West New Guinea sovereignty to Indonesia.

SOUTH ASIA

4. India reportedly can win a plebiscite in Kashmir:

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The US Embassy and the other diplomatic missions in India now believe that India can win a UN-sponsored plebiscite in Kashmir. The Embassy reports that Premier Sheikh Abdullah's land and tax reforms are responsible for his growing strength in the state.

Comment: This opinion is contradictory to the belief held by competent observers as recently as last summer. Abdullah's ruthless suppression of political opposition and UN delay in settling the Kashmir case have probably helped to develop a feeling on the part of Kashmiris that it is futile to combat increasing Indian control.

NEAR EAST

5. Comment on the Iranian Prime Minister's visit in Egypt:

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It is unlikely that the present visit of Prime Minister Mossadeq to Egypt will produce any tangible results, despite press predictions of the formation of a new Moslem bloc. Mossadeq

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[redacted] said merely that the visit was being made because of "Iran's ties with the Moslem countries and also our policy of cooperation."

Nevertheless, the Egyptian visit will permit Mossadeq to bring back to Iran strong expressions of Egyptian sympathy and support. Such assurances may have some political value to Mossadeq in Tehran when he returns almost empty-handed to a critical Parliament.

Egypt, which is having difficulty in solidifying Arab opposition to the Middle East Command, has assiduously been seeking Moslem and Asiatic approval for its position. It accordingly will welcome any support the Iranian Premier might be able to offer during his stopover in Egypt.

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6. Egypt exerting strong pressure on Arab UN delegates:

[redacted] Egypt is exerting "tremendous pressure" to persuade the Arab delegations to the UN General Assembly to issue a joint statement this week, endorsing Egypt's abrogation of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and its subsequent rejection of the Middle East Command proposals. The Lebanese Minister to the United States, Charles Malik, in transmitting the information, warned that the US should not be deluded by the efforts of the Iraqi Prime Minister to compose the current situation, since Iraqi public opinion would force him to yield to Egyptian demands.

The Lebanese Minister expressed his belief that King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia holds the key to the present situation. He accordingly urged that the US request Ibn Saud's assistance in countering the demands of the Egyptian Foreign Minister that all the Arab states publicly support Egypt's position. According to Malik, the Lebanese Foreign Minister is so violently opposed to the Egyptian tactics that he is ready to resign.

Comment: While Ibn Saud is probably the only figure in the Arab world who might exert some influence on Egyptian policy, there is little evidence to indicate that the aging Saudi Arabian monarch wishes to become embroiled in a dispute with his Egyptian friends.

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The dilemma facing those Arab leaders who are interested in the Western defense proposals and who feel very strongly about the Egyptian maneuvers is that Arab public opinion generally supports Egypt's nationalistic demands.

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**EASTERN EUROPE**

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8. Yugoslav officials object to Western press criticism:

According to the US Embassy in Belgrade recent news dispatches playing up peasant resistance and economic difficulties within Yugoslavia have caused a serious rift between Yugoslav authorities and Western press representatives. Yugoslav officials have objected to these news stories on grounds that they not only provide Cominform propaganda but, more

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
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importantly, jeopardize Yugoslavia's standing with parliaments and peoples of Western countries.

Comment: Recent speeches by Tito and other Yugoslav officials have shown an increasing sensitivity to Western criticism of the regime and its policies. Yugoslav leaders are no doubt fearful of the effects that an unfriendly Western press may have on the Western military and economic aid programs.

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