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## FAR EAST

1. Communist ground forces expected to remain on defensive in Korea: 3.3(h)(2)

The Far East Command, in a detailed analysis of the enemy's military intentions, foresees that the Communists will continue to defend their present ground positions. It is probable, however, that local counter-attacks to restore positions lost to the UN and limited "spoiling" attacks to disrupt UN offensive preparations will continue.

There continue to be, according to FECOM, no indications that the Communists will utilize in the immediate future the still considerable offensive potential they retain in western Korea.

Comment: There are indications that the overall enemy ground offensive potential in Korea has somewhat deteriorated in the past several weeks due to logistic difficulties and to a shortage of immediately available reserves in forward areas.

3.3(h)(2)

2.



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3. Progress of the Vietnamese Army disappointing:

The US Legation in Saigon is concerned over the lack of real progress in the creation of a Vietnamese army. The administration of mobilization has demonstrated grave defects in the


Huu government and the population is unenthusiastic about fighting under the leadership of Bao Dai, Huu and De Lattre.

Comment: As long as Premier Huu retains the Defense portfolio -- he also heads four other ministries -- efficient and vigorous development of a Vietnamese army will be precluded. His unfitness for the job is widely recognized.

Although the Vietnamese population is considerably more aware now than a year ago of the Communist threat to their country, the people are generally reluctant to fight for a government which is believed controlled by the French and in an army suspected of being an appendage of the French army.

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## NEAR EAST - AFRICA



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
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
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
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5. Egyptian Government concerned over internal situation:



The Egyptian Government fears that its troops and police are numerically insufficient to prevent the spread of rioting and discontent into the provinces, a reliable source reveals. The government is reportedly concerned in particular with the growth in power of the Moslem Brotherhood, and it is accordingly doing everything possible to restrict the rising influence of this fanatic, nationalist group.

Comment: The frequency of incidents in Egypt poses a definite threat to the present government in Cairo. This factor has probably been responsible for the existence of a large number of rumors pointing to the formation of a new Egyptian Cabinet. As long as the Anglo-Egyptian dispute remains a burning political issue, there is good reason to doubt whether any other government would better maintain public order than the present one, which is directed by Egypt's major political party. 3.3(h)(2)



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7. Comment on deferment of Moroccan debate in UN General Assembly:

North African nationalists probably will make strong verbal protests against the UN General Committee's postponement of debate on Arab charges that France is violating human rights in Morocco. The Communist press also will exploit US support for French "repressive" measures as another example of US "imperialism" in Africa. Demonstrations and disorders are probable, but sufficient French troops are in the area to control the situation.

This postponement is a major political and diplomatic victory for France as well as for Western solidarity. French-US relations throughout North Africa, but most particularly in Morocco, can now be expected to improve. The US, however, will lose favor with the Moroccan Sultan and the nationalists, although neither will turn to the USSR for assistance.

The Arab states have indicated their intention to bring up the matter again when the Committee presents its proposed agenda for the approval of the General Assembly as a whole. Most Moroccan nationalist leaders, however, may be privately glad that the question is postponed because they have been apprehensive that the case was jeopardized by hasty preparation of the brief.

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
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
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**WESTERN EUROPE**

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**10. Western promise of ultimate NATO membership may satisfy Germany:**



High Commissioner McCloy declares it is clear that while Chancellor Adenauer is not demanding German membership in NATO now,

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he nevertheless will not accept any arrangement which ultimately will discriminate against Germany. McCloy believes that Adenauer would accept an arrangement whereby the Western Allies would give their assurances that at some "appropriate time" not too far distant they would see that Germany had the same relationship with NATO as other participants in the European Defense Community. As Adenauer would have to use such a promise in his dealings with German parliamentary leaders, it could not be kept secret.

Comment: It has been apparent for some weeks that the problem of Germany's relationship to NATO was worrying Adenauer. Although the matter is not an urgent one at the moment, the Chancellor will certainly require satisfactory answers when the European army plan comes before the Bundestag, where the prevailing view is that Germany must receive equal treatment.

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
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